Williamson - Theory of Violence and Colombia

7/28/2019 Williamson - Theory of Violence and Colombia

1/11

University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Toward a Theory of Political Violence: The Case of Rural ColombiaAuthor(s): Robert C. WilliamsonSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1965), pp. 35-44Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/445653 .

Accessed: 17/04/2013 17:52

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of Utah and Western Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

preserve and extend access to The Western Political Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 168.176.162.35 on Wed, 17 Apr 2013 17:52:17 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=utahhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpsahttp://www.jstor.org/stable/445653?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/445653?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpsahttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=utah


2/11

TOWARD A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE:THE CASE OF RURAL COLOMBIAROBERT C. WILLIAMSON

LehighUniversityIOLENCE hasgenerallyeenassociatedwith evolution, ar,ororganizedcrime. The present entury as been remarkable or arge-scale iolencein these hree ategories.Much of recentmassviolencehas beena productofguerrilla r undeclaredwarfare,ncluding trugglesfliberationrom olonialrule, nd conflictsetween ifferentowergroups.At thebroadest ase,onemightsay, trifleretentiously,hatviolence nd terrorre an erratic y-productfthevast ocialchange oward qualitarianismntheworld.Yet this rticle ocuses na

uniqueprocess f violence:a varietyfcivilwar,which, ince1948,has annihilatednearly 00,000peoplein the backlands f Colombia. Before xamininghisphe-nomenon, eshall stablishhetheoreticalontext fterrorndviolence.Violencecanbe defined s a severely ysfunctionalorm fconflict, hich nthecaseofColombiahas beena vendetta etweenhe wopolitical arties,n abor-tiverevolutionaryrocess,nd a "blindreaction" o socialfrustration.'iolence s,amongother hings, cultural rtifact,nd in the Colombiancase,a traditionalbehavior attern eriodicallyecoming cataclysmnder ertain ocialpressures.If we acceptthe Simmel heory2hat onflictsnecessaryorgroup ntegrity,ohe-siveness,nd the"boundarymaintenance" f thegroup, heColombian xamplepushes he ase tothebreakingoint.The questionmaybe raised s to whattype fsocietys most ikelyoproduceviolence,r n what ociopoliticallimate iolences a predictableutcome.Accord-ingtoKornhauser, iolences associatedwithmassmovementshat renon-institu-tionalized.3n ourtwentieth-centuryass ociety,rganized iolencehasoccurredmostdramaticallyndertotalitarianovernmentshereformalizednd legitima-tizedchannels re a prescribedartof the socialsystem,r at leastare available.Regarding ransitionalrdeveloping ations, differentociopoliticallimatehasgenerallyeen thecase. In recentColombia, he ndividuals alienatedfrom hesociety ehas known. n rural reas, hedecline f ocalismndthe mergencefafederated ocialorderhaveposeda difficultroblem or oth hecampesinopeas-ant) and thellanero rangecattleman), ifferents they re. Anomy esultsromconflictingorms; herelations fthe ittlemanto the andand totheproprietorreNOTE: The author expresseshis gratitudeto the Facultad de Sociologia of theNational Uni-versity f Colombia (at whichhe was a Fulbright ecturer n 1961), and particularly oDean Orlando Fals Borda and MonsignorGerman Guzman, who providedmuch of thematerial. The author is also indebted to Jerome I. Fischman, AnthonyLeeds, andArist6buloPardo who have made suggestions bout themanuscript.' For a discussion of violence as a factor n powerpolitics n the traditionLatin Americanpat-

terns,cf. William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics,"WesternPolitical Quarterly, (September 1952), 445-68.2 Georg Simmel,Conflict, r.Kurt H. Wolff Glencoe: Free Press, 1955). Cf. also, Lewis A.Coser, The FunctionsofSocial Conflict Glencoe: Free Press,1956).8 WilliamKornhauser,The PoliticsofMass Society (Glencoe: Free Press,1959), p. 36.35

This content downloaded from 168.176.162.35 on Wed, 17 Apr 2013 17:52:17 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/11

36 THE WESTERNPOLITICAL QUARTERLYcaught nthewebof arger erritorialllegiances.Traditional audillismos ost npartybureaucracy,henationalpolice force, r other arge-scale dministrativeunits.Moreover, ogotaand other ities ave encroachedn whatwasoncean un-trampledandscape.The campesino inds isvalues nconfusion.In developing theory f violenceone inevitablyurns o the frustration-aggression ypothesis.t is hardlyrevolutionaryo suggest hat n mostunder-developed rtransitionalreas of theworld, majorityf thepopulationmayfindthestatus uo unacceptable.How militantlyhesendividualselease heir ensionsdependson a number ffactors,ncluding iteracyevel, eadership,nd accesstosanctioned hannelsforexpressionf discontent.To a largeextent, olombianshavebeendenied these utlets.Thus, nternecine arfare asbeentheend-resultofsocial,political,ndeconomic rustrationswell as ofpersonalnomie.

