Wild  Thorns  Living  Between  the  Impossible  and  the  Absurd  Dara  Hazeghi  

My cousin kills a man and I carry off his daughter. Tragedy or farce? War is called many things: brutal, cruel, wasteful and vicious among others. Yet as Sahar Khalifeh illustrates in Wild Thorns war is, above all, absurd. Wild Thorns is about war. It is about war within the Palestinian community, as well as war between the Palestinian and Israeli communities. It is about the twin absurdities that can come out of idealism and pragmatism. The Occupied West Bank of 1972 is described as a society under assault from the outside and the inside. Yet that society, despite the misfortunes of its citizens, soldiers on. Although a novel is by definition not history, an accurate portrayal of society, even if fictional, can provide real historical insight. The interior discussion of Wild Thorns boils down to one question: how can the Palestinian people survive under occupation? The two cousins, Usama and Adil, represent the two primary approaches. Usama is the young idealist, just returned from the Gulf. He holds that survival and political independence are one and the same. So long as the Occupation endures, Usama’s sanity and existence depends upon resistance. Adil is Usama’s foil, a pragmatist of necessity, because the responsibility for the family’s material survival rests on his shoulders. For him survival requires food on the table, and that means that the Occupation must be dealt with on its own terms. The rift between Usama and Adil also exists at a higher level. Usama is a former emigrant. He worked in the Gulf. He is politically active, tied body and soul to the

PLO.1 What Usama lacks is a real connection to the ‘people’ of Palestine. Indeed, he despises many of those he meets, either as materialists, like Shahada, or collaborators, like Zuhdi, or both. Usama convinces himself that he has no stake in the humdrum day-to-day lives of Palestinians. The ‘revolution’ is everything to him, to the point that if his cousin, Adil, is in the bus that Usama blows up, Usama thinks he can accept the loss.

Usama stands for the politically active Palestinian expatriates who became particularly important in the wake of the spectacular 1967 defeat of Nasser and pan-Arabism. Yasser Arafat is of course the most notorious member of this group. He went to university in Egypt after 1948 and worked in the Gulf for a few years. Thus by the time he began directing PLO operations in 1968, he had not been in the country for two decades, and likely had little connection to those who had remained behind. It is thus unsurprising that he was quite willing to conduct risky cross-border raids and attacks into Israeli-controlled areas. It was the people there, not him, who paid the price when Israel retaliated. Usama’s polar opposite, Adil, is stuck with the less-

rewarding and ultimately more difficult task of keeping a large family financially solvent. His responsibility to the family outweigh other considerations, and so while he is hardly thrilled, he is willing to work in Israel as a laborer, if that’s what is necessary to make ends meet. Adil is a pragmatist not because it’s the ideology that he finds most attractive, but because it’s the likeliest method to keep food on the table. For his part, Adil’s position was certainly not unique. Faced with limited economic opportunities in the West Bank, high inflation and crippling Israeli taxation, an enormous number of people undoubtedly did what he did. To Usama they are of course collaborators and traitors, but it is likely that they would have been equally happy with an independent Palestine, had they seen a means of achieving that did not require their families to starve. It is this difference in attitudes that forces many social cleavages within Palestinian society to the forefront of the book. Usama is repeatedly derided for his neat clothing. To many, his attire indicates that he is well enough off that he can afford to ‘make revolution.’ They on the other hand cannot, and they resent having their patriotism questioned. This comes out again and again. Usama’s encounter with the bread seller is a perfect example of this. Usama assails him for selling bread made in Israel. The bread seller responds: “Look friend, we’re not the first to work with them. While we were still wandering the streets of Nablus looking for bread to eat, your kind were running around Tel Aviv looking for companies to award you                                                                                                                1  Palestine  Liberation  Organization,  founded  in  1964,  with  the  goal  of  liberating  Palestine  from  the  forces  of  occupation,   through   armed   struggle.     The   PLO   considers   itself   the   primary   representative   of   the   Palestinian  people  in  Israel,  although  it  was  considered,  by  Israel  and  the  USA,  a  ‘terrorist  organization’  until  1991.  

