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Final Term Paper for Historical Practices I
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Amador 1
Julianna AmadorWilliam “Boss” Tweed: “Something for Everyone”
April 12, 1878 was the end of an era. It was a cool day in New York City.1 With spring
arriving only twenty-two days prior, the crocuses were in bloom within the vast landscape that
would soon become Central Park, just in time for Easter Sunday—the holiest day in the Catholic
Religion. Easter of 1878 would be the first celebrated within the city limits after the death of the
most powerful Irish-Catholic New York City politician of the nineteenth century. It was the day
William “Boss” Tweed died. At the age of fifty-five, Tweed succumbed to a battle with
pneumonia, dying in his prison cell at the Ludlow-Street Jail at noon with his team of doctors
and lawyers by his bedside.2 Though the “Boss” of New York City had died, his legacy, laced
with elements heavily rooted within machine politics—political corruption, money and property
theft—has remained a prominent topic within the study of the political and economic history of
New York City’s working class.
Many Progressive historians analyzing Boss Tweed and the reign of the Tammany Ring
under his rule view Tweed in a negative fashion, citing how his role in New York City’s
Democratic political machine had a pervasive effect on the city’s working class population.
Seymour J. Manelbaum has illustrated Tweed and the Tammany Ring’s profound impact on New
York City, discussing of the city before, during, and after the reign of Tweed—elaborating on
Tweed redistributing power within the city’s public works program, manipulation of the city
charter, and massive amount of debt accrued during his serving as state senator.3 Tweed’s
handling of education funds has also led historians to criticize his actions. Benjamin Justice
depicts Tweed’s economic policies being hampered with corruption, citing how Tweed allowed
1 “Weather,” The New York Times, April 13, 1878, 5.2 “Death of William M. Tweed: The Ex-Tammany Chief’s Last Hours in Jail,” The New York Times, April 13, 1878, 1.3 Seymour J. Manelbaum, Boss Tweed’s New York (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), 26.
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for public funds to be provided to private, parochial—the majority being Catholic based
institutions— schools in New York City, exemplifying his loyalty and favoritism towards his
fellow Irish-Catholic constituents over the remainder of the working class.4 Corresponding with
Tweed’s alleged favoritism of Irish-Catholic constituents, Tyler Anbinder analyzes Tweed’s
involvement in the prominent Nativist organization, Order of United Americans, before he
obtained any type of public office. Anibinder forces one to question if the policies of the
Tammany Ring exemplified Tweed’s perception on immigrants.5 It is as if these historians,
writing about Boss Tweed at various points in time since his death seem to overlook many
aspects and qualities of Tweed that made him a good leader—one that helped the working class
population of New York City.
Although an overwhelming amount of historical literature illustrates Tweed as having a
negative influence on New York City’s working class, a few historians, along with political
scientists, have come to reevaluate Tweed’s political and economic policies during the height of
his power. James C. Scott has broken down the development and practices of nineteenth century
political machines as an effective and legitimate form of government for this time for the sake of
controlling constituents unable to advocate for themselves—thus defending Tweed’s tight
control over the New York City government.6 Echoing Scott’s notion, David R. Colburn and
George E. Pozzetta have attributed Tweeds economic and political policies as providing great
assistance to immigrants looking to assimilate into American society.7 Though these historians
have come to re-evaluate Tweed’s legacy, these authors do not deny that he was heavily involved
4 Benjamin Justice, “Thomas Nast and the Public Schools of the 1870’s,” History of Education Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2005): 177.5 Tyler Anbinder, “‘Boss’ Tweed: Nativist,” Journal of the Early Republic 15, no. 1 (1995): 110.6 James C. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change,” The American Political Science Review 63, no. 4 (1969):1145.7David R. Colburn and George E. Pozzetta, “Bosses and Political Machines: Changing Interpretations in American History,” The History Teacher 9, no. 3 (1976): 455.
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in corrupt political and economic practices. The corruption Tweed became involved in has come
to overshadow his crucial role in assisting his working class constituents.
