Wireless Security New Standards for 802.11

Encryption and Authentication

Kazi Khaled Al-ZahidKazi Khaled Al-Zahid

2

Wired vs. Wireless

Wired networks offer more and better security Wired networks offer more and better security options than wirelessoptions than wireless

More thoroughly established standards with More thoroughly established standards with wired networkswired networks

Wireless networks are much more equipment Wireless networks are much more equipment dependent than wired networksdependent than wired networks

Easier to implement security policies on wired Easier to implement security policies on wired networksnetworks

3

802.11b Overview

Standard for wireless networksStandard for wireless networks

– Approved by IEEE in 1999Approved by IEEE in 1999

Two modes: Two modes: infrastructureinfrastructure and and ad hocad hoc

IBSS (ad hoc) mode BSS (infrastructure) mode

4

802.11 802.11 Standards

802.11 The original WLAN Standard. Supports 1 Mbps to 2 Mbps.

802.11a High speed WLAN standard for 5 Ghz band. Supports 54 Mbps.

802.11b WLAN standard for 2.4 Ghz band. Supports 11 Mbps.

802.11e Address quality of service requirements for all IEEE WLAN radiointerfaces.

802.11f Defines inter-access point communications to facilitate multiplevendor-distributed WLAN networks.

802.11g Establishes an additional modulation technique for 2.4 Ghzband. Intended to provide speeds up to 54 Mbps. Includesmuch greater security.

802.11h Defines the spectrum management of the 5 Ghz band for use inEurope and in Asia Pacific.

802.11i Address the current security weaknesses for both authenticationand encryption protocols. The standard encompasses 802.1X,TKIP, and AES protocols.

5

Wireless Security?

Hacking is no longer the esoteric domain of Hacking is no longer the esoteric domain of the techno-elite. Most often done by young the techno-elite. Most often done by young males ages 15-25 that have extensive males ages 15-25 that have extensive computer programming knowledge.computer programming knowledge.

Variety of reasons from simple curiosity all Variety of reasons from simple curiosity all the way to achieving terrorist ideals.the way to achieving terrorist ideals.

Most often used for identity theft and Most often used for identity theft and industrial espionage.industrial espionage.

6

Security Risks of Wireless LANs

Easier for unauthorized devices to attach to wireless Easier for unauthorized devices to attach to wireless networknetwork

- Don’t need physical accessDon’t need physical access

- Many organizations don’t apply securityMany organizations don’t apply security

- Presence of free wireless hacking tools Presence of free wireless hacking tools

Internal systems are usually not as secure as external Internal systems are usually not as secure as external or DMZ systemsor DMZ systems

7

Business Risks of Wireless LANs

A wireless attacker could affect you business in A wireless attacker could affect you business in the following ways:the following ways:

• Ability to destroy dataAbility to destroy data

• Ability to steal proprietary data from client Ability to steal proprietary data from client workstations and serversworkstations and servers

• Disruption of network service through Disruption of network service through corruption of network devicescorruption of network devices

RISK: Inability to meet core business and RISK: Inability to meet core business and customer needs that could lead to loss of customer needs that could lead to loss of revenuerevenue

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Security Risks INTRODUCED by Wireless Technology Rogue Access PointsRogue Access Points

Clients Communicating in Ad Hoc ModeClients Communicating in Ad Hoc Mode

Computerworld survey estimate at least 30 percent of businesses Computerworld survey estimate at least 30 percent of businesses have rogue wireless LANs.have rogue wireless LANs.

9

Original 802.11 Security

Service set identifier (SSID) Service set identifier (SSID)

– A simple code that identifies the WLAN. A simple code that identifies the WLAN.

– Clients must be configured with the correct SSID to Clients must be configured with the correct SSID to access their WLAN. access their WLAN.

Media access control (MAC) Media access control (MAC)

– MAC address filtering restricts WLAN access to MAC address filtering restricts WLAN access to computers that are on a list you create for each access computers that are on a list you create for each access point on your WLAN. point on your WLAN.

Wired equivalent privacy (WEP) Wired equivalent privacy (WEP)

– Encryption and authentication scheme that protects Encryption and authentication scheme that protects WLAN data streams between clients and access points WLAN data streams between clients and access points (AP) This was discovered to have flaws.(AP) This was discovered to have flaws.

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Access Point SSID

Service Set Identifier (SSID) differentiates one access Service Set Identifier (SSID) differentiates one access point from anotherpoint from another

– By default, access point broadcasts its SSID in plaintext “beacon By default, access point broadcasts its SSID in plaintext “beacon frames” every few secondsframes” every few seconds

Default SSIDs are easily guessableDefault SSIDs are easily guessable

– Linksys defaults to “linksys”, Cisco to “tsunami”, etc.Linksys defaults to “linksys”, Cisco to “tsunami”, etc.

