Why There Still Are No People - Stone

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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. Lxx, No. 1, January2005

Why There Still Are No People

JIM STONE

Univers i ty of N e w Orleans

T h i s paper argues that thereare no people. If identity isnt what matters in survival,psycholo gical connec tedness isnt what matters either. Further, fissioning cas es donot

support the claim that con nectedn ess is what matters.I

consider Peter Ungers view thatwhat matters is a continuous physical realizationof a core psychology.I conclude that ifidentity isnt what matters in survival, nothing matters.This conclusion is deployedtoargue that there are no people. Objections to EIiminativism are conside red, espec iallythat morality cannot survive theloss of persons.

Th is paper will argue th at thereare no people. Letme summarize the argu-me nt (pa rt I is cov ered last). In part I1 of what follow s, I argue that if identityisnt w hat matters in surv ival, psychological connectedness isnt what mat-ters either. Psychological connectedness, according to Derek Parfit, is theholding of particular direct psychological connections, for exam ple, wh en abelief, a desire ,or som e other psychological fea ture continue s to b e had (Par-fit 1 98 6, 20 6); psychological connectedness con sists in tw o othe r rela-tions-resemblance plus a cause that produc es it.For our purposes, to say ofa relation that it is what matters in survival is to say that it carries thebur-den of responsibility, remorse, and regret for past misdeeds; and that it iswhat makes rational the anticipationof, and the special hopes and fears wehave abou t, our own future experiences.A con sequ enc e of I1 is that if identityisnt what matters in survival, either something other than psychologicalconn ectedness is wha t ma ttersor nothing matters.

However fissioning cases appear to show that connectedness to a futureperson who isnt me is about as good as survival. Part I n explains why fis-sioning cases donot support the cla im that connectedness is what ma tters.Part IV conside rs Peter Ungers view that what matters in survival isnt con-nectedness but a physically continuous realization of my core psychologicalproperties (Unger, 1990). IV concludes that if identity isnt what matters in

survival, nothing matters.Part V argues that thereare no people if nothing matters in survival. It

follows that either identity is what matters or thereare no people. It willbe

This essay is meant to buttress my paper, Parfit and The Buddha: Why There areN oPeople(Stone,1988). People and persons are used as synonyms.

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helpful to set out here some of the ontological implications. On the Reduc-tionist account, a person just consists in the existence of a brain and body,and the Occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental states. Thefact of a persons identity through time consists in the holding of certainmore particular facts which can be fully described in a wholly impersonalway. As Parfit writes: Since personal identity over time just consists in theholding of certain other relations, what matters is these other relations (Par-fit 1984, 478). The argument above concludes that either identity is whatmatters or there are no persons; but if identity is nothing more than theseother relations, i t is not what matters. It follows that identity is a deep furtherfact+ there are people. Persons must be ontologically extra to bodies,brains, and psychophysical events.

Then what are persons? The Reductionist account is the plausible natural-istic account of persons, I submit. I take the physical alternatives that have

been considered (e.g. we are subatomic particles (Chisholm, 1978)) to benon-starters. If persons are extra to bodies, brains, and psychophysical events,they are immaterial souls. Naturalism denies that entities exist which liebeyond the scope of scientific explanation (see Danto, 1967). A consequenceof Naturalism, therefore, is that there are no persons. As Eliminativism is aconsequence of scientific naturalism (not to mention Empiricism), we have asforceful an argument for Eliminativism as can be expected in this area of phi-losophy; and the No souls, no people conclusion is important whether or

not Naturalism is accepted.Indeed, this might be taken to provide a knock-down argument against

Naturalism. We must choose between Eliminativism and Realism; as theformer is zany, there are souls. Of course the objection loses its force ifEliminativism turns out not to be so zany, especially as Dualism is notori-ously problematic. Consequently V and VI consider objections to Eliminativ-ism. However it will prove useful to begin with another question: If Reduc-tionism is correct, and connectedness, not identity, is what matters insurvival, which criterion of personal identity should we choose?

I

Lets identify the Psychological Criterion (PC) with the claim that personalidentity consists of non-branching psychological continuity. Psychologicalcontinuity consists of overlapping relations of psychological connectedness.*Lets identify the Biological Criterion (BC) with the claim that human per-sons are identical to human animals, so that person X at t l is identical to

*

Psychological continuiry is the holdingof overlapping chainsof strong connectedness(Parfit 1986, 206); chains are strong when they contain enough direct connectionsfo rpersonal identity. Parfit writes:Of these two relations connectedness is more importantboth in theory and practice( 2 0 6 ) .

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person Y at t2 iff X and Y are one and the same human animal (or man, touse Lockes term)? As human persons are self-aware men, and self-awaremen existed before they were self-aware and can survive the loss of self-

awareness, persons arent essentially persons (Stone, 1987; Olson, 1997).If psychological connectedness is what matters in survival, PC might

seem superior; in effect it maintains that identity consists in what mat-ters-at least when that doesnt branch. Indeed, as were used to thinking thatidentity matters, a criterion of identity which apparently tracks what matters

appears to track identity. However Parfit observes:

Now that we have seen that identity is not what matte rs, we nee d not try to rev iseor extend ourcriterion of identity,so that it coincides more often with what matters.On any natural under-standing of personal identity, such a coincide nce could be only partial, as the c ase of divisionshow s. And revisingour criterion may misleadingly suggest that identity is what matters (Parfit1984,272) .