THE BACKGROUNDOF La Violencia IN RURAL COLOMBIAColombiahashad an unenviable istoryn thedegree fviolence ven whenjudgedbyLatinAmerican tandards.However hese vents avebeen more nthedirectionf civilstrifehanof ruthless ictatorship.n the1860's and 1870's t isestimated hatroughly 0,000weredecimatednwarfare,nd again n 1899-1902perhaps100,000wereeliminated.4 he presentra of ruralviolence egan n 1949and continuedwith lapseat theaccession opowerofRojas Pinilla n 1953, n-creasing gainfrom 954to 1958 when heNationalFront r coalition overnment

was created. It has continued n a reduced cale sincethattime nd is describedmore dequately spsychopathicanditryhan s a political onflict.This tragic pisodearose from deadlockbetween henumericallyuperiorLiberalparty nd theoligarchical,oliticallyntrenched onservativearty.Thereturn ftheLiberalsto governmentn 1930,after ecades of Conservativeule,resultedn somewhat nlightenedocial egislationargely nderthe eadershipfAlfonsoL6pez. As theprogressivedvance faltered n theforties, charismaticrevolutionaryeader,JorgeGaitan,received mmense opularsupport.The gov-ernment eturned otheConservativesargely ecauseof a split ntheLiberalpartyin 1946. The twokeyConservativeigures,spina Perezand LaureanoG6mez,successivelyrovidedn increasinglyrbitraryule. On April , 1948, he ssassina-tionof Gaitin precipitatedhe famousbogotazo, periodofmobrioting,ooting,andkillingn thecapital.Whileorder eturned oBogotAnd other ities, oliticalviolence ecamethepattern ormuchofruralColombia. Although he Conserva-tivepartywasnot distinctn ideology rom heLiberalparty,tgenerallyad thesupport f themilitarynd the Church.At the ametime, heConservatives erea minorityartyndwereperceived y heLiberals smaintainingower yfraudu-lentmeans.STRAINS IN THE COLOMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Violence in Colombia s unquestionablyelated o socialdislocations, hichhave their ounterpartsn other atinAmerican reas. Asidefrom hemore han' EverettE. Hagen, On the Theory ofSocial Change (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1962), pp.379-80; and J6susMaria Henao and GerardoArrubla,HistoryofColombia (Chapel Hill:U. ofN. Carolina Press,1938), pp. 480-519.



4/11

A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: COLOMBIA 37onehundred ears fviolenttruggleetween hetwopolitical arties, number fconflictsr psychologicalressures avebeenand are operatingwithin hesocialfabric:1. Particularismor separatism asprecluded sense f nationalunity ntilrecently. iscontinuitiesncludegeographic arrierswithconsequent egionalismresultingromsolation fmany arts f thecountryswellas from aryingthnicstrains nd cultural raditions. swithmost fLatinAmerica, here sa feudalisticclasssystemnd an urban-ruralleavagewherebyheruralpopulation nd lowersegmentsf theurbanpopulationhave been denied certain anitarynd medicalservices,ducationalfacilities,ccupationalmobility,nd general ocioeconomicadvance. Also,there re thecleric nd anti-clericivalries hich re partiallye-flectednpartyoyalties.2. A majorproblem orColombiahas beentraditionalismndrigidityntheinstitutionaltructure,s, forexample,grossly nequal land tenure.Otherdis-proportionateocial arrangementsould includethe inability f the Churchtoprovide functionalrogram,ailure f he ducationalystemoreformts urricu-lumortoexpand ts ervicesufficiently,nd,most erious,ackofeffectiveovern-ment ecauseofparty ivalryndthe hreat fmilitaryntervention. hileColom-bia hasgenerallyared etterhanmost atinAmericanountries,tsgovernmenttbesthas represented "populist emocracy" ather hana "liberaldemocracy."The lack ofefficientational dministrativeachinery as been abeled"ad hocfederalism"y formeronsultant.6 nderLaureanoG6mez 1950-52) andRojasPinilla 1953-57) these roblems ere ggravateds thecountryradually riftedintodictatorship.3. The country'sconomicplight annot be overemphasized. he level ofpovertyfboth heminifundistand thequasi-serffthe atifundio,longwith heurbanworker'silemma f piralingnflationn thepostwar ears avebeen everelyunhealthyymptoms.With ncreasing eographicmobilityndwider ommunica-tion, hevocalizeddiscontentf the ity asaffectedhe ountrysidendviceversa.4. At therisk funwarrantedeneralizations,heauthorwouldposit hyper-emotionalityrevenpsychopathiclementsncertainubculturesfLatinAmerica.The highhomicide ateof thearea is evidence, lthoughwe grant hatpartsofLatin America ave a lower ate han ertainNorthAmerican ities.Alcoholic nddrug ddiction,nterpersonalivalry,ndviolence reoutlets or his needaggres-sion" triggeredy ocial, olitical,ndeconomic rustration.