– This gives away the fact that access point is activeThis gives away the fact that access point is active

Access point settings can be changed to prevent it Access point settings can be changed to prevent it from announcing its presence in beacon frames and from announcing its presence in beacon frames and from using an easily guessable SSIDfrom using an easily guessable SSID

– But then every user must know SSID in advanceBut then every user must know SSID in advance

11

Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP)

Special-purpose protocol for 802.11bSpecial-purpose protocol for 802.11b

– Intended to make wireless as secure as wired networkIntended to make wireless as secure as wired network

Goals: confidentiality, integrity, authenticationGoals: confidentiality, integrity, authentication

Assumes that a secret key is shared between access Assumes that a secret key is shared between access point and clientpoint and client

Uses RC4 stream cipher seeded with 24-bit Uses RC4 stream cipher seeded with 24-bit initialization vector and 40-bit keyinitialization vector and 40-bit key

– Terrible design choice for wireless environmentTerrible design choice for wireless environment

– In SSL, we will see how RC4 can be used properlyIn SSL, we will see how RC4 can be used properly

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WEP Flaws

Two basic flaws undermined its use for Two basic flaws undermined its use for protection against other than the casual browser protection against other than the casual browser - eavesdropper- eavesdropper

– No defined method for encryption key refresh or distributionNo defined method for encryption key refresh or distribution

• Pre-shared keys were set once at installation and rarely Pre-shared keys were set once at installation and rarely if ever changedif ever changed

– Use of RC4 which was designed to be a one-time cipher not Use of RC4 which was designed to be a one-time cipher not intended for multiple message useintended for multiple message use

• But because the pre-shared key is rarely changed, But because the pre-shared key is rarely changed, same key used over and oversame key used over and over

• Attacker monitors traffic and finds enough examples to Attacker monitors traffic and finds enough examples to work out the plaintext from message contextwork out the plaintext from message context

• With knowledge of the cipertext and plaintext, can With knowledge of the cipertext and plaintext, can compute the keycompute the key

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Encryption

WEP FlawWEP Flaw

– Takes about 10,000 packets to discover the keyTakes about 10,000 packets to discover the key

– Large amounts of known data is the fastest way of Large amounts of known data is the fastest way of determining as many keystreams as possibledetermining as many keystreams as possible

– The information may be as innocuous as the fields in The information may be as innocuous as the fields in the protocol header or the DNS name querythe protocol header or the DNS name query

– Monitoring is passive so undetectableMonitoring is passive so undetectable

– Simple tools and instructions freely available to spit out Simple tools and instructions freely available to spit out the keythe key

– Legal experts postulate this type of monitoring may not Legal experts postulate this type of monitoring may not be illegalbe illegal

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Other Problems

SSID (service set identifier)SSID (service set identifier)

– Identifies the 802.11 devices that belong to a Basic Identifies the 802.11 devices that belong to a Basic Service Set (BSS).Service Set (BSS).

– A BSS is analogous to a LAN segment in wired termsA BSS is analogous to a LAN segment in wired terms

– SSID is meant as a method to identify what Service Set SSID is meant as a method to identify what Service Set you want to communicate with; you want to communicate with; not as a security layer not as a security layer authenticationauthentication

– Even when using WEP, the SSID remains fully visibleEven when using WEP, the SSID remains fully visible

– Some mgfr even allow the WLAN cards to poll for the Some mgfr even allow the WLAN cards to poll for the SSID and self configureSSID and self configure

15

Other Problems

MAC (media access control)MAC (media access control)

– Possible to restrict access by MAC address on many AP Possible to restrict access by MAC address on many AP (access points) by means of an ACL(access points) by means of an ACL

– All standards compliant NIC cards, including WLAN cards, All standards compliant NIC cards, including WLAN cards, should have unique MAC, some software allow this address should have unique MAC, some software allow this address to be ‘spoofed’to be ‘spoofed’

Spoofing WirelessSpoofing Wireless

– Is easyIs easy

– Unlike internet devices which have routing issues to Unlike internet devices which have routing issues to overcome, IP addresses of wireless devices can be manually overcome, IP addresses of wireless devices can be manually changed at willchanged at will

– Some networks systems serve up the IP address dynamicallySome networks systems serve up the IP address dynamically

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Do Not Do This

[courtesy of Brian Lee]

IngredientsIngredients: Laptop (with 802.11b card, GPS, Netstumbler, Airsnort,: Laptop (with 802.11b card, GPS, Netstumbler, Airsnort,

Ethereal) and the car of your choiceEthereal) and the car of your choice

Drive around, use Netstumbler to map out active wireless networks Drive around, use Netstumbler to map out active wireless networks and (using GPS) their access pointsand (using GPS) their access points

If network is encrypted, park the car, start Airsnort, leave it be for a If network is encrypted, park the car, start Airsnort, leave it be for a few hoursfew hours

– Airsnort will passively listen to encrypted network traffic and, after 5-10 million Airsnort will passively listen to encrypted network traffic and, after 5-10 million packets, extract the encryption keypackets, extract the encryption key

Once the encryption key is compromised, connect to the network as Once the encryption key is compromised, connect to the network as if there is no encryption at allif there is no encryption at all

Alternative: use Ethereal (or packet sniffer of your choice) to listen to Alternative: use Ethereal (or packet sniffer of your choice) to listen to decrypted traffic and analyzedecrypted traffic and analyze

Many networks are even Many networks are even lessless secure secure

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Weak Countermeasures

Run VPN on top of wirelessRun VPN on top of wireless

– Treat wireless as you would an Treat wireless as you would an insecureinsecure wired network wired network

– VPNs have their own security and performance issues VPNs have their own security and performance issues

• Compromise of one client may compromise entire networkCompromise of one client may compromise entire network

Hide SSID of your access pointHide SSID of your access point

– Still, raw packets will reveal SSID (it is not encrypted!)Still, raw packets will reveal SSID (it is not encrypted!)

