William Wohlforth - Perceptions of Power Russia

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The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 BalanceAuthor(s): William C. WohlforthReviewed work(s):Source: World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Apr., 1987), pp. 353-381Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010224.

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2/30

THE

PERCEPTION OF

POWER:

Russia

n

thePre-1

9 14

Balance

By

WILLIAM C.

WOHLFORTH*

INTRODUCTION

INTERNATIONAL relations

cholars o not gree n the

onnection

between

the balance of

power

and war. They question whether

r not

an

equal distribution

f power among states r

alliances eads to

stability,

whetherthe preponderance of power in favorof one actor or alliance

leads to

peace,

or whether he

key

ies

in

the

transition fpreponderance

fromone

power to another.

Everyone s familiar

with these

questions;

yet,

more

than

twentyyears

of

rigorous

elaboration and

sophisticated

quantitative

estinghave

done little o

produce the

answers.'

Do

these

n-

conclusive results

uggest

that there

s

no

relationbetween the distribu-

tion of

power and war?

It would be unwise to draw such a conclusion,because, despitemuch

scholarly

ffort evoted to the

topic, mportant

spects

have not been ad-

dressed. One such

aspect

is the

perception

of

power.

If

power

influ-

ences international elations, t

must do so

through

the

perceptions

of

those who act

on

behalf

of

states.2

he

quantitative

measures of

power

used in the

iterature o testvarious

power theories re thusestimators

f

perceivedpower.

It

follows hat

good way

to check the

adequacy

of the

tests s to

compare the

measure

of

power used with

actual

perceptions

n

a particular ase. This is thecomparison shall make withregardto Rus-

sia

beforeWorld

War I.

*

I am

grateful

oBruce

Russett or

hishelp n

revising

arlierdrafts

nd to

Paul

Kennedy

forhis

helpful omments

n the first

raft.

I

The

pioneering

tudy s J.

David Singer,

Stuart

Bremer, nd

John

tuckey,

Capability

Distribution,

Uncertainty nd Major

Power War,

in Bruce

Russett,

d., Peace,

War and

NumbersBeverly

Hills,

CA: Sage,

I972).

Theirfindings

upported he

equality-equals-peace

proposition

or he

9th

century, utthe

preponderance-equals-peace

ropositionor

he20th.

Wayne H.

Ferris,

n ThePower

Capabilitiesf

National-States

Lexington,MA:

D. C.

Heath,

1973),

covered a similartimespan; hisfindingsupported heequalityproposition orboth

centuries.

Bruce

Bueno

de Mesquita,

Risk, Power

Distributions, nd the

Likelihood of

War, International

tudies

Quarterly5

(December

i98i), 54I-68,

found

no relation

etween

power distribution

nd

the ikelihood

of war

overthe

same

period.See also

Alan

Ned Sa-

brosky,

olaritynd War

Boulder,CO:

Westview,

985), and, for

good review

ofthe iter-

ature,

Randolph

Siverson nd

Michael

Sullivan, The

Distribution f Power

and

the

Onset

of

War, Journal

f

Conflict

esolution

7

(September

983),

473-95.

2K.

J.

Holsti,

nternationalolitics:

Frameworkfor

nalysis,

d

ed.

(Englewood

Cliffs,NJ:

Prentice-Hall,

972),

I58.


3/30

354

WORLD POLITICS

In one sense, t is not surprising hat thisroute has not been taken be-

fore:uncoveringdecisionmakers' perceptions

s a difficultask.The pre-

sentation

f the

major powers' perceptions

f Russian

capabilities

n the

years prior to World War I takes up a significantortionof this article.

Furthermore, erceptions

s recorded n

diplomatic

documentsare im-

precise

observations;

hebestone can expectfrom ven themostextensive

historical

esearch s a

general

sense of

contemporary

iews.

Still,

the en-

deavor

is

worthwhile,

or t reveals that ndicators f numerical

capabil-

ities misrepresent ot only Russia's prewar power, but the system-wide

distribution f

power.

These indicators lso

fail to

capture mportant y-

namic elements

n

the prewar power balance. Although

World War

I

is

onlya single case, thedisparity etweenperceptions nd estimators is-

covered for he

period

s

sufficientlyarge

to suggest hat he nconclusive

results f quantitative nalyses

of

power

theoriesmay be more a result

f

measurement

problems

than of a lack of

explanatory ower

on the

part

of

the variable

tself.

A

positive dividend

of

investigating erceptions

f

power

is the con-

tribution ounderstandinghe onsetof war. Perceptions and mispercep-

tions) help

to

explain

the

bellicosity

f the

major powers

in I9I4, their

unwillingness o take risks forpeace, and whythe war occurred n

19I4

ratherthan earlier

or

later. The balance

of power emerges from ll this

as an

important

ariable

which

should not be

ignored

n

the

study

of in-

ternational onflict; ts nfluence s exerted

n

very omplex ways

that re

difficult

f

not

impossible

o

capture

statistically.

ESTIMATING

THE PREWAR BALANCE

Before

turning

o a

presentation

f

perceptions,

t

may

be useful

to de-

scribehow the

prewar

balance

of

power

s

represented y quantitative

n-

dicators.Table

I

shows the measure

developed by

the Correlates

of

War

project

the most

widely

used

in the field. t

is a composite

ndex com-

bining

the

following

ndicatorswith

equal weights:

total

population,

ur-

ban population, nergy onsumption, teelproduction,military xpendi-

tures,

nd

military ersonnel.

The

figures

how

England, Germany, nd

Russiavyingforfirst lace amongthe European powers. Russia and Ger-

many appear approximately qual

in

power;by

905, bothhave

surpassed

England.

France

is

clearly

n

the second rank, having a power position

closer to

Japan's

or

Austria's

than to

those

of the

great powers.

With re-

gard

to

alliances,

the Dual Alliance between

Germany

nd Austria

seems

slightly

nferior o the

Russo-French

Entente. When

England

joins the

latter

grouping

n the

wake

of the

Russo-Japanese

War

of

1905,

the

re-


4/30

PERCEPTION

OF POWER

355

TABLE I

CAPABILITIES

OF MAJOR POWERS

Percentage f WorldPower

1900 1905

1910

1913

Russia

15

16 18 18

France 10 9 9

9

England

20

15 14 14

Germany

16 16 17

18

Austria 6

6 6 6

Italy

5

4 4

4

U.S.

22 25 26 26

Japan 5 10 6 6

Source: James

Lee

Ray, Global Politics

Boston: Houghton

Mifflin,979),

io6.

sultant ombination

massively

utweighs

he Austro-German

lliance

on

the scales of

European power.

In a more

general

vein,

he

figures

ndicate

thatcapabilities

were fairly

well dispersed hroughout

he

system,

ather

thanconcentratedn one stateor alliance.

The

main dynamic

element

portrayed y

the indicators

s

England's

precipitate

ecline,

which is

perhaps

exaggeratedby

her

demobilization

after he

Boer

War.

In most

respects,

ower

relationships

eem

fairly

ta-

ble. France

appears

to be

slowly losing

her

battle

to maintain a

place

among Europe's

great powers.

Russia

passes

Germany

n

capabilities

n

1905

and

i9io,

but the latter

ppears

to

be gaining

relative

o

Russia

in

the

years

ust before he war. Because

the Entente

powers'

relative

apa-

bilities emainstable n the finalprewar period,thisGerman rise eads to

an

improvement

n

the Alliance's positionvis-a'-vis he

Ententeon

the

eve

of the

war.

How do

contemporary erceptions ompare

withthis

picture

f a

Rus-

sia

superior

n

power

to

Germany

until

ust before

he outbreakof

war?

To address

this

question,

shall examine

the

perceptions

f each of

the

major powers (excluding taly,

but

including

Russia

herself)

f Russia's

capabilities

between

905

and

1914.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE POWERS

BRITAIN

Although

Russia's defeat

by Japan

n

1905

and the

subsequent

revolu-

tion

produced

a

degradation

f Russia's power

n the

eyes

of all

European


5/30

356 WORLD

POLITICS

statesmen, ts effectwas most muted among the British.British

military

observers,who had greatrespect or he qualities of the Russian nfantry-

man (though

not the

officers)nd

for he

vastnumbersRussia

could field,

did not see theManchurian defeat s a sign of any fundamentalRussian

weakness.3

Britishofficers

elieved, as stated

n

a i908 report

f the at-

tache

n

St.

