FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 70722. July 3, 1991.]

CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN, FLORA VELASQUEZ, BENJAMIN VELASQUEZ, RODOLFO VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO VELASQUEZ, NAPOLEON VELASQUEZ, MANUEL VELASQUEZ, JULIO VELASQUEZ, VICTORIA VELASQUEZ, CARLOS VELASQUEZ, LEONOR VELASQUEZ, ELENA VELASQUEZ, PATROCINIO VELASQUEZ, PATRICLA VELASQUEZ, SANTIAGO ZAPANTA, HERMINIGILDO SISON, ALFREDO AGAPITO, MOISES SANTOS, MAGDALENAPAGKATIPUNAN, AGAPITO MANALO, MIGUEL ANGELES, MATIAS ALVAREZ, PATRICIO LAYSA, TEOFILO DE LUNA, ISIDRO ANINAO, APOLINAR CASAL, MOISES GALLARDO, BONIFACIO PEREZ, DELFIN LAYBA, AND HERMOGENES FLORES, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE R. VELASQUEZ, JR., LOURDES VELASQUEZ, EDGARDO VELASQUEZ, LOLITA VELASQUEZ, MINERVA VELASQUEZ, CYNTHIA VELASQUEZ, CESAR GONZALES, ADOLFO GONZALES, EVELYN GONZALES, AMELITA GONZALES, RUBEN GONZALES, AND CARMENCITA GONZALES, respondents.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Ascuna & Bengson for petitioners.

Tomas P. Añonuevo for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIPS; FAILURE TO COLLATE AND CONSIDER DONATIONS MADE DURING THE LIFETIME OF DONOR; DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE HEIRS CONSIDERED DEFECTIVE. — It is a basic rule that before any conclusion about the legal share due to the heirs may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The trial court failed to

consider among others, Articles 908 and 1061 of the Civil Code . It is undeniable that numerous donations inter vivos were made by Jose Velasquez, Sr. in favor of some of his compulsory heirs. Likewise, no collation of the donations he executed during his lifetime was undertaken by the trial court. With the avowed specific provisions of the laws respecting collation, which are ruled controlling even in intestate succession, this Court finds that the lower court's ruling adjudicating the remaining portion of the conjugal estate to the private respondents is purely speculative and conjectural.

2. ID.; LAND REGISTRATION; LAND FRAUDULENTLY REGISTERED, HELD AS MERE TRUSTEE BY THE PERSON IN WHOSE NAME THE SAME IS REGISTERED. — The fact that they had succeeded in securing title over the said parcels of land does not warrant the reversal of the trial court's ruling that the sales and assignments were sham and fictitious. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent and the person in whose name the land is registered thus holds it as a mere trustee, the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property within a period of ten years (Pajarillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1969, 176 SCRA 340). Since petitioners asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the said parcels of land but acted in fraud of the private respondents, the former may be held to act as trustees for the benefit of the latter, pursuant to the provision of Article 1456 of the Civil Code:

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECONVEYANCE IN FAVOR OF ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CASE; NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL WHO AMONG THE HEIRS ARE DETERMINED ENTITLED THERETO. — But while the trial court has the authority to order the reconveyance of the questioned titles, We cannot agree that the reconveyance should be made in favor of the private respondents. The reason is that it is still unproven whether or not the private respondents are the only ones entitled to the conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. It is to be noted that as the lawful heirs of Jose Velasquez, Sr. the herein petitioners are also entitled to participate with his conjugal share. To reconvey said property in favor of the private respondents alone would not only be improper but will also make the situation more complicated. There are still things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.

4. ID.; SUCCESSION; STEPS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE LEGAL SHARE DUE THE COMPULSORY HEIRS. — No conclusion as to the legal share due to the compulsory heirs can be reached in this case without (1) determining first the net value of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr.; (2) collating all the donations inter vivos in favor of some of the heirs; and (3) ascertaining the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

D E C I S I O N

MEDIALDEA, J p:

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. CV No. 68431 dated February 7, 1986, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna, Branch II, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Civil Case No. SC-894, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is affirmed, with the following modification:

"The entire house and lot on West Avenue, Quezon City, shall be divided as follows:

"One-half value of said house and lot to defendant-appellant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her 13 co-defendants-appellants children (now petitioners) to the extent of their respective proportional contributions as stated above; and.

"The other one-half value of the said house and lot goes to the second conjugal partnership of the deceased husband and his second spouse Canuta Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth to Canuta Pagkatipunan and the other one-fourth appertaining to the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided equally among his 18 heirs as follows:

1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiff-appellee Lourdes Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia, and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellee Teresa Magtibay and her children, Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Angelita, Ruben, and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales;

1/18 undivided portion to each of the 13 defendants-appellants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Julio, Elena, Patricia, Victoria, and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez.

"SO ORDERED." (p. 55, Rollo)

The facts from the records are as follows:

The principal litigants in this case are the successors-in-interest of Jose Velasquez, Sr. who died intestate on February 24, 1961. Petitioner Canuta Pagkatipunan is the surviving spouse of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and the other 13 petitioners are their children namely: Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Julio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and Carlos. On the other hand, the private respondents are the descendants of Jose Velasquez, Sr. with his first wife Victorina Real who died in 1920 at Santa Cruz, Laguna. Private respondents Jose Velasquez, Jr. (substituted after his death during the pendency of this suit by his surviving spouse Teresa Magtibay and their children Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida), and Lourdes Velasquez are two of the five children of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. The other three, Amelia, Guillermo and Lutgarda, all surnamed Velasquez, all died before the commencement of this case. Amelia Velasquez died without any issue. Guillermo Velasquez was survived by private respondents Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez, his children, forced heirs and lawful successors-in-interest. Lutgarda Velasquez was survived by private respondents Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Amelita, Ruben and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales, likewise her children, forced heirs and successors-in-interest.

This case was judicially instituted by the private respondents against the petitioners in 1969 in a complaint entitled "accion reivindicatoria, annulment of deeds of sale, partition and damages." However, both the trial and the appellate courts considered that the real controversy in this case is the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties acquired by the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. in his two marriages, one with Victorina Real, who predeceased him, and the other with

Canuta Pagkatipunan, as well as the partition of the estate of said Jose Velasquez, Sr. among his heirs.