Have each access point maintain a list of network Have each access point maintain a list of network cards addresses that are allowed to connect to itcards addresses that are allowed to connect to it

– Infeasible for large networksInfeasible for large networks

– Attacker can sniff a packet from a legitimate card, then re-code Attacker can sniff a packet from a legitimate card, then re-code (spoof) his card to use a legitimate address(spoof) his card to use a legitimate address

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Fixing the Problem

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

– Developers can choose their own authentication methodDevelopers can choose their own authentication method

• Cisco EAP-LEAP (passwords), Microsoft EAP-TLS (public-key Cisco EAP-LEAP (passwords), Microsoft EAP-TLS (public-key certificates), PEAP (passwords OR certificates), etc.certificates), PEAP (passwords OR certificates), etc.

802.11i 802.11i standard fixes 802.11b problemsstandard fixes 802.11b problems

– Patch: TKIP. Still RC4, but encrypts IVs and establishes new shared Patch: TKIP. Still RC4, but encrypts IVs and establishes new shared keys for every 10 KBytes transmittedkeys for every 10 KBytes transmitted

• No keystream re-use, prevents exploitation of RC4 weaknessesNo keystream re-use, prevents exploitation of RC4 weaknesses

• Use same network card, only upgrade firmware Use same network card, only upgrade firmware

– Long-term: AES in CCMP mode, 128-bit keys, 48-bit IVsLong-term: AES in CCMP mode, 128-bit keys, 48-bit IVs

• Block cipher (in special mode) instead of stream cipherBlock cipher (in special mode) instead of stream cipher

• Requires new network card hardwareRequires new network card hardware

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Improved Security Standards

802.1x Authentication (2001)802.1x Authentication (2001)

WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) (2002)WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) (2002)

802.11i (2003-4)802.11i (2003-4)

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802.1X Authentication and EAP

802.1X802.1X

– Framework to control port access between devices, AP, and Framework to control port access between devices, AP, and serversservers

Uses Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Uses Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (RFC 2284) (RFC 2284)

– Uses dynamic keys instead of the WEP authentication static Uses dynamic keys instead of the WEP authentication static keykey

– Requires mutual authentication protocolRequires mutual authentication protocol

– User’s transmission must go thru WLAN AP to reach User’s transmission must go thru WLAN AP to reach authentication server performing the authenticationauthentication server performing the authentication

• Permits number of authentication methodsPermits number of authentication methods

• RADIUS is the market de facto standardRADIUS is the market de facto standard

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EAP Types

EAP-TLS (RFC 2716)EAP-TLS (RFC 2716)

– EAP is extension of PPP providing for additional EAP is extension of PPP providing for additional authentication methodsauthentication methods

– TLS provides for mutual authentication and session key TLS provides for mutual authentication and session key exchangeexchange

– Negotiated mutual key becomes Master-Key for 802.11 Negotiated mutual key becomes Master-Key for 802.11 TKIPTKIP

– Requires client & server certificates (PKI based)Requires client & server certificates (PKI based)

– Deployed by Microsoft for its corporate networkDeployed by Microsoft for its corporate network

– Shipping in Windows 2000 and XPShipping in Windows 2000 and XP

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Other EAP Types EAP-TTLSEAP-TTLS

– ““Tunneled” TLS -- -- uses two TLS sessions Tunneled” TLS -- -- uses two TLS sessions

• Outer--TLS session with Server certificate for Outer--TLS session with Server certificate for server authentication server authentication

• Inner Inner--TLS session using certificates at both Inner Inner--TLS session using certificates at both ends and passwordends and password

– Protects user’s identity from intermediary entitiesProtects user’s identity from intermediary entities

PEAPPEAP

– Similar to EAP-TTLS, but only allows EAP for authenticationSimilar to EAP-TTLS, but only allows EAP for authentication

– Server authentication via Server certificateServer authentication via Server certificate

• User’s password delivered through SSL protected channelUser’s password delivered through SSL protected channel

• Session continues when user’s password verified Session continues when user’s password verified

– Client-side certificate optionalClient-side certificate optional

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WPA Interim 802.11 Security

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)

Interim Solution between WEP and 802.11iInterim Solution between WEP and 802.11i

– Plugs holes in legacy 802.11 devices; typically requires Plugs holes in legacy 802.11 devices; typically requires firmware or driver upgrade, but not new hardwarefirmware or driver upgrade, but not new hardware

– Subset of the 802.11i and is forward compatibleSubset of the 802.11i and is forward compatible

Sponsored by the Wi-Fi AllianceSponsored by the Wi-Fi Alliance

– Will require WPA for current certificationsWill require WPA for current certifications

Support announced by Microsoft, Intel, othersSupport announced by Microsoft, Intel, others

