Why People Do NOT Believe Our Best Radiation Risk Estimatesradiationcounseling.org/docs/WhyBeleive.pdf · 2018-06-22 · Why People Do NOT Believe Our Best Radiation Risk Estimates

Why People Do NOT Believe Our Best Radiation Risk Estimates

A Presentation for the

Health Physics Society

Professional Development School on

Estimation of Radiological Risks

Purdue University, Lafayette IN

Friday, July 10, 2015

by

Ray Johnson, MS, PSE, PE, FHPS, CHP Director

Radiation Safety Counseling Institute 16440 Emory Lane

Rockville, MD 20853

[email protected] 301-370-8573


HPS, Professional Development School, “Estimation of Radiological Risks”

Purdue University, Lafayette, IN, July 10, 2015

Ray Johnson, MS, PSE, PE, FHPS, CHJP Radiation Safety Counseling Institute

Rockville, MD [email protected]

Despite great care in developing our best radiation risk estimates, until these estimates are interpreted, they have no meaning, they are just numbers. After interpretation, the numbers mean whatever the interpreter believes. Thus, the interpretation or meaning of radiation risks can be highly subjective and variable. Specialists in radiation safety may find some common agreements on the meaning of radiation risk estimates because of similar understanding of the technology and basis for such estimates. Unfortunately, most of the world does not have that background and understanding and may interpret radiation risks very differently. Perhaps the primary basis for differences in understanding risk estimates is fear. Our minds are programmed for survival to be constantly alert to any evidence of risks. The media has done a good job over the past 70 years to instill fears of “Deadly Radiation” in virtually everyone. As soon as the word “radiation” comes up, fears follow automatically in the in the same way that people are instinctively afraid of snakes, heights, and immersion. People often equate radiation with cancer and death. They equate “risk” with “chance” and they are not willing to take a chance on getting cancer. Lacking a technical understanding of risk probabilities, when asked to evaluate a risk estimate, they may substitute a different question, such as, “How do I feel about getting cancer?” This is a question they can readily answer without any knowledge of radiation science or statistics. This approach eliminates any concerns for uncertainty or probabilities. Everyone knows of someone who has had cancer and they are aware of the awful consequences. The prospects of radiation causing cancer become an overwhelming influence on interpretation of risk estimates and decisions for radiation safety. Our natural human instincts for safety are not well suited to situations involving randomness or uncertainty. Thus, while people may not be certain about the risks of radiation effects, they are certain that they do not want to become a victim of cancer. Research has shown that, when chance is involved, peoples’ thought processes are often seriously flawed. When either information or understanding are lacking this invites competing interpretations. For many people there are no gradations, such a low risk or high risk. Rather there is “zero” risk or the outcome is a sure thing. Unfortunately, misunderstanding of risk estimates may have very negative consequences. This paper will look at how we evaluate risk and the processes that lead us to make poor decisions for radiation safety.

Raymond H. Johnson, MS, PSE, PE, FHPS, CHP Director, Radiation Safety Counseling Institute 301-370-8573 BS - Civil Engineering, University of Vermont (1961) MS - Sanitary Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (1963) PSE - Professional Sanitary Engineer Degree, MIT and Harvard University (1963) PE – Licensed Professional Engineer, Vermont (1965 – present) PhD Studies, Radio and Nuclear Chemistry, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (1966–1972) Greater Washington Institute for Transactional Analysis – Counseling (1977–1980) CHP – Certified Health Physicist, American Board of Health Physics (1983–present) Johns Hopkins Fellow, Organizational Systems and Communications (1984–1985) FHPS - Fellow of the Health Physics Society and Past President (2000) Past President, American Academy of Health Physics (2015) Commissioned Stephen Minister – Counselor, United Methodist Church (2003–present)

Experience 2010 – pres. Director, Radiation Safety Counseling Institute. Workshops, training, and counseling for individuals,

companies, universities, or government agencies with concerns or questions about radiation and x-ray safety. Specialist in helping people understand radiation, what is safe, risk communication, worker counseling, psychology of radiation safety, and dealing with fears of radiation and nuclear terrorism for homeland security.

2007 – pres. VP, Training Programs and consultant to Dade Moeller Radiation Safety Academy, training and consulting in x-ray and radiation safety, safety program audits, radiation instruments, and regulatory requirements.

1984 - 2007 Director, Radiation Safety Academy. Providing x-ray and radiation safety training, audits, and consulting to industry (nuclear gauges and x-ray), universities, research facilities, and professional organizations.

1988 - 2006 Manager and Contractor to National Institutes of Health (NIH) for radiation safety audits of 3,500 research laboratories and 2,500 instrument calibrations a year, along with environmental monitoring, hot lab and analytic lab operations, and inspections of three accelerators and over 100 x-ray machines.

1990 - 2005 President of Key Technology, Inc. a manufacturer and primary laboratory for radon analysis with over 1,500,000 measurements since 1985. Primary instructor at Rutgers University for radon, radon measurements, radiation risks, radiation instruments, and radon risk communication courses (1990-1998).

1986 - 1988 Laboratory Director, RSO, Inc. Directed analytical programs and Quality Assurance for samples from NIH, Aberdeen Proving Ground, radiopharmaceutical companies, and the nuclear industry.

1970 - 1985 Chief, Radiation Surveillance Branch, EPA, Office of Radiation Programs. Directed studies of radiation exposures from all sources of radiation in the US, coordinated 7 Federal agencies for nuclear fallout events, QA officer 8 years. Head of US delegations to I.A.E.A and N.E.A. on radioactive waste disposal. ANSI N-13 delegate (1975-1985). Retired as PHS Commissioned Officer (0-6) in 1985 with 29 years of service.

1963 - 1970 U.S.P.H.S. Directed development of radiation monitoring techniques at DOE National Labs, nuclear plants, and shipyards in the US and Chalk River Nuclear Laboratory in Canada.

Health Physics and Professional Activities Health Physics Society (HPS) plenary member 1966; President-elect, President, Past President (1998-2001), Fellow (2000), Treasurer (1995-1998); Secretary (1992-1995); Executive Cmte. (1992-2001), Chair, Finance Cmte. (1996-1998); Head of U.S. delegation to IRPA X (2000). RSO Section Founder and Secretary/Treasurer (1997-2000); Co-founder and President, Radon Section (1995-1996). Co-Chair Local Arrangements Cmte. Annual Meeting in DC (1991); Public Info. Cmte. (1985-1988); Summer School Co-Chair (2004); Chair, President’s Emeritus, Cmte (2006); Chair, Awards Cmte. (2002); Chair, History Cmte. (2005-2012); Historian (2012-Pres.) Continuing Education Cmte. (2005-2012). Academic Dean for HPS Professional Development School on Radiation Risk Communication (2010) and Radiation Instruments School (2014). PEP, CEL and Journal Reviewer. AAHP Instructor; Treasurer, AAHP (2008 – 2011). AAHP President-elect, President, Past President (2012-2015). Baltimore-Washington Chapter: President (1990-1991) and Honorary Life Member; Newsletter Editor (1983-2005); Public Info. Chair (1983-1991), Science Teacher Workshop Leader (1995 – Pres.). New England Chapter HPS, Newsletter Editor, Board of Directors, Education Chair (1968-1972). President, American Association of Radon Scientists and Technologists (1995-1998) and Honorary Life Member, Charter Member; Board of Directors; Newsletter Editor (1990-1993). Founder and first President, National Radon Safety Board (NRSB) (1997-1999). Member of American Industrial Hygiene Association (1997-Pres.) (Secretary, Vice Chair, Chair, Ionizing Radiation Committee, 2009-2012), Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (1997-Pres.), Studied H.P. communication styles and presented Myers-Briggs seminars to over 3500 H.P.s since 1984. Over 35 professional society awards. Licensed Professional Engineer since 1965. Certified Health Physicist since 1983.