History has not been kind to Boss Tweed. Although, many historians view Tweed and
the Tammany Ring as “municipal monsters” having an overall negative impact on New York
City, Tweed and Tammany’s attempts to assist constituents has been overlooked, lost in the
corruption that plagued nineteenth century urban political systems. Though Tweed did
participate in corrupt money laundering schemes, instilled tax increases, even went as far as
stealing property and money from the state, he did in fact initiate legislation to assist the working
class, such as creating an overlooked public welfare program, as well as increasing funding for
schools within the city with the largest student body.8 In addition, he was also responsible for
naturalizing numerous new immigrants as United States citizens.9 Though the ways Boss
Tweed, as well as his other Tammany members obtained funding, support and votes were
products of back door deals and manipulating legislative language, Tweed did pass legislation
with the intent of assisting his constituents. More so, Boss Tweed was employing a political
system of municipal politics—a system appropriate for this time period and his working class
constituents, consisting of a vast number of immigrants. Thus, Tweed had an extensive and
pervasive influence on the City’s working class as head of the Tammany Ring from 1869-1873,
but not to such a negative degree as depicted by nineteenth century journalists and modern day
historians.
To understand Boss Tweed his power held within New York City and the State of New
York, a brief account of his journey from a young, hardworking man to a machine politician,
filled with ambition, is essential to personify this “municipal monster” history bestowed upon
8 John W. Pratt, “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program,” New York Historical Society Quarterly 45, (1969): 400.9 Mark D. Hirsh, “More Light on Boss Tweed,” Political Science Quarterly 60, no. 2 (1945): 270.
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Tweed. An understanding of the men heavily involved in the Tammany Ring is also essential
to understanding the degree and type of corruption occurring under Tweed’s reign. The second
relevant aspect to discuss is Tweed’s political actions such as consolidating political power,
manipulating the naturalization process and bribing constituents to vote Democrat. Lastly,
economic practices and of Tweed and Tammany, ranging from participation in money
laundering schemes to legislation regarding financial support for parochial schools exemplifies
Tweed and Tammany Hall assisting working class constituents despite being extensively
involved in corruption. The political and economic legislation simultaneously benefiting Tweed,
then men of Tammany hall and working class constituents embodied the normative system of
municipal government during the late nineteenth century—political machines.
Personifying a Political System: Tweed and the Men of Tammany
The “Boss” was born and bred New Yorker with an insatiable need for money, social
advancement and power. Born on April 3, 1823 to into a working class family, William Marcy
Tweed resided at 24 North Cherry Street in the Lower East Side of Manhattan.10 From a young
age, Tweed establishing a strong work ethic, working alongside his father. As a child, Tweed
worked in his father’s business of chair making, and as he matured, morphed into a
businessperson with great aspirations; Tweed became a junior partner in his father’s brush-
making company and eventually formed his own company with his brother, Richard Tweed.11
When Tweed’s business failed because of debt accumulated from overspending, Tweed became
heavily involved in the firefighting community of New York City. Even before entering the
realm of municipal politics, Tweed stole the spotlight at the expense of others, exemplifying his
need for power. Late nineteenth century journalist, Charles Wingate elaborates on how Tweed “.
10 Denis T. Lynch, “Boss” Tweed: The Story of a Grim Generation (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927), 14.11 Lynch, “Boss Tweed,”17.
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. .Tweed was summoned before the Fire Commission for throwing obstructions in the way of a
rival engine that it should not reach a fire before his own.”12 Even years before holding any sort
of elected office, Tweed was fiscally irresponsible and satisfying his desire for advancement an
power by providing assistance—though at the expense of others— to those needing it.
Tweed’s experience within the ranks of the firefighting community of New York City
sparked his interest in public service, conditioning him to become the leader of the city’s
Democratic political machine. In 1851, Boss Tweed entered the arena of New York City politics
when elected Alderman. Two years later in 1853, Tweed was elected to Congress where he
served a lackluster single term in the house representing the sixth ward of New York City.13
Though Tweed gained political and economic power during his time in these offices and various
interest boards—such as the School Board of Commissions, which he headed in 1857— his
power reached its zenith in 1868, with his election to the New York State Senate.14 Tweed, now
being a member of the New York State government, possessed more of an advantage in carrying
out his own political will while in Albany. From the state capital, Tweed headed the Tammany
Ring and instituted political and economic policies that not only benefited him personally, but
were beneficial to his working class constituents as well. Though Tweed was able to propose
legislation reflecting his personal interest, one must realize Tweed never acted alone—the state
senate must pass all legislation proposed by a senator. Thus, Tweed never acted alone, nor did
he have as the extensive power most citizens perceived him to have. Tweed was just a man
without Tammany.
