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CHARLES MORRIS' MAITRE YAN PATH AS VIA POSITIVA

Towards a Semiotic of Religious Symbolism

Harold H. Wilson

Religious Studies, McGill University, Montrer.!

March, 1994

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

© Harold H. Wilson, 1994

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Dedi<:ation

For

Patrk:ia Illingworth Paul Nathanson Robert Franck

in gratitude

... the message of the pathway speaks just 050

long as there are men (born in the breeze) who can heal' it. They are hearers of their origin. not servants of their production ....

Martin Heidegger·

ii

'Martin Heidegger, "The Pathway", ed. and trans. Thomas F. O'Meara, Listening 2.1 (1967): 89.

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III

Abstrroct

Charles William Morris (1901-1979) was a student of George Herbert Mead III tht'

early 1920s when Mead was involved in the Chicago School. Inspired by his l11l'ntol.

Morris wrote extensively on semiotics. phl1osophy of mmd. phllosophy of sn t.' nl"l'.

aesthetics, axiology and religion. Morris has received wide acdaim for his wl1ting~ on

semiotics. However. his writings pertammg to religlOn--the study of which Pll'occupil'd

him throughvut his life--have been aIl but entirely overlooked.

Morris first presented the "Maitreyan path" in his Path.\ of Lljl': Pr('/è/l'l' /0 cl

World Religion (1942). The expression "Maitreyan path" IS derived from the Sansknl

name Maitreya (Metteyya in Pali) meaning "the friendly one." Morris' lIndcl:-.landing of

this symbol is unorthodox and must be differentiated l'rom traditional BlIddhlsl

conceptions. According to him, the Maitreyan path IS best lInderstood in term:-. of the

paradoxical expression "generalized detached-attachment." At the centre of thls

expression is the idea of overcoming. Yet it is not a symbol in the traditional sense of the

term. It is beyond aIl form yet open to ail forms; it neither prescribes nor aS("fihe~ any

path, yet it is open to aIl particular paths.

If the Maitreyan path is without any specifiable form or t:ontent, how t:an it be an

eff~ctive symbol for self-overcoming? In answering this question thls study will apply

Morris' well-known thcory of signs to his little-known study of religious hehaviolll. This

being done, it is then possible to analyze the Maitreyan symbol 10 terms not only of ovcrt

behaviours, but also of sign functioning. 8ased vn the preceding analy~i:-., thls ~tudy

argues that self-overcoming 15 achieved not via fzeRativa by diminishing the self through

the negatiùn and abandonment of language, but rather via pmitiva by increasing the ~elf

through the affinnation and reclamation of language .

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Résumé

Fortement influencé par son maître G.H. Mead, C. W. Morris a publié plusieurs

écrits '1ur la '\émiotH-Iue, l'esthétique, l'axiologie et la religion. Largement connu pour ses

travaux en '\émiotique, Morns n'a pas eu le même succès en ce qUI concerne lies écrits

'1ur la religion, un champ d'intérêt qui l'occupa pourtant sa vie durant.

C'est en IY42, dans Paths of Life: Preface to a World Religion, que Morris

pré'iente pour la première fois ce qu'il appelle la "voie r.lattreyenne," une expression

dérivée du mot san~crit "Maitreya" ("Metteyya" en pali) et qui sigmfie "cordialité". La

compréhenSIOn par Morris de ce term~ diffèle de celles du bouddhisme traditionnel. Pour

Morris, la meilleure deSCription de la voie maitreyenne est celle donnée par l'expression

paradoxale "détachement-attachement généralisé." Au centre même de cette expression

'le trouve l'idée de dépassenlent. Toutefois, Maitreya n'e~t pas un symbole au sens

traditionnel de ce mot; il s'agit de ce qui est au-delà de toute forme, et pourtant ouven

à toutes les formes, de ce qui ne prescrit et n'impose aucune voie et qui, pourtant, est

ouvert à toute voie particulière.

Si la voie maitreyenne est sans forme ni contenu spécifique, comment peut-elle

être un symbole adéquat de l' autodépassement? Pour répondre à cette question, cette

étude rel:ourt à la théorie, bien connue, du signe de Morris, mais aussi à sa théorie, peu

connue, du comportement religieux. Sur cette base, il devient alors possible d'analyser

Maitreya en tant que symbole non seulement de comportement explicite, mais aussi de

fonctionnement du signe. La thèse qui sous-tend cette étude est que l'autodépassement

s'accomplit non pas de manière négative en diminuant le soi par le moyen de la négation,

voire de l'abandon du langage, mais de manière positive (via positiva) par

l'épanouissement du soi dans l'affirmation du langage et de ses exigences .

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" Contents

Dedication .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..... ............. Il

Abstract .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... III

Résumé . .............................. " ......... . ......... iv Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .. VII

Abbreviations ............................................. .. VIII

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 1 - Biographical Notes on C.W. Morris ......................... . 2 - The Maitreyan Path as Authentic Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6 3 - Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ., X

1 Th~ i<eligious Dimension of Selfhood .. , ...................... .. Il 1 - The Human Predicament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Il 2 - Religious Paths versus Religion ., ......................... 12 3 - Personality Types and Religious Paths ....................... 14 4 - Dominant "dionysian" Personalities ......................... 16 4.1 The Dionysian Path .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16 4.2 The Mohammedan IPath ................................. 19 5 - Dominant "promethean" Personalities .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21 5.1 The Promethean Palh ................................... 22 5.2 The Apollonian Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23 6 - Dominant "buddhistic" Personahties ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25 6.1 The Buddhist Ptlth ...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25 6.2 The ChristIan Path ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 27 7 - The Maitreyan Path ...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2X 7.1 Maitreya and World Religions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29 7.2 Maitreyanism and D.T. Suzuki's Zen Buddhism ................ 32

II The Semiotic Dimension of Selfhood ....... ... ,................. 35 1 .. Morris' Semiotic and Radical Empiricism ... "" . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37 2 - Morris' Definition of a Sign and the Basic

Components of Semiosis ................................. 39 3 - The Three Dimensions of Semiosls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 44 4 - Serniosis and the "Meanmg of Meaning" ...................... 46 5 - Linguistic Signs ...................................... , 47 6 - The Genesis of Language and Selfhood ...................... 49 6.1 Mead's Social-Vocal Theory .............................. 49 6.2 Morris' Critique of Mead's Significant Symbol .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 54

III The Body and Symbolic Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. () 1 1 - Body Types and Personality Components ..................... 61 2 - Personality Types and Human Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ()4

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3 - SemlOsl~ and Preferential Behaviour ........................ , ()X 4 - Modes of SignIfication and the Perceptual Stage of the Act. . .. . .. 70 5 - Semio~is and Human Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 73 6 - Human Freedom and the SocIal Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 77 7 - The Primary Forms of Discourse .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 79 X - Paths of Llfe and the Variety of Religious Discourse ............. X3 9 - The Body a~ the Locus of the Sacred .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. R5 10- The Body and Authentic Exbtence ......................... 89

IV The Maitreyan Path as Self-Overcoming Via Positiva .............. " 94 1 - Semiosis and Temporality .. .. ........................... 94 2 - Temporality and Paths of Life. ........................... 97 3 - Paths of Life and Authenticity .......................... " 100 4 - The MaItreyan Path as Self-Overloming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 102 5 - Self-Overcoming as Via Positiva .......................... 107

Conclusion ................................................ 110 1 - The Maitreyan Ideal and the Open Society ................... III 2 - Laboratories of Self-Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 113 3 - Self-Creation as Taking the Role of Another . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 115

Hilbiugraphy .......... .................................... 117

Appendix One: Paths of Life as Summarized in The Open Self .. . . . . . . . . .. 125

Appendix Twu: Poems about Maitreya by Charles Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 128

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Acknowledgements

1 want to express my gratitude ta .. everal people for thelr .1ssl~tal1\:e 111 wntlllg thl'

study. 1 am particularly indebted to my JdvI~or. Profe~~01 l\ t.luflœ Boulin. flH hls

lflvaluable guidance. helpful ~ugge~t'ons and encouragement. HIs rigoroll" plllln"oplucai

acumen cOl11bmed with a genuine tlexibllity exempiities the very mcanmg ul kllld;1l'~~.

Dean Donna Runnalls provided me wlth sorne bursanes wIlhout WhlCh 1 Cllllid not have

completed this study. Ellen Haring, Ementus Professor of Phllo~ophy ,n the lllllvt·I ... lly

of Florida, Oainesville. provided me with J. J ay Zeman' s memorial artlL'ie ni: C'h:ules

Morris. The Librarians of the ReliglOus Studies Library offered thelr expcrt1~e ,1Il11

assistance. Jenlllfer Wheeler found me several important monographs l'rom the lllllver"lty

of Chicago. My good friend Paul Nathanson proofread the fmal dralt of thls text ,md

made several helpful suggestions. Chandar Sundaram commented on "oille very carly

sections of my manuscript. My brother Scott a~sisted me wlth "ome hiographlcal resean.:h.

Barbara Galli gave me the 'R.-H.' imperative at a ume when l "orely needed It. Jacquc~

Beaudet, Asif Siddlqui, Soazig Ouhur, C!aude Roy and my companion Jocelyne Le Blanc

offered their friendship and moral support during the writmg of this study. '1'0 ail of the

above, thank you.

H. H. W .

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Abbreviations

References to the work~ of Charles Morris will use the following abbreviatIOns. Full cltation~ of these worh are provided in the bibhograohy.

BuP) "The Buddhl~t Personality Ideal..." ... (1960).

CS l "The Concept of Symbol 1" ... (1927).

ETS "Esthetlcs and the Theory of Signs" ... (1940).

F Festival... () Y(6).

FoTS Foundatiolls of the TheO/'y of Signs ... (1938).

Image ... (1 (76).

LoP Logical Postivi.\m, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism ... (1937).

MaCS "Man-Cosmos Symbols" ... (1956).

MeF "The Mechanism of Freedom" ... (1940).

MIL "MysuCÎsm and Its Language" ... (1971).

MuS "Multiple Self and Multiple Society" ... (l947).

N "Nietz~che: An Evaluatian" ... (1945).

NM "The Nature of Mind" ... (1929).

OS The Opell Se(t ... (104X).

PoL Paths ofLife: Preface to a World Religion. 2d ed ... (1956).

PMAP The Pragmatlc Move,'nent in American Philosophy ... (1970).

SuR Symho/isllI and Reali;y' A Study in the Nature of Mind ... (1925).

SaS SignificatlOll lJnd Signijicance ... (1964).

SAS "Sign~ About Signs About Signs" ... (l94X).

ScAT "Science. Art and Technology" ... (1960).

SLB Sign.\'. Language lInd B.!havlOr ... (1946).

SM "The Symbol Maitreyu" ... (1070).

T "A Tnbute" ... (1907).

VHY \'aril'fleS of Humall Va/ue ... (1956).

W JT "William James Today" ... (l (42) .

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Introduction

Ta be relt~ialls is to /Je directed ta othef'lles.'. ReligIOn 1,\ a mode of practice nOllrished by an attitude, lin attitude of directIOn, the gn'illg (!f ail of olle.\e1{ III CI comtallt aet taward an insistent \'I.\'/ofled perfection. (1 2X)

1 - Biographical Notes on C.W. Morris

Charles William MOITIs (1 Y() 1-1 (79) began hls academic ~tlldles at the 1I1l1Vl'1"lt)'

of Wisconsin but later transferred to Northwestern Untver~lty Although he h~ld 01 1);l\1a11 y

been interested ln engineenng, he switched to pSYl:hology and. III 1922. Icccived Iw. B.Sl

degree in psychology.1 Morri~ intended to be(:ome a pSyl:hmtflst hut bl'lame IIltl'lc"tl'd

In semiotics, WhICh led hlm to study under George Herbert Mead at the llJlIVl'1 slty of

Chicago. It was here, during his flrst year of graduatc stll(l!es. that Morm th"UIVl'It'd the

concept of Maitreya while \,'udymg Hmayana Buddhism under the tllte\agl' of the Cllllllt'nt

Buddhist scholar Walter E. Clark. At this lIme. howcver, Morm wa" IIltcre:-.ted not ol11y

In Buddhism; he was even "more strongly InfiuellL,ed by Nlctz~che. John Dewey. :lIld

George H. Mead." Also. his talks with Rabmdranâth Tagore and Nichola'i ROL'flch made

a ':Iignificant impression on him (SM 4) Wlthm the l'ontext of these dlvel"e II1flul'lIce ....

Morris' concept of Mmtreya began to develop.

Morris originally intended to rti'lm to the :-.tudy of psychlatI y afler completlllg lm

Ph.D., "but one ntght, .. It strul:k hlm that if he wanted to accounl for hllmall aLtloll, a

fruitful approach would be an al:count of signs and values. Considering slgn:-. and value ...

to be of immense importance to human life, Morris dedded that mght 'tn devole ... lh .... 1

entire life to the study of signs ano value~ "'.2 Although hi" inlere:-.t ln human

psychology, particularly Mead's bio-~ocial psychology, would remain undllllllll"hccl

IRichard A. Fiordo, Charle,\ Mor/l.\ and the Criticism of Di.\cour.\l' Œloomlngton, IN: Indiana University Press, 1 (77) 5-6.

2R. A. F.ordo 6. - QuotatlOn from Fiordo\ intervIew with C. W. Morm (Galllcwlllc, Florida, IX August 1973).

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throughout his academic career, Morris never sought a professional po~ition in

psychiatry.3

ln 1925, under the direction of George Herbert Mead, MOITIS completed his

doctoral thesis on Symbolism and Reality: A Study in the Nature of Milld. and he reeeived

his doctorate in philo~ophy from the University of Chicago.4 Followmg thi~. he taught

at the University of Chicago where he gave "the very first sequence of courses in

semiotics, so labelled, in any curriculum anywhere. ,,5 He also taught at Harvard

UniversIty and the New School of Social Research at Riee University. During the later

years of his life, Morris was Graduate Reseruch Professor at the University of Florida,

Gaine~ville. In addition to his active life of teaching, Morris also tra\'eHed extensively.

ln the early 1930s, he visited many of Europe' s phIlo~l1phical centres and became

thoroughly acquainted with the philosophical position of the Wiener Kreis. In 194X and

IlJ49, Monis travelled to Japan, China and India as part of his empiril-al study of human

value. f' Morris was also president of the Western DivisiJn of the American Philosophieal

Association.7 For many years he was associl\te editor of the International Eflcyc/opedia

of Ullijied Science. In this capacity, and because he wielded the "essential goad" in

lR. A. Fiordo 6.

4Charles W. Morris. Symbolism and Reality: A Study in the Nature of Mind (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1993).

~Thomas A. Sebeok, Americlln Signatures: Semiotic Inquiry and Method, ed. Iris Smith (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990) 75.

"Roland Posner, Anide, "Morris, Charles William (1901-1979)," Encyclopedic Dictiollllry of Semiotics, Tome 1., ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, IlJ~~) 565. - Morris' visit to Japan for the purposes of doing research on Maitreya (Miroku) tS not mentlOned by Posner. For a brief account of this visit, see Morris' memorial essay on D. T. Suzuki (T 12x) .

7R. A. Fiordo 6.

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advising Thomas Kuhn. Morris ensured the publication of Kuhn's landmark work The

Structure of Scientific RevolutiollS.8

Morris' own contribution to scholarship is quite substantml and varied. ron~isling

of monographs and articles on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of science. semiolll·S.

epistemology, aesthetics, axiology, psychiatry and. of course, religion. He also puhlished

two books of poetry. His best known publication. however. remains hl~ ground breaking

work, Foulldations of the Theo'Y of Siglls, published during the early pelÎod of IlIS

academic career.9 Indeed, it was only as a result of this publication in 19JX. lhal

"semiotic(s) as such began to transpire publicly and acquire a measure of deflllltulll III

... [the United States], although il~ author progressively, after the earl y 1 t)2()~. rommenl'Ïng

while training with Mead, immersed himself in the theory of slgns. ,,10 Even lhough he

is known primarily as result of this 1938 publication, MOITIs' contributIOn 10 the sludy

of signs has been quite significant; along with Charles Sanders Peirce and Roman

Jakobson, Morris is considered to be one of the "titans" of American scmiolics. '1 Y ct.

in spite of this fact, Morri~' works have drawn more attention outside of lhe lJllIted

States. According to Sebeok, "Morris was, by and large, always more appreciated abroad

th an in this country":2 Moreover, says Sebeok, "the global Impact of MOITIs. accrued

through hi:: books and teaching (although he remained a prophet with least honor al hl~

8Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutiolls, International Encydopedia of Unified Science 2.2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Pres~, 1 Y(2): sec preface, p. ViiI.

9 As J. Jay Zeman points out, Morris' work has been influential 10 the extent th al the basic terms presented in it, sY'1tactics, semantics and pragmatÎl:!o., have even entered inlo the revised English lexicon (Webster's Sevellth New Col/eRiate DictiOlllJry). (J. Jay Zeman, "Charles W. Morris [] YO] -] 979]," Transactions of the Charle.\' S. Peirce .s·()â(~ty 17.1 [1981]: 12).

l'T. Sebeok 64.

liT. Sebeok 81.

I~. Sebeok 66.

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own institution in Chicago) was impressive .... "13 For instance, an ltalian semiotician,

Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, has dedicated over twenty-five years to the study of Morns'

thought,14 and he consider~ Morris to have been a genius who "surpassed the

environ ment in which he happened to live; he was ahead of his time. Precise]y because

of this he wa~ so much attacked and disturbed in his work--especiaUy by phi]osophers,

who by their onto]ogica] nature are quarre]some, into]erant, and above aH a]ways terrified

by new and creative ideas."15 The notable thinker Karl-Otto Ape] has a]so wntten about

Morris' semiotic. In 1973, he completed a German translation of Morris' Siglls,

Lallguage, alld 8ehavior. Morris has drawn the attention of such notable thinkers as

Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer.16 ln North America, Morris has not been

entirely neglected: besides the numerous articles in response to his behaviouristic semiotic

as weil as his highly controversial theory of aesthetics, Richard A. Fiordo has published

a monograph, Charlt~' Morris alld the Criticism of Discourse. Richard League has related

Morris' semiotics to Charles E. Osgood's "semantic differential. .. 17 His thought has also

been incorporated in Susanne Langer's aesthetics, Harry Stack Sullivan's psychoanalytic

theory, and Fiordo' s theory of educational communication. 18 ln the philosophy of

JlT. Sebeok 65.

14Ferrucdo Rossi-Landi, "Signs about a Master of Signs," Semiotica 13 (1975): 155-197.

'~F. Rossi-Landi 174.

ItJJürgen Habennas, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of FUllctionalist Reason, vol. 2 of The The01'Y ofComnuwicative Action, 2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984) 15-16. -On Habermas' critique of Morris' semiotic see below chapter 2, #6.2. See also Hans­

Georg Gadal11er, Phi1osophical Hermelleutics, ed. and trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley, CA: University of Califomia Press, 1977) 82. - Gadamer acknowledges Morris' important contribution to the study of signs in relation to types of behaviour.

'7Rkhard League, PSycllOlillguistic Matrices: Investigation into Osgood and Morris (The Hague: Mouton, 1(77) 32.

'~Fiordo uses the axiological categories as presented in Morris' Paths of Life as a method for value clarification to be used by teachers in the educational setting. (Richard

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religion, Rosemary Zita Lauer has compared the work of St. Thomas to Morns'

semiotic.19 More recently, Maurice Boutin has used aspects of Morris' semiotic ln hi~

research on "relationality" and othemess.20

Although semiotics remained Morris' principal concem. there i .. throughout Ills 11ft'

work a movement towards an increasing preoccupation with aXIOlogieal isslIt's.!I

Because the latter is fundamental to his study of religion, one can also sel' III MOfTIs'

work a growing interest in issues germa ne to religion. Desptte thts fact, there ha~ not yl't

been a major study explicitly devoted to Morris' analysis of religion and his w11l:eption

of Maitreya.22

ln 1942, Morris published his first major work on religion. Pmhs (~l L,Jt'. 111 which

he presented his conception of the Maitreyan symbol.2' While working on this hook.

and for reasons Morris "cannot fully reconstruct." the Mattreya he encollntcrcd S0111t'

A. Fiordo, ed., Communication in Educatioll [Calgary: Detselig Enterprises, 19901 107-112). For my remarks on Morris' contribution to the thought of Suzanne Langer and Harry Stack Sullivan see below chapter 2, #2.

19Rosemary Zita Lauer, "St. Thomas and Modern Semiotic," Thomist 19 (I95fi): 75-99.

2°Maurice Boutin, "Relation, Othemess, and the Philosophy of Religion." Jourllalof' Religious Pluralism 2 (1992): 61-82.

21T. Sebeok 69.

22That Morris' work on religion has been entirely overlooked wtthm the field of religious studies is evidenced by the folJowing example. The symbol Maitreya is ccntral to Morris' writings on religion. In 1970 Morris published a short article "The Symhol Maitreya" in a newly formed religious Journal, Maitreya, that was sped fi<.: a Il y dedicatcd to this subject. The Princeton Maitreya Project (Princeton University, 11981-X21> culminated in a "conference exploring the Maitreyan theme from as many daffercnt perspectives as possible" (Alan Spornberg, Helen Hardacre, ed~., Mallreya, the Futu/'(I

Buddha [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19881 xxi). Vet, Alan Sponherg, a principal organizer of the Princeton ProJect, was unaware of Moms' contribution to this issue (Phone conversation with Alan Sponberg, University of Montana, November, 19(2).

23Paths of Life has subsequently been published twice, once in 1 YS6 and agaan in 1973 in a revised paperback form.

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twenty years before "came to life again, now 10 embody the idt!as of ... [hisl mature

thought" (SM 4). During his trip to lapan in 1948. for the purposes of exploring the

Japanese tradition of Maitreya (Miroku) , Morris first met Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki and

~truck up a life-Iong friendship. According to Morris, this contact with Dr. Suzuki was

an "important event" of his Iife. As he recalled, "it deepened and strengthened my

interest in Buddhism which had begun when 1 was a young man of about 20. 1 treasure

the friendship and this influence. It re.assured me in the direction my own thinking was

taking."24 Morris' interest in the M.aitreyan symbol, therefore, was not simply an

intellectuaJ interest. On the contrary, as 1. Jay Zeman leealls, Morris was "a man who

Iived the Maitreyan ideal that he saw as such an important pattern for the future."l5

After formally retiring from the University of Florida, Morris "looked forward to

devoting his time to really important work--his poetry."26 ln 1976, three years before

his death, he published his second and final book of poetry. ln it he presented an entire

chapter of poems dedieated solely to the praise of Maitreya.2.7

2 • The Maitreyan Path ais Authentic Existence

Morris was a mali of diverse interests. lndeed, his description of himself as a

'''philosopher. sdentist, and poet' aptly sununarizes his life's endeavors. "28

Nevertheless, having so many ]interests was not without ils difficulties. According to

Morris. his "problem was to r,econcile the attraction which these: radically different

l-IT 12X. - Morris became a Zen Buddhist. As Sebeok, one of Morris' former students of his seminar on semiotics at the University of Chic:ago, œcalls: "l met Morris in 1936 at tht~ University of Chicago. He was an extremely nice man. one of the nicest human beings l've ever met. He wa~ a Zen Buddhist, Just a man of extl'eme kindness .... " (T. Sebeok lJ7).

:!~.1. J. Zeman 22.

'!hJ. J. Zeman 3 .

. nl 53-62. - Several of these poems are presented in Appendix Two, below .

2SR. A. Fiordo 6-7.

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persons and traditions had for ... [him]" (SM 4). As a consequence of his own 4u~!>t to

integrate the many dimensions of his own personality arase Morris' conception of th~

Maitreyan path.

The expression "Maitreyan path" is derived trom the Sanskrit name Mattreya

(Metteyya in Pali) meaning "the friendly ont~." According ta the Buddhlst tradition.

Maitreya is the name of the future Buddha, that is, the Enlightened One. said to Iw

predicted by Shakyamuni Buddha. Morris' use of the word "Maitreya," howt'vcr, mu!>t

be differentiated from traditional Buddhist conceptions. His conception of the "Maitrcyan

path" is no doser to Buddhism in orientatIon than it is ta any other major religion. Even

so, Maitreyans are "friendly" to air types of personalities and religious attitude!>. but al the

same time they identify with none.

Morris is aware that sorne persons might be suspicious of his unorthodox lI~C of

this Buddhist symbol. According to him, this is understandable. because he had used the

term "Maitreya" in a way similar to Nietzsche's use of the name of Zoroasler. name/y.

in order lOto embrace a possible image of man and society which ... Ihel feh approprialc

to modern East and West" (SM 4). In spite of the objections that might be ralsed agalllst

his use of this symbol, Morris believed that the ideas and attitude embodied in the symbol

Maitreya were "of great vitality and importance" (SM 4).

In presenting his conception of Maitreya, Morris has a particular audience in minci.

1 t is for aIl those

men and women who "cannot go home again" to any of the religions, the philosophies. the forms of society whieh have yet been evolved. Men and women using gratefully their biologieal and social heritage, aetively at grips with the processes of nature In which life is lived, delightlOg in sharp thought and sharp perception. Men and women who wish to bnng together into a dynamic and tensioned foeus ail the elements of human nature which the traditional religions have indulged III isolation. Such individuals will be equally sensitive to art, to science, to technology; they are equally tired of self-indulgence, self-frustration, self-obfuseatlOn; they are equally bored with the waste lands and the utoplUS which frustration has whined or sentirnentalized.... They are tired of pretence, of hollow formulas, of faked affection, of false security, of mechanical aetlvity. They have a sense of new horizons, the strength of drastÎl: sodal eruptions,

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the lightheartedness of those who have relaxed the possessive grip on the self. (PoL <)-10)

To this numerous and im:reasing group of individuals, Morris writes an "apologetics" of

the Maitreyan path (PoL 8) as a "bold expression of their 'religion,' their 'path of

salvation,' their • nirvana '" (PoL 10).

According to Morris, the Maitreyan path is best understood in terms of the

expression "generalized detached-attachment." At the centre of this expression is the idea

of self-overcoming. In this view, Maitreya is a symbol for the unceasing task of

overcommg the grip of self-possessiveness, by luring the self into losmg itself, so that it

can find its true self. Yet Morris' Maitreyan symbol is not an "image" in the traditional

sense of the term. ft is beyond aU form yet open to aIl forms; it neither prest:ribes nor

ascribes any particular pa th of life, yet it is open ta aIl particular paths. Paradoxically,

the Maitreyan path is "for aIl and none".29

This study will argue that Morris' Maitreyan pa th is a symbol of self-overcoming.

Il is the summons of the deepest part of oUIselves to become that which we already are.

Implicit in the conœpt of seIf-overcoming, therefore, is the notion of authenticity.

This study will focus on the roIe of language in the process of self-overcoming.

As we shall see, for Morris, authentic existence via self-overcoming is achieved not by

diminishing the self through the negation and abandonment of language, via negativa, but

rather by increasing t.he self through the affirmation and reclamation of language, via

po.\'itiv{/~ this overcoming is realized in a stance of open relatedness to the world.

3 . Methodology

As mentioned above. Mllltreya IS without any specifiable fOTm or content. If so,

then how can it be an effective symbol for self-over~oming via positiva? Answering this

lJuestion will involve bringing together two streams of Morris' thought: his well-known

theory of signs and his little-known study of religion. The connection between Morris'

2~The expressIOn "for aIl and none," is taken from the subtitle of Nietzsche's Thus Spo"'e Zarathustr(/. On the titIe page of his Paths of Life, Morris also cite:, a passage from the same text: "This is my way. What is yours? The way there is none."

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theory of signs and his the ory of preferenttal behaviours i~ not explidtly dewloped III

either Paths of Life (1942) or The Open Se(l (1 94S), hi~ two prin(lpal \Hitlllg~ abolit thl'

Maitreyan symbol. It is only in his later writings. his emplrkal ~tudy. \ 'lII'll!flt'J 01 Humaf/

Value {1956). and his quinte~sential book on semiotÏl:s. Sigll/jiclllÏlm and S,g"i/Ïcol/cl'

(1964), that Morris establishes an explicit correlation between his semiotks and hls thcory

of preferential behavlOur. By applying this correlatIOn to his earlier theorew:al ~tlldy of

religion, it is possible to analyze the Maitreyan symbol 111 temlS of not only oyeU

behaviours, but also in terms of sign functior.ing.

This study conslsts of four chapters. The first provides an adumbration of and

commentary on Morris' analysis of seven religious personahty types based on Ills

conception of the self as an aggrcgate of three preferential behaviours. Maitrcyan

individuals are capable of expressing aIl seven basic personality types, yet they identify

with none. Understanding Morris' conception of Maitreya, therefore, requires a

comprehensive understanding of the six other religious personality types and

corresponding preferential behaviours.

Human beings. however, are more than just a system of preferences; for Morris,

the} are also sign users. The second chapter provldes an outline of Morris' the ory of

signs. After introducing the basic terms of Morris' semiotics, his understandmg of

language signs in the genesis of both selfhood and interpersonal communication is

examined.

The third chapter corrf'lates Morris' semiotic with his typology of religious

personalities. In order to do so, a dynamic model of Morris' seven personality types is

developed along with a typology of seven corresponding relIgious disçourses. Based on

Morris' understanding of 'iign functioning and human behaviour, the way~ in which

language can either frustrate or facilitate human freedom are explored. As will become

clear, the ;;0nteptions of human freedom and ~elf-overcoming are intlmately related.

The fourth chapter ~hows how Morris' semiotic and triadic conceptIOn of the self

can be related to the tridimensional structure of human temporality. For MOITIS, the self's

awareness of time and human finitude leads to 'ielf-possessiveness, inflexibility and

closure of the self. In contrast, authentic existence qua flexibility and openness is

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a<;hieved only when the temporal dimensions of the self are fully accepted and aIl forms

of ~elf-possessiveness are overcome .

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1

The Religious Dimension of Seltbood

1 - The Human Predicament

... There is no VOlee.

There is /l0 sound. There is no J7ame 011 the aira,.. There IS only the silence. And the co/do And vast death. (PoL 24X)

1 1

We live in "a world vaster and more powerful" than ourselves. As conselous

beings, says Morris, we are aware not only of our struggle to '\ustam ourselves. but al'\o

of the "relentless steps toward our own death" (PoL 3). Against the forœs that

momentarily support our strivings emerge processes that slowly and inevttably erode our

efforts; "visited by intense JOYS and tragic pains" we find ourselves eaught in the stream

of life, pu shed relentlessly "forward into the jaw~ of death: such is the human situation,

the human agony ... this agony is inherent in human life and inescapable" (poL 3).

Morris repeatedly uses the term "agony" to describe the human ordeal. His

ana!ysis of different types of religious behaviour is an assessment of how tndividuals

confront the suffering and finitude of their existence. As he states:

the ways in which men have met this agony vary with different times and with different times and places. To sorne persons the larger features of the process hardly rise to consciousness; to many there IS available a formula which gives at least a specious unit y and integration to their lives; sorne seek consciously and deliberately a eontrolling attitude to give their lives coherence and direction. (PoL 3)

For Morris, people are involved in a religious quest regardless of how aware they are of

their search. Ways of confronting the human predicament have been proposed by the

religious prophets. "The paths that have been proposed are the foundations of the great

religions" (PoL 4). In the past, the major religious paths sucœeded in providing

individuals with a living purpose. Traditional religions, however, cannot meet the

challenge of modernity. Pulled in a myriad of directions in a society "without a dominant

and pervasive center of integration, the individual is forced back upon himself as a

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center" (PoL 7). More th an ever, individuals must now decide for themseives, not only

what type of person they want to become, but aiso what type of 'iOClety they waht to

advocate. Without the beJief sy~tems of traditional religions and the hope of personal

immortality, indlviduals must 'itruggle aIl the more to discover meamng in life.

According to Moms, "the paths posed and permitted by the human agony are few

In number, though numerous in their elaboratlOns and interpretations" (PoL 6). The

various ways people have tried to confrant the human predlcament find exp~ession not

only In the varlet y of religions but also in different philosophies, types of societies, forms

of literature and art. ln Paths of Life, piimanly from an analysis of philosophical,

religious, mythical and literary texts, Morris identifies seven religious types: Buddhist,

Dionysian, Pramethean, Apollonian, Christian, Mohammedan and Maitreyan.