As both criteria coincide only partly with what matters, and as its easyenough to express the facts once identity and connectedness are separated (so

that the biologist can say if I fall into a PVS, that I survive but lose whatmatters, while in Teletransportation I have what matters but I dont survive)?PCs superiority in tracking what matters isnt a decisive advantage. Indeed,once identity is separated from what matters, the fact that PC apparently

tracks what matters no longer suggests that it tracks identity. The principal

reason philosophers have accepted PC is undercut.

On the other hand, BCs advantages are striking. Plainly, it has the advan-tage of ontological simplicity (Stone, 1987; Olson, 1997). Persons are iden-tified with self-aware men. Given PC there is no man (or brain) to which Im

identical. Indeed, I can jump from man to man, as in Teletransportation.

What then is my relation to the human animal whose hands are typing these

words? Are there two physical objects, the person and the animal, coincidentin space and time? Which is thinking this thought (Olson, 1997)?

Worse, PC yields strongly counter-intuitive consequences. I might have

become sentient at a slightly different time, been born a few minutes earlier;as a child I might have sat at a different place at the dinner table; in the first

grade I might have been assigned a different seat. Indeed, it might have beenthe case that throughout my entire life all of my token mental-events werejust different enough, either in content or in temporal location, to be numeri-

cally distinct from the tokens I actually had. Nonetheless my life could have

been as close to my actual life as these differences allow: the same parents,

Olson, 1997, originates the nam e Biological Criterion.If in Teletransportation1 have what matters butI dont survive, to what do the twooccurrencesof I refer? To me, the man about to step into the Teletransporter.1 dontsurvive, because the fellow materialized on Mars isnt me.I have what matters becausemy relationship to him warrants anticipating his experiences, andso on.

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the same name, the same job-I might write this paper, but each sentencewould be written a few minutes earlier or later. This might have happened to

m e . BC seconds the conclusion; as this person (Mr. A) is the same man as

me, he is me.According to PC, my life could have been different, certainly. If Id studied

economics in graduate school, I would probably be living somewhere else, Iwould be married to someone else, and certainly I would be having differentexperiences. As the economist would be psychologically continuous with the

person I was before I went to college (Mr. B), according to PC the economistwould be Mr. B. Of course Im also continuous with Mr. B; so, by the tran-sitivity of identity, the economist would have been me. In short, my life

could have branched and still been mine-so long as the person I would havebeen and I share a psychological past part. A strongly counter-intuitive con-sequence of PC, however, is that Mr. A would not have been me (Stone,

1987).For no stage of As life is psychologically connected to any stage ofmine. There are no causal relations whatsoever between events in his life andmine; for instance, neither of us remembers anything of the others life.

The counter-examples force can be increased. Suppose the first years ofmy life proceed as they do in the counter-example. Token mental-events are

just different enough to be distinct from the tokens I actually had, and thiscontinues until there is plainly a persisting self-aware person, five-years-old(Mr. C). A consequence of PC is that C is distinct from me his whole life

through, no matter how his life goes. For if C dies at five, as he and I haveno common psychological part, C must be distinct from me. But if C is dis-tinct from me if he dies at five, then he is distinct from me if he goes onliving; for surviving cannot make C a numerically different person from theperson he would be if he died at five.

The story now takes a new turn. When I go to first grade Im assigned theseat I was assigned in my actual life, so that my visual and auditory percep-tions are the ones I actually had. At home I switch to the place at the table inwhich I actually sat, and so on. As my memory is poor, I gradually forget theexperiences I had before. As my perceptions are caused by the same physical

objects, affecting the same neurons in the same way at the same time, theyare the very token perceptions Ive actually had; the same thing is true of my

token memories of these perceptions. By the time Im six, my life consists

of just the token mental-events that actually comprised it; and so it goes rightdown to this moment, as I write these words in just this way, having thesetoken thoughts and visual perceptions. A catastrophic consequence of PC isthat this person, embodied in the same man as me, who has literally lived my

life for the last fifty-five years, would be somebody else. This very thought,realized by these neurological processes in this brain, could have belonged tosomebody else. Or, if we insist on individuating token mental-states by their

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subject, the token neural-statesmy brain has undergone in the last fifty-fiveyears could have produced, in response to the same environment, a com-pletely different set of mental states. This toothaches identity depends onwhich mental states this brain realized mo re than a half- century ago.

Th ese difficulties sink P C in its contest with BC-unless the latter leadsto consequences at least a s coun ter-intuitive. Th e m ost serious difficulty forBC is what Eric Olson calls the Transplant Intuition (Olson, 1997). Sup-po se you r cerebrum is destroyed; your body p ersists in a vegetative state,sustained by your low er brain, untilO.J. Simpsons cerebrum (not his entirebrain, which w ould bring along the animal (Olson 199 7,45 )) is implanted init. T he resulting person is psychologically continuo us withO.J., not you.H e has O.J.s apparent memories, his personality, and he acts onO.J.sintentions. Bu t that person i s yo u, the person at the beginn ing of th e story,according to BC . This is strongly counter-intuitive, surely.