SOME CAUSATIVE LINKS IN COLOMBIAN VIOLENCEDespitethegeneral ackgroundf unrest ombinedwith ertain ocial situa-tions, conomic eprivations,nd extremeolitical ivalry,hequestion till emainsas towhy hisguerrillawarfare as continued orwell overa decade. Among hespecificauses re:

5Kornhauser,op. cit.,pp. 130-32.' Lynton . Caldwell, TechnicalAssistancendAdministrativeeformnColombia,"APSR,47 (June 1943), 494-510.7Hagen, op. cit.



5/11

38 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY(1) Political nd militarynvolvement. he use of the nationalpoliceforcebytheConservative overnmentecame nirreconcilableact otheLiberals.Con-

versely, ariouspolice unitsand armymembers efected o thesupport fpro-Gait'n forces uringhebogotazo nd therural iolence f the arly ifties.n otherwords, oth sidesregarded heconflicts a kindofholywar. To whatdegree heCommunistnfluence layeda role cannotbe accuratelyssesseddespiteG6mez'easycharacterizationfhis opponents s "Liberal crypto-communistanditry."It is truethatextremelyiberalcontingents ereaffected yforeignommunistideologyndorganization hardlyurprisingna socioeconomicrder hatwasnotaltogetherlien from heworlddescribedyKarl Marx. However, hebattlewasmainly oughtn thebasisofparty oyaltiesrrationallyerpetuatedy familyndvillage radition.(2) The breakdownftraditionalnstitutions.herehas been n the ountrya partial hift romhe familistic emeinschaft"o the contractual esellschaft."With hegradualdissolutionf ocalism avecome a number fchanges:citywardmigration,nitiationfcasheconomy,ppearanceoforganizedabor, nd thesug-gestionfwomen's ights. heseand othernnovations eredifficultosuperimposeon the ruralfolkwaysnd therigidpatriarchal amilynstitutionith ts extremebifurcationfsexroles, exual and other ibertieseingpermittedhemale,whilethe female s completelyubservient.t is significanthattheCaribbeanorcoastalarea with ts morevariedethnic ackgroundnd morepermissiveexualnorms swellas lessrigidCatholicism asnotespeciallyffectedyviolence.On theotherhand,the moreHispaniccentral reawas lessadjustable ochanging eeds.x0(3) Inadequate socialization.The psychopathicharacter f thekillingnwhich wholevillagepopulations ave been eliminated n bothsidesposessomeproblems. o whatdegree his ggression aybe cultural nviewofthem6lange fSpanish eudalism ithndigenousulturesannot eknown.One fact s clearhow-ever: leadersofviolencewere solated rom ormal ociety uring heir ormativeyears.Manyof theparticipantsreparentlesshildrenrproductsf he raditionalconsensual nion. The limitedxposure ofamilyifehas beenfurtheromplicatedby years fviolence nd consequentlyhepresent aybandolerosbandits)exhibitevenmoremarkedlyhisbackground.Possibly 0 per cent are illiterate.More-over,themasscarnagereflects need to express ne'sdeephostilityo society,finalsettlingf scores, nd suggestshe ackofanyadequate superego tructure.8 Testis Fidelis,El Basilisco en Accidn o Los Crimenes del Bandolerismo(Medellin: TipografiaOlympia, 1953), pp. 16f.SThe Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaftontinuumhas been variouslydefined s traditionalist-ration-alist,sacred-secular. Cf. Talcott Parsons,The Social System Glencoe: Free Press,1951),pp. 496-520, orCharles P. Loomis and J.Allan Beegle, Rural Social Systems New York:Prentice-Hall, 1950), especiallychaps. 1-3. Regardingtheapplication of thisconcept totransitional ationswould be Daniel Lerner,The PassingofTraditionalSociety (Glencoe:Free Press,1958).10 PossiblyColombia was respondingby a vendetta or guerrillawarfare to the anomie precipi-tated by the confrontation f old and new, or "traditionalized" and "emancipated" ele-mentsof the society,where a decade or twoearlier Italy,Germany, nd Spain respondedto the higher evel conflict f the traditionalized nd the rationalizedbyvarying xpres-sions of fascism;cf.Talcott Parsons,Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe: Free Press,1954), pp. 134-37.