2 - Religious Paths versus Religions

Morris defines the religious quest "as the quest by the individual for a life

answenng to his type of personality, whether that be the type he has aIready attained or

the type which seems to point a way out for the conflicts of his yet unsettled and

uncertain self" (PoL 34). Although he is aware that his broad definition of the religious

4uest can be questioned by man y occidental s, Morris wants to advance a definition that

moves beyond " ... the historical provincialism of Western supernaturalism," and a1so

beyond the fact that, as he says, "many contemporary students of religion have begun to

look at religious phenomena in terrns of techniques for the orientation of life" (PoL 4).

Morris is not concerned with the study of historical religions per se; he is

mncemed with the study of religious paths. l By this, 1 refer to an important distinction

1 Although his study uses historical narnes, Morris rernarks that "it is perhaps unfortunate that such terms were used, for ... 1 Paths of Lifej is not fundamentally concerned with historie al analysis. 'Buddhist,' 'Christian,' and the rest, are at best 'ideal types.' suggested by historical traditions, but not to be regarded as adequate portrayals of these traditions. Professor Ohe suggests that the book be read as an 'im&ginative experirnentation' with possible human attitudes and this seems good advice. Read in this way. it might be helpful in giving clarification to the attitudes of readers not in sympathy with the orientation favored in the book or not satisfied with the somewhat cavalier

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between the rneanings of the terrn "religion," a noun, and the term "reltgio!i.\," an

adjective. This distinction was advanced by Morris' own teacher, John Dt'wcy. According

to Dewey,

a religion (and ... there is no such thing as a relIgion III genera\) alway'i signifies a special body of beliefs and practices having sumt' kllld of institutional organizatIOn, loose or tight. In contrast, the ad ,l'clive "religious" denotes nothing in the way of speclflahle cntlty, clthcr institutional or as system of beliefs. It does not denotc aalythlllg to wlm:h one can specifically point as one ean point to thlS and that hIstone IchglOll or existing church.2

For Dewey, "the sense of the dignity of human nature IS as reltglous as I~ the 'icnse ot

awe and reverence when it rests upon a sense of human nature as a COOpCI atlllg part ot

a larger who le. ,,3

Dewey's universal definition of the religious has sorne affinity wlth Mon I~' own

conception of the religious quest. For example, Dewey also speah of the leligioll\ quest

as a search for "orientatIOn" of the self.4 Dewey's account of the re\lglOlIs, howevcl,

remains universal and abstract, denoting "nothing 111 the way of a speClfiablc enllty,'"

whereas for Morris the religious ean be glven sorne "peeitication. A~ 1 hope to \how,

Morris' Maitreyan path is an atternpt to glve sorne deflllition to the Icligious. Thll~,

unlike Dewey, Morris does not make a stron~ "dIslocation" between (/ religion and the

interpretations of historie faiths" (PoL vIii).

2John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, ) 1)34) 1)- J (J.

31. Dewey 25.

4According to Dewey, the religlOu~ lJuest mvolves "~orne complex of condJtI()n~ that operated to effect an adJusunent , an orientatIOn, that bnng~ wlth It a ~en\e of ... ecunty and peace" (J. Dewey 13). This que st involve-; "the who/e ... elf a~ an ideal, an IInagmative projection .... The self is always dlreeted toward sometnmg beyone! It ... clf and :-'0 It ... own unifu.:ation depends upon the Idea of the integration of the ... hifting ... lene:-. 01 the w{Jlld into that Imaginative totality we calI the Universe" (J. Dewey 11)). Impllcit ln Dewey' ... account of the religious quest is the need for a "rehglOu~" symbol a ... an imaginative unit y towards which individuals seek to direL:t and L:onduct theu hve~ .

51. Dewey 9-10.

i

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reJigious. On the contrary, for Morris, Just as there is no such thing as a religion in

general, there 15 also no such thing as a religious path in general. Rather, what Dewey

calls the rehgious is one path among many.

3 - Personality Types and Religious Paths

According to Morris, human beings are systems of interests. The term 'system'

refers to a "dynamic interaction" ln which "the fate of one has effects on the others ... the

open road which one interest has closes the road ta others" (PoL 16). Although these

systems of mterests are diverse and vary from individual to individual, the "existence of

common interests can be elucidated by distinguishing three components of human

personality: the diollysian, the promethean and the buddhlStic" (PoL 24). The term

'dionysian' refers to "the tendency to release and indulge existing desires in the presence

of objects appropnate to the satisfaction of desires" (PoL 24). The tenn 'promethean'

denotes the active tendency "to manipulate and remake the world in the service of the

satisfaction of existing desires" (PoL 24). Finally, the buddhistic compone nt refers ta the

self's tendency to regulate itself "by holding in check its desires. These are the

tendencies ta self-control, to solitude, to meditation, to detachment, to self-containment"

(poL 24-25).

Individual personalities can be characterized by a particular hierarchy cf these

three personality traits. The seven permutation~ presented below exhaust the logical

possibilities, providing that one excIudes the combinations in which two personality traits

are of the same strength. As presented in table 1, each permutation refen not only to

a specifie personality type but also to a corresponding religious path te which are

assigned the following names:

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Table 16

~ lliJ d1 JlJ rJJ:] ~ Buddhlst Dlonysian Promethean Apollonlan Chnstlan Mohammedan

GIJJ Maltreyan

In the above schemata, Morris designates the personality components with the same ~tcm

as sorne of the personality types. In order to avoid confusion, a lower case letter is lIscd

when referring to a personality component (for instance, dionysian) and a capital letter

is used when referring to the personality type (for instance, Dionysian).

It is also important to note here that "the distinctIve feature of personality does not

lie in the bare predominance of one component, but in Its predommanœ 10 relatIOn to the

other components" (PoL 30). In order to emphasize this point, the first six persona lit y

types discussed below are arranged into three paired groups: dominant dionysian

personalities, dominant promethean personalities, and dominant buddhistic personaliues.7

r..rhe following schema is presented by Morris on page 30 of Paths of Lift!. A discussion and presentation of this diagram can also be found in his later study entitled Varieties of Human Value (1956) 2-3.

7In his later works, MOITIS expands hls study into thIrteen paths; however, "for ail practical intents and purposes the first seven suffice" (Fiordo 153). To use the analogy of light, these "paths of life" are sufficient in the same way that the primary colours are sufficient to describe the col our spectrum produced by refracted white Iight. The colours visible to the naked eye are understood as indications of a mu<...h more diverse spectrum

Morris' thirteen paths of life are first presente<! 10 The Open Self (1 ~4X) and later in Varieties of Human Value (1956). In his earlier work, Morris has replaced ail the names of these paths wlth numbers. Way seven, however, IS <;ull refered to as the Maitreyan path. But in the later empmcal study, these paths are discu~sed 10 a more objective manner. As Morris states: "It may be noted that the thIrteen alternatives were simply numbered and not named. There were several reasons for thlS, but the mo\t important was the realization that the relation of the alternatives to historical religious and ethical systems was itself an empincal problem not to be prejudiced in advance. Sorne

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4 • Dominant "dionysian" Personalities

There is the grasped love of the Dionysian frellZY: This love ü blind in its [ury. This love sees not the beloved This love loses itself and the eloved. (PoL 233)

ln both the Dionysian and Mohammedan personalities the dionysian component

is predominant. Nonetheless, both have distinctly different personalities. The Dionysian

self, with its relatively low promethean characteristic, passively abandons itself to sensual

pleasures mat are easily obtainable. Likewise, the Dionysian with its high buddhistic

compone nt tends to seek pleasures which are mwardly directed and less socially oriented.

On the other hand, the Mohammedan path is characterized by a strong promethean

compone nt with a relatively low buddhistic character trait. As a consequence, the

Mohammedans' personalities are more sociaUy oriented. Their physical and emotional

energies are directed towards dominating the world in order to remake the world in

accordance with their own desires. Because their need for "detachment" is low, they use

liule self-restraint in pursuing their desired goals.

4.1 The Dionysian Path

The Dionysian way is based on the Greek god Dionysus, which, in contrast to

Apollo, represents the irrational in human beings. Dionysus is the god of fertility rites,

of passionate love, and of wine. According to Morris, Dionysus' "perpetuai death and

resurrection has become the symbol of wild abandon and the great demonic affirmation

of life .... Frenzied shouts, the cruel dismemberment of the sacrificial animal, the

communion of blood, phallic rituals, wine, dance s, the f1are of torches at the night rituals"

are ail associated with the Dionysian path (PoL 61). However, Morris claims,

Dionysi,lnism IS not a way of arbitrary abandon. The dionysian does not attach to ail

slight attention since given to this problem suggests that the major ethical and religious systems combine in certain ways various alternatives and should not simply be paired with one of them. The actuaJ evidence at hand is slight but points in that direction" (VHV 4). For a presentation of the first seven paths as described in hh Open Self see below Appendix One.

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phases of life. Pointing to the legend of Orpheus. Morris asserts that the Dionysian path

"had an ascetic element and a stress on sanity and moderation" (PoL 62). According ln

the myth. Orpheus paid favours to the sun god. Apollo. Dionysus. however. in an lIet of

jealous furore. had his followers dismember Orpheus. ln this view. Orpheus IS as~oclatt'd

with Apollo. the god of reason. order and moderation. ln this sense. the dt'velopl11t'nt of

the mystical cult, Orphism, represents the ascetic and moderate element inherent in the

Dionysian cult.

Although the Dionysian path is operative in aIl cultures and peoples. il ; ~ seldol11

given explicit representation. According to Morris, the most articulate votary nf

Dionysianism is Nietzsche. In this view. Nietzsche is more than Just a philosopher of

"ideas"; he is a religious prophet.8 lndeed, his characterization of himself in Ec('(} Homo

supports this claim. Nietzsche states:

1 kuow the joy of annihilation to a degree commensurate with my power to annihilate. In both cases 1 obey my Dionysian nature, which cannot separate the negative deed from yea-saying .... (dted in PoL 63)

ft is instructive to consider the context in which Nietzsche is advandng Dionysianism.

Morris points out that Nietzsche's yea-sayine was in reaction to the nay-saying of

Schopenhauer, who "had brought into prorninence a Christian means for reaching the

Buddhist goal"(PoL 69). According to Schopenhauer, it is "the will to live" which causes

all suffering. Accordingly, the only way to escape suffering is through denying the "will

to live." For Schopenhauer the only real "good" is "the conscious acceptance of the necd

8According to Morris, "Nietzsche's greatness lies in the fact the', he undertook a remarkably comprehensive critique of the basic value-conflicts of Western society and attempted to formulate a value structure for this civilization. He thought of himself as inaugurating an epoch in history" (N 285). Moreover, Nietzsche maintained "that every philosophy springs frorn sorne 'heart's desire,' its system of evaluations resting finally upon sorne imperious impulse of the philosopher in terms of which everything else is ranked, and for which every argument advance,d IS a weapon" (N 2X5). Thus, daims Morris, the way to evaluate Nietzsche's philosophy involves discovering his prime impulse "and to square one's account with this system of evaluations upon which his. resulting path of Iife is erected" (N 285).

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for annihilation a~ the only true cure for the sickness of life. ,,9 Translated into Christian

terms, Schopenhauer saw the ~ymbol of the crucified Christ as representing the truth of

existence; namely, that it is only through suffering that one can achieve freedom from

~uffering: "one i'; to carry the cro~s of Iife so that one's will to live may be crucified upon

it" (PoL 65).

Morris assert~ that "m Christianity and in Schopenhauer Nietzsche saw the shadow

cast by a commg nihilism: a Europe embracing a new Buddhilim [or a Buddhistic

Christianity J, a disintegrating Europe heading for the abyss of nothingness, celebrating or

even willing its own disintegration" (PoL 66). Against this backdrop, Nietzsche advanced

his affirmation of the "will to power." In his view, because alllife is dominated by a will

to power, attempts to deny this impulse are inherently dishonest and perverse. Since aU

life is an expression of "the will to power," then, ascetic practices are only "the will to

power" turned against itself, which for Nietzsche is still "the will to power".

Nietzsche's Dionysianism has a strong buddhistic component with a low

promethean personality trait. That Nietzsche 's Dionysianism is low in promethean

characteristics is evidenced by his ali-inclusive yea-saying. As Morris points out,

Nietzsche's ZarathLstra claims that the "world is perfect" (PoL 76), whereas Prometheans

do not find the present state of the world satisfactory; therefore, they work to remake "the

world in the service of existing desires." Admittedly, in Nietzsche's own writings there

is a promethean component. According to Morris, "as a "Promethean 'moralist'"

Nietzsche tumed his rancour against Schopenhauer's type of "nay-saying" Christianity.

Nevenheless, in the end, Nietzsche's Dionysianism "overcomes the Promethean moralist;

the doctrine of eternal recurrence takes precedence over the doctrine of the supennan".

At the sume time, Nietzsche's "yea-saying" is strongly buddhistic. It is a "yes" that rises

above one's own preference, beyond the exclusive "yes and no." In order to do so,

Dionysians must detach themselves from their own interests and desires. As Nietzsche

admonishes:

9RJ. Hollingdale, trans., "Introduction" to Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms. (Harmmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1985) 22-23.

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not (0 cleave to our own virtues. not to become as a whole a victim to .lIly of our specialities, to our "hospitality" for IIlstance. which is the danger of dangers for highly developed and wealthy souls. who deal prodigally. almost indifferently with themselves. and push the vlftue of liberality so far that it becomes a vice. One must know how to COII.\'I'Iî't> 011('.\('11:- tht" test of independence. (cited in PoL 75-7fi)

19

Nietzsche's Dionysianism emphasizes detachment from the world. As a consel}ueIKe.life

becomes a spectacle on a "stage" in which "one becomes a '\pectator ot oneself as an

actor" (PoL 76). "In Nietzsche," says Morris, "there appears the note of the divine

spectator, in the struggle but elevated beyond it, freed from suffering with the hlgher man,

freed from one' s elevation .... " 10

The internaI tension created by the conflict betweell buddhistlc and

dionysian traits gives the Dionysian personality its dIstinctive character. This mherent

tension is "periodically resolved--perhaps with the help of wine--by a dISSIpation of the

tension in the explosive release of dionysian traits; .... it becomes a festival outslde the

round of the normal sociallife, intense and dramatic and impersonal in character, centring

around the more elemental biologie appetites" (PoL. 76).

4.2 The Mohammedan Path

The Mohammedan path adopts a personality that is predominantly dionysian.

However, with its dominant dionysian compone nt, relatively strong promethean and

relatively weak buddhistic traits, the Mohammedan personality expresses itself in a

manner quite distinct from the Dionysian. In the Mohammedan chara(.;ter, the low

buddhistic component results in a reduced confliet between the selfs desire for

indulgence (dionysian desire) and detachment (buddhistic deslfe). Be(.;ause of Its weak

buddhistic component, the dionysian tendendes (.;an more easily devote themselves to the

service of their relatively strong promethean disposition. Thus, unlike the Dionysian self,

IOpoL 76. - According to Morris, "Nietzs(.;he' s own dominating and domineering impulse was dramatic. To live dramatically himself, and to use mankind as the materiai out of which to mold a hero of a drama for whkh the modern world is a stage--this is Nietzsche's secret center ... " (N 285).

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which is fraught with an internaI struggle between dionysian and buddhistic components.

the Mohammedan self is more unified. Instead of conflkt, the Mohammedan' s dionysian

trait relea~es its primaI and biological energies in the direction dictated by its promethean

desires. Thus, with little ~elf-restraint--a buddhistic elernent--the diopysian and

promethean components harmoniously co-exist in the Mohammedan path. Although there

is little inner contlict within the Mohammedan, the outer world of the Mohammedan is

wrought with struggle.

The key ta the Mohammedan personality and culture can be found in its stark

separatIOn of the world into two groups: "believers and unbelievers, 'the fcllows of the

Garden' and 'the fellows of the Fire'" (PoL 136). These believers join in a "holy war"

against the forl:es of evil. The reward for the victorious bdievers, however, is not to be

found in the present life. In a dionysian fashion, the na1.ural impulses of the self are

engaged in a baule against the evil unhelievers, the fruits of which are to he obtained in

a future life. Just as soldiers must submit themselves to 1.he authority of a leader, the

Mohammedan believers abandon their individuality "through the complete dedication of

themselves to the extension of the power of the community" (PoL 136). Unlike

Dionystans who abandon themselves to the forces of the self-centred "l," the

Mohammedans abandon themselves to the forces of the communal "we." Furthermore,

"there is a release from buddhistic restraint in this subrnission and an outlet fpr strong

action and strong feeling" (PoL 137). In contrast to the strongly buddhistic personalities

that find a centre within themselves, Mohammedan personalities find their identity within

a mmmunity: "the Mohammedan lives outwardly and lacks a centre of orientation within

himsdf. He needs a 'rope' to tie to--a community with an authoritative leader to follow-­

and glven such a rope he leads a life of high physical and emotional intensity" (PoL

139).

The Mohammedan personality is not exclusive to Islam, for "the stirrups for

Mohammedan feet" (poL 143) can be found in Marxism, Christianity and Nietzsche. For

instam:e, Morris argues that the Fascist-Nazis used Nietzsche to advance their own

Mohammedan project: "roped to new books and new apostles, fresh Mohammedan bands

have set out to c0nquer the earth. The words and the warriors are different; the patterns

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and the cycles are as of old" (PoL 145-146). Although Morris does not lestrict tht.'

Mohammedan personality to Islam, his characterization of the IslamÏl' religion i~

particularly troubling. Without any supporting argument he also likens Hitler's MC/II

Kampf to the Koran: "Hitler crystallized the whole movement in a deed: the parallel to

Mohammed is complete almost to the smallest detail; Mei" Kampf is a modern Koran"

(PoL 145). Such a characterization appears to be a classic case of what Edward Sall1 ha~

termed "orientalism. "II For Said, "orientalism" is a way of percelving the Ollent that

has aIl but elirninated the humanistic values inherent in the Orient. As a wnsequcm:c.

the "contemporary Orientalist's attitudes flood the press and the popular mllld. Arabs. fOI

example, are thought of as camel-riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, venal lechers whose

undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilization. ,,12 Morris not only assol'lates

Mohammedans with Stalin and Fascist-Nazis but also considers them a threat to ail oUlel

personalities. As a consequence, he believes that "until the possibihty of the physlca\

control of the earth by the Mohammedan type personality is removed. none hut thi!'> type

of personality can be sec ure on earth" (PoL 175). The Maitreyan might be the name of

the friendly one, but the Maitreyan 's friendliness does not extend to the Mohammcdan.

5 - Dominant "promethean" Personalities

There is the greedy love of the Promethean Mo/der This love is on/y selfs ladder. The beloved is materia/ to be mode/ed. The be/oved is "vil/' s instrument The be/oved is bellt in the cast of the mo/der. (PoL 233)

Both the Promethean and Apollonian personalities have a dominant promcthcan

component. This means that each of the~e personalities is inclined towards remaklllg "the

world in the service of the satisfaction of its desires" (PoL 24). However, unlikc the

Promethean type personality, which directs its creatlVlty towards the satJ~faction of It~

IIEdward Said, "Crisis lin Orientalisml," Modern Criticism and Theory, ed. David Lodge (London: Longman, 19HH) 295-309 .

IZE. Said 307.

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dionysian desires, the Apollonian's creative spirit is constrained by the dictates of its

strong buddhistic component.

5.1 The Promethean Path

The Promethean way refers to the mythological titan Prometheus. According to

the myth, Prometheus stole fire from the gods and gave it to humankind. As a

çonsequence, Zeus had him chained to a mountain where an eagle consumed Iii) liver, but

at night the liver was restored. ln doing so, "Prometheus remained defiant in suffering,

hopeful as to the future, proud of the forces which he had released" (PoL 85).

Prometheus is the symbol of the maker who willingly suffers in the service of obtaining

the techniques by which to remake his world. Furthermore, "Prometheus is primarily (a]

technologist: various forms of the myth attribute to him the gifts of building, of

navigation. of mining, of divination, of medicine" (PoL 85-86). Prometheus, whose name

means "forethough t ," emphasizes his capacity for reason and knowledge. Prometheus also

symbolizes the philanthropie aspect of human nature. From this perspective. the

Promethean type personality refers to those individuals who use their reason, knowledge

and technical abilities in the service of others.

For Morris, John Dewey's pragmatism "is the clearest philosophie voice of

Prometheus". n Accordingly. Dewey' s ideal hUlTJan being

is socialized Promethean man: he is man living outwardly in society and environing nature, utilizing emotions, his intelligence, and his activity to transform this society and this nature so that the values of society ... are progressively satisfied, enlarged and co-ordinated. To effect the sodalization. moralization of Promethean man, and to put at his disposaI ail the agendes of advanced culture: this is the key to Dewey's life work. (poL (5)

Dewey believed that the agencies of change were to be found in science and technology.

It was through the se new "instruments" of advanced culture that individuals would find

ways to orient themselves successfully.

"poL 93. - In a later article, however, Morris asserts that William James "is an ev en clearer exemplification of the Promethean personality" (WJT 183-184).

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Dewey's Prometheanism is highly dionysian in that his pragmatism IS dircl'ted

towards satisfying the social and biological desires of human nature, On the olher hand.

his Pr'Jmetheanism has a low buddhistic component. Beeause Dewey's Prometheanism

is socially oriented, buddhistic tendencies to solitude, detachment. and 'ielf-retlertlon do

not dominate. Dewey is a Promethean moralist and religionist whose "arllvlties

everywhere tended to restrain dionysian and buddhistic factors of human nature in so far

as they weakened the socially reconstructive orientation of the individual, and to harness

whenever poss:ble these factors into furthering the Promethean campaign" (PoL lJ5),

Morris h critical of Dewey's Prometheanisrn berause it tends to he intolerant of

o,ner orientations. On the positive side, Morris also daims lhat Dewey's Prometheanisrn

"of never-endmg reconstruction ... has helped to free him from service to seduetlve ideals

essentiaUy alien to hjs own activity" (PoL 112). In other words, it is the aet of continuai

remaking that afforis the Promethean a measure of openness. Therefore, within the

Promethean personality, there is a possibility of overcoming il'i own conœit and

intolerance.

5.2 The Apollonian Path

The god Apollo is associated with law and order governing the physical, social,

intellectual, and moral spheres of life. As Morris states, "harmony, moderation, clarity

are his characteristics, he is no friend of sorrow or solitude, death is banishment from his

presence and excess withers" (PoL (17). [n addition, "Apollo is a l:onserving deity,

holding in check the forces of renewal and disintegration" (PoL (18). Thus, the followers

of Apollo are socially engaged individuals, motivated by a need for moderation, harmony,

and continuity. They are conservative with regard to social change, retit:ent towards any

alterations that deviate from the socially established norms.

According to Morris, "Aristotle 's writing are the Canon of the Apollonian

personality" (PoL (19). ft is his concern for "essences," "essentml natures," that expresses

the Apollonian personality. For Aristotle, once the "essence" of an object had been

established, then its "nature" had been discovered. For instance, a green leaf that

bec ornes a "brown" leaf still remains essentially a "Ieaf." ln this respect, Aristotle's

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inclination to search hr the essence of things corresponds to the Apollonian desire for

conti nuit y and conservation.

Anstotle's Nichomachean Ethics, Morris says, presents an expliclt formulation of

the Apollonian personality (PoL 121). Indeed, in his Ethics, one can see AristotIe

attempting to unite the Apollonian conflict between a dominant "promethean" personality

compone nt and a relatively strong "buddhistic" character trait. For example, Aristotle

daims that the highest good for which ail human activities aim is eudaemollia. the

"highest" good and the final end to which aIl human endeavours aim, "the contemplative

Iife".14 Even so, the contemplative life depends on right government. ft is acquired as

"a result of virtue and sorne process of leaming or training. ,,15 For Aristotle, it is only

through the proper govemmg of the state thM one can legislate an education conducive

to the virtuous life. If so, then this means that the good life is contingent, not only on

contemplation but also on a skilful and active political life. In other words, individuals

who desire a detached, self-sufficient life of contemplation must create a society that is

conducive to this desired end.

This interpretation of Aristotle offers sorne insight into Morris' criticism of the

ApolJonian personahty. For him "the weakness of this personality and a society

dominated by it arises from the fact that the inherent self-centeredness of the Apollonian

is dependent upon the control of social agencies and goods for its support; to possess

himself he must possess society" (PoL 125). Likewise, Aristotle's highest good, the

contemplative life. can be maintained only by a society that promotes this Iifestyle.

Contemplatives, therefore, must legislate the members of their society into activities

oriented towards their chosen orientation. For example, Aristotle emphasizes action that

is preceded by deliberation; consequently, the "irrational," spontaneous and impulsive

natures of the "dionysian" type personalities are not tolerated. In such a society, non­

contemplative dionysian paths of life would be discouraged. This corresponds to Morris'

14Aristotle. The Nichomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19X4). p. 263.

I~AristotIe. The Nicltomachean Ethics, p. 18.

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schematization of the Apolloman persona lit y which hns a relatively low dwny~lan

component. At the same time, this persona lit y type is predominantly promethean. The

Apollonian acts in order to "manipulate and remake the world in the serviœ nt the

satisfaction of existing desires" (poL 24). In the case of the Apollonians, howevt'r, the

type of the society they create is shaped by their relatIvely strong "buddhlstic" natult' ...

Thus, unlike Dewey's Promethean individuals, who build a society for the benefu 01 hnlh

themselves and others, Apollonians build a society in terms of their own self-intl'rests.

6 • Dominant "buddhistic" Personalities

There is the grasped detachment of the Buddhi.'lt eye: This eye has made itself blind. This eye has repulsed the world'.'I damor. This eye fears illvolvement. This is the eye of the .'Ielf-œntred self. (poL 233)

In both Buddhist and Christian paths, the buddhistic personality component

dominates. The buddhistic character trait refers to the self's tendencies to "self-colltrol,

to solitude, to meditation, to detachment, [and] to self-containment" (PoL 25). Even so,

the promethean component of the self is given dominance in the Buddhist way of life

over the dionysian component. This results in a personality inclined towards promethean

interests such as science and technology. At the same time, its relatively low dionysian

trait accords with the strongly intellectual character of its domlllant buddhistic componcnt.

In contrast, although the Christian personality also has a predominant buddhistic

compone nt, it has relatively strong dionysian and low promethean element". Thus, III

comparison to the Buddhistic personality, the Chrbtian mode of expressing its buddhistic

component is less intellectual and more emotional: its prayer (meditation) i~ of the

"heart" rather than the "head"; its weak promethean character is expressed in ilS less

practical "other worldly" orientation.

6.1 The Buddhist Path

Morris describes the Buddhist path as the "way of detachment from desire" (poL

39). Nevertheless, according to him, it is necessary when discussing Buddhism "to

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26

distinguish its general view of the nature of the religious quest and the specifie path

which Buddhism proposes for the fulfilment of tht quest" (PoL 49-50). Morris makes

a distinction between early Buddhism (as originally taught by the Buddha) and the later

Mahayana and Tantri<.: forms of Buddhism. From its inception, Buddhism was concerned

with a "path" that "required no doctrine of the immortality of the individual or his

entranœ into sorne supematural 'other world'" (PoL 44). Salvation or "nirvana" was

understood as sornething that could be attained and lived in one's own life time.

Furthermore, early Buddhisrn set aside aU speculative questions (problems concerning the

soul or non-soul, existence or non-existence) as "undetennined." Instead, it focused its

attention on problems concerned with living in this world. What the Buddha had

dis<.:overed "nd taught was based on his own insights about hirnself and others. The

foundation of his teaching was based on the realization that desire is "the basic factor of

life, and the existence and frustration of desire as the basic source of human suffering"

(PoL 40). Consequently, through detachment from desire one would gain freedom from

suffering. This teaching, s'\ys Morris, was the fundamental insight of early Buddhism.

Later, however, Mahayana and TalHric forrns of Buddhism were introduced. In

bath, Buddhism becarne more idealistic, "more and more akin ta the metaphysical systems

which the Buddha had put ta one side as indifferent of, if not hostile ta, the religious life"

(PoL 45). For instance, the Mahayana tradition introduced the bodhisattva ideal,

advancing the notion that those struggling ta attain Buddhahood should postpone their

own salvation until they had helped aU sentient beings ta achieve Nirvana. In arder ta

do sa, bodhisattvas, out of love for their fellow human beings, take on the suffering of

many reincarnations. Morris pointli out, however, that with the introduction of the

bodhisattva ideal Buddhism moves away from its original goal of freedom from

atta<.:hment. Instead, the Mahayana path advances the way of attachment ta "love": the

desire ta alleviate the suffering of others. In this respect, Morris claims, the later

teachings of Buddhism introduced a promethean element (PoL 48). The promethean

tendendes are evidenced hy the fact that man y Buddhist '''physicians of the sou!'''

became "physicians of the body and played their part in the history of Indian medicine"

(PoL 54).

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To a much lesser degree dionysian tendencies within Buddhism have developl'd.

Tantric forms of Buddhism employ methods of abandonment to deslre in order to

overcome "attachment" to desire. By satiating their desires through TantrÏl: practkes. tl1l'

grip of bodily passions on the self is lost: "Iust is to be cru shed by lust" (PoL 49). FOI

Morris, both the Tantric and Mahayana developments in Buddhism are slglllficant. On

the one hand, they show relatively high promethean and low dionysian aspects of thl'

Buddhist personality. On the other hand, they show the inadequades llf this path for

those who have other dominant character traits. From this perspective. Mahayana and

Tantric doctrines "are attempts by persons higher in promethean and dionysJan traits to

modify Buddhism in ". direction more congenial to their natures" (PoL 51 ).

6.2 The Christian Path

The Christian personality has a dominant Buddhistic wmponent wlth rclativcly

strong dionysian and weak promethean traits. For Morris, Christ's per~onality is the "key

component in the attitude of the Christian man" (PoL 126). As represented hy Chnst\

life, Christianity is a path of love. Unlike the Buddhist's personality. the Chnstian' s way

of orientation to the self and the world is affective rather than intellectual. The ~trnng

dionysian component of the Christian represents this emotional disposillon. For Morn~.

it is this unique attitude of "love" that has shaped the entire development of Christial11ty

(PoL 126).

As in his discussion of Buddhism, MOITIS make~ a distinction between the

teachings of Christ and the teachings of the Christian tradition. Furthermore, becau\e of

Christ'" relatively short life and teaching (e.g. in comparison to the Buddha who taught

for over fifty years) Morris believes that "it is very difficult to recover the original

content of Christ's orientation" (PoL 127-12X). Even sa, Morm as~em that "m term~ of

wntemporary scholarship it seems likely that it conslsted essenttally in the bclicf that the

salvation of the tndividual and con~equently of mankind. wa\ to he found in a challJ.:l' of

heart, prefigured in the Psalms" (PoL 12X). In other words, the "change of heart"

admonishes the self-containment of certain feeling~ over and again~t the \elf-expre~~ion

of other emotions. Chnst's "grand passion," therefore, i~ not the diony~ian abandonmt'nt

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of <;elf ta the whim of bodily passion. On the contrary, Christ's love was a deliberate

choice made through a painful inner struggle. The image of Christ in the garden of

Gethsemane, praying "not as 1 will, but as thou wilt," is representative of the tension

inherent in the Christian personality. This inner conflict is a consequence of two strong,

yet antithetical, character components. It is a struggle between buddhistic and dionysian

dispo~itions: a tension between the pull of an inwardly directed intellectual disposition

against the pull of an outwardly directed emotional orientation.

Concerning the third character component, Morris daims that the low promethean

trait of Christian personalities is evidenced not only by their negative attitude towards

"dence and technology, but also by their tendency to acquiesce in sodeties dorninated by

other personality types. He states:

scorning at heart the scientific and technological agencies of human control, he [the Christian personality] has acquiesced unwillingly but persistently in the forms which Promethean and Apollonian man have given to society, and has seen his grand vision watered down to the defense of the existing social order, or he has tumed Mohammedan in his distress. (PoL 132)

ln other words, because of its strong dionysian character, the Christian orientation tends

to be more "mystIcal" (non-rational) and other-worldly. As a result, Christians have a

strong distrust of "this-worldly" oriented sciences and technologies. For Morris, in the

history of Christianity, the scorning of science and technology has turned into

"Mohammedan" intolerance.

7 - The Maitreyan Path

Thae is the gardeller' s detachment of the Maitreyan eye: This is the scientist' s eye--that things may speak in their

aWIl idiam. This is the artist' s eye--that each aspiring thing be freed

ta seek Ifs aWIl maturity The heart has informed this eye and the eye has distilled

heart's warmth. (PoL 234)

The essential characteristic of the Maitreyan path is the ability to integrate aU the

feutures of the human self. Maitreyans are at once strongly promethean, dionysian, and

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buddhistic (PoL 153). But since all aspects of the self L'annot be exprl"!\l'd

simultaneously, the Maitœyan will seem to be a "chameleon lJke Proteus -- one type nt

person at one moment and another type at another moment" tPoL 155). COJl!\cqucntly.