Petersburg,

hatRussia in a defensivewar ... would render

a good account of tself

ven

against

a

combination

f

ts Western

neigh-

bours.

In

contrast

o

I905,

Russia would, first f all, perform etter n

a war that

nlisted

national

sympathies.

urthermore,

there s a strong

force

lready

on the frontier nd an admirable system f railwaysfrom

the nterior,

gain

in contrast o theManchurian ituation.And theelite

ofthe Russian troopsare immediately vailable. These troops were not

touched

n the

ast

war.

To

thismustbe added the well-knownqualities

of the Russian soldier who, if properly ed ... should accomplish

any-

thing.

4

From 1908

to

1914,

British

military

bservers ontinued to assess fa-

vorablyRussia's extensive fforts

o absorb thetactical nd organizational

lessons of

the

Japanese

war and to increase the overall size of the

army.

An

attache's

memo

of

1914,

which

represented

he war office's

iew

and

was shown

to

Prime Minister

Grey,

ook note of

continuing roblems

but

concluded that the

army

is

improving veryday

...

[and

it

is]

only

a

matter f time before

it]

becomes a match

for

ll

of Western

Europe. 5

British iplomats

were

similarly

eluctant o draw extreme onclusions

on

the basis

of Russia's

I905

experience.6

By

i908,

Ambassador

Nicholson

was ready to

assert

that

n

any war waged byRussia

on

behalf

of her

interests,..

the Russian

government

would not be

hampered,

s was the

case in the astwar, by anxiety egardingnternal isturbances. 7his op-

timismwas

supportedby reports

rom he consulates

n

the border

prov-

inces,

which

by

i908

noted the virtual bsence of overtrevolutionary

c-

tivity

nd discounted the

possibility

f

uprisings

n

the event

of

military

3

See theattaches'

dispatches

from

905/6

cited

by

P.

Towle, The

European

Balance of

Power

in

I

9 I4,

Army

uarterly

nd

DefenceJournal

04

(April

974),

334,

335.

4Kenneth

Bourne and

D. CameronWatt, gen.

eds., British

ocuments

n

ForeignAffairs

(hereafter ited as

BD), Pt. i, Ser. A (Russia), V,

I77, I78. Wyndham to Foreign Office,

I I.I9.08.

5

CitedbyKeithNeilson, Watchingthe Steamroller':BritishObservers nd the Russian

Armybefore

9I4,

Journal

fStrategictudies (June 985),

2I2.

Naval observerswerescep-

tical ofRussian naval

capabilities,

ut this had little nfluence n

the overall

assessment e-

causeRussia was judged not to be

vulnerable o blockade.For

representative

emoranda,

ee

BD (fn.

),

III, 172; V,

84; VI, 247,

26i, 28i,

282.

German

assessmentsmay be

found n Ivo N.

Lambi, The

Navy

and German

owerPolitics

Boston: Allen

&

Unwin, 984).

6

See Cecil

Spring-Rice's

ispatches

o

Salisbury,

D

(fin. ),

III, I07.

7Ibid.,V, I77; to

Grey,

9.ii.08.


6/30

PERCEPTION OF POWER 357

hostilities.8 till,

much British

optimismwas

reserved

for

the

future,

view that was bolsteredwhen Russia backed down in the face of a Ger-

man ultimatum during the Bosnian annexation crisis

of

i908. Indeed,

Russian Prime MinisterStolypin old Nicholson just after he crisisthat

Russia was not yet in a position to meet Germany and Austria com-

bined.

This

would onlybe the case in two

or

three r fouryears. 9 on-

sequently,

n his

introduction o the Annual Report

for 909,

Nicholson,

while stressingRussia's rapid recovery nd her unlimited resources

and

population

of over

I50,000,000,

concluded

that t was only

in two

or at most threeyears that Russia will be in a position o take theplace

in

Europe to which she is rightly

ntitled. -

The evidence,as it flowed nto London fromthe St. Petersburg m-

bassy, eemed to bear out Nicholson's judgment: from 910 on, the An-

nual Reports document a steady streamof record harvests, xcellent

fi-

nances,

military

growth and reform, nd industrialdevelopment.Still,

Britonson the scene did not view Russia, even togetherwith France, as

offsetting

erman

power

on the Continent.

Assessing

he

power

balance

in

lightof all the militarymeasurestaken by France, Germany, nd

Rus-

sia

in

1913, Nicholson's replacement

n

St. Petersburg,Ambassador

Bu-

chanan, acknowledged the temporary dvantageswhichGermanyhas

secured

by

her

Army

Bill

of last

year. These, however,

will in a

few

years

time be

eclipsed by

the counter

measures

which Russia has been

obliged to take

in

selfdefense. t appeared to

him

that,

unless ..

Germany

s

prepared

o make till urther

inancial

acrificesor

militaryurposes, hedays fherhegemony

n

Europe

willbe

numbered;

as,

evenwithout he

o-operation

f

England,

Russia nd France ombined

will

thenbe

strong nough

o

confront

heunited orces f the

Triple

Al-

liance.There re,however,till hree ritical ears o passbefore hat esult

is

achieved.

Diplomatic

and

military

bservers hus

greed

n

seeing Russia capable

only

of

defense until

910,

regaining he potentialfor offensivewarfare

sometimebetween

1910

and

1912, and by

1913

becomingfullywar-ready

as the term

was understood n those days- that s, capable of mounting

offensives

n

thekey fronts. here isno reason to believe that heseviews

8

Risto Ropponen,Die KraftRusslandsRussia's power] Helsinki: Historiallisia utkimik-

sia, i968),

I

3.

This work by

a Finnish historian, ased on extensive rchivalresearch,

s

the

mostextensive reatment f

perceptions f Russian power during hisperiod.

9

BD (fn.4), V,

282;

to

Grey,

7.05.09.

10

bid., 32.

11

G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperly, ds.,British ocuments n the

Origins

fthe

War

(London, I927-I938),

X, Pt.

2, 767; to Grey,

8.03.I4.


7/30

358

WORLD POLITICS

were not shared by the top

decision makers. Grey, lthoughhe probably

thought

n

termsof power,

was reluctant o express himselfpublicly n

this

way, preferringnstead

more

moralistic ronouncements n foreign

policyin tune with Liberal sensitivities.1 he precipitatereduction n

Russian power in

1905/6 nd

its deleterious ffects n the European

bal-

ance were crucial elements n the

argumentfor continental ommit-

ment and the

nitiation

f

staff alks withthe

French.'3Grey

did

express

his desire to see Russia

re-established s a factor

n

European

politics..'4

The

1907

Anglo-Russian

entente,designed to accomplish this end

(as

well

as

to

arrange

the two

empires' affairs

n

the East), seemed based on

confidence n eventual

Russian restoration. hose policymakers around

Greywho thoughtn terms fthe balance ofpower for xample,Nich-

olson and Sir Eyre Crow were

likely

o

rate Russia a seriousfactor, ut

by

no means

Germany'sequal.'5

This

was also

trueof the

forceful irec-

tor of

military perations,

General Henry Wilson. It is probably

fair to

say

thatWilson's view of

Russian

power

was a function f

his

argument

for a

continental

ommitment;

hat

s,

he

expected

that

Russia,

in

addi-

tion to cancelling

out

Austria,

would draw away from he Western

front

just sufficient umbers

of

German divisions o make the contribution f

thesmall BritishExpeditionaryForce appear decisive. Russia had to be

just strong nough

to

make the

plans

of

Wilson and the French ook

re-

alistic,

but not

so

strong

s to make the

B.E.F.'s

contribution

uperflu-

OUS.'6

Although Grey

did indicateto several nterlocutorshat

he

rated Rus-

sia as a formidable

military

ower,'7

t no

time did he contradicthis ex-

perts' ssessment hatonly

n the

futurewould

Russia,

with

France,

be

an

effectiveounterweighto Germanpower.

FRANCE

From

905

until

9i0/ii,

the

French

ompletely

iscounted ussia s

a factor

estraining ermany.

As General

Moulin,

the

military

ttache

n

St.

Petersburg,

aw the situation n

i906,

Russia would

require

at

least

12See

Keith

Wilson,

British

ower

in

theEuropeanBalance, nDavid

Dilks, ed., Retreat

fromPower London: Macmillan,

98i), Vol. I, 22.