– ColubrisColubris– Funk SftwFunk Sftw– IntesilIntesil

– ProximProxim– ResonextResonext– TITI

– AgereAgere– AtherosAtheros– AthnelAthnel

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WPA

Improves WEP encryptionImproves WEP encryption

Based on TKIP protocol and algorithmBased on TKIP protocol and algorithm

– Changes the way keys are derived Changes the way keys are derived

– Refreshes keys more oftenRefreshes keys more often

– Adds message integrity control to prevent packet forgeriesAdds message integrity control to prevent packet forgeries

Benefits Benefits

– Encryption weakness improved but not solvedEncryption weakness improved but not solved

– Some concern that TKIP may degrade WLAN Some concern that TKIP may degrade WLAN performance without hardware acceleratorperformance without hardware accelerator

– But protects current device investment But protects current device investment

– Will be available sooner than 802.11iWill be available sooner than 802.11i

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WPA

Works similarly to 802.1X authenticationWorks similarly to 802.1X authentication

– Both Clients and AP must be WPA enabled for Both Clients and AP must be WPA enabled for encryption to and from 802.1X EAP serverencryption to and from 802.1X EAP server

– Key in a pass phrase (master key) in both client and APKey in a pass phrase (master key) in both client and AP

– If pass phrase matches, then AP allows entry to the If pass phrase matches, then AP allows entry to the networknetwork

– Pass phrase remains constant, but a new encryption Pass phrase remains constant, but a new encryption key is generated for each sessionkey is generated for each session

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TKIP

Temporal Key Integrity ProtocolTemporal Key Integrity Protocol

– Quick fix to overcome the the reuse of encryption key Quick fix to overcome the the reuse of encryption key problem with WEPproblem with WEP

– Combines the pre-shared key with the client’s MAC and Combines the pre-shared key with the client’s MAC and and larger IV to ensure each client uses different key and larger IV to ensure each client uses different key streamstream

– Still uses WEP RC4, but changes temporal key every Still uses WEP RC4, but changes temporal key every 10K packets10K packets

– Mandates use of MIC (Michael) to prevent packet forgeryMandates use of MIC (Michael) to prevent packet forgery

BenefitsBenefits

– Uses existing device calculation capabilities to perform Uses existing device calculation capabilities to perform the encryption operationsthe encryption operations

– Improves security, but is still only a short-term fixImproves security, but is still only a short-term fix

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New 802.11i Security

Addresses the main problems of WEP and Addresses the main problems of WEP and Shared-Key AuthenticationShared-Key Authentication

– Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)

– Message Integrity Control ~ MichaelMessage Integrity Control ~ Michael

– AES Encryption replacement for RC4AES Encryption replacement for RC4

– Robust Security Network (RSN)Robust Security Network (RSN)

Require new wireless hardwareRequire new wireless hardware

Ratification ~ YE 2003Ratification ~ YE 2003

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Robust Security Network

RSN uses Dynamic NegotiationRSN uses Dynamic Negotiation

– For authentication and encryption algorithms between For authentication and encryption algorithms between AP and client devicesAP and client devices

– Authentication is based on 802.1X and EAPAuthentication is based on 802.1X and EAP

– AES EncryptionAES Encryption

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How RSN Works

11. Client sends request for association and security negotiation to AP, which forward to WLAN switch.. Client sends request for association and security negotiation to AP, which forward to WLAN switch.

2. WLAN switch passes request to Authentication Server (RADIUS).2. WLAN switch passes request to Authentication Server (RADIUS).

3. RADIUS authenticates client.3. RADIUS authenticates client.

4. Switch and client initiate 4 way key negotiation to create unique session key. Switch pushes key, 4. Switch and client initiate 4 way key negotiation to create unique session key. Switch pushes key, which is AES encrypted to AP. AES encrypts all data traffic.which is AES encrypted to AP. AES encrypts all data traffic.

ClientAccessPoint

WLANSwitch

EthernetSwitch

RADIUSServer

1. 2. 3.

4

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Final Words

802.11 is truly useful technology802.11 is truly useful technology

Wireless networking will continue to expandWireless networking will continue to expand

As the networking standards change so will the As the networking standards change so will the security issuessecurity issues

Network security specialists need to understand Network security specialists need to understand wireless networking; and vice versawireless networking; and vice versa

Start evaluating and deploying new security standardsStart evaluating and deploying new security standards

SANS Institute Information Security Reading RoomSANS Institute Information Security Reading Room

– http://www.sans.org/rr/wireless/http://www.sans.org/rr/wireless/

NIST Wireless Network SecurityNIST Wireless Network Security

– http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/draft-sp800-48.pdfhttp://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/draft-sp800-48.pdf

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802.11a Works at 40mhz, in the 5ghz rangeWorks at 40mhz, in the 5ghz range

THEORETICAL transfer rates of up to 54mpbsTHEORETICAL transfer rates of up to 54mpbs

ACTUAL transfer rates of about 26.4mbpsACTUAL transfer rates of about 26.4mbps

Limited in use because it is almost a line of sight Limited in use because it is almost a line of sight transmittal which necessitates multiple WAP’s transmittal which necessitates multiple WAP’s (wireless access points)(wireless access points)

Cannot operate in same range as 802.11b/gCannot operate in same range as 802.11b/g

Absorbed more easily than other wireless Absorbed more easily than other wireless implementationsimplementations