"to other types of persons the Maitreyan will seem no distInctive type: they WIll legard

him as trying to be aB -- and becoming nothlllg" (poL 154). MJitreyans do not glVl'

exclusive allegiance to any aspect of the "self;" rather they utilize whatevcr ,lSpel.'t of

themselves that a situation may requue. In this respect, it is possible to llnder~tand thelr

paradoxical way of orientation: "the path of generalized detached-attachment". Bel'all~e

they do not give theu complete allegiance to any particular aspect of the self al ,illY

moment Maitreyans are neither completely attached nor detached ta any mode of

orientation. At any moment, if necessary, Maitreyans adopt and express other aspcl't'i nf

themselves.

7.1 Maitreya and World Religions

The conditions favouring the realization of the Maitreyan Ideal have Ilot arrived.

Because "this personality has not yet found its embodiment in a religious prophet, its

embellishment and delineation in literature and philosophy, It is (hfficult at thls time to

focus sharply the picture of the Maitreyan man" (PoL 153). Nonetheless, "it has recelved

at least a partial expression in many religions and colored the lives of a numher of

individuals".16

IhpoL 159-160. - Exduded from Morris' discussion of the world religIOns is any mention of Judaism. This is a curious omission, considering the significance of thl'> religion in the history of the western worid. Morris provides no explanation for thlS, although his comments on Chnstianity offer a clue. According to him, ., it il) very (lIfticult to recover the original content of Christ' 1) orientation." Even 'iO, "Ill terms of contemporary scholarship it 'ieems likely that it wnsi~ted e~sentJally in the belief that salvation of the individual and consequently of mankind, was to be found in a change of heart, prefigured in the Psalms" (PoL 127-12X). Thus, in,>ofar as the life of Christ wa~ an extension of the personality "prefigured" in the text of Judaism, MorrÎ'i regarded Christ's personality as a prophetie" personality of Judaism. Such an interpretatlon is debatable, of course, and would caU for a di'icusslOn lying beyond the scope of thi ... ~tudy.

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Morris finds Hinduism to be "a pel:uliarly instructive case." Like the Maitreyan

path, Hinduism offers a unit y in diversity as a "consequence of the enlightened manner

in which it has made provision for the differences in mdivlduals and the corresponding

features of the universe to which the se differences make them attentive" (PoL 160). Ils

polytheism enables it ta rel:ognize many personalities and corresponding religious paths.

There is the path of devotion for those with dionysian personalities, the path of action for

promethean personalties, the path of knowledge for buddhistic individuals (PoL 160). The

three components of this personality are also expressed in the various Hindu gods, all of

whom are l:onsidered manifestations of "the one supreme uncharacterizable God" (PoL

160). For the Dionysian personality, there is Siva the destroyer. The ascetic side of Siva

"is witness to the dionysian-buddhistic tension of the Dionysian" (PoL 160). For

Promethean individuals, there is Brahma the creator. However, this god came to play a

subordinate role in Hinduism. This corresponds to the "restricted outlet that promethean

impulses had in the oriental society" (PoL 160). And for the Apollonian personality, with

its tendenl:Y towards conservation, there is Vishnu the preserver. Because each path is

the expression of one God, each is equally respected.

The attitude of "detached-attachment" is frequently cited ln the Hindu scriptures,

even though the expression of this path remains only partial and the tendency for one

personality component to dominate is effective. For instance, although a passage from

the Bhaf.:avad-Gita expresses "detached-attachment," Dionysian actions play a

subordinated role in the expression of it. t7

17Morris cites the following passage from the Bhagavad-Gita: "Man winneth not from freedom action by abstaining from activity, nor by mere renunciation doth he rise to perfection. Nor can anyone, even for an instant, remain really actionless; for helplessly is every one driven ta action by the qualities born of nature. Who sitteth, controlling the organs of action, but dwelling in his mind on the objects of the senses, that bewildered man is called a hypocrite. But, who, controlling the senses by the mind, 0 Arjuna, with the organs of action without attachment, performeth yoga by action, he is worthy. Perfoml thou right action, for action is superior ta inaction, and inactive, even the maintenance of thy body would not he possible .... Without attachment, constantly perform action which is dut y, for, by performing action without attachment, man verily reacheth the Supreme" (PoL 160-161).

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The Taoist writings also partially exemplify the Maitreyan path. U nlike the HlIldu

texts examined by Morris, the Taoist writings express a fonn of "detm:hment-attachment"

that is too Dionysian and insufficiently Promethean. 18 ln this re'ipect. Taoi'il11 has an

affinity with Nietzsche's philosophy.

Stoieism offers a more explicit example of "detached-attachment." ln the wntings

of the Stoics, Morris finds "evidence of an attempt to somehow bnng together thl'

attitudes of detachment and attachment" (PoL 162). However. as a complete philosophy.

Stoicism emphasizes buddhistie dispositions, while directing its promethean impulses

towards self-control. ln turn. dionysian tendencies are "allowed to appear only 111 the

sublimated form of ultimate 'abandonment' to the wlder cosmic processes".I'1

With its high buddhlstic tendencies and sublimated dionysian dispositions.

Stoicism shares more in common with Buddhistic personalities than Chnstian ones.

Nevertheless, both Christian and Stoic personalities do share strong buddhistic

dispositions. This may explain why man y Church fathers have admired and adopted

elements of Stoie philosophy.

From the perspective of the individual, Morris considers Leonardo da Vinci ta be

"a forerunner of the Maitreyan ideal as operative in Hfe" (PoL 163). As a scientist. an

18 As an example of what he terms "the mild 'cosmic' dionysian character" of Taoism, Morris refers to a passage from the Tao Tê Ching: "For the world is a divme vessel:/ It cannot be shaped;/ Nor can it be insisted upon./ He who shapes it damages it;/ He who insists upon it loses it.! Therefore the sage does not shape it, so he does not damage it;/ He does not Iose it" (PoL 162).

19To illustrate this, Morris cites the following passage from the writings of Epictetus: "It is hard ta combine these two qualities, the carefulness of one who is affected by circumstances, and the intrepidity of one who heeds them not. But Jt is not impossible; else were happiness also impossible. We should act as we do in sea-faring. 'What can 1 do?' --choose the master, the crew, the day, the opportunity. Then cornes a sudden storm. What matters It to me'! my part has been fully done. The matter is ln the hands of another--the Master of the ship. The ship is foundering. What then have 1 to do'! 1 do the only thing that remains to me--to be drowned without fear, without a cry, without upbraiding God, but knowing that what has been born must likewise perish. For 1 am not Eternity, but a human being--a part of the whole, as an hour is part of the day. 1 must come like the ho ur, and like the hour must pass" (PoL 162-163).

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engineer-inventor and a painter, his activity exemplified aIl three dimensions of the self:

the promethean tendency needed for science, thf." dionysian disposition needed for

engineering, and the buddhistic temperament of the artist.20 lndeed, da Vinci had a

complex and diverse personality. "With aIl his endless percept.'al and inventive curiosity,

this 'disciple of experience' delighted at the abstractness of mathematical thought; and

over his long life of continuai and restless activity is spread the mande of poignant

detachment" (PoL 163-164). Even so, the intense devotion involved in a "long Iife of

continuai and restless activity" also requires a "poignant" attachment. ln this sense,

renah~ance personalities like da Vinci exemplify the Maitreyan attitude of "generalized

detached-attachment" .

7.2 Maitreyanism and D.T. Suzuki's Zen Buddhism

If Maitreyanism finds features of merit in aIl the historical religions but does not

identify with any particular religion, then why has a Buddhist symbol been chosen to

represent this "religion of religions"? Morris answers this question by distinguishing

between the early and late periods of Buddhism. Late Buddhism refers to the second five

hundred years of its Mahayana development, which "became a philosophy of the idealistic

type more and more akin to the metaphysical systems which the Buddha put to one side

a~ indifferent for, if not hostile to, the religious life" (PoL 45). ln contrast, early

Buddhlsm refers to a common-sense naturalism that is "unique for the sanity and the

thoroughness with which it envisaged the essentials of the religious Iife. For a mornent,"

says Morris, "it pennitted men to see, hehind the clouds of mythology and metaphysics

and perverted asceticism and magical ritual, the religious quest in all its purity " (PoL 56).

Morris' Maitreyanism is associatf'd with this early period in Buddhist history.

Here, he finds a religion that is receptive to a scÏentific attitude. From thlS perspective,

Maitreyanism can be seen as a revival of early Buddhisrn. But, this time, armed with a

21lThe relation of the three personality components to science, technology and aesthetÏcs will he discussed in chapter 3, #7.

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"radical empiricism."ZI Maitreyans will be able to avoid the temptmions thm befell the

followers of later Buddhism.

Even though Maitreya has some affinity with early Buddhlsm. Morris insists that

it is no c10ser to Buddhism than it is to any other religion. However. in t1lS IlJ60 artidt'

entitled "The Buddhist Personality Ideal as Expressed in the Works of Diasetz Tt'ltal(l

Suzuki," Morris presents a portrayal of the Zen Buddhist personality that is dO~t'r ln the

Maitreyan ideal than the Buddhist personality he presents in Path.\' of Lit(·.

For instance, Morris considers the kind of detachment advm.:ated by SUllIkl'!\

personality to be "perhaps describable as attached-detachment" (BuPI Il). ThiS kmd ot

detachment, however, is not identical to the Maitreyan attitude. The generahzatlOn of tilt'

"attached-detachment" advocated by Suzuki applies only to the buddhistic and dionY"iian

components of the self. Hence. not aIl components of the self are aIlowed free

expression. The promethean component of Suzuki's ideal personality i~ suppressed. hut

not eliminated. That is, Suzuki does not repudiate ail forms of dOl1unam:e or powel,

rather, he is specifically concerned with repudiating "dominance conceived a~

possessiveness and as conquest. 'The desire to posses.' we are told. 'i~ considered hy

Buddhism to be one of the worst passions mOTtais are apt to he possessed with'" (BuPI

12). This repudiation of possessiveness and conquest does not result in idle passivity. On

the contrary, Suzuki continually stresses the active dimension of Zen. "Zen wants to act."

he says; or he characterizes Zen as "fighting a battle of life courageously and

undauntedly" (BuPI Il). Thus, there is not only an active element but aIso a heroic

dimension in Suzuki's Buddhist persona lit y ideal.

The "Zen" personality is a complex one involving the buddhistic, promethean and

dionysian components of the self. Il is strong in both the dionysian and hllddhi~tic

components, while reducing sorne promethean elements of the ~elf. For SUZUkl, each

personality component "must be qualified in a way which makes it compatible wlth the

others" (BuPI 12). When this is achieved, our consciousness is "not the battlcground of

21For definition of "radical empiricism," l>ee chapter 2, #1.

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opposite feelings, but it is, so to speak, their mutually-tolerating, felicitously­

commingling, synchronously-interfusing play-ground" (BuPI 12).

Suzuki's introduction of Zen to the United States "has had considerable influence,

and this influence continues tu grow" (BuPI 9). Morris is convinced that this influence

has great potenual. The American personality type being Promethean is strong in neither

the dionysian nor buddhistic components. Hence, through a synthesis of these two

personalities the resulting personality ideal would be stronger in dionysian and buddhistic

compone nt 0;. At the sa me time, because Suzuk.i's personality rejects the promethean

tendendes to "possessiveness and the 'conquest of nature'" it would weaken those attitude

expressed in the American personality ideal. On the other hand, says Morris, "it is to be

expected that Buddhism in the United States will mitigate somewhat the emphasis upon

detachment and attachment, and take a much more sympathetic attitude to science and

technologkal control of its environment" (BuPI 13).

For Morris, "the Buddhism presented by Suzuki has an entirely different quality:

'Zen aims at preserving your vitality, your native freedom, and above all (he completeness

of your being'" (BuPI 13). Suzuki's Buddhist ideal might not be identical to Morris'

Maitreyan ideal; nevertheless, insofar as Zen "aims" for the completeness of the whole

personality, it shares much in common with Maitreyanism .

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II

The Semiotic Dimension of Selfhood

Man is a plud:y. challcy. Lueky .\~vmbolizif/g (Mf/g. Hü symbols are hÎs essentÎal glOly (Jill! his bwdef/. Hi.\ drea11ls come from them. his proximate Remis. Ill.\ .""stai"illg Încentives to action. and his de/uSIOf/s. (l 39)

The previous chapter was aboul the vanety of ways in whil:h the three pnmmy

components of the personality are prioritized in each of the seven bask personality types.

From tbis perspective, an individual's personality is not only an organized system of

interests; it is also "a conscious system of interests" (PoL 1(0). The role of consclOusnes~

must be accounted for. According to Morris, it cannot be ~xplained away ~imply by

reducing the rnind to a series of Watsonian stimulus-response sequences. The human

mind is not merely a "palette of feeling in which Iife paints itself' (poL 17), it io; more

than this; it also involves thought processes that extend the individual 's world

beyond the narrow timits of his immediate existence; it allows him to participate imaginatively in lives and processes which far outrun his own; it makes him the conscious witness of his JOY and agony; Il has engendered the sciences and the art~ and the religions; it has made of life and death insistent presences. (PoL 17)

In claiming that the mind Taises the individual beyond the Immediate present,

Morris a1so wants to avoid metaphysical explanations of human conSl:JQusness that view

the rnind as ontologically distinl:t from the body. According to him, the mind emergcs

out of the human aptitude lOto treat present things as signs of what i~ not present, an

aptitude amplified and sustained by the fabric of communication with fellow men, and

functioning in the service of the web of interest~ whil:h l:onstitute IIfe" (PoL 17). The

human mind is "a complicated tissue of sign proœsses, a quaIity whkh life ha!\ taken

on; not a thing with a destiny independent of the vicissitudes of mortal existen<.:e. ,,1 ft i~

within this "tissue of sign processes" that people are born. In this view, people arc horn

IPoL 17, emphasis added.

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36

into a minded world; they are not born with a mind. Following George Herbert Mead.

Morris daims that Mead's psycho-social theory

turns inside out the ancient conception of the individual endcwed at birth with a "mind" through which he enters into social relations. It has traced the appearance of that mind within the processes of social interaction. and spedfically within the process of linguistic communication. It has shown that man'~ ability to guide his conduct by reflection requires the operation of a kind of symbol made possible only within a social community. (PoL 21)

From tins perspective, people internalize the dominant system of interests within their

society. In this way, they adopt for themselves a 'mind' that is common to others in

their community. By doing so, they come to see themselves as others would see them.

This is what Mead caUs "taking the role of another," a process made possible through a

complex system of linguistic signs through which the biological individual becomes a

sodal being. The minci, therefore, is eminently social. It is an intersubjective

phenomenon expressed in and through people's commerce with others in the world.

Morris believes that the resuIts of Mead's social approach must be accepted and that the

semiotic dimension of selfhood is primarily an analysis of the social dImension of the

self: "we can no longer neglect in the study of individuals the social agencies by which

diverse biological organisms have been given common characteristics which the y share

as men and women--their minds, their morality. their consciousness of self" (PoL 22).

Morris aiticizes Mead's psycho-social theory because it tends to emphasize the social

proceslo. over against the role of individual differences. ln order to correct this tendency.

Morris focuses hls attention upon the individual.

1 shaH return to lhis important issue of individual differences in the next chapter.

Here, my task is to give an account of Morris' theory of the human mind. A\..:cording to

him, the human mind is "in separable from the functioning of signs--if indeed mentality

is not to be identified with such functioning" (FoTS 1). This perspective caUs for a

dbcussion of the mi nd-body problem from the viewpoint of radical empiricism and

senuotics An examination of Morris' theory of signs is needed in order to situate Mead's

theory of the genesis of language .

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1 - Morris' Semiotic and Radical Empiricism

Like many contemporary philosophers. Morris reJects "Galilean-Cartesian­

Newtonian" metaphysks. According to him. "the substance view tïnds no advocatl's III

philosophy," and "the traditional materialistic conœption of nature has rect'lwd sevcll'

blows from recent theoreucians of science" (CS 1 253). Nevertheless, cnnfuslon HWI

these concepts remains because "we have attained no generally accepted suhstllutt' ...

[m]any of the difficulties of present theories of mind are due to the attempt 10 maintalll

the mechanico-atomistic conception of nature while rejecting the conception of lllmd a~

an immaterial entity" (Cst 253).

In such a state of confusion, there is a need to redallTI a phenomenologlcal

analysis of experience. Such an approach, for Morris, requires a radical empincism.

From this perspective, "neither the immatenal entity of mmd nor the mechalllco-atomistlL'

conception of nature can be defended. Instead, Pragmatism must be glvcn the credit fOI

completely rejecting both aspects of the traditional world view and for dcvdopmg many

of the implications of this double rejectioll. "2

Indeed, the two components of the expression "radical empirkism" slgnify Hus

double rejection. As William James points out, the word "empiricism" is used to signal

an opposition to any ratIonalism that gives priority to universals over against partlculars.

that makes "wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well as in that of hClIlg." \

Empiricism involves giving priority to particulars. Therefore, the desaiption of thlllg~

starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second 0\ der. It is essentially a mosaic philosophy, a philosophy of plural facb, likc that of Hume and his descendants who refer these facts neither to Substances in which they inhere nor to an Absolute Mind that creates them a, objects.4

2CS 1 254, emphasis added.

3William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism and a Plurali:.tic Universt!, (New York: Longmans, Green, 1943) 41.

4W. James 41-42.

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3X

Yet, James maintains, traditional empiricism has not rid itself of metaphysical

assumptions. Hence, the term 'radical' is used to signify an empiricism that undenakes

to neither "admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor

exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. ,,5

For Morris, the psychological atâtudes of behaviourists and introspectionists differ

in terms of what c.;an be admitted into their account of experience (CS 1 255).

8ehaviourists beheve only in the existence of observable behaviours. Because mental

operations do not express themselves in overt actions, they den y the reality of any

mediation by a self. Consequently, aIl actions are reduced to stimulus-response

sequences.6 "In this way the whole content of direct experience vanishes and we are left

only with a responding organism, responding to nothing and experiencing nothing" (CS 1

262). Because this perspective in volves the rejection of a self as mental functioning,

Morris c.;aIls this the "self-exclusive" view.

ln contrast, introspectionists maintain that mental experiences are "private" or in

the "mind." This perspective offers, at best, only a descriptive account of private mental

experiences. Excluded from this account are the dynamic aspects of the self that become

manifest only when they are connected with overt behaviour. Morris calls this world­

picture the "partial self-inclu,sive" view.

Radical empiricism combines both the introspectionist and the behaviourist

perspectives" in olle account, ... without passing beyond experienced content" (CS 1 257).

This "total self-inclusive view" affords a comprehensive account of the mind because both

quantitative and qualitative elements of experience are included. From this perspective,

~w. James 42.

bMead's comments are insightful on this point: "there remained, however, the field of introspection, of experiences which are private and belong to the individual himself-­experiences commonly called subjective. What was to be done to these? John B. Watson 's attitude was that of the Queen in Alice in WOllderland-- 'Off with their heads!'-­there were no such things. There was no mental imagery, and no consciousness" (George Herbert Mead, Mind. Self, and Society: From the Stand point of a Social Behaviorist, ed . C.W. Morris [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934] 2-3).

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one "may observe one 's own organism in relation to other organisms. and the relation of

other organisms to each other" (CS 1 257). For Morris, "[tlhis is. in faet, a commun

perspective for the adult human being. and the self-exclusive and the partial sdf-indusiw

views are really abstractions from this larger view" (CS 1 257),

From the standpoint of radical empiricism, James' denial of com,ciollsnt'S~ as a

distinct entity7 can be understood as a "double rejection" of both the sclf-exdllslvl' and

the partial self-inclusive points of view. According to Morris. Jarne~ realized

that the thought about something (consciousness in the sense of "consciousness of") was also not a special kind of "entity" or "stllff' l'lut a functional affair of one item in experience serving as a sllbstitllte for another by directing conduct with respect 10 lhat for which il was li

substitute. James did not himself make much use of semlOtical terrninology, but it is nOl unfaÏr to say that on thls analysis. consciousness (in the sense of consciousness of something) is the functloning of slgn~. and anything apprehended may so function as a sign. "Mind" in this sense is a sign-process. (PMAP 124)

Morris' "total self-inclusive" perspective offers a solution to lhe problem of mind.

ConsCÎousness is neither solely private nor solely public, nor is it i" 'a mind;'

consciousness is rather a "functional affair", a sign process. Furthermore, the tl'rm

'consciousness' must be distinguished from the tenn 'mmd.' According to Morri~,

"consciousness denotes the present functioning of symbols, while the phrase 'a mind'

denotes the entire systematic symbolic repertoire of an orgamsn; (NM 23X).

2 • Morris' Definition of a Sign and the Basic Components of Semiosis

How to define signs without using other signs,!H By placing sign~ in a nOIl-

7In his weIl known essay "Doe~ 'Consciousness' Exist'!", Jame~ remarks that "to c1eny plumply that 'consciousness' exist'i seems so absurd on the face of Ît--for understandahly 'thoughts' do exist--that 1 fear some re:.ders will follow me no faTther. Let me th en immediately explain that 1 mean only to deny that the word stands for sorne entHy, l'lut to insist most \:mphatically that Il does stand for a function" (W. James 3).

g"[T]he difficulty in philosophical matters is in findmg the begmning, Thi~ ditfkulty becomes acute in a discussion of symbohsm, because a discussion involve~ the use of symLols, and yet the very aim of the discussion is to get beyond symbols, that is, to place

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symboHc context. In order to rid his semiotic of any traces of dualistic thinking. Morris

develops an account of signs defined in terms of human conduct. In doing so, he is not

attempting to reduce the functioning of signs to mere overt behaviour. Neither semiosis

nor human conduct are reducible to each other for Morris; purposive human behavlOur

involves rather the incarnation of sign processes: "there is an intrinsic connection between

meaning and action, such that the nature of meaning can be clarified only by reference

to action."9 As Rossi-Landi points out, signs must be connected with behaviour because

there can neither he communication without behaviour nor behaviour without

communication. "There can be no behavior without communication because one cannot

conceive that a human or non-human animal that behaves in sorne way, carries out an

activity, in short does something, is communicating nothing at all."lo

ln Signs, Language and 8ehavior (1946) Morris defines a sign in terms of the

interpreter's disposition to respond: "If anything, A, is a preparatory-stimulus which in

the absence of stimulus-objects initiating response-sequellces of a certain behavior fami/y

causes a disposition in some organism to respond under certain conditions by respollse­

sequences ofthis behaviourjamily, then A is a signOl (SLB 10). As this definition shows,

Morris presents sign functioning in terms of causal categories. However, properly

symbols in a non-symbolic context" (SaR 12 - 13).

9C. F. Delaney, "Recent Work on American Philosophy," The New Scholasticism 45 (1971): 467. - As Delaney points out, Morris maintains that this view towards action and thought makes the "pragmatic ori(~ntation" historically distinct from any other (C. F. Delaney 467).

Ilh'This is true," says Rossi-Landi, "(i) in the sense that no animal can ever live withollf codes and without 'social programming' of his individual behavior ... ; and (ii), in the sense that by observing what the animal is doing or is not doing information can always be gained. It is only w!.en we reduce the totality of communication to sorne of its sectors--for ex ample, to those which are usually defined as conscious and/or intentional and/or finalistic--that we can then differentiate between sorne behavior which is sign and therefore communicative behavior, and other behavior. This 'other behavior' is declared a non-sign, non-communicative, because it falls outside a pre-selected zone. The reduction, already present in the premise, emerges in the conclusion. But really we have only distinguished between two types of sign-behavior, between two different types of communication" (F. Rossi-Landi 170-171).

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speaking, an interpreter is not caused to act by the mere presence of li sign. 111cre IS no

sign without an interpreter and there is no interpreter without a slgn: rather, they ait'

present to eaeh other simultaneously, which means that the elluse-effect rdation IS Ilot

involved in the process. This central poilit marks Morris' distam:iatlOn from thl'

behaviorist approach to the notion of the slgn.

The expressions 'stimulus-obJects' or 'preparatory-stimulus' also -;uggest too

strongly the language eharacteristic of Watsonian behaviourism. Although MOrriS I~

adamantly opposed to Watson's psychologieal doctrine, he aligns himself with Mead.

Clark L. Hull and Edward C. Tolman because "ail these men have endeavolllcd 10

develop a general theory of behaviour that will embrace the behavior of rats and mcn .lIId

yet account for their differences."·· In using the terms 'stimulus' and 'response' Morns

most certainly does not intend to suggest that "every stimulus 'mechanil:ally' calls out a

response"·2. Without a proper aecounting of simultaneity bUllt into his deflllltion of

serniosis -- a point Mead eonstantly stressed in his own account of the signifleanl symhol

-- Morris leaves himself open to sorne serious misunderstandings. For instance, Arthlll

F. Bentley considers Morris' Si/{ns, Lall/{uage, alld Behavior to be an "unholy alliance of

'goal seeking psychology at the rat level,' set up 'with liule change,' and 'the cohwcb~

of the older logics and philosophies,' a mixture of outworn traditions of Newtol1lan

mechanies with philosophie formalism and dualism" (SAS 122). Of course, in light of

what we know about Morris' views about Watsonian behaviourism and traditional

IISAS 123. - According to Rossi-Landi, Morris "insists on the type of behavionsm he prefers: not a strictly biological behaviorism of the Walsonian sort, which 111 term~ of the history of ideas is mechanistic materialism, but rather -- through the widcr behaviorism of Tolman and Hull -- a dedaredly sœial behavionsm like Mcad'~ .... [Morris] had abandoned the narrow paths of behavionsm and had ventured onto the terrain of a behavioristics ... which may end up by becoming Identified wlth the ~tudy of praxis, of human action in genera!. Since man i~ man only socially, human action could have been understood by Morris himself as social practice" (F. Ros~i-Landi 1 ()().

12SAS 123. - In an eartier article, Morri~ explicitly remarh: "A ~ignificatioll, or a process of semiosis, i3 any situation in whil.:h one thing take~ account of ~omethmg else, which is Ilot directly causally efficacious, through the medlation of a thlrd ~omething; a sign is thus a 'mediated taking aecount of'" (ETS 132, emphasis added).

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rnetaphysic~, a critique of Morris' behaviouristic aeeount of serniosis reqUIres a rnueh

more sophisticated analysis th an those presented by Bentley and others.

Morris' original definition of a slgn, as presented in his Foundations of the TheOl')'

of Si!:I1..\", does not use the terrninology eomrnonly associated with behaviourisrn. 13 ln

the Foundatiolls, he defines a sign in tenns of what he caBs a "taking aecount of." "In

behavionstics, to take account of D by the presence of S illvolves responding to D i/l

vlrtue of the re.\jJOIlse to S."14 The response of the Interpreter to D (the Interpretant)

happens In the presence of S (the sign). The interpretant is a "taking aeeount of

sornething," "insofar as it is evoked by sornething functioning as a sign by sorne

interpreter. "I~. The crucial word, here, is the terrn "evoked," which rneans "to calI

forth." Thus, this earlier definition still employs the vocal metaphor, central to Mead's

social-vocal theory. lbat a sign "caUs forth" its Interpretant is not the same as "eausing"

the Interpreter to respond. Because Mead's "vocal gesture" is experienced simultaneously

in both the communicator and the eommunieatee, it beeomes a cause and effeet for both

the speaker and respondent at one and the same time. The cause-effeet relationship does

not obtain. For these reasons, therefore, 1 will adopt Morris' definition of a sign as

presented in his FOUfldatiolls of the Theory of Signs.

1 ~Sebeok remarks that, "in 1938 Morris wrote a brilliant rnonograph on semiotics WoundatlOns 0/1 the Them) of Signs], which had nothing to do with psychology. Subsequently. between 1938 and 1946, he diseovered behaviorist psyehology; 1 always felt this was a great mistake." According to Sebeok, Morris aligned himself with the behaviounst p~ychology of Clark L. Hull and Edward C. Tolman. The effect has been that when the latter dedined, so did Morris' behaviouristic sernlotics. When Sebeok, a former ... ludent of Morris. expre~sed these criticlsms to his former teacher, Morris replied: "Weil. you're entuled to your opinion. 1 don't agree wlth you; 1 think the 1946 book 1 Sig fl.\' , La/lguage, a/ld 8ehavior' is very important because, precisely, it aligns you with pSYl'hology." Other semIOticians also agree. Roland Posner thinks very highly of Morris' 1946 book (T. Sebeok 9~P)9).

I~FoTS 6. emph<lsi ... acided .

I~FoTS 4. emphasis added.

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For Morris. signs are either signaIs or symbols.

Signal Symbol'l>

A signal is a substitute stimulus. For instance. the school bell !'.Ignab Ihe end of l·la..,..,:

the smell of smoke in the kitchen SignaIs an overcooked dlllner: Ihe pattl'lIng ..,OlllHl Oll

the roof indicates that it i .. raining. In the~e cases the !'.igns have not been ploduu'd by

their interpreters. In contrast. lia symbol is a slgn that IS fJlOdut'cd hv (/1/ lfl{t'I/J/('lI'I ot .1

signal and aets as a substitute for that signal with which III!'. -,ynonymoll!'..""

Semiosis refers to the proœss by which somethmg operale!'. as a \Ign. 'l'lm

process involves five basic terms: a siRIl-vehicle, a cJellotalllm. a slgllllïmfltlll. an

interpretant, and an illterpreter.

A sign-vehide refers to "a particular event--such as a glven ... Olllld <lI mark 01

movement--which is a sign" (SLB 20). In the act of speaking. vocal sound!'. are Ihe !'.Ign­

vehldes. A denotatum is "anything that would permit the COll1plctlon ot the re-'pon ... e­

sequence to which the interpreter is dlsposed because of a slgn" (SLB 17) For III <;tance ,

when 1 am paying a cashier at the grocery store, my wallet slgnIhe~ the money, Ihe

denotatum, not present III immediate expenence, that 1 need to <':oll1plele Illy pUlLha'.t'

That objects can operate as signs is not at ail uncommon. On the LOntrary. to lI ... e MOI rI'. '

exall1ple, the desk upon which 1 am typing "igmfies an abject that ha,> IOUT leg'., li real

and a bottomside, ail of whlch are not presently available to my oh!'.ervation (~;aS 2).

lf'Thb diagram is presented 111 Beth Sondel, The Humanity 01 WOf'(J.\, (Cleveland, N Y World, 195X) 136.

17Sondel 136. - ThiS distinction I!'. first introduced by Morri!'> in hl!'. major opu!'., Slgn.\, LanRuaRe, and Behavior (SLB 23-27), the Importance uf which ha ... heen aLknow\cdged by such notable thinkers a!'> Ernst Cassirer, Su!'>anne Langer and Harry Stad Sullivan Set" E. Cassirer, An Essay Oll Man, (New Haven,CT. Yale Univcf\lty Pre ....... , 1 !J7()) :n, S Langer, Feeling and Form (New York: Charles Scribner' .... Son .... , IlJ53) 2(m, and If S Sullivan, The Interpersonal TheOl'y of P.\ychwtry, ed. Helen SWlLk and Mary Ladd (iawe! (New York: W.W. Norton, 1(53) H7-HH.

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A significatum refers to "those conditions which are such that whatever fui fils

them is a denotatum" (SLB 17). Thus. if there is money in my wallet. then it ~igmfIe~

the money 1 require to make the purchase; if there is no money in my wall et, then the

wallet has a sigmficatum, but no denotatum. Any slgn that has a denotatum denotes its

denotatum. Although not aIl signs denote, aIl signs signify (SLB 347). In other word~,

not ail signs have a denotatum. but aIl signs must have a significatum. 18 An interpreter

is "any organism for which something i~ a signOl (SLB 17). Every slgn has an interpreter,

for there is no sign without an interpreter. An Interpretant is the interpreter'~ "disposition

to respond" in the presence of a sign. The term refers to those habits of behavIOur "in

virtue of whlch the sign-vehicle can be sald to deslgnate certain kind~ of abjects or

situations" (FoTS 32). For example. in arder ta pay the cashier, 1 reach for my wallet ta

make the payment. In this case. the wallet ~ignifies the money 1 need, and because 1

believe the wallet's significatum has a denotatum, 1 act aecordingly. This IS my

disposition to respond (the interpretant). But if there is no money in my wall et. 1 cannat

complete the action that 1 have mitiated. Hence. as this example shows, we need to make

sure that our signs are reliable. In arder ta do ~o we must distinguish between !>Igns

which merely signify and those signs which denote. As Morris asserts. we must "demand

of signs that they show their eredentials" (OS fi3), for only in this way ean we avoid

gullibihty and leam orto master signs instead of being mastered by them" (OS 63).