13

Keith Wilson, To the Western ront:BritishWar Plans and the Military ntente'with

France, British

ournal f nternational

tudies (July977),

I56;

Paul

Kennedy,The Rise of

theAnglo-German

ntagonism

London: Allen & Unwin, 982), 425.

4

Quoted by

Kennedy, bid.

15

Ropponen fn.

8), 287.

i6

See incidents f

Wilson'sdismissive iew of the

Russians s recounted y

Kennedy fn.

13), 427, and Ropponen fn.8),

246,

n. I26.

17

See the ncidents

eported y

Kennedy fn. 3), and

Erwin

Hb1tze,

ie

Selbstentmachtung

Europas [The

self-enfeeblementf

Europe]

(Frankfurt-ZUrich: usterschmidt

bttingen,

I975), 235, 300.


8/30

PERCEPTION OF POWER

359

three

years

of

peace

to

present ny

threat o

Germany.

After visit o the

western

theater,Moulin said

of

his three-year stimate,

add to this the

Russian coefficient ..

,

by which anything we at home or

the Germans

could do inoneyeartakestwoyears nRussia. '8 n theevent,hisoff-the-

cuffprediction f recovery y 9I2 was quite close to themark

in

terms

of French

perceptions.

International rises n

I908, i91 I,

and I9I2 gave French

decision mak-

ers

glimpses of the Russians' sense of theirown capabilities. n

each

in-

stance,

he

Russians told them heyneeded more time.During the

Agadir

crisis n i9ii, for

example, the French general staffwas informed

y

its

Russian counterpart hat,because of ts military npreparedness, Russia

will clearlynot be ready forwar with Germanywithconfidence f suc-

cess before at least two years. '' This may have been what

prompted

Prime MinisterCalliaux to remarkduring the crisis, you

forget

hatthe

Russian

army

s worthnothing. 20

During

the

Balkan War

of

9I2,

the

Russians again told their French allies, even

if

Austria should

attack

Serbia, Russia

will

notfight. 21

Two factors ontributed o the rise

n

theFrench

perception

f Russian

power after

1912.

The firstwas impressiveRussian improvements f

a

material kind, ncluding ncreasedarmysize,new and greaternumbers

of

weapons,

and vast

mprovements

n the

strategic

ailroadnetwork.

All

of these were

dutifully eportedby

the

military ttache

in St. Peters-

burg.22

Even more

mportant,

owever,was the Russians' shift rom de-

fensive o an

offensive

trategy,

shift

temming

oth

from n increased

estimate f their

wn

capabilities

nd from he

conclusion

reached

by

the

Russian

general staff hatGermanywould devote

the bulk

of

ts army

to

the western front t the

outset.23 his knowledge

essentially

orced the

Russians to accept the French argumenton the primeimportanceof a

rapid

offensive gainst Germany: f France fell,Russia herself

would be

at

the

mercy

of

Germany, nd, even

if

the struggle

n

the west

were in-

8

Cited

by D. N.

Collins,

The

Franco-RussianAllianceand

Russian

Railways,

Historical

Journal6

(December

I973),

785.

19

uoted

by

A. V.

Ignat'ev

in

Russko-anglistie

tnosheniia

akanune

ervoi

mirovoi

oiny

[Russian-English

relations

before the First

World

War]

(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-

ekonomicheskoi

iteratury,

962),

i

i

6. Unless

otherwise

tated,

ll

translationsre

by

the

pres-

entauthor.

Quoted

byL.F.C.

Turner,

The

Russian

Mobilization n

I9I4,

in

Paul

Kennedy, d.,

The War

Plans

oftheGreat

owers

Boston:

Allen

&

Unwin, 985),

253.

21 French

attach6 n

Petersburg,uoted

by

V.

I.

Bovykin

n Iz

istorti

oznzknoveniia

ervoi

mirovoi

oiny:

Otnoshenija ossii

Frantsii

1912-1914gg.

[From

the

history

f

the

onsetof the

FirstWorld

War:

Russian-French

elations

9I2-1914]

(Moscow:

Moskovskogo

Universiteta,

i96i),

I48.

22

Ropponen fn.

),

96,

23I-

23

Jack

Snyder,

The

Ideology

f

the

Offensive:

ilitary

ecision

Mating

and

theDisasters

f

I9I4

(Ithaca, NY:

Cornell

University

ress,

984), I57.


9/30

360 WORLD POLITICS

conclusive,Russia had an incentive o strike arly at Germany's weaker

front o end the war quicklyand on favorable erms.Because Russian de-

fense-mindedness ad long been considered by many French advocates

of the offense shortcomingmore seriousthanany n the materialrealm,

this

rise

n

Russia's offensive

pirit

annotbe overestimated

n

explaining

the

French

change

of view.

Still, s late as

I9I3

some Frenchmenhad doubts about

their

lly's

ca-

pabilities.

n a memorandum

prepared early

n the

year,

Chief of Staff

Joffre

uestioned

whetherRussia could mobilize and

implement

her

war

plan

without

being paralyzed by

internaldisturbances.24

e noted that

workers' organizations were strong nd were located in key industrial

centers,wherestrikes nd demonstrations ould most upsetthemachin-

ery

of mobilization. n late

1913, however, hemilitary ttache

enthome

a relatively ptimistic eport n which he ratedRussian power as lying

somewhere between

France's overoptimistic

ssessment n

1904

and her

overpessimistic ne in

i906.25

By 1914, the mood in officialParis was

more

upbeat than

at

any

time since I905.

Russia's recently

dopted

Great

Program

of

armamentwas expected

to increaseher

military

a-

pabilities

relative to

Germany's.

In

May

1914, Ambassador

Paleologue

submitted long memorandumcounteringJoffre'sontentions n every

point.26

e maintained hat he balance of forces

emained

n favor f the

tsar and that the wide masses of the people remained oyal to him; that

the

revolutionary orces, hough strong

n

many ndustrial enters,

were

divided

and unable

to

cooperate;

nd that heoutbreak

of

war

would

pro-

duce a rise n

patriotism.

In this

huge army, Paleologue wrote,

disci-

pline

is

excellent. The

regime

was

still

ble

to drown the

revolutionary

forces n blood. On thequestionof Russia's ability o mobilize and im-

plement

her war

plan, Paleologue

had

no

doubts:

In order forthe alli-

ance to be

effective,

e need a

powerful

Russia.

And,

I

think can

certify

thatshe is

powerful

..

in her own

manner.' 27

GERMANY

For the

majority

f

German

officialswhose

thoughts

n the

subject

re

in

the historical ecord, he revivalofRussia's power and therealization

of herobvious latentpotentialwerefactors reatly obe feared,butthey

were

expected

to

happen

in

the future.

This

relegation

f the revival of

Russian power

to the future

eems

to

have been nearly s

true

n

I914

as

it

was in

I905.

24Ropponen

(fn.

8),

i68.

25

Ibid.,

8b

.

26

IbBvn(.)3,

27

Quoted

y

Bovykin

fn. 1),

35,

191.


10/30

PERCEPTION OF

POWER 361

From I905

to

I908, reports

from

diplomats

and military

ttaches

stressedRussia's weakness

on all three cales of the

9I4 view of power:

military orces, conomic-financial

osition, nd societal cohesion. Even

Moltke's general staff eports,which stressedRussia's strong ointsmore

than the attaches' reportsfrom

St. Petersburg,were, before 19I2, uni-

formly ismissive f Russian

power.28 olitical observers haredthisdim

view, althoughtheyplaced

more mportance n societalweakness n Rus-

sia and the specterofrevolution. During the Bosnian annexation

crisis

in

908/9,

the operative ssessment

n Berlin was thatno rational

Russian

would risk war in view of the country's npreparedness nd

weak inter-

nal condition. ChancellorBilow affirmed o the Austrian

foreignmin-

ister,Count Aerenthal, ConcerningRussia, am in agreementwith you

that he is atpresenthardly n a position o naugurate n active

policy. 29

Moltke wrotehis Austrian ounterpart,

onrad von Hbtzendorf, hat he

opportunity

orwar

was

unlikely o reappearunder suchfavorable

on-

ditions. 30

The

operativeperception

f Russian

power

remained he same

in

1912,

when

the First

Balkan War raised the

possibility

f a

Russo-Austrian

war.

The St.