But does BC really lead to this consequence? Suppose that my brain istransplanted to the brainless body of my identical twin. Most philosopherswould agre e that the psychologically con nec ted person w ho results is me.BCcan accomm odate this intuition (O lson 1997 , 4 3 , for its reasonable to viewbrain tran splant as the limiting case of amp utation and transplant, that is,asbody transplant.A man goes where his brain goes. If my brain is removedand thrown away, the animal is destroyed even if the brainless body is keptal ive artificially-just as if we destroyed all of m e bu t my liver and kept i t

al ive somehow.It might be tempting to identify me with my brain;I would resist this.On the face of things Im an anim al, not an animals organ.I have hands andfeet as proper parts. Ro ughly its sufficient for an animal to persist that thereare non-branching spatio-temporally continuous maximal aggregates of cellsfunc tionin g collectively according to a genetic developmen tal bluep rint; con-sequently I once existed without a brain-when I was a blastula, say. Oncethe human a nimal is embrained, however, he goes where his brain goes-notbecause hes identical to his brain but because the embrained animal cansur-vive the am putation of eve rything bu t his b rain. That material thingT per-sists if pared dow n to proper partP doesnt compelus to identify T withP .Absent a good reason not to doso, Reductionists ought to identify personswith the m ost intuitive candida te.

Wh at about the identity con ditions for human brains? Certainly it seem sreasonab le thatif one excises most of the brains matter at ago and substi-tutes a chunk of new brain-cells, the result is a numerically distinct brain.Consequently the resultof the cerebrum transplant is that my brain is

destroyed, for the cerebrum comp rises about two-thirds of the brain . Thereforethe anim al is destroyed-so I cease to exist. On the other hand if th e majorityof the brains ma tter remains intact and functional, the brain survives andso

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does the animal.A consequence of BC, therefore, is that in the cerebrumtransplant caseI do not survive-unless, of course, my cerebrum is alsotransplanted-but O.J. does. On the other hand, if my cerebrum is trans-planted to O.J.s body, then I survive, too. In short, its reasonable to treatcerebrum transplant as if it is brain transplant; for the brain cannot survivethe sudden replacement of most of its m atter, b ut it can surviv e the los s ofsom e of its matter if most o f its matter re ma ins intact and functional.

T o sum up: onc e what matters in survival is separated from identity , theprincipal argum ent in PC s favor is undercut. Fu rther,PC, not BC, leads tostrongly counter-intuitive consequences. The Reductionist must thereforeacc ept BC (o r, less intuitively, identify human perso ns with brains or cerebra;my argument will go through anyway,so I set these options aside). Thismuch is plain:As Reductionism entails that identity isnt what matters, theReductionist is ill-positioned to object toour deploying BC in the argument

that follows.

I1

Consider this case.I suffer from headaches. Im examined by a neurologistwho tells me that I have a brain tumor which must be removed immediately.This can be done by a single radiation treatment dispensed by a RadiationM ach ine. The treatment is painless, how eve r it will erase all the informationencoded in my cerebrum-my me mories, my personality , eve rythingI

know-though the rest of my brain wont be affected. This neurally encodedinformation supervenesupon the molecular structure of my cerebrum. Thetreatment undoes that structure without damaging my brain, leaving me withthe mind of a newborn in fan t-ed uc ab le, but blank. Fortunately the RadiationMachine also records the precise molecular structureof m y brain. TheMachines com pu ter will transform that information into a se t of instruc-tions. Th ree seconds after it erase s my perso nality , the neurologist will pressbutton A and the Ma chine, by following these instructions, will imprint thatsam e patterno n my brain aga in, restoring all the inform ation it erased.I willlose consciousness for three seconds. When I wake up, I willbepsychologically connected to myself asI was three seconds ago.I willresemb le myselfon accoun t of a reliable c au se and, though it isnt the normalone, this is insufficient reason to conclude thatI will lose what matters insurvival.I can anticipate my vacation next week just as m uch as ifI had declined the procedure.

The case where my cerebrum is removed and destroyed, and the lower brain sustains thebody in a PVS, involves neither the replacement nor the transplantation of brain matter.The sufficient condition that I mentioned above for a brains being destroyed isnt satis-fied. So far nothing precludes our saying that the brain survives cerebrum removal sim-plici ter.

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Th e neurologist confides that the M achine is also being used in researchaimed at creating the physical basis for a complete personality. On the Ma-chines com puter s hard dn ve are instructions (a, b, c, d...) for rearrangingcerebrum mo lecules to encode the inform ation for a personality which thecomputer generated randomly o ne year ago. Indeed, there is a buttonB on th econsole-push B and the Mach ine will rearrange the molecules of my brainaccording to this other setof instructions. By an extraordinary coincidence,that randomly generated personality is mine, down to the last detail. Sheknows this because the examination she gave me included a reading of mybrains molecular structure. Pu shing B will rearrange the m olecules of m ybrain in exactly the way that pushing A will. Th e instructions will havebeenrecorded twice on the machines hard drive, the first time one year ago, thesecond three seconds ago . Th e machine will fo llow a, b , c, d ... whicheverbutton gets pressed. The neurologist assures me that of course she hasno

intentionof pushingB.An hour later Im lyingon a table waiting for the procedure to begin,

when she staggers by on her wayto the control console in the next room.Shes drunk as a lord, and shes muttering: Lets shee.. m shupposed topush B. O r ish it A? O r ish itB? Plainly B is as likely to be pushed as A.Ho w should I view this situation? It ma kesno sense to be frightened that shewill push B. If she pushes A, the Machine will follow instructions a, b, c,d..., rearranging the mo leculesof my cerebrum in a certain way ; if she pushes

B, the Mach ine will follow a, b, c , d..., rearranging the sam e mo lecules inthe sa m e way. It would be irrational t o think If in three seconds she pushesA and the molecules in my cerebrum are arranged according to a, b, c, d...,producing a personality just like the one I had before, that is as goodassurvival; but if she pushes B and the molecules a re arranged ac cording to a , b ,c, d..., produc ing a pe rsonality just like the oneI had before, that is as badasdeath. The difference between pushing A andB cannot plausibly m ake thatdifference. If pushing A gets me what m atters in survival,so does pushing B.I can anticipate my vacation just as rationally wh ichever button she presses.