6/11

A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: COLOMBIA 39In otherwords, he bizarrenature ftorturend death demonstraten extremelylowculturalevel ombinedwith bscure sychopathiceeds."

(4) Commercial nd economic spects.The case hasbeen madeasmuch hatviolence tpresentstheretentionfa quasi-institutionalizedabit ystem. etit snot esstheresult feconomicmotivation. t is no accident hatviolence hows nupward purt uring ertain griculturaleasons:cropthefts attractiveuringhesemi-annual offeeharvest,nd cheap land is availablewhentheoccupants rethreatenedyviolence.Atpresentn certain reas the victimsregenerallyhosewhohave failed opayforprotectiveervicesgainst anditryndviolence.12THE PATTERN OF VIOLENCE

Statisticsevealthedegree o whichviolencehas affectedhecountry.Whilethe arger artof thecountry as at one timeor another eenaffected,n recentyears ourdepartamentosavehad the most evere osses:Tolima, Caldas,Valle,andHuila. In Tolima,for xample, 2 percentof theroughly50,000 nhabitantshave beenforced o migrate rom heirhomes, ormostof the decade ending n1958.' Not lessthan17,000werekilled fwhom80 percentweremalesbetweenfifteennd forty ears ld.14 In an intensivetudy fonerefugee-crowdedarrio,37 percentofthefamilies ad lostan averageof two closerelatives.'5t maybeaddedthat heover-alloss to thecountrys not as tremendouss often alculated.Insteadoftheconventional00,000figure,t isreasonable o consider maximumof 180,000deaths o 1958,withpossiblyome20,000 incethatdate,or a totalofbetween and2percent fthe ountry'sopulation.'6Guzma'n oints o thedeterminationf efes nd their ollowersn both ides onodejarni la semilla leavenothing, oteventhe eed), or tocompletelyradicateentire amiliesrvillagesncludingventheyoungestmembers."This fanaticismhelps oexplain hehighdeathrate.However, he bovefiguresreproportionatelysomewhat elowthe ossesn theUnitedStates ndSpanish ivilwarsor nColom-bia's previous ivilwars. Colombia'spopulation rowthwasonly lightlyeterredduring heseyears, oughly 2.5 percentnatural ncrease,whichmight therwisehavebeen omethingver .5per ent.Alsothe osseswouldhavebeenhigherf he arlyRojas Pinilla egimendtheFrenteNacional had not come into existence educing artyrivalries,nd inci-dentally,making pecificffortso reducetheviolence. The continuance fvio-lence s a function fa number f barriersn addition o thosementioned bove:nGermanGuzman,Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umafia Luna, "La Violencia en Colom-bia," MonografiasSociol6gicas, No. 12, Volume 1 (Bogota: National University, 962),especiallychaps. 5-7.*Hispanic AmericanReports,16 (May 1963).19Hernando Amaya Sierra, Alfred Wells, and Sergio Restrepo, La Violencia en el Tolima(Ibagu6: SecretariU e Agricultura,1958).14 Ibid.1 Roberto Pineda, "El Impacto de la Violencia en el Tolima: El Caso de El Libano," Mono-grafiasSocidlogicas,No. 6 (BogotA: National University, 960), pp. 16-17,16Guzmin, op. cit.,p. 262.1 Ibid., p. 205,