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802.11b – “WiFi”

Operates at 20mhz, in the 2.4ghz rangeOperates at 20mhz, in the 2.4ghz range

Most widely used and accepted form of wireless networkingMost widely used and accepted form of wireless networking

THEORETICAL speeds of up to 11mbpsTHEORETICAL speeds of up to 11mbps

ACTUAL speeds depend on implementationACTUAL speeds depend on implementation

– 5.9mbps when TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is used 5.9mbps when TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is used

(error checking)(error checking)

– 7.1mbps when UDP (User Datagram Protocol) is used 7.1mbps when UDP (User Datagram Protocol) is used

(no error checking)(no error checking)

Can transmit up to 8km in the city;Can transmit up to 8km in the city;

rural environments may be longer if a line of sight can be establishedrural environments may be longer if a line of sight can be established

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802.11b - “WiFi” (cont.)

Not as easily absorbed as 802.11a signalNot as easily absorbed as 802.11a signal

Can cause or receive interference from:Can cause or receive interference from:

– Microwave ovens (microwaves in general)Microwave ovens (microwaves in general)

– Wireless telephonesWireless telephones

– Other wireless appliances operating in the same Other wireless appliances operating in the same frequencyfrequency

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802.11g - “Super G” Operates at the same frequency range as 802.11bOperates at the same frequency range as 802.11b

THEORETICAL throughput of 54mpbs THEORETICAL throughput of 54mpbs

ACTUAL transmission rate is dependent on several ACTUAL transmission rate is dependent on several factors, but averages 24.7mbpsfactors, but averages 24.7mbps

Logical upgrade from 802.11b wireless networks – Logical upgrade from 802.11b wireless networks – backwards compatibilitybackwards compatibility

Suffers from same limitations as 802.11b networkSuffers from same limitations as 802.11b network

System may suffer significant decrease in network System may suffer significant decrease in network speeds if network is not completely upgraded from speeds if network is not completely upgraded from 802.11b802.11b

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802.11n (Ultranet)

Standards in discussion now; should Standards in discussion now; should be completed by the end of 2006be completed by the end of 2006

REAL throughput of at least 100mbpsREAL throughput of at least 100mbps

– 4 – 5 times faster than 802.11g/a 4 – 5 times faster than 802.11g/a

– 20 times faster than 802.11b!20 times faster than 802.11b!

Better distance than 802.11a/b/gBetter distance than 802.11a/b/g

Being designed with speed and Being designed with speed and security in mindsecurity in mind

Perfect compliment for WWW2Perfect compliment for WWW2

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Wireless Networking Categories

Personal Area NetworkingPersonal Area Networking

– Bluetooth, UWBBluetooth, UWB

Local Area NetworkingLocal Area Networking

– IEEE 802.11 (a, b, g)IEEE 802.11 (a, b, g)

– HomeRFHomeRF

– Packet Radio 900mhz ISMPacket Radio 900mhz ISM

Wide Area NetworkingWide Area Networking

– 2.5-3G cellular2.5-3G cellular

– BlackberryBlackberry

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Rogue Device Threat

Can make your network vulnerable…Can make your network vulnerable…

Even with a secure wireless networkEven with a secure wireless network

Even if you have no wireless networkEven if you have no wireless network

Both Access Points and Clients are Both Access Points and Clients are dangerousdangerous

GoalGoal

Protect network jacksProtect network jacks

Identify unauthorized wireless devicesIdentify unauthorized wireless devices

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WarChalking

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Wireless Tools

Types of Monitoring toolsTypes of Monitoring tools

– StumblingStumbling

– SniffingSniffing

– HandheldHandheld

Hacking toolsHacking tools

– WEP CrackingWEP Cracking

– ARP SpoofingARP Spoofing

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Stumbling Tools

Stumbling tools identify the presence of Stumbling tools identify the presence of wireless networks. They look for beacons wireless networks. They look for beacons from access points, and also broadcast client from access points, and also broadcast client probes and wait for access points to respond.probes and wait for access points to respond.

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Netstumbler

http://www.netstumbler.comhttp://www.netstumbler.com

– FreeFree

– Window based Window based

– Very simple GUIVery simple GUI

– GPS capableGPS capable

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Wellenreiter

http://www.remote-exploit.orghttp://www.remote-exploit.org

– FreeFree

– Linux based Linux based

– Supports many Supports many

wireless cardswireless cards

– GPS capableGPS capable

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Other Stumbling Tools MacStumbler (MAC)MacStumbler (MAC)

http://homepage.mac.com/macstumbler/http://homepage.mac.com/macstumbler/

MiniStumbler (PocketPC)MiniStumbler (PocketPC)

http://www.netstumbler.com/download.php?op=getit&lid=21http://www.netstumbler.com/download.php?op=getit&lid=21

Mognet (JAVA)Mognet (JAVA)

http://chocobospore.org/mognet/http://chocobospore.org/mognet/

BSD-AirTools – dstumbler (BSD)BSD-AirTools – dstumbler (BSD)

http://www.dachb0den.com/projects/bsd-airtools.htmlhttp://www.dachb0den.com/projects/bsd-airtools.html

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Sniffing Tools

Sniffing tools capture the traffic from a Sniffing tools capture the traffic from a wireless network and can view the data wireless network and can view the data passed across the air. passed across the air.