Of course there will be some differences. If the neurolog ist pushe s A, m ymem ories of visiting Afgh anistan in1972 will be veridical; if she pushesB,they wont be mem ories a t all-for I wont have them becauseI visitedAfgh anistan. Indeed, if sh e pushesB I wont remember my past life at all.Still I will have the same token memories whichever button sh e pushes,and the same information about my past. As that information will be justasreliable if she pushes B as if she pushes A -e it h e r way, whatI have will bejust as good as memory-this difference provides no reason to view th e push-

ing of B as less in my interest than the pushing of A.Of co urse if sh e pressesB, whe n I leave the hospital I will no t be asI am

because I was as I was. If the computerhad generated a different personality,

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I migh t be speak ing Ch inese and remembering ope rating a fishing boatoffTaiwan. Its extraordinary luck that the computer generated my personality,certa inly. Bu t all that is well in the past. AsI lie on the table awaiting theprocedure, thereis no possibility whatsoever thatI will leave the hospitalspeaking Chine se. The machine is going to rearrange the mo lecules of m ybrain according to a, b, c, d..., producing the same personality, come whatma y. The situation mig ht well produce a sens e of vertigo-if the com puterhad selected differently,I could have lost almost everythingI value aboutmyself. Bu t it didnt select differently, thank heaven!To the extent that luckwas involved, it was definitely good luck. Nothingof value is now at risk.

I might feel a thrill of fear at the thought: Maybe the person wh o leavesthe hospital if B is pressed wont beme! As psychological connectednesswill be severed, perhaps he will be somebodyelse in my body who is justlike me. W ere supp osing , however, that identity doesnt matter in survival;

so connectedness canno t matter because it mak es for identity-nor can press-ing A. As identity isnt what matters, my doubts about whetherI will beidentical to that person are beside the point.In addition, weve acceptedBCwhich, on ce weve separated what matters from identity, is plainly superior toPC. T he person who leav es the hospital will indeed be m e, forhe is the sameman as me. As I observed above, the Reductionist is ill-positioned to objectthat weve deployed the wrong criterion of personal identity.

What about remorse and repentance? Suppose we find Adolph Hitler still

alive; we ch arge him w ith genocide. W e learn that in1980 Hitler underwent atreatment like the one in my example; medical records report thatB waspressed accidentally. Consequently he doesnt remember committing hiscrim es, though he kno ws that his memories are com pletely accurate. Hitleris consum ed with rem orse; he begs our forgiven ess. It would b e wrongheadedto tell him that, as connectedness is what matters in survival, not identity,his relation to th e perpetrator of his crime s cann ot warrant remorse-althoughremorse would certainly be in order if A had been pressed. Suppose wereback in 1980, watching the procedure. It would be irrational to say: If inthree seconds the neurologist pushesA and the molecules of Hitlerscere-brum are arranged accordingto e, f, g, h..., producing a personality just likethe onehe had before, then Hitlers future remorse will be rational; but if shepushes B andthe molecules are arranged according to e, f, g, h..., producing apersonality just like the one he had before, then Hitlers remorse will beassenseless as his feeling repentant for the crimes of som ebod y else who merelyresembles him. Imagine later tryingto console Hitler on the ground that,after all, the neurologist pressedB, not A. If repentance and contritionare

warranted whichever button gets pressed,so is moral responsibility. The dif-ference between her rearranging the molecules of H itler s cerebrum accordingto e, f, g, h... by p ushingB rather than A is too slender to absolve Hitler of

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responsibility. Its unlucky for Hitler, but fortunate for the court, that thecom puter generated his old personality.

T o sum up: If identity isnt what matters in survival, I would be irrationalto fear thatB, not A, will be pressed. IfB is pressed, the person who leavesthe hospital will be responsible for my past misdeeds; and its rational for meto anticipate his experiences. Since I have what matters without it, psycho-log ical connectedness isnt what mat ters in survival. If identity isnt whatmatters, either something other than connectedness matters or nothing mat-ters.

I11

The chief support for the claim that psychological connectedness, not iden-tity, is what matters in survival flows from cases in which a man divides.Consider Tele transpo rtation first. Parfit writes:

The Scanner here on Earth will destroy my brain and body, while recording the exact states ofall of my cells.... Travelling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to rea chthe Replicator on Mars. This will then create, out of new matter, a brain and body ex actly likemine. It willbe in this body thatI shall wake up (Parfit 1984, 199).

Like most people, Im leery of Teletransportation. Im afraid Ill be murderedby the Scanner; somebod y else will b e created on Mars. Thats because thereis a complete and sudden change of my matter, marked spatial discontinuity,plus a three-minute gap w hen Im not located anywhere. Nor amI inclined tothink that I ought to anticipate my Martian replicas experiences, fear historture, andso on. In the absen ce of a clear intuition that he is me, the fact ofpsychological connectedness doesnt motivate the intuition thatI have whatmatters in survival.