3 . The Three J>imensions of Semiosis

Semiosis i~ three-dimenslOnal; it involves syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.

These repre~ent dlfferent relauonal funetions: syntactics is the relation of one sign ta

another; ~ell1antics is the relatIon of signs ta obJects; pragmaties IS the relation of signs

to their interpreters or users. AlI three dimensions are interdependent; the failure of one

relatIon leads ta the failure of semiosis. Since all aets of semiosis involve ail three

1Nln FoU/ulations of the Them}' of Si~ll.\. Morris uses the term 'designatum' instead of 'signifieatum.' (See: FaTS 5). Later. in Sigfl..lj, Language and Behavior, he drops the former term in favour of the latter; the phrases '''ta have signification' and 'ta have a sigmtïeatum' are synonymous with 'to sig nif y'" (SLB 354).

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dimensions, it is incorrect to speak of "pragmatical slgns." "semanti\:al signs." or

"syntactical signs," as if they were discrete entities (SLB 21S-19). For instal\l.:e. IOgll:

might be considered to deal exclusively with "syntacticaJ ~;igns;" the rules of tnferenn~

that govem the manipulation of logical slgns involve. however. the pragmati\:J.I dlJllen~iol1

of serniosis. Likewise. the substitution or replacement of signs by other slgn~--II\

derivations or in metatheory for example--involves the semantical dimension ot semiOSllI.

The difference between signs "lies not in the presence or absence of behavior but ln Ihe

sector of behavior under consideration" (SLB 219).

The study of the syntactic dimension of semiosis IS called sYlIlactic.\'. 'Ilte Mudy

of the semantic dimension of semiosis is called semantics. and the study of the pragmatll:

dimension of semiosis is called pragmatics.

The following schema provides a helpful summary of the tenns discussed

above. 19

Figure 1.

SEMIOSIS Syntactlcal.··· .............. ,. Semantlcal.··· ....... _ .... -- ..... _ ... Pragmabcal Dimension ot DimenSion ot Dimension ot SemlOSIS Seml9sIs Semiosis .

:

SIGNIFICATUM DENOTATUM

OTHER SIGN-SIGN- " , VEHICLE VEHICLES 1 1

1 1 1 1 INTERPRETANT 1 1 NTERPRETER 1 1 1

SEMIOTIC 1

1 1 1 , 1 1

SYNTACTICS SEMANTICS PRAGMATICS

19 As presented by Morris. However, to accord with the terminology used in his behaviouristic formulation of semiosis, the term 'designatum' has been replaced by the term 'significatum'''(ETS 133). See previous footnote.

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This diagram clarifies the distinction between semÏotics as a science and semiosis

as an event. Although it is possible to perform a separate study of each dimension, it

does not follow that they function separately. On the contrary, the exclusion of any

dimension, or necessary aspect, from the sign process means the failure of semiosis. No

element in the diagram has temporal priority. Semiosis is a simultaneity of sign-events.

4 - Semiosis and the "Meaning of Meaning"

'Meaning' is a "quasi-synonym" of semiosis.20 However, "semiotic does not rest

upon a theory of 'meaning'; the term 'meaning' is rather to be c1arified in terms of

semiotic" (FoTS 44). Although Morris preferred not to use the term 'meaning' because

it is too vague, he uses the teTm 'semiosis' in connection with three dimensions of

meaning. These are MF "formaI meaning" (= syntactics); ME "existential meaning" (=

semantics); and M p the "pragmatic dimension of meaning" (= pragmatics). Hence, the

meaning of a sign can be stated as "the sum of its meaning dimensions: M = ME + M p

+ M,:' (LoP (5). In this view,

these three dimensions of meaning are interrelated in such a way that the meaning-situation forms an organic who le. 'l1le meaning situation can be stated from either the object pole, the formaI pole. or the life pole.... None of the three dimensions can be transcended, although anything that is said can be investigated from either of the three points of view. (LoP 65)

These remarks should caution those philosophers who attempt to lirnit the use of language

to one dimension of meaning. For instance. the logical-positivist believes 'meaning' to

involve solely the formai dimensions of meaning (syntactics). In contrast, the empiricist

considers 'meaning' to be the clarification of objective meaning2\ (semantics): one looks

"for meanings as one would look for marbles: a meaning is considered as one thing

umong other things, a definite something definitely located somewhere" (FoTS 44). This

!OF. Rossi-Lilndi t 80.

21 As it is used by Morris, the expression 'existential meaning,' rders to objective meaning--the relation of ~igns to their objects--and should not be confused with the philosophical tradition of existentialism. ln order to avoid such confusion, the expression 'objective meaning' is used here in place of Morris' expression.

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is also the aIl too common tendency of daily life; consequently. objective memling is

"usually viewed as the only aspect worth considering."zz But. as the above tOll1\llla

shows. 'rneaning' involves the simultaneous presence of ail three dimensions. Scmio"s.

therefore, can be understood as the comprehensive study of mealllng. An:onling 10

Morris, '''rneaning' signifies any and ail phases of sign-processes (the status of bl'mg a

sign, the interpretant, the fact of denoting. the significatum) ... " (SLB 19). Thll~. language

qua semiosis involves a tnadic "meaning" structure: a syntactll: dimension as analYJ'l'd

by logical positivism; a sernantic dimension as studied by ernplfidsm. and il pragmatic

dimension (the social conventions of communication) as analyzed by pragmau~m.11

5 • Linguistic Signs

Signs can be used in many ways. Both non-linguistic and linguistic signs are uscd

by human agents. Linguistic signs are predorninantly symbols, though in some IIlstanccs

linguistic signs can operate as signaIs.24 Linguistic signs can use tactile. visual or

22 According to Maurice Boutin, this tendency to consider only the sernantic dimension of rneaning happens not only in everyday life, but also "in theology, quite particularly with regard to the theological analysis and understanding of the intentional structure of faith. According to a kind of natural tendency the possible change of fOl;U~ ~h()w~ therefore the following move: fifst, semantics; then, in sorne cases, syntactÏl:s; tïnally. and nearly by chance so to say, pragmatics. Each of thesc perspectives allows for a partlcular set of relations established and used also as a description of the intentional ~tructure of faith." According to Boutin, these "three sets of relations ... are closely related to Rudolf Bultmann's understanding of the intentional structure of Christian faith" (M. Boutlll, (lJ; see also 74).

23R. Posner 566.

24 According to Morris, It is not dear whether or not ail hnguistic signs fum.:tion a~ substitutes for other synonymous signs. Linguistic signs would be "symbols only If for each of them there could he found sorne other ~ign, with the ~ame sigmfi<.:atum, for whlch they becarne substitutes. Sorne persons might argue that thr 'perception' of tood or obstacle was itself a signal-process, and that language signs are al ways substitutc ... for such signaIs. But this raises the diffi<.:ult question as to whether or not pen.:eptlOn i~ lo

be regarded as a sign-process" (SLB 34). Furthermore, the tenn 'perceptIOn' is very arnbiguous. According to sorne, perception is antecedent to sign processe\, wherca~ others consider perception to be a sign process (SLB 252nO). Be<.:au~e of thi~ ambiguity,

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auditory sign-vehicles. For instance, sign language uses a system of hand gestures,

written languages use graphie signs, and Braille uses tactile sign-vehicles. Spoken

languages use vocal sounds as their sign-vehicJes. ln addition, the technological

dimension of sorne sign-vehicles should not be overlooked. The developments of

telephone, radio, television and computers have dramaucally increased the interpreter's

abiJity to produce and to be affected by auditory and graphie signs.

The term 'language' is very ambiguous. Although there is "very general

agreement that language is a sign phenomenon social in nature, there are rnany

dlsagreements as to what is necessary for signs to be language signs" (SLB 32). In order

to gain sorne precision and darity regarding language signs, Morris develops a highly

technical vocabulary. According to him, "a language is a set ofplurisituational comsigns

rt!stricted in the way in which they are combined. "25 The teim 'plurisituational' refers

to a set of signs whose significations are relatively constant in every situation.

'Comsigns' refer to signs that have the same signification for both the individuals who

produce them and those who are stimulated by them (SLB 33-34). To say that language

is a "set of plurisituational comsigns restricted in the way in which they are combined"

irnplies that it is a "system of plurisituational comsigns" (SLB 36). Since a sign-family

refers to a set of plurisituational significations,26 language can also be defined as a

.\'ystem of comsign1amilies (SLB 36).

Morris believes that this definition of language is in accordance with the way it

is used in scientific discussions. His defmition also ensures that language is understood

to be a social phenomenon. It insists that "language signs are interpersonal, and hence

Morris does not consider it advisable to base a claim about language upon a doctrine of perception. Consequently, he does not ru le out the possibility that there may be both language signais and symbols (SLB 252nO) .

.!~SLB 36. - ln FOlmdatiolls of the Theory of Signs, Morris defines language as "any intersubjective set of sign-vehicles whose usage is deterrnined by syntactical, semantical, and pragmatical rules" (FoTS 35) .

.!6 A sign-family is "a set of similar sign-vehicles that for a given interpreter have the sarne signification" (SLB 354).

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presuppose a plurality of interpreters" (SLB 37). For Morris. however. the insisten(c Ihal

aIl language occurs only in a social eontext is questionable. Ta use his example. suppose

that someone writes a paem that is destrayed before anyone «:an read il. ln Ihis l'a!'>t\ It

we were to insist lhat language oceurs only as social behaviour. we wou Id be forœd (0

condude that the poem was not written in a language. For thl!'> reason. Morns' ddïnition

allows for the possibility of language in non~soc.:ial contexts (SLB 37),

6 • The Genesis of Language and Seltbood

Morris' theory of the genesis of linguistic slgns is based upon the accollnl

advanced by his teacher and mentor, Mead. Morris believes thal his own accollnt

develops Mead's analysis while identifying "a number of Issues where Mcad's

interpretation is unclear" (SLB 42). Due to the importance of Mead's theory for Morris'

semiotic, the discussion continues with a presentation of Mead's genetic account of

language.

6.1 Mead 's Social-Vocal Theory27

According to Mead, the genesis of language involves the genesis of self and

society. The individual is not endowed with a self at birth. (nstead, il arises out of the

process of social experience and activities made possible by language. This does not

mean, however, that without language there can be no social process. On the contrary,

non-linguistic animaIs live and function in complex social structures. ln these soc.:ieties,

animaIs communicate in a primitive way that Mead caUs a "conversation of gestures."

ln a dog-fight, for example,

the aet of each dog becomes the stimulus to the other dog for hls response. There is then a relationship between these two; and as the act is responded to by the other dog, it, in tum, undergoes change. The very fact that the dog is ready to attack another becomes a stimulus to the other dog to change his own position or his own attitude. He has no sooner done this

27Mead's theory of language is called "social-vocal," because he identifies ail symbols with language symbois arising out of the social-vocal situation.

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than the change of attitude in the second dog in turn causes the fust dog to change his attitude. 2S

50

Each dog responds immediately to the other's gesture, each dog's gesture being a stimulus

for the other's response. The dogs do not reflect upon the significance of their gestures:

"We do not assume that the dog says to himself, 'If the animal cornes from this direction

he is going 10 spring at my throat and 1 will turn in such a way "'.29 The dog does not

respond self-consciously to the other animal's gesture. Similarly, in boxing or fencing,

people engage each other in a conversation of gestures. Although sorne actions will be

deliberate, success in action sports such as these often depend on the ability to respond

immediately. As in the dog-fight example, each person must respond "instinctively" to

the other's attitude. 30

When individuals use a gesture calling out a response in themselves that evokes

the sa me response in the other we have a conversation involving significant symbols.

Mead defines a significant symbol as

... the gesture, the sign, the word which is addressed to the self when it is addressed to another individual, and is addressed to another, in form to aIl other individuals, when it is addressed to the self.

Signification has .. .two references, one to the thing indicated, and the oilier to the response, to the instance and to the meaning or idea. lt denotes and connotes. When the symbol is used for the one, it is a name. When it is used for the other, it is a concept. But it neither denotes or connotes except, when in the form at least, denotation and connotation are addressed both to the self and to others, when it is a universe of discourse that is oriented with reference 10 a self. 31

Thus, a symbol is significant to the extent that it is in a universe of discourse that has

referem.:e to the self. A universal language is a complex system of significant symbols

2SG. H. Mead 42-43.

~9G. H. Mead 43.

lOG. H. Mead 43.

llG. H. Mead, liA Behaviouristic Account of the Significant Symbol," Journal of PhUoSOIJhy 19 (1922): 162 .

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that are common to aIl members of a community. Through a prucess of socialization theM."

"are taken over into the nature of the individual himself." 'z ln doing so. tht" pt'rson

acquires a universal discourse that is constituted by signifil:ant symbols.

The social process is mediated by significant symbols. Through this rnech:iI1ism

of communication, individuals are able to become conscious of them~elves as selvrs. For

Mead. the vocalization of significant symbols enables human agent~ to beconll' sl'lf­

conscious. 33 ln calling out to another, indivlduals simultallt'ously hear them!'>e1ves spl'aJ..

as their respondents would hear them.34 The vo..:al gesture cast!'> the speaker into il held

of common experience; in calling out to another. both speaker and respondent ;ue

addressed by the same act of speaking. Through the vocal gesture. people tnllls..:end

themselves. The addressee responds as the speaker would also respond and the shaIcd

experience is one of cooperative activity. In such cooperative acts. the slgnitkant sYl11hol

not only denotes a "shared response," but it also connotes an objectIve ~c1f. ThIs IS the

social self. It is the reply to a vocal gesture shared by aIl members of a linguistic

community.

Through the activity of play children first learn to "take the attitude of another."

Mead says, for instance, "children get together ta 'play Indmn.' This means that the ..:hild

has a certain set of stimuli which cali out in itself the responses that the y would cali out

in others, and which answer ta an Indian. In the play period the chi Id utilizes his own

responses ta these stimuli which he makes use in building a self. ",~ Children play at

32G. H. Mead, Mit/d, Self 26R.

33For Mead, it is through the "vocal gesture" that ail language symbols arise. Morris, however, advises against such an exclusive identification. "One implication of lhi~ lhcory would be that a family of deaf-mutes, not especially trained by normal individuals, would develop no syrnbols and no mental phenomena. This seems highly questionable, but ~IIlCC this is open to sorne kind of deterrnination by the study of deaf-mutes, and sorne check afforded by experimental evidence, no dogmatlc statemel;t one way or another is as yet advisable" (NM 235).

34G. H. Mead, Mit/d, Self 141.

35G. H. Mead, Mind, Self 150.

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being mother or father and, in doing so, they address each other as their parents address

them. In play, however, there is no continuity between the roles children choose to

assume. As Mead says, .. such is the simplest form of being another to one' s self. It

involves a temporal situation. The child says something in one character and responds

in another character, and then this responding in another character is a stimulus to himself

in the first character, and so the conversation goes on ... 36

ln the activity of playing agame, children must take the attitudes of everyone

involved. In order to participate, they must be able to internalize a set of organized rules.

When children can do so, "this represents the passage in life to the organized part that is

essential to self-consciousness in the full sense of the term.'137 To use Mead's example,

in order to play baseball, children must know how each of the players will respond to

their own gestures. These responses are governed by rules that aIl the players assume.

Mead caUs this set of organized attitudes "the generalized other."

In the social world, the "generalized other" is the attitude of the community or

social group to which the individual belongs. In order to gain a self in the fullest sense,

an individual must adopt the attitude of "the generalized other." ln doing so, the

individual

finds himself speaking to himself and to others with the authority of the group. These attitudes become axiomatic. The generalization is simply the result of the identity of responses. Indeed, it is only as he has in sorne sense amalgamated the attitudes of the different rôles in which he has addressed himself that he acquires the unit y of personality.38

Through the vehicJe of language, people are able to organize and internalize the attitudes

of the community in which they {ive. In doing so the indivldual acquires a unity of

IhO. H. Mead, Mùui, Self 151.

170.H. Mead. Mimi, Self 152 .

180. H. Mead. "A Behaviouristic Account" 161.

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personality; this is what Mead caUs a "social self."39 The individual's social self (tht'

"me") is a linguistic construction; it is an amalgamation of vocal gestures that havt'

become significant symbols. As an organization of significant symbol~. tht' social 'ielf

is neither an object nor a subject. It expresses itself in the vocal gesture that enables

individuals to address themselves when addressing another simultanecusly. The self that

they address, therefore, signifies both themselves and others who belong to tht' 'iallll'

linguistic community.

The social self is neither static nor univocal: the "me" that people ad(hcs~ I~

constantly varied, for it must also answer to the novelty of their biologÎl:al lI11plllses (the

"1").40 Insofar as individual biological impulses modify their responses to cach other'~

social-vocal gestures, significant symbols acqllire new significations. They become

plurivocal. In turn, the social self--an organized set of significant symbols--hccomcs

endowed with novel significations. Changes in the social self affect ail persons of the

linguistic community, and the addition of novel significations to the social self afford~

the possibility of novel significations in individual selves. ln this way, both society and

individual may open to novel ways of being-in-the-world. The degree to whlch thls

happens, depends not only on the openness of individuals, but also on the openness of the

"generalized other" that constitutes their community.

39The terms 'self' and 'personality' are not synonymous. Ali selves have personalities, but not ail personalities are selves. A personality is an organizatlOll of personality traits. A personality trait is a particular disposition to respond when certain stimulus-objects are present. By organizing these attitudes into a l:oherent whole, the individual acquires a self. Henl:e, the term 'self' refers to a unified set of personality traits.

40G. H. Mead, liA Behaviouristic Al:count" 161. - Mead refers to the "1" as the biologie individual. ft is "the response of the organism to the attitudes of other~: the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes" (G. H. Mead, Mimi, Self 175; 347-378).

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6.2 Morris' Critique of Mead's Significant Symbol

While recognizing Mead's genius in isolating the fundamental genetic problem in

the ongin of significant symbols (comsigns), Morris is critical of Mead's solution. The

problem is ta explain how people acquire similar interpretants of a sign that both can

produce. Mead thought the vocal gesture could provide a solution. The productIon of

sounds enabled individuals to hear themselves as others wou Id hear them. MOITIS admlts

that "this is certamly one key to the problem" (SLB 39), but "the mere fact that an

organism hears the sounds it utters as other organisms hear these sounds is at best a

necessary condition" (SLB 40). Mead's explanation, therefore, still does not tell us how

a vocal gesture can acquire the same interpretant in both organisms.

ln order to show how comsigns arise, Morris considers two organisms that are

given the same training such that both behave identically at the sound of a buzzer. In this

case, "such signs would he interpersonal and plurisituational, but not yet comsigns" (SLB

40). On the other hand, if the two organisms made similar sounds each time one or the

other was seeking food, the vocal gesture cou Id gain the same signification as the buzzer

sound. In this case, the sign wou Id not only have an interpretant common to both animais

but also be produced by both animais. Such a sign would be a comsign. According to

Morris, "the uttered sound would te a comsymbol if it was a substitute for the buzzer or

sorne other sign; otherwise it would be a comsignal" (SLB 40).

According to Morris. this example shows how a signal can become interpersonal,

a com-signal."l He believes that Mead' s social-vocal theory fails to explain this. Even

so, Mead's insight into the reflexive nature of vocal sounds shows how a sign can become

plurisituational.42 If the vocal signal accompanies both the same stimulus and the set

of similar behaviour patterns with sufflcient frequency, and if the organism has the

requisite biologlcal rnechanisms (such as a sufficI~nt memory etc.), then a habit--a

disposition to respond--can be acquired. If so, it is also possible that when the original

41"A slgn is interpersonal to the degree that it has the same signification to a number of interpreters" (StB 349). An interpersonal signal is a comsignal.

42Not aIl plurisituational signs are symbols, but ail symbols are plurisituational.

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stimulus is absent, the vocal gesture can in itself dispose the interpreter to behave Cl.\ {I

the original stimulus were present. The vocal gesture has then bel:ol11t' a symbol. but it

is not yet a comsymbol. In order for a symbol to become a comsymbol. Il must he not

only plurisituational but also interpersonal:

The mere fact that an organism hears the sounds it utter~ as othel organisms hear these sounds is at best only a neœssary condlüon, F0r Il

is equally necessary that both orgamsms produœ sunilar sound~. and that each sirnilarly interprets the sound of the other. (SLB 40)

That the conditions sufficient for a language utterance should obtain IS 4uitt' an

extraordinaryoccurrence, For Morris. "it is ObViOUS at once that only under very unusual

situations could this combination of circumstances obtain" (SLB 40), The gene~l-'; of

comsymbols is an event of the simultaneous presence of organisms 111 whlch the USta of

vocal gestures having sirnilar plurisituational significanœ (symbols) bec orne interpersonal

(comsymbols).

Jürgen Habermas is highly critical of Morris' interpretation of Mead's aCl:ount of

language genesis, According to Habermas,

in laying the foundations of semiotÎcs in behavior theory, Morris appealed to his teacher, G.H. Mead, but he missed the real point of Mead's approach. Mead understood the meaning structures built into the functional circuit of animal behavior as a feature of interaction systems that guarantees a prior, instinctually based commonality between participating organisms. Mead has to attach importance to reconstructing the linguistically sublimated commonality of intersubJel:tlve relations between participants in symbolIcally medlUted mterm;tlons from the per~pective of the participallts themselves./43

/ He cannot content himself, as does Morris, with ascribing to individual organisms I,;onl:un ing interpretations of the same stimulus, that is cOIl.'itallcy of meaning as viewed from the perspective of the viewer. He has to demand .\'umelw.\.\ of meaning. The use of the same symbob wlth a con~tant meaning has tn be not only given as Juch; It has to be knowable for the symbol users themselves. And this samelless of meanillf: can be secured only by the

43 As these remarks indicate, Habermas is contra~ting the "self-inclusive VICW," which he believes to be Mead's concern, with the "self-exclusive view," whlch he beheve~ to be Morris' perspective. Both Morris and Mead, however, hold the "total ~elf-indu~lve" view, and consider the other two viewpoints to be "abstractions from this larger view" (CS 1 257). See below, footnote 46.

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intersubJective validity of a rule that 'conventionaIly' fixes the meaning of the ~ymbol.44

56

Here, Habermas is referring to Wittgenstein 's weIl known analysis of the notion of a rule.

According to Wittgenstein, lOto think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence

il is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule

would be the same thing as obeying it."4~ ft follows, then, that a rule must be

intersubJectively prior to the aet of foIJowing it. If "sameness of meaning" can be

established only by "a rule that 'conventlOnaIly' fixes the meaning" then. as Mead

thought, such rules must be part and parcel of the gesture contained within "the

fum.:tional circuit of animal behavior."

This ingenious use of Wittgenstein's analysis of a rule helps to elucidate the

foundational role of the gesture in the genesis of interpersonal communicaùon. However,

Habermas' comment that Morris is content "with ascribing to individual organisms

concurring interpretations of the same stimulus, that is cOllstancy of meflning viewed from

the perspective of the viewer," implies that he considers Morris to be a behaviourist.

Evidently, Habermas misses the real point of Morris' approm;h. Consequently, and

lamentably, he confuses the total self-inclusive view of Morris' behaviouristics (radical

empincism) with the self-exclusive View of Watsonian behaviourism (empiricism).-I6 But

44J. Habermas, The The01'y of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of FUllctionalist ReasolZ 15-16.

-I~Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 196H)

* 202.

-It>Morris' "total self-inclusive" approach accords with that of his teacher. As Mead states, "social psychology is behaviouristic in the sense of starting off with an observable actIvity--the dynamk, on-going social process, and the socIal aets which are its component elements--to be studied and analyzed scientificaIly. But it is not behaviouristic in the sense of ignonng the inner experience of the individual--the inner phase of that process of activity. On the contrmy, it is particularly concerned with the rise of such experience within the process as a whole" (G. H. Mead, Mind, Self 7-8).

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Morris is no behaviourist. As we have seen, he explicitly r~jects the self-exclUSIve VIt'\\'

"that ascribes cOlIstallcy of meanmg viewed from the perspectlve of the viewl'r ".p

In order to understand Moms' cnticisms of Mead's slglllhcant ~ymhnl. Il I~

essential to grasp the distinction he makes between a cOlllslgnal and a cOIl1~ymbol Hoth

are comsigns, signs that have gamed mterpersonal slglllflcance A COI11~lgn,tl 1:-' a

plurisltuational and interpersonal sIgnal. wherea!'> a cOlllsymbol IS a cOIl1~lgnal that 1"

generated by an organism as a substitute stimulus for that cOl11slgnal ln whlch Il l'

synonymous. Comsignals can also be generated by the orgal1lslll that respomj.., to thl'Ill.

but if the signal to which the orgamsm responds is not a substitute stlllluhl' .. tOI ,mothel

comsignal. it is not a comsymbol.4t! A comsignal that is generated by an orgalll~1ll 1"

a gesture.49

Morris' buzzer example IS a heunstic devlce ta explam how sIgnai ... may hCCIlIlll'

plurisituational and interpersonal, yet not comsymbob. His exampk ... tlOW\ hoth thl"

genius as weIl as the weakness of Mead's argument. On the one harld. the vocal ge ... tllll"

offers the mechanism by which signais can become interpersonal, or com~lgnal',. On the

other hand.

this is merely to show how gestures may have an II1terper~onal

signification; it does not differ in e~sentlab, for in~tance, trom a ca~e

where a buzzer may have a common ~ignificatioll for two dog'i; Il doe!'> not in itself account for comsigns. Mead must further show how more than one organism cornes to produce the sound III 4uestion (111 order 10 get comsignals) and how sounds produced by more than one organism becollle substitutes to each of them for already eXI!'>ting interpersonal ~igns (in order to get comsymbols) .... (SLB 43)

47See above, section 1 of this chapter.

48An organism can abo generate non-interpersonal, or pnvate, signah. A hunger cramp, for instance, is a sign generated by its mterpreter. But, becau\e the \ign doe~ not operate as substitute stImulus for another !'>ign, it I~ not a symbol. Sorne \Ignal\ prodUl .. ed by an interpreter have an Important function which I~ nelther IIlterper!'>onal nor \ymboltl..

4'J As Morris point~ out, "Mead'~ conception of the ge~ture I~ c1early rclatcd to what we calI a signal, and he at times calls it a non-~igniflcant '1yrnbol to dl\tingul\h it trom the significant symbol" (SLB 43).

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5X

ln other words, Mead's approach does not sufficiently explain t-ow comslgnals l:an

become substitute stimuli for other comsignals to which they are synonymous.

Neverthele~s, Mead does offer a clue for its solutions: "In a way, Mead's stress upon the

social act supplies the necessary principle of explanation" (SLB 41). Even so, Morri~

finds Mead's conception of the social act ambiguous. On the one hand. Mead defines the

social act as

the cJass of actli which involve the co-operation of more than one individual, and whose object as defined by the act... is a social object. 1 mean by social object one that answers to all the parts of the complex act, though these parts are found in the conduct of different 1Odividuals. The objective of the acts is then found in the life-process of the group, not In

those of the separate mdividuals alone.50

ln this view, comsigns arise out of the co-operative social act in which a common SOCial

goal provides the rule "that makes possible the similarity of sounds and interpretants

necessary for cOlnmon signification" (SLB 44).

Mead also refers to social acts in which two animais are fighting. But in this case

the term 'social' "can hardly have the same sense of co-operation toward a common

goal." ln order to understand how comsigns can arise out of non-cooperative situations

one needs only to recall Mead's often quoted dog-fight example. In this case, two

animaIs are incapable of symbol formation; both <!re engaged in a "conversation of

gestures":

The al:t of each dog becomes the stimulus to the other dog for his respcnse. There is then a relationship between these two; and as the act is responded to by the other dog, it, in turn, undergoes change. The very fal:t that the dog i~ ready to attack another bel:omes the stimulus to the other dog to change his own position or his own attitude.~1

As this example shows, there are basic similaritie,; in how each dog responds to the

other's gesture, and it is just because both animais share similar "attitudes" to each other's

gesture that the dog-fight is possible. But 10 this case, comsigns arise out of l:ompetitive

~llG. H. Mead, Minci, Self 7(n7) .

~IG. H. Mead, Millci, Self 42-43.

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rather th an cooperative behaviour. ft is the aim of their competitive aClions Ihal provldc~

the "rule" that makes possible common significations. Morris. therefore. is l'IitÏl"al ot

Mead's contention that comsigns arise only out of social acts that art' cooperatIve in

nature.52 Although social behaviour is necessary for tht're tn be l·om:-'Ign~.

"[c]ompetitive and even symbiotic social behavior may be sufficient to account tOI the

genesis of sorne comsigns" (SLB 45). In other words, regardless of the nallln.' of Iht'

social act, the gesture must guarantee a "socJally based commonahty" fOi there to Ill'

comsigns. And this commonality arises out of the "Iife-process of the group. not III tltllSC

of the separate individuals alone."53

These comments bring into question Habermas' interpretation of not only Morm

but also Mead. As we noted above, Habermas believes Mead ta understand tltat

"sameness of meaning" is guaranteed by a "prior, mstinctually based commonahty

between participating organisms." Of course, how we interpret this remark depends on

what Habermas means by a "prior, mstinctually based commonahty." Although he

recognizes that the "1" emerges "equiprimordially with the 'me. ",~4 Il would appear tltal

Habermas is giving priority to the biological individual (the "1"). This is Ilot Mead's

perspective. There is no condition "prior" to the social proœss that guarantee~. "sameness

52For Mead, "commumcation is a SOCial proœss whose natural hlstOi y shows that it arises out of cooperative activities, such as those involved in sex, parell1hood, tïghting, herding, and the like, in which sorne phase of the act of one form, whil:h may be called a gesture, acts as a stimulus to others to carry on their part~ of the ~ocial ad' (Mead, TIU' Philosophy of the Present, ed. Arthur E. Murphy IChicago: University of Chicago Prc~~, 1980] 167). ln contrast, for Morris, "the comsign, while requiring minimum -;oclal behavior in the sense that organisms provlde stimuli to other organisrm, doe~ not necessarily require an act to be a reclprocal SOl: Jal behavior--rt IS ~utflClt'nt that the organisms perform response-sequences ... without <.:Ooperating in the prO(.:e~~ , (SLB 44). However, Mead's assertion is a de~criptive account of the ,m:ial procc~\ mlher th an an explanation. To say that "communication IS a ~ocial process whose natural hi<;tory .\how.\ that it arises out of cooperative activities" il, not the ~ame a, making d;~im~ concernlllg the conditions necessary for language in general. Becau~e Meaà be!ieve~ human agcnt~. are social being~ who are cooperatIve in nature, hi~ theory take~ thi~ mto account.

530. H. Mead, Mind, Self 7(n.7) .

54J. Habermas, 59.

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of meaning." Rather, "instincts" can provide a common basis for "sameness of meaning"

only if there is a sufficient "socially based commonality." Likewise, the social act can

provide a common basis for "sameness of meaning" only insofar as there is an adequate

"instinctually based commonality." 80th imply each other. When Morris speaks of a

"socially based commonality," he is assuming the latter, and when Habermas speaks of

an "instinctually based commonality" he is assuming the former. In this respect, Morris'

criticisms of Mead's significant symbol concur with Habennas' interpretation. Therefore.

in formulating an account of language genesis, it seems advisable to incorporate both

Morris' and Habermas' criticisms. The gesture cOlltains both an "instinctually" and a

"socially" based commonality. Together these provide the rule necessary for there to be

"sameness of meaning", and, a fortiori, linguistic communication .

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ID

The Body and Symbolic Transformatiun

... It is the nature of the body to be active: it is not impelled ami Ilot drawn to action. Its impulsions are tlze hegi,,"i"gs of its actions. its goals are the consummations of its impulsions

The body is a long-made miracle, the concretion of a myruui of tries. tlU' solution of a myriad of problems. It is alive with trillions of ifS com{J0flelll lives. Its flow carries the movement of their many Jlowillgs. Its tllOlIghts and feelings are j70werings of ifs jlowings.

ln its flowing the body wends its wayamong things. selecting among them. opening itse/f to some of them. closing itself and recoiling from others of them. The body is a flag-bedecked boat moving with the river. {Jllu.\·ing and steering and wlristling. But never leavlIlg tire river. (1 31)

1 • Body Types and Personality Components

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In the last chapter, based on a critique of Mead's social-vocal theory, we saw that

both biological and social commonalities are necessary for the genesis of not only

language but also selfhood. Although Morris believes we must accept "the results whkh

such a social approach to the individual has attained," he argues that Mead's social theory

of the self inadequately accounts for individual differences and their efft~cts upon the

social structures (PoL 22). In an investigation of paths of life, an explanation of the

differences between people is aIl the more needed, particularly in our present world,

which for Morris is "a babel of man y voices" (PoL 7). Because there IS no longer U

"dominant and pervasive center of integration" people are thrown bUl:k upon their own

resources. Consequently, now more than ever, persons mu'.;t find within themselves a

direction for the orientation of their who le personality.