46

Kismit

http://www.kismetwireless.nethttp://www.kismetwireless.net

– FreeFree

– Linux based Linux based

– GPS capableGPS capable

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AiroPeek

http://www.wildpackets.com/products/airopeekhttp://www.wildpackets.com/products/airopeek

– Must pay for itMust pay for it

– Windows based Windows based

– Real timeReal time

packet decodingpacket decoding

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Other Sniffing Tools

AirTraf (Linux) AirTraf (Linux)

http://airtraf.sourceforge.net/index.phphttp://airtraf.sourceforge.net/index.php

Ethereal (All OS’s) Ethereal (All OS’s)

http://www.ethereal.com/http://www.ethereal.com/

Sniffer Wireless (Windows, PocketPC)Sniffer Wireless (Windows, PocketPC)

http://www.sniffer.com/products/sniffer-wireless/http://www.sniffer.com/products/sniffer-wireless/default.asp?A=3default.asp?A=3

BSD-AirTools - Prism2dump (BSD)BSD-AirTools - Prism2dump (BSD)

http://www.dachb0den.com/projects/bsd-airtools.htmlhttp://www.dachb0den.com/projects/bsd-airtools.html

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Handheld Tools

Handheld tools are more portable and provide Handheld tools are more portable and provide wireless network identification and network wireless network identification and network status monitoring. status monitoring.

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AirMagnet

http://www.airmagnet.com/ http://www.airmagnet.com/

– Pocket PC basedPocket PC based

51

Waverunner

http://www.flukenetworks.com/us/LAN/Handheld+Testers/http://www.flukenetworks.com/us/LAN/Handheld+Testers/WaveRunner/Overview.html WaveRunner/Overview.html

– Linux kernal on iPaqLinux kernal on iPaq

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Other Handheld Tools

Kismet (Linux, Sharp Zaurus) Kismet (Linux, Sharp Zaurus)

http://www.kismetwireless.nethttp://www.kismetwireless.net

IBM Wireless Security Auditor (Linux, iPaq)IBM Wireless Security Auditor (Linux, iPaq)

http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/wsa/http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/wsa/

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Hacking Tools

Hacking tools are for pointed attacks to gain Hacking tools are for pointed attacks to gain access to secured wireless networks. access to secured wireless networks.

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WEP Cracking Tools

WEPCrackWEPCrack

http://wepcrack.sourceforge.net/ http://wepcrack.sourceforge.net/

AirSnort AirSnort

http://sourceforge.net/projects/airsnort/http://sourceforge.net/projects/airsnort/

BSD-Tools dweputils BSD-Tools dweputils

http://www.dachb0den.com/projects/dweputils.htmlhttp://www.dachb0den.com/projects/dweputils.html

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ARP Spoofing MitM Tools

libradiatelibradiate

http://www.packetfactory.net/projects/radiate/http://www.packetfactory.net/projects/radiate/

ettercapettercap

http://ettercap.sourceforge.nethttp://ettercap.sourceforge.net

dsniff dsniff

http://naughty.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/http://naughty.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/

AirJack AirJack

http://802.11ninja.nethttp://802.11ninja.net

Wireless Security Monitoring

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Need For Wireless Security Monitoring To protect the Wired network from Wireless To protect the Wired network from Wireless

Technology:Technology:

– To Identify and locate wireless devices within the To Identify and locate wireless devices within the organizationorganization

– Provide method of responseProvide method of response

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Effective Wireless Security Monitoring Complete area coverageComplete area coverage

24/7 monitoring24/7 monitoring

Remote distributed sensors Remote distributed sensors

Central data aggregation and analysisCentral data aggregation and analysis

Integration into enterprise network managementIntegration into enterprise network management

ScalabilityScalability

Wireless Monitoring Product Types

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Products that Scan Wired Network for Access Points

ISS Internet ScannerISS Internet Scanner

http://www.iss.nethttp://www.iss.net

Foundstone FoundscanFoundstone Foundscan

http://www.foundstone.comhttp://www.foundstone.com

QualysQualys

http://www.qualys.comhttp://www.qualys.com

NmapNmap

http://www.insecure.org/nmap/http://www.insecure.org/nmap/

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Wireless Clients (laptop or PDA) walked around facility

NetstumblerNetstumbler

http://www.netstumbler.comhttp://www.netstumbler.com

KismetKismet

http://www.kismetwireless.nethttp://www.kismetwireless.net

WellenreiterWellenreiter

http://www.remote-exploit.orghttp://www.remote-exploit.org

Air MagnetAir Magnet

http://www.airmagnet.com/ http://www.airmagnet.com/

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Enterprise Wireless Monitoring Solutions

Air DefenseAir Defense

http://www.airdefense.net/ http://www.airdefense.net/

IBM Distributed Wireless Security AuditorIBM Distributed Wireless Security Auditor

http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/dwsa/http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/dwsa/

IsomairIsomair

http://www.isomair.com/http://www.isomair.com/

NETSEC Wireless Security Monitoring NETSEC Wireless Security Monitoring ServiceService

http://www.netsec.net/http://www.netsec.net/

Wireless Security Answer

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Wireless can be Secure Apply all security features of productsApply all security features of products