Yasser  Arafat    

franchises so you could sell their products (68).” The upper class is fatally compromised in the eyes of the bread seller. They form a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’2, always willing to put Israeli pounds before Palestinian people. They are illegitimate. Obviously the problem with this is that with the traditional community leaders thoroughly discredited, who will move in and take their place? Interestingly enough, Usama would probably agree with many of the bread seller’s criticisms. He has no patience for his grandfather who spends day and night complaining to journalists. A grandfather, it may be added, who was a member of the pre-Occupation elite. Usama wants action, not talk, and he chides Adil repeatedly for this. In point of fact, Usama is supposed to be part of a new resistance movement. The PLO was founded in 1964, and certainly once Yasser Arafat took over, it remained largely free of the taint of the previous generation of failed leaders. As a representative of this emerging organization, Usama is supposed to stand for the new, not the old. The obvious background to all this is the Occupation, which added its own dose of absurdity. Palestinians were taxed heavily with ‘liberty taxes’, which went to pay for their continued occupation. The taxes they paid for food went to subsidize Israeli agriculture. The money they were supposed to contribute to the Histadrut3 was used to maintain high wages for the Israelis. The list goes on. Adil and Zuhdi highlight the impossibilities of the situation. Adil realizes that even the Jewish workers are not treated well, in absolute terms. They too are being exploited, he decides. Yet when Zuhdi and Shlomo end up in a fight, and Adil is unable to stop it, he becomes an eager participant, enraged that his efforts at “Middle East peace” had been rebuffed so rudely. It is later Adil who comforts the Israeli wife of the officer that his brother, Usama, had killed. Yet it is also he who tears the epaulets off the dead officer’s uniform, because of what they symbolize. Further, it is Adil who in the end pays the price of Usama’s recklessness, and it is the house he worked so hard to keep that the Israelis demolish.

                                                                                                               2  An  interesting  term  which  suggests  that  indigenous  collaborators  (Palestinian  traders  and  merchants)  could  benefit   from   their   association   with   Israeli   policymakers,   and   which   complicates   the   security   of   those   under  occupation—take  similar  roles,  or  resist  more  forcefully?    Either  way,  more  Palestinians  are  at  risk.    The  concept  has   its   roots   in   Asian   colonialism,   particularly   in   Hong   Kong,   Macau   and   Shanghai,   where   British   (and   other  European   masters)   were   successful   in   extending   their   economic   hegemony   by   having   trade   in   non-­‐Asian  products  facilitated  by  Chinese  merchants—thus,  oppression  by  the  Europeans  becomes  substantially  faceless.  3  The  Histadrut   is   a   federation   of   Israeli   industrial   groups,   and   is   the   economic   base   of   Israel’s   government,  society,  and  security.    It  has  been  criticized  as  an  instrument  of  economic  oppression,  and  not  just  to  Palestinians.  

Nationalism4 in this story is not a hero but a villain. It is nationalism that prompts Usama and Basil to destroy their family. It is nationalism that kills Zuhdi. It is nationalism that utterly fails to offer any practical solutions to day-to-day problems, serving instead as an absurd chimera for the gullible and the naïve. Nationalism is exhibited as being devoid of any foundation, and thus merely another castle in the sky on which the foolish dote. Instead, what one sees is a form of resigned solidarity. Bonds between individuals tend to be local. There are no national networks save, perhaps, the PLO. While people locally look after each other, that’s the extent of it. Meanwhile, social fragmentation runs deep. The poor distrust the well off. The well off disdain the poor. In terms of organization the society seems scarcely less fractious than it did in the years after the Arab revolt. On the part of the ‘revolutionaries’, there is a brutal contempt for those who try merely to live their lives. It is worth mentioning that the Occupation was consciously designed to have these sorts of effects. Israel most certainly had no intention of allowing nationalism to spread if it could prevent it. Their policies were intended to do more than undermine the Palestinian economy. By weakening local businesses, they made people dependent on Israel for goods and employment. Dependency, as we saw with Adil, clearly reduces political tendencies. The policy of house demolitions had much the same effect. The consequences of living under the same roof as a PLO fighter for any period would be homelessness. Once homeless, some would no doubt blame the PLO. While the Israelis did not cause the deep divisions in Palestinian society, they were happy to profit from them. At a broader historical level, Wild Thorns offers a plausible explanation for the seeming inaction of Palestinian society under Occupation until the late 1980s.5 The divisions detailed were not the sort of things easily papered over, and the forced dependence, combined with isolation and partial estrangement from those most eager to fight the Occupation, made matters doubly difficult. The political response of Palestinians was to some degree a victim of circumstance as well: those who could resist by sacrificing did, those who couldn’t didn’t. These are of course generalizations, but in a good number of cases, they seem justified. Survival within Wild Thorns boils down to navigating the many treacherous conflicts afoot in the Occupied territories. On the one hand, all fought Israel, since all attempted to continue to live in the area. Even passive Adil was fighting, for by keeping his family alive, and in Palestine, he was opposing Israeli policy. At the same time, Palestinians were fighting each other, over strategy, over leadership                                                                                                                4  Consider   how   Khalifeh   devalorizes   nationalism   throughout   the   novel;   by   making   it   a   villain,   what   then  becomes   the  heroic?    What   signified   becomes   valorized?     How   does   this   perpetuate   the   conflict,   rather   than  promote  peaceful  solutions?  5  The   Intifada   was   a   Palestinian   uprising   against   the   Israeli   occupation   of   the   Palestinian   Territories,   which  lasted   from   December   1987   until   the   Madrid   Conference   in   1991.     The   militant   groups   Hamas   and   Fatah  originated   in   the   context   of   the   Intifada,   and   their   supporters   regard   the   Intifada   as   a   protest   against   Israeli  repression   including   extrajudicial   killings,   mass   detentions,   house   demolitions,   forced  migrations,   relocations  and  deportations.    The  Intifada  represents  the  first  active  radicalization  of  Palestinian  resistance  to  the  Israeli  policies—we  can  perceive  this,  perhaps,  as  a  systemic  triumph  of  the  values  Usama  represents.  