It appears that after the death of Victorina Real in 1920, no dissolution of the first conjugal property has been made. Consequently, Jose Velasquez, Sr. enjoyed full possession, use, usufruct and administration of the whole conjugal property of the first marriage.  llcd

In 1930, Jose Velasquez, Sr. took Canuta Pagkatipunan as his second wife although they cohabited as early as 1921, when she was 16, soon after his first wife's death. From this marriage, the other 13 co-petitioners were born. Neither had there been any liquidation of the second conjugal partnership after the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in 1961. This situation gave rise to the controversies in the instant case spawned by the parties' conflicting claims from both sides of the two marriages.

The trial court appointed two sets of commissioners one on January 31, 1975, for the purpose of making an inventory of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr., and the other on November 15, 1976, to determine which of the parcels of land listed in such inventory submitted by the first set of commissioners belong to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage or to the conjugal partnership of the second marriage.

Based on the Report and Inventory submitted on May 29, 1975, the commissioners listed the following properties as acquired by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his marriage with Victorina Real:

1. Tax Declaration No. 2718. A riceland, located in Luya and with an area of 93,662 square meters;

2. Tax Declaration No. 3125. A Secano land located in Luya and with an area of 12,540 square meters;

3. Tax Declaration No. 2623. A Cocal and Forestal, situated in Salang-Bato (Macasipac) and with an area of 500,000 square meters;

 

4. Tax Declaration No. 2096. A riceland, situated in Islang Munti and with an area of 40,328 square meters;

5. A Cocal and Forestal land situated in Bankang Bato containing an area of 240,000 square meters;

6. Tax Declaration No. 4251. A Cocal, Secano and Cogonal land situated in Cambuja and containing an area of 163,121 square meters;

7. Tax Declaration No. 1342. A parcel of land situated in Bagumbayan and containing an area of 80,258 square meters;

8. Tax Declaration No. 3541. A Cocal and Secano land, situated in Bagumbayan and containing an area of 20 hectares;(Total area as surveyed is 392,503 square meters. This includes the area of the land stated in Item 7 of the Inventory).

9. Tax Declaration No. 82. A Cogonal land situated in Tungkod (Ikalong Tuwid), containing an area of 385,324 square meters;

10. Tax Declaration No. 1500. A riceland, situated in Pague, containing an area of 9,228 square meters;

11. Tax Declaration No. 5688.

a) A parcel of land situated in NAPSE (Masinao), containing an area of 24,725 square meters;

b) A parcel of land situated in NAPSE (Masinao), containing an area of 25,000 square meters;

12. Tax Declaration No. 543. A parcel of land situated in Gomez Street, containing an area of 755 square meters;

13. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboam containing an area of 367.2 square meters;

14. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of 367.2 square meters.

15. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of 367.2 square meters.

16. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of 367.2 square meters.

17. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboam, containing an area of 1,275 square meters.

18. Tax Declaration No. 804-A. Three parcels of land situated in Salang Bato, containing an area of 450,000 square meters;

19. Tax Declaration No. 2560. A parcel of land situated in Salang Bato which area is included in item no. 18.

20. A parcel of land situated in Burgos St. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).

21. A parcel of land situated in Burgos St., containing an area of 5,000 square meters. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).

22. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St., containing an area of 800 square meters. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).

23. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St., containing an area of 1,050 square meters. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).

24. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).

25. A parcel of land situated in Zamora St., containing an area of 3,605. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).

26. Tax Declaration No. 2412: A parcel of land situated in Caboam, containing an area of 12,867 square meters;

27. A parcel of land situated in Dra. Amelia St."

On the other hand, the commissioners listed the following properties as acquired by Jose Velasquez, Sr. on February 11, 1921 or after the death of Victorina Real:

28. Tax Declaration No. 2547. A parcel of land situated in Barandilla, containing an area of 21,566 square meters;

29. A parcel of land situated in Barandilla, containing an area of 93.191 square meters. (Commissioner's Inventory, Rollo, pp. 355-360).

Worth noting are the following findings of the commissioners:

"3) That among the properties acquired by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his lifetime, only the one mentioned in Item 7 of the Inventory (Annex "A") is still intact. It is situated in Bagumbayan, Sta. Maria, Laguna, and is containing an area of 80,258 square meters, more or less;

"4) That Item 8 of the Inventory is only 200,000 square meters, more or less in Tax Declaration No. 3541, but as per Survey caused by the defendants (which is not yet approved) it contains an area of 330,345 square meters. That the Tax Declaration of said parcel of land is under the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan, but plaintiff Jose Velasquez, Jr. is the one in possession of said property. That the area as contained in the Survey includes the area of the land mentioned in Item 7 of the Inventory (80,258 sq. m.);

"5) That the other properties of the late Jose Velasquez Sr. were disposed of by the said decedent during his lifetime and some

were sold and or disposed of by the parties and heirs of the late Jose Velasquez, Sr.;

"6) That the Barandilla properties, as evidenced by the Venta Absoluta dated February 11, 1921 executed by Pedro Villanueva in favor of Jose Velasquez Sr., were disposed of portion by portion. It was sold by the late Jose Velasquez who disposed of some portions and the rest by either the plaintiffs or defendants. An area of 11,200 square meters more or less was DONATED (donacion propter Nupcias) in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan by the decedent Jose Velasquez, Sr. as evidenced by Kasulatan ng Pambagong Documento Donacion Propter Nupcias notarized under Inst. 135; Page 47; Book I; Series of 1947 of Notary Public Bonifacio de Ramos;

"7) That the parcels of land appearing in Items 5 and 6 of the Inventory (Annex "A") were DONATED by the late Jose Velasquez Sr. to Guillermo Velasquez;

"8) That parcels of land mentioned in Items 18 and 19 of the Inventory (Annex "A") were DONATED by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. to Jose Velasquez, Jr. Said properties were sold by the Donee to Sps. Santiago Recio and Filomena Dimaculangan;

"9) The property mentioned in Item 27, page 3 of the Inventory was given by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. to one of his daughters, Dra. Amelia Velasquez while she was still living and now owned by her heirs;

"10) A residential lot at 7 West Avenue, Quezon City, titled in the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan, was acquired from the PHHC (People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, now National Housing Authority) and presently occupied by the defendants." (Rollo, pp. 351-353)

There is divergence of findings and opinion among the three members of the second set of commissioners with respect to the properties covered by Items 7 and 8 and the property in the unnumbered item relating to Lot 2-A West Avenue, Quezon City and the house thereon of the Inventory submitted by the first set of commissioners. They refuse to make findings as to the nature of the properties because the petitioners had caused the issuance of titles covering said properties. However, all the commissioners were in agreement that all the other properties listed in the Inventory belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.

