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A discussion of America's need to build the thermonuclear bomb back in the 1950's to maintain its nuclear advantage and keep the Soviet Union under check.
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Kyle Monsma
1 April 2007
American Studies
Mr. Puchalla
Why America Made the H-Bomb
In the summer of 1945, the world was forever changed. The annihilation of two cities
and the surrender of Japan showed the potency of atomic weapons in war. The atomic age was
ushered in as one of great technological development and much fear. With the end of WWII, a
new conflict arose between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. Most Americans saw the Soviet
Union as aggressors leaving its massive army in Eastern Europe. This conflict between two
super powers developed into the Cold War. The Soviet threat became real to Americans in the
September of 1949 when the Soviet Union detonated its own nuclear weapon. A technological
race between the Soviet Union and U.S.A. began. To exert dominance, the U.S. developed the
thermonuclear bomb. The thermonuclear bomb, also known as the Hydrogen bomb, works by
setting off a fission based nuclear reaction which heats up deuterium and tritium (hydrogen
isotopes) to point in which the isotopes began to fuse. The fusing of the two isotopes puts out an
immense amount of energy in the form of electromagnetic radiation, which will incinerate
anything in a large radius. This H-bomb has a devastating power that has to be measured in
megatons (millions of tons of TNT). The development of the thermonuclear bomb was a
necessity to help Americans, in general, feel safe from the communist threat by allowing the U.S.
to maintain nuclear superiority and to provide deterrence from a direct Soviet attack.
After WWII, many Americans had differing views on the atomic bomb, and its many
uses along with how to deal with the Soviet Union. The Truman administration in charge of
developing and forming policies at the time came to shape American policies that would last for
the next 10 to 20 years. The policies formed were the response to a changing world theater and
Soviet aggression, which many Americans feared. Before 1949, the Truman policies were
based on assumptions about the U.S.S.R., which were expressed in the “Mr. X” article written by
George Kennan. George Kennan worked as a formal diplomat between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union and wrote of “[t]he political personality of Soviet Union” (Kennan, 36). He warns U.S.
government officials “that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability,”
and instead they will have “a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening
of all rival influence and rival power” (Kennan, 47-48). The Truman administration, knowing
of the Soviet hopes in the eventual demise of capitalism, decided to take an even stronger
containment stance. This new stance would be on a global scale using improved economic,
political, and military power as tools. The U.S. as the sole nuclear power implemented the
nuclear bomb to strengthen its political and military might for containment. Many Americans
showed their support for this position in the summer 1949, when 70% of Americans in a Gallup
poll opposed any pledge by the U.S. to not be the first using an atomic weapon in war (Boyer,
86). Military officials also agreed with the use of the atomic bomb for containment; George C.
Kenney in the Strategic Air Command discussed openly the Pentagon’s plan of a gigantic
nuclear strike involving 133 A-bombs against Russia in the event of a war. In addition, the
atomic bomb became an important ingredient in America’s defense posture against the new
foreign threat. Continued research and development of the fission bomb was also continued, but
the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons soon came to an end.
Americans were struck with fear when Truman announced the U.S. had picked up
“evidence that […] an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.” (Truman). In September of
1949, the Soviet’s successfully built and tested their own nuclear bomb; the U.S.A. had lost its
monopoly. The atomic bomb could no longer be used as easily as an offensive weapon from
strategic bombers nor as a defensive posture against Soviet invasion. The American government
was shocked how the under developed Soviet Union was able to develop its own nuclear bomb
so quickly. The Truman administration, military leaders, and the American public had to
rethink. Truman commanded that a top-secret review be carried out on U.S. policies and tactics.
The result was the NCS-68 documents, which had a greater effect on future government policies
than the “Mr. X” document (the NCS-68 documents were however influenced by the “Mr. X”
documents). The NCS-68 documents and the Joint Intelligence Committee predicted the
buildup of the Soviet atomic arsenal and the possibility of attack from the Soviet Union once it
had sufficient capabilities. It was calculated that Communist nations as a whole would beat
Americans in “conventional, or nonatomic, warfare” and reach “an approximate stalemate in
nuclear weapons […] by about 1954” with the USA (NCS-68, 75). However, the document also
indicated “[t]he United States might extend its advantage for a few years longer if the hydrogen
bomb should be perfected” (NCS-68, 75). Americans, after calming down from fear of attack,
changed the goal of US monopoly on atomic weapons to that of U.S. superiority. The U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff requested a full out attempt to build the H-bomb. Additionally, Truman had all
ready made known his strong support for “research on all nuclear technology including
thermonuclear technology” on January 31, 1950 (“Timeline of Nuclear Age”, 1950). Because of
the Soviet’s development of their own atomic bomb, the research and development of the H-
bomb received a new incentive in the U.S.A., and the program was set in motion.