Publications Authored over 500 book chapters, articles, professional papers, training manuals, technical reports, and presentations on radiation safety. Author of monthly column, “Insights in Communication” HPS Newsletter 1984 – 1989, 1994 -2001, and 2012- 2013. Contact at: 301-990-6006, [email protected]. 301-370-8573, www.radiationcounseling.org


HPS, PDS, Purdue University, Lafayette, IN July 10, 2015 1

Why People Do NOT Believe Our Best Radiation Risk

Assessments

Ray Johnson, MS, PSE, PE, FHPS, CHPDirector

Radiation Safety Counseling [email protected]

Professional Development School

Radiation Risk AssessmentsHealth Physics Society

Purdue University

Lafayette, IN Friday, July 10, 2015

Outline for this PDS LectureMeaning of radiation risk assessments

Basis for evaluation of radiation risks

Radiation risks and fears

How we process data for assessing risks

How these processes areprone to errors

Effects of random chance

Why people interpret risks differentlyHPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015 2

My OdysseyI am not a specialist in radiation risk

assessment –– 50 years in radiation safety

I am not a specialist in psychology– 3 years of training in 1970s

to practice counseling

35 years of building links betweenpsychology and radiation safety

Trying to understand basis of radiation fears for better communication

HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015 3

Credit for Inspiration

Richard Toohey, Ph.D., CHPPresident-Elect, HPS

“Why No One Believes Us:

Cognitive Neuroscience

and Radiation Risk”


How Believable Are We ?

Do people in general believe our best radiation risk estimates ?

YES ________ NO ________

– WHY ?


Why We May Lack Credibility ?Our risk assessments are too technical ?

Lack of understanding probabilities and uncertainty ?

People have other more credible sources ?

We are generally distrusted as scientists ?

Our estimates do not match up with what people have always heard ?

Why take risks, if not needed ?– Better to be safe from radiation , than sorry ?




Axioms on the Meaning of Radiation Risks ?

1. Radiation risks assessments have no inherent meaning,

they are just numbers,

until they are interpreted

2. The meaning of radiation risk assessments is whatever people believe it to be

Thus, the meaning of risks is highly subjective and variable


Interpretation of Radiation Risks

Specialists in radiation safety may find common agreements on the meaning of radiation risks, because of similar technical understanding

Most of the world does not have that background or understanding and may interpret radiation risks very differently

Believability or different interpretation ?


Have You Been Puzzled By - - ?How people can make such fast decisions for safety with little data or understanding

How they can be so sure of their decisions

How illogical they may seem

How emotions affect safety decisions

How people lack a number sense

Lack of understanding of magnitudes and probabilities

Lack of understanding randomness

9 HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015

Radiation = FearsThe predominant factor in the evaluation

of radiation risks is FEAR

Fears are driven by Imagination of unacceptable consequences of radiation

Many do not care what the best risk estimates may be

They just “know” that radiation is to be avoided - as a reaction to gut fears

Anecdotes – “radiation safety,” oil field HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015 10

Basis of Radiation FearsRelated to how our minds work for

processing information for safety

Studies in neuroscience show -

Its about survivalWe are constantly alert to dangers and

we make decisions accordingly

Our evaluations of radiation risks are prone to many errors


Two Systems for Risk Decisions1. Conscious - Reason and rational analysis of facts

– Favored by technical specialists– May lead to intelligent decisions,

but, very slow and takes effort

– For radiation safety, we often do not have all the facts, time to gather facts,or knowledge to understand them

2. Subconscious - Emotion, instinct, and

gut reactions , very fast,

– Does not need all the facts– Origin of most decisions, especially for safety




Role of Our Conscious Mind < 1%

Slow, deliberate, rational, thinks, reasons, and makes decisions and choices based on sensory input

Source of knowing and awareness

Serves as the captain of our ship, the giver of orders

Analyzes information to make decisions

Can only deal with one thing at a time– Example


Subconscious Mind > 99.999%The seat of our emotions / creativity.Takes orders from the conscious

mind without judgments

A Very Fast, super computerFunctions 24 / 7 operating the

machine we call our body– Regulates our heart, our breathing,

digestion of food, healing of cells, etcHandles thousands of inputs simultaneously

for our health and protectionProgrammed to fear / react instantly to danger


How We Make Risk DecisionsWe process, sort, compare, categorize, and

correlate information, in relation to -– Immediate circumstances “Radiation OMG”– Experiences – what have we heard ?– Life factors, such as health, wealth,

traditions, and lifestyles– Loss aversion – need to be safe

With all these inputs we come up with instant judgments

– Quick judgments are crucial to survivalBased on limited information– May not be best in the long term– Is running away the best answer ?HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015 15

Instant Subconscious Processing

Stimulus

Media Stories

Chernobyl

Fukushima Hiroshima

“Deadly Radiation”

X-rays

Response

Cancer

DeathFamily & Children

Property Damage

Loss Avoidance

“OMG – RUN !”