An understanding of individual differences IS espedally germane to the study of

religious paths, "for the diversities of such paths are in sorne way l:orreJated with

orientational problems of individuals, and the diversJty of the answers is dctermined by

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the natures of various individuals, whatever may in tum be the conditions (physÏl:al,

biological, and social) under which such natures have appeared" (PoL 23).

ln the first chapter, we saw how Morris identified three common elements of the

personality, the different combinations of which were used to explain the differem.:es In

seven bask per"ionality types and corresponding religious orientations. ln Paths of Lifl',

however, Morris suggests that the source of differences between persons can be found in

their different biological dispositions.

W.H. Sheldon's biological theory of the human personality proposes that the

human personality is a function of three physical traits: viscerotonia, somatotoma, and

œrebrotonia. For Morris, dlese three biological types have conesponding temperaments

that are similar to the dionysian, the promethean, and the buddhistic character components

mentioned above. 1

A<.:cording to Sheldon's theory, the viscerotonic is strongly endomorphic.

Endomorphy "refers to soft roundness in physique. A physique extreme in endomorphy

has a rounded head, soft protruding lips, a short large neck .... " (OS 34). Morris points

out that the viscerotonic "loves comfort: soft fumiture, a soft bed, luxurious surroundings.

He also radiates comfort" (PoL 26). The viscerotonic temperament is likely to find sorne

affimty with the Dionysian personality type which indulges in existing desires "in the

presence of obJeCl'i appropriate to the satisfaction of those desires" (PoL 24).

IW.H. Sheldon 's theory of body types is called constitu~onal psychology and is by no means passé. On the contrary, it remains a developing area of study. As the 1 esearchers of a 19X2 study of Sheldoll' s work remark: "There is nothing mysterious about the study of morphology--the science of form. ft is an implicit part of every sdentific diSCIpline and IS to be found in the study of rocks, plants, animaIs, blood, and ~o forth. Because the study of human morphology is a new science, it may take the experiem.:e of several decades before it is readily accepted as the basic point of departure in the study of human beings and their needs. The essential difference between the constitutional approach to dlP study of personality and the more customary approaches is sllllply this: constitutionalists acknowledge a relation between structure and behavior in every aspect of human life" (Emil M. Hartl, Edward P. Monnelly, and Roland D . Elderkin. PIlysiqlit! m/(t Deliquent 8l'haviour: A Thirty-Year Follow-Up of Wil/iall H. Slrt'/doll'.\" Varieties ofDeli/lquellt Youth [New York: Academie Press, 1982] 3).

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In contrast the somatotonic is strongly mesomorphic. A mesol11orph has a high

amount of developed bone and muscle tissue. Accordingly. a somatotonll.' exprt'SSt'~

"motivational patterns dorninated by the will to exertion. exercise and VIgoroll~ sl'lf­

expression" (PoL 27). The somatotonic's temperament is comparable to the Promcthean

personality type that dominates and "manipulates the world in tht' St'rvH..'t' of Itu:

satisfaction of existing desires" (PoL 24).

Finally. the cerebrotonic is ectomorphic. which refers to "the linear fragility of Ihl'

body. The extreme cases are slender reeds.... Such bodies do not give us the senst' 01

softness of muscled bone, but the impression of alertness. sensltlvlty. brittlencss,

angularity" (OS 35). The cerebrotonic's temperament is "high-keyed. sensitive. wary, on

the defensive ... to resist loss of self-awareness ... to shy away from large open plal'C~ and

social groupings, to turn to meditation and retlection when in trouble" (OS 36). The

cerebrotonic, therefore, is likely to exhibit actions characteristlc ot the Buddhlstlc

personality type with tendencies to solitude, meditation and self-containment.

In Paths of Life, Morris is cautious about making correlations between hi~

personality traits and Sheldon 's three somatypes. However, in hi~ book The 01'('11 St"I.

published six years after Paths of Life, Morris makes a stronger daim conccrnlllg the

human body and its corresponding personality characteristics: "the seat of our need-; IS Olll

body. As our bodies differ our needs differ. That is why in understanding men and

women we must understand their bodies. And why 111 building a life we must know our

own body" (OS 39). In The Open Self, he categorizes the human personahty in

accordance with three basic needs: dependence, domination, and dctachment.1. The

viscerotonic temperament corresponds to the dependent personality trait. Such per~on-;

have a need "for easy compliance with the world and for a world that ea~ily complic~

2Both Karen Horney and Erich Fromm, Morris recall~, have also settled on threc characteristic strategies for explaining per~onahty disturbanœs Horney calls the .. e 1)

"movement towards persans"; 2) "movement against persons"; 3) "movement away from persans". She also refers ta these behaviour~ as sublTIlssion, aggre~sion, and withdrawal. Similarly, Erich Fromm refers ta neuroti<.: behaviours as "the negative aspects of the receptive, exploitative, and hoarding orientations" (OS 103- 1(4).

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with the body by not demanding too much effort" (OS 37). In contrast, somatotonic~

exhibit a need to dominate their situation. Unlike viscerotonics, they need a world that

can he controlled and remade in accordance with their desires. Finally, cerebrotonics

express a need to he detached from the world. Instead of being involved in the world,

cerebrotonics move away from the world. For such men and women there is "a

movement toward the inner man. Not comfort is wanted, not power, but awareness of

oneself' (OS 39). These categories of dependence, domination and detachment

correspond to the Dionysian, the Promethean and the Buddhistic personality types. 3

2 - Personality Types and Human Action

For Morris, all purposive hum an acts are cyclical. Between birth and death, we

exist in the world through a manifold series of epicycles involving three consecutive

stages: the perceptual, the manipulatory, and the consummatory. Concomitant with the

selfs movement through the three stages is the self's movement through the three

components of itself.

Figure 2: The Epicycle of Ruman Action

, -....... -::...---", /",. ...... ,

/ / '"

birth - ••••

1 / / maniPulatiO'n\ \

1 l ' j per~cePIi\: \', ,) ... - death

" ...... ~bnsummatién ~----

llnterestingly, constitutional psychologists have adopted the expressions "Dionysian enthusiasm," "Promethean fortitude," and "Christian renunciation" (= buddhistic detatchment) to denote the three psychological components, each of which corresponds to one of the three somatypes as outlined by Morris (Emil M. Hartl et aL, Physique and Deliquent 8ehaviour 39-40).

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In his Varieties of Human Value (1956), published more than fourteen years aftel

Paths of Li/e, Morris makes an important connection between his three personality

components and Mead's analysis of the three stages of the act.4

For Mead, "if an impulse (as a disposition to a certain kind of action) is given. the

resulting action has three phases: the perceptual, the manipulatoTY. and the

consummatory" (SaS 4). In the perceptual stage, individuals must fiTst percclve thl'

object, or objective, towards which they are going to act. The perceptual stage is not only

sensual; it can also be intellectual. For instance. before ~eslgners begin to sketch their

ii!ustrations, they must have sorne idea--however inchoate--about how they are gomg lU

proceed. This does not mean, however, that the final result necessarily accords wlth theu

initial intention. On the contrary, changes an..i alterations take pldce during the

manipulatory stage. Nonetheless, in this phase of the act, individuals must behave

towards their object (or objective) in a way that satbfies their original impulse. Finally.

aIl being well, the individual achieves the consummatory stage of the act (SaS 4).

As illustrated below, the three stages of the act correspond to the three personality

components: buddhistic, promethean, and dionysian. In addition, these personality

components correspond to three types of behaviour: detachment, dominance and

dependence (attachment) (SaS 24).

Table 2: The Relation of Personality Components tu Stages uf the Act

Personality Component

buddhistic promethean dionysian

Preferential Behaviour

detachment dominance dependence (attachment)

Stages of the Act

perceptual manipulatory consummatory

4J. Jay Zeman remarks that here are "the roots of a fruitful connection between semÏotic and value theory, a connection which is the prime aim of Signification and Significance" (Zeman 19-20).

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According to Morris, the perceptual stage of the act involves detachment (SaS 21). At

this stage, people have not yet commined themselves to a specifie course of action.

Therefore, their boundaries are being neither invaded nor extended over things. They are

detached. (SaS 21). On the other hand, in the manipulatory stage of the act, individuals

must gain control of the required objects in their environment "securing them or

constructing them as the case may be" (SaS 22). In doing so, they must extend their

boundaries to inc1ude other objects or systems (SaS 22). Finally, the consurnmatory

stage requires dependent behaviour; they must let the secured object work upon them. In

order for this to happen, personal boundaries must he permeable and receptive. Thus, in

the final stage of the act, persons are dependent or attached. These correlations make an

important contribution to Morris' the ory of the self. Instead of Morris' static

representation of seven basic personality types (Table 1), it is now possible to provide a

dynamic model based on human action.

Ali human acts require three distinct phases of the self. In order to complete a

task, therefore, persons with dominant personality types must act in ways that are contrary

to their preferences. For example, the Dionysian personality has a high preference towards

attachment behaviours, Jess preference towards detachment, and little desire for dominant

behaviour.

Figure 3: A Dynamie Mode. of the "Dionysian" Personalily Type

x

y = time

time-p m c

y

p,m,c = stages of the act

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This figure provides a temporal representation of the Dionysian' s preferential behavlOur.

The x axis represents the time spent at each stage of the act. divided by the sum of all

times required for one complete act. The resulting curve shows the relauve time~ spent

at the perceptual, manipulatory, and consummatory stages.

Dionysian personalities emphasize the consummatory phase of actIOn. SlIlce the y

are strongly inclined towards this stage, they would be inclined to extend the duratlon of

this stage. In turn, they would he inclined to spend relatively less time in the perceptual

stage, while having little toleration for manipulatory actions. Such personsalities woulct

exhibit impatience when involved in tasks that required extensive mampulatory açtJons.

For instance, in the act of painting, Dionysian personalities would not be mclined to

produce highly realistic pictures that demand long periods of manipulatory behaviour.

In stead , they would choose painting styles that are more gratifying. spontaneous anct

affective (attached).

Using the same model, it is now possible to produce adynamie representation of

Morris' personality types.

Table 3: A Dynamie Representation of Morris' Personality Types

pme pme pme

pme Maitreya

Buddhist Dionysian Promethean pme Apollonian

pme pme Christian Mohammedan

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This table provides a dynamic representation of preferential behaviours in terms of the

relative times spent at each stage of the act. Maitreyans are impanial to all stages of the

act and ail personality types. They assume whatever personality type the situation

requires. Thus, in order understand the diverse nature of their personalities, il is necessary

to comprehend ail six other personality types. In this respect, the Maitreyan is like

Roben Musil's "man without qualities," that is, "the man in whom aIl qualities merge

spectrally into the whiteness of none, the unbroken beam. ,,5

3. Semiosis and Preferential Behaviour

As already mentioned, Morris establishes a Iink between Sheldon 's body types and

his three personality components. ln Signification and Significance, however, he makes

a further connection, not only between the personality components and Mead's stages of

the act, but also between the stages of the act and modes of signification (SaS 27).

Hence, implicit in these correlations is a relation between the biological "meaning

structures" of particular body types and the act of communication. The following table

schematizes these correlations.

Table 4

Sheldon's Body Tvpe Preferential Behaviour Stages of the Act Modes of Signification

ectomorphic detachment perceptual designative mesomorphic dominance manipulatory prescriptive endomorphic attachment consummatory appraisive

Like the corresponding dimensions of semiosis, all modes of signifying involve

simultaneous presence of each other. No language utterance is purely designative,

prescriptive or appraisive in the same way as there is no discrete dimension of semiosis.

5Translator's "Foreword" to Robert Musil's The Man Without Qualities, vol. 1 of 3 vols., Eithe Wilkins & Ernst Kaiser trans .. (London: Capricorn, 1965) p. iv.

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Like the components of the personality, a linguistic utteranœ can be predominantl)'

designative, prescriptive, or appraisive.

The statement "the good cat must sit on the black mat" contains deslgnatiH"

prescriptive, and appraisive utterances. The terms 'cat', 'blad.', and 'mat' aIl'

predominantly designative; whereas 'must su' is a predominantly prescllptlVl' uttclalll'l'

The term 'good' is predominantly appraisive. Of course, because language uttl'ranL'l'~ Lan

both denote and connote, single terms can employ more than one mode of slglllflcatlOlI

For instance, in a certain context the term 'black' mlght be not only dCMgnatlve hut abo

appraisive. In moral situatIons the term 'must' may be both prescnptive and appraislVl'.

Thus, these modes of signification are context speciflc, the u'\c of whll.:h can he found

only by studying their interpreters' actions in theu particular situatIOns (SaS 5)

As shown above in table 4, the three modes of signification are explicable III teflus

of the three stages of the act. In this view,

a sign is designative insofar as it signifies observable propertles of the environment or of the actor, it is apprlJlsive lllsofar as il signities the consummatory properties of sorne obJect or situation, and it is 1)f'(J,\'criptl Vt'

insofar as it signifies how the object or situation is 10 he reacted to so a~ to satisfy the governing impulse. (SaS 4)

Thus, the perceptual stage of action requires desigllative utterance~ III ordcr "to perL'civc

the relevant features of the environment in which it is to act" (SaS 4). The mampulatory

stage involves the need to "behave toward the objects in a way relevant to the ~atlsfactlOll

of its impulse" (SaS 4). This stage, theJefore, requires pre,\cr//J!ive utterances. Fmally,

ail being weU, the interpreter attains the cOll.\ummatory ~tage of the act. 1 Il ()/ der to

realize the final stage of the act, appralSlve utterances are requlred.

The three pha~e~ of action can also be stated in tenm of Sheldon'~ three hody

types (temperaments) and the three personality component~. Each of the pcr:-,oJlallly

components refers to a particular type of interpretant: a "takmg account of" III tl'rm,> of

a tendency towards detachment, dominance, or attachment. The .\IJ:lli/ïcatum of a '>Ign

vehicle caUs out a l:orrespond1l1g personality components in the lIlterpretallt. lhlllg the

stages of the act as a guide we can see that a deslgnatlve utterance rail., out the

buddhistic component of the ~elf; a pres(,\ iptlve utterance calls out the promethcan

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component of the self; and an appraisive utterance calls out the dionysian component of

the self (table 4 above).

4 - Modes uf Significatiun and the Perceptual Stage of the Act

The perœptual stage of the act is basIc to ail human undertakings. This stage

mvolves the deliberation process before purposive action can begin. Before choosing a

particular course of action, human agents begin by collecting infonnation from their

surrounding enVlfonment. This requires the buddhistic personality component involving

the sensory nervous system as weil as the "sensory projection areas of the cortex" of the

biological mdlvidual (SaS 7). Concomitant with the information gathering process is the

evaluative action of the dionysian component. This dimension of the personality IS an

expres~ion of the "autonomie nervous system, including the memory sections and pleasure

centers of the self" (SaS 7). The dionysian component chooses either an objective or an

obJect that is prized amongst the field of designative significations made av ail able by the

sensory nervous system. This field is constituted by both previous and anticipated

experiences that are arranged In a preferential hierarchy.

Once the objective has been chosen, the means to its attainment must be

considered. This requires the promethean dimension of the personality, that indicates to

the self via some prescriptive significations, the appropriate behaviours required for

reachmg the desired goal. "Pnmanly prescriptive signs strongly involve the somatÎl: (or

motor) nervou~ ~ystem including the effector system of the brain."f> The actlvÏty of the

promethean personality comoonent in itself, however, does not necessitate a certain course

t, Morris considers the relation of each of the three modes of signifcation to a particular dimension of nervous activity to be a "possible hypothesis": "This suggestion of course does not deny that in ail cases sorne other aspects of the organism are operative, and ~ince most slgns actually have welghts on ail three dimensions of signification, it doe~ not Imply that the interpretant of a sign is limited to one aspect of nervous activity and It~ related organic accompaniments. But it does suggest that the tridlmen~ionality of signification is reflected in a tridimensionality of mterpretants" (SS 7-8). In the above presentation 1 have also related the tridimensionality of the interpretant (described here 111 tenns of three aspects of nervous actlvity) to Morris' three personality components.

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of behaviour. The objective preferred might not be chosen if the behavlOurs reqUirect tOI

its attainrnent are negatively appraised by the dionysian wmponent. On the other hanct.

if the object preference is sufficiently strong. then in spite of negatlvely apprai~ed

behaviours, action might he undertaken for the sake of obtaining the deslred goal. The

following table illustrates the correlations between the personality component:-.. aSpt'Cl~

of nervous activity, and the modes of signification required in the pen.:eptual stage ot thl'

act.7

Table 5

Dimension of Personality Interpretant (& Correspondlng Action Dimensions of (Dispositton to Nervous Actlvlty) Reguirf3d Signification Respond by) Slgmflcatlons

Buddhistic Obtalning Designative Sense organs Stimulus properhes (sensory information nervous system)

Dionysian Selection of Appraislve Object Reinforcmg propertles (autonomic objects for preferences of the obJect nervous preferentlal system) behavlour

Promethean Action on Presenptlve Behavlour Act as Instrumental (somatlc abject by preferences or motar specifie nervous behavlour system)

The tenns presented under the colurnn called "significations" are taken hy MOITI\

from psychology and may require sorne explanation. The expression 'wmulus propertle~'

7Table 5 is similar to the one presented by Morris in SlgnifiwtlOn and SiKmflculI(,l' (SaS 8). A column correlating the three personality components with the corre~ponding neurological dimensions of the self has been added.

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refers to more than Just those characteristic~ of an abject that are directly observed. For

instance, the stimulus properties of the desk 1 am currently working at con~isb of more

th an those sensations that are Immediately pre~ented ta me in my visual field: for

in~tance, the underslde or backslde of the desk. Stimulus propenle~, therefore, refer to

a whole set of passibie stimulus properties that a particular obJect can provide under

different circumstances. Stimulus properties not only stirnulate the visual faculty, they

actlvate the olfactory, audltory and tactile faculues (SaS 8).

The "remfarcing property of an object" refers ta "the capacity of an abject ta

Increase the probability of the performance of response made to it" (SaS X). Here 1 do

not refer to stimulus propenies. The delectable smell of food is a stimulus propeny of

the abject. The remforcing propeny of the obJect being prepared IS the fact that it I~

"edible" Edibility as a pro pert y of the obJect might seem counterintuitive at first, for It

is rommonly believed that such qualities are properties that the sUtJject ascnbe~ to the

abject. For Morris, however, this view is mistaken. Rather, edibility is a propeny that

is "obJectively relative." The edlbility of the grass m the field, for instance, is a propeny

of the obJect relative to the cow who has a dIgestive system for which grass is food. H

An "l11strumental act" refers to an intermediary behaviour that serve~ as a way of

attaining a deslred abject-goal. Thus, the desire to have a pastry In my fridge involves

going to the kitchen, opening the fridge, and so forth. AlI the~e prehminary action~ are

instrumental for my di..;position ta eat the pastry (SaS 9).

As the abnve schema shows, the perceptual stage involves not only designative

uttcrance .. but also, at the same time, both appraisive and prescriptive utterances.

Dcslgnatlvc utterances g~nerated by the interpreter cali out the buddhistic dimension of

the self needed for gathering information. Accordingly, apprai~ive and prescriptive

signifIcations are generated ta evoke the dionysian and promethean persononality

cnmponent!-.. Thus, in the perceptual stage of the act, the buddhistic component,

XMorris chooses to use the expression "objective relativism" ta sig nif y this philosophical position. The terms 'perspectivism' or 'contextualism' can also be used (sec: OS 129-133). See also below chapter 4, #3 (n9).

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supported by designative significations, predominates. while at the sanR' tllne dlUnyslan

and promethean components of the self are evoked in the !'oervin.· of huddhl,lIl'

behaviours. This is also the case for the other two stages of al'tlOll. At tlll' m:llllplilatOl y

stage, the promethean component predominates. with the olher two dlllll'nslOl1!'o 01 the !'oelt

supporting promethean aCllvities. Fmally. at the consummatolY !'otage 01 the .I\:t. !loth the

promethean and the buddhistic components are subordinated to the tok of slIstallllll!!

dionysian actions. At no stage of the act. therefore. does one personality L'omponclll 01

ItS corresponding preferential behaviour operate In Isolation of the other two.

5 - SemiosÎs and Human Freedom

Choice and freedom are inextricably connected Wlth each other: "Ihe lI11portanl

usage of the term 'freedom' centers around the problem of chOice. A helllg I~ fret' III Ihls

sense to the degree that the course of hi~ life is selected from among Val iom, P()!'o:-.Î hie

alternatives; free action is then chosen actIOn" (MeF 5X2).

ln order to understand how slgns afford the posslbihty of free action, Mo" I!\ ret CI S

to "the hypothetical case of an animal that responds only to 'vhat Il Immediatcly come,

in contact with, so that it responds to nothing as a sign of something ebe" (Mel" 5X2)

Here is an example of Watsonian stimulus-response behavlour in which thc a III III a 1 doc.,

not see an obJect "at a distance or respond to any feature~ of It!\ irnmcdaate CnVI/Olllllcnt

as signs of what exists beyond thl!\ irnmedlate envlrcnment" (MeF 5X2) To the exll'nt

that such an animal's actions are ummpeded, the ammal ha!\ negatlve freedo/ll Altt.ough

it might be free to do as its impulses dictale, It i~ still at the Illert.y of "., own II11pU"e.,

and of its immediate environment. Such an ammall!\ not free 111 the pO'ltivc 'l'me of Ihe

term. An organism can be sald to have positive freedom only to Ihe dcgrec that Ih

actions are not solely a fum;tion of it~ Immediate envlronment.'1

'JMeF 5X3. - Morris doe~ Ilot u~e the terrm 'po!\itlve' and 'negatlve' when di!\t.U"~lIIg these two different meanings of freedom. The~e teflm have been added here 111 orcier to clarify the di~unction he make~ between these two type~ of frcedoll1. The concept of negatlve freedom signifies freedom from impedlment"i, wherea"i pO,ltlvC freccIom rder., to freedom for a chosen course of action. See Erich Fromm, E.\cape jrom Fft'NJom (New

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Positive freedom is possible only for those animais that can "perceive" objects at

di~tance. "Sud perception involves sign processes. in that sorne present cJue--a COlOT or

shape or sound or contact--is responded to in such a way as to take account of obJects

and their properties which are not in the immediate neighbOThood of the organism" (MeF

5X3). In thi~ way. the organism is able to make choices that are independent of its

Immediate environment. Positive "freedom," therefore, refers to "behavior directed by

signs" (McF 5X3).

According to Morris. it was Mead' s belief that freedom is

the unique prerogative of man, and that this humanly distinctive type of behavior was made possible t.hrough the appearance of spoken language. For ln ~peech with others and himself man is easily able to keep the sign operative II1dependent of the immediate environment; to bring before himself for consideration (by the interrelabonship of slgns) the consequt'nces of a mode of action; and to try out experimentally alternative modes of action by stimulating himself through various sign compounds. (MeF 5M)

Out of the human capacity to form symbols, the mental field emerges; and within this

field. freedom presents itself. But thls field "is not confined 1.0 the indlvidual. much less

located in a bra1l1. Sigmficance belongs to things in their re/ations to Îndividuals."lo

Within this intersubJective field emerges a repertoire of signs indicating various

alternatives and con~equence~ "The degree to which the organism is free in any situation

depends upon the symbolic repertoire that IS available for that situation" (SaR 76). The

glcater the ~ymbohc repertoire, the greater the freedorn. Lingmstic symbols greatly

IIlcrea~e this capaclty. for "not only IS the experience of the individual form avmlable but

potentJally the whole body of experience of those who share the language symbols" (SaR

77). With the event of language emerges a field of 1I1tersubJective symbols. But. at the

saille ume. the "meaning ~tructures" contained in the gesture provide the intersubjective

foundation necessary for the possibility of communication. This repertoire of

cOlllsymbob. therefore. is a complex set of relations; it also involves the functioning of

York: Holt. Rinehart and Wmston. 1lJ64) 32 .

lOG. H. Mead. "8ehaviouristic Account" 163. emphasis added.

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the biological individual. Contrary to the ivory-tower view. Ihe mind IS not Mll1ll'

receptacle in whieh things of a 'mental' charm:ter exist apart from Ihe human orgall1~m.

For Morris, such a view "ean have no place in a radical empmclsm" (SaR .t6) Mmd "1:0-

nothing apart from sorne organism: a disembodled mllld ... I~ a mythologilulcoIlCl'(Htoll"

(SaR 46).

So far, 1 have shown how semiosis affords the possiblltty of frl'edom. The Ilollon

of serniosis, however, raises the question of who is thlllktng and dlllo"mg l"tl't'Iy. FOI

Morris, this question "reveals the lingering assurnplion that there I~ ~01l1e psyducal tWlIlg

or entity which thinks or uses symbols" (SaR 42). Those who ask sm:h a quesllon ail' "not

satisfied with the reply that 'the passing thought is the thlllker'" (SaR 42), hccau<;c mOll'

often than not sueh persons consider thernselves 10 be substanttal entillc~ Ihal CXlst plll1l

to, and independently of, the contingencie~ of expenence. They say to Ihem~l'Ivt's: "1 am

not a series of experienees, but the person who has these eXpenCIll-es."" BUI If Ihell'

is no thinking and deliberating rnetaphysical subject, then what is involvcd in the proccss'!

Sorne contemporary philosophers have attempted to explain the proœ~s of Iret'

choice in terms of the structure of a person's ·will'. Harry Frankfurt, for cxampll',

defines freedom in terms of a person's "capacity for retlective scll-evaluatHHl Ihal I~

manifested in the form of second-order desires."l2 ThiS conceptton of ~c1fllOOd ha" het'Il

aptly called the "split-Ievel self."n Second-order desires are dividcd over and agaill~t

fust-order desires. with the 'true self' being equated wlth the ~econd-order de~lres of a

person 's critical self-refleetive faculties. Cenlral to thl~ theory i .. "the ahility to alter

one's preferences and to make them effective 111 one's action" and, indeed, tn make thcm

llOerek Parfit, Reasons and Per,\olls (Oxford: Oxford UniversIty Prc~s, 1 ()X(l) 221, emphasis added.

12H.O. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Pcrwl1," Thl' Import(/I/('(I

ofWhat We Care About: PhLlm.ophlcal E.\''\{ly.\ (Cambndge: Camhridge lJnlver\lty Prc~." 1998) 12.

13Marilyn A. Friedman. "Autonomy and the Split-Level Self," The SoutlU!rJI .IoUlllal of Philosophy 24 (19g6): 19-35.

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effective because one has reflected upon them and adopted them as one' s own."14

Person~ are free only if they have deliberated and then acted in accordance with their

deliberations. But the notion of a thinking subject deliberating among a hierarchy of

desires (first-order versus second-order desires) presupposes a metaphysical entity existing

behind and choosing among these preferences. This "split-Ievel" account of human

conduct is only a new form of classical metaphysics; il identifies the mental functioning

of the thinking subject in a domain distinct from, and prior 10, the impulses of the body.

Morris' total self-inclusive perspective rejects such an opposition. Mind is not a symbolic

prœess that operates independently of corporeal events in the world; on the contrary,

"melllality is the symbolic functioning of events. ,,15

Although human conduct involves reason, it is not sufficient to determine

preference. Rather, "understanding seems to weaken or extirpate a desire only by

showing the harmful effects of this desire upon sorne other desire, so that the control of

desire (as Spinoza and others realized) is ultimately by desire and not by understanding

alone" (PoL 51). These remarks recall Merleau-Ponty's adage that "in realiry the

deli/Jeratioll J()/Iows the decision."16 Decisions precede the reasoning process, because

preferences are the ultirnate arbitrators of our rational deliberations. As Morris states,

"Irleasoning airs preferences, holds before the self alternative possibilities of liking and

dislikmg, and in the process the self transforms itself and its allegiances" (OS 14). To the

extent that the self can symbolize its preferences, the self is transformed. This happen:;;

inasmuch as the self permits the addition of more preferences into the deliberating

process. In thlS way a larger and more dIverse self is created (MuS 75).

This transformation of the self requires a resolute desire to air the full spectrurn

of its preferences, because there are also persistently anti-rational forces at work within

l'Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge Ul1IvefSlty Press, 19XH) 15.

I~NM 237, emphasis added.

II>M. Merleau-Ponty. Phellomen%gy of Perception, trans. Collin Smith (New York: The Humanities Press, 1970) 435, emphasis added.

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the self. Again and again, the mighty force of self-possessiveness exen:ises its desire 10

take ho Id of the self. At a certain stage of the self's development. the self prefers to

protect what it has attained, and to hide from itself forces whirh it does not yet feel strong enough to handle. The person who has been able to build sorne fair image of himself hugs his fair image. He is loathe to admit to himself desires and thoughts and actions whirh would Jar with this bright vision. (OS 14-15)

Such people acknowledge only those preferences and ~ignifications that maxlIluze theu

"bright" image of themselves, white projecting all those traits they n~Ject about themselves

onto other persons. In doing so, they conceal from themselves the unpleasant truth about

themselves and avoid the unsettling process of the selfs reconstruction and enlargcl1lt'nt

(OS 15). Even if there is sufficient desire to do so, reason can air preferences and hold

them before the self only if it has a sufficient symbolic repenoire. 'This symbolic

repertoire is an intersubjective field of significations that are common to the members of

a particular society. This field constitutes the social self.

6 - "uman Freedom and the Social Self

The social self c:tn be examined in terms of the three dimensions of the

personality. Concomitant with the personality types are social personality types:

Buddhistic, Dionysian, Promethean, Apollonian, Christian, and Mohammedan. For

Morris, none of these social selves permits the full expression of ail dimensions of the

self; a society's ~ocial self is open inasmuch as it permits its constituent members to

express an components of the self. Like their corresponding personalities, the social

selves listed above are not completely open. Rather, they are ail c/osed to the ~xtent that

they do not tolerate the expression of certam personality components. In each wc lai self,

one personality component dominates over the other two. In the Chnstian social self, for

instance, the buddhistic persona lit y component dominates over the dionysian and

promethean components of the self. ln terms of stages of the act, the Christian social ~elf

is disposed towards the perceptual phase of action with less inclination towards the

consummatory phases of action, while having tittle tolerance for manipulatory behaviours

(see table 3).

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The three stages of the act, to the extent that they are govemed by signs, involve

three corresponding modes of signification (see table 4). Since a Christian society would

favour Christian behaviors, the social self qua symbolic repertoire would be open ta those

modes of signification that are required for the perceptual stages of action. To a lesser

extent it wouJd permit those modes of signification required for the consummatory stage.

while havmg Iittle tolerance for those significations that calI out the manipulatory stage

of actIOn. Therefore. the symbolic repertoire available to persons in a Christian society

wouJd be predominantly designative, with fewer appraisive significations, and relatively

few prescnptive significatIOns.

Such a symbolic repertoire would be sufficienf for those inclined to Christian

behaviours; relative to this repertoire, people wouJd be free in both the negative and

positive senses of the term. Not only is the intersubjcctive field available to them open

to their behaviours, but also, because it supplies the significations necessary for their

behaviors, it provides the means by which they can realize their personalities. But other

personalities extant in this same society would remain suppressed. People who are

strongly mesomorphic (solTIatotonÏcs), for instance, would have a natural tendency

towards promethean actions. Still, because promethean actions require prescriptive

significations. mesomorphic persons would be denied the means by which to realize the

preferences inherent in their biologlcaJ dispositIOns.

If "sameness of meaning" is in part contingent upon sameness of biological

temperaments (such as instmctually based commonalities), a society that is closed to

certain temperaments is also dosed to those "same meanings" that are possible between

persons who share similar biologlcal dispositIOns. Consequently, Prometheans in a

Christian society wouJd share "sameness of meaning" with other persons only to the

extent that their le:,s dommant dionysian and buddhistic temperaments offered a field of

intersubJective sigmfIcations. MOITIS' schema of personality types (sec table 1) shows

that Chlistians and Prometheans ~hare similar dionyslUn tendencÏes. This suggests that the

relative number of appraisive significations required by each personality type would be

~imilar. Via thlS personality component. Promethean personalities in a Christian society,

or vice versa. would find the maJority of sinûlar meanings. Such a society would be

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lacking in intersubjective meanings arising from promethean dispositions. Consequ~ntl y.