The records before Us will show that the properties covered by items 7 and 8 were originally declared for taxation purposes in the names of the spouses Real and Velasquez. This has been admitted by Canuta Pagkatipunan during the hearing before the Commissioner and is duly supported by documentary evidence. LexLib

After the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. the full possession of said property was acquired by Canuta Pagkatipunan. On March 4, 1967, she sold the same property to the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan, her brother-in-law and sister, respectively (they were previously impleaded in the trial court as party-defendants). Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843 was issued in the names of the said spouses who later resold the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan. Thereafter, tax declaration covering said property was issued in her name. During the pendency of this suit, this property was subdivided and assigned by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her thirteen children. The latter caused the issuance of separate free patent titles in their favor covering the subdivided lots conveyed to them by their mother. Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-2000 to P-2012 were accordingly issued in their names.

With regard to the West Avenue property it is not disputed that said residential lot was purchased on installments from People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (now National Housing Authority) by the spouses Jose Velasquez Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan. The installments were paid by the said spouses until Jose Velasquez, Sr. died on February 24, 1961. Canuta Pagkatipunan, with the help of some of her children, shouldered the payment of the remaining installments until said property was fully paid in 1965. On February 23, 1968, the PHHC executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the said house and lot to Canuta Pagkatipunan.

On August 11, 1980, a judgment was rendered by the trial court:

"1) Declaring the properties listed in the Inventory submitted by the Commissioners on May 9, 1975, as belonging to the estate of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real;

"2) Confirming all the conveyances, either by way of sale or donation, executed by Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his lifetime;

"3) Declaring null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales, transfers, assignments or conveyances: (a) the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan (sic);

(b) the deeds of assignments executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children, covering the properties listed in Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory; and ordering defendants (petitioners) to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs (private respondents) the parcels of land covered by Patent Titles Nos. P-2000 to P-2012;

"4) Declaring as null, fictitious and fraudulent the sales by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children and her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan and brother-in-law Moises Santos, listed in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint; declaring the plaintiffs owners of the said properties; and ordering the defendant CanutaPagkatipunan and her children-defendants to deliver possession of said properties to the plaintiffs;

"5) Ordering the partition of the house and lot in West Avenue, Quezon City in the following manner:

 

"(a) One-half undivided portion to defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan; and the other half appertaining to Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided among his heirs, to wit:

1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan;

1/18 undivided portion to Lourdes Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Teresa Magtibay and her children Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Angelita, Ruben and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales;

1/18 undivided portion to each of the defendants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Julio, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez;

"6) Ordering the defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her children-defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00, as reimbursement for attorney's fees;

"7) The defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her children-defendants are likewise ordered to pay the costs of this suit;

"8) The case against the other defendants, other than Canuta Pagkatipunan and her children and the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan, is ordered dismissed." (pp. 614-617, Rollo).

Petitioners appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

On February 7, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court, Third Civil Cases Division promulgated a decision, affirming the decision of the trial court, with the modification that the entire house and lot in West Avenue, Quezon City be divided into two; one-half value to the petitioners Canuta Pagkatipunan and her 13 children to the extent of their respective proportional contributions and the other half value, to the second conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth to the wife and the other one-fourth appertaining to the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided equally among his heirs.

Hence, this instant petition for review pointing out the following four (4) assignments of error, to wit:

I

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE ESTATE LISTED IN THE INVENTORY SUBMITTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS ON MAY 9, 1975 AS BELONGING TO THE DECEASED SPOUSES JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR. AND VICTORINA REAL.

II

"THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONFIRMING ALL THE CONVEYANCES EITHER BY WAY OF SALE OR DONATION EXECUTED BY JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR. DURING HIS LIFETIME.

III

"THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID, SHAM AND FICTITIOUS THE FOLLOWING SALES: a) THE SALE EXECUTED BY CANUTA PAGKATIPUNANIN FAVOR OF HER SISTER MAGDALENA PAGKATIPUNAN AND BROTHER-IN-LAW MOISES SANTOS; b) THE RESALE EXECUTED BY MOISES SANTOS AND MAGDALENAPAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN c) THE DEEDS OF ASSIGNMENT EXECUTED BY CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF HER CHILDREN: COVERING THE PROPERTIES LISTED IN ITEMS 7 AND 8 OF THE INVENTORY; AND ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN AND HER CHILDREN DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS TO RECONVEY IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-

APPELLEES THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY PATENT TITLES NOS. P2-000 TO P-2012.

IV

"THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN WEST AVENUE, QUEZON CITY, ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN AND THE OTHER HALF TO JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR." (pp. 21-22, Rollo)

After a careful review of the records and the arguments presented by both parties, the Court finds that both the trial court and the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court failed to consider some basic principles observed in the law on succession. Such an oversight renders the appealed decision defective and hard to sustain.  prcd

It is a basic rule that before any conclusion about the legal share due to the heirs may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. In the assailed decision, the respondent court affirmed the trial court's ruling, that Jose Velasquez, Sr. had already disposed of and exhausted his corresponding share in the conjugal partnership owned by him and Victorina Real, so that his heirs have nothing more to inherit from him, and that accordingly, whatever remaining portion of the conjugal property must necessarily appertain only to the private respondents as heirs of the deceased Victorina Real. Clearly, the trial court failed to consider among others, the following provisions of the Civil Code:

"ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.

"To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them."

"ART. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition."

It is undeniable that numerous donations inter vivos were made by Jose Velasquez, Sr. in favor of some of his compulsory heirs. They

include among others, the donation made in favor of Guillermo Velasquez on February 26, 1953, consisting of 403,000 square meters (Items 5 and 6); the donation made in 1926 in favor of Jose Velasquez, Jr., consisting of 450,000 square meters (Item No. 18); the donation in favor of Amelia Velasquez (Item No. 27), and the donation in favor of CanutaPagkatipunan, consisting of 11,000 square meters (part of Item No. 29) (Commissioner's Report, Rollo, pp. 355-360).

It appears that there was no determination whatsoever of the gross value of the conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Obviously it is impossible to determine the conjugal share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. from the said property relationship. Likewise, no collation of the donations he executed during his lifetime was undertaken by the trial court. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to ascertain whether or not such donations trenched on the heirs' legitime so that the same may be considered subject to reduction for being inofficious.

Article 909 of the Civil Code provides:

"Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime.

"Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which the testator could have disposed by his last will.

"Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be reduced according to the rules established by this Code."