Contrast Division:

My body is fatally injured, as a re the brainsof my two brothers. My brain is divided, and e a c hhalf is successfully transplanted into the bodyof one of my brothers. Eac h of the resultingpeople believes that he is me, seems to remember living my life, has my character, and is inevery other way psychologically c ontinuous with me. And he has a body that is very like mine(Parfit 1984, 254-255).

Here most p eople feel that theydo have what m atters.As my relationship tojust o ne of the resulting peop le would conta in what matters if I stood in ittohim a lone, how can its duplica tion be as bad as death? Whats baffling aboutDivision is that Im convinced initially that some future person is me, yetoninspection theresno easy candidate. There is no ground for saying Im justone of the two offshoots; and Im not both of them, for then they wouldbeidenticalto each other. Arguably here is a case where I have what ma tters insurvival butn o future person is me.

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Yet why do we feel that we have what matters in Division but not inTeletransportation? Note that the features of Teletransportation that make medoubt my survival-the complete and sudden change of matter and the drastic

collapse of spatio-temporal continuity-are absent in Division. Instead wehave psychological connectedness plus physical continuity of enough of the

central nervous system to support conscious life. As the sufficient conditionfor identity in ordinary cases is apparently satisfied, naturally were more

inclined to think we survive.

Indeed, might I not survive Division with a divided mind and body? Parfitrejects this option because it involves grotesque distortions in our concept ofa person, (Parfit 1984,476) but (earlier) he owns that if the questions WillI survive? and Will there be some person who is alive who is the sameperson as me? are treated as equivalent, then the least unsatisfactory descrip-tion of Williams case is ... hat I survive with a divided body and a dividedmind (Parfit 1971, 205). Each offshoot is a person in his own right, but aperson might be composed of two other persons, as the Popes crown iscomposed of three other crowns (Parfit 197 1, 203). Indeed, Parfit asserts thatin Division my brain continues to exist, and, because it is divid ed... t sup-ports not just one but two lives (Parfit 1984, 476). The hemispheres, nowbrains in their own right, are still parts of the original brain. If the animal

follows his brain, he also persists and supports two lives. We might say thatthe animal (A) survives as a scattered object, the two new animals (B and C)

resulting from Division are As parts.Parfit asks: Suppose the resulting people fight a duel. Are there three

people fighting, one on each side and one on both? (Parfit 1984, 257) Yes.

Its reasonable to ascribe to A, who now supports two lives, the acts of hisparts; so A can be standing and sitting just as a road can be curvy andstraight. And suppose one of the bullets kills. Are there two acts, one mur-

der and one suicide? (257) Suppose B shoots C with the intention of therebydestroying A; then so does A. Both B and A murder C. How many people

are left alive? One or two? (257). The presumption that a man (or a brain)can survive a hemispheres destruction is defeasible in extraordinary cases: ifboth A and B survive, coincident men have the same experiences. Nothingjeopardizes B. This gets us a second murder-B murders A-plus a suicide. I

maintain only this: the idea that I survive with a divided mind and body isntso bizarre that it cannot sustain the intuition that I persist.

The upshot is that Division does not support the claim that psychologicalconnectedness is what matters in survival. That Im connected to some futureperson is a constant in both Teletransportation and Division. As I dont feelthat in Teletransportation I have what matters, connectedness doesnt explainwhy I do feel I have i t in Division. Thats explained by the intuition that Isomehow survive Division (with a divided mind and body, perhaps), which in

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turn is motivated by the apparent satisfaction of the sufficient condition foridentity in ordinary cases.As The intuition that in Division I have whatmatters depends upon the intuition that I survive is a t leastas plausible asits conv erse, Division doesnt suppo rt the view that what matters in survivalis some thing oth er than identity.

IVIf neither identitynor connectedness matters, yet something still matters,what might it be? Acco rding to Peter Ung er, w hat m atters in survival is thatsom e future person will have my core psychological propertieson account ofthe physical continuity of whatever physical entity, or whatever successionof such entities, then realizes those particular m enta l capacities, that is, m ybrain; the capacities must persist, even if Im unconscious (Unger1990,109). Co re psychological properties are meager and widely shared: the

capacities for consciousness, memory, and low-level reasoning.A futureamn esiac moron could have my core psychological properties. Whether A orB is pressed, the resulting person will have my core psychology because hehas my brain, which con tinues to realize my core psychology during the threeseconds Im unc onsciou s. Thats why it doesnt ma tter which button getspressed. If the computer had selected differently, and a person em bod ied in th isma n had left the hospital speaking Ta mil, with memories of Jaffna, I wouldhave as good a reason to anticipate his experiences as I d o my ow n. Indeed,

they would be m y ow n, for identity just consists of non-branching brain-based continuityof co re psychological properties.

Suppose the Radiation Machine works differently, however.In radiatingmy brain the Machine will damage (only) my cerebrumso that it loses itsmental capacities. In the original case the machine leaves my brain like ababys, educable but blank.In this new case, however, the cerebrums capac-ity for memory, consciousness and reason are destroyed utterly; the livemeat that remains has the mental capacity of my liver. The neurons mole-cules are so arranged that the neurons capacity to func tion is destroyed,though they remain alive and structurally identifiable as neurons. Fortunately,in three secondsA will be pressed and the m ach ine will rearrange m ycere-brums m olecules as they were before, restoring my old personal-i t y - o t he rw i seI would linger in aPVS, sustained by my lower brain. Thatperson will be psychologically connected to me,so (a fortiori) he will havecore psych ological properties just like mine . As my brain wont realize thosecapacities during the three seconds Im unconscious, however, they willnotpersist in a physically con tinuo us realizer.