7/11

40 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYrugged errain,rmy nefficiency,nd thehalf-heartednessf nterestndorganiza-tionwithin henational nd localpower tructureo mplement eans fcombatingtheproblem.'8Institutionalizationnd socialorganizationOne of themore remarkablespectsoftheviolenciahas been theelaboratedeploymentfpersonnel.Duringtheperiod1949to 1952,the national oliceandarmy nits arried n theConservativeauses, nd againtheConservativesnteredinto guerrilla arfaref their wn n theRojas Pinillaperiod.The complexityforganizationnddegree fdepravity ereapparentlymatchedn kindbytheLib-erals, efendingheDirectoria el Partido party irectorate)n the nticipationfonedayreturningopower, r at leastbeingrepresentedn thegovernment. er-haps themost xtensive rganizationn the Liberal frontwas theguerrillarmythatcontrolled he EasternPlainsin theearlyfifties.9"enerally,n theory heguerrillarmywasnotradically ifferentrom onventionalmilitaryrganizationinitsgenerallyierarchicalharacter.20At the sametime, specially ith hecom-munist-inspireduerrillas,rganization as frequentlynformal. n the moreorlessspontaneouslynitiatedmovements,oyaltyndorganization ereon a primarygroup asis, rientedoward hevereda localterritorialrgovernmentalnit) andvillage. On the otherhand,a number fguerrillamovements ere inked ntoalarge-scale ational rganization,s with he Movimiento eAutodefensa ampe-sina. Integratinghe arge-scale rganizationaltructureas beenthe comando rEstadoMayor,with he mpressiveitleComandoGeneralde las Fuerzas Revolu-cionarios e losLlanos OrientalesEastern lains),whichnrealityunctionednlyonpaper. Butthe iterature,ncludingomedozennovels fviolencia, ortrayheimportancef the ocal efe, hecorporal r the ieutenant. odaymost f thevio-lenceorbandolerismos ntheform fgangswith elativelymall-scalerganization.In addition o themorefamiliarmilitary oles, here re specialized olesorgroupings; or xample hecuadrilla, taskforce omposed fpeasants.Therearetheobservador,contactmancarefullycreeninghe ctivitiesf he ocalresidents;thesefialadorsignaler), ften pre-adolescentho ndicates otheband at whathour hevictims most ulnerable; he guantador,heprotector ho for feewillholdoff hebandoleros.Otherroles nclude hearrangementfmilitarytores re-quentlyn thehandsofa woman. In some ases, he efe'sconcubine asbeentheassistanteader ofthegang.21Whether hegroup s largeor smallthemovements18 It has been suggestedthat another factor is underpopulation; cf. Theodore Caplow, "LaViolencia," Columbia University orum,6 (Winter 1963), 45-46. However,an area mostaffected yviolence is also heavilypopulated, namely, heQuindio in the state of Caldas.Similarareas inAntioquia and Valle are also examples.19 A vivid account, among others, s to be found in Eduardo Franco Isaza, Los Guerrillas delLlano (BogotA: LibreriaMundial, 1959).20 Organizationally,thefuerzasguerrilleraswere composed of a hierarchy: (1) theguerrillaorescuadra,generally ed bya cabo primero corporal) and usuallynumbering hreetoninemen; (2) seccidn,composedofthreeto fiveguerrillasunder the commandof a lieutenant;(3) company,ofthreetofive ectionsunder a captain; (4) agrupaci6nguerrillera, iveofthe agrupaciones under the command of a colonel or general. Cf. Guzman, op. cit.,pp.143-44.21 Philip Payne, "Death in theCounntryside,"Time,August6, 1951, pp. 30-31.



8/11

A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: COLOMBIA 41ofeach member ad tobe managedbythe eader, rpdjaro (bird) as he ismorerecentlyabeled thechieftainwithout party ttachment.22espitetheclosetiebetweeneaderandfollower,unishmentsere evere ndfairlyrimitive. orthe eader s for hefollower,heroleswerenewones: inseveralreasthe efeswerealmost ll former armers ho had beendeprived ftheirandsbyviolencia, tillotherswere x-policeieutenants,fewwereformertudents,ndonekey igurenthePlainswas anex-teacher.Beyond heformalnd informalrganizationherehasbeen themistica, rakind f piritualndritualistic orale. The trappingsncluded attooingfthe rossfor heConservadores,hehammernd sickle or heCommunists,ftenncludingthename of the efe; a number fromantic nd martial ongs;an extensive ewjargon;23 and an elaborate olklore, ith engthy ewspaper ccounts egardinghepda'arond his xploits,hename tselfonveyingonsiderablemagery:Mico Blanco(WhiteMonkey),LenguaBrava (Loud Mouth),El Mosco (The Fly),El Vampiro,El Condor, nd manyothers some ffectionate,omeaimedat invokingerror.Not east mpressivemong heritualswere hevarieties fmutilation hich ifferedfor egion rparty; or xample, l cortedefranela f Tolima (the"flannel nder-wear ut") .24 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF La Violencia