and over the means of resistance. From these struggles to achieve the (nearly) impossible, the absurd emerges as a natural outgrowth. It is in such a situation that war between those who should be friends becomes as vicious as war between enemies. Fortunately, Sahar Khalifeh indicates, Palestinians in the Occupied territories in 1972 had adapted to surviving the almost impossible situation. If they could not completely reconcile black and white, they came as close as was humanly possible.

http://myownlittleworld.com/miscellaneous/writings/wild-thorns.html 17 July 2005

Discussion  Questions  

1. What is intended by the description of Palestine as, “the promised land?” For Israelis, the right of return6 is guaranteed in the 1948 Constitution; what is ironic about this policy, given the recent history of European Jews?

2. The opening chapter of Wild Thorns introduces the concept of the death of romanticism (and romance) as signified by the character of Usama. Obviously, this is not a love story as such; therefore explain what is inferred by the introduction of this subtext in the motivations of Usama, and the Palestinians he represents.

3. Usama is returning to the West Bank—evaluate the interactions he has at the IDF checkpoint. What impressions of this exchange does Khalifeh impart to her reader? What literary techniques help her achieve this effect? Consider the psychological and emotional dimensions of this ‘relationship’ and the greater whole it represents.

4. Consider the mirroring of Usama’s interrogation with the unseen woman’s assault by the IDF officers in an adjacent room—what, essentially, unifies their experience at the hands of the IDF officers? What are two possible (and typical) justifiable reactions to these events?

5. Usama thinks to himself, “What had happened to these people? Was this what the occupation had done to them? Where was there will to resist, their steadfastness? His disgust erupted into an angry question: ‘Where’s the resistance then?’(21)” How does this echo what Foucault7 has suggested to

                                                                                                               6  The  Law  of  Return  is  legislation  enacted  by  Israel  in  1950,  that  gives  all  Jews,  persons  of  Jewish  ancestry,  and  spouses   of   Jews   the   right   to   immigrate   to   and   settle   in   Israel   and   obtain   citizenship,   and   obliges   the   Israeli  government   to   facilitate   their   immigration.   Originally,   the   law   applied   to   Jews   only,   until   a   1970   amendment  stated  that  the  rights  "are  also  vested  in  a  child  and  a  grandchild  of  a  Jew,  the  spouse  of  a  Jew,  the  spouse  of  a  child   of   a   Jew   and   the   spouse   of   a   grandchild   of   a   Jew".     As   for   Palestinians,   these   rights   have   never   been  acknowledged.    The  government  of  Israel  views  Palestinian  assertions  of  the  right  to  return  as  baseless,  and  does  not  view  the  admission  of  Palestinian  refugees  to  their  former  homes  in  Israel  as  a  right,  but  rather  as  a  political  claim  to  be  resolved  as  part  of  a  final  peace  settlement,  that  is  systematically  complicated  by  the  occupation  of  both   the  West  Bank  and   the  Gaza  Strip  (and  later,  the  Golan  Heights),  all   traditional   ‘homelands’   to  Palestinian  communities.  7  Recall   that  some  of  Foucault’s   research  basis   involved   the  social  dynamics  of  prisons  and  prisoners,  a  useful  analogue   to  appreciate  occupation.     In  his  Discipline  and  Punish:  The  Birth  of  the  Prison,  Foucault   suggests   that  reforms   in  penal   institutions  moved  away   from  rehabilitation  (read  assimilation)   to  simple  exertions  of  power  through  subjection,  and  humiliation.    More  on  this  later  in  the  novel…  