The construction of the world’s first thermonuclear bomb experienced many obstacles.
Before the Soviet detonation of the bomb many opposed the development of the H-bomb, even
top U.S. Air Force generals questioned how it would be ethical to use a bomb that could
obliterate an entire city with potentially 1,000 times the power, if not more, of current atomic
bombs. After the Soviet test, this obviously changed; a Gallup poll in February of 1950 showed
69% of Americans favored building the H-bomb and 9% gave “reluctant approval” (Boyer 89).
Despite the need for the bomb at the time and strong public support for the program, there were
many Americans, 19% in the same Gallup poll, who disagreed with the development of the H-
bomb (Boyer 89). Scientists also had varying views on the issue. Scientists such as J. Robert
Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and I.I. Rabi all opposed making the hydrogen bomb, because the
weapon had no limit on its explosive capability. They believed that no government should have
the limitless power of the H-bomb due to the “adaption to war like aims and activities
[corrupting] the mentality of men” (Einstein). On the other hand, Scientists led by Edward
Teller (including Ernest Lawrence and Luis Alvarez), supported the development of the H-bomb,
because they believed it was inevitable that the U.S.S.R. would eventually attempt to surpass the
U.S.A. by making a Soviet H-bomb.
With the enactment of NCS-68 document as the new basis of U.S. policies and tactics
funding to the National Security Council increased a full 350%. Funding for the development of
the H-bomb soon flooded money into Los Alamos again, and the program began under the
guidance of Edward Teller. After scientists had discussed, researched, and went through many
design changes, the program had constructed a massive thermonuclear device which stood two
stories high and was code named “Mike” (and was technically not a bomb, because it was too
large to be carried by a plane). On October 31, 1952, the US detonated the first thermonuclear
device. With a power of 10.4 megatons, the device set off a massive explosion 500 times that of
the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. The mushroom cloud formed from the bomb was massive. The
cloud was 100,000 feet high and clearly visible from a distance of over fifty miles! The
American program was a success. Americans now had a little comfort from a nuclear attack
despite communist aggression and the ongoing Korean War.
The outbreak of the Korean War put the topic of the use of atomic weapons in war under
hot debate in America. The continual frustrations and costliness of the Korean War lead
American approval for using the atomic bomb in Korea on military targets from a minority of
28% on August 1950 to majority of 51% on September 1951 Gallup polls (Boyer 92). Although
many military generals such as McCarthy and other Americans wanted to use the A-bomb, it was
never used, because of the political complications which would have arisen. While a majority
Americans approved the use of the nuclear bomb in war, using it first contradicted the victory
culture of the U.S.A. at the time. The victory culture believed fighting should be done only after
being attacked, such as in Pearl Harbor. Also the hesitation was due to how many politicians and
diplomats supposed the America’s allies and the rest of the world may react to such an event.
Eventually the Korean War came to an end in July 27, 1953, without the use of nuclear weapons.
The death of Stalin came soon after in March helped relax the high political tensions. A few
months later, America found itself with a new problem.
On August 12, 1953, the Soviets tested their own thermonuclear bomb. Americans were
initially struck with fear, but it was soon realized that this nuclear bomb was crudely built. The
bomb developed by the Soviet scientists was not a true H-bomb and used a layer cake design
with alternating layers of plutonium and deuterium to produce an explosive yield of 400 kilotons.
The power of the Soviet’s nuke was only a small fraction of the massive power of the “Mike”
test which yielded 10.4 megatons. America still remained the superior nuclear power. However,
the Soviet bomb had an advantage; it was a usable bomb. In 1953, the Dooms Day Clock was
set only two minutes till midnight showing some were pessimistic about the future. New policies
on specifics uses of the new super bomb and atomic bombs had to be reformed yet again to adapt
to the new political environment of the thermonuclear age.