Christians would not understand what ü: essential to the biologieal Idenltty of

Prometheans. But insofar as these Prometheans lacked the significations ne~essary for

expressing their naturaI preferences. they would be unable to understand themselve~.

Consequently, in a Christian society, Prometheans would be alienated not only from other

people that constitute their society, but also from their biological inhentance.

7· The Primary Forms of l'iscourse

Morris defines discourse as "a specialization of language for the better

accomplishment of sorne specifie purpose" (ScAT 242). The expression "primary torm ..

of discourse" refers to speciaIizations of language that are needed for achievmg speClfl~

purposes that are basic to all human undertakings. The three primary forms of dis(Our~e

are scientific, technological, and aesthetic. Ali other forms of discourse l:olllmonly u~cd

to distinguish other human activities--such as poetie, mathematical, reltglOus,

metaphysical, political or philosophieal--are funetions of these three bask fonn~ (ScAT

245). In turn, the three primary forms of discourse are functions of the three dimensions

of serniosis:

scientific discourse brings into prominence the relation of signs to obJects denoted (the semantical dimension), esthetic dlscourse accents m a distinctive way the sign structure itself (the syntactlcal dimenSion), technological discourse emphasizes the efficacy of the signs III the practicc of the users (the pragmatical dimension). The theory of discourse is thus one of development of the general theory of signs .... (ScAT 245n2)

Morris' the ory of discourse, however, i'\ related not only to hi~ ~emiotic; il lall

also be related to his three preferentIal behaviours and the correspondmg mode~ of

signification.

Table 6

DimenSions of Semlosis Preferentlal Behavlours Modes of Signification Forms of Discourse

syntactical semantical pragmatical

detachment domination dependence

designative prescriptive appraisive

aesthetic scientific technological

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Scientitïc discourse is directed towards the verification and reliability of predictive

statements in terms of empirical evidence. ft is primarily concerned with relation of signs

to their obJects (semantics). SCIence answers to the human "need to be able to de termine

corre<.:tly his expe<.:tations, and hence his activity, in terms of the evidence which lies at

hand" (ScAT 243). This need correspond~; to the promethean component of the self that

tends toward controlling the environment and requires prescriptive significations to do so.

Scientific discourse, therefore, is the specialization of language aimed at producing

rehable prescriptions for human behaviour.

Technological discourse is concerned with inducing a mode of action (ScAT 246).

This involves determining the efficacy of specifie signs in relation to their interpreters or

users (pragmatics). Technological discourse is aimed at neither prescribing nor

designaung new preferential behaviours; its field for presentation is a repertoire of

predominantly appraisive significations already established within society. According to

Morris, "it has an irreducible rhetorical or imperative component" (ScAT 246).

Imperatives such as 'ought' or 'should or 'do' and 'do not' are its characteristic features

(ScAT 246). Such imperatives have authority, ta the degree that the actions they produce

are approved by those to whom they are addressed.

Technological discourse IS common ta the religious prophet, the politician or the

moralist. As history shows. these types of persans have used technological discourse for

either beneficial or unscrupulous purposes. Through their imperatives, they induce people

to action for good or ill by appealing to habits of behaviour that already have social

approval.

Aesthetic discourse is concerned with the designation and presentation for direct

inspection of a whole realm of both positively and negatively appraised ways of

orientatlOn. 17 The preferential behaviours expressed by a work of art are embodied

wllhin the sign vehicle itself. Aesthetics is lia specialized type of language which is the

171n Varieties of Human Value, Morris presents an empirical study of twenty paintings as "a non-verbal source of data serving as a check on the results gained from the verbally formulated 'Ways to Live'" (VHV 144-162).

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actual work of art (the poem, the painting, the music); the term does not rerer to

discourse about art, unless, indeed, this discourse is itself esthetic rather than scientitk

or technological" (ScAT 244). Unlike scientlfic or technological (iIscourse, acsthdll'

discourse is not concerned primarily with either the semantlc or the pragmatic dimensions

of semiosis. Rather, it "accents in a distinctive way the sign structure Itself" (syntactlcs)

(ScAT 243n2).

"That art is a language, that the work of art is a slgn, IS the ba~lc doctnne of

estheticians from Plato to Dewey" (ScAT 244). As Morris points out, the terl11 '1I1l1tatlOn'

originally referred to more than just the lIteraI reproduction of ~xlst\l1g ohJcct'\. For

example,

Aristotle speaks of the imitation of what IS or what men thlllk what ought to he ... ; to affirm that the work of art was an imitatIOn was to aftirm that It was a sign, and, indeed, a sign ofa specifie character: an imagc or Icon 'lll1ltatlng' what is designated by embodymg in itself the characters of any obJcct the slgn could be said to denote. (Sc A T 244)

Morris suggests that Anstotle's POe/Îcs can be mterpretcd "a~ a trcatbe 111 c\thctlcs

written from the standpoint of the theOlY of SI6I1S" (ScAT 244).

Although a work of art involves the communication of preferentlal bchavlours, III

18"Art is the language for the communication of values" (ScAT 245). By the terlll 'value', Morris refers to the three primary forms of preferential behaVlOlIr: dcpcndclIcc, dominance, and detachment ~SaS 21-22). He pOints out that the problcll1l) wllh the "term 'meaning' in semlotlc are paralleled by those wlth the tcrm 'value' in aXlology" (SaS 1 h). 1 argued III section 3.1 of chapter two tllat Morris aVOld\ u<;lIlg the tcrm 'meanl/lg' III

developlIlg hls theory of slgns. Thl~ IS becau~e 'mcanll1g' 1 ~ a tcrm to hc c1antïed wlthlll semlOtics ltself (FoTS 44). By the ~ame argument, the meanlllg of the terl1l 'valuc' 1\ to be clarified withlll axiology. Even thollgh Morns finds the term 'value' 10 hc vague and ambiguous, he still contlllues to use It III developlIlg hl~ aXlOlogy and hic, thcory of aesthetics. But ifaxiology involves the clanficatlon of the term 'value', thcn 111 ordcr 10

avoid confusion, it seems wise not to use thl~ term cither. For thc~e rCélmnc" 1 aVOId tht.: term 'value' whenever pmsible and ~peak of 'prcferentlal behavlour,' ,p, a ha\lc dimensIon of Morns' aXlOlogy. Per~om may cxhIl11t ncgatlve or pO"ltlVC prefercntml behaviours. PositIve preferentlal behavIOur referc., 10 the way Itldlvlduah bchave toward\ an object or SItuatIOn slIch tllat tlley attempt "to mallltalll the pre\cncc of thlc, ohJcct or situation, or to construct tills obJect or ~Ituatlon If It I~ not prc~cllt" (SaS 16). In contrac,t, persons exhlblt negative preferentlal behavlOur~ whcll tlley "~eck to move away from t/m object or sItuation, or to destroy or prevent the occurrence of thl\ obJcct or ~Ituallon"

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it is not a statement but an icon. 19 In other words, aesthetic discourse is not a language

that talks about preferential behaviours; the latter are embodled within the work of art

itself: "in the apprehension of the iconic sign there is both a mediated and an Immediate

taking account of certain propertles. ,,20

As is the case with the three dimensions of semiosis, the three primary forms of

discourse require the slmultaneous presence of each other. There is no exc1usively

scientific, technological, or aesthetic discourse. Wh en directed towards a householder,

for instance, the sClentific statement that the combination of bleach and ammonia results

in the production of tOXIC chlorine gas, Implies the technological imperative: do not mix

these two products. Because sClentists are allTIlng to reahze the ends of science, theyare

also technologists; in order to do so, they must develop and control techniques

appropriate to this goal: "If sCIence provides the basis for the control of technological

discourse, it IS also true that the development of science is inseparable from the

development of technology" (ScAT 247). By the same token, aesthetic discourse is also

to sorne degree IIlvolved in scientific discourse. The direction a scientific study takes is

generally intluenced by the preferential behaviours of the scientists involved: "it is clear

that the direction of sCience IS in a general sense detenmned by what values men at the

time hold, and that SCIence provides the basis for the control of all techniques, since the

(SaS 16-17).

l'lThe term 'icon' as it IS used here by Morris is akin ta Charles Sanders Peirce's defimtion: "an [COli is a sign which would possess the character whlch renders it slgniticant. evrn though ItS obJect had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a geometncallme" (Charles Sanders Peirce, "Loglc as Semlotic: The Theory of Signs." The Philo.\Ophy of Peirce: Selecred Wmif/gs [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956] 104).

2°ETS 137. - ln a work of art the sign-vehicle is one of its denotata (ETS 137). In Signffimfioll and Sigl1(tical/ce (1964) Morris writes: "The aesthetic perception of ... [an art] objeCl may be charactenstically different from other fonns of perception. But this IS another problem. and 1 no longer feel that its solutIOn is alded by saying that ail iconic signs denot~ themselves. It seems senl10tically neater to say that aIl signs signify but that no sign necessanly denotes" (SaS 69).

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detennination of whether a given procedure does or does not reach a œrtain goal is a

scientific question Il (ScAT 245).

8 - Paths of Life and the Variety of Religious Discourse

The three preferential behaviours of detachment. dominance and depel1cknœ

correspond to the buddhistic, promethean and dlOnysian personality componcnts. In cach

of the personality types, apart from the Maltreyan, one preferential bchavlour dOlllmatcs

over the other two. Each of the three preferential behaviours favours one of tilt' tltrce

primary forms of discourse. Consequently, each personahty type has a plcdllcctlon Ilot

only towards the primary types of behaviour. but also towards the prumu y tor111!'> of

discourse. The primary forms of discourse are specIalized languages needcd fOi

undertaking certain cultural activities.

Each path of life corresponds to a particular personality type that has a partlcul:lI

set of preferences for certain types of behaviour that manifest themselves in specifie

forms of cultural activity. The expression 'religlOus discourse,' therefore. rcfcls 10 a

secondary form of discourse that prïoritizes the primary forms of dlscourse in accordancc

with the behavlOur preferences that constitute a particular path of life. In other wOHb.

each path of life can be characterized in terms of its preferences nol only towarcb the

primary modes of behaviour (detachment, dommance and dependencc>, but abo towards

the primary forms of discourse (aesthetic, scientific, and technologKal). Ju!'>t a!'> the

distinctive feature of the particular religious path does lies not in the iJare plcdollllnancc

of one preferential behaviour, but in its predommance in relation to the other two, SO, too,

does the distmctive feature of a religious dis<.;Ourse lie not in the bare predominance of

one type of primary discourse. The distinctive feature of each IS to be lound III the

predominance of one primary form of dlscourse in relation to the other two. Each of the

primary forms of cultural activlty reqUires a corre~ponding form of di~c()ur..,c .

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Table 7: The Hierarchical Structure of Religious Discourses

rriiJ [1Q Q1 J1J gJJ ~ . Buddhlst Dlonysian Promethean Apollonlan Chnstlan Mohammedan

~ Maltreyan

A = aesthetic T =technological 5 = scientific

Dominant Technological Discourses Dominant Scientitic Discourses Dominant Aesthetic Discourses

Dionysian Mohammedan

Promethean Apollonian

Chnstlan Buddhlst

This table also has implications for understanding the nature of the social self as

an intersubjective field of significations that are common to aIl members of a particular

society. This intersubjective field of significations can he described in tenns of the

secondary forms of discourse. The three primary discourses mentIOned above are

speciahzations of languages required for three primary forms of cultural activities: art,

science. and technology. The deterrnÏnanon of the predominant forrns of pnmary

dlscour!'>e~ in a particular society provides a clue to the nature of the social self not only

in terms of preferential behaviours but also in terms of predilections towards certain types

of cultural actIvities. ln a society with a Christian social self. a Christian type of

dlscour~e predommates. As suggested by table 7, the ChristIan social self would favour

artlstic endeavours. while also having a strong interest in technological behavlOurs; but.

at the ~ame ume. it would have little tolerance for scientific actIvities. Since each of

these pnmary activilles and correspondmg discourses emphasize a specific dimension of

semlOSlS. a linguisllc analysls of the Chnstian social self would accent the syntactical. and

to a lesser extent the pragmatical dimensions of serniosis; but the semantical dimension

would not be emphaslzed. ZI

21 Metaphyslcians. logicians and mathematicians stress the syntactical dimension of semlOSlS. Language as it is often used by journalists. salespersons and politicians

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Chnstian forms of diseourse serve Chnstian personahties well. But those who dn

not have a Christian personality would not be so fOltunate. Prometht'an pl'r"nn.\lttll'" ,Ill'

disposed to those actlVlties that are dlrel.:ted by sl'Ïl'nttfk fortll~ l)f di~l'Ollr~l'. But III ,1

Christian sOI.:lety "dentifie forrns of (i!sl.:ourse would bl' dlsll1ll1.lgt'd Lack mg \lll'llIIlll

forms of discourse, they would have no mt'an~ by wl\lch to .\rtIl'UI.Hl', lkvdup III

undertake those activlues that are Lharacteri"til.: of their per\Onalldl's. A~ thl\ l".lmpk

shows, the dominance of a speCifie form of di"cour~e withtn .\ \out'ty ha~ .\ double l'lied

upon those whom it suppresses Not only do thelr lIlherent pott'I1Utthties and lh\Pll~lth)Jl"

not accord with those sanctioned by thelr community, hut alsn they do not have .\

discourse suitable for addressing their own needs and pllrpo~es.

9 - The Body as the Locus of the Sacred

Echoing the philosophy of Nietzsche, Morris \peaks of a Western (nllspiracy

against the body.2Z Throughout the two thollsand years nf Western hl~tory "we have

deprecated, ignored, slandered our bodies. Our rehgion~ have been reltgion~ WIth hodIlcs',

souls and our psychologies have been p.,ychologtes of bodiles~ mmds. Wc have tncd \0

aet as dlsembodled men and we have paId the penalty .... " (OS 30). Indeed, wc have

19nored the most valuable part of ourse Ives. Over against the .. olial self, the "me", 1" the

biologie al individual. the "{". As Mead says, the "1" "is that whlch distmgU\she~ ... 1 the

indlvlduall from anybody else, makes him what he is. ft is the most prcclOlis part ot

emphasizes the pragmatical dimen~ion, whereas language used by scienti ... ts emphasizes the semantical dimension.

22Although highly eritical of Nietzsche'" Dionyslanism, MOlTls pral~e... lm psychological in'iights: "Psychologically, Nietzsche still has much to tell u~ ln "plte ot the developments which have smce taken plar.,e in dynamic psychology. The ment of hl'\ analysls is the biologieally reali~tic way in which he deals with the actual force .. at work In the human personality, forces whlch prevaJlmg Ideologle~ had largely Ignored. JlI~

work II) a remarkable contrIbution to the p"ychology of mdlvldual dlfferencc~ ... Nietzsche' s analysis in thi.., domain has diJe<.:ted attention ta the ba."lc p ... yr.,hologl<.:al cores ot nval ways of life, cuttmg to the es"entlal'i through the f>ll1:"e of devlcco.; by whi<.:h fundamental attitudes c1othe--and often disguio.;e--them~elves 1 (N 2(~9-290).

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ourselves."23 Likewise, for Morris, "the body is the core of the self and must be enlisted

in its construction" (OS 31).

The body (the "1") is sacred because it is the aspect of ourselves that i!\

irreducible. It is, therefore, also the source of our dignity. We cannot be It.'placed.

Nevertheless, because we have failed to listen to our bodies when forming our prcferencl's

and life choices, man y of us have sought ways of orientation that are incompatible wilh

our personal temperaments. Ta the extent that we ::ave done thi~, we have forfeited our

unique inheritance.

Our unique inheritance is not something we have; the body IS Ihat whu.:h Wt.'

fundamentally are. As Gabriel Marcel points out,

My body is my body just in sa far as 1 do Ilot consider it in this detached fashion, do not put a gap between myself and il. To put this poml in another way, my body is mine in so far as for me my body IS not an object but, rather, 1 am my body. Certainly, the meaning of 'am' in that sentence is, at first glance, obscure; it is essentially, perhaps, in its implications, a negative meaning. To say that 1 am my body is not to negate, to deny, to erase that gap which, on the other hand, 1 would be postulating as soon as 1 asserted my body was merely an instrument. And we must notice at this point that if 1 do postulate such a gap, 1 am at once in an infinite regress .... If, then, we think of the body as merely an instrument, we must think of the powers of sorne othe,. body (a mental body, an astral body, or what you will); but this mental or astral body must itself be the instrument that extends the powers of sorne thlrd kmd of body, and so on for ever.... We can avoid this infinite regress, but only on one condition: we must say that this body, which, by ;1 fiction modelled on the instruments that ex tend its powers of action, IS nevertheless, in so far as it h my body, not an instrument at ail. Speaklllg of my body is, in a certain sense, a way of speaking of myself; Il plal.c!\ me at a point where either 1 have not yet reached the lIl-;trumental relationship or 1 have passed beyond it. 24

Marcel's comments stress the importance of grasping the radicalness of the body In

relation to our sense of self. The daim being made here has also becn argued by Martin

230. H. Mead, Mind, Self 324.

ZAGabriel Marcel, Rejlection & Mystery, vol. 1 of The Mystery of Bein!t, 2 vols., trans . O. S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1960) 123.

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Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and more recently Charle'i Taylor. Like Marcel, they

maintain "that our manner of being as subjects is in essential respects that of embodied

agents. It is a claim about the nalUre of our experience and thought, and of aIl those

functions which are ours qua subject .... To say we are essentially embodled agents it

[sic] to say that it is essential to our experience and thought that they be [hose of

embodied beings. 112~

The same argument is implicit in Morris' own understanding of the human agent

as a user of signs. Indeed, his stress on the behaviouristic definition of a sign as the

interpreter's dispositIon to respond is a way of radically grounding the mind qua sign

functionmg In the human body. Wh en Morris remarks that "10 pnler is more than to

rlJa.wn"(OS 15), he stresses the urgencies and impulsions of the body for whlch sign

processes are a function of the body's intended consummations. When he asserts that the

body "is not impelled and not drawn to action" (1 31), he daims that icieas do not Impel

the body; on the contrary, the body moves of its own accord guided by the signs it

generates for ils own goals and purposes. In this respect, the impulses of the body (the

"I") precede the self's conscious deliberations. 26 By focussing on the role of the body

(the "I") in governing the conduct of individual behaviours, Morris does not glve priority

to the "I" over agamst the "me." On the contrary, the conduct of individuals is

influenced as weIl by the set of intersubjective significations that are made available by

the social self. In turn, the body's impulses are constrained or liberated depending on the

significations that are available via the social self.

2.'iCharles Taylor, "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments," Proceedings of the Aristotelial1 Society 79 (1978-79): 153.

2t'This viewpoint is consistant with Mead, who repeatedly claims that although we can know ourselves from the point of vlew of our social selves (the "me"), the response of the "1" cannot be known in advance: "The 'l' as a response to the situation, in contrast to the 'me' which IS involved in the attitudes ... [the individual] takes, is uncertain. And when the response takes place, th en it appears in the field of experience largely as a memory Image" (G. H. Mead, MII/d. Self 176).

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Through the social process the biologÎl.:al self is transformed into a sodal hemg.

When this happens, the selfs ideals are

now not merely expressIOns of what it is but what it wishes to be. Its very ideas of it'ielf are now coloured by ideals. lts urgendes are no longer merely animal needs but animal needs socially transformed and liol:ially viewed. The body is still therf', always there. but It has been dressed in social cIothes. It looks at itself in a social rmrror. It approvcIi or disapproves of itself through sOl:lal eyes. (OS 4X)

What people want, therefore, lOis not merely the satisfal:tion of deslres. but soclally

approved desires satisfied in socially approved ways" (OS 47). Indeed. Lili MOITis pOllltS

out,

[i]t was inevitable that Mead should even give the concept of salvation LI

social turn: the self, made possible by society, can envisage the outlines of a sncial orde!' more congenial to its complex nature than the society in which it finds itself. The need for salvation ... (wntes Meadl is not the need for 'the salvation of the indivldual but the salv<.t.Îon of the self as a social being .... The demand for salvation, where it has swept over mankind as a whole, has gone along with the necessity of great social change. '" (PoL 22)

The extent ta which the religious need arises within people depend~ on the disjunction

between their deeply rooted preferences and the preferenœs of the social selves they have

adopted in becoming selves. When people cannot realize their bodily impulses ln a way

that is socially approved, their social relatIOns become obstacles to their self-making.

There is another important reason why Morris focuses on the body. As we have

seen, freedom is in part dependent on the discovery of stabilities. If the world were

complete chaos in which no stabilities could be foul/d, then there would be no language.

Sign functioning is possible just because certain events in the world are predictable. For

example. because the alterations of most obJects in every day life follow predk:table

cause-effect sequences, lt is possible to slgmfy certam expectations (effects) when certain

events occur. Signs can then become a rehable indicator of objects perceived at a

distance, and as 1 have argued ahove, po~itive freedom is possible only to the extent that

our significations enable us to make reliable predictions.

For Morris, self-knowledge about our physkal temperaments is important because

it offers knowledge about the dimension of ourselves that is relatively stable. To be sure,

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89

sickncss and accidents may radically alter our biological temperaments, but the process

of aging usually bring~ about only graduaI t.:hanges in our physical constitutions. Our

personalities do not consist Just of the primary impulses generated by the body; there are

also the de~ires created by a level of the persona!ity that is much more complex.

Followmg Erich Fromm, Morris calls this dimension of the self "character." The term

'charactel' refers to those "[elatively stable patterns of motivations and behavior which

a per'ion assu l1es in the course of a life-history in the physical and social world" (OS

135). While recognizing that certain types of physiques are more inclined to develop into

certain types of character, "the connection is looser, more complex, more capricious.

Temperament as the style of the body's reaction remains close to the body. Character as

an affair of life-history is more variable. Temperament is a resource, character an

eventuation" (OS 135-136).

Central to the religious quest is the question of what type of "character" we choose

to become in our quest for orientation within the world. In our search for an orientation

of our who/e self, it is wisdom to look to our own resources: for Just as it is true that

œrtain characters can develop more easily from certain types of physiques, it is also the

case that certain temperaments can frustrate or make impossible the realization of certain

personality types. To seek the integration of our who le being, therefore, we must take

into account our bodily dispositions.

10 • The Body and Authentic Existence

According to Morris, society no longer has "a dominant and pervasive center of

Integration" arourd which it can unify itself. The social self has become a "babel" of

voices, and as a consequence men and women are being pulled in a myriad of directions.

The "post-modern" social self is a pastiche of many paths that offers no specifie direction;

the more fragmented the social self becomes, the more fragmenteu individual selves

become. In such a social milieu people are thrown back upon themselves as centres. As

1 have shown, Morris argues that this centre is to be found within the body. Here, people

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l)()

can find their own organic structure, an "existential fulcrum.'m as it were, on Whldl 10

un if y and integrate their whole personalities.

Implicit in Morris' emphasis on knowledge of one's own body is a conccpl nt

authenticity. This involves becoming that which, to some degree, wc already me We

become authentic by realizing those inherent potentialiues, or re~oun:e:-., that are 1I1llque

to our own biological temperaments: "It IS the heart of wisdom to go along the hm', nt

your deepest inclillations and strongest aptitudes. ta remain true to your hllman pOlenllal"

(OS 94). At stake here is a way of bemg-in-the-world that cvokes the alleglallLl' ot ail

dimensions of the individual. To this extent, Morris' conceptIon of thl' rellgiolls que:-.t

has sorne affinity with Paul Tillich 's understanding of faith a~ ultll1latt' COllce"l.

According to Tillich.

ultimate concem is an act of the total personality. It happens in the œntel of the personal life and include.s aIl its elements. Faith is the most centered aet of the human mind. It is not a movement of a speCial ~eetlon or a special function of man' s total being. They are united in the ,:et of faith.... Since faith is an act of the personülity as a whole. it partH.:ipates in the dynamics of personallife. These dynamics have been described 111

many ways, especially in the recent developments of analytiL psychology.28

From this perspective, Morris' understanding of the rehgious quest ean be vlewed as the

individual's search for an ultimate concern around which to centre and onent the entire

personality .

For Morris, the religious quest as an act of faith involves not only the ~ean.:h for

orientation of the whole self but also "a mode of practlce no uri shed by an aUitude, an

attitude of direction, the glvmg of ail of oneself in a conMant aet toward an m'>lstent

visioned perfection" (1 28). In semiotie terms, thls "inSistent vj~ioned perfet..tion" IS an

ideal. "An Ideal is a lure: an idea of somethmg whlch the person who has the idea ~eeks

to realize, to attain, to hold in being, or to bring mto bemg" (OS 34). A religlOus ideal,

therefore, is an idea (a set of intersubJective signification~). It eorre:-.pond-; to those

27G. Marcel, Reflections & Mystery 95- 1 26 .

28p. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper, 1957) 4.

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per~onality Ideab that indivlduals \eek to realize through an aet of their whole being. For

a religious ideal ta be an effecti ve "Iure," however, it mUSt at the very least offer a set

of intcrsubjectlve signification.;; that calI out al! the eorresponding dimensions of their

interpreter<;.

Now, for Morris, the human agent "is a being that continually remakes himself,

the ... elf-maker, the artisan that makes himself the material for his own creation" (OS 23-

24). If we are artisans who make ourselves the matenal for our own creation, then it

hecomes imperative to understand the medium out of which we are made. As 1 have

shown, the social self is not necessarily pro\'lding us with an authentic symbol by which

10 direct our moral imaginations in our acts of self-creation. In a world without a

dominant and pervasive centre, it lS now, more than ever, necessary for us ta listen ta

ourse Ives for guidance. This type of listening requires a momentary silencing of the

social self (the "me"), in arder to hear the call from that which is unique to ourselves, the

body, the "1." Listening to our bodies is quite difficult indeed for it requires

dbtinguishing the desires of the social self (the "me") from the deeper impulses of our

personal temperaments (the "1"). Recause the self that we are most aware of is the

consequenœ of an ongoing reaction between the "1" and the "me," our authentic

preferences are by no means self-evident.

Discovering those preferences that are most genuine to ourselves involves what

Charles Taylor calls "radical re-evaluatIon". According to him, a radical re-evaluation is

"not Just a condition of articulacy about preferences, but also about the quality of life, the

kinds of beings we are or want to be. It is in this sense deeper."29 These evaluations

con~;titute the horizon and foundation of other evaluations. As Taylor points out,

"precisely these deepest evaluations are the ones which are least clear, least articulated,

1110st clearly subJeet ta illusion and distortion. It is these which are closest to what [ am

as a subje\.:t, in the sense that shorn of them 1 would break down as a person, which are

~9Chnrles Taylor, "What is Human Agency?" in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 26.

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among the hardest for me to be clear. "30 The process of radical re-evaluatlOn. therefore.

is not to be confused with the type of questioning lhat is involved. say. when a pelson

asks whether or not a specifie sort of action is honest; in this instanœ. the meaning of the

term 'honest' is accepted without fur th cr question. 11 On the contmry. says Taylor.

radical re-evaluations, by defjnition the most basIc tenns. those in whieh other evaluations are carried on, are precisely what is 111 question. lt I~

just because aIl formulations are potentially under sllspidon of distOi tmg their objects that we have to see themaIl as revisable. thut we are forœd back, as it were, to the illarticulate Iimit fram whic/z they originl1tt' \2

Taylor does not have an adequately developed semiotics to descnbe thi~ proccss

of radical questioning in terms of sign processes. Stated in semiotH': tellllS. radie.ll le­

evaluation involves an attempt to determine significations that accord wlth thnse

fundamental dispositions that are rooted in the body and are essentlal to our very sellse

of self. These dispositions form the "inarticuiate li mit " of ourselves Just because they

belong to the non-linguistic realm (e.g. human bchaviours) without whid OlJr

corresponding depth-significations would have no meaning whatsoever.

Many of us have pursued a path of life, but unfortunate\y have not taken mto

account our bodily dispositions. ft is no wonder, then, that many of u:-. are strUl:k with

a sense of meaninglessness. People' s lives are not meaningless me!'ely because they do

30e. Taylor 40.

31e. Taylor 40 .

ne. Taylor 40, emphasis added.

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93

not have an adequate semantic and syntactic understanding of their language. ThelI lives

are meaningless inasmuch as the intersubJective significations that they possess do not

evoke a response in the deepest and most precious part of themselves: the "1. ",'

llA method for discovering the structure of one's bodily temperament might be devt!loped by combining Morris' typology with the method of "focusing" put forward by Eugene Gendlin. To help his patients unlock the wisdom of their bodies, Gendlin asks them to 'fish' with words. Instead of trying to name the inchoate feelings that have been disturbmg them, Gendlin has his patients experiment with a variety of words until one of them evokes a response that identifies their "feh sense". Gendlin caUs this finding a "handle." Once they have established a "handle," the word can be used to help them t'oeus on the original feeling. By doing sa, further expressions are generated. In this way, the "felt sense" becomes more aIticulate and is transformed in the process (Eugene Gendlin, FOCllSÎll1-: [Toronto: Bantam Books, 1981] 51-64).

If the words and phrases obtained through "focusing" could be analyzed and identifled in terrns of Morris' threc modes of signification, a typology of the interpreter could be established. If the terms generated by an individual were predominantly prescriptive, for instance, this would indicate a high promethean disposition; if the individual's set of depth-significations were predominant!y appraisive, this would suggest a strong dionysian component.

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IV

The Maitreyan Path as Self-Overcoming Via Positiva

The emerging friend in mail struggle.\ to tilt' dt'ath agaiflst posseS.\1Veness. (1 54)

1 - Semiosis and Temporality

94

As we have seen, Morris identifies the human mind with the funl:tionmg of slgns

(FTS 1). Consciousness is a sign process that takes place ln time. but the çonneçtioll

between consciousness and time is more radical than this. In his first Critique. Immanuel

Kant argues that time and I:onsciousness are mextncably connected; without

consciousness there is no time, and without time there is no l:onsl:iousness. 1 Stated in

semiotic terms, this means that without the symbolic fum:tioning of events there would

be no awareness of time whatsoever (and viœ versa).

As Morris points out, mind qua semiosis lifts the individual "beyond the narrow

limits of his immediate existence" (PL 17). Through the use of signs, the human being

"extends the boundaries of his present world and lives in the light of things that have

been, things distant from him, and things that may come in the future ... It has made of

life and death insistent presences" (PL 17).

The search for the orientation of the self arises out of a heightened awareness of

the effects of time: "the religious quest has often been the search prompted by death for

a stable object of love; and the universality of this quest has made it possible for

particular religions to persist through diverse social <.:hanges" (PL 19). Underlying this

search for a "stable obJect of love," IS a desire to escape the human predÏ<.:ament. At

llmmanuel. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (London: MacMillan, 1983), § A 362, p. 341. - Commentmg on this passage, Genevieve Lloyd says: "Kant daimed in the eighteenth century that it is no more true to daim that consciousness is in time, than rime is in it, and that indeed it cornes to the same thing .... He was claiming that we cannot think conscÏousness without thinking time, or time without thinking consciousness--that if we take away the thought of <.:onsciousness, time also vanishes" (Genevieve Lloyd, Being in Time: Selve:, and narrators in phi/osophy and literature [London & New York: Routledge, 1993J 2).

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level, people are aware of their inevitable dissolution, and their response ta this

knowledge expresses itself in their at.:tions.

As the dynamic model shows, each personality type exhibits a particular reluctance

to move freely through the epicycJe of human action. For instance, Buddhist personalitles

prefer the detached, perceptual stage of the act. Consequently, the y move through the

mampulatory and consummatory stages with increasing reluctance. Once the process is

completed, they qüickly return ta a detached mode of orientation. In the same way, al!

the basic personality types attempt to resist the processual nature of their existence.