Fo r Un ger what matters in survival has several different meanings-theo ne that concerns him is prudential concern, which h e determines by the

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avoidance of future great pain test. In thought experiments concerning myalleged survival,I have just two options.

I may elect to experience ... very considerable pain and ... hus ensure that the being whoemerges will ... eel no pain. Alternatively, I may elect to endure no pain before the processbegins and ... hus ensure that the being who emerges from the process will, after awakening,undergo really excruciating tortures for quite a long time. (Unger 1990, 28-29)

What results does the test yield when applied to the new th ought experi-ment? Pace Unger, I would endure considerable pain before the radiationtreatment in order to ensure that the be ing who em erges will not be tortured.This is because I would view the outcome as my own continued life. Impsychologically connected to a single future person who is embodied in thesame man asI am. That my cerebrum wasso damaged that it briefly lost itsmental powers seems unimportant given the outcome. My lower brain kept

on functioning normally, no matter was removed from my brain,so my brainsurvives. I have about as much reason for prudential concern as I ordinarilydo, so I have what matters in survival without a physically continuous real-izer of my core psychology.

Is the outcome mischaracterized? Theres a new cerebrum, arguably, con-figured from the matter of the one that ceased to exist three seconds earlier. Anew cerebrum makes for a new brain which makes for a new man. Howeverthe cerebrum at t4 is made of the same molecules as the cerebrum at t1, and itdoes seem plain that theres a continuing material thing(C) composed ofthose molecules that preceded the three second span and con tinues past it. IfCisnt the cerebrum, then both thetl and t4 cerebra are coincident withC, andrealize the same thoughts asC. Its simpler to identify them withC; thecerebrum is the brain-part that in fact has those powers, but itpreceded them(when it formed in the embryo) and it can lose and regain them-even as acorpses hand is still a hand and at the resurrection will be the same hand.This is an intuitive way to talk, its simpler ontologically, and we havenoreason not to adopt it.

Perhaps what really matters in survival, however, is acausa l ly continu-ous physical realization of my core psychological properties: my cerebrum,the hard drive of the radiation machine, then my cerebrum again. At everymom ent in the process some physical thingor other has the ability to realizemy co re mental capacities(i f not in its own matter, then in thatof somethingelse), and the capacity of each physical thing in the chainis explained by thatof an earlier member. Arguably causal continuity is the continuity that mat-ters.

Now add this wrinkle. Will the neurologist press Aor B? If identity isntwhat matters in survival,I have nothing to fear. The molecules of my cere-brum will be arranged accordingto a, b, c, d... whichever button sh e presses,producing a personality just likem y old one. The difference betweenso

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arranging them by pressingB rather thanA cannot plausibly make the differ-enc e between an outcom e as good as survival and one as bad as sudden death.B ut if B is presse d, theresno causally continuous chain of physical realizersof my core psychological properties. Yet I have what matters in survival,even by the avoidance of future great pain test. For the only considerationthat might dissuade me from suffering intense pain now in order to avoidexcruciating torture later is the thought that the person resulting from push-ing B may not beme. If identity isnt what matters in survival,I would cer-tainly m ak e the sacrifice.

To sum up: If identity isnt what matters in survival, either a relationother than connectedness matters or nothing matters. Given the failure ofUng ers thesis, its hard tosee wha t the som ething other could be. Not thatsom e fut ure person will have co re psychological properties like min e: decapi-tation would be as good as continued life. N ot that som e future persons per-sonality isexactly like mine; I haveno reason to anticipate the experiencesof a coinciden tal replica. T he thought experiments sho w that the existence ofa causal chain from me to that future person, accounting for the resemblanceor just for his having my core psycho logy, isnt wha t matters-not evenwhe n it flows through a physically continuo us realizer.I draw the warrantedconclusion that if identity isnt what matters in survival, nothing matters.

V

As John Locke observed: [Person] is a forensic term, appropriating actionsand their merit. (Locke,Essay Concerning Human Understanding,book 11,ch. 27). Persons are conceived as responsibility bearers, capable of rationalhopes, fears, and remorse. If nothing matters in survival, there areno per-sons! Identity is what matters or nothing matters; therefore identity is whatmatters in survival-$ thereare persons. As I argued earlier, it follows thatpersons a re ontologically extrato bodies, brains, and psychophysical events.The most plausible remaining accountof persons is that they are souls.A

consequenceof Naturalism, therefore, is that there areno persons. ButI

am a6

186

The Reductionist might obje ct that the re will still be thinking intelligent bein gs that c anconsider themselvesas themselves in different times and places. How ever ifthisLockean definition of person isto be satisfied there mustbe at least one intelligentbeing who exists at tl and t2, and who recognizes at tl that he is identical tothe being thatexists at t2(or vice versa). But if at tlI recogn ize that the intelligent being att2 is identi-cal to me, then if I know he will have experienceE, then it is rational for me to anticipateexperiencingE. If Reductionism is true, it is never rational for meto anticipate an expe-rience I know a future person will have. ThereforeI never recognize that the being att2is identical t o me . Further, if a t t2I know that the being at tl is identical to me, thenif 1

know that he performed a des truc tive and unnecessary action then it is rational for me toregret having performed it. But if Reductionism istrue, it is never rational for me toregret performing an actI know a past being performed. ThereforeI never recognizethat the intelligent being at t lis identical to m e. Consequently if Reductionism is true , th eLockean de finition is never satisfied(see Stone 1988,530).