Require Authentication and Authorization and Require Authentication and Authorization and EncryptionEncryption

Use the same well known network security Use the same well known network security solutions as wired networks including:solutions as wired networks including:

– Network segmentation Network segmentation

– Use of personal firewallsUse of personal firewalls

– Well defined, trainable, and enforceable security policyWell defined, trainable, and enforceable security policy

Perform Wireless Security MonitoringPerform Wireless Security Monitoring

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My Favorite Wireless URLs

Wireless Security LinksWireless Security Links

– http://bengross.com/wireless.htmlhttp://bengross.com/wireless.html

– http://www.wirelessanarchy.com/http://www.wirelessanarchy.com/

Wireless Industry NewsWireless Industry News

– http://www.80211-planet.com/http://www.80211-planet.com/

Wireless BlogsWireless Blogs

– http://www.wardriving.com/http://www.wardriving.com/

– http://80211b.weblogger.com/http://80211b.weblogger.com/

Mailing ListsMailing Lists

– wireless-subscribe@kismetwireless.netwireless-subscribe@kismetwireless.net

– wirelesslan-subscribe@yahoogroups.comwirelesslan-subscribe@yahoogroups.com

Limitation of Wireless Networks

AvailabilityAvailability

EnvironmentalEnvironmental

Adding DevicesAdding Devices

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Availability

Wireless becoming more and more available as Wireless becoming more and more available as time passestime passes

Wireless data networks are growing at roughly the Wireless data networks are growing at roughly the same rate as cellular telephone networks with same rate as cellular telephone networks with comparable coveragecomparable coverage

Does not rely on laying cables for connectivityDoes not rely on laying cables for connectivity

Network cannot be accessed in situations where Network cannot be accessed in situations where RF signals have interferenceRF signals have interference

Largely inaccessible in rural areasLargely inaccessible in rural areas

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Environmental WeatherWeather

– Rain, lightening affect RF signalsRain, lightening affect RF signals

– Solar flaresSolar flares

RF interference from ambient sources or other RF interference from ambient sources or other RF devicesRF devices

– Microwave towersMicrowave towers

– Radio towersRadio towers

Electromagnetic interferenceElectromagnetic interference

– GeneratorsGenerators

– Power plantsPower plants

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Adding Devices

Extending range requires additional WAP’sExtending range requires additional WAP’s

Not always a viable optionNot always a viable option

Possible conflicts between 802.11b and 802.11g Possible conflicts between 802.11b and 802.11g cause significant speed decrease in networkcause significant speed decrease in network

Opens network up to more attacksOpens network up to more attacks

Non-conflicting SSIDs (Service Set Identifiers)Non-conflicting SSIDs (Service Set Identifiers)

– SSID’s are numbers that identify wireless devices on a SSID’s are numbers that identify wireless devices on a network.network.

– When SSIDs are not set dynamicallyWhen SSIDs are not set dynamically

Security Issues

Wired vs. WirelessWired vs. Wireless

Hacking and CrackingHacking and Cracking

Types of AttacksTypes of Attacks

Open NetworksOpen Networks

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Wired vs. Wireless

Wired networks offer more and better security Wired networks offer more and better security options than wirelessoptions than wireless

More thoroughly established standards with More thoroughly established standards with wired networkswired networks

Wireless networks are much more equipment Wireless networks are much more equipment dependent than wired networksdependent than wired networks

Easier to implement security policies on wired Easier to implement security policies on wired networksnetworks

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Hacking and Cracking

Wired networks less susceptible to hackers/crackersWired networks less susceptible to hackers/crackers

RF signals allow for more unauthorized attemptsRF signals allow for more unauthorized attempts

Ubiquitous wireless networking devices allow accessUbiquitous wireless networking devices allow access

HackingHacking

– Gaining unauthorized access to networks/devices Gaining unauthorized access to networks/devices

by algorithms or penetration programs by algorithms or penetration programs

CrackingCracking

– Extending the use of devices past original intentionsExtending the use of devices past original intentions

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Common Hacking & Cracking Techniques and Devices Referred to as “Wardrivers” or “Warchalkers”Referred to as “Wardrivers” or “Warchalkers”

Use PDA’s, laptops, scanners, tablets or any Use PDA’s, laptops, scanners, tablets or any WiFi enabled devicesWiFi enabled devices

Underground networks list and update open Underground networks list and update open networks that are waiting to be exploitednetworks that are waiting to be exploited

Attack weak keys or sniff messages going Attack weak keys or sniff messages going over the network to determine SSID rangeover the network to determine SSID range

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Types of Attacks

Man in the Middle AttacksMan in the Middle Attacks

– Attacker intercepts identification information of the sending and receiving parties.Attacker intercepts identification information of the sending and receiving parties.

