Why We Are Not Regulating Carbon

8/11/2019 Why We Are Not Regulating Carbon

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Cities and Global Governance II:Environmental Politics

The issues surrounding the needto protect our global

environment have only recentlycome to light over the last fifty

years, dating to the 1962

publication of biologist RachelCarson s groundbreaking book,Silent Spring.


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While govt. officials are aware ofthe problems caused by

environmental degradation andabuse, they are often reluctant

to take the steps needed to curbsuch abuses lest they offend

special interest groups i.ebusinesses and multi-nationalcorporations (MNCs)


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As governments and consumers in(wealthier nations of) the global

North have restricted or banned anumber of tobacco products,pharmaceuticals and pesticides;

global marketing (by MNCs) hascreated new outlets for these

goods in (developing countries of)the global South and Far East. [1] [ 1] Jan Aart Scholte Globalization. A critical introduction , (New York: St.Martins Press, 2000):213-214


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Environment NGOs have beenmoderately successful raising

overall global public awarenessand in one particular instance,pressuring most countries to sign

an international agreement todeal with the environmental issue

of CFCs and ozone depletion.


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The ozone regime establishedthrough the 1985 Vienna

Convention and the 1987 MontrealProtocol was particularly successfulinitially, but less so more recently.

By 1997 world production of mostozone-depleting substances hadfallen to 76 percent of the 1988

level.


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1. The limited number of uses forCFCs also weren t considered

essential in much of the world2. DuPont scientists were able to

develop an economically suitable

replacement chemical (HFCs)3. Only a few MNCs, operating

mainly in the developed world,

were producers of CFCs


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Unfortunately, progress on other

environmental issues, such ascutting the CO2 emissions thatcontribute to climate change, has

been slow to non-existent inmost countries around the world.


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In the classical economics model,the search for and development

of economical substitutes for anyproduct is driven by a need or a

desire by consumers andproducers for lower cost

alternatives.


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Figure 1: Inflation adjusted price ofimported oil for past ten years vs 1981 peak


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Figure 2: Inflation adjusted real vs. nominalprice of imported oil past 30 years

Imported Crude Oil Prices: Nominal and Rea l

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Short Term Energy Outlook-January 2009

Dollarsper

barrel

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Projections


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Figure 3: Inflation adjusted real vs.nominal price of gasoline for past 90 years

Real Gasoline Pump Price: Annual Average 1919- 2010

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Short Term Energy Outlook January 2009

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It is therefore hard to envision anyinternational agreement to

regulate the use of fossil fuels andreduce greenhouse gas emissionsbeing as achievable or successful

as the agreement on ozonedepletion, especially since the

world's two biggest emitters, theUS and China, have still not cut

their outputs under Kyoto.


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Figure 4: Total EU greenhouse gasemissions in relation to the Kyoto target


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Given this lack of progress, someenvironmentalists have now

come to the conclusion that amore expeditious way to

address their environmentalconcerns might be through the

use of existing internationalagreements and publicinternational law.


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Currently, the only existinginternational institution within

the framework of publicinternational law that is in aposition to mediate and

adjudicate environmentalissues and global trade

disputes, is the WTO.


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The WTO Appellate Bodydecision in the Shrimp-Turtles

dispute actually strengthens the

right of the state to adoptconservation measures(sympathetic to environmental

NGO concerns) by a liberal

interpretation of exhaustiblenatural resources [1]

[1] Tanyarat Mungkalarungsi The Trade and Environment Debate Tulane Journalof International and Comparative Law, Vol. 10 (2002): 381


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My analysis of the WTO AppellateBody s decision in Shrimp-

Turtles suggests that best alliesfor NGOs would be sympatheticWTO member states that are

both willing to implement traderelated environmental

restrictions and also applythese policies fairly.


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How do you persuadegovernments to be more

sympathetic toenvironmental concerns andto implement trade relatedenvironmental restrictions?


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Environmentalists should alsoconcentrate on developing

relationships with their nativecountry s business and social elites.

If business and social elites can beconvinced that there is an urgentneed for action, then they will makesure government officials cooperate.


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What is ultimately needed?

An international institution suchas a World EnvironmentOrganization (WEO), with

enough regulatory andgovernance powers to protectsociety and the environmentfrom the negative impacts of

climate change.

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Why We Are Not Regulating Carbon