16

Fears of Radiation are InvoluntaryInstinctive fears of heights, snakes, spiders,

closed spaces, submersion, public speaking Repeated message “Deadly Radiation” for 70 yrs– Transferred to our subconscious mind for

protection as a frame of reference– Radiation is now an instinctive

source of fear– Thus, fear of radiation –

is not a conscious choiceSubconscious reacts automatically to

radiation without consulting the conscious mind

Decision to “RUN” is now automaticHPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015 17

What Does “Risk” Mean ?People often equate radiation with

cancer and death

For many people “risk” means the same as “chance”

Most are NOT willing to take a “chance” on getting cancer from radiation,

if it can be avoided

People generally do not understand risk probabilities




Probabilities and Radiation Risk

Dealing with randomness and probability is normal for health physicists

Radiation is a random phenomenon– All measurements are samples from a random

distribution and are only best estimates

The practice of ALARA is to minimize future random chance of cancer

We use LNT as a model for safety practices

19 HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015 HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015 20

Calculated Risks –

How to Know When Numbers

Deceive You

Gerd Gigerenzer

Simon & Schuster2002

Franklin’s Law

Benjamin Franklin in 1789 wrote:

“Out constitution is in actual operation, everything appears to promise that it will last, but in this

world there is nothing certain but death and taxes.”


From GigerenzerFranklin’s law helps us overcome the

illusion of certainty, But it does not tell us how to deal with risks

Primary conclusion from Gigerenzer - When thinking or talking about

risks, use frequencies rather than probabilities

– People often think in terms of whole numbers, not percentages or fractions.


People Want CertaintyPeople want assurance and certainty

Perceptions provide useful images of our environment, as well as

feelings of comfort and safety

–Although not always correctUncertainty and risk are to be avoided

Even an illusion of certainty is preferable

Remember our minds are wired for survival


Our Minds Create Certainty

Visual perception reflects this process

Necker Cube




Is seeing believing?

Good resolution for only 1 – 2 degreesof arc around retina’s center

We move our eyes to focus more widely

Our two eyes and brain interpolate to fill the gaps

We use our imagination to fill in gaps of nonvisual data.

We draw conclusions based on incomplete data and conclude our picture is clear


Errors of the Conscious MindIs Seeing Believing ?



Which tabletop is bigger ?

Roger Shepard -1990, Turning the Tables Illusion of Certainty

Our perceptual system (subconscious)

analyzes incomplete or ambiguous information and “sells” its best guess to our conscious mind as a definite product

Inferences about depth, orientation, andlength are provided automatically

Thus, even understanding the illusion does not change the perception of our conscious mind


We Look But Do Not Always SeeWe skim – we do not read every letter

We look for patterns and anticipate what is coming

We notice on a need-to-know basis

As something becomes familiar, we tend to notice less , not more, and we come to see things not as they are, but as we assume they ought to be.

We could all benefit from a better understanding of our own limitations


Can You Read This ?

If you can read this with ease,

you have an awesome talent.

This is both backwards and

upside down.




We Anticipate What is ComingWe rely on context to guide our

perception of everyday events

Encountering something out of context, makes recognition a lot harder

We need to know the context in order to process information

– Newspaper headlines

– Subheadings

– Photo captions


Placebo EffectIf the conscious mind is convinced to

expect a positive effect, that message is sent to the subconscious mind, which does not judge, but proceeds to marshal resources to accomplish that expectation

Can be positive or negative

Examples– Retirement

– Death of a spouse

– Fukushima32HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015

Natural FrequenciesOur minds have evolved dealing with

natural frequencies (whole numbers) for assessing risks

Probabilities and percentages are more recent inventions, not always understood

Our minds record frequencies of events, such as spatial and temporal locations of objects with little effort, awareness, or interference

– Again, its about survival


InnumeracyInability to reason appropriately about

numbers, uncertainties, and risk

H.G. Wells (early 1900’s? ) - predicted “Statistical thinking will one day be as necessary for efficient citizenship as the ability to read and write.”