With Tweed positioned in Albany, the men incorporated into his Democratic political
machine tended their elected offices back in New York City. The magnitude of Tweed’s image 12 Charles E. Wingate, “An Episode in Municipal Government: I. The Ring,” The North American Review 119, no. 245 (1874): 363.13 Hirsh, “More Light on Boss Tweed,” 269.14 Pratt, “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program,” 399.
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embodied by his political power overshadowed that of Tammany Hall. Wingate’s multivolume
account of Tweed and Tammany’s rise to power in the early 1870s discusses this notion citing
“those who controlled the city government of New York were now supreme at Albany, and
William M. Tweed was the master spirit among that little knot of men; in him the ring was
personified.”15 Although the Tammany Ring consisted of numerous bureaucrats, three men
were the driving forces under Tweed—Abraham Oakey Hall, Richard Connolly and Peter B.
Sweeny. As the nineteenth century journalist, William R. Martin wrote, these three men were
the “the pirates” of Tammany Hall.16 Hall held the greatest amount of power within the local
offices of the Tammany Ring, transitioning from New York County’s district Attorney to Mayor
at the height of Tweed’s power. Though these two men held great amounts of power within the
Tammany Ring, Sweeny was arguably the most powerful out of the four men closest to Tweed.
Sweeny was Tweed’s right hand man—his number one crony within the Tammany
machine. Working his way up from a lobbyist with intense political aspirations stemming from
family ties within New York City politics, to District Attorney and eventually City Chamberlin,
Sweeny was the most seasoned politician out of the prominent politicians involved within the
Tammany Machine— thus becoming known as the “Brains” behind Tammany Hall during
Tweed’s time in power. Although Sweeny never admitted how much influence he held within
the Tammany system, citing how he strongly believed he was just a small piece of the puzzle that
was Tammany Hall, “I am not and never claimed to be a leader. Tweed. . . Mayor Hall and,
Comptroller Connolly and other’s I might name are more leaders than I am. I am sort of an
advisor.”17 Although Tweed is arguably the most remembered figure of Tammany Hall and
15 Charles Wingate, “An Episode of Municipal Government: II. The Reign of the Ring,” The North American Review 120, no. 246 (875): 127.16 Martin, “The Financial Resources of New York,” 427.17Wingate, “An Episode in Municipal Government,” 370.
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New York City’s Democratic political machine, the actions of these men resulted in Tweed’s rise
to power.
These men were the pillars of support of Tweed’s power, promoting and sustaining
Tweed’s popularity among his working class constituents. With Tweed serving as a senator in
Albany, it was up to Hall, Connolly and Sweeny to maintain Tweed’s greatness in the hearts and
minds of his constituents in the wake of his absence. In 1871 a movement to erect a statue of
Tweed was enacted by those closest to him, “the gentleman who have been pushing on the
project were Mr. Tweed’s peculiar friends who would no more offend him than they would
quarrel with their bread and butter.”18 Hall, Connolly and Sweeny signed their names to the
petition in support of this move to glorify Tweed. Sweeny, along with Hall, and Connolly were
the men who made it possible for Tweed to become the “Boss” of New York City—Tweed may
have been the figure head of Tammany during this time, but he never acted alone to carry out
political and economic policies. It is as if these three men, though playing a prominent role in
Tweed asserting his power over New York City, forgotten by modern day historians, being blind
sighted by the magnitude of Boss Tweed’s legacy.
Tweed’s Political System: Corrupt, Common and Helpful
The late nineteenth century was a pivotal period for the whole of Western society—
technological innovations such as steam and coal powered machinery transformed the way of life
within many nations. In the United States, the expansion of industrialization caused an influx in
immigrants flocking to the United States with the hopes of obtaining factory jobs to become
more fiscally stable, thus having a better life. At the end of the civil war, the population of New
York City was expanding so rapidly, the Grant administration administered two census reports to
determine the exact size of the population—finally reporting a total of 942, 292 people living
18 “The Philanthropic Tweed” The New York Times, March 17, 1871.