us about how institutions of power operate? What might we surmise will be Usama’s motivations, as he reintegrates into West Bank society?

6. Khalifeh’s novel largely interrogates the variable tactics of dealing with occupation, as personified by the characters of Usama and his cousin Adil. Define and evaluate how Adil reacts to occupation in a fundamentally different manner than Usama—what is involved in the opposition between Idealism / Pragmatism?

At this point, it might be worthwhile to apply what we know about Jungian archetypes as we deconstruct the dyadic parallelism Khalifeh builds with Usama and Adil. Each feels their own shame, derived from the same initiating and existential circumstance. Adil’s protestations aren’t convincing, least of all to himself; Usama’s disbelief at the learned helplessness dimension of his people under occupation disgusts him (and reminds Adil, too). Perhaps Khalifeh is inviting us to consider

Adil and Usama as a unity of the Self and the Shadow. The dark impulses that are the signifiers of Usama balanced by the equivocations and rationalizations of Adil, whose considerations are legitimized by the fact they are made to perpetuate the survival of his family—in doing so, he too defeats Israeli intentions, but by different means. If we consider Martin Seligman’s8 animal experiments to interrogate the biologic dimensions of depression, at the University of Pennsylvania in 1967, we can recognize his theory of learned helplessness, and how cognitive restructuring does, in fact, occur. Subjects under occupation lose the will to resist; they fail to see the potential for hope in hopeless situations. Some may resort to ever more extreme (but ultimately self-defeating) measures.

7. With his mother and cousin, Nuwar, perhaps we have a sense of the fractured anima within this Usama/Adil unity. In what ways do both of these women subtly indicate their appreciation for Usama, at the expense of an equal admiration for the efforts of Adil? What is inferred that Usama’s mother believes, “God will settle everything (32)” and what contrast is suggested that Nuwar believes, “We’ll settle it all ourselves. (34)” Is there an argument Khalifeh may be making as to the religious nature of the modern conflict?

                                                                                                               8  The   concept   of   learned   helplessness   was   discovered   accidentally   by   psychologists   Martin   Seligman   and  Steven   F.   Maier.   They   had   initially   observed   helpless   behavior   in   dogs   that   were   classically   conditioned   to  expect  an  electrical  shock  after  hearing  a  tone.    The  impact  of  learned  helplessness  has  been  demonstrated  in  a  number  of  different  animal  species,  but  its  effects  can  also  be  seen  in  people.  Consider  one  often-­‐used  example:  A  child  who  performs  poorly  on  math   tests   and  assignments  will   quickly  begin   to   feel   that  nothing   he  does  will  have   any   effect   on   his   math   performance.   When   later   faced   with   any   type   of   math-­‐related   task,   he   may  experience   a   sense   of   helplessness.     Learned   helplessness   has   also   been   associated   with   several   different  psychological   disorders—depression,   anxiety,   phobias,   shyness   and   loneliness   can   all   be   exacerbated   by  learned  helplessness.  