Early 2,000’s a weather man predicted 50% chance of rain on Saturday and 50% on Sunday and concluded there was 100% chance of rain on the weekend


Innumeracy is Connected to -Illusion of certainty– Remember Franklin’s Law

Ignorance of risk– Aware of uncertainties, but not magnitude

Miscommunication of risk– Knows about risks,

but not how to communicate them

Clouded thinking– Knows about risks, but not how to draw

conclusions from them


Interpretation of Probability

Degree of belief – subjective probability

Propensity - depends on properties of an object, such as the physical symmetry of a die. If the design, mechanism, or traits are not known, then there is no probability.

Frequencies – probability based on a large number of observations, defined as relative frequency for a specified reference class




What the World WantsTo deal only with absolutes

People do not want to know about uncertainty and probabilities

Most people just want to know,

“Am I safe or not safe?”They do not want to know about risk

estimates

When presented with a risk of 1 / 10,000– Many will conclude they are the 1


How People Handle Probabilities

38

Not understanding risk probabilities– People substitute an easier question

–“How do I feel about getting cancer?”

The answer to this question does not require any technical understanding

– Eliminates dealing with randomness, probabilities, and uncertainty

HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015

Horrors of CancerEveryone knows of the horrors of cancer

Prospects of cancer become anoverwhelming influence on decisions for radiation safety

While people may not be certain about the risks of radiation

–“They are certain that they do not want to become victims of cancer”


How Hard Do we Expect People to Work ?

How much effort should people put

into understanding radiation risks?How hard should we expect to work to

understand how people make risk

decisions?

What is the incentive to commit this effort ?

Why should people change their views

about radiation ?


Can We Ignore Public Fears of Radiation?

Do irrational fears influence public policy?

Should we protect the public from fear?

How do we justify expenses for reducing imaginary risks?

Isn’t this actually happening all the time?

How many of us are dealing with “real” risks?

How much of what we do is driven by public views (fears) of what is needed for safety?


Patterns and Expectations

The illusion of patterns strongly affects our views on radiation risks

Paducah – Gaseous Diffusion Plant –reports of cancer incidence in many neighborhoods

How many people in Japan who may get cancer among the Fukushima evacuees will likely conclude that the Daiichi incident is the cause ?




Truth andThe Illusion of Knowing

We create good stories to explain the world around us and then we believe our stories

It is easier to construct a good story when we know little and have fewer pieces to the puzzle

– This might explain why some people are so convinced of the hazards of radiation

Stories confirm what we have always believed and what we have always known

What do we really know for sure ?


David Ropeik

Bounded rationality

How people make decisions,

When –

1) Limited data

2) No time to get data

3) No understanding of data


Daniel Kahneman

Ferrar, Straus, and Giroux,New York

2011


Kahneman- A New VocabularyWords and definitions to describe

mental errors

To learn to recognize these errors in ourselves and others

We are too quick to accept information provided by our subconscious without analysis by our conscious mind

For efficiency our brains take shortcuts which lead to errors in judgement


Subconscious Narrative

We attempt to create a story or narrative of our lives from information available

Since this information is limited to our experience, we often do not have the whole picture

Thus, we are prone to errors, especially for assessing risks


Sources of Judgement Errorssubstitution, stereotyping, WYSIATI (what you see is all there is), causal explanations, base-rate neglect, the halo effect, the framing effect, the anchoring effect, narrative fallacy, illusion of validity, illusion of skill,

Overconfidence in what we think we know




We are Inherently Illogical

Because of the way our minds work, we cannot help but be illogical and irrational

People ignore statistical information and lead their lives based on causal connections and explanations

Our brains confuse the actual experience with the memory of the experience


Errors of Perceptions

We do not passively notice the world

around us, instead our awareness of events is both selective and constructive

• Much of what strikes the eye or ear is never seen, heard, or remembered

• Much of what we think we have perceived or recalled, never actually happened


RememberingWhen we recall a story, it doesn’t

simply become a version of the original event, it becomes the event as we remember it

Conversation is not always about imparting information or telling the truth, but about managing the impressions we make

Accuracy can take a back seat


MemoriesMentally, people have two selves, experiencing-self and remembering-self.