Petersburg

mbassy, s well as the foreignminister,

han-

cellor, war minister, eneralstaff,nd thekaiser, ll thoughtRussia too

weak to take action.3'Moltke's

1912 memorandumto the chancellor

on

the Russian situation oncluded: At the momentRussia

is

behind

n the

reorganization f her armyand its equipment and

weaponry.... 32 The

chief of staff

wrote to Conrad

that war is unavoidable,and the sooner

the

better. 33

n October

1913,

Berchtold

reported

on a long discussion

with the

kaiser.

He

related that,

n the midstof an extended diatribe

on

Russia's irredeemably ostile ntentions, he kaiser maintained

that

for he time

being

Russiadoes not nspire

him]

with nyworry: or he

28

See

Ropponen fn. 8),

222, 270

for

the

attache's

nd Moltke's

908 reports.

he British

attachenoticed the

exceedingly nfavorable

pinion

that

my

German

colleague

holds of

the

Russian rmy. D (fn.

), V,

I77;

Wyndham o ForeignOffice,

9.1

i.08.

29

Ludwig

Bitter t

al., eds.,

Osterreich-Ungarnsussenpolitik

on

derBosnischen

rise

1908

biszum

Kriegsausbruch914

[Austria-Hungary's oreign olicy

rom heBosniancrisis

n

908

to the outbreakof

war in

19141

(hereafter

ited

as

O-UA) (Vienna

and

Leipzig: Osterrei-

chischer

Bundesverlag, 930), I,

p.

I5;

23.07.o8.

3

Cited by Holger H. Herwig, Imperial Germany, n ErnestMay, ed., KnowingOne'sEnemies:

ntelligence ssessmentsefore heTwo WorldWars

Princeton: rinceton

University

Press,

985),

8o.

3'

Ropponen fn.

8),

249-50.

Quoted by Ropponen, bid.,

49. Naval assessments

n

this period paralleledMoltke's,

withhuge

increases

n

Russian naval

capabilities nvisaged

for he future. ambi

(fn.5),

395-

96.

33

John

C. G.

Rdhl,

An der

Schwelle

zum

Weltkrieg:

Eine Dokumentation

iiberden

'Kriegsrat'vom 8 Dez. 1912

[On

thebrink f world war:

documentation

f the War

Coun-

cil of

8

Dec.

1912]

Militdhgeschichtliche

itteilungen

1

(No. I,

1977),

77.


11/30

362 WORLD POLITICS

next six years one can be certainon that ccount. He had

discovered this

n

March when,

after war

council at Tsarskoe Selo, a German

from he

Bal-

ticprovinces nown ohimrepeated sar Nicholas's ronouncement:ieu

soit ofe

nous

neferons as de guerre, vant ix ans c'est mpossible.

ntil hen

the armywill not be readyfor ction, nd furthermoreRussiawillbe]

haunted y he pecter f revolution.34

Althoughmost German officialsn 1914 retained heir

disdainfulview

of

existing

Russian

power,

Russia's

seemingly trong

financial

position

and

growing economy,

and

the adoption

of the

four-year Great

Pro-

gram of rearmament, id make Moltke and other military eaders in-

creasingly essimistic boutthe future. n May, Moltke toldConrad that

to

wait meant to lessen our chances; it was impossible o compete with

Russia as regards

uantity. 35

Secretary f StateJagowreported conver-

sation

with

Moltke that ame month:

The

prospects

or he

futureweighedheavily pon him. n two or three

yearsRussia would have finished rming.Our enemies'

military ower

would

then

be so great hat

he

did

not know

how

he

coulddeal

with

t.

Now we were

stillmore

or

less a match or t.

n his

view therewas no

alternativeut

to

fight preventive

ar so as to beatthe

nemy

while

we

could

still

merge airly

ell from

he

truggle.

he Chief

f

Staff

here-

fore ut ttomethat urpolicy hould e geared obringingbout nearly

war.36

The Russian componentof this rgumentwas virtually he same

in

i908

and 1912. Only the stridency f the argument

was

new,

based on recent

salient vidence of

Russia's capability

o recover.

Bethman-Hollweg,

who

had been

pessimistic

bout the future n

1912,

was still so

in

1914.

The

day

afterAustria was

given

the

blank check

by Germany,

he told his

private secretary hat the secret ntelligence ives a shattering icture.

... The

militarymight

of Russia is

growing

fast....

The

future

elongs

to

Russia, which is

growing

and

growing

and is

becoming

an

ever

in-

creasing nightmare

o us.

Similarly,Jagow

wrote to

Lichnowsky,

the

German ambassador in

London,

that in a few

years

Russia

... will

be

ready.

Then she

will

crushus on land

by weight

of

numbers,

nd she

will

have

her Baltic

fleet

nd her

strategic ailwaysready. 37

Accordingto Jagow,however, hecrux was that at present

Germany

was ready,while Russia fundamentallywas not. 38 he kaiser himself

considered

Russian

intervention

nlikely

because Russia

is,

at the

pres-

34O-UA

(fn.

9),

VII,

p. 515,

report

o

Foreign

Office,

6.10.13.

35

Cited

by

Fritz

Fischer,

War

of

llusions

London:

Chatto&

Windus,

975), 400.

36

Quoted inFischer, bid.,

02.

37

Cited

by

Volker R.

Berghahn,

Germany

nd the

Approach

f

War n

I9I4 (New

York: St.

Martin's

Press, 973), 191-92.

38

Quoted

by

Fritz Fischer n

Germany's

ims n theFirst

WorldWar

New

York:

Norton,

I967), 159-


12/30

PERCEPTION OF POWER

363

ent moment,militarilynd financiallyotally nprepared or war. 39

Pourtales elates hat, in caseofexternal

omplications,

the

evolution-

ary rganizationsn Russia]wouldcreate difficultosition or hegov-

ernment. 40 he Austrian mbassadorn Berlin,

zdgyeny,eported

n

July n a conversation ithChancellor ethman-Hollwegoncerning

radical olution o theSerbian uestion. From n

internationaloint

of view, the Austrian eported,he chancellor

considers he present

momentmore favorable han a laterone. In

reponseto Emperor Franz

Josef's

ote on

Austria's plans,

Kaiser Wilhelm offered

Austria

Germa-

ny's full support f Russia foughtfor Serbia. In

any event, Sz6gyeny

reportedthe kaiser as saying, as things tand

today,Russia is far from

being prepared for war, and will think twice before

taking up arms.

Sz6gyeny continued: Should we reallyperceive

the necessity f

a mili-

tary ction againstSerbia, he

[the

kaiser]would

regret

t

were we

to

allow

the

presentmoment,

o favorable o

us,

to

go

unused. 4'

AuSTRIA-HUNGARY

Until

191 I/I2,

Austro-Hungarianperceptions

f Russian

power

mir-

rored those of Germany. n theirconfrontation ith Russia

during

the

Bosnian annexation crisis,Austro-Hungarianofficials ased theirpolicy

on the assumption, s Foreign MinisterAerenthalwrote to Biilow,

that

Russia

is

hardly

n

a positionto inaugurate n active

policy. 42

hief of

StaffConrad von

Hotzendorf,the

main source of

military

dvice in the

cabinet, upportedthis view, arguing

for

a preventive

war

while

Russia

remained

in

an inferior tateof war readiness. 43

y

1912,

however,

m-

provements n Russia's internal ituation,military

eforms,nd reduction

in the time needed tomobilize sowed

uncertainty mong Austro-Hun-

garian officials.Although some, including nfluential eneral staff ffi-

cers, ontinued o stressRussia's weaknessand

Austria-Hungary's bility

to

prevail against her,44many diplomaticrepresentatives

hought

Russia

capable

of serious

offensive

ction.45

39

uoted

in

Berghahn

(fn. 37),

i89.

4

Cited in

Hbltze (fn.

17),

238.

4

O-UA (fn. 9), VIII,

pp.

306-7,

319; to

Foreign

Office,.07.14 and

6.07.14.

42

Ibid., I,

pp. 8,

12.06.08,

and

856, 20.02.09.

43

Ibid., II, p. 389,

2.07.09.