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person if I am anything: a consequenceof Naturalism is thatI dont exist.There is nothing in nature for me to be. Of courseI might identify myselfwith something that comes and goes in a moment, the transient subjectofthis very thought, perhaps (Strawson1994, 133-134). But having comesofar, it is ontologically simpler, and more consistent with whatis revealed inintrospection,to say that thereis, after all, only the thought.

Doesnt this provide a knock-down argument aga inst Naturalism? Obvi-ously there are people; Naturalism precludes them,so there are souls! Butperhaps the victory is Pyrrhic, for now the existence of peopleis no moreobvious than the existence ofsouls: the ob jections first premiss is false.Icannot do justi ce here to the arguments of the Friends ofSouls; nor will Irehearse all the difficulties for Dualism. Instead consider how far we gotogether. Realists and Elimin ativists agree that persons mus t be so uls. Weagree. that Reductionism is metaphysically incoherent because it trie sto

groun d persons in an ontological basetoo impersonal to support them. Also,we share a solution to the Division puzzle. If Im a s oul,I go where it goes(Swinburne in Shoemak er and Swinburne,1984). If it goes with one hemi-sphere, that lifeis mine. If it ceasesto exist, I lose what matters.Souls ar econceived as simples,so they cant divide. If Imnor a soul, I never existedto begin with,so nothing happens to me whenI fission. Generally wecantransform metaphysical persistence-puzzles in to mere epis tem ic difficulties bypositing an underlying Shipof Theseus, say, which goes either to the ship

we assem ble out of S hips discarded planksor to Ships spatio-temporal con-tinuer. The idea that persons underlie the flux and diversity of human lives,and go we-know-not-where in puzzle cases, strikes me as plausible as theideathat there is an underlying Sh ipof Theseus.

As there is no middle-ground between Realism and Eliminativism, themost persuasive argument for Realism is that Eliminativism (but not Real-ism) is incredible. SinceIve foresworn attacking Realism, let me trytomake Eliminativism less incredible. Some philosophers find Eliminativismincoherent o n its face. According to Parfit, an outrigh t denial of the existenceof personsis of cou rse absurd for entirely grammatical reasons (Parfit1987,312). He writes: There are personsor subjects in this language-dependentway. (312) Bu t the Eliminativists denial of pe rsons involves no grammati-cal absurdity. Certainly my assertionI dont exist sounds ungrammatical:who doesnt exist? HoweverI can be construed as the thinker of thisverythought; and The thinker of this very thought doesnt exist Russelis nicelyinto the non-absurd: Itis not the case that thereis one and only one thinkerof this very thought. Eliminativisms absurdity is unlikely to be foundin

grammar.Th e Eliminativist can still talk asif there are people, however, even

though muchof what she says will be literally false. WhenI utter a sentence

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like I believe there areno persons, the proposition I assert (that there is ju stone subject of this thought and it believes that there areno persons) is false,but uttering it expresses indirectly the truth that the belief that there arenopersons is causing the utterance. Ta lking as if there are su bjects is useful, forit often tracks features of reality that it would be difficultto express other-wise. O nc e aga in it is skillfu l to think w ith the learned and spea k with thevulgar.

Galen S traw son believes its a metaphy sical truth, not a grammatical illu-sion, that exp erience is necessarily for a su bject of ex perience.

Experience necessarily involves experiential what-it-is-likenessfor someone or something.Whatever the natureof this experiencing something, its real existence cannotbe denied(Strawson1994, 129).

Experience requires subjectivity, but does subjectivity require a subject?

David Rosenthal argues that thereis something its like to have a sensoryexp erien ce jus t in case it is targeted by a higher-order s tate (Ro senth al,1997).(Rosenthal takesHOSs to be thoughts, but Locke, Armstrong, and Lycanidentify HOSs with inner perceptions.) For Rosenthal, subjectivity getscashed-in in terms of consciousness, which is explained in terms ofHOSs.An Eliminativist can plausibly argue that the claim What-it-is-likeness isnecessarily what-it-is-likenesslfor som eone is really tracking another fact:that what-it-is-likeness necessarily involves the sensory states being con-

scious, which requ ires only that it is targeted by aHOS. This is the truth thatmotivates Strawsons claim. Of course its natural to express it in terms ofsubjects, for we generally talk as though me ntal states belong to subjects.Ina universe consisting only of mental states, however, some of whichareHOSs,eve rythin g required for what-it-is-likeness w ould be p resent.

Alternatively, Th om as Nagel writes that there is so me thing its like forthe subject (a bat, say) to have a m ental state only if theres som ething itslike from her point of view (Nagel,1979). Subjectivity gets cashed-in interms of pointof view. The bats perceptual experiences represent the worldfrom a certain perspective, and they represent it in virtue of certain aspects.That is the bats point of view, Ive argued; consequently theres somethingits like to be a bat even if bats lackHOSs (Stone, 2001). Otherwise itsdoubtful that bats have experiences, which is not what Nagel wants to say.Subtract the bat from the experiential stream and her po int of view rem ains.

W e neednt decide between these rivals. Th e who le po intis that Elimina-tivism has ample resources to explain subjectivity in terms of the intention-ality of mental states a n d o r their relations to one anothe r. Arguably the facts

in virtue of which we say that an experience has a qualitative aspect onlyifthere is some thing its like for som eon e to have it can b e expressed without

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mentioning subjects. So Strawsons appeal to what it is like for... snt a

decisive argument for the thesis that an experience requires an experiencer.