Martin  Seligman  

8. While searching for Adil at his home, Usama meets Adil and Nuwar’s younger brother, Basil, who introduces his friends, who are having a heated discussion as to the Israeli policy of education—are there ironic comparisons to be made with the policy described with the following excerpt? What effect is created in the reader’s imagination? Why does this cause Usama to feel some hope? First,  at  elementary  school,  we’re  repressed  and  tamed.    Then  at  secondary  school,  our  personalities  are  crushed.    In  high  school  they  foist  an  obsolete  curriculum  on  us  and  our   families   begin  pressuring  us   to   get   the  highest   grades   so  we   can  become  doctors   and   engineers.     Once   we’ve   actually   become   doctors   and   engineers,   they  demand  that  we  pay  them  back   for  the  cost  of  our  studies.    And  our  parents  don’t  work  their  fingers  to  the  bone  to  pay  for  our  education  so  that  we’ll  return  and  work  for  peanuts  at  home.     So   the  only   solution   is   emigration,  which  means  working   in  Saudi  Arabia,   Libya,   and   the  Gulf.    What’s   the   result   of   all   this?     Educated  people  leave  the  county,  and  only  workers  and  peasants  remain.    And  that’s  exactly  what  Israel  wants  to  happen.  (59)  

9. Examine the interchange between Usama and the Breadseller (67-69) which

makes Usama feel “…alienated and impotent.” To what extent could it be argued that he feels this way due to a sense of class guilt,9 for his (though not personally we can surmise) complicity with the Israeli policy at times in the past? In what ways is Usama more and more an outsider in Palestine? What danger does he represent for those such as Adil and the Breadseller?

10. How would you describe and justify the position of Zuhdi? (75-80) What painful truths does he provide Usama, and why do both Adil and Usama feel ashamed by the implications of Zuhdi’s statements? In what way might the reader consider Zuhdi to be the wisest of all the characters we’ve encountered thus far? Why is that problematic?

11. One of the more notable aspects of Wild Thorns is the rich emotional texture

that has been achieved with these characters, particularly with Adil and Usama. At the centre of the novel (81-102) Khalifeh crafts a detailed description of this disparity between Usama and Adil, as they try to understand each other:

a. Consider the tu quoque10 logical fallacy—Usama is convinced that

Zuhdi is not patriotic—how is Zuhdi, in fact, Usama’s ally, at least ideologically?

b. Describe the internal conflict for Usama at this point of the novel. What is the moral hazard that gives him pause in his efforts to carry out

                                                                                                               9  With  roots  in  Marxist  theory,  class  guilt  is  simply  that  recognition  that  manifests  itself  as  personal  conflict  for  those  who  benefit  in  terms  of  economics,  circumstance,  power  or  privilege  because  of  their  willing  complicity  to  work   for   the   benefit   of   themselves   as   proxies   of   the   bourgeoisie,   while   still   deriving   their   identity   as  proletarian,  whom  they  abandon  all  allegiance  to.    Orwell  might  well  consider  them  as  ‘nonpersons.’    In  classic  Marxism,  class  guilt  acts  as  a  check  on  individualistic  compulsions,  and  thus  disempowers  the  bourgeoisie.  10  Tu  Quoque  is  avoiding  having  to  engage  with  criticism  by  turning  it  back  on  the  accuser—answering  criticism  with  criticism.    Usama  is  the  master  of  this,  and  is  rather  cavalier  in  how  he  deploys  it.  

his mission on the Egged buses? How does his mission, if successful, perversely achieve the Israeli government’s objectives? What is the effect upon the reader that Usama doesn’t realize this?

c. Consider the scene at the café where Usama overhears the

conversation of Palestinian workers (89-91); is there a difference to how the reader receives this information and how Usama does? If the reality of Palestinian submission is a class struggle, what is it based upon, and are there possible solutions?

12. Ultimately, what decisions does Usama make after his attempt for Adil and

he “…to understand each other” fails? What fundamental differences between the two cousins are illustrated through their conversation in the Saada neighbourhood? From your point of view, is Usama the real “instrument of the enemy?” Why or why not?

13. Evaluate the prison sequences of Zuhdi and Basil—both receive an explicit and implicit introduction to Marxist theory11—however, there are differences in the interactions each has: Basil becomes intoxicated with rhetoric, while Zuhdi has to resist the suspicions that he is a spy. How do we make sense of what is happening to them, in a Foucauldian12 sense, and to what extent do you feel either of them may survive the prison with their beliefs (or innocence) intact? Consider the conflicts that each has to deal with.