On January 12, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles brought into the U.S. politics
a new policy of massive retaliation. The tactic would attempt to prevent the Kremlin from ever
considering any attack on the U.S., because the fear of a gigantic American retaliation. One
article in the New York Times went to state that “[t]he old doctrine that ‘offense is the best
defense’ has become more pertinent in the age of the airplane and the atomic weapon” (Baldwin
68). This was reinforced by the U.S. detonation of the usable H-bomb, Bravo, with an enormous
power of 14.8 megatons (which was actually expected to only have a yield of 4 to 8 megatons).
If Soviets dared to strike the U.S. in any way, the response could be the complete destruction and
annihilation of the Communist world. The idea of deterrence and retaliation appeared to develop
many paradoxes; escalation of nuclear weaponry caused an attack to be less likely. The policy of
massive retaliation attempted to conventional wars by deferring future Koreas, but the strategy
was not the best way to deal with minor day to day issues. The policy was based on the
invulnerability of the U.S. homeland and that Soviet leadership would take serious the threat of
total destruction. Eventually after the Soviet development of a real H-bomb in 1955 and the
Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. vulnerability was realized. In the 1960s, M.A.D. (mutual assured
destruction) tactics were adopted, and the purpose of nuclear weapons made more flexible.
Submarines equipped with ballistic nuclear missiles provided the only deterrence from nuclear
strike, by keeping Russia vulnerable even after a successful attack against the U.S. and all its
military instillations. The overall idea of M.A.D. was that the invulnerability of both nations
would keep either nation from attacking the other. The possession of the thermonuclear
warheads made it possible to assure this destruction was possible and deterred the U.S.S.R. from
launching a nuclear strike against the U.S.A.
U.S. policies have gone through many changes from WWII into the Cold War, and
thermonuclear weapons have played a key part in these changes. Although these weapons
brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust, the H-bomb allowed a period of cold peace
between the United States and the Soviet Union. These weapons of mass destruction were part
of an escalation in Cold War, which also lead to great technological leaps that benefited the
U.S.A. Perhaps, some of the greatest paradoxes come from the building and the improvement of
the thermonuclear bomb. Devastating weapons of unspeakable power actually prevented a
massive WWIII of East against West from happening. From the decision to build all the way up
to M.A.D. tactics, the American H-bomb (or warhead) has provided many Americans over time a
comfort from communist aggression, and later protection from nuclear attack.
Kyle Monsma
26 October 2006
American Studies
Mr. Puchalla
Works Citied
Baldwin, Hanson W. "Is Ther a Defense Against the H-Bomb?" New York Times 18 Oct. 1953,
sec. SM: 7+. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. King County, Mercer Island. 20 Apr. 2007.
Keyword: H-Bomb. The newspaper article written was written in 1953, to discuss possible
defenses the U.S. could employ against the H-bomb. The article was used for a quote and
to gather insight on how the U.S. thought it could defend itself through deterrence. The
article is a primary source written in 1953 and published by the New York Times; the
author, Baldwin was at the time military editor of The Times.
Boyer, Paul. "American Attitudes Toward the Bomb During the Early Cold War Years." The
Cold War. Ed. Derek C. Maus. San Diego: Greenhaven P, 2003. 83-93. The article is
written about changing view in the American public over the A-bomb and H-bomb after
WW II up to the early stages of the Korean War. This section provided me with statistics
and specific examples of the American public’s views. Boyer is a history professor at the
University of Wisconsin, and has written two books about atomic bomb and Cold War
culture.
Einstien, Albert. "The Menace of Mass Destruction." Second Annual Dinner of the Foreign Press
Association. New York. 11 Nov. 1947. The speech was given by Albert Einstein in front
of the Security Council and General Assembly of the U.N. on how we should treat
nuclear weapons as an epidemic. The speech provides an idea on why some scientists did
not support the H-bomb nor the continued use of the A-bomb.
Engelhardt, Tom. "To Use or Not Use: Implications of Nuclear Weapons." The Cold War. Ed.
Derek C. Maus. San Diego: Greenhaven P, 2003. 133-38. The article discusses the
situation and events which made it impossible for politicians to decide to use the atomic
bomb in North Korea. The articles provides information on the victory culture of the
1950s, and the massive power of the U.S.’s nuclear arsenal compared to Russian’s
arsenal. The author, Tom Engelhardt is a historian and consulting editor for
Henry/Metropolitan Books.
Kennan, George F. "George F. Kennan ("Mr. X"): the Sources of Soviet Conduct (July 1947)."