44

The Austrianmilitaryttache's iews rereported ytheGerman ambassador:Johannes

Lespius

et

al.,

eds.,

Die Grosse

olitik er

Europdischen

abinette

Grand

policy

of the

Euro-

pean

cabinets]

Berlin:

Deutsche

Verlagsgesellschaft

ur

Politik und

Geschichte,927-1932),

XXXVI, 379;

Pourtalesto

Bethman

Hollweg, 19. II.12. Chief of Staff

onAuffenburgtem-

porarily eplacing

Conrad)

asserted

hat

our

chances

of

successwould be

in

no

way

unfavor-

able

even in a war which

we

fought ut alone

againstRussia. General

Staff

Report

ited

by

Ropponen

fn.8), 243.

Auffenburg

lso believedthat

he two central

powers

would remain

victorious ven

against coalition

onsisting fBritain,

rance, taly

nd

Russia.

Quoted

by

Fischer (fn.

35),

144-

45

See

Ambassador

Thurn's memos to the

Foreign

Office,

-UA

(fn.

9), IV,

794,

822.


13/30

364 WORLD POLITICS

By

1913,

when the Council of Ministersmet twice to considerthe

in-

ternational ituation during the Balkan wars, the lines of debate

had

changed; whereas in i908 Russia's veryabilityto intervenewas ques-

tioned, now only her intentions ere discussed.46 onrad admitted that

the chances for uccess

had

diminished

ince

908,

but thought

t

was still

possible

to prevail against a Russian intervention

n behalf of Serbia,

though everydelay,

from

purelymilitary tandpoint,

worsens the sit-

uation. 47 ome of this confidence

n

the face

of

recognized Russian

im-

provementswas due to a belief n the potentialfor revolution: he mili-

tary made plans to distribute

rms

to rebels

in

Poland, where,

it was

hoped,

an

uprising

would clear the

way

to Warsaw for

Austro-Hungar-

ian troops.48

The perception f a steadyrelative ncrease n Russian power, nexor-

ably continuing nto the future,

was held

by

a

majority

f Austriandeci-

sion makers

by

the eve of the war.

They

viewed the

existing

distribution

of

power

as

marginally

n favor f the

Central

Powers. A

foreign

ministry

memorandum distributed fterthe murder at Sarajevo

asserted: The

goal

of the Dual Alliance

is

to break the

military uperiority

f the two

monarchical

powers through

he assistance f Balkan

troops. 49

he

pu-

tativesuperioritywas, ofcourse,somewhattentative, or t could be re-

versed by

the

addition

or

subtraction

f some small Balkan states.

This

was essentially cknowledged by

Conrad

when,

n a

note

on the

impor-

tance of Rumania, he

statedthat,

with Rumania

in

the

enemycamp,

the

monarchy'smilitaryposition

would be

very

unfavorable.

The

army

was 'not

in

a

position

o offset he additional

ncrement f

power

which

Russia would

achieve

byvirtueof

her new

army bill, as

well

as

by

the

forcespreviously eeded againstRumania. 50

Only Hungarian officials,particularlyHungarian

Prime Minister

Tisza, who, for domestic reasons, opposed the monarchy's

nti-Serbia

policy,

argued

both that theexisting

balance was unfavorable nd that

Russia could

get relatively

weaker in the future.51 he

majority

posi-

tion

the assessment

upon

which

the

council

based

its

policy

of

reducing

Serbia was

expressed by

the war minister:

...

it would be more advan-

tageous

to

wage

war

immediately,

s the

power

balance

will in the

future

shift isproportionatelyo ourdisadvantage. 52

46Ibid, VI,

333-34;

Council

of Ministers (COM)

minutes, 05.02.13.

47

Ibid., 03;

COM minutes,.10.13.

48

Ropponen fn.

8),

i

i.

49

O-UA (fn.

9), VIII, 254.

5OIbid.,69;

to Berchtold,2.07.14.

5' Ibid.,

43

(COM

minutes,

.07.14);

and

371.

52Ibid.,

348.


14/30


15/30

366

WORLD POLITICS

Chief of StaffZhilinskii

informed he French thatRussia could not be

ready fortwo or three

years.59 t the same time, zvol'skii,

the ambassa-

dor in Paris, was being

instructed o remind theFrench that from the

point of view of our military reparedness, he presentmoment cannot

be seen as advantageous

formilitaryction. 60

A

paragraph,aterdeleted,

instructed

zvol'skii to tell the French that German

mobilization

might

call

forth Russian

one, but an offensive ould notbe promised.

In

1912,

the First Balkan War provided another

opportunity or the

Russians

to

engage

in self-assessment.he evidence, nce again,

ndicates

extreme Russian scepticismabout

the

country's

apabilities.

As noted

above,

the French military ttachewas told at general

staff eadquarters

that Russia would not fight f Serbia were attackedbyAustria.The

same passive posture

was advocated by Finance Minister

Kokovstov and

Foreign

Minister azonov at a

special

conference

withthe tsar n Novem-

ber,

and

at a

Council

of Ministersmeeting a

few weeks later. At both

meetings,

War Minister ukhomlinov

rgued

that

extensive

measures be

taken in

response

to Austria's

preparations,

which,

the Council

minutes

say,

could

allow

her

to force

war at an unfavorable

moment. '6'

At both

meetings,

Kokovstov

and

Sazonov

opposed

the war minister, rguing

that hisproposedmeasures could escalate towar withAustria-Hungary

and, hence,

Germany:

War withGermany

would be an absolute isaster;moreover, e do

not

haveactivemilitaryorces

n the

Baltic,

he

rmy

as

notbeen

brought

o

a sufficienttate f readiness,nd

the

nternal ondition

f the

country

s

farfrom hekindofenthusiasticndpatriotic ood which

would

permit

counting

n a

powerful

ise

n national

pirit.62

In both nstances, he tsar upported he more restrained ption.63

As the

French

observed,by

I

9

I 2 and

1913

Russian

military lans

be-

gan

to take

on

a more offensive

haracter: he

1913

plan

envisioned

of-

fensives

gainst

both

Austria-Hungary

nd

Germany.

This was

partly

mirovo;

oiny

90I-I9I4

[Russian-German

iplomatic

elations

n the eve of the First

World

War

1910-1914] (Moscow:

Nauka,

i985),

97.

59

Ignat

ev

(fn.

9),

I i

6.

6o

Mezhdunarodnye

tnoshenija

Epokhy

mperializmaInternational

elations

n the age of

imperialism] ommissiiapo Izdanii DokumentovEpokhi Imperializma Moscow:Gosudar-

stvennoe otsial'no-ekonomicheskoe

zdatel'stvo, 935):

Ser.

,

Vol.

28,

p.

378; Neratovto

Iz-

vol'skii, 0.o8. I I

(new style).

6,

Quoted by

Snyder fn. 3), 248,

n.

98.

62

Cited byBovykin fn.

1), 153-

63

One

of

these

meetings

s recounted yKokovstov

n

his

memoirs, ut ofMy

Past,

trans.

Laura

Matveev Stanford, A: Stanford

niversity

ress, 935),

345.

It

forms

art

ofTurner's

argument

Russian

Mobilization,

n Kennedy,

fn.

0) stressinghe

mportance

f theRus-

sian mobilization

n the origins fthe war.

See the

rebuttals yMay (fn.

0), 23,

and Avetian

(fn.

8),

I 86.


16/30

PERCEPTION OF POWER

367

the

resultof the Russians' increased

confidence

n

their apabilities s

re-

form nd rearmament

rograms

progressed. ven more,however, t was

the

result

of the

reactionof two different

ussian military

roups

to

in-

creasedknowledge of the Schlieffen lan; one imperialisticallyminded

group, which wanted to strike t

Austria-Hungary, nd one

European-

orientedgroup,

which

wanted to

fulfill

lliance

commitments y attack-

ingGermany first. he

rivalry f the

groups, which lacked an effective

organizational

basis

for ts

resolution, roduced

the

offensivewar plan

of

1913. In fact,the

argumentsof both

factionswere based on scepticism

about Russia's

power

in

comparison

with

thatof

Germany.64

During

the

Russian-German

diplomatic

risis ver the

atter's

ispatch

of General von Sanders to command thegarrison t Constantinople an

area

Russia

sought

to

keep

freefromthe

influence

f

other

Great Pow-

ers), France as she had

during the First Balkan War urgedRussia to

take a

strong tance.There was some sentiment n

Russia

to do just that.