The experiencing-self answers the question, “How are things right now?”

The remembering-self answers the question, “How was it, on the whole?”

Memories are all we get to keep from our experience of living.

Confusing experience with the memory of it, is a compelling cognitive illusion.


Errors of Recall

We recall through rose colored glasses

We recall our past in a more favorable light

We reconstruct our memories in positive, self flattering ways

–Without knowing we are doing thisWe remember wins more than losses


Can We Rely on Memory ?Alterations to the story become

incorporated into the memory of the storyteller and the storyteller then remembers things that may not have happened

We then come to believe our own untruths and are not aware of this happening

Brian Williams ?




The Availability Heuristic Occurs when the mind bases its

judgment on the probability of an event happening.

Where the probability is determined by the number of similar incidences it has stored in memory

And how easy it is for the brain to recall those incidences

– TMI, Chernobyl, Fukushima


Subconscious PrimingExposure to a word makes it easier for

related words to be evoked. Action and emotions can also be primed. The influencing of an action by an idea, is known as the ideomotor effect.

Memory is susceptible to illusion.

Words that have been seen before are easier to see again.

This is known as the illusion of familiarity.


Subconscious FunctionsStudies of brain responses have shown

that violations of normality are detected very quickly. Finding causal connections in a story is an automatic process of our subconscious mind

The main function of our subconscious is to determine what is “ NORMAL” in a our world.

It works to make connections to create a coherent interpretation of each situation.


Subconscious ErrorsOur subconscious functions mainly by

jumping to conclusions.

This becomes risky when a situation is unfamiliar, the stakes are high, and there is no time to collect more information.

Our subconscious is biased to believe certain things, without evaluation

Our conscious mind is in charge of doubting and unbelieving.


Subconscious ErrorsOur subconscious is very good at

building the best possible interpretation with the ideas that are available, but it does not consider ideas that it does not have. WYSIATI

Overconfidence - where the brain fails to realize that evidence is missing,

Framing - where different ways of presenting the same information evoke different emotions.


Errors of our Conscious MindOur conscious mind is sometimes busy

and often lazy.

It often accepts almost anything the subconscious presents (Deadly Radiation)

Our conscious mind is set up for self-criticism, but its search for information and arguments is mostly constrained to information that is consistent with existing beliefs.




Errors Due to Randomness

Our preference for causal thinking leads us to make serious mistakes when evaluating the randomness of truly random events.

Our downfall occurs because we are pattern seekers and believers in a coherent world.

Causal explanations of chance events are generally wrong.


Interpretation of Small Risks

Many people have a basic limitation in the ability of their minds to deal with small risks.

They either ignore them altogether or give them too much weight, with nothing in between.


Denominator Neglect

People overestimate the probability of unlikely events and give too much weight to their likelihood in their decisions.

Vividness and the ease of imagining are key factors in risk decisions

Denominator neglect helps explain why different ways of communicating risks vary so much in how they affect people.


Fear of RegretRegret is an emotion and a punishment

we inflict upon ourselves.

Regret is usually accompanied by feelings that we should have known better.

If making a certain choice can cause harm or damage, that choice becomes a taboo trade-off

Because of the regret and shame it would cause.


Vintage Books

New York

2012

HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015 65 HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015 66

Nassim Nicholas Taleb

Random HouseNew York 2004




Nassim Nicholas Taleb

Random House New York2007, 2010

We are Naturally LazyThe “law of least effort” applies to both

cognitive and physical exertion. This law maintains that if there are several ways to reach the same goal, people will eventually go to the least-demanding course of action.

The brain seeks out ways to be more efficient.

Laziness is built into our nature.


Limited Budget of EffortPhysical activity and deliberate thought

draw on the same limited budget of effort. They also show that maintaining a coherent train of thought requires discipline.

If someone gives you a math problem while you are walking – you will automatically stop to “think” about it

How much effort should people commit to understanding radiation risks ?


We Can Do Only One Thing at a Time

Task Saturation – trying to do too many things at once

We cannot divide attention between two conscious activities

We may be conscious of two things happening at the same time, but we cannot make two conscious decisions at the same time


Can We Multitask ?