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within the city limits, and by 1870, reporting over 40% of the population in the city was foreign
born.19 An influx of immigrants moving into urban areas did not occur solely in New York City.
In the wake of overseeing a vast amount of Immigrants because of industrialization, New York
City’s municipal government was just one of numerous political machines managing
“immigrant-choked cites” such as Chicago and Boston, providing constituents with effective and
legitimate governing within the United States.20 Seeing the rise of municipal political machines
as a system of government in urban areas during the nineteenth century, Tweed and Tammany
were just following the norm of municipal politics. Tweed and the men of Tammany hall may
have participated in various corrupt practices, but the political machine these men embodied did
provide numerous forms assistance to their working class constituents—both practices common
in nineteenth century political machines.
Along with this influx of immigrants in New York City, living conditions reached an all-
time low. Overcrowded tenement houses filled the city, garbage and human excrement overran
the streets—some people had no place to go, as Denis Lynch recalls, “homeless boys and girls
roamed the streets of New York during the day, sleeping wherever night, and hunger and
weariness overtook them.”21 With the ever-expanding population of New York City consisting
of immigrants unfamiliar with prominent aspects of American Society—such as the English
language—along with unsanitary conditions, a state of disarray enveloped the city. Upon
Tweed’s election to the Senate and provocation of the New York City legislature, the city
government authorized an abundance of public works programs with the intent of improving the
condition of the city sponsoring projects consisting of constructing a system of unified pears,
19 Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed’s New York, 7-8.20 Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change,” 1143.21Lynch, Boss Tweed, 22.
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improving the sewerage system, water supply and streets.22 By doing this, Tweed improved
living conditions within the city—thus improving his constituents, overall quality of life—and
provided opportunity for government funded jobs for his constituents.
In terms of Tweed’s Democratic political machine, the ends justified the means. In 1870,
the first year Tweed served in the State Senate, he enacted his most important political policy.
Tweed, along with his associates of Tammany hall, rewrote New York County’s charter,
consolidating the majority of political power held within New York City and placing it in the
hands of the Common Council. Promising to centralize and simplify city government, Tweed
abolished the city’s commissions and established various departments within the city
government. 23 During this consolidation of power, Tweed was not only serving as state senator,
but was superintendent of the Public Works department—the department allotted the most power
within the new city charter. The enactment of this charter not only extended Tweed’s power, but
also protected the power of his fellow Tammany brethren as well. The new charter established a
protocol if a Tammany member was unable to complete his term, the Tammany Democratic
Machine would not only maintain its power and authority over New York City, but possibly
extend it as well. Charles Nordoff, a nineteenth century journalist wrote about the new city
charter allotting a large proportion of political power within New York City to Tweed and his
“pirates:”
See how the charter guards the power of the ring at every point: to remove the Mayor by impeachment would yet leave untouched the heads of the departments, that is to say, Tweed, Sweeny, Connolly, and their partners…and it further provides that when a new appointment of one of the Heads of Departments is made, I shall be, not for the remainder of the term of the officer removed, but for the full term of his office under the charter. 24
22 Mandelbaum, “Boss Tweed’s New York, 71.23 Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed’s New York, 71-73.24Charles Nordhoff, “The Misgovernment of New York, A Remedy Suggested,” The North American Review 113, no. 233 (1871): 333.
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Yes, there were episodes of political corruption within the machine, as exemplified by the
enactment of the new 1870 city Charter, but Tweed never lost the support of his working class
constituents during his reign of the Tammany Ring. 25 Why is this so? Because of the fact he
was providing his constituents with a sense of protection and worth—aspirations the working
class during this time severely lacked. Tweed’s consolidation of power was his way of bringing
control and order to what he believed to be disorganized government, while simultaneously
allowing him to become New York City—arguably New York State’s—most powerful
politician.