Upon investigatinghishistoryfguerrilla arfare nd terror hequestion e-mains s to what t contributeso ourknowledgef thesociologyfviolence.Forone thing, s a costly ivilwar, t wasrelativelynnoticed yworld pinionntheyears f arger lobalconflicts. erhaps hisgnorance r ndifferences an index othedegree f nterestn theworld t large o Latin American ssues.Also,violenciaillustratest leasttwoproblems f rural ife n certain nderdeveloped arts f theworld: therelativemmunityf thecity o thiskind fwarfare,nd thefrustrationofrural ife s a cause of violence. Fracturizationf andplots nd other roblemsoftenure, longwith rosion nd soilexhaustion,ll point othepotential angersin otherpartsof ourhemisphere. arenthetically,tmaybe mentioned hat theAllianceforProgresssalloting ighpriorityo and reformroblems.Social psychologicalxplanationso theColombianviolencepose a numberofproblems.Among heperipheral ariabless thepossible ffectftherelease fhardenedKoreanwarveterans Colombiabeing heonly atinAmericanountryto participaten that ction.25 his event houldbe considerednlight fG6mez'aversionocommunismlongwith is oveofrightistictatorships.t is ustpossiblethatKorean involvement as a meansofcreating ationalunitynd a distraction

During theRojas period theConservativegang leaderswere called "Blue Birds" for hepartycolor, but with the continuance ofviolence the terms godos, chulos,etc.) forConserva-tive chieftains uringthe highwatermarkofviolence suggestthedominantdevotionstothe Liberal side. Chusmero has been used byLiberals as the preferred quivalent termofpdjaro. Chulavita (a town in BoyacA) became the termforpolice officers ho in theyears1948-53 made war on the Liberals.3Guzmin, op. cit.,chap. 8.24 bid., p. 206." Vernon Fluharty,Dance oftheMillions: MilitaryRule and the Social Revolutionin Colom-bia (Pittsburgh:U. ofPittsburgh ress, 1957), p. 272.



9/11

42 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYfrom ertaindomestic roblems,ncluding iolence tself.26 nother ossible x-planation f thecrescendofviolencewas therelease f omehundredsfprisonersduringthebogotazoin 1948.27 In reality,mostcriminals, ncludingbandoleros, erverelativelyriefermsndthis actorannot edisregardednunderstandingiolencein a number fLatinAmerican ountries.And formanyparticipantsonstantx-posure oviolence nly erved oreinforcehismodeofbehavior.Socializationwassystematicallyevoted oaggressionndsadism ver he arger art f a generation,at leastfor ome housandsfmales nrelevant eographicreas.Deeper analysiswouldprobablyeveal hat he"aggressioneed" n Colombiaisparticularlytrong, otonly or conomic rivationutfor he ackof a coherentfamily tructure ithadequatelywarm and stablerelationshipsetweenfamilymembers, hether usband ndwife, rparentsnd children.However, numberofLatin countriesmight emonstratehis ame ackofpsychologicalophisticationinfamilyoles ndfunctionsithout hehistoryfviolence,rof ny ther bjectivecriterionf behavioral rpersonalityefect. t isbeyond hescopeof thispapertoexamine he contributionf Freudian nd neo-Freudian heorys to what tcancontributeoourunderstandingfmassviolence uttherelationshipfvarious ate-gories ffrustration,ggression,ndsadism re relevant.A significantspectof the violencephenomenon as been a "self mpellingprocess" arried n betweenparty dherentst thecommunityr vereda evel.28Party oyalty hich s ascriptive yfamilyndvillagebecomes majormotivationin the ndividual'sife n thisdrive oward evenge.His ownanxietyevel,fedbyenvironmentalrustration,eads to violence as cyclicbehaviorwithsnowballingeffect. onsequently,lthough artyabels re essmeaningfulhanbeforehe1958coalition, hehabitsystemervades.Its continuancen spiteoftherounding-upofbandoleros oints o a deviant ut nherentolewithin he ulture.Finally, n theproblem fcausation,we returno cultural nd subculturalrregional ariables.The deeprelation oSpanish nstitutionslways ecomes ful-crum n anydiscussionfColombianprocesses.29t is significanthat thecoastalarea with tsCaribbean thnic trains,ndustrializedlantation ystem,ndmilderclericismas beenspearedviolence, s have the southernegions fColombia,butfor ifferenteasons.The areatoward cuadorhashada stabilized ulture attern;even the fewLiberals are pro-clerical. tilldifferentre thevast EasternPlainswiththeir eculiar ype f violencebasedon therestless,ndividualistattlepeonin rebelliongainst he andowner. ven within hehighviolence reaofthe nten-sively opulateddissected ighlandshere reregional ariations. or nstance,herichValle province as diffuse,norganized iolencewhichhas incidentally adetherefugee enterCali the fastest rowingmajorcity f therepublic. Although" Orlando Fals Borda, "El Conflicto,La Violencia, y La EstructuraSocial Colombiana," in