14. The climax of Khalifeh’s narrative revolves around Usama’s missions—a knife

attack on an IDF lieutenant in a market, and the bombing attack on the Egged worker’s buses moving out of Nablus into Israel.

a. Evaluate Um Sabir’s rapidly shifting allegiances during the attack at

the greengrocer’s—how do you explain this psychologically? What immediate questions are prompted in the reader?

b. When the IDF officers come to Usama’s mother’s home, she too demonstrates conflicted emotions—why do you think this is so? What values are at the core of these conflicts?

c. Zuhdi’s release from detention punctuates these scenes involving Usama—why do you feel Khalifeh has placed this event here as a counterpoint to the central action? What purpose does it serve?

d. Reread the chapter detailing the attack on the Egged buses (179—185) and discuss the techniques the author uses to intensify the

                                                                                                               11  Basil  is  immediately  set  upon  by  the  older  prisoners,  who  heap  him  with  praise  and  a  new  nom  de  guerre,  Abu  al-­‐Izz   (father   of   glory),   while   Zuhdi’s   nemesis   in   cell   23,   Adil   (spot   the   binary   there),   has   co-­‐opted   all   of   the  prisoners  in  an  impromptu  course  of  dialectical  materialism—literally,  a  captive  audience.    In  both  cases,  the  rhetoric   of  Marxist   theory   as   it   applies   to   the   condition  of   the  Palestinians   is   largely  perceived   as  hollow  and  impractical,  although  it  is  intoxicating  to  Basil.  12  Recall   that   Foucault   tells   us   that   institutions   of   power   cannot   exist   as   spontaneous   events—they   are  constructed  by  (in  Marxist  terms),  the  proletariat.    One  cannot  be  oppressed  without  consent.  

chaotic action, the shifting loyalties, and moral equivocations of the ‘actors’ in the scene. Considering the interplay between Zuhdi and Usama, who are both dying of their wounds, what is the overall impression for the reader?

15. As the novel closes, Khalifeh brings us back to the real centre of the

narrative—the al-Karmi family. The youngest members of the family are Adil’s brother and sister, Basil and Nuwar, and with their final developments in the novel, we can fully synthesize the author’s commentary on the insidious destructiveness of occupation—it’s not so much an enemy without as it is an enemy within.

a. Consider the final development of Nuwar’s character (186-201) and how she signifies a feminist locus for the novel, and the psychology of occupation itself. In what ways is she neither a feminist nor a revolutionary? Why is it significant that these two terms are unified in this context?

b. In what ways is she exactly like her brother, despite the fact that she spends much of her time ridiculing him throughout the story?

c. Abu Adil calls his youngest son Basil a “…prodigal13 brat” (196) who

has impugned most of the members of his family for various modes of cowardice. What do you think motivates him to destroy his own family, as the IDF soldiers move closer and closer to arresting Basil?14 What impression upon the reader would you suggest is intended by Khalifeh that Basil escapes the consequences of his participation in Usama’s terror cell, and the consequences of the summary destruction of his family?

d. Ultimately, what do Adil, Nuwar, and Basil each personify in the

context of the Israeli Occupation? Which character is the most tragic? Which is the most farcical, or otherwise absurd? Why do you feel the author wants this ‘question’ to be resident in our minds as we evaluate the al-Karmi’s at their ignominious end? You may wish to involve your understandings of Seligman’s learned helplessness theory and the notion of cognitive restructuring.

                                                                                                               13  Compare  this  with  the  Biblical  story  (Abrahamic  traditions  notwithstanding)  of  the  prodigal  son.    In  this  story,  from   the  Gospel   of   Luke,   a   father   gives   his   two   sons   his   inheritance   before   he   dies.   The   younger   son,   after  wasting  his   fortune   (prodigal  means   ‘wasteful  and  extravagant’)   goes  hungry  during  a   famine.  He   then   returns  home,  hoping   for  redemption  by  renouncing  his  kinship   to  his   father.  Regardless,   the   father   finds  him  on   the  road   and   immediately  welcomes  him  back   as   his   son   and  holds   a   feast   to   celebrate   his   return.   The   older   son  refuses  to  participate,  stating  that  in  all  the  time  he  has  worked  for  the  father,  he  did  not  even  receive  a  goat  to  celebrate  with  his  friends.  The  father  reminds  the  older  son  that  everything  the  father  has  is  the  older  son's  (his  inheritance)  but  that  they  should  still  celebrate  the  return  of  the  younger  son.    Consider  the  parallels  here  that  Basil,   signifies   that   wasteful   extravagance,   an   indulgence   in   vengeful   idealism.     According   to   a  more   recent  reading  these  interconnected  parables   from  Luke—the  Lost  Sheep,  the  Lost  Coin,  and  the  Prodigal  Son—are  a  unity  unto  themselves;  the  younger  son,  who  strays  far  from  home,  equates  with  the  lost  sheep,  while  the  elder  son,  who  remains  at  home,  corresponds  to  the  lost  coin.  One  went  far,  one  stayed  near,  yet  both  were  lost.    Are  both  Basil  and  Adil  lost?  14  You  may  wish  to  evaluate  Basil’s  actions  in  the  context  of  what  the  Greeks  called  a  Pyrrhic  victory.  