Ac<.:ording to Martin Heidegger, the structure of authentic existence as "care"

(Sor1(e) involves the simultaneous presence of ail three dimensions of time. 2 This

understanding of lime stands against the inauthentic view that considers rime to be an

infinite series of 'nows', discrete units that are perpetually moving in a linear progressIOn

from pa st and present to future. Because the notions of '''future', 'past" and 'Present'

have first arisen in terms of the inauthentic way of understanding time," in using these

concepts we have to guard against the tendency to think of time inauthenticaUy.3 10

help avoid this, Heidegger deveIops a new terminology: pas t, future, and present are

expressed in relational terms; he refers to the authentic self as a mao'ix of being a[ready

1/1, ahead of it.w/f. and amidst.4

Heidegger's insight offers a clue to understanding Morris' own account of

temporahty pr~supposed in his theory of religious behaviour. Like Heidegger, Morris is

very mueh aware of the "agony" of the human predk:ament: the inescapable and forward

movement in ume towards death. Although he does not explicitly dlSCUSS the structure

of time in relatIOn to his triadic tneory of the self, the tridimensional structure of human

2Morns coneurs: "To be wise is ta admit into this our fair present both pastness and futurity, that we may in our present widely be" (1 25).

'Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) 374.

""The being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-aIready-in-(the world) as being­amidst (entities encountered within-the-world). This being fiUs in the significance of the term "mre" ... [authentic existence] .... " (M. Heidegger, Being and Time 237).

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time is implicit in Morris' interpretation of Mead's three stages of the act. T"blt- x. presented below, correlates the tnadic structure of time wlth the stage" of the a\.'t.

preferential behaviours, modal categories of eXlstence,~ and dllnen!'>ioll~ of sernWSI\

Table 8

Tempofahtv Stages of the Act Preferential Behavlours Modahties Dimensions of Semiosis

PAST Perceptual PRESENT Manipulatory FUTURE Consummatory

Detachment Dominance Dependence

Necess!ty Actuality Possibility

Syntactlcs Semantlcs Pragmatlcs

The perceptual stage involves deliberatlOn. The determination of a partlcular

course of action depends on knowledgc gained from previous expenences Therefore, Jt

the perceptual stage, the past dimenSIOn of the self is emphasized. Past expericl1l;e~ are

related to present actualities in order to determine future posslbilitie~ Morcovcr, the

deliberation process is possible because the sign-sequences that form the self\ 11I~tory

have a loglcal or material necessity. What has happened in cur live~ cannot be unc!one.

Because the interrelationship of these sign events have a determlm~te structure, wc Lan

imaginatively predict the future consequences of a wide variety of actIOn.... The pa~t

dimension of the self stresses the syntactical dimension of semlOSlS.

Once the process of dehberation is completed, the meuno.; to ilS attallllT1enl .lfC

undertaken. At this stage, the manipulatory behaviours are emphao.;ized and the pre~cl1l

dimension of the self (the "bemg amidst the objects" or ubJect bemg mafllpulated)

predominates. Here, the individual is predommantly concerned with the relation of \lgm

to obJects (semantics).

5The relation between Kant's modal categone!:> and the three dimen~lOn'\ of ~CnllO"'I\ is suggested by M. Routin. According to him, "modal thinking stand~ al the Ihre~hold between semantics and pragmatics" (M. Boutin, "Conceiving the Invl~ible: J{)~eph C. McLelland's Modal Approach to Theological and Religious Plurall~m," unpubli~hed manuscript, 1992, 12).

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As the manipulatory ~tage approaches its de:-.ired end, the future dimension of the

..,clf i:-. empha~ized. Once the cOn<iummatory litage is achieved, what was once a future

po'>'iibility IS actualized. "It IS hcre," 'iays MOITIs, "that we expend ourselve'i, to become

in the future, pa~t" (I 25). Ali finne ta~k'i that can be completed wIthm an lifetIme are

cyclical and can be analyzed in term'i of the three ... tages of the aet.

My concern here, however, IS with paths of IIfe as hfe-projects. From the global

per~pectlve, the con~ummatory ,>tage of our lives always remams at the horizon. So long

as we are alive, our IIve!-. are never a 'iettled Issue. What the self will become, therefore,

rernajn~ al ways "ahead of itself," a "perpetuai posslbility".6 Possibility emphaslzes the

pragmatic dimension of :-.emiosls. Pragmatics concerns the mterpreter's "disposItion to

respond" in the pre<;ence of a 'ilgn. The teTm 'disposItion' refers to the future. Since the

Interpreter l'i not l.au~ed to fe',pond in the presence of a sign, regardless of the necessity

of the :-.ign' S occurrence, the modality of the pragmatic dimension of the self remains

possi bi Ilty.

2 • Temporality and Paths of Life

Just as the dimensions of semiosis, stages of the aet and preferential behaviours

are tridimensional, so, too, are the temporal dimensions of the self. The seven personality

types can abo be charactenzed in terms of the priority that each gives to the three

dimensions of time. ThIS expresses itself not only in their particular behaviours and

actIOns, but also m theu OrIentation in general. Again, the temporal character of each

personahty type does not lie in the bare predommance given ta one dimen~ion of time;

it lies in the predomInance of one time dimen'lion in relation to the other two. The

schema presented below shows the temporal orientation of each of Morris' seven

personality types.

~[ have adopted the expression "perpetuaI possibility" from T.S. Eliot who states: "All time is unredeernable. / What might have been remains an abstraction / Remaining a perpetuaI possibility / Only in a world of speculation .... " (T. S. Eliot. Four Quartets, in Collected Poems: 1909-1962. [London: Faber and Fa ber, 1963] 189).

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Table 9: The Temporal Structure of Morris' Paths of Life

mpJp.l IF IpJ~ ~ IF CI~J gJJ ~ IF IprlpJ Buddhlst Dlonyslan Promethean Apollonran Chnstlan Mohammedan Maltreyan

Pa = Past Pr = Present F = Future

The Dionysian and Mohanunedan personahues are bath future dlft~clcd. Even 'i0.

both express their future orientatIons in different ways. The Diony~ian per .. onality. a ..

extolled by NIetzsche, has liule mterest in the present ume dnnenslOn. wlth a Iclalively

high prefer,nee for the historieal (past) dimension of the self. Thi:-. onentatlon dUOI(h

with Nietzsche's doctrine of etemal recurrem;e. The present is under'itood a:- a rcpetltlOll

of the past; it will reeur continually in the future. By contrast, the tulure-oflentcd

Mohammedan personality has little mterest m the historical dmlenwHl ot the "elf all('

focusses on rewards obtained in the future whIle strivmg to change the plesent .. tale ot

affairs. For the Mohammedan per~onahty, the reward for victorioll~ bcllcver\ 1'> not 10

be found in the present life.

In bath the Promethean and Apollonian personahty type~, the present dllllcmion

of the self predominates. Both seek to remake the world for the \atl~facllon of dC\lre\

in the present. Pror.lethean personaliue'i have relatlvely little concern for the pa .. t

dimensIOn of the self. wah a relauvely 'itrong preference for the future-dlrelled

orientations; present satIsfactlOn~ are II1terpreted m tenm of future <..on,>eqllt'nu.~,> A'>

Morris points out, they engage In a "never-enctmg recon\tructlOn" (poL 112) Ihat

harnesses al! dimensIOns of the self "lOto furthenng the Promethean carnp,ugn" (PoL 14)

In contrast, the Apollonian per~onahty ha,> a relatively ,>tTOng hiwmcal oTlentalJo!l.

whereas the future dImensIOn of the ~elf IS suppre~\ed. Morm con'>lder .... ATI\tntle ' ..

wntings to be "Canon of the Apolloman personality" (PoL 119). Central to thc,>e WfJtlng\

is Aristotle's eoncern for "essential natures." The search for the "unchangrng" e\~ence of

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things corresponds to the Apollonian desire for continuity and conservation. Thl~

involve~ the attempt to overcome the disintegrating effects of time. Consequently.

Apollonians try to recover and preserve the past for the satisfaction of desires in the

pre~ent.

ln Christian and Buddhist personality types, lh~ historical dimension of the self

predominates. Morris characterizes the Buddhist path as a "way of detachment from

desire" (PoL 39). According to the teachings of the Buddha, suffering results from

attac~ments to thingli that inevitab~y pass away. From this perspective, the world is a

passing show; what is will al ways become the past. Because aU things are impermanent.

the alleviation of suffering is gained by detachr.-tent from the world and freedom from

suffering is achieved in the present. Christian personalities have a relatively strong future

orientation. whereas their interest in the present dimension of the self is neglected. The

Christian orientation has for its focus a historical event--Lhe revelation of Christ--the

consequences of which are anticipated in a future event: the parousia. But, according to

Morris. when the "kingdom on the earth faited to arrive". Christians turned their "glance

to a future heavenly home" (PoL 132). That the present dimension of the self--beiflg

an/il/st the world--is suppressed in Christian personalities is evidenced by their distrust

of thisworldly oriented sciences and technologies.

In the Maitreyan personality, no temporal dimension of the self predominates.

This offers a clue to the indeterminate character of the Maitreyan symbol. If this symbol

has no specifi:tble denotatum, what does it sig nif y? The Maitreyan path is temporality

itself: it signifies the radical openness within which ail things can come into being. Open

10 ail dimensions of time. the Maitreyan path is open to ail stages of the act, ail preferen­

liai behaviours, and ail dimensions of semiosis .

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3 - Paths of Life and Authenticity

Authenticity involves having both an adequate conception of human hemg 111

general and an adequate conception of oneself in particular.7 So far. this study h<l~

stressed the diversity of human potentialities as expressed in a variety of l'onespondll1g

paths of life. Morris argues that individuals should follow a path that accOlds \Vith thell

deepest inclinations. Except for the Maitreyan path, in ail six other basic pCI sonallty

types one dimension of the self predominates over the other two. This 1" also the caSl'

with their corresponding preferential behaviours, modes of signification and dlll1ens\On~

of human temporality. If the Maitreyan path is the exemplar of authentlc eXIMencc. how

is it possible to choose any other path authentically'!

According to Morris, the belief that a particular chosen path is tht' path of hic IS

based on an inadequate understandin,g of human nature. At the outset of 11IS Parh.\ 0/

Life, he quotes from Nietzsche: "What way is yours? The way there is t/Olle. "II The helil'l

that one's way of orientation is the way fails to aeknowledge either the dlversity of

human personalities in general or the complexities of human experienœ in particulat.

From this perspective, there is nothing inauthentic about choosing a path of life that

accords with one's own bodily dispositions, as long as the choice is ba~ed on the

understanding that one's chosen way is only one way among many.

The somatypes that correspond to the seven basic personality types and religious

paths offer clues for discovering one's own unique motivations and preferences. "But,"

says Morris,

the y are only clues, and of limited worth--partly because it is "i0 difficult to tell the truth about oneself, even to oneself; parti y because we may through social pressures be off the beam of our own true tlight; parti y because our data shows that the variability and plasticlty of person:-- i"i a~ real a faet as tile tendency of certain kinds of person:-- to move ln certain directions. (OS 93)

7Micheal E. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidef.:~l'r' .\' Concept of Authellticity (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 19X2) 24 .

8The quote from Nietzsche is presented on the title page of Morris' Paths of Lift!.

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lOI

For instance, many, but not aIl individuals with dominant mesomorphic physiques adopt

for themselves a Promethean or Mohammedan path. Likewise, not a11 of the persons who

chom~e either of these path~ are mesomorphs (OS 93). Furthermore, Morris stresses that

"there is no way of life that might not be chosen by any person under certain

circumstallces" (OS 93). To say this, however, does not reduce a11 paths to a vicious

relativism. On the contrary, "decision oœurs in a situation, usudly a social situation, and

a good decision takes into a..:count the uniqueness of the person making the decision and

the uniqueness of the situation which presents the probJem".9 To decide on this basis

accords with the method of science. As Morris points out, science has taught us lOto

qualify our predictions by adding a statement of the conditions under which what IS

predicted will oceur, and with what likelihood" (OS 93-94). Unfortunately, many of us

have not adGpted this method with respect to our appraisals and prescriptions. Instead.

man y of us tend to absolutize our ethical statements: "We thunder our goods and bads,

our oughts and ought nots as if they had no relation to particular persons in particular

dllemmas" (OS 94). In~tead of thinking our chosen path is a way, we have a tendency

to speak and act as if it wou Id be the only path.

The im,:ination to hypostatize one's own cho~en path is latent in every religious

path and corresponding personality type and must be guarded against at ail limes. Morris

wams us that the lure of Maitreyan ideal also poses a sirnilar danger, "if it causes us to

lose sight of diversity" (OS 120). As he emphatically states: "No Maitreyan tyranny!

... Iltl is only one alternative among others. To impose this personality ideal upon

cveryone would be a~ tyrannous as the imposition of any other personality ideal" (OS

'lOS 93. - The posluon being advanced here is "objective relativism." Su~h a perspective is "relativistic to be sure", says Morris. "But such reiativism is not vicious. Il gives us both unit y and diversity. It saves us from absolutism and nihilism alike. It forces us to qualify our assertions by stating explicitly the conditions under which somethmg is affIrmed to be--or to be good. But this is merely what semantic healthiness demands of LIS if we are to avoid the pitfall of overgeneralization. It does not follow that things are not objectively what they are under given conditions, or that under certain conditions one thing is not really better than another. Neither truth nor value is made 'subjective.' The philosophy of objective relativism is a movement toward greater objectivity. not us denial" (OS 131).

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121). The Maitreyan path is a way amongst a plurality of paths. The "specializations of

the self are as legitimate as its expansion " (OS 121).

4 • The Maitreyan Path as Self-Overcoming

Based on Morris' tripartite schema of the ~elf, the basic religlous paths ,m'

incomplete: for each religious type, one personality ~omponent domina tes over the other

two. However, as 1 have argued above, there is nothing wrong, per se. wuh a self that

arranges its preferential behaviours in a hieran;hy; the problem with each of the se

personalities lies in their exclusive allegiance to one particular organization of tlle~e

dimensions of the self. Because of their static and inflexible natures, they are unable to

flourish in lhose societies that do not prize their personality type.

Successful orientation within the world requires "flexibility," the ability to utilize

ail dimensions of the personality. Today, the need for greater flexlbility of the self has

become acute. "Our world is a babel of voices" (PoL 7). Modernity no longer provides

individuals with a clearly defined social self. In our increasingly fragmented world of

divided selves, man y personality types are competing for allegiance. Successful

integration of the self requires a flexible personality.

"Aexibility" is characteristic of the Maitreyan path (PoL 155). U nlike the six other

paths, the Maitreyan path gives no exclusive allegiance to any aspect of the self and

utBizes whatever aspect the situation requires. If their situation requires a Buddhistic

personality, Maitreyans adopt a Buddhistic personality. But at the same time, the y do not

identify with any particular orientation. Circumstances inevitably change. When this

happens Maitreyans alter themselves to accord with the new situation.

Concomitant with the notion of flexibility is the concept of authenticity. The

flexible self is authentic because selfho'Jd is a dynamic process in which it is continually

becoming another to itself. Contrary to the "ivory-tower" Cartesian view, the self is not

a distinct unchanging entity that exists independently of the flux of worjdly existence; it

is a dynamic centre of organized interests that is inextricably connected wlthin the world.

Immersed in the world, authentic individuals choose their future selves. "As

choosers of our future," says Morris, "we enter the rlomain of the formers of ideals, the

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103

domain of artists, statesmen, prophets" (OS 24). This is the domain of authentic existence

in which indivlduals engage themselves in an ongoing process of self-creation. This

creative desire i~ not to be confused with the creative desire of Promethean personalities

who invariably attempt to dominate the world in their attempt to remake the world. On

the contrary, authentic self-making is a co-creative process involving both the individual

and the world.

Creative interactions between the self and the world, however, are seldom

attained. Against the forces of change people more often th an not attempt to ding to

what they have become. Morris ca1ls this "possessiveness":

This possessiveness, this holding on to what we are or have, is a mighty power. Il is what our theologians mean by primordial sin, or by absolutizing the relative, or by clinging to a created good instead of being transformed in the creative process. ft is the main obstacle to the ongoing proœss of Iife-making. (OS 23)

This tendency towards possessiveness is one of the major obstacles of the religious

quest. 1fI The search to realize a1l aspects of ourselves through self-creation demands that

we relinquish ail forms of acquisitiveness.

The tenL_lu,:y to hold on to what we are is latent in every human action. As T.S.

Eliot remarks:

ln my beginning is my end. In succession Houses rise and fall, crumble, are extended, Are removed. destroyed, restored. or in their place Is an open field, or a factory, or a bypass. Old stone to new building, old timber to new fues., Old fires to ashes, and ashes to earth .... Il

W"lf possessiveness is, as Thomas Wolfe insisted, the TOot evil which blocks the creative future, it is also true that this evil has deep roots--and the drastic social changes that are necessary will meet strong resistance" (PoL 211) .

IIT.s. Eliot, Four Quartets 196.

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104

Unlike Mary Stuart's original dictum, "En majln est mail COmnlt'lIcemt!1It", Eliot reverses

this statement to read deathward. 12 ln doing so, he remmds us of the paradoxlcal truth

of our existence: every beginning involves and end. Eliot al .. o remmds us Ihat Olll

existence is not only a forward movement towards death but also a .\1'('('('.\.\'1011 of

recurring cycles.

As 1 have already mentioned, ail purposive actions are cydical. involving three

consecutive stages. With the completion of each stage of the aet, each component of the

self becomes de trop (Sartre) and must be relinquished. Hence, with the successful

completion of a purposive act, ail components of the self have become supertluous. The

self has reached its goal; in doing so it has used itself up. With successful complction

of ar. uct, the self experiences the end of itself. This slipping away of the self is terribly

hard to accept. It suggests to the self that its foundations are not finn. When thls

happens, the self becomes anxious and tries to repossess itself. This is the self's perpetuai

tendency towards closure. It is unrelenting: "Each new success becomes in tum a new

obstacle. The forces of death and near-death are al ways at hand. Winter always recurs"

(OS 116).

According to Morris, "the forms of possessiveness vary with the forms of

selfhood. But in every case possessiveness is the tendency of the self to hold on to its

present attainments, to remain what it is, to hug what it has" (OS 115). Ali attempts to

elude the processual nature of one's existence are inauthentic. There is no abiding self

that remains self-identical through time. Morris' conception of human nature opposes ail

substantialistic theories of the self.\3 The terms 'mind' and 'body' are two dlfferent

12Derek Traversi, T.S. Eliot: The Longer Poems (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1976) 126.

\3 Although Morris maintains that "[t]here is no reason to regard selfhood as a substance independent of physical and social contexts or as an event occurring in each unique situation," he does not ho Id the view that the self has no '·substantiality." Rather, the self has a relative substantiality: "Certain bodily characteristics of a person remain relatively constant in the various situations he confronts at different times, and these in turn ensure a certain constancy of motivation .... They give a measure of substantiality to the self and to its demands and help account for the enduring differences between

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105

ways of referring to a single unity. With the disintegration of the body cornes the

disintegration of the mind and the self.

This is also the Maitreyan understanding. As Morris. states, "the Maitreyan

a(;(;ount of human nature rests on and must be controlled by the scientiflc studie~ of

human nature" (PoL 171), and science does not allow us to make dogmatic assertions

about death (PoL 18). Being dogmatic involves making daims that are either beyond the

realm of human experience or impossible to verify. This is the case with Jeath. As

Wittgenstein aptly remarks, "[d]eath is not an event of life. Death is not lived

through .... "14 It remains an open question, therefore, whether or not an individual In

sorne form survives what we cali death. But at the same time, says Morris, "If science

prohibits dogmatism, the weight of the evidence speaks of the finality of death ".15

Unlike the other religious paths analyzed by Morris, the Maitreyan path IS

radically open to ail dimensions of human temporality. Being open ta aIl dimensions of

time, Maitreyans fully accept without complaint the deathward direction of their own

lives. This attitude is portrayed in one of Morris' philosophical poe ms:

We will not deny your [death's] power. We will not blind ourselves. We will not cover our nakedness. We will not cry out. We ask for no help.16

selves" (MuS 73-74).

14Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C.K. Odgen (London; RoutIedge, 1990) § 6.4311.

I~PoL 1 X - Wittgenstein also remarks: "The temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say, its eternal survival after death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but this assumption in the first place will not do for us what we always tried to make it do. Is li riddle solved by the fact that 1 survive for ever? Is this etemal life not as enigmatic as our present one'! ... " (Wittgenstein, Tractatus § 6.4312).

ItlpoL 245. - Morris' poetic remarks are reminiscent of Franz Rosenzweig's comments. According ta Rosenzweig, in arder for a person to be "restored to life he must acknowledge the dominion of death. He must no longer wish to live otherwise than deathward. Life becomes simple then, indeed, only because it does not seek to elude

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106

Nevertheless, this stance is not a fonn of philosophical stoicism. Maitreyans malo..e no

attempt to find rest in an intellectual 'eddy' free from the deathward movement of theu

lives. Neither do they prescribe a path of detachment to counter the suffering that reslllt~

from the inevitable loss of attachments.

The Maitreyan path involves the quest to realize ail aspects of the self. Ali

aspects of the self can be realized only if ail aspect'\ of the self can be freely givcn IIp.

No aspect of the self abides through time; rather, certain aspects of the self cumc into

being, while other aspects simultaneousiy pass away. In other words, the onentatlOll of

aIl dimensions of the self does not involve becoan;ng ail things at once. On the I.:Olltral y.

as expressed in the symbol of Maitreya, authentic existence involves a dW/(I11l1C

integration of becoming "one type of person at one moment and another type of pcrson

at another moment" (PoL 155). Yet, to become another person at another moment

involves the ability to relinquish what one has struggled to become. The mdlvidual can

freely do this only if the grip of self-possessiveness is loosened, such that no aspect of

the self is allowed to dorninate and sustain itself at the expense of any other. Such an

individual is neither attached nor detached to the self as a whole. Rather, the Maitrcyan

is "grateful to the forces that sustain his activity, and energetic in his attempt to ride these

forces" (PoL 165). But at the same time "he has no illusions as to his place in the widcl

scheme of the universe; no insistence that he be exempt from the doom which IS the latc

of ail component things, no festering resentment toward forces which prove, after

struggle, stronger than he .,," (PoL 165). Maitreyans move freely with the flow of life.

In doing so they remain open to the entire range of human emotions, from the joys of

attachment to the agonies of detachment, al.:cepting loss and gam in a way that is "akin

to good sportsmanship--the deepest concrete expression which the West has given tu the

[Mr.itreyan] attitude of detached-attachment. ,,17

death" (Franz Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking," Nahum N. Glatzer, trans., Franz Rosenzweig: His Lije and Thought [New York: Scho<.;ken Books, 1(67) 213).

17poL 178. - "The sportsman plays the game for the play itself; he plays to win jf possible, but can me et defeat; he plays vigorously and he deals strong blows, but hi~

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107

5 • Self-Overcoming as Via Positiva

Maitreyans exude flexibility, but to other persons "the Maitreyan will seem no

distinctive tyt:,!; they will regard him as trying to be aIl--and becoming nothing" (PoL

154). But if Maitreya is uncharacterizable, how can it be a symbol for self-overconung

via positiva'!

Morris refers to the Maitreyan path of gencralized detatched-attachment not only

in terms of flexibility but also in terms of openness and non-possessiveness. The latter

terms are used by Morris as synonyms for the former: flexibihty is to be understood as

openness and non-possessiveness, whereas inflexibility refers to the partial or complete

dosure of the self Morris calls "possessiveness" (OS 115-116). The more flexible

individuals are, the less possessive they are, ann vice-versa.

Flexibility does not mean relinquishing a direction. Implicit in the concept of

flexibility is the notion of self-directedness. It would make no sense to call people

flexible if they have no preferences. To describe Maitreyans as flexible does not mean

that they have relinquished any direction. To be open to aIl dimensions of lite self

simuItaneously would result in paralysis, whereas "[t]o live is to stand before alternatives"

(OS 5). In choosing one course of action, the self must remain c10sed to another: "".the

open road which one interest has closes the road to others" (PoL 16).

ln The Open Self. Morris states that "[t]he forms of salvation ... are forms of

annihilation--annihilation of sorne form of possessiveness by pointing to sorne open road

which the self can henceforth traverse. The self is saved for its walk forward in time by

loosening the cramped legs of its immediate actualities" (OS 116 & 62). The Maitreyan

pa th is the quintessential "open road," qua flexibility. Not aIl individuals are disposed

to follow ~;uch a path; in order to realize their own potentialities, they must frame for

themselves another ideal towards which to direct their lives. What then is their "open

road",! A passage from Morris' poem Maitreya suggests an answer:

action is friendly and he has the delight of a spectator of his own sport. In the co smic game man is but a player. The Maitreyan has regained the vast Indian vision of Nitya Lila--the sport of the gods" (PoL 178).

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To each of the great god-ideals belongs a virtue and a vice:

To Apollo, loyalty--and inflexibility (the spirit steadfast in the waters of erosIOn-­the loss of the knowledge of when to yield).

To Gotama, detachment--and self-centeredness (the eye freed from the urgencies of the body-­the eye opaque to outward shine).

To Christ, sympathy--and sentimentality (the heart warm 10 significance beyond itself-­the heart undisciplined in It'i affection).

To Dionysus, abandonment--and inconsiderateness (the festivity of the abundant body--the feveri3hness of the self-intoxicated body).

To Mohammed, resoluteness--and tyranny (the arm firm with the spear of conviction-­the arm arrogant in mailed armour).

To Prometheus, resourcefulness--and aimlessness (the hand responsive to the promptings of the self-­the hand severed from the depths of the self).

The virtues, each qualified by each of the others, define Maitreyan virtue.

The great composite name of all the virtues is Maitreyan friendIiness.

The vices, each qualified by each of the others, define Maitreyan possessiveness. (1 53-54)

((lX

As this poem suggests, each of the basic paths examined by Morris express a particular

virtue. Pursued unpossessively, each path becomes a possible "open road for the self to

henceforth traverse" (OS 116). Therefore, specializations of the self, as weil as its

expansions, can offer ways for overcoming self-pos~essiveness in the quest to realize their

unique potentialities. When any one of these virtues or combination of virtues is pursued

self-possessively, it becomes a vice. AlI the basic paths as virtues, "each qualified by the

others", express the distinctive character of Maitreyan friendliness. However, the vices,

each qualified by the others, define Maitreyan possessiveness (1 54). No path, incIuding

the Maitreyan path, is exempt from the "black power" of possesslveness. The path

towards a larger and more open self is wrought with struggle: "each self at each moment

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109

struggles to remain open and tends to become closed. This is the primordial a'ld never

ending conflict of good and ev il from which no one is exempt" (OS 115).

The tendency toward c10sure and self-possessiveness is not overcome by

diminishing the self via negativa: "we are selfish not bccause we are self y but because

we do not have enough self. And slgnificant selflessness is not found in absence of self,

but in plenitude of self. We become non-possessive not by becoming smrller but by

becoming larger" (OS 23). As 1 argued in chapter three, the self is enlarged by

augmenting its linguistic repertoire, via positiva. Since "the llmits of my languaRe mean

the limits of my world,"(8 when the self's linguistic repertoire is increased, the limits

determined by it'i linguistic incapacity are overcome. A larger and freer self is realized.

The measure of our signs is the measure of our freedom (OS 52). We are free to

the extent that we are no longer at the mercy of the immediate environment. A

diminished self with a limited language is limited in the ways it can deal with the

contingencies of life. Because its ability ta respond ta a given situation is restricted, it

cannot help but remain inflexible and closed to other possibilities. Consequently, when

it encounters a situation that demands a response which j' is incapable of providing, it

becomes anxious and fearsome and self-protective.

Pointing away from the closed self towards the "open road" of freedom, Morris

offers the Maitreyan ideal. Being a symbol without specificity, the Maitreyan path is the

radical openness that allows aH paths to go their own wa)'; insofar as it is a via positiva,

it signifies a plenitude in which aIl individuals may find direction in their quest for self­

accomplishment.

IIIL. Wittgenstein, Tractatus § 5.6.

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Conclusion

There is a religiolls commitment j(l1 more ample cll/ci

profound, which befriends the self ami other .\eh'es utte, 1)' unpossessively, which befriellds ail things but lets eaeh go its own way, a religion embmClng the Great Thing ltl ils multeity. (1 28)

\Hl

ln André Malraux's The Waillut 'l'rees of Altelllmrg. Walter Berger lemarks that

"the greatest mystery is not that we have been flung at random between the profusion of

the earth and the galaxy of the stars, but that in thlS pnson we c.m fashlon Images of

ourselves suffici~ntly powerful to deny our nothingness.'" For Malraux, human eXistence

is inescapable. From the relentless rnovement towards our own deaths, we -.truggle to

escape. Alienated and lost ln a chaotic and absurd world, we fall ta live authentlCally

because we cannot bear to face the truth of our desttny. Against the Inevitable slipping

away of the self cornes denial: we struggle to fashion a timeless image of ourselves. The

path we seek in is not a singular one, for "only the singular ean die and everythlf1g mortal

is solitary. ,,2

Tuming away from the summons of the deepest part of ourselves--the exigence

(Gabriel Marcel) of the body \0 manifest its inherent potentialities--we proJect our hopes

and dreams towards a disembodied self in a umeless future. The path we now <;eek is no

longer a way; it is the way for ail times and aIl places. Implicit in our seard for a

"stable object of love" (PoL 19) is the denial of everything that is <.;ingular. We seek to

repossess ourselves, but this universalizing of our quest also has social consequences.

'André Malraux, The Walnut Trees of Altenburg, trans, A. W. Fielding (New York: Howard Fertig, 1989) 74. Aiso cited in Maurice Friedman, To Deny Our Nothingness.· Contemporary Images of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976) 17.

2Fré1oz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans, William W. HaJio (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 19R5) 4.

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III

1 • The Maitreyan Ideal and the Open Society

As 1 have '\tressed throughout this study, "in religion, as elsewhere, it is fatal ta

give pnonty to elther the indlvidual or society: sorne problems of the individual appear

in any ,>ociety, and no feature of the mdividual is free from the influence of the society

in which he or ~he lIves" (poL 19). As an individual Ideal Maitreya signifies a

personalIty that i,> open to aIl components of the 'ie1f. As a social ideal, It signifies an

Inter')ubjet.:tÏve field that is open to all modes of signification and corresponding

behaviours. The Maitreyan symbol, though, is more than an ideal of negative freedom.

To have freedom Jrom persona) and social restraints is necessary but not sufficient;

posluve freedom is also necessary and, in order for the Maitreyan ideal to be realized,

both society and its constituent members must provide the means for its attainment.

Positive freedom involves the ability to "make choices in the light of symbolically

indicated consequences of alternative courses of action" (MeF 585).

The degree to v'hich someone has freedom for a particular course of action "is

relative to the sign repertary and to the habits of sign usage which an individual is

aIlowed to acquire" (MeF 585). This slgn repertoire is provided by the society into which

individuals are bom. Hence, although individuals are given a language at birth, they are

not necessarily given freedom. Rather, the freedom the y are given is relative to the sign

repertoire that their society provides. Individuals "can be 'made' free or kept from being

free, and the isolation of the mechanism of freedom, as the isolation of all mechanisms,

places great power and responsibillty in the hands of those who direct society" (MeF

5X5). This IS not to be construed as a denial of individual responsibility. The fact that

there are social forces people cannot control in the process of their own deve'opment does

Ilot imply determinism. Rather, says ivforris, "to admit this is merely to admit again that

men live m a mighty world. The half .. truth of determinism is sufficient to silence the

chant of the Clown Free Will that a man can do anything he wants at any timePI But

10n that issue, aJthough with reference to another question .. -"the conditions necessary for the appearance of an object of discoUTse" .... the French philosopher, Michel Foucault, says that "these conditions are many and imposing. WhlCh means that one cannot speak of anything at any time" (Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge and The

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Il ~

it does not silence our just conviction that we are free in the sense that we rcmain ahVl'''

(OS 19).

Human beings are symbolic animaIs that "make themselves by their thoughts--thell

ideas and ideals .... [They] choose their future insofar as they thmk. And 111 no othl'I \Vay"

(OS 12). Like each personality type. societies also advam:e a partu:uhu path of 11ft' hl!

Morris, however, there has not yet been a society that has penl11ttcd the lull t'Xplt'\SIlHl

of aIl aspects of the individual. Yet individual and social freedom ale not gallled hv

suppressing the dominant social discourse via negat/va; they are adllt~ved by augnwlltlllg

the symbolic repertOire of the existing social discourse--l'/{J positiva--such that all 1ll0dl'~

of signification are given fair representatlOn.