GuzmAn, p. cit.,p. 373." JohnD. Martz, Colombia, A Contemporary olitical Survey (Chapel Hill: U. ofN. CarolinaPress,1962), p. 117, citesthis mongvarious theories fmassviolence.* Andrew Pearse, "Factors ConditioningLatent and Open Conflict n Colombian Rural So-ciety,"Fifth World Congressof Sociology,Washington,D.C., September2-8, 1962.* One writer sks whether the Civil War in Spain and Violencia in Colombia mightbe com-pared. HerbertMatthews,New York Times,April23, 1951, p. 7.



10/11

A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: COLOMBIA 43the ities hemselvesreprotectednclaves, opulation ensity ithinhe ural reashas no apparent elationshipo the rateofviolence.There s also theproblem fwhy omeareascaughtup earlierntheviolence ulture reno longer o addicted,notablyAntioquia nd El Choc6. It is realized hat omeof thesegeneralizationsaboutregionalvariations re tentative ypothesesequiringurthernvestigation.

CONCLUSIONSWe havechosen he iteral ranslationf a violencia,lthoughnstead f"vio-lence"theterm civilwar" or some other pithetmight ave been selected.Thegeneralityf the term violence" s well suited o thediffusevents n ruralColom-bia.30For onething,heprocess as the usual characteristicsfguerrillawarfare:a governmenteprivedfpower, heblendingf arger rganization ith ocalunits,a marginal elationshipobrigandage,nd itsuse oforpredilectionor opographicandclimaticxtremes.31ertainlyhe droitnesssequal to theexploits ecordednthe astfew enturiesfthishistoricype fwarfare. n pillage, urning,ndkillingitcompareswith heextremesftheNapoleonic ra or of someofthecivilor nter-nationalwars fthe ast enturynd a half.32A less ecurenterpretationf a violenciamight e considered major ngredi-entofsocialrevolution.33n theColombian ase,ruralviolencemaybe regardedas reaction o the failure f a revolutionocomeoff.The author's wnsurvey,ociteonlyone source,demonstratedhatnearly 0 percentofuniversitytudents

inBogotA eredesirousfbasic ocialchange uncambio adical) andwere osomeextent eflectingheaspirationsfmost f their ompatriots.34owever, he elitesare n too muchdisagreementbouthowthis hange r revolutions tobeeffected,and theeconomic ligarchysopposedto anymarked hiftn thestatus uo. Notleast, he ack of a charismaticeader or ofanycoherentndresponsibleeader-ship wouldmake revolution difficult atter.Nonetheless, any f the ccom-" The Colombian episode also represents he fourmotivesofviolence as presentedbyWright:(a) "maintenanceof law and political authority," s effective overnmenthas not func-tioned in the country, t least in the regimesof Ospina, G6mez, and Rojas; (2) "self-preservation nd retribution," amely,the Liberal partyconsidered tself s forcibly re-