Although Tweed’s implication of the 1870 charter is seen as his most influential of his
political policies to some historians, a few of Tweed’s political policies aimed at bettering the
working class have often been overlooked—lost in the shadow of his partaking in pork barreling
legislation, money laundering and ballot stuffing. Often, historians criticize Tweed for immoral
campaigning, such as bribing constituents as well as pressing the idea of naturalizing immigrants
around election time as well. Charles Wingate recounts how during the election process of 1868,
Tweed gained access to the state senate, “the manner in which the applications were passed was
scandalous and fraudulent. They…were repeatedly sworn in groups without any separate
examination. In one instance thirteen, and in another fifteen, men were naturalized in five
minutes.”26 Tweed along with Tammany officials in charge of properly naturalizing immigrants,
did manipulate the system by speeding up the process with the intent of having them vote for
Tammany’s Democratic machine on election day. Nevertheless, this wrongdoing does not take
away from what Tweed was doing to these working class immigrants—assisting them in their
assimilation process, while at the same time ensuring he maintained his control over Tammany.
25 Colburn and Pozzetta, “Bosses and Machines”, 449.26 Wingate, “An Episode in Municipal Government,” 401.
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Not only assisting these new bounds of immigrants by speeding up their naturalization
process, but Tweed offered numerous incentives in exchange for his constituents votes on
election day. Tweed, Sweeny and the remainder of Tammany Hall established an unofficial
welfare program long before the creation of any formal system.27 Targeting the poor and
working class, Tweed along with Sweeny, and Connolly would campaign and promise
constituents food, coal, even government jobs in exchange for their loyalty and vote come
election day.28 Although Tweed was manipulating the voting process for his own political gain,
offering incentives provided his working class constituents—who had no money or extensive
political power—he simultaneously provided the working class with a sense protection,
belonging and initiating reform to better their overall quality of life. In addition to assisting
working class constituents, Tweed and Tammany maintained control over the city through the
rule of their Democratic political machine—arguably the most common form of urban rule
during the nineteenth century.
Economics: Money beyond Tweed’s Pockets
Despite the fact Boss Tweed assisted his working class constituents by offering
incentives in exchange for votes and providing them with a sense of security, Tammany’s
handling of New York City’s finances during Tweed’s height of power was irresponsible. There
is no disputing the fact that Tweed, along with his Tammany cronies took advantage of their
constituents when it came to finances. As William Martin recalls when discussing the financial
state of New York City after the fall of the Tammany Ring in 1873, Tweed and his men were
responsible for causing, “an increase of debt, a load of taxation, a waste of resources, the
destruction of business, the depletion of life and the maladministration and extravagance in every
27Gil Troy, “Money and Politics: The Oldest Connection,” The Wilson Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1997): 20.28 Pratt, “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program”, 399.
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direction.”29 Martin’s distain for Tweed and Tammany is well backed when taking into account
how much debt New York City accrued under Tweed’s reign. Just two years into Tweed’s term
as state senator, the city’s debt shot up from $ 30,000,000 in 1867, to a staggering $ 90,000,000
in 1871.30 In good faith, some of the money accounting for this massive increase in city debt
funded various public works projects such as the “City beautiful movement” which brought
revenue into improving small parks in downtown areas.31 However, there is no denying that
Tweed, along with Sweeny and the other Tammany members pocketed a great amount of city
money. It is estimated that from 1867-1871, the same period in which New York City’s debt
tripled, the Tammany ring stole between $75,000,000-200,000,000 dollars from the City through
various means such as false vouchers and padded bills.32 The corruption within the Tammany
Ring is not disputable—these men took advantage of their power when it came to extending their
vast fortunes. However, Tweed and Tammany established economic policies during Tweed’s
administration that only satisfied the personal interest of these men, but further assisted their
constituents as well.
One of Tweed’s most controversial piece of economic legislation involved public
funding for privet schools. In 1869, Tweed was able to add a provision to the next year’s annual
tax levy bill for New York City that mandated 20% of funds allocated to the city dispersed to
schools within the city limits that have the highest student population.33 Tweed’s sly and
manipulative nature actually benefited his constituents in this instance. Within the requirements
for schools to receive state funding, the schools that were eligible to receive funding could not be
schools charging tuition rates, and had to have no less than two-hundred enrolled students—a
29 Martin, “The Financial Resources of New York”, 429.30 Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed’s New York, 77.31 Lyle Dorsett, “The City Boss and the Reformer: A Reprisal,” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 64, no. 3 (1972): 153.32 Hirsch, “More Light on Boss Tweed,” 268.33 Justice, “Thomas Nast and the Public Schools of the 1870’s,” 177.