Of course Eliminativism still flies in the face of the most fundamentaldatum of common sense. We exist. But common sense is often a casualty of

science, while Eliminativism, if Im right, has behind it the whole force ofNaturalism. Why, then, do we all believe that we exist? The answer given byEliminativists is that the sense of self is a delusion borne of human psychol-ogy. The delusion can be overcome, at least briefly, by attending to the mind-body process, which interrupts the slurring together of successive mental

states to which David Hume credited the idea of self. Attention can also dis-

solve the powerful attachment to mind and body, and the resulting craving for

permanence, of which the sense of self is an artifact-as the Buddha taught.To spend a long while attending to the mind-body process is to be struckpretty forcefully with the insight that no one is in it. There is a sense of

awakening from a dream. Even the HOSs that comprise introspection arefleeting and impersonal, arising due to the causation of other transient states.A consequence of Humes view is that mindfulness meditation will producejust this insight. As the delusion of self is dissolved by practices that under-

cut what, according to plausible psychological explanations, are its cause, the

appeal to common sense is inconclusive, too.

VI

Why, then, is it so hard to accept the consequences of an impersonal uni-verse? There is, of course, the bafflement of our self-concern. In short, whatbecomes of me? Of course, given what will happen to the self-cherishing Ipretty soon anyway, the idea that i t never existed has its consolations. Ashuman life is largely a bafflement of our self-concern, these increase the more

the idea is accepted. Were now fishing in the right waters, at any rate. What

makes Eliminativism really hard to swallow is that morality is destroyed.

Right and wrong cannot exist in an utterly impersonal universe. Who was

harmed by the Holocaust, after all? None of it happened to anybody! It wouldbe crazy to accept such consequences, surely.

An immediate response is that Utilitarianism survives, for it quantifiesonly over mental states, not subjects. An insight of classical Utilitarianism

is that pleasant mental states are intrinsically better than painful ones-not

better for anybody, just better simplici ter. An act is right if it makes theworld a happier place. If acts exist, but the person who acts does not, thereare right acts and wrong acts. Also there are good and bad intentions, fornothing in Eliminativism precludes actions motivated by a desire for a betterworld. A more serious difficulty is that justice doesnt supervene on utility.

There are fundamental human rights, contracts and obligations, special dutiesto our families and countrymen, which we violate if we always do whats

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most useful. Rights bearers are required, people wronged by promises broken,persisting subjects whom death would deprive of a future. How can deon-tological ethics survive the loss of subjects?

Perhaps Buddhism contains an answer. The Buddha knew that the universeis impersonal through and through; he wasnt deluded at all. Yet he attackedthe caste system because he recognized its injustice. How was h e able to dothis? The delusion of self is an artifact of craving, attachment, and inatten-tion; it dissolves as they do. In their place a powerful compassion arises-atleast for those well established in virtue. Suppose my paranoid fnendbelieves himself to be the object of a conspiracy. If Im compassionate I willenter into that delusion, until it becomes sufficiently real that he knows that Iknow what its like for him. A natural activity of compassion is to enter intothe delusion that causes pain; it takes up the point of view of delusion,investing its intentional object with a vivacity that makes it emotionally

real. As that objects emotional reality flows from the activity of compas-sion, not from the perception or cognition that the object is real, i t is consis-tent with recognizing the delusion as delusion. Compassion can create itsown object.

An awakening Buddha finds herself surrounded by transient minds and bod-ies possessed of the delusion that they contain persons, which involves acycle of pleasure and pain. Compassion enters into the delusion, investing itwith emotional reality, thereby creating persons whom compassion loves.

The Buddha spent most of his life bringing to people he knew didnt exist theliberating news that they never were. He did this from compassion for them.Compassion enabled him to recognize the caste systems unfairness to peoplehe knew didnt exist.

According to Buddhism, wisdom and compassion support each other liketwo hands that wash one another. The realization that my brother is a bag ofbones finds its complete expression in compassion for my brother. Con-versely, to care for somebody all the way down to her metaphysical ground isto recognize her emptiness. From the perspective of compassion, the world isful l of suffering beings crying out for protection and for justice. From theperspective of wisdom, while the natural order contains terrific pain, no onesuffers it. Without compassion, wisdom would be other-worldly, less thanwise. Without wisdom the compassionate heart would be broken. From theperspective of compassion, knowing the universe is impersonal is a reason tobe kindly and fair. A Buddhist saying goes: Ultimately there is neither rightnor wrong, but right is right and wrong is wrong.

Kant believed that morality must be founded on respect for persons. I sug-

gest that morality is better founded on compassion. The sentiment of respect

Buddhist practice is devoted largely to developing virtues like patience, kindness, andcompassion, which provide the indispensable setting for enlightenment.

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overly narrows the moral community-it excludes infants, fetuses, and non-human animals. Compassion populates the universe with moral objects. InMahayana Buddhism, the Bodhisattva vows to be reborn for the sake of allsentient beings-yea, until the last blade of grass is liberated!Of the twosentiments, compassion is less fragile ontologically: it motivates a satisfyingmorality even in an impersonal universe like ours.*

Thanks for comments to John Cottingham, Eric O lson, Galen Strawson, and to anonymousreferees from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Thanks to Dean Stretton forhelpful correspondence. Specia l thanks to Judith Crane.

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