Sazonov,

for

xample,

argued

on

many

occasions

that,

were

English sup-

portguaranteed,Russia could

risk

a showdown with

Germany:

Russian ction

with

he

upport

f France s not

especially

angerous

or

Germany.

oth

powers

re

scarcely apable

f

dealingGermany mortalbloweven n the vent f uccess n thebattlefield,hich salways ncer-

tain.

But

a

struggle

n

which

England

took

partmight

e

fatalforGer-

many.65

At

a

special conference f

top ministers eld

in

1914 on the Sanders

crisis,

Sazonov's view

prevailed against

War

Minister

Sukhomlinov's

argu-

ments for

more forceful osture.

Stressing

he

potential

or

revolution-

ary

unrest

nd

military npreparedness,

he

conferencemembersdecided

to continue negotiations n Berlin, but to employ methods of influence

thatwould raise the

riskof war

only

n the

eventof active

participation

by

both France

and

England

in

joint

actions

with Russia. 66

The

Sanders crisis

reveals that Russia and her allies now

considered

themselves

trong

nough

to

adopt a

policyof deterrence r containment

of

Germany,

rather han one of

continued

onciliation.

Ministers

ike

Sa-

zonov-who

had

long

been

convincedof

Russia's inability o act-now

maintained that a more

forceful olicywas

a surer way to

peace,

or at

leastpeace on acceptableterms. his argument arried hedayduringthe

July

risis.At

the Council of

Ministers

meeting alled bythe tsaron

July

24 to

consider

the

Austrian ultimatum o Serbia,

the council

chairman's

64

See

Snyder

fn.

3),

i64-66,

175;

Norman

Stone,

The

Eastern ront

New

York: Charles

Scribners'

ons,

1975),

33-34.

65

Quoted

by

Lieven

(fn.

55),

48.

66

Bovykin

fn.

1),

176; Avetian

fn.

8),

231.


17/30

368 WORLD

POLITICS

speech,regarded by a participant s

the most nfluential f the meeting,67

followed

this ine.

The chairman dmitted

hat

our rearmamentad notbeen ompleted

nd it seemed oubtful hether

our Army nd ourFleetwouldeverbe abletocompetewith hose fGer-

many nd Austro-Hungarys regardsmodern echnical fficiency.

But]

the nlyhopeof nfluencingermany

as to how hem, ymaking

firm

stand, hat

we

had

come o the nd ofthe oncessions ewerepreparedo

make.68

Afterthe chairman's speech, the opinions

of the two service ministers,

Sukhomlinov

and

Grigorovich,were sought. They

noted that the

re-

armament

program

was

not

complete,

nd that

uperiority

ver the Cen-

tral Powers could not be assumed. Although later theyboth retracted

their assessments

of

Russian readiness

n private,69hey asserted at the

meeting

that hesitation

was no

longerappropriate.... They

saw no ob-

jection to a

display

of

greaterfirmness

n

our

diplomaticnegotiations. 7o

The participants ventually greed

to

a partialmobilization,

nd to

sup-

port

Serbia even at riskof war.

PERCEIVED VERSUS ESTIMATED POWER

STATIC ASPECTS

It is clear that

he

ndicators

n

Table

I

vastly

verstate

Russian

power:

no one

thought

f Russia as

superior

n

power

to

Germany

or

England

in

the

prewar years.

n

fact,

Russia

feared

subordination

o

France

which,

according

o the

figures,

was

only

half s

powerful.

he

discrepancy

s not

limited

o the Correlates f War index.

n all

thequantitative

tudies

con-

sulted in the preparationof thisarticle,the estimatorsused whether

composite like

the Correlates

f War

index),71

ased

on

military xpend-

itures,72

r

based

on

gross

national

product73

were at least as far off he

mark

in

estimating

Russia's

power

as the Correlatesof

War

figures.

67

Lieven (fn.55),

142.

61Ibid.,

143.

69

Ibid.,

i86, n. 125. Sukhomlinov ater old

an

aide to Sazonov

that,

even with

he

upport

of

France,

we

would findourselvesuntil

917,

and

perhaps

ven until

9i8,

in

a

position

f

indisputablenferiorityithrespect o thecombinedforces fGermany nd Austria. N. A.

Bazilii,Memoirs

Stanford,

A:

Hoover

Institution,973), 91.

7,

Lieven (fn.

55),

143-

7' Ferris

(fn. i);

Charles

F. Doran and

Wes

Parsons,

War

and

the

Cycle

of Relative

Power, American olitical cience

Review

74

(December i980),

947-65.

72

Ned

Sabrosky,

From Bosnia

to

Sarajevo, Journalof

onflict

esolution

9

(March

1975),

7-

73 A.F.K.

Organski

and

Jacek

Kugler,

The

War

Ledger Chicago:

University

f

Chicago

Press,

980).


18/30

PERCEPTION

OF POWER

369

In the

case of

the Correlates of War

figures,

he

underlying

mis-

estimation

can

be

explained by

disaggregating

he data

(see

Table

2).

Estimates of

military xpenditures

nd

personnel

were scrutinized

by

pre-1914decisionmakers,and clearly nfluenced he formation f per-

ceptions.

Thus,

the

figures

n the two first ines of Table 2

probablypar-

allel

perceptions

fairly ccurately.

Russia's

great

expenditures

nd

huge

army,however,

were discounted

bymany

because of her

inefficiency;

users of these estimators

enerally

ssume that

the

latter

s

captured

by

the other

figures low energy

onsumption,

teel

production,

nd urban

population).

Two

factors,

more than

any

others,

ccount forthe

discrep-

ancy

that nevertheless

btains.

First,

he estimators verstate he

impor-

tance of Russia's huge populationin comparisonwithperceptions.Al-

though doubtless a factor n

pre-ii4

eyes,

the tsarist

mpire's

sizable

population tended

to

be

discounted because

of

the

prevalent

belief

that

the coming

war

would be short.

Only

in

a

long

war

would the

Russian

masses have

a

military ffect,

hrough

he

callingup

of reserves. he

Rus-

sian

population

was also discounted

because

it was

perceived

as

lacking

in

societal cohesion. This

is

the

nonmilitary

ariable

most often

ited in

TABLE

2

DISAGGREGATED

ESTIMATORS

FOR

RUSSIA AND GERMANY

(1905)

Russia

Germany

Military

expenditures

51,539,000

46,167,000

(pounds

sterling)

Military personnel

1,160,000

648,000

Energy

consumption

37

112

(millions of tons coal

equiv.)

Steel

Production

2.7 10

(millions

of

tons)

Urban population 8.4 11

(millions)

Total

population

147

60

(millions)

Source:

Correlatesf

War

data made

available

y

the

nter-University

onsortium

or

Political

nd

Social

Research,

niversity

f

Michigan.


19/30

370 WORLD POLITICS

analyses of

pre-i914

decision makers; in general, it had a significant

dampening effect n perceptions f the influence f Russia's huge mili-

tary nd population.

One could argue that thisfocuson perceptionss misguided; that the

objective distribution f capabilities hat must exist at any given

time

somehow

influences tatebehavior

regardless

f the

perceptions

f

deci-

sion makers. Or one might rgue that n mostcases real power will ap-

proximate perceptions,

which

are difficult o gauge in any precise

way.

Indeed, the design and use of quantitative ndicators eem to rely

n such

assertions, orthey re oftenbased on variables like steel production

thatdid not appear incontemporary alculations.The figures eem to be

estimating real, notperceivedpower. For thisreason, tmaybe useful

to

compare estimators nd perceptions o Russia's real power.

The best measure of Russia's capabilitymay be its actual performance

in

the war. By this standard,Russia's power was overratedby

pre-1914

decision makers,

lthough

not

by

as

much

as

some accountshold,

and not

at all to the extent

mplied by

the

indicators.

Russia was

correctly

x-

pectedto

be

able to defeatAustria

nd

tohelpdefeatGermany.That

real-

ity should

not be

obscured by

the

fact

that the war tore Russian

society

apart

and

helped

to

pave

the

way

forrevolution.

rom

I9I4

to

i9i6,

the

Russians

tied down

over

ioo

Alliance divisionson the easternfront.As

late as

mid-I9I7,

Russia held down

I,528

Alliance

battalions,

s com-

pared

to

I,3I4

German battalions

that were

deployed

on the

western

front.74 lthough

the German

component

of the Alliance was

unques-

tionably

he most formidable nd the

majority

f

German forceswere

al-

ways deployed

in

the west, the amount of German power drawn

offby

the Russians shouldnot be underestimated. ntil

9I7,

Russia capatured

more German

prisoners

han Britain nd France combined.75

fter heir

defeat

by

the

Russians at Gumbinnen

n

I9I4,

the Germans

transported

several

corps east just

when

the

crucial

Marne

battle

opened.