America in the Cold War. Ed. Walter Lafeber. New York: Wiley, 1969. 35-48. The “Mr.
X” documents made public the assumptions made by the Truman administration about
the Soviet Union and provided arguments to advance the idea of containment of
communism. The document was used as an insight on strategies and policies of the
Truman administration. It was formed prior to September of 1949. The document is an
exact copy and is a primary source from 1947.
Lafeber, Walter, ed. "NSC-68: How to Prepare for an Indefinite Period of Tension and Danger
(April, 1950)." America in the Cold War. New York: Wiley, 1969. 74-77. The
paraphrased NSC-68 documents were written in 1950; they discuss the U.S. policies and
military tactics in dealing with the Soviet Union and new alternatives to these tactics now
that the U.S.S.R. had made its own atomic bomb. The documents were used to see the
old U.S. tactics prior to 1949 with the A-bomb and what officials in the National Security
Council believed were the only alternatives in dealing with Soviet Union. The source is a
primary source written by the National Security Council in 1950. It was paraphrased and
then released, because parts of the document remain classified.
Johnson, Kathleen. "H-Bomb Development Summary." The Cold War Museum. 4 Mar. 2007
<http://www.coldwar.org/articles/40s/h_bomb.html>. This website page gives a brief
over view of the history of the decision to build H-bomb. It allowed me to get a quick
idea of events that influenced the decision to build the H-bomb. Kathleen Johnson wrote
the information with full access to the Cold War Museum information and other
recourses.
"Postwar to H-Bomb." Los Alamos National Labratory History. Los Alamos National Labratory.
3 Mar. 2007 <http://www.lanl.gov/history/postwar/index.shtml>. The website page gives
a short paragraph on the first H-bomb test. It provided me with the size of the first
thermonuclear test. The article is written for the Los Alamos National Laboratory as a
historical view of their own facility.
Resch, John, Ed. Americans at War. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. 1196 pp. 4 vols.
Gale Virtual Reference Library. Thomson Gale. King County Library System. 16 Mar.
2007 <http://find.galegroup.com/gvrl/infomark.do?&contentSet=
EBKS&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=GVRL&docId=CX3427399999&source=g
ale&userGroupName=kcls_web&version=1.0>. The article writes about specific events
and Soviet to U.S. relations which played a major role in the escalation of nuclear
weapons to the H-bomb. The article was used to help piece together different documents,
decisions, and meetings taken place between 1946 and 1952. The article was provided by
the Gale Virtual Reference Library, which contains a reliable source of historical articles.
Rossenfeld, Carrie. "Cold War: a Brief History." Atomic Archives. National Science Digital
Library. 4 Mar. 2007 <http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/>. The website
has a section about the history of the Cold War and briefly provides information on the
topics. The page on the H-bomb provides a good overview about the split amongst
scientist to build the H-bomb, and the eventual go ahead from the government to carry
out the program. The atomic archives website is a member of the Nuclear Pathways
project, funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation's National Science
Digital Library in effort to make information on historical and present nuclear issues
more available to the public.
"Timeline of Nuclear Age." Nuclear Files. National Science Digital Library. 3 Mar. 2007
<http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/html_index.htm>. The website provides
good first hand articles on the Nuclear Age and has a nice timeline of events which goes
from the 1940s to the present. The timeline helped me to piece together when some
events occurred in relation to each other. Nuclear Files is also a member of the Nuclear
Pathways project, funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation's National
Science Digital Library in effort to make information on historical and present nuclear
issues more available to the public.
Truman, Harry S. Address. Washington D.C. 23 Sept. 1949. This address is the speech given to
the American public announcing the Soviet detonation of the bomb. The speech gives a
firsthand account on how Truman approached the atomic bomb detonated by Soviet
Union and told the American public. The address is a primary source and the exact
words of Truman on September 23, 1949.
Weisgall, Jonathan M. "The Beginings of "Nuclear Diplomacy"" The Cold War. Ed. Derek C.
Maus. San Diego: Greenhaven P, 2003. 73-82. The article is written about the chaotic
years after WWII that lead to the atomic bomb tests of July 1946 as an indirect warning
to Soviets about continued expansion. The article gave a good idea of views on potential
uses of the A-bomb and break down of U.S. to Soviet relations. The article was written
by Jonathan M. Weisgall, an attorney who represented the inhabitants of the Bikini Atoll
where the atomic bomb test of July 1946 took place.