Gains from multitasking are illusory

Our brains slow down when juggling multiple tasks

Switching from task to task can create problems – we forget what we are doing


Role of the Subconscious Mind

Influences our conscious view of the world in fundamental ways

– How we view ourselves and others

– The meanings we attach to everyday events in our lives

– Our ability to make quick judgments

– The actions we take in response to instinctive experience of the world




First Vintage Books Edition, May 2009

Leonard Mlodinow

73HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015

Leonard MlodinowThe Drunkard’s Walk – How

Randomness Rules Our Lives

Anecdote of lottery winner– 7 X 7 = 48

“We create our own view of the world and then use it to filter and process our perceptions, extracting meaning from the ocean of data that washes over us

– And we are often prone to errors”74HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015

Human IntuitionNot suited to situations involving

uncertainty

People cannot create or recognize random numbers

Neuroscience looks at how people make decisions when faced with imperfect or incomplete data

When chance is involved, our intuition may be prone to substantial errors


When Chance is InvolvedIntuitive processes are

seriously flawed

We often make poor decisions when confronted with randomness or uncertainty

Difficult task to swim against the tide of human intuition


Adding Details

If added details fit our mental picture

– The more real it seems and the more probable

However, adding less-than-certain details to a conjecture makes the conjecture less probable

It is common to assign higher probabilities to contingencies that are described in more detail


Uncovering the TruthThe understanding of randomness can

reveal hidden layers of truth, but only to those who possess

the tools to uncover them.

Our brains are not wired to do probability problems very well.

We determine the “truth” intuitively




Perception and Reality

Human perception is not a direct consequence of reality, but rather an act of imagination.

Perception requires imagination because the data that people encounter in their lives is never complete and always equivocal


How is Randomness Seen

People have a very poor conception of

randomness. They do not recognize it

when they see it and they cannot

produce it when they try.

Our minds are wired:to assimilate data, fill in the gaps, and look for patterns


Confirming PatternsEven random patterns can be interpreted

as compelling evidence,– If they relate to our preconceived notions

But by confirmation bias we are focused on finding and confirming patterns rather than minimizing false conclusions

Big step – to question our perceptions and theories. Should we spend time

looking for evidence that we are wrong ?81 HPS PDS, Purdue University, July 10, 2015

Role of ThinkingOur minds do not seem made to think

deeply and introspect

Good thing, otherwise an introspective ancestor would have been eaten by a lion

Consider that thinking is time consuming and often a great waste of energy

We actually do much less thinkingthan we think we do.


Speedy Perceptions

We are good at sizing up a situation

We can extract meaning in 1/10th of a second

The price for such speed is that we miss a lot of details

The problem is that we do not “think” we missed anything

We are not wired the way we think we are


We Cannot Unlearn

Hard to ignore or unlearn bad information,

Even when we know it is wrong

Overconfidence is a leading cause of errors

Memory is more of a reconstruction, rather than a reproduction




Finding Meaning is Automatic

We search for meaning – not the details

Difficult to force ourselves to remember meaningless information

Why we forget passwords and hiding places – We equate “unusual” to memorable,

when in fact it is the opposite

We extract meaning, even when not aware of doing this


We Do Not Know We are Biased

Instant judgements have profound implications for rationality of many decisions

When we do not know that we are biased,

eliminating mistakes due to bias can be very difficult


Meaning of Risk ?

Our conscious mind is concerned with how risky “it is”

Our subconscious mind, where risk decisions are made, is concerned with how risky “it seems”

That perception depends on how the risk is framed


Ignorance of Risks

In a democracy we are swamped with information (statistics) , much of which is not understood

Major forms of miscommunication– Single event probabilities

– Relative Risks

– Conditional probabilities


Single Event Probabilities

Can be confusing:– Because there is no reference class

– No comparable events known

– Thus, probability is only a guess

– People tend to fill in the reference class according to their interests of concerns


Relative Risks

A drug company may say a certain drug will reduce risk of dying by 22%

Some may believe this means 220 out of a 1,000

Actually it means that without the drug, 41 out of a 1,000 will die and with the drug only 32 will die – a 22% difference




Conditional Probabilities

The probability of an event occurring given that another event has already occurred is called a conditional probability.