In

early

i9i6,

the

Germans

deployed 48

divisions n the east

(compared

to

I20

in

the

west).

Alliance

casualties

on all

threefronts

re

presented

n

Table

3.

The

Russians nflicted asualties

argely

n

Austro-Hungarians

ather

than

on the more formidable

Germans;

the substantial id of Britain nd

Francemustalso be taken nto account. t is further ruethatRussia was

never

able to

develop

an

offensive apable of threateningGermany,

as

had

been

expected prior

to

the

war.

Nevertheless,

her

huge

size

repre-

sented a latentthreat he

Germans had to

consider,

nd

her

reduction

f

Germany's

Austrian

lly

drew

away

considerableGerman forces

ecause

74Stone

(fn.

64),

93.

75Ibid., 2.


20/30

PERCEPTION OF POWER 371

TABLE 3

CASUALTIES OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

ON VARIOUS FRONTS

Numbern Thousands

PercentagefTotal

Western ront 4,668

63

Eastern ront 1,858

25

Italianfront 915 12

Note: These are

casualtiesproduced

in major battles.Deaths were

a

greater

percentage

of German

casualties

n

the east

than in

the west. Italy's figure

overstates hat

country's

war

potential because

her armed

forces were simply

on the scene

during

the Austro-

Hungarian collapse.

Sources: Dupuy and Dupuy, Encyclopedia f Military istoryNew

York:

Harper

&

Row,

1975); David Eggenberger, History fBattles New York: Crowell, 1967);Thomas Har-

bottle,Dictionay ofBattles New York: Stein & Day, 1971); Germany,Reichsarchiv,

elr

Weltkrieg, ols. 2, 5, 6, 7; I. I. Rostunov,RusskiiFrontPervoiMirovoi Voiny,Vol.

I

(Mos-

cow:

Nauka, 1976).

Berlin felt hatAustria had to be

supported.

Russia's

collapse

n

I9I7

had

an immediate effect n the course of the war:

by shifting

orces o the

west,Germany was able to mount a huge offensiven i9i8 which could

well have been beyond the capacityof the westernAllies to contain f t

had not been for he

aid of

the

United States.

n

short,

hese

casualtyfig-

ures

indicate that Russia's role

in

preventing victoryby the Central

Powers was

by

no

measure

a minorone.

Perceptions,

while off he

mark,

were not

widely so, given the delusions thatmost decision makers enter-

tained about a

futurewar.

Russia's power, and particularly he country's ossible contribution

o

a

long

war

(which was held

to

be unlikely),was indeed overrated, ut

not

nearly o thedegree implied by the quantitative ndicators.Because they

took societal cohesion

into account, contemporary bserverswere

more

accurate

than the

indicators.

The

indicators husmisrepresentothper-

ceived

power and what we now can suggestwas the real power relation-

ship.

Because the

threedifferent aysofconceiving fpower (real, per-

ceived, and estimated) ed to such differentharacterizations f Russian

power (and

hence the balance of

power)

in

this ase, it is important

o be

clear about the

causal

link

betweenpowerand statepolicy.

t

matters,

n

short,whetherthe

indicators re

attempting

o

gauge

real or

perceived

power.

There is a

disconcertingly

ommon

tendency

n the literature

o

equate power

with

estimated

power,

which can lead to

a

misunder-

standing

of the

pre-World

War

I

atmosphere.76

hat

tendencymay

well

76

One article, or xample,

notes hat,

ased on theCorrelates f

War

estimators,

in

1905,

the

major power

subsystemwas still n a

general tate

of

equilibrium.By

910,

that quilib-


21/30

372 WORLD

POLITICS

be similarly isleading

ith egard o other mportanteriods f nter-

national istory.

Quantitativetudies

ftherelation

etween

he

ystem-wideistribu-

tion fpower nd the nset fwardo notgenerallypecifyow power

is translatedntopolicy. hey

do not ndicatewhether hequantitative

indicatorsstimate eal r perceived

ower. heirmainpurposes simply

to testfor relation nd,

ifone obtains,whether t supports he equality-

equals-war

or the

equality-equals-peace

ypothesis.

With

regard

to

WorldWar I, themisestimation

f Russian ower ofeither ind)

eads

to an inaccurate pecification

fthe ystem-wideistributionf power.

Withregard o the lliances f

theperiod, hefiguresuggest n imbal-

ance nfavor f theEntente owers.A more ccurate epresentationf

perceived ower

would

surely

howa lesspowerful ussia

nd a more

powerful ermany,mplyingomething

loser o balancebetween he

blocs.

This would

affect otonly

herelation etween heblocs, utthe

nature f thedistribution

f

capabilitiestself: o the xtent

hat hefig-

ures

overrate ussia t the

xpense

f Germany,hey nderstatehede-

gree fconcentrationfpower

n

the ystem.

The effectfthis articulariscrepancyn statisticalesultss hard

o

evaluate.t depends n thenumber fcasesandonwhether he war

variable s

operationalized

n

a waythat ccounts or he mportance

f

thewar.

f

the et

of

cases s limited o

major

wars, r if suchwars re

accorded

articular eight

n

the

nalysis,

oubts ncrease

s to whether

discrepancies

n the

estimation

f

power

will be

randomly

istributed

across

ll the ases

or

across ll the

heavilyweighted ases).77

ven

f

unrealistic

hough

his

may

eem all wars

bymajorpowers

re treated

equally ifwar scodedas a dichotomousariable),here ouldconceiv-

ably

be

systematic

ias

n

power

stimation. ermany,

or

xample,

on-

stituted

defining

actor

n

theEuropean alance

rom

870

to 945. It is

rium had been upset and the

balance altered n favor f the Entente oalition. abrosky fn.

72), i8. Actually,

he

perceived

balance was

most disturbed n

1905,

with

equilibriumonly

beginning o be

restored n 1910.

77

For example,Singer

et al.

(fn. )

code war as nation-monthsf war underway, hus

accountingfor the magnitude

of conflicts. heir

finding

hat

ow concentrationCON) of

power equal distribution) as associatedwithpeace inthei9thcentury utwithwar in the

20th

century

as been widely discussed.

This

finding

s

heavily

nfluenced

y

the

factthat

three ery arge wars WorldWars I and

II

and theKorean War)

occurred n the

20th

century

duringperiodsof ow CON.

In the nstance f the

First

World

War, f Russia s assigned o%

(rather

han

8%)

of

worldpower

thedifference oing

to

Germany),

he

CON figure hanges

from

208

(close to the owest

value)

to

244

(above the

median and near themean CON value

of

.250).

Assigning ercentages

s of course omewhat rbitrary,

uta relatively eakerRussia

and a

greater

oncentration

f

capabilities

n

Germany

re

clearly mpliedby

theevidenceon

perceptions. hus,

the

ignificance

f this

finding

s

greatly

educed.

f

theestimators

re

sim-

ilarly

ff

he

mark n the case of World War II,

the

conclusion

will vanish ntirely.


22/30

PERCEPTION

OF POWER 373

quite possible

that

Germany's

centralgeographicalposition,her advan-

tage

n

having nterior ines,

nd her oft-noted

rganizational uperiority

had a

multiplying

ffect n the

perception

f

her power. Germany'sgeo-

graphical positionmay also suggestvulnerability; ut, because Germany

was a revisionist tateformostof theperiod,hergeographywas not ikely

to occupya high priorityn thecalculationsof her opponents. t is also

quite conceivable that technology hanges in ways that could bias even

composite ndicators.The development

of the railroad,forexample,

n-

creased the mportance f and power in relation o sea power.78

In short, he evidence presentedhere raisesthe suspicion hat ontend-

ing propositions bout the balance

of power have not been adequately

tested, or heoperativebalancecan differ rom he estimated ne in fun-

damentalwaysover long periods

of time. As far as estimated

ower

bal-

ances are

concerned,

Bruce Bueno

de

Mesquita may be right

n conclud-

ing

that any effort o

infer

nything

bout the likelihood

of war from

thepresence

or absence of a

particular ower

distribution

s

likely

o

yield

no

better results

than random

guessing. 79

One cannot

yet,

however,

draw final conclusions

on the

usefulness

f

studying erceived

istribu-

tions.

