Wood and Ryan

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Cuban Missile Crisis

Andrew Wood and Dave Ryan



A Brief Chronology

May, 1962: Khrushchev makes veiled

references to a plot (How would the U.S. feel to

have missiles pointing at them, as they have

missiles pointed at us?)

September: JFK and Congress issue warnings

to USSR that US will deal harshly with any

threats to national security

October 14: U2 recon. flight over Cuba spotssites installing nuclear missiles

October 15: Presence of missiles is confirmed



The Missiles: One Site



Chronology, Continued

October 16: President Kennedy notified

October 16-22: Secret deliberations on what

should be done

October 22: Kennedy tells nation his plan for

blockade and quarantine

October 23: OAS endorses naval quarantine

October 24: Naval quarantine begins andsuccessfully changes course of many Soviet

ships




October 25: One Soviet ship challenges naval

quarantine; Kennedy lets it pass

October 25: At the UN, Adlai Stevenson directly

challenges the Soviet ambassador to admit to

the existence of missiles, when the ambassador

refuses, Stevenson wheels out pictures of the

missile sites

October 26: Soviets raise possibility for a deal:if we withdraw missiles will America promise not

to invade Cuba?




October 27: Soviets demand that Americansalso withdraw missiles from Turkey; Major

Anderson’s plane is missing over Cuba,

presumably shot down; U.S. recon plane straysover Soviet airspace…high tensions

Kennedy tells Khrushchev that he will acceptthe proposal of the 26th, Kennedy tells hisbrother to tell the Soviet Ambassador that

though the Turkey missiles would not be part ofthe bargain, they would be removed in time

October 28: USSR agrees to withdraw missiles



Soviet Decisions

Motivations

Close the missile gap—Currently far

behind U.S. in terms of number of

missiles Verbal threats no longer effective with

overwhelming evidence of U.S.

superiority

Protect Cuba

Reciprocity: The U.S. has missiles

pointing at us, let’s see how they feel

now



Soviet Decisions, Continued

Inability to use the missiles

If fired a missile, repercussions would be

severe



Why Khrushchev Settled

Effectiveness of naval quarantine

Conventional inferiority in the Caribbean

No possible countermove

Overwhelming world support for the U.S.

Other possible reasons

Got what he wanted?No U.S. invasion of Cuba

U.S. missiles withdrawn from Turkey



The American Decision

In September Kennedy had statedand Congress had passed aresolution saying that if the SovietUnion placed offensive weapons in

Cuba we would not tolerate it. Could we then rely solely on

diplomacy? Kennedys thoughtJohn could be ―impeached‖ if hedidn’t act in accordance with hisprior warnings

Determined in first 48 hours of crisis

that the removal of missiles was theprimary objective

This objective effectively ruled outisolated diplomacy, and left twooptions…



The American Decision cont.

Option 1 - Air Strike

On October 17th, President Kennedy ―made

the flat statement that there would definitely be

an air strike, at least against the missile sites,and perhaps against wider targets‖ (Bundy

394)

Reservations from others, airstrike may be

using a ―sledgehammer‖ to kill a ―fly

Later that day Robert McNamara suggestspolicy in between diplomacy and an air strike



The American Decision cont.

Option 2 – Blockade Advocated early on by McNamara and Robert

Kennedy, blockade would not require instant killing,but critics feared it would not remove the missiles

and would allow Soviets time to complete what theyalready had in Cuba

Douglas Dillon strengthened blockade argument bysuggesting that it would only be a first step, that ifKhrushchev did not remove the missiles to lift it,then more could be done

By Friday the 19th

, the committee working on theblockade adapted it into a quarantine, on SundayKennedy accepted their plan as the course ofaction



Could America have acted

differently? Could we have used the crisis to remove

Castro? Our warnings all along had been against offensive

weapons so once that warning is tested if we use itto attack Castro are we sticking to our word?

Could we have tried diplomacy before resortingto the quarantine? If we didn’t keep secrecy, Khrushchev could have

proclaimed defiance, or denouncedquarantine…then both countries would be inpositions where they’re heading straight for eachother and can’t just turn back



Castro’s Role

No real role in decisionmaking

Apparently out of touch withthe situation

Oct. 26: ―Aggressionimminent/imperialistsdisregarding worldopinion‖—Clearly not thecase

Khrushchev plays alongto some extent but it isclear he disagrees withhim (―your suggestionwould have started athermonuclear worldwar‖)



Questions

Do you feel Major Anderson’s death justifiedmore aggressive action?

Seeing as how our options in the crisis weresomewhat dictated by the warnings we issued

in September…should we have issued thosewarnings?

Robert Kennedy likened an air strike to PearlHarbor (Bundy 394), was that a fair analogy?

If the m issi les in Cuba were conventional,and neither the Sov iet Union nor the U.S.

pos sessed any nuc lear weapons, wou ld the

cris is have been avoided?



The Cuban Missile Crisis

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