The probability that event B occurs, given that event A has already occurred is

P (B|A) = P (A and B) / P (A)


The Effect of Timing

When consequences of our decisions are far off, we are prone to bigger gambles,

When consequences are more immediate, we tend to be more conservative

I wonder how people generally view the immediacy of radiation effects ?


Truth and Subconscious BiasWe tend to believe what confirms our views

and to discount other information

Thus, we may accept data from small samples

We may judge on basis of how information “resembles” something we already know

We draw conclusions based on“ease of recall”

– This may be function of media coverage

– Paradox, media reports what people want to see


Source of Quick Responses

Responding quickly to threats or to promising opportunities improves the chance of survival.

Our subconscious takes over in emergencies and gives priority to self-protective actions.


Response to Threats

Human brains are designed to give priority to bad news. This evolutionary history is reflected by the automatic operations of our subconscious

Threats are recognized and given priority over opportunities as a survival technique.

Loss aversion is one of many manifestations of broad concerns for survival


Review - SubconsciousConstantly monitors all inputs to predict

and avoid imminent danger

Anything unusual, such as radiation, triggers a search of all knowledge and memories to decide if protective action is needed

Most will conclude that radiation is bad

Without technical knowledge, they may not be able to defend this decision , but deep in their gut, they know this is true

Imagination of unacceptable consequences of radiation will win out every time.




Summary

This has been a very quick review of how people evaluate risks and why they may not believe our best risk estimates

Or, how they interpret risks differently

Our minds are programed for survival to make quick judgements about risks and decisions for safety

Such judgements are PRONE to ERRORS


Ways we are Prone to ErrorsWe use mental shortcuts for quick decisionsDecisions by subconscious mind are crucial

for safety – especially for imminent danger– Does not do well for dangers that are not

imminentSubconscious acts on impressions which may

not be based on good information– Not based on evaluations and therefore it has

no clues to errors or biasesConscious mind is not inclined to second guess

subconscious decisions – Wants to conserve energy


Sources of Errors In Safety Decisions -

“To err is human”

We are all afflicted with systematic biases in the way we see, remember, and perceive the world around us

Our expectations shape the way we see the world, and the way we act

These effects occur subconsciously

We are biased and don’t know it


ConclusionsWhy do people not believe our best risk

estimates ?

People often do not understand what risk numbers mean

Differences in Interpretation– Based on fears

– How our subconscious processes information for survival

– These processes are prone to many errors


References

How Risky is it Really, David Ropeik, 2010Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman,

2011The Drunkard’s Walk – How Randomness Rules

Our Lives, Leonard Mlodinow, 2008Subliminal – How Your Unconscious Mind Rules

Your Behavior, Leonard Mlodinow, 2012Human Error, James Reason, 2009Why We Make Mistakes, Joseph T. Hallinan,

2009 The Psychology of Risk, Glynis M. Breakwell,


ReferencesCalculated Risks, Gerd Gigerenzer, 2002

Unlimited Power, Anthony Robbins, 1986

The Black Swan – The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 2010

Fooled by Randomness – The Hidden Role of Chance in Life, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 2004

The Genie Within Your Subconscious Mind, How it Works and How to Use it. 2009Harry W. Carpenter

The Power of Your Subconscious Mind. 2008Joseph Murphy




References

McIntyre, Leslie (2012-07-26). Quicklet on Nassim Taleb's The Black Swan (CliffNotes-like Book Summary and Analysis) (Kindle Locations 66-70). Hyperink - Black Swan Book Summary and Analysis. Kindle Edition.

Summaries, Instaread (2014-04-04). Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman –A 30-minute Summary. Kindle Edition.

Montaqim, Abdul (2012-02-23). Quicklet on Nassim Taleb's Fooled by Randomness (CliffNotes-like Summary) (Kindle Locations 74-76). Hyperink Book Summary, Analysis, Commentary. Kindle Edition.


Questions ?

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Documents

Why People Do NOT Believe Our Best Radiation Risk Estimatesradiationcounseling.org/docs/WhyBeleive.pdf · 2018-06-22 · Why People Do NOT Believe Our Best Radiation Risk Estimates