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nearly perfect description of the Catholic schools within New York City.34 Allegiances and
favoritisms aside, this piece of legislation had the potential to better the working class society,
by better improving education. No mention of Tweed’s avocation or inaction of the 1870 tax
levy bill was made by those who experienced Tweed’s reign first hand—it is a portion of
Tweed’s contribution to his constituents overshadowed by his participation in monetary and
power manipulations.
Boss Tweed was a man fueled by money and power, who held an incredible amount of
influence in New York City and New York State political systems. The men involved within
Tammany hall have come to embody characteristics of Tweed’s identity—overshadowing Hall,
Connolly and Sweeny with his political and economic power—undermining in the fact Tweed
maintained his power in New York City because of the patronage of these men. Tweed’s reign
of New York City’s Democratic political machine lead to the consolidation of city power and
consisted of numerous bouts of corruption—elements common in nineteenth century municipal
machine politics. Tweed and Tammany’s involvement in vast amounts of corruption has earned
these men a negative reputation amongst historians, overshadowing the good political and
economic policies implemented to benefit and assist working class constituents. Though aspects
of Tweed’s assistance did not extend to the entirety of the working class—some policies
benefited specific groups such as Irish-Catholics and immigrants—Tweed and Tammany did
provide aspects of assistance. One is compelled to wonder: is Tweed to blame for his corruptive
ways, or was he just a product of the system of machine politics? Tweed, along with the men
Tammany Hall, were merely products of the reactionary system of government established in the
wake of Industrial progress during the nineteenth century—the political machine.
34 Pratt, “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program”, 403.
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Bibliography
Primary Sources:
“A Look at the Convention.” Nation 7, July 16, 1868.
“Death of William M. Tweed: The Ex-Tammany Chief’s Last Hours in Jail.” The New York Times, April 13, 1878.
Martin, William R. “The Financial Resources of New York.” The North American Review 127, no. 265 (1878): 427-443.
Norhoff, Carles. “The Misgovernment of New York: A Remedy Suggested.” The North American Review 113, no. 233 (1871): 321-343.
"The ‘Philanthropic’ Tweed.” The New York Times, March 17, 1871.
“Weather 1.” The New York Times, April 12, 1878.
Wingate, Charles F. “An Episode in Municipal Government: I. The Ring.” The North American Review 119, no. 245 (1874): 359-408.
---. “An Episode in Municipal Government: II The Reign of the Ring,” The North American Review 120, no. 246 (1875): 119-174.
Secondary Sources:
Monographs:
Lynch, Denis T. “Boss” Tweed: The Story of a Grim Generation. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927.
Manelbaum, Seymour J. Boss Tweed’s New York. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965.
Scholarly Articles:
Anbinder, Tyler. “‘Boss’ Tweed: Nativist.” Journal of the Early Republic 15, no. 1 (1995): 109-116.
Colburn, David R. and Pozzetta, George E. “Bosses and Machines: Changing Interpretations in American History.” The History Teacher 9, no. 3 (1976): 445-463.
Dorsett, Lyle W. “The City Boss and the Reformer: A Reappraisal.” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 63, no. 4 (1972): 150-154.
Hirsh, Mark D. “More Light on Boss Tweed.” Political Science Quarterly 60, no. 2 (1945): 267-278.
Amador 15
Justice, Benjamin. “Thomas Nast and the Public Schools of the 1870’s.” History of Education Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2005): 171-206.
Pitts, Reginald H. “Suckers, Soap-Locks, Irishmen and Plug-Uglies.” Historical Archaeology 35, no. 3 (2001): 89-102.
Pratt, John W. “Boss Tweed’s Public Welfare Program.” New-York Historical Society Quarterly 45, (October 1961): 396-411.
Scott, James C. “Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change.” The American Political Science Review 63, no.4 (1969): 1142-1158.
Troy, Gil. “Money and Politics: The Oldest Connection.” The Wilson Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1997): 14-32.