16. In the final scene of the novel, the IDF demolishes the al-Karmi home, for the

crime of harboring the ‘terrorist’ Basil. Although this is easily read as tragic, as Khalifeh directs us through the description of Adil’s internal monologue, what argument can you substantiate that this is also farcical, and that in the end, these Israeli policies are likely to be successful in continuing the marginalization of the Palestinians under Occupation? What power do the Palestinians actually possess?

17. Hazeghi, in the initial reading, has provided a succinct analysis of the role of nationalism in the development of Khalifeh’s novel. He writes, “It is nationalism that utterly fails to offer any practical solutions to day-to-day problems, serving instead as an absurd chimera for the gullible and the naïve.” What, in the final reflection, do you feel should be taken away from the novel in terms of the discourse it develops regarding nationalism? How can we contextualize it in other forms (Thailand15 perhaps, but there are numerous others) to best understand Khalifeh’s more general thesis?

                                                                                                               15  Thaiification—or  Thai-­‐ization  is  the  process  by  which  people  of  different  cultural  and  ethnic  origins  living  in  Thailand   become   assimilated   to   the   dominant   Thai   culture,   or   more   precisely,   to   the   culture   of   the   Central  Thais.   Thaification  was   a   step   in   the   creation   in   the   20th   century   of   the   Thai   nation   state  where   Thai   people  occupy   a   dominant   position,   away   from   the   historically   multicultural   kingdom   of   Siam.   Thaification   is   a  byproduct   of   the   nationalist   policies   consistently   followed   by   the   Thai   state   after   the   Siamese   coup   d'état   of  1933.  The  coup  leaders,  often  said  to  be  inspired  by  Western  ideas  of  an  exclusive  nation  state,  acted  more  in  accordance   with   their   close   German   nationalist   and   anti-­‐democratic   counterparts   (pre-­‐Nazi)   to   effect  kingdom-­‐wide  dominance  by  the  Central  Thais.  The  businesses  of  interspersed  minorities,  like  the  traditionally  merchant  Thai   Chinese,  were   aggressively   acquired   by   the   state,  which   gave   preferential   contracts   to   ethnic  Thais   as   well   as   collaborative   Ethnic   Chinese   (again,   a   kind   of   comprador   bourgeoisie).     Thai   identity   was  mandated  and  reinforced  both  in  the  heartlands  and  in  rural  areas.  Central  Thailand  became  economically  and  politically   dominant,   and  Central   Thai   (differentiated   from  multi-­‐lingual   Siamese)   became   the   state-­‐mandated  language   of   the   media,   business,   education   and   all   state   agencies.   Central   Thai   values   were   successfully  inculcated   into  being  perceived  as  the  desirable  national  values,  with   increasing  proportions  of   the  population  identified   as   Thai.   Central   Thai   culture,   being   the   culture   of  wealth   and   status,  made   it   hugely   attractive   to   a  once-­‐diverse  population  seeking  to  be  identified  with  nationalist  unity.    The  main  targets  of  Thaification  have  been  ethnic  groups  on  the  edges  of  the  Kingdom  of  Thailand,  geographically  and  culturally:  the  Lao  of  Isan,  the  hill  tribes  of  the  north  and  west,  and  the  Muslim  Malay  minority  of  the  south.    There  has  also  been  a  Thaification  of  the  large  immigrant  Chinese  population.    In  all  relevant  respects,  Thaiification  is,  as  Foucault  has  suggested,  a  confiscation   of   identity,   enacted  by  hegemonic   systems  of   subjection,  humiliation,   and  other   socio-­‐economic  oppression.