1. Marcela Rodelas v. Amparo AranzaFacts: Petitioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the holo will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla. The grounds of their opposition are as follows:1. Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator.2. The alleged copy of the will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect.3. The original must be presented and not the copy thereof.4. The deceased did not leave any will.The appellees also moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will. The appellees' motions were denied. They filed a Motion for recon. Motion for Recon was approved. Appellant's motion for recon was denied. Appellant appealed the case to the CA which certified the case to the SC on the ground that the appeal does not involve questions of fact.Issue: Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.Ruling: Yes. a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.2. Spouses Roberto and Thelma Ajero v. Court of Appeals and Clemente Sand G.R. No. 106720; September 15, 1994 Facts: The decedent names as devisees Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero and their children. The petitioners filed a petition for the allowance of decendent's holographic will. Private Respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decendent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by the decedent; and the will was procured by pets through improper pressure and undue influence. Dr. Jose Ajero also opposed the petition. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court admitted the holo will to probate. On appeal, the said decision was reversed and the pet for probate was dismissed. The CA found that the holo will failed to meet the requirements for its validity. I held that the decedent did not comply with Arts 813 and 814.It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent. Ruling: 1. Refer to Art. 839. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.

3. Sofia Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, Rufina Gomez, Oscar Jugo Ang, Carmelita Jugo Facts: Martin Jugo named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. The will clearly stated that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita. He stated that since 1952 he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. The testator and the petitioner herein were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely his legal wife and his children (Oscar & Carmelita) his entire estate. He devised the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The pet filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased. The legal wife and her children filed an opposition. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the testator admitted to cohabiting with the pet. The Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The respondent court set aside the decision of the CFI. It declared the will to be valid except the devise in favor of the pet pursuant to Art, 739 in relation with Art. 1028. Pet filed a motion for recon - denied. Issues: 1. Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner. 2. Validity of hte disposition in favor of the pet. Ruling: 1. No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. 2. Invalid. Refer to Art. 739. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides: The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents: First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee. Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings. Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals. Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator.

4. Polly Cayetano v. Hon. Tomas Leonidas and Nenita Campos Paguia Facts: Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as surviving heirs. Hermogenes Campos adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased. Eleven months after, Nenita filed a pet for the reprobate of a will of the deceased which was allegedly executed un the US. Nenita alleged that after the testatrix death, her last will and test was presented, probated, allowed, and registered in Philadelphia. The pet for the reprobate of the will was opposed. Pet filed a motion to dismiss opposition stating that he has been able to verify the veracity of the will and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter. The lower court admitted the will to probate. Hermogenes filed a pet for relief, praying that the order allowing the will to be set aside was secured through fraudulent means. Motion for recon denied. Meanwhile, pet died and left a will, which incidentally has been questioned by the respondent. Issue: Validity of the provisions of the will. Ruling: Petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him. - Without merit. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. -Art. 16, 1039. The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.5. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO v. LUZ, GLICERIA AND CORNELIO MOLOFacts: Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939. On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law. In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.Issues: 1. Was Molos will of 1918 subsequently revoked by his will of 1939? 2. Assuming that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testators belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect, can the earlier will be admitted to probate?Held: 1. NO. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court laid down the doctrine that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. Although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State in the subject of revocation of wills, the court is of the impression from a review and the study of the pertinent authorities that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good law.2. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.6. Heirs of Jesus Fran v. Hon. Bernardo LL. Salas G.R. No. L-53546; June 25, 1992 Facts: Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal properties located in Cebu City, Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. She left a last will and testament wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives(b,s,n,n) all her properties. She designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor. Jesus Fran filed a pet for the probate of Remedios' will. The pet alleged that Rosario was not physically well. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Fran on the third page of the petition. The PRs (sisters of the deceased) filed a manifestation, alleging that they needed time to study the petition bec. some heirs have been intentionally omitted. PRs did not file any opposition. The petition thus became uncontested. The probate court rendered a decision admitting the will to probate. Pet filed an Inventory of the Estate, copies thereof were furnished to the PRs. A Project of Partition was submitted by hte exec to the court. The PRs still did not make any objections. TC issued its Order approving the partition. Thereafter, the aforesaid branch(which issued the order) was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. PRs filed with the new branch a MR of the probate judgment and the order of partition. Pets challenged the juris of the court. Respondent Judge issued an order declaring the testamentary dispos as void. Issue: 1. GAD of respondent Judge. Ruling: 1. Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter set aside the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the subject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary dispositions therein and ordered the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having been no claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran submitted a Project of Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which private respondent Espina expressed her conformity through a certification filed with the probate court. Assuming for the sake of argument that private respondents did not receive a formal notice of the decision as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their prior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have been an idle ceremony. In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition, which is normally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate the proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision, they should have desisted from performing the above acts and instead demanded from petitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the will. The same conclusion refutes and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify them of the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail because private respondents were present when the court dictated the said order.