vented fromexercisingany national power, in addition to the frustrations f citizenscaught in a corruptpolice system, ot to speak ofeconomicdisorientation; 3) bothpar-ties,as well as otheralignments,were convinced of the "defenseofhonor and prestige";(4) of their"promotionof social and political justice"; and (5) the role of "individualimpulsesand interests" s bothleaders and followershave found n thesystem fviolencea means of livelihood,status,and a most appealing means of expressingmachismo. Cf.Quincy Wright,A Study of War (Chicago: U. ofChicago Press, 1942), Vol. 2, p. 1395.SI CarletonBeals, "GuerrillaWarfare," Encyclopedia ofSocial Science (New York: Macmillan,1950), Vol. 7, pp. 197-99.32 Quite beyond the limits of the present paper would be a discussionof possible similaritiesbetween violence in such events as the Arab-Israeli conflict, he North Africa surge ofnationalism,guerrillawarfare n SoutheastAsia (including theHuks in thePhilippines),and not least, the role of guerrillawarfare n Fidel Castro's accession to power and theaftermath. Cf. amongothers,Merlo Kling, "Cuba: A Case Studyof a SuccessfulAttempt

to Seize Political PowerbytheApplicationofUnconventionalWarfare,"The Annals,341(May 1964),42-52.3 Ralf Dahrendorf,Class and Class Conflict n IndustrialSociety (Stanford: StanfordU. Press,1959).4 RobertC. Williamson,"Some Students'Attitudes nd Their Determinants: A Sample of theNational University fColombia," MonografiasSociol6gicas, No. 13 (Bogota: Universi-dad Nacional, 1962).



11/11

44 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYpanying henomenafrevolutionavebeenpresent: emographicariationsespe-ciallymigrations),n alterationf exnorms,amily isruption,ndotherymptomsof ocialdisorganization.oo,historysrepletewith arious easant ebellions,zar-istRussiabeing articularlyoted or his endency.35ut a rebellionsnot revolu-tion, lthough requentlysubstitutionr a prelude oone.It is popularto discuss iolence r any phenomenonn terms f its atent swell as itsmanifestunctions.3 he Colombian pisode snoexception.The city-wardmigrationasalready eenmentioned.twouldbeilluminatingo nvestigatethe effectsf theparticipationftheclergy. conomic onsequencesrevisiblentheconsolidationf andholdings,or ne tem, ndprobablynthedevelopmentfa national conomy.A recent ausational nalysis ftheviolence oints o frustra-tionresultingrom he evere eiling nupward ocialmobility. onsequentlyherehave emerged ew "career"opportunities,ot east ofwhich smobilityn the n-formalmilitarynits.37The political spects rehardlyess mportant:ubordina-tionof communityr regional uthorityo federal ontrol nd integration. hecreation f thecoalitiongovernment as in largeparta product ftheviolencia.In other erms,n the atent evel he pisodehastended ounifyhe ountry espitethe ntenseegionalism,tratification,ndparticularistraditions.Finally, iolence s itself form f crime s well as being category f socialconflict.n this undeclaredwar or quasi-revolutionothcontenders ereactingillegallyndyet achof the wopolitical arties laimed egitimacyo their iolence.To whatdegree heprocess f violencehas complicated hefuture ocialdevelop-ment fColombia annot eknown.Asa matter ffact, heyear1963 awpossiblytheworst utbreaksince1957. However,1964appearstomark hecapture ndend of ome f hemostmportantefes.38lthoughheNationalFront sstill perat-ing,pro-RojasPinilla sentimentncreased rom percent ofthevotes ast nthe1962 electionso 15 percent ofthe 1964elections, ith heGeneralhimselfro-viding erbal hreatsnthedirection f coup.39The AllianceforProgress t present egards hecountrys one of themorehopefulprospectsn a particularlyleakhemisphericanorama. One hopesthateventuallya violenciawillbe merely istory.n anycase,forthesociologistheperiodwillprobably e recorded s one of an abortive evolution,n inchoate, n-conventionalivilwar,and an arenaofcollective ehaviornwhichmasshysteriaandmasshomicide ecameacceptedbycertain lementsfthepower tructurendbytherural ulturen a regional asis.

* Feliks Gross,The Seizure ofPolitical Power (New York: PhilosophicalLibrary, 1958, p. 94." H. L. Nieburg,"Uses ofViolence," Journalof ConflictResolution,7 (March 1963), 43-54.8 Camilo Torres Restrepo,"La Violencia y los Cambios Socio-culturales en las Areas RuralesColombianas," Memoria del PrimerCongresoNacional de Sociologia (Bogota: EditorialIqueima, 1963), pp. 95-152.88Time, May 8, 1964, pp. 36-38.8 New YorkTimes,March 22, 1964, p. 7.

Documents

Williamson - Theory of Violence and Colombia