DYNAMIC

ASPECTS

The

proposition hat hanging

power relationships

ie at the root

of n-

ternationalwar

is

older even

than the various

balance-of-power

ormu-

lations.

Dynamic

theories

range

from

Gilpin's hegemonic

transition,

o

Organski's power transition,

o Doran and

Parsons'

inflection

oint

model.80All

these theories

explicitly

ely

on

perceptions

f

power

and

power

trendsfor theircausal

explanation.

How do

they

fare n the case

of

World War

I?

In the

prewar period, perceptions

f trends

undoubtedly

were of cru-

cial

importance.Rising

German

power

had,

of

course,

been

an

issue

for

generation.

But the evidence

presented

here ndicates hatdecision

mak-

ers

on

both sides

perceived

Russian

power

as

increasing

more

quickly

than German

power

a

perception

hat affected he calculations

of the

various

countries

n

fundamental

ways.

The

case

of World War I

pro-

vides evidence to supportthe importanceof expectations bout future

power relationships.

he

expectation

hatRussian

power

would increase

78

This factor, f course,

has furthermplications orGermany's ower

n comparisonwith

England's. See Paul Kennedy, Mahan vs

MacKinder

in

his Strategy

nd

Diplomacy:1870-

1945 (London: Fontana,

983).

79Bueno

de

Mesquita fn.

)

566-67.

8o

Robert Gilpin, War and

Change n World

Politics Cambridge:Cambridge University

Press, 98i); Organski and Kugler fn.73); Doran

and Parsons fn.

').


23/30

374

WORLD

POLITICS

more

quickly

than

German

power

in

the future-essential for

under-

standingthe onset ofthe

war was

clearlyrelatedto past

power

trends,

but

it also had a

logic of

its

own. As is

indicated

by

de

Tocqueville's

ob-

servation n

i830

thatRussia and Americaeach will one dayhold in its

hands the

destiny

f

halfthe

world, there

was a venerablehistorical ra-

dition of

assuming that the vast

Russian resources would

eventually

translate nto world

power. Thus

Germandecision

makers-even

those

who

dismissed

existing

Russian

power-always assumed that Russia's

power

would

increaserelative o

Germany's.

Quantitative

ests,which

must

rely

on

simplified

ssumptions,

annot

account

for the

influence uch historical

traditions xert

upon

expec-

tations. nstead, they ssume thatexpectations re based upon an extra-

polation

of

existing rends.8'

As should

be

clear,

however,

trends n the

quantitative stimators

o not

correspond

o

perceived

trends.

The Cor-

relates f War

figures n Table

i

show

Germany

nd Russia

vying orfirst

place,

with

Germany's

apabilitiesncreasing elative o those

of

the

dom-

inant Russia on the

eve of

the war. Table 4

shows why:

German increases

in

steel

production and

military

xpenditureseventually

outweighed

Russian

population ncreases.The

figures

lone do

not,

however,

reflect

three

very

mportantdeterminants f the

perception

of

rising Russian

power.

First,

the

diplomatic

documents

ndicate

thatRussia's

power

was

felt

o be

risingquickly

n

part

because

it

was

perceived

to

have sunk

to

such a low

point.

The

curveof Russianpower, s it

appeared

in

the minds

of

prewar

statesmen,

id

not

slope

upward

from, ay,

o

or

i i

percent

o

I2

percent.

Rather,

t

shot

up

from

ffectively

ero in

I905/6

to

its tradi-

tional level in the

years between

910

and I9I4. Russian

capabilities

n

thisperiod resembleda massivelydeflatedeconomygoing through ts

first

Keynesian reflation. he

countrywas

simultaneously

ncreasing

ts

overall

capacity

nd

the

proportion

f

capacity

t

utilized.

The

other

pow-

ers were

merely

ncreasing

their overall

capacity.

The

upward-sloping

curve of Russian

power

thus seemed

steeper,

nd

represented far

more

dramatic and

dynamic

factor n

the

changingpower

configuration,

han

the

figuresmply.

A second and

related

aspect

not

captured

by the ndicators s

the fast-

increasingconfidence n the cohesion of Russian society s evidence of

discontent aded

under

the reform nd

repression

f the

Stolypin

egime.

Finally,

although

Germany

and

the

other

powers

increased

the size of

their

total

military orces s

fast

or faster

han

Russia,

the

percentageof

the

atter's orces hat

ould be

deployed

t

the front

n

thefirst

ew weeks

81This is the

approachtakenby Doran

and Parsons,

bid.


24/30

PERCEPTION

OF POWER

375

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGES OF GROWTH FOR RUSSIA AND GERMANY

(COW

Variables, 900-1913)

Russia Germany

Military ersonnel

40

38

Military xpenditures

98

123

Energy onsumption

79.5

66

Steel production

120 176

Urban

population

86

61

Total population

29 19.5

Source: Correlatesof War data made available bythe Inter-Universityonsortiumfor

Political and Social Research,University

f Michigan.

of war increased at a much

faster

ate than

did their verall

size.

Again,

Russia was starting

rom lower mobilizationbase than any

other

major

power: the reduction

of

Russia's

mobilization

time

greatly

ncreased the

real effect f large Russian numbers

on

pre-I9I4

minds,

ruled as they

were by short-war ssumptions.

Because the figures

o not

capture

these

important uances, however,

heymisrepresent revailing

rends.

A

bet-

ter

representation f perceptions

nd the expectations uilt upon

them

would show Russian power increasingmore uicklyfrom considerably

lowerbase.

Any quantitative

est

f a dynamic

heory, r any casual analysis f nu-

merical indicatorsof

power,

will

thereforemiss an important ynamic

element: the perceived rapid declineand rise of Russia. The problem s

greaterthan that,however. Many

dynamic theories re concernedwith

power

transitions

points

at

which

the power

of

one state surpasses

that

of

another)or inflection oints n the power growthof states at

which

there s a shift

n

the

velocity

f

riseor decline or the direction f change).

In

any quantitative estof such theories,not only the change

n

but

also

the

evelofrelativepowerhas to

be

related

to the

occurrence

f

war.

Un-

fortunately,

he levels

of

relativepower can

be

grossly

misestimated

y

numerical indicators. n The War Ledger,forexample, Organski and

Kugler

found that war

occurs

only if one of the contenders themost

powerful

tates

n

the

system]

s in the

process

of

passing

the

other. 82

n

statistical

nalysis,

he

Russian-Germandyad conforms

o the

theory

n

the

pre-World

War I

case,

but

t

does so

only

because the measure

GNP)

82

Organski and Kugler fn.73),

51-


25/30

376 WORLD POLITICS

shows Russia as the

dominantpower,not passed by Germanyuntil

9I

I.

War thenoccurson

schedule n

I9I4.

As far s perceptions

re

concerned,

however,

Germany

probablypassed Russia

in the

I870s.

In another n-

stance, Doran and Parsons, n testing heirhypothesis hat war is more

likelyto occur at inflection

oints

n the

ong-term ycle

of a state'srela-

tive

power, develop

a

composite ndex

of

power that,unlike the Corre-

lates of

War

indicators,

oes

capture prewar

trends

Russia rising,

Ger-

many falling behind). But, as

Doran and

Parsons expect,

their

identification

f

ow and high points n power in the prewar period does

not seem tocorrespond o perceptions.83his lack of correspondence oes

not invalidate the

theories hemselves, ut

it does

suggest

he difficulties

in testing.

THE PERCEIVED

BALANCE

AND

WAR

Some common themes

run

through

his discussion of

testingpower

theories most of them

suggesting

a

relationship

between

perceived

power

and war. In

thisfinal

ection,

shall consider hree f them n

turn:

differences n

perceptions,

he

volatility

f

perceptions,

nd the

capri-

ciousness of perceptions.

DIFFERENCES

IN

PERCEPTIONS

Risto Ropponen,

in

his detailed

study

of

the

perception

of

Russian

power

in the

prewar

period,

discovered

systematic ichotomy

etween

France, England, and

Italy (all

of which

overestimated

Russian

power)

and

Germany

and

Austria

which

Documents

William Wohlforth - Perceptions of Power Russia