As a social ideal, Maitreya signifies a society that allows aIl types 01 pt'I ~ol1ahty

to realize their inherent potentialities. Morris calls this social Ideal "the opel/ ,\Onel\' 01

open selves" (PoL 135). Such a society

will accept and dignify diversity. It ,."ill repudtate ail attempt~ to pOlU Ils rnembers into a cornmon mold. It will be a society ln whlch ail vanctlcs of persons can attain their own unique forms of integrity. It will glory III

a rnultiplicity of arts and philosophies and ways of life. It WIll recogllll.e that interactions between persons are dlver~e. ft will constantly adapt It~

institutions to meet new needs and new problems .... ft will be a pcr~on­centered society in which no type of person can impo~c hl~ pattern (lf selfbolld upon other persons. (OS 14tJ)

Fundamental to MOrrIS' ~tudy of religlou~ paths and personaluy typc~ i .. the

Maitreyan ideal. From the outset of thi" study, it has been the critcnon hy whil.h all

other religious orientati;ms are appralsed. U nlike the Maltreyan path, ail other palh .. "have

stressed something essential to the developrnent of the full human .. df, and yct have

distorted sorne phase of the ~elf by giving lt exclusive dominance" (PoL 154) Ail the .. e

pJths of life are derived from a more complex nature a'\ excmphflcd hy the Mallreyan

attitude of generalized detached-attachment: the Maltreyan,

In rnakll1g himself the guardJan of the full complexity of the full human self ... can at least be sure that at sorne pOll1t and to ,>ome degrce he will

Discourse of Language, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith [New York: Pantheon Book'>, 1 Y72j 44).

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join hands with those who ~tress sorne portion of the self, and sorne hlstorkal phô.!~e of its evolutlon; an understanding of the relation of paths of IIfe to types of per~onality will give him strength to elaborate a way of life. (PoL 155-156)

113

Yet, the Maltreyan path "is not resolvable into the successive assumption of other

attitudes nor their mathematical ~ummation" (PoL 155). In other ward s, the Maitreyan

Ideall:annot be understood in terms of semantics. As a semantic concept, the Maitreyan

Ideal ha~ no I:haracterizable denotatum. However, as a pragmatic concept--the interpreter's

dispo'\ition to respond in the presence of a sign--the Maitreyan path signifies a disposition

of flexibility and hospitality. The Maitreyan "will by nature understand and sympathize

with the six other types of personality and six types of religious attitudes ... but he will

he unable to take as his ideai or his religion any of these types of persons or any of their

directive attitudes" (PoL 153-154). Nevertheless, as the exemplar of friendliness,

Maitr~yans "would provide a perspective by which the chasms which divide various types

of personalities could be bridged" (PoL 155). Because of their diverse linguistic

l:apal:Îues, combined with a self-understanding gained through their own inner struggle,

Maitreyans would be highly adept translators. They could help others to traverse the

linguistil: chasms that alienate them from both themselves and other members of their

socIety.

2 - Laboratories of Self-Creation

Creation is a bright, awesome, burdensome task. Do Ilot speak of it Iightly, and of it Ilothing ask. (1 101)

The pathway to greater freedom for aH members of society is achieved through

the enlargernent of the social self. ft can he enlarged only inasmuch as the individuais

that l'onstitute it contnbute novel significations. The source of linguistic novelty is found

in the strm:ture of language itself. Because language has a grammatical structure, it

"pennits a great variety of sign cornbinations, and so makes it possible to form new ideas

and new ideals from old ones" (OS 59). Freedorn, therefore, is to be found through the

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114

creative use of language itself. Just as artists require knowledge of their l'reative medium.

so, too, do individuals require a knowledge of signs.

According to Morris. "the study of signs has hecome in our day a vItal part nf the

study of man" (OS 49). Even so. this study I:annot he carried out in isolation 1'rol11 nlhel

dimensions of human experience. As important as it is. the study of slgns lS only one

phase of the study, "intimately linked with the studies of human physiques. envlronmci1ts.

and cultures" (OS 49). Such self-understanding is sorel y needed in order to .,urmount the

dark powers of ~elf-possessiveness that block the open road to freedom.

Self-creation is directed towards the expansion and growth of the self. Wc

transforrn ourselves through the signs we produce: the greater our sign repertoire. the

greater our freedom, The way we talk and think is determined by the ~igns that aIe

available to us. To overcome the limitation attal:hed ta this determinatton. Morris

recommends that we bec orne 'sign chemists,' combining signs in novel ways and th us

experirnenting with new ways of being-in-the-world. "But," says Morris. "Iolnly the self

that is willing to change can think creatively" (OS 70).

In chapter three of this study, a way of initiating a process of self-transformation

was suggested by Taylor's concept of "radical re-evaluation". By drawing into question

those assumptions that are fundamental to the very sense of ourselves, we open ourselves

to other ways of being-in-the-world. This proœss affords us the possibility of dbcl)vering

our own unique potentialities, for "only as we grow ioto what we deeply are, ap,j cast off

the false images of ourself, can we become puppeteers and not puppets in the theatre of

signs" (OS 67). Radical re-evaluation Is one way to "lift the mask of signs," so that wc

can "lift the mask of ourselves" (OS 67). As these remarks suggest, signs can also be

used to conceal the truth about ourselves. Hence, an increased lingUlstic repertoire does

not necessarily imply a more authentic and open self. On the contrary--as Nietzsche

championed throughout his writings--Ianguage can be used aIl too easily for self-deceptive

purposes. The active scrutiny of not only our signs but also our motives IS at ail times

needed .

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3 - Self-Creation as Taking the Role of Another

"The high mission of the artist is to explore novel ways of being for and against,

and to Jet u~ share his explorations through the specialized language which he has

created" (OS (1). In an experience of art, we take the roles of others. "seeing things as

others see them, standing as the y stood before things, and falling as they feU" (OS 61).

ln this way a larger more diverse self is ereated. Through the experience of art we can

advam:e our own growth and enlargement.

The religious dimension of art a~ a means of self-overcorning is suggested in

Morris' commentary on a series of scientific photographs presented in a book compiled

by Gyorgy Kepes entitled The New Landscape. This book juxtaposes the -10st diverse

orders and dimensions of the cosmos from the microscopie photographs "of a snail's

tongue" to a maerocosmic image of a "galactic system" (MaCS 99). According ta Morris,

the photographs can be used in 'spiritual exerCÎses' for the unceasing task of man-making, used for jarring the self from an ever-settling rigidity, breaking its egocentric boundaries, renewing its vitality by connecting it with what is vital, offering it something fine enough to lure itself into losing itself, and so into finding itself. (MaCS 99)

The experience of viewing these diverse orders of the comos is reminiscent of the old

Buddhist practice that involves imagining "oneself as sm aIl as an insect, and to view

things from this perspective; and then immediately to become in imagination as large as

a mountain and to survey insect and man from this perspective" (MaCS 99). By doing

so, people Juxtapose symbolica!ly the most diverse orders of the universe "to look from

below and above, to be inside and outside simultaneously" (MaCS 99).

This imaginative process is none other than the "taking the role of another"

advanced by Morris' teacher, George Herbert Mead. In the case of Kepes' photographs,

though, the process of role-taking is extended to aIl dimensions of the cosmos. As Morris

points out, such imaginative role-taking is not achieved independently of language. In

this respect. Kepes' "penetrating commentary" (MaCS 98) about these photographs is

particularly important, for the photographs cannot become

symbols until they are creatively transformed by human action. The assigning of captions indicates that one such transformation has aiready been made. U nless it were k!1own lhat one photograph is a magnification

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•

of something very small and another a record of something very large. they would not he scientific symbols. nor of scientific import. The words assigned to them are both indications of the conditions under which the photographs were obtained and of an interpretation made in terms of scientific theory. (MaCS 99)

Ilh

Through Kepes' commentary, "words and photographs have interpenetrated, and whm IS

seen is no longer merely a differentiated structure .... What is seen IS now seen 11\ tenns

of what is said" (MaCS 99). ln semiotic terms, the photographs have become post­

language symbols. i.e. symbols whose meanings are dependent on language symbols bill

are not themselves language symbols. "Language in this way gives evellts in our wor/li

and in ourselves a meaning they would Ilot otherwise have"(OS 59).

Combined with Kepes' commentary. the pllotographs evoke an imaginative

"cosmic wandering" (MIL 187). This process of symbolic Identification involves radically

diverse signs that refer not only to the here and now but also to the past and future (MIL

182). When the interpretants of these signs are simultaneously aroused, the person is "no

longer merely an object among objects"(MIL 187): the limits of the possessive self have

been overcome .

... Selflessne~;s needs support of cosmic grandeur. Little and large can we only dare to be if what we envisage can satiate our wonder. (1 6 J)

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117

Bibliography

1 • Primary Sources: Works by Charles W. Morris 1

1lJ25 Symbolism and Reality: A Study in the Nature of Mind. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago.

1lJ27 "The Concept of Symbol 1." Journal of Philosophy 24: 253-62.

1927 The Concept of Symbol Il.'' Journal of Philosophy 24: 281-91.

I92X "Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing." Monist 38: 494-510.

192X "The Prediction Theory of Truth." Monist 38: 387-401.

1929 "The Nature of the Mind." Rice Institute Pamphlet 16: 153-244.

1932 Six Theories of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

1932 "Truth, Action, and Verification." Monist 42: 321-329.

1934 Pragmatism and the Crisis of Democracy. Public Policy Pamphlet No. 12. Ed. Harry D. Gideonse. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

1937 Logical Positivlsm, Pragmatism, and SC/elltific Empiricism. Paris: Herman et ce.

193X Foundatiolls of the Theory of Siglls. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. 1.2: 1-59.

1939 "Esthetics and the Theory of Signs." Journal of Unified Science 8: 131-50.

1940 "The Mechamsm of Freedom." Frèedom: Its Memling. Ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harcourt, Brace, pp. 579-89.

)942 Paths of Life.' Preface to a World Religion. New York: Harper & Bros; 2d ed., New York: George Brazillier, 1956; 3d ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.

1942 "William James Today." ln Commemoration o/William James. H.M. Kallen ed .. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 178-187.

lC'omprehensive bibliographies of Charles Morris' writings can be found in Fiordo (pp. 191-94), and also Rossi-Landi (pp. 186-193).

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IIX

1945 "Nietzsche: An Evaluation": Journal of the History of Ic/t'US fi: 2H5-93.

1946 Signs, Language and 8ehllvior. New York: Prentke-Hall.

1947 "Multiple Self and Multiple Society." Freedom al/d E.\fJ/!ricllce. Essay.\· Prl'sell(t'cI to Horace M. Kallen. Ed. S. Hook and M. R. Konvitz. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 70-77.

1948 The Open Self. New York: Prentice-Hall.

1948 "Signs about Signs about Signs." Philosophy lllld Phellomen%gical Resellrch 9: 115-133.

1955 "Value Seales and Dimensions." Journal ofAbnonnal and Social Psychology 51: 523-535.

1956 "Man-Cosmos Symbols." The New Landscape. Ed. Gyorgy Kepes. Chkago: Paul Theobald, pp. 98-99.

1956 Varieties of Human Value. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

1960 "The Buddhist Personality Ideal as Expressed in the Works of Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki." Buddhism and Culture. Ed. Susumi Yamaguchi. Kyoto: Nakano. pp. 9-14.

1960 "Science, Art and Teehnology." A Modern Book of Esthetics. Ed. Melvin Rader. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. pp. 241-248.

1964 Signification and Significance: A Study of the Relation of Sign.\' and Values. Cambridge. MA: M.I.T. Press.

1966 Festival. New York: George Braziller.

1967 "Religion and the Empirical Study of Human Values." Religious Humanism. 3.1: 74-75.

1967 "A Tribute." The Eastern Buddhist: New Series 2: 128-29.

1970 The Pragmatic Movement in Americlln Philosophy. New York: George Braziller.

1970 "The Symbol Maitreya." Maitreya 1: 4-6.

1971 "Changes in Conceptions of the Good Life by American College Students from 1950-1970," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 20.2: 254-260.

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119

IlJ71 "My~ticism and Its Language." Language: An Inquiry into Its Meaning and Function. Ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press. pp. 179-X7.

IlJ71 Writin~s on the General Theory of Signs. The Hague: Mouton.

IlJ76 Image. New York: Vantage Press.

19lJ3 Symbolism and Reality: A Study in the Nature of Mind. Amsterdam: John BenJamims Publi'lhing, 1993.

2 - Secondary Sources

Amyx, Clifford. "The Iconic Sign in Aesthetics." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 6 (llJ47): 54-59.

Bent1ey. Arthur F. "Signs of Error." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (1949-50): 99-106.

Black. Max. '·The Semiotic of Charles Morris." Max Black. Language and Pltilosophy: Studies in Method. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1949, pp. 169-254.

Creed, Isabel, P. "iconic Signs and Expressiveness." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 3 (1944): 15-21.

Delaney, C.F. "Recent Work on American Philosophy." The New Scholasticism 45 (1971): 457-477.

Ducasse, C.J. "Sorne Comments on C.W. Morris' 'Foundations Of The Theory of Signs'." Phi/osophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (l942): 43-52.

Fiordo, Richard A. Charles Morris and the Criticism of Discourse. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1977.

Gentry. George. "Signs, Interpretants, and Significata." Journal of Philosophy 44 (1947): 3IX-24.

Lauer. Rosemary Zita. "St. Thomas and Modern Semiotic." Thomist 19 (1956): 75-99.

League, Richard. PsycholinRuistic Matrices: Investigation into Osgood and Morris. The Hague: Mouton, 1977 .

Mead. George Herbert. "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol." Journal ofPhi/osophy 19 (1922): 157-163.

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120

Mind. Self, and Society: From the Stalldpoillt of a Social Behm';orist. Ed. C.W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1934.

"The Nature of Aesthetic Experience." Selected Writings' Georgt' Herl'ert Mead. Ed. Andrew J. Reck. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co .. 1964.

Philosophy of the Act. Ed. C.W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Pre~~. 1938.

The Philosophy of the Present. Ed. Arthur E. Murphy. Chicago: University of Cllicé\go Press, 1980.

Phillips. Jean. "The Concept 'Disposition to Respond' in a Behavioral SemiotÏl.:." Phi/osophy of Science 17 (1950): 347-53.

Roberts, Louise Nisbet. "Art as Icon: An Interpretation of C.W. Morris." Tulal/t' St/ulie.\ in Philosophy 4 (1955): 75-82.

Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio. "Signs about a Master of Signs." Semiotica 13 (1975): 155-1lJ7.

Rudner, Richard. "On Semiotic Aesthetics." Journal of Aesthetics al/cl Art Cl'lti('üm \0 (1951): 67-76.

Smith, Vincent Edward. "Dr. Charles Morris and Semiotic" The Moder/l Sc/lOo/mali 25 (1948): 140-143.

Sondel, Bess. "An Analysis of Signs Language and Behavior and The Opel/ Sell" B. Sondel. The Humallity ofWords. Cleveland, NY: World, ItJ5X. pp. 135-16X.

Zeman. J. Jay. "Charles W. Morris (1901-1979)." Trallsactionsofthe Charlt'.\ S. Pei/,('(' Society 17.1 (1981): 3-24.

3 . Other Sources

Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. David Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Prcs~, 1994.

Boutin, Maurice. "Conceivmg the Invisible: Joseph C. MeLelland's Modal Approach to Theological Pluralism. Unpublished manuscript, 1992.

"Relations, Otherness and the Philosophy of Religion": The Journal oJ Rell1:iou.\ Pluralism 2 (1992): 61-82 .

Cassirer, Ernst. An Essay on Man. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, J<)70.

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Dewey, John. A Common Faith. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1934.

Art as Experience. New York: Minton, Balsh, 1934.

Experience and Nature. New York: Dover Publications, 1958.

Drury, M. O'C. The Danger of Words. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.

Dworkin, Gerald. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambndge University Press, 1988.

Eliot, T.S. Four Quartets in Collected Poems: 1909-1962. London: Faber and Faber, 1963.

Fiordo, Richard A., ed. Communication in Education. Calgary: Detselig Enterpnses Ltd., 1990.

Fleisher Feldman, Carol. "The 'Old Pragmatics and the 'New'." Journal of Pragmatics JO (1968): 405-413.

Foucault, Michel. The Archeology of Knowledge and The Discourse of Language. Trans. A. M. Sheridan. New York: Pantheon Books. 1972.

Frankenberry, Nancy. Religion and Radical Empiricism. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 1987.

Frankfurt. Harry G. The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Friedman, Marilyn A. "Autonomy and the Split-Level Self." Southem Journal of Philosophy 24 (1986): 19-35.

Friedman. Maurice. To Delly Our Nothingness: Colltemporary Images of Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

Fromm, Erich. Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962.

Gadamer. Hans-Georg. Philosophical Hermeneutics. Ed. and Trans. David E. Linge. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977.

Gendlin, Eugenc. Focusillg. Toronto: Bantam Books, 1981.

Genevieve Lloyd. Being in Time: Selves and Ilarrators in philosophy and literature. London: Routledge, 1993 .

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Habennas. Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2: Lift'world and Systt'fIl. A Critique of FUllctionalist Reasoll. 2 Vols. Boston: Beacon Press. t lJX4.

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Kant, lnunanuel. Critique of Pure Reasoll. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. London: MacMillian Press. 1983.

Kepes, Gyorgy. The New Lalldscape. Chicago: P. Theobald, 1956.

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Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Rea.wJ/I, Rite alld Art. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Malraux, André. The Walnut Trees of A/tenburg. Trans. A. W. Fielding. New York: Howard Fertig, 1989.

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Reflection & Mystery. Vol 1 of The Mystery of Bein!:. 2 Vols. Trans G. S. Fraser. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1960 .

Merleau-Ponty, M. Phellomenology of Perception. Trans. Collin Smith. New York: The Humanities Press, 1970.

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Ansl:ombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. C. K. Ogden. London: Routledge, Il)l)().

Zimmerman. Michael E. Eclipse of the Self: The Developmellf of Heidegger'.\' COllcept of Authenticity. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 19X2 .

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Appendix One

Seven Paths of Life as Summarized in The Open Self

Path 1.( Apollonian)

In this "design for living" the individual actively participates in the social life of his community, not ta I.:hange it primariliy, but to understand, appreciate, and preserve the best that man has attained. Excessive desires should be avoided and moderation sought. One wants the good things of life but in an orderly way. Life is to have cJarity, balance, refinement, control. Vulgarity, great entr.usiasm, irrational beh .. 'vior, impatience, indulgence are to be avoided. friendship is to be esteemed by not easy intimacy with many people. Social changes are to be made slowly and carefully, so that what has been acheived in human culture is not lost. The individual should be al.:tive physically and socially, but not in a hectic or radical way. Restraint and intelligence should give order to an active life (OS 74).

Path 2. (Buddhist)

The individual should for the most part "go it alone," assuring himself of privacy in living quarters, having much time ta himself, attempting to control his own life. One should stress self-sufficiency, reflection and meditation, knowledge of himself. The direction of interest should be away from intimate associations with social groups, and away from the physical manipulation of objects or attempts at control of the physical environment. One should aim to simplify one' s extemallife, to moderate those desues whose satisfaction is dependent upon physical and social forces outside of ~meself, and to concentrate attention upon the refmement, clarification, and self-direction of one's self. Not much can be do ne or is 10 be gained by "living outwardly." One must avoid dependence upon persans or things; the center of life should be found within one self (OS 75).

Path 3. (Christian)

Thb; way of life makes central sympathetic concem for other persons. Affection should be the main thing in life, affection that is free from ail traces of imposition of oneself upon others or of using others for one's own purposes. Greed in possessions, emphasis on sexual passion, the sean:h for power over persons and things, excessive emphasis upon

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intellect, and undue concern for oneself are to be avoided. For the\t' things hinder the sympathetic love among per"ons whil'h alone gIVl'" significance to life. If we are aggressive we blod our 1 ~çeptlvity to the personal forces upon whkh we are dependent for genuine per~onal grnwth. One should accordingly purify oneself, restrain one's "df-asserttveness. and become receptive, appreclative. and helpful wlth respect to other persons (OS 75).

Path 4. (Dionysian)

Life is something to be enjoyed--sensuously enjoyed, enjoyed wlth rehsh and abandonment. The aim of life should Ilot be to wntrol the course of the world or society or the lives of others, but to be open and receptlve to things and persons, and to delight in them. Life is more a festival that a workshop or a school for moral discipline. To let oneself go, to let thlng\ and persons affect one~df, is more important th an to do--or to do good. Such enjoyment, however, requires that one be "elf-l'~ntered enough to be keenly aware of what is happening and free for new happenings. SA one should avoid entanglements, should not be ~elf-sal:nficing; one should he alone a lot, should have rime for meditation and awareness of oneseIf. Solitude and sociality together are both necessary in the good life (OS 75-76).

Path S. (Mohamedan)

A person should not hold on to himself. withdraw from people, keep aloof and self-centered. Rather merge oneself with a social group, cnJoy cooperation and companionship, Join with others in resolute a<.:tivity for the realization of common goals. Persons are social and persons are active; life should merge energetic group activity and cooperative group enjoyment. Meditation, restraint, wnœrn for one's ~elf- ... uffkiem;y, abstract intellectuality, solitude, ~tress on one'., po~~e~~lOns ail cut the roots which bind persons together. One should live outwardly wlth gu~to, enjoying the good things of life, working WIth others ta "e<.:ure the thlllgs which make possible a pleasant and energetic sodal IIfe. Those who oppose this ideal are not to be dealt wHh tao tenderly. Life <.:an 't be tao fastidious (OS 76) .

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Path 6. (Promethean)

Llfe <.:ontinually tends to stagnate, to become "comfortable." to become '\kklied o' er with the pale cast of thought." Against these tendencies. a person mu~t ~tress the need of constant activity--physical action, adventure, the reah-;uc solution of specifie problems as they appear, the improvement of teçhniques for controlhng the world and society. Man's future depends pnrnarily on what he does, not on what he feels or on his speculations. New problerns constantly arise and al ways will arise. Improvements must alway-; be made if mar is to progress. We can 't just follow the past or drearn of what the future might be. We have to work resolutely and continually if wntrol is to he gained over the forces which threaten us. Man should rely on technical advances made possible by scientific knowledge. He should find his goal in the solution of his problems. The good i'i the enemy of the better (OS 76-77).

Path 7. (Maitreyan)

We should at various times and in variou~ ways accept something from all the other paths of life, but give no one our specific allegiance. At one moment one of them is the more appropriate; at another moment another is the most appropriate. Life should contain enjoyment and action and contemplation in about equal amounts. When either is carried to extremes we lose something important for our life. So we must cultivate flexibility, admit diversity in ourselves. accept the tension which this diversity produces. find a place for detachment in the rnidst of enjoyment and activity. The goal of life is found in the dynamic integration of enjoyment, action and contemplation. and so in the dynamic interaction of the various paths of life. One should use a11 of them in building a life, and no one alone (OS 77) .

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Appendix Two

Poems about Maitreya by Charles Morris

Consecration (PoL 217-219)

Maitreya, man-god, image of man not yet come, Child in the womb of the World-Wanton, Sport of the Maker of gods and galaxies and men, Joy of the anguished World-Bird, Sired of She and the gods and the men She has spawned, Genn in the shell of the speckled World-Egg--We give you ourselves in your travail of birth that we may

endure our travail. We summon you that we may summon ourselves.

Cast your shadow before us that we may not remain shadows. Release in us the shackled powers that struggle for release. Supple our fingers that we may weave our stubbom strands. Strengthen our arms that we may pull in place our biggest

blocks.

We are weak and confused out of very abundance. Our animal limbs are restless in our social honeycombs. We are ill at ease in our garments and yet fear nakedness, We have glimpsed high mountains, yet our legs tremble before

the ascent. The range of our eyes has destroyed the sharpness of our vision. The voices of many gods have dimmed the voiœ of the living

god.

In the name of truth we have thrown up word-towers in which truth cannot live;

We have played with words that things might not çut our fingers.

ln the name of love we have betrayed love's formative power; We have become merchant~ of love, ~eeking to win in the exchange.

ln the name of kindness we have smothered our outward reaches;

We have consecrated our basenes~ in aped humility. In the name of god we have crucified the seekers of god;

We have wrapped our paucity in the mantle of piety.

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We have blinded our eyes, that we might not see. We have hurried, that we might not think. We have thought, that we might delay the deed. We have dulJed our senses, darkened our mind, dog-tied our

muscles. We are the chiJdren of fear, of pretense, of dishonesty. We are not whole. We are confused. We are weak.

Draw to a point the abundance of this our chaos. Give us integrity, the dustIess mind, the arm that strikes without hate, the unveiled eye, the courage to dare.

Tear down false, makeshift, omate scaffolding. Give us simplicity, humility without pretense, aeonic vision. a heart warm to the instant.

Take away from us our fear, our surface, our refuge. Give us flexibility, joy in coming to be and passing away, the upright stance, the strength for suffering, the strength

of detachment, the strength of love. Tum again the Wheel that in your birth we too may he bom.

We too would stand in our wholeness before the World­Mother.

Stand as you would stand, unfettered, undaunted, distant lov-ing,

Companions in the play of the restless laughing World-Mother, Fellow-doers, fellow-watchers, in the Etemal Play. Undaunted. unfettered, distant, loving ones.

Cast your shadow before us that we may not remain shadows.

Detached-Attachment (PoL 233-234)

Binary stars, twin souls, bird companions on the beach-­Such are the warm heart and the eye of glass. Hold fast both! Give both haven and hearth! Let the heart inform the eye and the eye distill heart's warmth!

There is the grasped love of the Dionysian frenzy:

This love is blind in its fury . This love sinks itself in the heloved.

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This love sees not the heloved. This love loses itself and its beloved.

There is the greedy love of the Promethean molder: This love is only selfs ladder. The beloved is material to be modeled. The beloved is will' s instrument The beloved is bent in the cast of the molder.

There is the gardener's love of the Maitreyan lover: This love is the gard~ner's delight in the tree. This love is the gardener's delight in the tree's growth. This love neither binds nor releases. This eye has distilled this heart and heart has infonned this eye.

There is the grasped detachment of the Buddhist eye: This eye has made itself blind. This eye has repulsed world's c1amor. This eye fears involvement. This is the eye of the self-centered self.

There is the greedy detachment of the Apollonian eye: This eye disdains what it has not yet seen. This eye hides behind Venetian blinds. This eye knows rancor. This is the eye of the complacent self.

There is the gardener' s detachment of the Maitreyan eye: This is the scientist's eye--that things may speak in their

own idiom. This is the artist's eye--that the significance of things may

be savored. This is the moralists eye--that each aspiring thing be freed

to seek its own maturity. The heart has informed thls eye and the eye has distilled heart's warmth.

Love for ail the self he unfettered from each. Love for the Beloved that the self be unfettered from ail. Detachment from the Beloved that heart's warmth be freed

for aIl. Detachment from a11 that hearts warmth be freed for each.

Binary stars, hennit-twain, bird companions on the world's beach--

S uch are the warm heart and the eye of glass. Hold fast to both! Give both haven and hearth! May love inform your eye, and your eye distill heart's warmth!

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Maitreya (1 53-54)

"1 am not the first Buddha who came upon the earth, neither shaH 1 be the last. ln due time another Buddha will arise in the world, a Supremely Enlightened One, endowed with wisdom, knowing the universe, an incomparable leader of men. He will reveal to man the eternal truths which 1 have taught." A vanda said, "How shaH the world know him'!"

The Buddha ~aid: "He will be known as Metteyya which means: He whose name is kindness."

The Pali Canon

For a time of complexity, a complex god. For a lime of mankind, a man-god. For a time of birth, a god in birth.

The mighty engines of life converge on their next desti­nation.

The naseent, the inchoate, the unachieved, the forming, find

their direction and their voice.

To each of the great god-ideaIs belongs a virtue and a vice:

To Apollo, loyality--and inflexibility (the spirit steadfast in the waters of erosion-­the 10ss of the knowledge of when to yield).

To Gotama, detachment--and self-centeredness (the eye freed from the urgencies of the body-­the eye opaque to outward shine).

To Christ, sympathy--and sentimentality (the heart warm to significance beyond itself-­the heart undisciplined in its affection).

To Dionysus, abandonment--and inconsiderateness (the festivity of the abundant body--the feverishness of the self-intoxicated body).

To Mohammed, resolutenesss--and tyranny (the arm finn with the spear of conviction-­the arm arrogant in mailed annour).

To Prometheus, resoursefulness--and aiml~ssness (the hand responsive to the promptings of the self-­the hand severed from the depths of the self).

The virtues. each qualified by each of the others, derme Maitreyan virtue.

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The great composite name of all the virtues is Maitreyan friendIiness.

The vices, each qualified by each of the others. define Maitreyan possessiveness.

The emerging friend in man struggles to the death against possessiveness.

The new god. the sun god. struggles to the death against the demon of his own black hello

Maitreya Sculpture (1 55)

Who could have made you in the many-centered past in the north of India'?

What vast and simple man could so truly say "( am. Look what you could be!"

And so cut across the years to us so utterly complex to vex us in our sea.

And so to challenge us and humble us and stir us that we such worth might he?

Utterance (F 82)

Hear you the selfless laughter that can Buddha after Buddha spawn; that can scorn nothing that blessed before; and fears nothing that the farthest more will bring to sorne future dawn far after .

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Chinese Figure (1 57)

Maitreya, the compassionate Buddha of the future (fifth çentury statue) serene in a Boston rnuseum!

And yet, why not'! It is an old fond Japanese legend that Maitreya, waiting in the far Tusita heaven

for his own epoch, descends again and again to this earth.

Vou rnay have seen hirn even in a bar. Why not in Bos­ton'!

Pathos of Distance (1 56)

He of whom we are but the shadow --how different from us would he bel No doubt we would not recognize him when we walked pa st hirn, nor he our face.

Perhaps even now we have passed him on sorne silent street (for he may ever be near and among us; how would we know'l) and did not greet him as he walk:ed by.

Surely no overt sign would he show. We may have seen him this day sorne place. He may have smiled at us tonight as we passed him on the street. We would not know.

And yet we are the shadow of his substance, and the arrow cast from his bow. W~ are the preparers of his entrance. We are the heralds of his show.

Encounler (1 58)

Drossy, Drossy, so small fruit-fly, a broken wing, and now you die.

A tall Buddha you may have been. Colosal Maitreya 1 may have seen .

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Direction (1 59)

The event shoves forward to its destination. Man enters at last the mid-point region between Gotama and Maltreya. The pointer moves on past dead center, toward the green elation.

Maitreyan Signature (l 62)

His piebald steeds wear a myriad of bells that ring in many heavens and in many hells.

Mi-Lei-Fo (l 58)

"The beUy is capable to contain--it contains the things under Heaven whicl\ are difficult to contain. The broad face is inclined to laugh--to laugh at the laughable men on earth."

Inscription to Mi-Lei-Fo

Tenth-century China monk, careless mountebank of the hempen bag, pot-bellied bonze, fat as a sleepy one, overgrown and idiot child with unschooled voice of Zen, mild and so blank, dressed in rag, perhaps Maitreya once, then in bronze: dunce in rhymes, we permit you your disquise: what is vast must rest at times as foolish wise.

MaitTeya's Legion (1 59)

A new vision of man is growing: of universal man, homo universus.

This is man beyond greed, knowing man, receiving-man, sowing-man, reaping-man.

This is the complex man of complex need, yet as careless and as confident as a seed;

a small finite thing in a growing multiverse, taU in aspiring, in doing, and in bestowing.

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Bodhisattvas (1 60)

We cannot move to splendid isolation; with the struggling ones must we remain.

Their pain congeals into a vast globule, and this we must ourselves assume.

Their smaUest death is our own doom, and for their smallest space must we find room.

To others the face of final pure elation. Our chosen fate is with the human person.

Sailing (1 60)

The way now tends toward Maitreya's ardor. He is far off and cannot be easily reached.

The passage will be immense, and the longing, the doubt, the irresolution, and the despair.

But the ship of man now wends to this stout harbour, this fair intense solution; and it cannot be beached.

Humanity (161)

What to Gotama were the castes are now to us the nations:

formations witholding from men their universality, their humanity.

As centers of aspiration and identity in sorne location. nations are valid.

But as self's boundaries they are squalid. Only with the whole of man are we wholly free .

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Union (1 61)

Science wedded now to Maitreya's vision -­this is man's out to greatness, this is the next embedded human way.

This is Westness linked with Eastness in a new day; this the next elateness, renewal's shout, heal of irresoluteness.

Selflessness needs support of cosmic grandeur. Little and large can we only dare to be if what we envisage can satiate our wonder.

Maitreyan Wisdom (1 62)

This is an overflowering. Do not confuse it with other wisdoms.

Yet no one of them is negated. Each in its voice is elementally essential. This is aIl of them, related and elated.

This is the rejoicing of the mother kingdoms. Their mutual glowing .

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