With the avowed specific provisions of the aforesaid laws respecting collation, which are ruled controlling even in intestate succession, this Court finds that the lower court's ruling adjudicating the remaining portion of the conjugal estate to the private respondents is purely speculative and conjectural.

Relative to the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan to the spouses Magdalena Pagkatipunan and Moises Santos; the resale of the same property to her; and the subsequent deeds of assignment she executed in favor of her children, the trial court had clearly established that Canuta Pagkatipunan employed fraudulent acts to acquire title over the said properties. Hence, the trial court, as well as the respondent court are correct in ruling that the said sales and assignments are null and void, sham and fictitious.

The pertinent portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:

"From the evidence adduced by the parties during the hearing before this Court and before the Commissioners, these properties were acquired on November 19, 1918 by the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victoria Real from Estanislao Balasoto (Exh. H-5, Commissioner). Said property was originally declared for taxation purposes in the names of said spouses. (Exh. H-Commissioner). On March 4, 1967, defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan sold the same property to the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-1-Commissioner). The vendee Magdalena Pagkatipunan is the sister of the defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan. Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843 (Exh. H-2-Commissioner) was issued in the names of the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan resold (sic) the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-3-Commissioner). Thereafter, tax declaration covering said property was issued in the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exhibit H-4-Commissioner). During the pendency of this suit, this property was subdivided and assigned by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children, the defendants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Julio, Victoria and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez. Said defendants-children of CanutaPagkatipunan caused the issuance of free patent titles in their favor covering the subdivided lots conveyed to them respectively by their mother (Exh. 2, 2-A to 2-L).

"It is evident that the parcels of land under Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Canuta Pagkatipunan had no right to alienate the same. Her conveyance of the same property to her brother-in-law and sister is fictitious or simulated. Ten (10) days after she executed her sale, the same property was resold to her by the vendees. She utilized said conveyance and reconveyance only for the purpose of securing a tax declaration in her name over said property. Her subsequent subdivision of said lot and transfer of the subdivided lots to each of their children further show her fraudulent intent to deprive the plaintiffs of their rightful shares in the disputed property." (Rollo, pp. 606-607)

Despite the several pleadings filed by the petitioners in this Court, they did not rebut the foregoing findings of the trial court but merely held on to their argument that since Free Patent Titles Nos. P-2000 to P-2012 were already issued in their names, their title thereto is indefeasible and incontrovertible. This is a misplaced argument.  prcd

 

The fact that they had succeeded in securing title over the said parcels of land does not warrant the reversal of the trial court's ruling that the above mentioned sales and assignments were sham and fictitious. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent and the person in whose name the land is registered thus holds it as a mere trustee, the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property within a period of ten years (Pajarillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1969, 176 SCRA 340).

Since petitioners asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the said parcels of land but acted in fraud of the private respondents, the former may be held to act as trustees for the benefit of the latter, pursuant to the provision of Article 1456 of the Civil Code:

"ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."

But while the trial court has the authority to order the reconveyance of the questioned titles, We cannot agree that the reconveyance should be made in favor of the private respondents. The reason is that it is still unproven whether or not the private respondents are the only ones entitled to the conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victoria Real. It is to be noted that as the lawful heirs of Jose Velasquez, Sr. the herein petitioners are also entitled to participate in his conjugal share. To reconvey said property in favor of the private respondents alone would not only be improper but will also make the situation more complicated. There are still things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.

Relative to the last assignment of error, We find the ruling made by the respondent appellate court proper and in accord with law insofar as it adjudicated the one-half (1/2) portion of the house and lot situated at West Avenue, Quezon City, as belonging to the petitioners to the extent of their respective proportional contributions, and the other half to the conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan. We must modify it, however, as it readily partitioned the conjugal share of Jose Velasques, Sr. (1/2 of the conjugal property or 1/4 of the entire house and lot) to his 18 heirs.

As already said, no conclusion as to the legal share due to the compulsory heirs can be reached in this case without (1 ) determining first the net value of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr.; (2) collating all the donations inter vivos in favor of some of the heirs; and (3) ascertaining the legitime of the compulsory heirs.  LLjur

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court as modified by the respondent appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE except insofar as it:

(a) declared the properties listed in the Inventory submitted by the commissioners on May 9, 1975 as belonging to the estate of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real;

b) declared null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales, transfers, assignments or conveyances:

1) the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan; 2) the resale of the same property executed in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan; and 3) the deeds of assignments executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her 13 children; covering the properties listed in Items 7 and 8;

c) declared as null and void all the other conveyances made by Canuta Pagkatipunan with respect to Item No. 13 of the inventory; and

d) dismissed the case against the other defendants except Canuta Pagkatipunan and her children and the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan.

Civil Case No. SC-894 is hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, for further proceedings and the same Court is directed to:

a) follow the procedure for partition herein prescribed;

b) expand the scope of the trial to cover other possible illegal dispositions of the first conjugal partnership properties not only by Canuta Pagkatipunan but also by the other heirs as can be shown in the records;

c) include the one-fourth (1/4) share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in the residential house in Quezon City with his conjugal share under his first marriage, if any, to determine his net estate at the time of his death.

The trial court's pronouncement as to cost and damages is hereby deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

 

||| (Pagkatipunan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70722, [July 3, 1991])

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-2386. April 16, 1906.]

MIGUEL FUENTES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. JUANA CANON Y FAUSTINO, ET AL., defendant-appellant.

Ramon Salinas, for appellants.

Aguedo Velarde, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGACY; "LEGADO MODAL." — A legacy to A. of 3,000 pesos with directions to purchase lands, to certain one-third of such lands and to deliver the other two-thirds to B. and C., is not a legado modal as that term is defined in law 21, title 9, partida 6.

2. ID.; INTEREST. — A judicial demand having been made on the heirs of the testatrix in 1893, for the delivery of the legacy, interest thereon commenced from the date of such demand.

3. ID.; HEIRS; RESPONSIBILITY. — The liability of the heirs who have received the inheritance of the testator to pay this legacy is pro rata (mancomunada), and is in proportion to the interest which each has in the inheritance.

D E C I S I O N

WILLARD, J p:

The twentieth clause of the will of Josefa Faustino y Mendoza, who died on the 1st day of April, 1887, is as follows:

"Vigesima. — Mando se entreguen a los conyuges Don Miguel de la Fuente y Doña Potenciana Medrano tres mil pesos para invertirlos en compra de buenos terrenos de labor quedandose con una tercera parte y repartiendo las dos restantes la una a la viuda e hijo de Don Eriberto de la Fuente y la otra a los hijos y herederos de Don Honorio de la Fuente."

The plaintiffs herein, Miguel de la Fuente and Potenciana Medrano, brought this action against the twenty heirs of Josefa to recover the 3,000 pesos mentioned in this legacy. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in the court below. Defendants excepted to the judgment, and have brought the case here by bill of exceptions. No motion for a new trial was made in the court below.

The first claim of the appellants is that the plaintiffs are required to give a bond before they are entitled to the delivery of the 3,000 pesos, the legacy here in question being defined in law 21, title 9, partida 6, and known as a legado modal. There is nothing in this claim. As far as the heirs of the testatrix are concerned, there is no condition whatever attached to the legacy. With the rights of the beneficiaries mentioned in the said twentieth clause the defendants in this case have nothing to do. As to them there was an absolute gift of 3,000 pesos, and the plaintiffs have the right to receive that from the heirs, and they are under no obligation to give security to the heirs before the money is paid.

The court below ordered judgment against the defendants for 3,000 pesos and interest from January 1, 1894. The appellants claim that this was error. It was proved that in November, 1893, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the heirs of the testatrix to recover this legacy. For some reason that case was not brought to trial. It, however, amounted to a judicial demand for the payment of the money, and the interest commenced to run from that date.

The case shows that upon the death of Josefa her property was divided among two nephews and a niece. One of the nephews afterwards died, and his property was divided among heirs of two other nephews who had died before Josefa and the nephew and niece who had survived her. The court ordered judgment against the twenty defendants for the payment of 3,000 pesos and interest, without any statement as to how much each defendant was to pay.

The judgment as it stands must be construed as imposing an equal pro rata liability, and for this reason we think it is erroneous. The liability imposed upon the heirs to pay this legacy ispro rata (mancomunada) and in proportion to the amount of the estate to which each one was entitled. The judgment of the court below is modified, and judgment is rendered against the defendants for the following amounts, to wit: Maria Josefa Canon Faustino, 1,250 pesos; Cipriana Pilar Faustino, Lazaro Faustino, Filomena Faustino, and Francisco Faustino, 62.50 pesos each; Emerenciano Faustino, Jose Faustino, Exequiel Faustino, Trinidad Faustino, Pedro Faustino, Jose Faustino, and Manuel Faustino, 35.71 pesos each; Juana Canon Faustino, Fernanda Canon Faustino, Marciana Canon Faustino, and Fernando Canon Faustino, 250 pesos each; Concepcion Suarez y Canon Faustino, Alfredo Suarez y Canon Faustino, Adolfo Suarez y Canon Faustino, and Alfonso Suarez y Canon Faustino, 62.50 pesos each.

Judgment is also rendered against each one of the defendants for interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 1st day of January, 1894, on the sum for which judgment is herein entered as above set forth. With this modification the judgment of the court below is affirmed. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. After the expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered herewith and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for proper procedure. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.

||| (Fuentes v. Canon y Faustino, G.R. No. L-2386, [April 16, 1906])

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-32328. September 30, 1977.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners-appellants, vs. PANFILO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees.

Ramon C. Zamora, Lorenzo E. Coloso, Jose L. Castigador, Arthur Defensor & Sixto Demaisip and Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.

Nacianceno G. Rico & Felipe G. Espinosa for oppositors-appellees.

D E C I S I O N

FERNANDEZ, J p:

This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, in Special Proceeding No. 2176 dismissing the petition for the probate of a will. 1

One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence.

Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews, respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4, 1963 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736. In the course of said intestate proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate of AdrianaMaloto on February 1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each. 2 The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, then presided by Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, approved the extrajudicial partition on March 21, 1964. 3

On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. 4 It appears that Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named as heirs but Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said will which are bigger, different and more valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said will also allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.  LibLex

On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto. 6

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto.

The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued an order dated November 16, 1968 denying the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been filed out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied. Petitioners appealed from the order of denial. On motion of Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed late. A motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied. A supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating as additional ground that the appeal is improper was issued.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-30479. This Court dismissed the petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:

"L-30479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) — THE COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for certiorari and mandamus, without passing on the issue of whether or not the petitioners appeal from the order of November 16, 1968 of respondent Judge was made on time, it appearing that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question." 7

Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and clarification, this Court issued a resolution dated July 15, 1969 which reads:

"Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L-30479, Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11, 1969, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration, with the clarification that the matter of whether or not the pertinent findings of facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject order of November 16, 1968 constitute res adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for probate of the alleged will in question

indicated in the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969, wherein such matter will be more appropriately determined." 8

Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 9

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

"I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE PROBATED HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.

II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT OR ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).

III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO HAD ALREADY PASSED OUT OF EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO HAD ALREADY VESTED IN THE DISTRIBUTEES OF THEIR ASSIGNS.

IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO MALOTO ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE REMEDY UNDER THIS PROCEEDING, THEY HAVING CEASED TO BE INTERESTED PARTIES." 10

In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the will on the basis of the finding of said court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged will sought to be probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The probate court sustained the oppositors' contention that the petition for probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736. 11

The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the following errors:

"I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ADMITTEDLY GENUINE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO (THE SUBJECT OF PETITION FOR PROBATE - SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO) HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REVOKED BY HER (ADRIANA MALOTO).

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID PETITION (FOR PROBATE OF THE AFORESAID LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO) IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT THE MATTER CONCERNED IS NOW RES ADJUDICATA.

III

THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFORESAID PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTOAND IN NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT (THE PETITION ABOVE-CITED DUE COURSE." 12

The instant petition for review is meritorious.

The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the proceedings was denied because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question."

In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of AdrianaMaloto.

WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

||| (Testate Estate of Maloto v. Maloto, G.R. No. L-32328, [September 30, 1977], 169 PHIL 234-239)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000.]

OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, petitioner, vs. PASTORA PIEDAD, respondent.

Ceferino Padua Law Office and Gatmaytan Law Office for petitioner.

P.C. Jose & Associates for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree of the decedent. Respondent, on the other hand, is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a collateral relative within the third civil degree of the decedent. The issue here is the applicability of the rule on proximity among collateral relatives. Thus, the question is: Can petitioner inherit alongside respondent?

The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference. Applying now the rule on proximity, respondent relative within the third civil degree excludes petitioner relative within the fifth civil degree from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; SUCCESSION; APPRECIATION OF THE LAW. — The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed incongruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out by the Code.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RULE ON PROXIMITY; APPLICATION OF RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION. — The rule on proximity

is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. . . . By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. . . . In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. SacTCA

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO "OTHER COLLATERAL RELATIVES WITHIN THE FIFTH CIVIL DEGREE." — The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H.Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J p:

On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City.

Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law.Finding merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.

In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact, thus:

"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is question of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, and their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 1

Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest over the case, (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus:

"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from the estate of Augusto H. Piedad;

that the notice of hearing was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.

"These facts are undisputed.

"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention; the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law. There is doubt as to what law is applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts. aHCSTD

"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence, nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be had even without going to examination of facts on record." 2

Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review on certiorari.

The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated, does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives?

Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth degree relative of the decedent.

The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of

law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out by the Code.

The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones, except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:

 

"ARTICLE 26. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines.

By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.

"ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited."

"ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."

In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.

"ARTICLE 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.

"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sister, whether they be of the full or half blood."

"ARTICLE 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit."

"ARTICLE 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who aresixth in order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.

"ARTICLE 966. . . .

"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth." SCHATc

Accordingly —

Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestatothe estate of the decedent.

The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code —

"ARTICLE 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."

Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line." —

invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. ISADET

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (Bagunu v. Piedad, G.R. No. 140975, [December 8, 2000])

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-66574. June 17, 1987.]

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J p:

Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.  LLphil

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:

"a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;

"b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;

"c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;

"e) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."

Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.

Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti-Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.

Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.

On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3

After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate AppellateCourt in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads —

"WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."

"Costs against the oppositors-appellees."

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the following: LexLib

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);

II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);

III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;

IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct descendants and/or grand children;

V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and

VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.

The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent

their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother (Simona Pamuti)" 5

Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:  Cdpr

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a).

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6

Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:

"In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can

not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art, 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).

 

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.  cdll

Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de

Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void."

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr. and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Padilla and Bidin, J., took no part.

Footnotes||| (Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66574, [June 17, 1987], 261 PHIL 542-555)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-22469. October 23, 1978.]

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.

SYNOPSIS

Teodoro R. Yangco was the acknowledged natural son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with

Tomas Corpus, one of whom was Jose Corpus. Jose Corpus had a daughter, Juana Corpus. Petitioner Tomas Corpus is the son of Juana Corpus. As the sole heir of Juana Corpus, petitioner Tomas Corpus filed an action in the Court of First Instance to recover his mother's supposed share in the Yangco's intestate estate, claiming that the project of partition made pursuant to the order of the probate court as invalid and hence, the estate should be disposed of under the rules of intestacy. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground of res judicata stating that the intrinsic validity of Teodoro R. Yangco's will had already been passed upon in a special proceedings approving the project of partition.

Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was certified to the Supreme Court as it involved more than P50,00 pursuant to the Judiciary Law before it was amended.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on another ground, namely that since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child, and since JuanitaCorpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supported hereditary share of his mother, because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; WILL; DULY PROBATED WILL FORM PART OF JUDICIAL OR PUBLIC RECORDS; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant's contentions that the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, dated June 14, 1907 which states that Teodoro R. Yangco was his acknowledged natural son, cannot prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in Section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and the statement of Teodoro Yangco's biographer that Luis Yangco had two marriages, the first with Ramona Arguelles (Teodoro's mother) and the second with Victoria Obin have no merit. The authenticity of that will which had been admitted and duly probated is incontestable. That will is now part of a public or official judicial record.

2. ID.; FILIATION; PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY; CHILD BORN OUT OF A UNION OF A MAN AND A WOMAN IS PRESUMED LEGITIMATE. — It is disputably presumed "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; (Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio) "that a child born in lawful

wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life".

3. ID.; ID.; SUCCESSION; NO SUCCESSIONAL RECIPROCITY BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE RELATIVES. — Article 943 of the old Civil Code "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The rule is now found in article 992 of the new Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children and relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 943, OLD CIVIL CODE (ART. 922 NEW CIVIL CODE); BASIS OF. — The rule found in Article 943 of the old Civil Code prohibiting successional reciprocity between legitimates and illegitimates is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family, while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUCCESSION OF ACKNOWLEDGED OR LEGITIMATE CHILDREN. — Under Article 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to his entire estate and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share like. In default of natural ascendants, decedents' natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters.

D E C I S I O N

AQUINO, J p:

Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision

in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.

Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio, (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.

Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.

Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel. cdphil

Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestadocon respecio a los mismos, y que señale un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto".

The probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar rados por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a perpetual prohibition against alienation, that condition would be regarded "como no puesta o no existente". It concluded that "no hay motivos legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada." (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article

785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)

From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco appealed to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in this Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise agreement. As the resolutions dismissing the appeals became final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates.

Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).

On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controversy over the Yangco estate.

On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco' intestate estate, He alleged ill his complaint that the dispositions in Yangco's will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.  LLphil

The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate.

Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17[5], Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).

 

Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized, and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches.

In the disposition of this appeal, it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved by determining whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of Yangco. Has TomasCorpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?

To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation. The trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:

"Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, llamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos." (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).

That will was attested by Rafael del Pan, Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez.

Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with

Victoria Obin, implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.

These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit 1 herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's will, in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.

On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumed "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and [cc], Rule 131, Rules of Court). llcd

Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.

Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que lo haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" (6 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola, Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 465-6) . . .

Appellant Corpus concedes that if Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).

The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab

intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".

That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185-6).

Under articles 944 and 945 of the spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.

Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).

Where the testatrix, Rosario Fabie, was the legitimate daughter of Jose Fabie, the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Fabie, her father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Fabie, 88 Phil. 128).

By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909). The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29). LLpr

WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

||| (Corpus v. Corpus, G.R. No. L-22469, [October 23, 1978], 175 PHIL 64-71)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 7768. November 14, 1912.]

MANUEL SARITA ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ANDRES CANDIA, defendant-appellee.

Felix Sevilla y Macam for appellants.

Vicente Urgello for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ESTATES; RIGHTS OF INHERITANCE; COLLATERAL HEIRS. — The plaintiff who joins as the representative of his grandfather in a complaint with others, who are brothers and nephews of the predecessor in interest, lacks such right of representation, for it belongs in the collateral line only to the nephews and not to the grandnephews. Hence, a sister and nephews of the deceased having appeared to claim the inheritance, they, as the nearest of kin, exclude such a remoter relative as the grandnephew.

2. ID.; CONJUGAL PROPERTY; WIDOW'S RIGHTS. — The widow who claims without contradiction to be coowner with the deceased in the property he left, which the law presumes to be conjugal partnership property, is entitled to one-half thereof, and also to usufruct of a half of the remaining half, according to articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code; and so long as this usufruct of hers is not paid this half of the remaining half is subject to payment thereof, under article 838.

D E C I S I O N

ARELLANO, C.J p:

The spouses Apolinario Cedeno and Roberta Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece of land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees. Apolinario Cedeno died in 1895 and Roberta Montesa in 1909. It is alleged that during the lifetime of these spouses, from 1886 to April, 1909, on which latter date Roberta Montesa died, Andres Candia was holding and cultivating the said land, but that, as stated in the complaint, he did so merely under a lease and paid the said spouses one hundred pesos semiannually; that, from May, 1909, he refused to pay the emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land, appropriated the land and claimed ownership thereof; and that he also took possession of four mares, twelve carabaos, and several pieces of furniture which were in the house erected on the said land — a house worth 50 pesos — which he also seized and claimed as his property. Apolinario Cedeno had three brothers and one sister, Macario, Domingo, Leon, and Cristeta, of whom only the last mentioned is living. Macario left five children, among them Tomas Cedeno; Domingo, the same number, among them a daughter named Sofia, who died leaving a son, Manuel Sarita; and Leon, four, among them, Gregorio Cedeno. All of these except Gregorio Cedeno and his brothers sue for the ownership of the land and the other personal property of ownership of the land and the other personal property of Andres Candia which, together with the fruits thereof, they requested the Court of First Instance of Cebu to sentence the latter to return to them and, further, that he indemnify them in the amount of P800, and pay the costs.

Andres Candia, a nephew of Roberta Montesa, as the son of her sister, testified that he had been brought up, from the time he was very young, in the house of the spouses Cedeno and Montesa; that he worked on the house which those spouses left at their death when it was under construction, and, from his boyhood, assisted in the cultivation of the land; that said Apolonio Cedeno, otherwise known as Isidario Cedeno, was a cabeza de barangay of the pueblo of Sibonga, who, in order to pay certain shortages of the cabeceria under his charge, on the 24th of June, 1881, sold the said land to Juan Basa Villarrosa, who held it in quiet and peaceable possession for twenty-four years and at his death such possession was continued by his sons, Sinforoso and Vicente Villarrosa, from whom witness, Andres Candia, acquired the property by purchase; that at no time di he hold the same as a lessee nor pay for it any emphyteutic rent whatever; and that he never had in his possession the animals mentioned in the complaint.

The scour absolved the defendant from the complaint, on the grounds that, with regard to the animals and real property sued for, there was no proof whatever that they were in the possession of the spouses at the time of their death, and, with respect to the land: (1) That the defendant was the possessor in good faith continuously and was presumed to hold under just title so long as the contrary should not be proved; and (2) that neither the plaintiffs nor their alleged predecessors in interest made demand for it during the period of twenty-six years, since the ownership thereof was conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeno to Juan Basa Villarrosa, on the 24th of June, 1881, it being evident that during this very long period of time they did not obtain possession of the property.

The judgment having been appealed through a bill of exceptions and the appeal having been heard, we determine: With respect to the personal property, that the opinion of the trial court is unchangeable, as, in this regard, it has not been impugned as erroneous on appeal, and is certainly in accord with the merits of the case; and, as concerns the land, (1) that this action is one for the recovery of possession from the present possessor, and, in order to bring it, the plaintiffs make use of hereditary right, by styling themselves the heirs of Apolinario Cedeno; (2) that the plaintiffs are, on the one side, Cristeta Cedeno, who is a sister of the deceased Apolinario Cedeno, on another, some nephews and nieces of the latter, his brother Macario's children; and on the other, some children of Domingo Cedeno, among them, Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in representation of his deceased mother, Sofia, also a daughter of Domingo Cedeno; (3) that they assert their hereditary right in an intestate succession, and that the land in question was the community property of the deceased spouses, Cedeno and Montesa, as established hypothetically, especially by the plaintiffs' witnesses, Estanislao Solano and Irineo Tormis; (4) that, such being the case, they could demand, as the legitimate heirs of Apolinario Cedeno, only one-half of the land, but not the other half which belonged to Roberta Montesa, of whom they are not heirs ab intestato, from the fact that they are collateral relatives of this woman's husband: so that the claim to all the land is manifestly unfounded; (5) that, moreover, it is manifestly unfounded in so much as Sofia's son, Manuel Sarita, in representation of his mother, could not act as a plaintiff, nor could she, Sofia, do so by representing her father, Domingo; on the hypothesis that the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters (Civil Code, art. 925, par. 2), and

the said Manuel Sarita is not a child of a brother, as are the children of Macario and Domingo Cedeno; and, finally, that it was manifestly imprudent also to include as plaintiffs Gregorio, Lorenzo, Abundio and Jose, the children of Leon Cedeno, a brother of the deceased Apolinario Cedeno, when, as the first of them testified, they did not attempt to take part in this litigation:

"JUDGE. Is M Sevilla your attorney?

"WITNESS. No, sir.

"Q. Have you employed him? — A. No.

"Q. Have you spoken to him about this case? — A. No, sir.

"Q. So, then, you were never in Mr. Sevilla's office? — A. I do not know where it is.

"Q. Have you authorized this action against Andres Candia? — A. No, sir.

"Q. Have your brothers, Lorenzo, Juan, and the others, done so? — A. They have not.

"Q. So that in this suit neither you nor your brothers now have any claim against Andres Candia? — A. No."

Elsewhere this same witness said:

"My uncles and cousins spoke to me about the institution of this suit; I told them that it could not be, because the land was purchased by Juan Villarrosa at the time that our deceased uncle found himself obliged to cover certain shortages against him in the cabeceria; it was sheen that he sold the land."

In view of the foregoing considerations, we decide, with respect to the exercise of the hereditary right derive from the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeno:

First. That Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in whose house, according to Exhibit D, there was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the plaintiffs to confide the suit to the attorney who has conducted it, has absolutely no such right, because he cannot represent his grandfather Domingo, since, as aforesaid, in the collateral line the right of representation can only take place in favor of the children of brother or sisters, but not in favor of the grandson of a brother, such as is the said Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeno who, in turn, was the daughter of Domingo Cedeno.

Second. That, on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeno, does exist, it could only be exercised by Cristeta Cedeno, the children of

Macario Cedeno, and those of Domingo Cedeno, but not by Manuel Sarita, because in inheritances the nearer relative excludes the more remote, excepting the right of representation in proper cases (Civil Code, art. 921); from which it is inferred that, in pushing forward Cristeta Cedeno, the children of Macario Cedeno and those of Domingo Cedeno, to exercise such a hereditary right, it should have been noticed that the personality of these parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeno, of a more remote degree.

Third. That, on the same hypothesis, in the eyes of the law no meaning whatever could be given to the document, Exhibit H of the plaintiffs, wherein it is made to appear that the widow of Apolinario Cedeno, Roberta Montesa, implored of the heirs of her deceased husband that she be allowed to continue in the possession of the land and the house of the family; inasmuch as, as coowner of such property, she was entitled to one-half of the other half of the same, pursuant to the provisions of articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code, and until she was satisfied for her part of usufruct, this held of the other half remained liable for the payment of such part of usufruct. (Civil Code, art. 838.)

 

Fourth. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is proved that at the death of such alleged predecessor in interest in the inheritance, the land in question was not owned by him, it having been transferred in 1881, according to a conclusion established by the trial judge. Therefore, the action for the recovery of possession, derived from such alleged inheritance, cannot exist.

This transfer of the land affected by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeno was originally the title alleged by the defendant — a title which must not be presumed in the present case, but proved. It is true that the possessor, in the capacity of owner, has in his favor the legal presumption that he holds under lawful title and cannot be compelled to exhibit it. (Civil Code, art. 446); but it also true that when the defendant agrees with the plaintiffs that the thing demanded belonged to a determinate person during his lifetime from whom these latter claim to derive their right, the existence is thereby admitted of a right of ownership opposed to title of the present possessor, and hence logically the necessity for the latter to prove his title and exhibit it, in order to destroy the contrary presumption in favor of that prior ownership.

The defendant, according to the finding of the trial judge, has proved that he has such a title, by the exhibition of three documents: one, of the sale of Isidario or Apolinario Cedeno to Juan Basa Villarrosa (Exhibit 2); another, of the sale with pacto de retro by the latter's son, Sinforoso Villarosa, to the defendant (Exhibit 3); and the other of a final sale by the other son, Vicente Villarosa, to the same party, Andres Candia (Exhibit 4).

Against this finding of the lower court, the appellants allege: 1. That Isidario Cedeno, the vendor, has nothing to do with Apolinario Cedeno, his predecessor in interest; and, 2. That the land in Talamban known as that of Juan Basa Villarosa is about 15 or 20 brazas distant from the land in Talamban which is concerned in this litigation.

But the finding impugned is in no wise erroneous. Tomas Cedeno, one of the plaintiffs, testified that his uncle Apolinario had the baptismal or Christian name of Isidario, was better known by the nickname of Adiot, and we the only cabeza de barangay in Sibonga with the surname of Cedeno. Domingo Cedeno, who was erroneously made to appear as a plaintiff, said that the original owner of the land in question was "his deceased uncle, Isidario Cedeno," and that Isidario was the true name. The averment of the appellants that "the finding of the court is precisely contrary to the agreement made by both parties," (brief, 8) is in all respects incorrect. "In the said agreement, they say, no other name than that of Apolinario was recorded and admitted to be the name of the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest. By that same agreement the defendant could not be heard to prove another so different name as that of Isidario for the purpose of confusing it with that of Apolinario . . . (brief, 8). The agreement only says: "By agreement between the attorneys for both parties, the complaint in this case is understood to be amended in the sense that the name of Apolinario Cedeno, which occurs in the first line of the first paragraph of the complaint, is substituted for the name of Apolinario Cedeno; it being agreed that the amended answer which the court has just admitted refers to the complaint so amended." The only point that appears to be agreed upon is that where the plaintiffs say in their complaint Apolinario, the same shall be read Apolinario; but it was not agreed that the party Apolinario might not be known by any other name than that of Apolinario, nor that the defendant should not try to prove another name as that of Isidario.

It is also in all respects inexact that the land in Talamban, the subject matter of the complaint, which formerly belonged to Apolinario Cedeno, is different from the land in Talamban which the defendant claims was sold by Isidario Cedeno to Juan Basa Villarosa. The complaint says: "Boundaries: On the north, by Calixto Nejarda; on the south, by the river called Grande and Alejandro Mirafuentes; on the east, by the same river, Grande; and on the west, by a large rock." Defendant's Exhibit 2 says: "Bounded on the north by Calixto Nejarda; on the east by Calixto Nejarda; on the south by Alejandro Mirafuentes; and on the west by Miguel and a large rock." The plaintiffs' witnesses, Solano and Cuestas, and the plaintiffs themselves, Sarita and Tomas Cedeno, designate the same boundaries as does the defendant, giving also as the eastern boundary, besides the river, Calixto Nejarda . . . The interposition of "Miguel" as being on the west, written in other documents as on the south, is perfectly explained by the defendant: It refers to Miguel Calixto who broke up the ground between the large rock and the land in dispute; and so it is that in subsequent documents it also appears as the western boundary.

For the preceding reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellants.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

 

||| (Sarita v. Candia, G.R. No. 7768, [November 14, 1912], 23 PHIL 443-450)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-37365. November 29, 1977.]

GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-appellant.

Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.

Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

D E C I S I O N

GUERRERO, J p:

This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a legal question.

The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that:

"Simeon Bagsic was in married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.

On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.

Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. LexLib

Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and GervacioBicomong.

Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza."

(Rollo, pp. 2-3)

The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described

five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:

"A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernandino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso. Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;

B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;

C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of 11,739 sq. sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and Bernandino Alina; on the E. by Bernandino Alina; on the S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by Anacleto Glorioso. Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;

D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No, 21452, assessed at P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and

E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria, Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area — 24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala; on the E. by Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00."

(Record on Appeal, pp. 4-6)

Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the

Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisca Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.

After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same. the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to the defendants.

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena, are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this decision shall have become final.

With costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.

(SGD) JOSE G. BAUTISTAJudge"

Record on Appeal, p. 47

From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession, that is, those described under Letters D and E in the

complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A, B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. 2

On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died on May 9, 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)

On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9, 1945. 3

The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the trial court and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this case to Us.

We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide: cdll

"Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter."

"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood."

In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood, in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.

 

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and nieces of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, N.C.C., in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melania Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviarvs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610). prcd

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, N.C.C., is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.

We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

No costs.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

||| (Bicomong v. Almanza, G.R. No. L-37365, [November 29, 1977], 170 PHIL 440-447)