– Substitutes own key in both situationsSubstitutes own key in both situations

– Gives access to all information passed between partiesGives access to all information passed between parties

Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of ServiceDenial of Service or Distributed Denial of Service

– TCP SYN ACK Flood or Buffer Overrun – Typical DoSTCP SYN ACK Flood or Buffer Overrun – Typical DoS

– Illicit servers used to set up zombie machines for a DDoSIllicit servers used to set up zombie machines for a DDoS

Social EngineeringSocial Engineering

– Most prevalent form of network attacksMost prevalent form of network attacks

– Hardest to defend against because it involves human natureHardest to defend against because it involves human nature

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Types of Attacks (cont.) ““Weak key” attacksWeak key” attacks

– Involve algorithms in RC4 hashing algorithm and WEP Involve algorithms in RC4 hashing algorithm and WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)(Wired Equivalent Privacy)

– Both implementations use easily broken algorithmsBoth implementations use easily broken algorithms

– WEP has been broken in under 2 hoursWEP has been broken in under 2 hours

Dictionary attacksDictionary attacks

– Attackers use pre-populated list of frequently used Attackers use pre-populated list of frequently used passwords and regular wordspasswords and regular words

Birthday attacksBirthday attacks

– A complicated algorithmic attackA complicated algorithmic attack

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Open Networks

Most often associated with home networksMost often associated with home networks

Networks are the target of hackers that “wardrive.”Networks are the target of hackers that “wardrive.”

Result of wireless networks that are either Result of wireless networks that are either unsecured entirely or are using weak WEP keysunsecured entirely or are using weak WEP keys

Effects can be devastatingEffects can be devastating

Mitigating Risks on a Wireless Network

or

How I learned to love WLANS and stop How I learned to love WLANS and stop fearing the Wardriversfearing the Wardrivers

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Wireless Networks

Ensure all unused ports are closedEnsure all unused ports are closed

– Any open ports must be justifiedAny open ports must be justified

– ““Pessimistic” network viewPessimistic” network view

Enforce the rule of least accessEnforce the rule of least access

Ensure SSIDs are changed regularlyEnsure SSIDs are changed regularly

Ensure insurance and authentication Ensure insurance and authentication standards created and enforcedstandards created and enforced

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Encryption and Data Insurance USE STRONG ENCRYPTION!!USE STRONG ENCRYPTION!!

– SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm)SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm)

End to End EncryptionEnd to End Encryption

– Initiate encryption at user and end at server that is Initiate encryption at user and end at server that is behind the firewall, outside the DMZbehind the firewall, outside the DMZ

Treat WLANs as untrusted networks that must Treat WLANs as untrusted networks that must operate inside the DMZoperate inside the DMZ

Access trusted network via VPN and two-factor Access trusted network via VPN and two-factor authenticationauthentication

Increase application securityIncrease application security

– Possibly through use of an enterprise application Possibly through use of an enterprise application systemsystem

– Minimally through increased encryptionMinimally through increased encryption

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Encryption and Data Insurance Do not, under any circumstances, Do not, under any circumstances,

allow ad hoc WLANSallow ad hoc WLANS

Embrace and employ the 802.11i Embrace and employ the 802.11i IEEE security standardIEEE security standard

– Native per user access controlNative per user access control

– Native strong authentication Native strong authentication

(tokens, smartcards and certificates)(tokens, smartcards and certificates)

– Native strong encryptionNative strong encryption

Best bet for new wireless Best bet for new wireless networksnetworks

Wireless Future

““To the future and beyond!!”To the future and beyond!!”

-Buzz Lightyear-Buzz Lightyear

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IPv4 Moving to IPv6 IPv4 changing to IPv6IPv4 changing to IPv6

– US currently using IPv4; consists of four 8 bit fields US currently using IPv4; consists of four 8 bit fields (255.255.255.255)(255.255.255.255)

– When initially created, US received lion share of IP addresses; When initially created, US received lion share of IP addresses; Europe and Asia left with remainderEurope and Asia left with remainder

IPv6 is the futureIPv6 is the future

– Already in use in Asia and EuropeAlready in use in Asia and Europe

– Limited implementation in use Limited implementation in use

(RFID’s and shipping ports)(RFID’s and shipping ports)

New devices currently on marketNew devices currently on market

– NetgearNetgear

– CiscoCisco

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Pros of IPv6

Eliminates the need for SSIDsEliminates the need for SSIDs

– Every device will have its own IP addressEvery device will have its own IP address

– Billions of unique IP addressesBillions of unique IP addresses

– Eliminates the need for NAT (natural address translation)Eliminates the need for NAT (natural address translation)

Can accept a range of IP addressesCan accept a range of IP addresses

Minimizes hackers/crackers ability to penetrate networksMinimizes hackers/crackers ability to penetrate networks

Increases scalabilityIncreases scalability

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Cons

Cost of Change OverCost of Change Over

– Current infrastructure cannot be used unless it is already Current infrastructure cannot be used unless it is already IPv6 compliantIPv6 compliant

– New hardware requiredNew hardware required

Network ChangesNetwork Changes

– Re-addressing of current IPv4 hardware/clientsRe-addressing of current IPv4 hardware/clients

– Compatibility with existing wireless infrastructureCompatibility with existing wireless infrastructure

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Parting Thoughts

Wireless Networking while great in theory has Wireless Networking while great in theory has significant problems that are not easily significant problems that are not easily addressedaddressed

Upgrades to wireless technology that are on Upgrades to wireless technology that are on the horizon make changing over/integrating the horizon make changing over/integrating far less attractivefar less attractive