Philosophical Review

Wilhelm Wundts Stellung zur Erkenntnistheorie Kants by Willi NefReview by: G. W. CunninghamThe Philosophical Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan., 1914), p. 99Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2178518 .

Accessed: 14/05/2014 17:23

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to The Philosophical Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.35 on Wed, 14 May 2014 17:23:39 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

No. I.] NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS. 99

ming up his position, he says that an immediate knowledge of the external world is impossible, that "this knowledge is only possible through carrying over to the external world the counterpart (Erscheinung) of our ego (Ich)"; in other words, it is necessary for us to anthropomorphize the external world before we can know it (p. 41). Such is the presupposition of knowledge.

It is not very easy to see why this doctrine, if carried to its logical conclu- sion, would not land us in the same predicament in which Berkeley found himself. Indeed, if meaning is put into the metaphors used, it is not easy to see that the theory differs essentially from Berkeley's. One cannot but wonder how, if we must know only through the objectification of the ego, we can ever know anything but the ego. Of course it is necessary for us to anthropomorphize, we must create the world after our own image; but to insist that this anthropomorphizing tendency is the logical presupposition of the knowing process seems to leave us suspended in the air catching at straws. It would seem that, if we insist that all we have to start with is the Ich, then the Ich is all we have when we end our speculations. But perhaps the author will clear up some of these difficulties in a later discussion.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM. MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

Wilhelm Wundts Stellung zur Erkenntnistheorie Kants. Von Dr. WILLI NEF. Berlin, Leonhard Simion Nf., I9I3.-PP. 47.

In current philosophical literature, Wundt's epistemological theory has not received the consideration that it deserves. The explanation of this, in the opinion of the author of the present monograph, is probably to be found in the fact that Wundt has not followed the usual custom of taking Kant as his point of departure. It seems appropriate, therefore, in order that those whose overlook or misunderstand Wundt's doctrines may get a clear notion of them,, to compare his epistemology with that of Kant. This service to the Wundtianm theory of knowledge Dr. Nef undertakes. In the present work, which is the sixth volume of the Bibliothek fur Philosophie, the author devotes himself exclusively to the historical problem of indicating the relation between the epistemology of Wundt and that of the K6nigsberg philosopher. The critical discussion of problems here raised the author reserves for future consideration.

The monograph opens with a short review of Wundt's general epistemological standpoint and a statement of Wundt's view of Kant's historical position. The body of the essay deals with the following problems: subject and object; the forms of intuition, space and time; and the fundamental concepts of the understanding, universality, substance, causality, and purpose. The pamphlet concludes with a brief discussion of the Ding-an-sich.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM. MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.35 on Wed, 14 May 2014 17:23:39 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions