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WORKERS O F ALL CO U N TRIES, U NITE!

3Vice Chairm an Com ra d e Lin Piao: Long Live the Victory of People’s War W ritten on: Septem b er 3, 1965 First Ed ition: Foreig n Lang ua g es Press, (Peking, China ) 1965 Second Ed ition: Lib eration Pub lic ation, (Ind ia ) 2006 PDF Com pilation: Lib eration Pub lication 2006

This b ook is not for b usiness purpose. The b ook is pub lishe d in ord er to facilitate its free d istrib ution

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Contents Introd uction 5 The Principal Contra d iction in the Period of the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan and the Line of the Com m unist Party of China 8 Correctly Apply the Line and Policy of the United Front 14 Rely on the Peasants and Esta b lish Rural Base Are as 22 Build a People’s Arm y of a N ew Type 27 Carry out the Strateg y and Ta ctics of People’s W ar 32 Ad here to the Policy of Self-Relia nc e 37 The International Sig nific ance of Com ra d e Mao-Tse Tung ’s Theory of People’s W ar 41 Defe at U.S. Im perialism and Its La ckeys b y People’s W ar 50 The Khrushchev Revisionists are Betrayers of People’s W ar 55

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Introd uction Full twenty ye ars have elapsed since our victory in the Gre at W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan. After a long period of heroic strug g le, the Chinese people, und er the le a d ership of the Com m unist Party of China and Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung, won fina l victory two d e c a d es a g o in their war a g a inst the Japanese im peria lists who ha d atte mpte d to sub jug ate China and swallow up the whole of Asia. The Chinese people’s W ar of Resistance was an im portant part of the world war a g a inst Germ an, Japanese and Italia n fascism . The Chinese people rec eived support from the people and the anti-fascist forces a ll over the world . And in their turn, the Chinese people m a d e an im portant contrib ution to victory in the Anti-Fascist W ar as a whole. O f the innum era b le anti-im perialist wars wa g e d b y the Chinese people in the past hund re d ye ars, the W ar of Resista nc e Ag a inst Japa n was the first to end in com plete victory. It occupies a n extrem ely im portant pla c e in the anna ls of war, in the anna ls of b oth the revolutionary wars of the Chinese people and the wars of the oppresse d nations of the world a g a inst im peria list a g g ression. It was a war in which a weak sem i-colonial a nd sem i-feud a l country trium phe d over a strong im perialist country. For a long period a fter the invasion of China’s northe aster provinces b y the Japa nese im peria lists, the Kuom intang followed a policy of non-resista nc e. In the e arly sta g e of the W ar of Resistance, the Japa nese im perialists exploited their m ilitary superiority to d rive d e ep into China and occupy ha lf her territory. In the fa c e of the m assive attacks of the a g gressors and the anti-Japanese upsurg e of the people throug hout the country, the Kuom inta ng was com pelle d to ta ke part in the W ar of Resista nc e, b ut soon a fterward s it a d opted the policy of passive resista nc e to Japan and a ctive opposition to the Com m unist Party.

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The he avy responsib ility of com b a ting Japa nese im perialism thus fell on should ers of the Eig hth Route Arm y, the N ew Fourth Arm y and the people of the Lib erate d Are as, all led b y the Com m unist Party. At the outb re ak of the war, the Eig hth Route and the N ew Fourth Arm ies ha d only a few tens of thousa nd s of m en and suffere d from extrem e inferiority in b oth arm s a nd equipm ent, and for a long tim e they were und er the crossfire of the Japanese im peria lists on the one hand a nd the Kuom inta ng troops on the other. But they grew strong er and strong er in the course of the war and b e c am e the m a in force in d e fe ating Japanese im perialism . How was it possib le for a weak country fina lly to d e fe at a strong country? How was it possib le for a seem ing ly we ak arm y to b e com e the m ain force in the war? The b asic re asons were that the W ar of Resista nc e Ag a inst Japan was a g e nuine people’s war le d b y the Com m unist Party of China and Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung, a war in which the correct M arxist-Leninist politic al m ilitary lines were put into effe ct, and that the Eig hth Route and the N ew Fourth Arm ies were g enuine people’s arm ies which applie d the whole rang e of strate gy and ta ctics of people’s war as form ulated b y Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung . Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s theory of and policies for people’s war have cre atively enriche d a nd d evelope d M arxism -Leninism . The Chinese people’s victory in the anti-Japa nese war was a victory for people’s war, for M arxism -Leninism and the thoug ht of M a o Tse-tung . Prior to the war a g a inst Japan, the Com m unist Party of China ha d g one throug h the first Revolutionary Civil W ar of 1924-27 and the Second Revolutionary Civil W ar of 1927-36 and sum m ed up the experienc e and lessons of the successes and failures in those wars, and the le a d ing role of M ao Tse-tung ’s thoug ht ha d b e com e esta b lishe d within the Party. This was the fund a m ental g uara ntee of the Party’s a b ility to le a d the Chinese people to victory in the W ar of Resistanc e.

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The Chinese people’s victory in the W ar of Resistanc e paved the way for their seizure of state power throug hout the country. W hen the Kuom intang re a ctionaries, b a cke d b y the U.S. im peria lists, launche d a nation-wid e civil war in 1946, the Com m unist Party of China a nd Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung further d eveloped the theory of people’s war, led the Chinese people in wa g ing a people’s war on a still larg er sc ale, and in the spac e of a little over three ye ars the gre at victory of the People’s Lib eration W ar was won, the rule of im perialism , feud a lism a nd b ure aucrat-c apitalism in our country end e d a nd the People’s Repub lic of China found e d . The victory of the Chinese people’s revolutionary war bre a che d the im perialist front in the East, wroug ht a gre at cha ng e in the world b a la nc e of forces, a nd a c c elerate d the revolutionary m ovem ent a m ong the people of all countries. From then on, the nationa l lib eration m ovem ent in Asia, Afric a, a nd Latin Am eric a entered a new historic al period . Tod ay, the U.S. im peria lists are repe ating on a world wid e sc ale the past a ctions of the Japanese im perialists in China a nd other parts of Asia. It has b e com e an urg e nt nec essity for the people in m any countries to m aster and use people’s war as a weapon a g a inst U.S. im perialism and its la ckeys. In every conc eiva b le way U.S. im perialism a nd its la ckeys are trying to exting uish the revolutionary fla m es of people’s war. The Khrushchev revisionists, fe aring people’s war like the pla g ue, are he aping a b use on it. The two are collud ing to prevent and sa b ota g e people’s war. In these circum stances, it is of vital practic al im porta nce to review the historical experienc e of the gre at victory of the people’s war in China and to rec apitulate Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s theory of people’s war.

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Chapter- 1 The Principal Contrad iction in the Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Line of the Com m unist Party of China The Com m unist Party of China a nd Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung were a b le to le a d the Chinese people to victory in the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan prim arily b e c ause they form ulated a nd applie d a M arxist-Leninist line. Basing him self on the fund a m ental tenets of M arxism -Leninism and applying the m ethod of class ana lysis, Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung a na lysed , first, the m utual transform ation of China’s principal and non-principal tra d itions following the invasion of China by Japanese im perialism , second , the consequent charg es in class relations within China a nd in international relations, and , third , the b a la nce of forces as b etwe en China and Japa n. This a na lysis provid e d the scientific b asis upon which the political and m ilitary lines of the W ar of Resistance were form ulated . There ha d long b e en two b a sic contra d ictions in China --the contra d iction b etween im perialism a nd the Chinese nation, and the contra d iction b etwe en feud a lism a nd the m asses of the people. For ten ye ars b e fore the outb re ak of the W ar of Resistance, the Kuom inta ng re a ctionary clique, which represented the interests of im perialism , the b ig la nd lord s and the b ig b ourg e oisie, ha d wa g e d civil war a g a inst the Com m unist Party of China and the Com m unist-led W orkers’ a nd Pe asants’ Red Arm y, which represented the interests of the Chinese people. In 1931, Japa nese im perialism inva d e d a nd occupied northe astern China. Sub sequently, especia lly a fter 1935, it steppe d up a nd expa nd e d its a g g ression a g a inst China, penetrating d e eper and d e eper into our territory. As a result of its invasion Japanese im peria lism sharpene d its contra d iction with the Chinese nation to an extre m e d e g re e and b roug ht a b out cha ng es in class relations within China. To end the civil war and to unite a g a inst Japanese a g gression b e c a m e the pressing nationwid e d em a nd of the

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people. Cha ng es of varying d e grees also occurre d in the politic al attitud e of the nationa l b ourg e oisie and the various fa ctions within the Kuom intang . And the Sia n Incid ent of 1936 1 was the b est case in point. How was one to assess the chang es in China’s politic al situation, and what conclusion was to b e d rawn? This question ha d a d irect b e aring on the very survival of the Chinese nation. For a period prior to the outbre ak of the W ar of Resista nc e, the “Le ft” opportunists represente d b y W a ng Ming within the Chinese Com m unist Party were blind to the im portant cha ng es in China’s politic al situation c aused b y Japa nese a g gression since 1931 and d enied the sharpening of the Sino-Japanese nationa l contra d iction a nd the d e m a nd s of various socia l strata for a war of resistance; inste a d , they stresse d that all the counterrevolutionary fa ctions a nd interm ed iate forces in China and all the im perialist countries were a m onolithic b loc. They persiste d in their line of "closed -d oorism " a nd continued to a d voc ate: “Down with the whole lot.” Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung resolutely foug ht the “Left” opportunist errors a nd penetrating ly ana lysed the new situation in the Chinese revolution. He pointed out that the Japa nese im perialist attem pt to red uce China to a Japa nese colony heig htene d the contra d iction b etween China a nd Japa n a nd m a d e it the principal contra d iction; that China’s internal class contra d ictions -- such as those b etween the m asses of the people and feud a lism , b etween the pe asa ntry and the land lord class, b etween the proletariat and the b ourg e oisie, and b etween the pe asa ntry and urb a n petty b ourg e oisie on the one hand and the b ourg eoisie on the other -- still re m a ined , b ut that they ha d a ll b e e n rele g a ted to a second ary or sub ord inate position as a result of the war of a g g ression unle ashe d b y Japan; a nd that throug hout China opposition to Japanese im perialism ha d b ecom e the com m on d e m a nd of the people of all classes and strata, except for a hand ful of pro-Japa nese traitors a m ong the big la nd lord s and the big b ourg e oisie.

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As the contra d iction b etwe en China and Japa n ascend e d a nd b e c am e the principal one, the contra d iction b etween China a nd im peria list countries such as Britain a nd the United States d escend e d to a second a ry or sub ord inate position. The rift b etween Japa n and the other im perialist countries ha d wid ene d as a result of Japanese im peria lism ’s attem pt to turn China into its own exclusive colony. This rend ered it possib le for China to m ake use of these contra d ictions to isolate and oppose Japa nese im perialism . In the fa c e of Japa nese im perialist a g g ression, was the Party to continue with the civil war a nd the Agrarian Revolution? Or was it to hold aloft the b a nner of national lib eration, unite with all the forces that could b e unite d to form a broa d national united front and conc entrate on fig hting the Japanese a g gressors? This was the prob lem sharply confronting our Party. The Com m unist Party of China and Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung form ulated the line of the Anti-Japanese N ational Unite d Front on the b asis of their ana lysis of the new situation. Hold ing a loft the b a nner of national lib eration, our Party issue d the c all for national unity and united resistanc e to Japanese im peria lism , a c a ll which won fervent support from the people of the whole country. Thanks to the com m on efforts of our Party and of China’s patriotic arm ies and people, the Kuom inta ng ruling clique was eventually com pelle d to stop the civil war and a new situation with Kuom intang -Com m unist co-operation for joint resista nc e to Japan was broug ht a b out. In the sum m er of 1937 Japa nese im perialism unle ashe d its all-out war of a g g ression a g a inst China. The nation-wid e W ar of Resista nc e thus b roke out. Could the W ar of Resistance b e victorious? And how was victorious to b e won? These were the questions to which all the Chinese people d em a nd e d im m ed iate answers.

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The d e fe atists c am e forward with the assertion that China was no m atch for Japa n and that the nation was b ound to b e sub jug a ted . The blind optim ists c am e forward with the assertion that China could win very quickly, without m uch effort. Basing him self on a concrete ana lysis of the Chinese nation a nd of Japa nese im perialism -- the two aspects of the principal contra d iction --Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung pointed out that while the “theory of nationa l sub jug ation” was wrong, the “theory of quick victory” was untena b le, and he conclud e d that the W ar of Resistance would b e a protra cted one in which China would finally b e victorious. In his cele b rated work On Protra cted W ar, Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung pointe d out the contrasting fe atures of China a nd Japan, the two sid es in the war. Japan was a powerful im peria list country. But Japanese im perialism was in its era of d e cline and d oom . The war it ha d unle ashed was a war of a g g ression, a war that was retrog ressive and b a rb a rous; it was d e ficient in m anpower and m ateria l resources and could not sta nd a protra cte d war; it was eng a g e d in an unjust c ause and therefore ha d m e a gre support internationa lly. China, on the other hand , was a we ak sem i-colonia l and sem i-feud a l country. But she was in her era of prog ress. She was fig hting a war a g a inst a g g ression, a war that was progressive and just; she ha d sufficient m a npower and m aterial resources to sustain a protra cte d war; internationa lly, China enjoye d extensive sym pathy and support. These com prised all the b asic fa ctors in the Sino-Japanese war. He went on to show how these fa ctors would influenc e the course of the war. Japan’s a d vanta g e was tem porary and would g ra d ua lly d im inish as a result of our efforts. Her d isa d va nta g es were fund a m e ntal; they could not b e overcom e and would g ra d ually grow in the course of the war. China’s d isa d va nta g e was tem porary a nd could b e gra d ua lly overcom e. China’s a d vanta g es were fund a m e ntal and would play a n incre asing ly positive role in the course of the war. Japa n’s a d vanta g e a nd China’s d isa d vanta g e d eterm ined the im possib ility of quick victory

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for China. China’s a d vanta g es and Japan’s d isa d vanta g es d eterm ine d the inevita b ility of Japan’s d e fe at a nd China’s ultim ate victory. On the b a sis of this ana lysis Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung form ulate d the strate gy for a protra cte d war. China’s W ar of Resistance would b e protra cted , and prolong e d e fforts would b e nee d e d g ra d ua lly to we aken the enem y’s forces and expand our own, so that the enem y would chang e from b eing strong to g oing we ak and we would cha ng e from b eing wea k to b eing strong a nd a c cum ulate sufficient streng th fina lly to d e fe at him . Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung pointed out that with the chang e in the b a la nce of forces b etwe en the enem y and ourselves the W ar of Resistance would pass throug h three sta g es, na m e ly, the strateg ic d e fensive, the strate gic stalem ate and the strateg ic offensive. The protra cte d war was also a process of m ob ilizing, org a nizing a nd a rm ing the people. It was only b y m ob ilizing the entire people to fig ht a people’s war that the W ar of Resistance could b e persevered in and the Japanese a g g ressors d e fe ated . In ord er to turn the anti-Japa nese war into a g e nuine people’s war, our party firm ly relied on the broa d est m asses of the people, united with all the anti-Japa nese forces that could b e united , and consolid ated a nd expand e d the Anti-Japanese N ational Unite d Front. The b asic line of our party was: b old ly to arouse the m asses of the people and expand the people’s forces so that, und er the le a d ership of the Party, they could d e fe at the a g g ressors and b uild a new China. The W ar of Resista nc e Ag a inst Japan constituted a historic al sta g e in China’s new-d e m ocratic revolution. The line of our party d uring the W ar of Resistance aim ed not only at winning victory in the war, but a lso at laying the found a tions for the nation-wid e victory of the new-d em ocratic revolution. Only the new d em ocratic revolution m akes it possib le to c arry out a socia list revolution. W ith respect to the relations b etween the d em ocratic and the socialist revolutions, Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung said :

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In the writing of an article the second half c an b e written only a fter the first half is finished . Resolute le a d ership of the d em ocratic revolution is the prerequisite for the victory of socialism . 2 The concrete ana lysis of concrete cond itions a nd the concrete resolution of concrete contra d ictions is the living soul of M arxism -Leninism . Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung has invaria b ly b e e n a b le to sing le out the principal contra d iction from a m ong a com plexity of contra d ictions, a na lyse the two aspects of this principa l contra d iction concretely and , “pressing on irresistib ly from this com m a nd ing heig ht”, successfully solve the prob le m of und erstand ing a nd hand ling of the various contra d ictions. It was precisely on the b asis of such scientific ana lysis that Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung correctly form ulate d the politic al and m ilitary lines for the people’s war d uring the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japa n, d eveloped his thoug ht on the esta b lishm ent of rural b a se are as a nd the use of the countrysid e to encircle the cities and fina lly c apture them , and form ulated a whole ra ng e of principles and policies, strateg ies and ta ctics in the political, m ilitary, econom ic and cultural field s for the c arrying out of the people’s war. It was this that ensure d victory in the W ar of Resistanc e and cre ated the cond itions for the nation-wid e victory of the new-d em ocratic revolution.

N otes

1. Under the influence of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and the people’s anti-Japanese movement, the Kuomintang North-eastern Army Under Chang Hsueh-liang and the Kuomintang 17th Route Army under Yang Hu-Cheng agreed to the anti-Japanese national united front proposed by the Communist Party of China and demanded that Chiang Kai-Shek should stop the civil war and unite with the Communist Party to resist Japan. Chiang Kai-Shek refused. On December 12, 1936, Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng arrested him in Sian. Proceeding from the interest of the entire nation, the Chinese Communist Party offered mediation and Chiang Kai-Shek was compelled to accept the terms of unity with the Communist Party and resistance to Japan. 2. Mao Tse-tung, “Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese A National United Front”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., Press, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 290.

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Chapter-2

Correctly Apply the Line and Policy of the United Front In ord er to win a people’s war, it is im perative to b uild the broa d est possib le unite d front and form ulate a series of policies which will ensure the fullest m ob ilization of the b asic m a sses as well as the unity of all the forces that c an b e united . The Anti-Japa nese N ational United Front e m b ra c e d a ll the anti-Japa nese classes a nd strata. These classes and strata share d a com m on interest in fig hting Japan, an interest which form e d the b asis of their unity. But they d iffered in the d e gre e of their firm ness in resisting Japan, a nd there were class contra d ictions and conflicts of interest a m ong them . Hence the inevita b le class strug g le within the united front. In form ulating the Party’s line of the Anti-Japanese N ationa l Unite d Front, Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung m a d e the following class a na lysis of Chinese society. The workers, the pe asants, a nd the urb a n petty b ourg e oisie firm ly d em a nd e d that the W ar of Resistance should b e c arried throug h to the end ; they were the m ain force in the fig ht a g a inst Japa nese a g gression and constituted the b a sic m a sses who d e m a nd e d unity and prog ress. The b ourg e oisie was d ivid e d into the nationa l and the com pra d or b ourg e oisie. The nationa l b ourg e oisie form e d the m ajority of the b ourg eoisie; it was rather fla b b y, often va cillate d a nd ha d contra d ictions with the workers, but it also ha d a certain d e gre e of re a d iness to oppose im perialism and was one of our a llies in the W ar of Resistanc e. The com pra d or b ourg e oisie was the bure aucratic-c apitalist class, which was very sm a ll in num b er b ut occupied the ruling position in China. Its m em b ers atta che d them selves to d ifferent im perialist powers, som e of the m b eing pro-Japanese and others pro-British and pro-Am eric an. The pro-Japanese sections of the com pra d or b ourg e oisie were the c apitulators, the overt and covert traitors. The pro-

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British and pro-Am eric an section of this class favoured resistanc e to Japan to a certain extent, but they were not firm in their resistanc e and very m uch wished to com prom ise with Japan, and b y their nature they were opposed to the Com m unist Party a nd the people. The land lord s fell into d ifferent c ate g ories; there were the big, the m id d le and the sm a ll land lord s. Som e of the big la nd lord s b e c a m e traitors, while others favoure d resistanc e but vacillated a gre at d e al. M any of the m id d le and sm a ll land lord s ha d the d esire to resist, but there were contra d ictions b etween them a nd the pe asants. In the fa c e of these com plic ated class relationships, our Party’s policy re g ard ing work within the united front was one of b oth allianc e and strug g le. That is to say, its policy was to unite with a ll the anti-Japanese classes and strata, try to win over even those who could b e only va cillating a nd tem porary allies, and a d opt appropriate policies to a d just the relations a m ong these classes a nd strata so that they all serve d the g enera l c ause of resisting Japa n. At the sa m e tim e, we ha d to m aintain our Party’s principle of ind epend enc e and initiative, m ake the b old arousing of the m asses a nd expa nsion of the people’s forces the centre of g ravity in our work, a nd wa g e the nec essary strug g les a g a inst all a ctivities harm ful to resista nc e, unity a nd prog ress. Our Party’s Anti-Japa nese N ationa l United Front policy was d ifferent b oth from Chen Tu-hsiu’s Rig ht opportunist policy of all allia nc e and no strug g le, and from W a ng Ming ’s “Left” opportunist policy of all strug g le and no allianc e. Our Party sum m e d up the lessons of the Rig ht and “Left” opportunist errors a nd form ulated the policy of b oth a llianc e and strug g le. Our Party m a d e a series of a d justm ents in its policies in ord er to unite all the anti-Japanese parties and g roups, includ ing the Kuom intang, and a ll the anti-Japa nese strata in a joint fig ht a g a inst the foe. W e pled g e d ourselves to fig ht for the com plete re alization of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary Three People’s Principles. The

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g overnm ent of the Shensi-Ka nsu-N ing sia revolutionary b a se are a was rena m e d the Governm ent of the Shensi-Kansu-Ning sia Specia l Reg ion of the Repub lic of China. Our W orkers’ a nd Pe asants’ Red Arm y was re-d esig nated the Eig hth Route Arm y and the N ew Fourth Arm y of the N ational Revolutionary Arm y. Our land policy, the policy of confisc ating the land of the la nd lord s, was chang e d to one of red ucing rent a nd interest. In our own b a se are as we carried out the “three third s system ”1 in our org a ns of politic al power, d rawing in those representatives of the petty b ourg e oisie, the nationa l b ourg e oisie and the enlig htene d g entry and those m em b ers of the Kuom inta ng who stood for resistanc e to Japa n and d id not oppose the Com m unist Party. In ac cord a nce with the principles of the Anti-Japanese N ational Unite d Front, we also m a d e ne c essary and a ppropriate chang es in our policies relating to the e conom y, taxation, la b our and wa g es, a nti-espiona g e, people’s rig hts, culture and ed uc ation, etc. W hile m aking these policy a d justm ents, we m aintained the ind epend enc e of the Com m unist Party, the people’s arm y and the b ase are as. W e also insisted that the Kuom intang should institute a g e neral m ob ilization, re form the g overnm ent apparatus, introd uce d em ocra cy, im prove the people’s livelihood , arm the people, and c arry out a tota l war of resistance. W e wa g e d a resolute strug g le a g a inst the Kuom intang ’s passive resistance to Japa n a nd a ctive opposition to the Com m unist Party, a g a inst its suppression of the people’s resistanc e m ove m e nt and its trea cherous activities for com prom ise and c apitulation. Past experienc e has taug ht us that “Left” errors were lia b le to crop up a fter our Party ha d corrected Rig ht errors, and that Rig ht errors were lia b le to crop up a fter it ha d correcte d “Left” errors. “Le ft” errors were lia b le to occur when we broke with the Kuom intang ruling clique, and Rig ht errors were lia b le to occur when we unite d with it.

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After the overcom ing of “Left” opportunism and the form a tion of the Anti-Japa nese N ational United Front, the m ain d a ng er in our Party was Rig ht opportunism or c apitulationism . W a ng Ming, the exponent of “Left” opportunism d uring the Second Revolutionary Civil W ar, went to the other extrem e in the e arly d ays of the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan and b e c am e the exponent of Rig ht opportunism , i.e., capitulationism . He countere d Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s correct line and policies with an out-and -out c apitulationist line of his own and a series of ultra-Rig ht policies. He voluntarily a b a nd one d proletarian le a d ership in the Anti-Japanese N ational United Front a nd willing ly ha nd e d le a d ership to the Kuom intang . By his a d voc a cy of “everything throug h the united front” or “everything to b e sub m itte d to the united front”, he was in e ffe ct a d voc ating that everything should g o throug h or b e sub m itte d to Chiang Kai-shek a nd the Kuom intang . He oppose d the b old m ob ilization of the m asses, the c arrying out of d em ocratic re form s a nd the im prove m e nt of the livelihood of the workers a nd pe asants, a nd wa nte d to und erm ine the worker-pe asa nt alliance which was the found a tion of the united front. He d id not want the Com m unist-le d b a se are as of the people’s revolutionary forces b ut wanted to cut off the people’s revolutionary forces from their roots. He reje cted the people’s arm y le d b y the Com m unist Party and wante d to hand over the people’s arm e d forces to Chiang Kai-shek, which would have m e ant ha nd ing over everything the people ha d . He d id not want the le a d ership of the Party a nd a d voc ated a n allia nc e b etwe en the youth of the Kuom inta ng a nd that of the Com m unist Party to suit Chiang Kai-shek’s d esig n of corrod ing the Com m unist Party. He d e cke d him self out and presente d him self to Chia ng Kai-shek, hoping to b e given som e officia l appointm ent. All this was revisionism , pure and sim ple. If we ha d a cted on W a ng Ming ’s revisionist line and his set of policies, the Chinese people would have b e en una b le to win the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan, still less subsequent nation-wid e victory.

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For a tim e d uring the W ar of Resistanc e, W a ng Ming ’s revisionist line c aused harm to the Chinese people’s revolutionary c ause. But the le a d ing role of Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ha d a lre a d y b e e n esta b lished in the Central Com m ittee of our Party. Und er his le a d ership, all the Marxist-Leninists in the Party c arried out a resolute strug g le a g a inst W a ng Ming ’s errors and rectified them in tim e. It was this strug g le that prevente d W a ng Ming ’s erroneous line from d oing g re ater and m ore lasting d a m a g e to the c ause of the Party. Chiang Kai-shek, our tea cher b y neg a tive exa m ple, helpe d us to correct W a ng Ming ’s m istakes. He repe ate d ly lectured us with cannons a nd m a chine-g uns. The g ravest lesson was the Southern Anhwei Incid ent, which took pla c e in January 1941. Be c ause som e le a d ers of the N ew Fourth Arm y d isob eyed the d irectives of the Central Com m ittee of the Party and followe d W a ng Ming ’s revisionist line, its units in southern Anhwei suffered d isastrous losses in the surprise atta ck launche d b y Chiang Kai-shek a nd m a ny heroic revolutionary fig hters were slaug htered b y the Kuom intang re a ctionaries. The lessons le arne d a t the cost of b lood helped to sob er m any of our com ra d es and incre ase their a b ility to d isting uish the correct from the erroneous line. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung constantly sum m ed up the experienc e g aine d b y the whole Party in im plem enting the line of the Anti-Japanese N ational Unite d Front a nd worked out a whole set of policies in g ood tim e. They were m ainly as follows: 1. All people fa vouring resistance (that is, all the anti-Japanese workers, pe asants, sold iers, stud ents and intelle ctuals, and b usinessm en) were to unite and form the Anti-Japanese N ationa l Unite d Front. 2. W ithin the unite d front, our policy was to b e one of ind epend enc e and initiative, i.e., b oth unity a nd ind epend ence were nec essary. 3. As far as m ilitary strateg y was concerned , our policy was to b e guerrilla warfare wa g e d ind epend ently and with the initiative in our own hand s, within the

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fra m e work of a unified strateg y; g uerrilla warfare was to b e b asic, b ut no cha nc e of wa g ing m ob ile warfare was to b e lost when the cond itions were favoura b le. 4. In the strug g le a g a inst the anti-Com m unist d ie-hard s he a d e d b y Chiang Kai-shek, our policy was to m ake use of contra d ictions, win over the m a ny, oppose the few and d estroy our enem ies one by one, a nd to wa g e strug g les on just g round s, to our a d vanta g e, and with restraint. 5. In the Japanese-occupie d with Kuom inta ng are as our policy was, on the one hand , to d evelop the united front to the gre atest possib le extent a nd , on the other, to have sele cted c a d res working und erg round . W ith reg a rd to the form s of org a nization a nd strug g le, our policy was to assig n sele cte d c a d res to work und er cover for a long period , so as to ac cum ulate streng th a nd b id e our tim e. 6. As re g ard s the alig nm ent of the various classes within the country, our b a sic policy was to d evelop the prog ressive forces, win over the m id d le forces a nd isolate the anti-Com m unist d ie-hard forces. 7. As for the anti-Com m unist d ie-hard s, we followed a revolutionary d ual policy of uniting with the m, in so far as they were still c apa b le of b ring ing them selves to resist Japan, a nd of strug g ling a g a inst a nd isolating them , in so far as they were d eterm ined to oppose the Com m unist Party. 8. W ith respect to the la nd lord s a nd the b ourg e oisie — even the big land lord s a nd b ig b ourg e oisie — it was nec essary to ana lyse ea ch c ase and d raw d istinctions. On the b asis of these d istinctions we were to form ulate d ifferent policies so as to achieve our aim of uniting with all the forces that could b e united . The line and the various policies of the Anti-Japa nese N ational United Front form ulated b y Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung stood the test of the W ar of Resista nc e and prove d to b e e ntirely correct. History shows that when confronted b y ruthless im perialist a g g ression, a Com m unist Party m ust hold a loft the nationa l b a nner a nd , using the weapon of the

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united front, ra lly around itself the m a sses and the patriotic and anti-im perialist people who form m ore than 90 per cent of a country’s population, so as to m ob ilize all positive fa ctors, unite with all the forces that can b e united and isolate to the m axim um the com m on enem y of the whole nation. If we a b a nd on the national b a nner, a d opt a line of “closed -d oorism ” and thus isolate ourselves, it is out of the question to exercise le a d ership and d evelop the people’s revolutionary c ause, a nd this in re ality a m ounts to helping the enem y and b ring ing d e fe at on ourselves. History shows that within the unite d front the Com m unist Party m ust m aintain its id eolog ic al, political a nd org a nizational ind epend enc e, a d here to the principle of ind epend enc e and initiative, and insist on its le a d ing role. Since there are class d ifferenc es a m ong the various classes in the united front, the Party m ust have a correct policy in ord er to d evelop the prog ressive forces, win over the m id d le forces and oppose the d ie-hard forces. The Party’s work m ust centre on d eveloping the prog ressive forces and expand ing the people’s revolutionary forces. This is the only way to m aintain and streng then the united front. “If unity is soug ht throug h strug g le, it will live; if unity is soug ht throug h yield ing, it will perish. ” 2 This is the chie f experienc e g aine d in our strug g le a g a inst the d ie-hard forces. History shows that d uring the national-d em ocratic revolution there m ust b e two kind s of a llia nce within this unite d front, first, the worker-pe asa nt allianc e and , second , the allianc e of the working people with the b ourg e oisie and other non-working people. The worker-pe asant allianc e is an allianc e of the working class with the pe asants and all other working people in town a nd country. It is the found ation of the united front. W hether the working class c an g a in le a d ership of the national-d e m ocratic revolution d epend s on whether it c an le a d the broa d m a sses of the pe asa nts in strug g le and rally them around itself. Only when the working class g a ins le a d ership of the pe asa nts, and only on the b asis of worker-pe asant allianc e, is it possib le to esta b lish the second allianc e, form a broa d united front a nd wa g e a

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people’s war victoriously. Otherwise, everything that is d one is unrelia b le, like c astles in the air or so m uch e mpty talk.

N otes 1. The “three thirds system” refers to the organs of the political power which were established according to the principle of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and in which the members of the Communist Party, non-Party progressives and the middle elements each occupied one-third of the places. 2. Mao Tse-tung, “Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front”, Selected Works, Eng. Ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, p. 422.

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Chapter-3 Rely on the Peasants and Esta b lish Rural Base Areas The pe asantry constituted m ore than 80 per cent of the entire population of sem i-colonia l and se mi-feud a l China. They were sub je cted to the three fold oppression and exploitation of im perialism , feud a lism and b ure aucrat-capitalism , and they were e a g er for resistanc e a g ainst Japa n for revolution. It was essential to rely m ainly on the pe asa nts if the people’s war was to b e won. But at the outset not all com ra d es in our Party saw this point. The history of our Party shows that in the period of the First Revolutionary Civil W ar, one of the m a jor errors of the Rig ht opportunists, represente d b y Chen Tu-hsiu, was their failure to recog nize the im porta nc e of the pe asant question and their opposition to arousing and a rm ing the pe asants. In the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil W ar, one of the m ajor errors of the “Left“ opportunists, represented b y W a ng Ming, was likewise their failure to recog nize the im porta nc e of the pe asant question. They d id not re alize that it was essential to und ertake long -term and painsta king work a m ong the pe asants and esta b lish revolutionary b ase are as in the countrysid e; they were und er the illusion that they could rapid ly seize the big cities a nd quickly win nation-wid e victory in the revolution. The errors of b oth the Rig ht a nd the “Le ft“ opportunists broug ht serious setb a c ks and d e fe ats to the Chinese revolution. As far b a c k as the period of the First Revolutionary Civil W ar, Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ha d pointed out that the pe asa nt question occupie d a n extrem ely im portant position in the Chinese revolution, that the b ourg eois-d em ocratic revolution a g a inst im perialism and feud a lism as in essenc e a pe asant revolution a nd that the b asic task of the Chinese proletariat in the b ourg e ois-d e m ocratic revolution was to g ive le a d ership to the pe asants’ strug g le.

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In the period of the W ar of Resistance Ag a inst Japan, Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung a g a in stressed that the pe asants were the m ost relia b le and the m ost num erous ally of the proletariat a nd constitute d the m ain force in the W ar of Resistanc e. The pe asants were the m a in source of m anpower for China’s arm ies. The fund s and the supplies ne e d e d for a protra cted war c am e chiefly from the pe asa nts. In the anti-Japanese war it was im perative to rely m ainly on the pe asants and to arouse them to participate in the war on the broa d est sc ale. The W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan was in essenc e a pe asant revolutionary war le d b y our Party. By arousing a nd org a nizing the pe asant m asses and inte grating them with the proletariat, our Party cre ated a powerful force c apa b le of d e fe ating the strong est enem y. To rely on the pe asa nts, build rural b a se are as a nd use the countrysid e to encircle and fina lly c apture the cities — such was the way to victory in the Chinese revolution. Basing him self on the chara cteristics of the Chinese revolution, Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung pointed out the im porta nc e of b uild ing rural revolutionary b ase are as. Since China’s key cities have long b e e n occupied b y the powerful im perialists a nd their rea ctionary Chinese allies, it is im perative for the revolutionary ra nks to turn the b a c kward villa g es into a d vance d , consolid ate d b a se are as, into gre at m ilitary, politic al, econom ic and cultural b astions of the revolution from which to fig ht their vicious enem ies who are using the cities for atta cks on the rural d istricts, a nd in this way gra d ua lly to a chieve the com plete victory of the revolution throug h protra cte d fig hting ; it is im perative for them to d o so if they d o not wish to com prom ise with im perialism a nd its la ckeys b ut are d eterm ine d to fig ht on, and if they intend to b uild up and tem per their forces, and avoid d ecisive b attles with a powerful enem y while their own streng th is ina d equate.1

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Experience in the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil W ar showe d that, when this strate gic conc ept of Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s was applied , there was a n im m ense growth in the revolutionary forces a nd one Red b a se are a a fter another was b uilt. Conversely, when it was violated a nd the nonsense of the “Le ft” opportunists was applied , the revolutionary forces suffered severe d a m a g e, with losses of ne arly 100 per cent in the cities and 90 per cent in the rura l are as. During the W ar of Resista nc e Ag a inst Japa n, the Japanese im perialist forces occupied m a ny of China’s b ig cities and the m ain lines of com m unic ation, b ut owing to the shorta g e of troops they were una b le to occupy the vast countrysid e, which rem ained the vulnera b le sector of the enem y’s rule. Consequently, the possib ility of b uild ing rural b ase are as b e c a m e even g re ater. Shortly a fter the b e g inning of the W ar of Resistance, when the Japanese forces surg e d into China’s hinterland and the Kuom intang forces crum b le d a nd fle d in one d e fe at a fter a nother, the Eig hth Route and N ew Fourth Arm ies led b y our Party followed the wise policy laid d own b y Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung a nd b old ly d rove into the are as b ehind the enem y lines in sm a ll conting e nts a nd esta b lished b a se are as throug hout the countrysid e. During the eig ht years of the war, we esta b lished ninete en anti-Japa nese b ase are as in northern, central and southern China. W ith the exception of the big cities a nd the m a in lines of com m unic ation, the vast territory in the enem y’s re ar was in the ha nd s of the people. In the anti-Japa nese b a se are as, we c arrie d our d em ocratic re form s, im proved the livelihood of the people, and m ob ilized a nd org a nized the pe asant m asses. Org a ns of a nti-Japanese d em ocratic political power were esta b lished on an extensive sc ale a nd the m asses of the people enjoyed the d em ocratic rig ht to run their own a ffairs; at the sa m e tim e we carried out the policies of “a re asona b le burd en” a nd “the re d uction of rent a nd interest”, which we akene d the feud a l system of exploitation and im proved the people’s livelihood . As a result, the enthusiasm of the pe asant

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m asses was d e eply aroused , while the various anti-Japanese strata were given d ue consid eration a nd were thus united . In form ulating our policies for the b ase are as, we also took c are that these policies should fa cilitate our work in the enem y-occupied are as. In the enem y-occupied cities a nd villa g es, we com b ined le g a l with illeg a l strug g le, united the b asic m asses a nd all patriots, and d ivid e d a nd d isinteg rated the political power of the enem y and his puppets so as to prepare ourselves to attack the enem y from within in co-ord ination with operations from without when cond itions were ripe. The b ase are as esta b lished b y our Party b e c a m e the centre of g ravity in the Chinese people’s strug g le to resist Japan and save the country. Relying on these b ases, our Party expand e d a nd streng thene d the people’s revolutionary forces, persevered in the protra cted war and eventually won the W ar or Resista nc e Ag a inst Japa n. N atura lly, it was im possib le for the d evelopm ent of the revolutionary b ase are as to b e plain sailing a ll the tim e. They constituted a trem end ous thre at to the ene my a nd were bound to b e atta cke d . There fore, their d evelopm ent was a tortuous process of expansion, contra ction and then renewed expansion. Between 1937 and 1940 the population in the anti-Japa nese b ase are as g rew to 100,000,000. But in 1941-42 the Japanese im peria lists use d the m ajor part of their inva d ing forces to launch frantic atta cks on our b ase are as and wroug ht havoc. Me anwhile, the Kuom inta ng, too, encircle d these b ase are as, b locka d e d the m a nd went so far as to atta ck them . So b y 1942, the anti-Japanese b ase are as ha d contra cte d a nd their population was less than 50,000,000. Pla cing com plete relianc e on the m asses, our Party resolutely a d opted a series of correct policies a nd m e asures, with the result that the b ase are as were a b le to hold out und er extrem ely d ifficult circum stanc es. After this setb a ck, the arm y a nd the people in the b ase are as were tem pered a nd g rew strong er. From 1943 onward s, our b a se are as were g ra d ually restored and expand e d , and b y 1945 the population

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ha d g rown to 160,000,000. Taking the entire course of the Chinese revolution into ac count, our revolutionary b ase are as went throug h even m ore ups and d owns, a nd they weathere d a g re at m any tests b e fore the sm all, separate b ase are as, expa nd ing in a series of waves, gra d ua lly d eveloped into extensive and contig uous b a se are as. At the sa m e tim e, the work of b uild ing the revolutionary b a se are as was a gra nd rehe arsal in preparation for nation-wid e victory. In these b ase are as, we built the Party, ran the org a ns of state power, built the people’s arm e d forces and set up m ass org a nizations; we eng a g e d in ind ustry and a griculture and operate d cultura l, ed uc ational and all other und ertaking s nec essary for the ind epend ent existenc e of a separate re gion. Our b ase are as were in fa ct a state in m iniature. And with the ste a d y expa nsion of our work in the b ase are as, our Party esta b lished a powerful people’s arm y, trained c a d res for various kind s of work, ac cum ulated experienc e in m any field s a nd b uild up b oth the m ateria l and the m ora l streng th that provid e d favoura b le cond itions for nation-wid e victory. The revolutionary b ase are as esta b lished in the W ar of Resistance later b e c a m e the spring b oard s for the People’s W ar of Lib eration, in which the Chinese people d e fe ate d the Kuom intang re a ctionaries. In the W ar of Lib eration we continued the policy of first encircling the cities from the countrysid e and then c apturing the cities, and thus won nation-wid e victory.

N otes 1. Mao Tse-tung, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, pp. 316-17.

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Chapter-4 Build a People’s Arm y of a N ew Type “W ithout a people’s arm y the people have nothing . ”1 This is the conclusion d rawn b y Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung from the Chinese people’s experienc e in their long ye ars of revolutionary strug g le, experienc e that was b oug ht in b lood . This is a universal truth of M arxism -Leninism . The specia l fe ature of the Chinese revolution was arm e d revolution a g a inst arm e d counter-revolution. The m ain form of strug g le was war and the m a in form of org a nization was the arm y which was und er the a bsolute le a d ership of the Chinese Com m unist Party, while all the other form s of org a nization and strug g le led b y our Party were co-ord inated , d irectly or ind irectly, with the war. During the First Revolutionary Civil W ar, m a ny fine Party com ra d es took a n a ctive part in the arm ed revolutionary strug g le. But our Party was then still in its infa ncy and d id not have a cle ar und ersta nd ing of this specia l fe ature of the Chinese revolution. It was only a fter the First Revolutionary Civil W ar, only a fter the Kuom intang ha d b etrayed the revolution, m assacred larg e num b ers of Com m unists and d estroyed a ll the revolutionary m a ss org a nizations, that our Party rea che d a cle arer und erstand ing of the suprem e im portanc e of org a nizing revolutionary arm ed forces a nd of stud ying the strate gy and ta ctics of revolutionary war, a nd cre ated the Workers’ and Pe asants’ Red Arm y, the first people’s arm y und er the le a d ership of the Com m unist Party of China. During the Second Revolutionary Civil W ar, the Workers’ and Pe asa nts’ Red Arm y cre ated b y Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung g rew consid era b ly a nd a t one tim e re a che d a tota l of 300,000 m en. But it later lost nine-tenths of its forces as a result of the wrong politic al and m ilitary lines followe d b y the “Le ft” opportunist le a d ership.

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At the start of the W ar of Resista nc e Ag a inst Japan, the people’s arm y led b y the Chinese Com m unist Party ha d only a little over 40,000 m en. The Kuom inta ng re a ctionaries attem pte d to restrict, wea ken and d estroy this people’s arm y in every conc eiva b le way. Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung pointe d out that, in these circum stanc es, in ord er to sustain the W ar of Resista nc e and d e fe at the Japa nese a g gressors, it was im perative gre atly to expa nd and consolid ate the Eig hth Route and N ew Fourth Arm ies and a ll the guerrilla units le d b y our Party. The whole Party should g ive close attention to war and stud y m ilitary a ffa irs. Every Party m em b er should b e re a d y at all tim es to take up arm s and g o to the front. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung a lso incisively state d that Com m unists d o not fig ht for personal m ilitary power b ut m ust fig ht for m ilitary power for the Party and for the people. Guid e d b y the Party’s correct line of expand ing the revolutionary arm ed forces, the Com m unist-le d Eig hth Route and N ew Fourth Arm ies a nd anti-Japanese guerrilla units prom ptly went to the forefront at the very b e ginning of the war. W e spre a d the see d s of the people’s arm ed forces in the vast are as b ehind the enem y lines a nd kind le d the fla m es of g uerrilla warfare everywhere. Our people’s arm y ste a d ily expand e d in the strug g le, so that b y the end of the war it was a lre a d y a m illion strong, and there was also a m ilitia of over two m illion. That was why we were a b le to eng a g e ne arly two-third s of the Japanese forces of a g g ression and 95 per cent of the puppet troops and to b e com e the m ain force in the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan. W hile resisting the Japanese inva d ing forces, we repulsed three larg e-sc ale a nti-Com m unist onslaug hts launched b y the Kuom intang re a ctionaries in 1939, 1941 and 1943, and sm ashed their countless “friction-m ong ering ” a ctivities. W hy were the Eig hth Route and N ew Fourth Arm ies a b le to grow b ig a nd strong from b eing sm a ll and wea k and to score such gre at victories in the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan?

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The fund a m ental re ason was that the Eig hth Route and N ew Fourth Arm ies were found e d on Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s theory of arm y b uild ing . They were arm ies of a new type, a people’s arm y that whole-he arte d ly serves the interests of the people. Guid e d b y Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung ’s theory on b uild ing a people’s arm y, our arm y was und er the a bsolute le a d ership of the Chinese Com m unist Party and m ost loyally carried out the Party’s Marxist-Leninist line and policies. It ha d a hig h d e gre e of conscious d iscipline and was heroic ally inspired to d estroy all enem ies a nd conquer all d ifficulties. Internally there was full unity b etwe en c a d res and fig hters, b etween those in hig her and those in lower positions of responsib ility, b etwe en the d ifferent d epartm ents and b etwe en the various fraternal arm y units. Externally, there was sim ilarly full unity b etween the arm y and the people and b etwe en the arm y and the loc al g overnm ent. During the anti-Japa nese war our arm y staunchly perform ed the three tasks set b y Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung, na m ely, fig hting, m ass work, and prod uction, and it was at the sa m e tim e a fig hting force, a politic al work forc e and a prod uction corps. Everywhere it went, it d id propa g a nd a work a m ong the m asses, org a nize d a nd arm ed them a nd helped them set up revolutionary political power. Our arm y-m en strictly ob serve d the Thre e Main Rules of Discipline and the Eig ht Points for Attention, 2 c arried out c am paig ns to “support the governm ent and cherish the people”, a nd d id g ood d e e d s for the people everywhere. They also m a d e use of every possib ility to eng a g e in prod uction the mselves so as to overcom e econom ic d ifficulties, b etter their own livelihood and lig hten the people’s b urd en. By their exem plary cond uct they won the whole-he arted support of the m asses, who a ffe ctionately c alle d them “our own b oys”. Our arm y consisted of loc al forces as well as of re gular forces; m oreover, it energ etic ally b uilt and d eveloped the m ilitia, thus practising the system of

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com b ining the three m ilitary form ations, i.e., the re gular forces, the loc al forces a nd the m ilitia. Our arm y also pursue d correct policies in winning over enem y officers and m en in g iving lenient tre atm ent to prisoners of war. During the anti-Japanese war we not only broug ht a b out the revolt and surrend er of larg e num b ers of puppet troops, but succe e d e d in converting not a few Japanese prisoners, who ha d b e en b a d ly poisone d b y fascist id eolog y. After they were politically awakene d , they org a nize d them selves into anti-war org a nizations such as the Le a gue for the Lib eration of the Japa nese People, the Anti-W ar Le a gue of the Japanese in China and the Le a g ue of Awa kene d Japanese, helpe d us to d isinte grate the Japanese arm y and co-operate d with us in opposing Japanese m ilitarism . Com ra d e Sa nzo N osaka, the le a d er of the Japa nese Com m unist Party, who was then in Yena n, g a ve us g re at help in this work. The essenc e of Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s theory of arm y b uild ing is that in b uild ing a people’s arm y prom inenc e m ust b e given to politics, i.e., the arm y m ust first a nd forem ost b e built on a political b asis. Politics is the com m a nd er; politics is the soul of everything . Politic al work is the lifeline of our arm y. True, a people’s arm y m ust pay attention to the consta nt im prove m e nt of its weapons and equipm ent a nd its m ilitary technique, b ut in its fig hting it d oes not rely purely on we apons a nd technique, it relies m ainly on politics, on the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and coura g e of the com m a nd ers a nd fig hters, on the support and b a cking of the m asses. Owing to the applic ation of Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s line on arm y b uild ing, there has prevailed in our arm y at all tim es a hig h level of proletarian political consciousness, an atm osphere of ke enness to stud y the thoug ht of M ao Tse-tung, a n excellent m orale, a solid unity and a d e ep hatre d for the enem y, a nd thus a gig a ntic m oral force has b e en b roug ht into b eing . In b a ttle it has fe ared neither hard ships nor d e ath, it has b e e n a b le to charg e or hold its ground a s the cond itions require. One

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m an c an play the role of several, d ozens or even hund re d s, a nd m ira cles c an b e perform e d . All this m akes the people’s arm y le d b y the Chinese Com m unist Party fund a m e nta lly d ifferent from a ny b ourg e ois arm y, and from all the arm ies of the old type which serve d the exploiting classes a nd were d riven a nd utilize d b y a hand ful of people. The experienc e of the people’s war in China shows that a people’s arm y cre ated in ac cord a nce with Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s theory of arm y b uild ing is incom para b ly strong a nd invincib le. N otes

1. Mao Tse-tung, “On Coalition Government”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. III, pp. 296-97. 2. The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were drawn up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during the Agrarian Revolutionary War and were later adopted as rules of discipline by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and the present People’s Liberation Army. As these rules varied slightly in content in the army units of different areas, the General Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in October 1947 issued a standard version as follows: The Three Main Rules of Discipline:

(1) Obey orders in all your actions. (2) Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses. (3) Turn in everything captured.

The Eight Points For Attention:

(1)Sp eak politely . (2) Pay fairly for w hat y ou buy . (3) Return every thing y o u borrow . (4) Pay for any thing y o u dam ag e. (5) Do not hit or sw ear at people. (6) Do not dam ag e crops. (7 ) Do not take liberties w ith w om en. (8 ) Do not ill-treat captives.

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Chapter-5 Carry out the Strate gy and Tactics of People’s War Eng e ls said , “The em a ncipation of the proletariat, in its turn, will have its specific

expression in m ilitary a ffairs and cre ate its specific, new m ilitary m ethod . ” 1 Eng e ls’ profound pre d iction has b e e n fulfilled in the revolutionary wars wa g e d b y the Chinese people und er the le a d ership of the Chinese Com m unist Party. In the course of protra cted arm e d strug g le, we have cre ated a whole ra ng e of strate gy a nd ta ctics of people’s war b y which we have b e e n a b le to utilize our strong points to atta ck the enem y at his wea k points. During the W ar of Resista nc e Ag a inst Japan, on the b a sis of his com prehensive

ana lysis of the enem y and ourselves, Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung laid d own the following strate gic principle for the Com m unist-le d Eig hth Route and N ew Fourth Arm ies: “Guerrilla warfare is b asic, b ut lose no chanc e for m ob ile warfare und er favoura b le cond itions. ” 2 He raise d g uerrilla warfare to the level of strate gy, b e c ause, if they are to d e fe at a form id a b le enem y, revolutionary arm ed forces should not fig ht with a reckless d isre g ard for the consequenc es when there is a gre at d isparity b etwe en their own streng th a nd their enem y’s. If they d o, they will suffer serious losses a nd b ring he avy setb a cks to the revolution. Guerrilla warfare is the only way to m ob ilize and a pply the whole streng th of the people a g a inst the enem y, the only way to expand our forces in the course of the war, d eplete and weaken the enem y, gra d ually chang e the b a la nce of forces b etween the enem y and ourselves, switch from g uerrilla to m ob ile warfare, and fina lly d e fe at the enem y. In the initia l period of the Second Revolutionary Civil W ar, Com ra d e Mao Tse-

tung enum erate d the b asic tactics of g uerrilla warfare as follows:

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The enem y a d vanc es, we retre at; the enem y c am ps, we harass; the enem y tires, we atta ck; the ene my retre ats, we pursue. 3 Guerrilla war ta ctics were further d eveloped d uring the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst

Japan. In the b ase are as b ehind the enem y lines, everyb od y joine d the fig hting — the troops and the civilian population, m en a nd wom en, old and young ; every sing le villa g e foug ht. Various ing e nious m ethod s of fig hting were d evise d , includ ing “sparrow warfare”, 4 land -m ine warfare, tunnel warfare, sa b ota g e warfare, a nd g uerrilla warfare on la kes a nd rivers. In the later period of the W ar of Resistance Ag a inst Japan and d uring the Third

Revolutionary Civil W ar, we switched our strate gy from that of g uerrilla warfare was the prim ary form of fig hting to that of m ob ile warfare in the lig ht of the cha ng es in the b a la nc e of forces b etween the enem y and ourselves. By the m id d le, a nd especia lly the later, period of the Third Revolutionary Civil W ar, our operations ha d d evelope d into larg e-sc ale m ob ile warfare, includ ing the storm ing of b ig cities. W ar of annihilation is the fund a m ental g uid ing principle of our m ilitary

operations. This g uid ing principle should b e put into effe ct re g ard less of whether m ob ile or g uerrilla warfare is the prim ary form of fig hting . It is true that in g uerrilla warfare m uch should b e d one to d isrupt and harass the enem y, but it is still nec essary a ctively to a d voc ate and fig ht b attles of annihilation whenever cond itions are favoura b le. In m ob ile warfare superior forces m ust b e conc entrated in every b a ttle so that the enem y forces c an b e wipe d out one by one. Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung has pointed out: A b attle in which the enem y is route d is not b asic ally d e cisive in a contest with a foe of g re at streng th. A b attle of a nnihilation, on the other hand , prod uces a gre at a nd im m e d iate im pact on any enem y. Injuring a ll of a m a n’s ten fing ers is not as effe ctive as chopping off one, and routing ten enem y d ivisions is not as effe ctive as annihilating one of them . 5

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Battles of annihilation are the m ost effe ctive way of hitting the enem y; e a ch tim e one of his brig a d es or reg im ents is wiped out, he will have one brig a d e or re gim ent less, and the ene my forces will b e d em ora lize d a nd will d isinte grate. By fig hting b a ttles of a nnihilation, our arm y is a b le to ta ke prisoners of war or c apture we apons from the ene my in every b a ttle, and the m orale of our arm y rises, our arm y units g et b ig g e r, our weapons b e com e b etter, and our com b a t effe ctiveness continua lly incre ases. In his cele brate d ten c ard ina l m ilitary principles Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung pointed

out: In every b a ttle, conc entrate an a bsolutely superior force (two, three, four a nd som etim es even five or six tim es the enem y’s streng th), encircle the enem y forces com pletely, strive to wipe them out thoroug hly and d o not let any esc ape from the net. In specia l circum sta nc es, use the m ethod of d e a ling crushing b lows to the enem y, that is, concentrate all our streng th to m ake a frontal attack a nd also to atta ck one or b oth of his fla nks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing a nother so that our arm y c an swiftly m ove its troops to sm ash other enem y forces. Strive to avoid b a ttles of attrition in which we lose m ore than we g a in or only bre ak even. In this way, a lthoug h we are inferior as a whole (in term s of num b ers), we are a b solutely superior in every part and every specific c am paig n, a nd this ensures victory in the c am paig n. As tim e goes on, we sha ll b ecom e superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enem y. 6 At the sa m e tim e, he said that we should first atta ck d ispersed or isolated enem y

forces and only attack conc entrated a nd strong enem y forces later; that we should strive to wipe out the enem y throug h m ob ile warfare; that we should fig ht no b a ttle unprepare d a nd fig ht no b a ttle we are not sure of winning ; and that in any b a ttle we fig ht we should d evelop our arm y’s strong points and its excellent style of fig hting . These are the m ajor principles of fig hting a war of a nnihilation. In ord er to annihilate the enem y, we m ust a d opt the policy of luring him in d e ep

and a b a nd on som e cities and d istricts of our own ac cord in a planne d way, so as to let him in. It is only a fter letting the ene my in that the people c an take part in the

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war in various ways a nd that the power of a people’s war can b e fully exerte d . It is only a fter letting the ene my in that we ca n b e com pelle d to d ivid e up his forces, take on he avy b urd ens a nd com m it m istakes. In other word s, we m ust let the enem y b e com e elated , stretch out all his ten fing ers and b ecom e hopelessly b og g e d d own. Thus, we c an concentrate superior forces to d estroy the ene my forces one by one, to e at them up m outhful b y m outhful. Only b y wiping out the ene my’s effe ctive streng th c an cities or loc alities b e fina lly held or seize d . W e are firm ly a g a inst d ivid ing up our forces to d e fend a ll positions a nd putting up resista nc e at every pla c e for fe ar that our territory m ig ht b e lost and our pots and pa ns sm ashe d , since this can neither wipe out the enem y forces nor hold cities or loc alities. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung has provid e d a m asterly sum m a ry of the strateg y a nd

ta ctics of people’s war: You fig ht in your way and we fig ht in ours; we fig ht when we ca n win and m ove away when we c an’t. In other word s, you rely on m od ern we apons and we rely on hig hly conscious

revolutionary people; you g ive full play to your superiority and we give full play to ours; you have your way of fig hting a nd we have ours. W hen you want to fig ht us, we d on’t let you a nd you can’t even find us. But when we want to fig ht you, we m ake sure that you can’t g et away a nd we hit you squarely on the chin and wipe you out. When we are a b le to wipe you out, we d o so with a veng e ance; when we c an’t, we see to it that you d on’t wipe us out. It is opportunism if one won’t fig ht when one c an win. It is a d venturism if one insists on fig hting when one c an’t win. Fig hting is the pivot of al our strate gy and ta ctics. It is b e c ause of the nec essity of fig hting that we ad m it the nec essity of m oving a way. The sole purpose of m oving away is to fig ht and b ring a b out the final and com plete d estruction of the enem y. This strate gy and these tactics c an b e applie d only when one relies on the broa d m asses of the people, a nd such applic ation b ring s the superiority of people’s war into full play. However superior he m ay b e in technic al equipm ent a nd whatever

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tricks he m a y resort to, the ene my will find him self in the passive position of having to rec eive blows, and the initiative will always b e in our hand s. W e grew from a sm all and weak to a larg e a nd strong forc e and fina lly d e fe ate d form id a b le enem ies at hom e a nd a b roa d b e c ause we carrie d out the strateg y a nd ta ctics of people’s war. During the eig ht ye ars of W a r of Resistance Ag a inst Japan, the people’s arm y le d b y the Chinese Com m unist Party foug ht m ore tha n 125,000 eng a g e m ents with the enem y and put out of a ction m ore tha n 1,700,000 Japa nese and puppet troops. In the three ye ars of the W ar of Lib eration, we put eig ht m illion of the Kuom intang ’s rea ctionary troops out of a ction a nd won the gre at victory of the people N otes

1. Frederick Engels, “Possibilities and Perspectives of the War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852”, Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Russ. Ed., Moscow, 1956, Vol. VII, p. 509.

2. Mao Tse-tung, “On Protracted War”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, p. 116.}

3. Mao Tse-tung, “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 124.

4. Sparrow warfare is a popular method of fighting created by the Communist-led anti-Japanese guerrilla units and militia behind the enemy lines. It was called sparrow warfare because, first, it was used diffusely, like the flight of sparrows in the sky; and because, second, it was used flexibly by guerrillas or militiamen, operating in threes or fives, appearing and disappearing unexpectedly and wounding, killing, depleting and wearing out the enemy forces.

5. Mao Tse-tung, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 248.

6. Mao Tse-tung, “The Present Situation and Our Tasks”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1961j, Vol. IV, p. 161.

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Chapter-6 Ad here to the Policy of Self-Reliance The Chinese people’s W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan was a n im porta nt part of the Anti-Fascist W orld W ar. The victory of the Anti-Fascist W ar as a whole was the result of the com m on strug g le of the people of the world . By its participation in the war a g a inst Japa n at the final sta g e, the Soviet arm y und er the le a d ership of the Com m unist Party of the Soviet Union he a d e d b y Stalin played a sig nific ant part in bring ing a b out the d e fe at of Japanese im perialism . Gre at contrib utions were m a d e b y the peoples of Kore a, Vietna m, Mong olia, Laos, Ca m b od ia, Ind onesia, Burm a, Ind ia, Pa kistan, M alaya, the Philippines, Thailand and certain other Asian countries. The people of the Am eric as, O c e ania, Europe and Afric a also m a d e their contrib ution. Und er extre m e ly d ifficult circum stanc es, the Com m unist Party of Japan and the revolutionary forces of the Japa nese people kept up their valia nt and staunch strug g le, and playe d their part in the d e fe at of Japanese fascism . The com m on victory was won b y all the peoples, who g ave one another support a nd encoura g e m ent. Yet e a ch country was, a b ove all, lib erate d a s a result of its own people’s efforts. The Chinese people enjoyed the support of other peoples in winning b oth the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan and the People’s Lib eration W ar, and yet victory was m ainly the result of the Chinese people’s own efforts. Certain people assert that China’s victory in the W ar of Resistance was d ue entirely to foreig n assistance. This a b surd a ssertion is in tune with that of the Japanese m ilitarists. The lib eration of the m asses is ac com plishe d b y the m asses them selves — this is a b a sic principle of M arxism -Leninism . Revolution or people’s war in any country is

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the business of the m asses in that country and should b e c arried out prim arily b y their own efforts; there is no other way. During the W ar of Resistanc e Ag a inst Japan, our Party m aintained that China should rely m ainly on her own streng th while at the sa m e tim e trying to g et as m uch foreig n assistanc e as possib le. W e firm ly opposed the Kuom inta ng ruling clique’s policy of exclusive relianc e on foreig n aid . In the eyes of the Kuom intang a nd Chiang Kai-shek, China’s ind ustry and a g riculture were no g ood , her weapons a nd equipm ent were no g ood , nothing in China was any g ood , so that if she wanted to d e fe at Japan, she ha d to d epend on other countries, and particularly on the U.S.-British im perialists. This was com pletely slavish thinking . Our policy was d ia m etric ally oppose d to that of the Kuom inta ng . Our Party held that it was possib le to exploit the contra d ictions b etwe en U.S.-British im perialism and Japa nese im perialism , but that no relianc e could b e pla c e d on the form er. In fa ct, the U.S-British im perialists repe ate d ly plotte d to b ring a b out a “Far Eastern Munich” in ord er to arrive at a com prom ise with Japa nese im perialism at China’s expense, a nd for a consid era b le period of tim e they provid e d the Japanese a g g ressors with war m ateriél. In helping China d uring that period , the U.S. im peria lists harb oured the sinister d esig n of turning China into a colony of their own. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung said : “China has to rely m ainly on her own efforts in the W ar of Resistance. ” 1 He a d d e d , “W e hope for foreig n aid b ut c annot b e d epend ent on it; we d epend on our own efforts, on the cre ative power of the whole arm y a nd the entire people.” 2 Self-reliance was especia lly im portant for the people’s arm ed forces and the Lib erated Are as led b y our Party. The Kuom intang g overnm ent g ave the Eig hth Route and N ew Fourth Arm ies som e sm a ll a llowances in the initial sta g e of the anti-Japa nese war, b ut g ave them not a sing le penny later. The Lib erated Are as fa c e d g re at d ifficulties as a result of the

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Japanese im peria lists’ sava g e atta cks and b rutal “m opping -up” c am paig ns, of the Kuom intang ’s m ilitary encirclem ent a nd econom ic b locka d e and of natural c ala m ities. The d ifficulties were particularly g re at in the ye ars 1941 a nd 1942, when we were very short of food and clothing . W hat were we to d o? Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung asked : How has m ankind m ana g e d to ke ep alive from tim e im m em oria l? Has it not b e e n b y m en using their hand s to provid e for them selves? W hy should we, their latter-d a y d escend a nts, b e d evoid of this tiny b it of wisd om ? W hy can’t we use our own hand s? The Central Com m ittee of the Party and Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung put forward the policies of “a m ple food and clothing throug h self-relia nc e” and “d evelop the econom y and ensure supplies”, and he arm y and the people of the Lib erate d Are as ac cord ing ly launche d a n extensive prod uction c am paig n, with the m ain em phasis on a g riculture. Difficulties are not invincib le m onsters. If everyone co-operates and fig hts the m, they will b e overcom e. The Kuom inta ng re a ctionaries thoug ht that it could starve us to d e ath b y cutting off a llowances and im posing a n econom ic b locka d e, b ut in fa ct it helpe d us b y stim ulating us to rely on our own e fforts to surm ount our d ifficulties. W hile launching the gre at c am paig n for prod uction, we applied the policy of “b etter troops and sim pler a d m inistration” and econom ize d in the use of m anpower a nd m aterial resources; thus we not only surm ounte d the severe m ateria l d ifficulties a nd successfully m et the crisis, b ut lig htene d the people’s b urd en, im proved their livelihood and laid the m aterial found ations for victory in the anti-Japanese war. The prob le m of m ilitary equipm ent was solve d m ainly b y relying on the c apture of arm s from the enem y, thoug h we d id turn out som e weapons too. Chiang Kai-shek, the Japanese im perialists and the U.S. im perialists have all b e e n our “chie fs of transportation corps”. The arsena ls of the im peria lists always provid e the oppresse d peoples and nations with arm s.

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The peoples arm ed forces led b y our Party ind epend ently wa g e d people’s war on a larg e sc ale and won g re at victories without a ny m aterial aid from outsid e, b oth d uring the m ore than eig ht ye ars of the anti-Japanese war a nd d uring the m ore than three ye ars of the People’s W ar of Lib eration. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung has said that our fund a m e ntal policy should rest on the found a tion of our own streng th. Only b y relying on our own efforts c an we in a ll circum stanc es rem ain invincib le. The peoples of the world invaria b ly support ea ch other in their strug g les a g a inst im perialism a nd its la ckeys. Those countries which have won victory are d uty b ound to support a nd aid the peoples who have not yet d one so. N evertheless, foreig n aid c an only play a supplem entary role. In ord er to fig ht a revolution a nd to fig ht a people’s war and b e victorious, it is im perative to a d here to the policy of self-relia nc e, rely on the streng th of the m asses in one’s won country and prepare to c arry on the fig ht ind epend ently even when a ll m aterial aid from outsid e is cut off. If one d oes not operate by one’s own e fforts, d oes not ind epend ently pond er a nd solve the prob lem s of the revolution in one’s own country and d oes not rely on the streng th of the m asses, but le ans wholly on foreig n aid — even thoug h this b e aid from socia list countries which persist in revolution — no victory c an b e won, or b e consolid ated even if it is won. N otes 1. Mao Tse-tung, “Interview with Three Correspondents from the Central News Agency, the Sao Tang Pao and the Hsin Min Pao ”,

Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, p. 270.

2. Mao Tse-tung, “We Must Learn to do Economic Work”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. III, p. 241.

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Chapter-7 The International Sig nificance of Com ra d e Mao-Tse Tung’s Theory of People’s War The Chinese revolution is a continuation of the gre at O ctob er Revolution. The roa d of the Octob er Revolution is the com m on roa d for all people’s revolutions. The Chinese revolution a nd the Octob er Revolution have in com m on the following b a sic chara cteristics: (1) Both were led b y the working class with a M arxist-Leninist party as its nucleus. (2) Both were b ased on the worker-pe asa nt alliance. (3) In b oth c ases state power was seized throug h violent revolution and the d ictatorship of the proletariat was esta b lished . (4) In b oth c ases the socialist system was b uilt a fter victory in the revolution. (5) Both were com ponent parts of the proletarian world revolution. N atura lly, the Chinese revolution ha d its own peculiar chara cteristics. The Octob er Revolution took pla c e in im perialist Russia, b ut the Chinese revolution b roke out in a sem i-colonial and sem i-feud a l country. The form er was a proletarian socia list revolution, while the latter d eveloped into a socia list revolution a fter the com plete victory of the new-d em ocratic revolution. The Octob er Revolution b e g a n with arm ed uprising s in the cities and then spre a d to the countrysid e, while the Chinese revolution won nation-wid e victory throug h the encirclem ent of the cities from the rural are as a nd the final c apture of the cities. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s g re at m erit lies in the fa ct that he has succe e d e d in inte grating the universal truth of M arxism -Leninism with the concrete pra ctice of the Chinese revolution and has enriched a nd d evelope d M arxism -Leninism b y his m asterly g e nera lization and sum m a tion of the experienc e g aine d d uring the Chinese people’s protracted revolutionary strug g le.

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Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s theory of people’s war has b e e n prove d b y the long practice of the Chinese revolution to b e in ac cord with the ob je ctive laws of such wars a nd to b e invincib le. It has not only b e e n valid for China, it is a gre at contrib ution to the revolutionary strug g les of the oppresse d nations a nd peoples throug hout the world . The people’s war le d b y the Chinese Com m unist Party, com prising the W ar of Resistanc e and the Revolutionary Civil W ars, lasted for twenty-two ye ars. It constitutes the m ost d rawn-out and m ost com plex people’s war led b y the proletariat in m od ern history, and it has b e e n the richest in experienc e. In the last ana lysis, the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution is the theory of the seizure of state power b y revolutionary violence, the theory of countering war a g a inst the people by people’s war. As M arx so aptly put it, “Force is the m id wife of every old society pre g na nt with a new one. ” 1 It was on the b asis of the lessons d erive d from the people’s wars in China that Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung , using the sim plest and the m ost vivid lang ua g e, a d vanc e d the fa m ous thesis that “politic al power grows out of the b arrel of a g un”. 2 He cle arly pointed out: The seizure of power b y arm ed force, the settlem ent of the issue by war, is the central task a nd the hig hest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution hold s g ood universally, for China a nd for all other countries. 3 W ar is the prod uct of im peria lism and the syste m of exploitation of m an b y m an. Lenin said , “W ar is always a nd everywhere b e gun b y the exploiters them selves, by ruling a nd oppressing classes”. 4 So long as im perialism and the system of exploitation of m an b y m an exist, the im perialists and re a ctionaries will invaria b ly rely on arm e d force to m aintain their rea ctionary rule and im pose war on the oppresse d nations and peoples. This is an ob je ctive law ind epend ent of m an’s will.

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In the world tod a y, all the im peria lists he a d e d b y the United States and their la ckeys, without exception, are streng thening their state m a chinery, and especia lly their arm ed forces. U.S. im perialism , in particular, is c arrying out arm e d a g g ression and suppression everywhere. W hat should the oppressed nations a nd the oppressed people d o in the fa c e of wars of a g g ression and arm ed suppression b y the im perialists and their la ckeys? Should they sub m it a nd re m a in slaves in perpetuity? Or should they rise in resista nc e and fig ht for their lib eration? Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung a nswered this question in vivid term s. He said that a fter long investig a tion and stud y the Chinese people d iscovered that all the im perialists and their la ckeys “have sword s in their hand s and are out to kill. The people have com e to und erstand this and so a ct a fter the sa m e fashion”. 5 This is calle d d oing unto them what they d o unto us. In the last a na lysis, whether one d ares to wa g e a tit-for-tat strug g le a g a inst arm e d a g g ression a nd suppression b y the im perialists and their la ckeys, whether one d ares to fig ht a people’s war a g a inst them , m e ans whether one d ares to em b a rk on revolution. This is the m ost e ffe ctive touchstone for d isting uishing g e nuine from fa ke revolutionaries and M arxist-Leninists. In view of the fa ct that som e people were a fflicted with the fe ar of the im perialists and re a ctionaries, Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung put forward his fa m ous thesis that “the im perialists and all re a ctionaries are paper tig ers”. He said , All re a ctionaries are paper tig ers. In appe arance, the re a ctionaries are terrifying , b ut in re ality they are not so powerful. From a long -term point of view, it is not the re a ctionaries b ut the people who are re ally powerful. 6 The history of the people’s war in China a nd other countries provid es conclusive evid enc e that the growth of the people’s revolutionary forces from we ak and sm a ll b e g inning s into strong a nd larg e forces is a universa l law of d evelopm ent of

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people’s war. A people’s war inevita b ly m eets with m any d ifficulties, with ups a nd d owns a nd setb a c ks in the course of its d evelopm ent, but no forc e c an alter its g e neral trend toward s inevita b le trium ph. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung points out that we m ust d espise the enem y strate gic ally a nd take full ac count of him ta ctic ally. To d espise the enem y strateg ic ally is an ele m e ntary requirem ent for a revolutionary. W ithout the coura g e to d espise the ene my and without d aring to win, it will b e sim ply im possib le to m ake revolution and wa g e a people’s war, let alone to a chieve victory. It is also very im porta nt for revolutionaries to ta ke full ac count of the enem y tactic ally. It is likewise im possib le to win victory in a people’s war without ta king full ac count of the enem y ta ctic ally, a nd without exa m ining the concrete cond itions, without b eing prud ent and g iving g re at attention to the stud y of the art of strug g le, and without a d opting a ppropriate form s of strug g le in the concrete pra ctice of the revolution in e a ch country and with re g ard to e a ch concrete prob lem of strug g le. Dialectic al a nd historic al m aterialism tea ches us that what is im porta nt is prim arily is not that which at the g iven m om ent seem s to b e d ura b le and yet is alre a d y b e g inning to d ie away, b ut that which is arising a nd d eveloping, even thoug h at the g iven m om ent it m a y not appe ar to b e d ura b le, for only that which is arising a nd d eveloping is invincib le. W hy can the apparently weak newb orn forces always trium ph over the d e c a d ent forces which appe ar so powerful? The re ason is that truth is on their sid e and that the m asses are on their sid e, while the re a ctionary classes are always d ivorce d from the m asses a nd set them selves a g a inst the m asses. This has b e e n b orne out b y the victory of the Chinese revolution, b y the history of a ll revolutions, the whole history of class strug g le and the entire history of m a nkind .

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The im perialists are extre m e ly a fraid of Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s thesis that “im peria lism a nd a ll re a ctionaries are paper tig ers”, a nd the revisionists are extrem ely hostile to it. They all oppose and a ttack this thesis a nd the philistines follow suit b y rid iculing it. But all this c annot in the le ast d im inish its im portance. The lig ht of truth cannot b e d im m ed b y a nyb od y. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s theory of people’s war solves not only the prob lem of d a ring to fig ht a people’s war, but also that of how to wa g e it. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung is a gre at statesm an a nd m ilitary scientist, proficient at d irecting war in ac cord a nce with its laws. By the line and policies, the strate gy a nd ta ctics b e form ulated for people’s war, he led the Chinese people in steering the ship of the people’s war past a ll hid d en ree fs to the shores of victory in m ost com plic ate d a nd d ifficult cond itions. It m ust b e em phasized that Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung ’s theory of the esta b lishm ent of rural revolutionary b ase are as a nd the encircle m e nt of the cities from the countrysid e is of outstand ing a nd universal pra ctic al im porta nc e for the present revolutionary strug g les of all the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly for the revolutionary strug g les of the oppressed nations a nd peoples in Asia, Afric a a nd Latin Am eric a a g ainst im perialism and its la ckeys. Many countries and peoples in Asia, Afric a and Latin Am eric a are now b eing sub jected to a g g ression and enslavem ent on a serious scale by the im perialists he a d e d b y the United States and their la ckeys. The b a sic political and econom ic cond itions in m any of these countries have m any sim ilarities to those that prevaile d in old China. As in China, the pe asant question is extrem ely im porta nt in these re gions. The pe asants constitute the m a in force of the national-d em ocratic revolution a g a inst the im perialists a nd their la ckeys. In com m itting a g g ression a g a inst these countries, the im perialists usually b e gin b y seizing the big cities and the m ain lines of com m unic ation, b ut they are una b le to b ring the vast countrysid e com pletely

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und er their control. The countrysid e, and the countrysid e alone, can provid e the b roa d are as in which the revolutionaries c an m anoeuvre fre ely. The countrysid e, and the countrysid e alone, can provid e the revolutionary b a ses from which the revolutionaries c an g o forward to fina l victory. Precisely for this re ason, Com ra d e M ao Tse-tung ’s theory of esta b lishing revolutionary b a se are as in the rura l d istricts and encircling the cities from the countrysid e is attra cting m ore and m ore attention a m ong the people in these re gions. Ta king the entire g lob e, if N orth Am eric a and W estern Europe c an b e c alle d “the cities of the world ”, then Asia, Afric a and Latin Am eric a constitute “the rural are as of the world ”. Since W orld W ar II, the proletaria n revolutionary m ove m e nt has for various re asons b e en tem porarily held b a c k in the North Am eric an and W est Europe an c apitalist countries, while the people’s revolutionary m ovem ent in Asia, Afric a and Latin Am eric a has b e en g rowing vig orously. In a sense, the contem porary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclem ent of cities b y the rural are as. In the final ana lysis, the whole c ause of world revolution hing es on the revolutionary strug g les of the Asian, Afric an a nd Latin Am eric an peoples who m ake up the overwhelm ing m a jority of the world ’s population. The socia list countries should re g ard it as their internationa list d uty to support the people’s revolutionary strug g les in Asia, Afric a and Latin Am eric a. The O ctob er Revolution opene d up a new era in the revolution of the oppresse d nations. The victory of the Octob er Revolution b uilt a brid g e b etween the socia list revolution of the proletariat of the W est a nd the nationa l-d e m ocratic revolution of the colonial a nd sem i-colonial countries of the East. The Chinese revolution has successfully solved the prob lem of how to link up the nationa l-d e m ocratic with the socialist revolution in the colonial and sem i-colonia l countries. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung has pointe d out that, in the epoch since the Octob er Revolution, anti-im peria list revolution in a ny colonial or sem i-colonia l country is no

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long er part of the old b ourg eois, or c apitalist world revolution, b ut is part of the new world revolution, the proletariat-socialist world revolution. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung has form ulated a com plete theory of the new-d em ocratic revolution. He ind ic ated that this revolution, which is d ifferent from a ll others, c an only b e, nay m ust b e, a revolution a g a inst im perialism , feud a lism and b ure aucrat-c apitalism wa g e d b y the b roa d m a sses of the people und er the le a d ership of the proletariat. This m e ans that the revolution c an only b e, and m ust b e, led b y the proletariat a nd the g e nuinely revolutionary party arm ed with Marxism -Leninism , and b y no other class or party. This m e ans that the revolution em b ra c es in its ranks not only the workers, pe asants and the urb a n petty b ourg eoisie, b ut a lso the national b ourg e oisie and other patriotic and anti-im perialist d em ocrats. This m e ans, finally, that the revolution is d irected a g a inst im perialism , feud a lism and b ure aucrat-c apitalism . The new-d em ocratic revolution le a d s to socialism , and not to capitalism . Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s theory of the new-d em ocratic revolution is the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution b y sta g es as well as the Marxist-Leninist theory of uninterrupted revolution. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung m a d e a correct d istinction b etween the two revolutionary sta g es, i.e., the nationa l-d em ocratic and the socialist revolutions; at the sa m e tim e he correctly and closely linked the two. The nationa l-d em ocratic revolution is the nec essary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevita b le sequel to the national-d em ocratic revolution. There is no Gre at W a ll b etween the two revolutionary sta g es. But the socialist revolution is only possib le a fter the com pletion of the national-d em ocratic revolution. The m ore thoroug h the nationa l-d em ocratic revolution, the b etter the cond itions for the socialist revolution.

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The experienc e of the Chinese revolution shows that the tasks of the national-d e m ocratic revolution c an b e fulfilled only throug h long a nd tortuous strug g les. In this sta g e of revolution, im peria lism and its la ckeys are the principal enem y. In the strug g le a g a inst im peria lism a nd its la ckeys, it is nec essary to rally all anti-im perialist patriotic forces, includ ing the national b ourg e oisie and a ll patriotic persona g es. All those patriotic persona g es from a m ong the b ourg e oisie and other exploiting classes who join the anti-im perialist strug g le play a prog ressive historical role; they are not tolerated b y im peria lism b ut welcom e d b y the proletariat. It is very harm ful to confuse the two sta g es, that is, the national-d em ocratic and the socialist revolutions. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung criticize d the wrong id e a of “ac com plishing b oth at one stroke”, a nd pointed out that this utopia n id e a could only wea ken the strug g le a g a inst im perialism and its la ckeys, the m ost urg ent task at that tim e. The Kuom intang re a ctionaries a nd the Trotskyites they hired d uring the W ar of Resistance d elib erately confuse d these two sta g es of the Chinese revolution, proclaim ing the “theory of a sing le revolution” and prea ching so-calle d “socialism ” without any Com m unist Party, wipe out a ny revolution a nd prevent the a d va nc e of the national-d em ocratic revolution, and they used it as a pretext for their non-resistanc e and c apitulation to im perialism . This rea ctionary theory was b uried long a g o b y the history of the Chinese revolution. The Khrushchev revisionists are now a ctively prea ching that socialism c an b e built without the proletariat and without a g e nuinely revolutionary party arm ed with the a d vanc e d proletaria n id eolog y, and they have c ast the fund a m e nta l tenets of M arxism -Leninism to the four wind s. The revisionists’ purpose is solely to d ivert the oppresse d nations from their strug g le a g a inst im perialism and sa b ota g e their nationa l-d em ocratic revolution, all in the service of im perialism . The Chinese revolution provid es a successful lesson for m aking a thoroug hg oing nationa l-d em ocratic revolution und er the le a d ership of the proletariat; it likewise

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provid es a successful lesson for the tim ely transition from the national-d em ocratic revolution to the socialist revolution und er the le a d ership of the proletariat. Mao Tse-tung ’s thoug ht has b e e n the guid e to the victory of the Chinese revolution. It has inte grated the universal truth of M arxism -Leninism with the concrete pra ctice of the Chinese revolution and creatively d eveloped M a rxism -Leninism , thus a d d ing new weapons to the arsena l of M arxism -Leninism . Ours is the epoch in which world c apita lism and im perialism are he a d ing for their d oom and socialism a nd com m unism are m arching to victory. Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung ’s theory of people’s war is not only a prod uct of the Chinese revolution, b ut has also the chara cteristics of our epoch. The new experienc e g aine d in the people’s revolutionary strug g les in various countries since W orld W ar II has provid e d continuous evid enc e that Mao Tse-tung ’s thoug ht is a com m on asset of the revolutionary people of the whole world . This is the gre at internationa l sig nific anc e of the thoug ht of M ao Tse-tung . N otes 1. Karl Marx, Capital, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, Vol. I, p. 751.

2. Mao Tse-tung, “Problems of War and Strategy”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. II, p. 224.

3. Ibid. p. 219.

4. V.I. Lenin, “The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government”, Collected Works, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1962, Vol. VIII,

p. 565.

5. Mao Tse-tung, “The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP,

Peking, 1961, Vol. IV, pp. 14-15.

6. Mao Tse-tung, “Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1961, Vol. IV, p.

100.

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Chapter-8 Defeat U.S. Im perialism and Its Lackeys b y People’s War Since W orld W ar II, U.S. im peria lism has stepped into the shoes of Germ an,

Japanese and Italia n fascism and has b e en trying to b uild a gre at Am eric an e mpire b y d om inating a nd enslaving the whole world . It is actively fostering Japanese and W est Germ a n m ilitarism as its chief a c com plices in unle ashing a world war. Like a vicious world , it is b ullying a nd enslaving various peoples, plund ering their we alth, encroa ching upon their countries’ sovereig nty and interfering in their internal a ffa irs. It is the m ost ra b id a g g ressor in hum a n history a nd the m ost ferocious com m on enem y of the people of the world . Every people or country in the world that wants revolution, ind epend enc e and pe a c e c annot b ut d irect the spe arhe a d of its strug g le a g a inst U.S. im perialism . Just as the Japanese im perialists’ policy of sub jug a ting China m a d e it possib le for

the Chinese people to form the broa d est possib le unite d front a g a inst the m, so the U.S. im perialists’ policy of seeking world d om ination m akes it possib le for the people throug hout the world to unite all the forces that c an b e united and form the b roa d est possib le united front for a converg ing atta ck on U.S. im peria lism . At present, the m ain b attlefield of the fierce strug g le b etween the people of the

world on one sid e and U .S. im peria lism and its la ckeys on the other is the vast are a of Asia, Afric a and Latin Am eric a. In the world as a whole, this is the are a where the people suffer worst from im perialist oppression and where im perialist rule is m ost vulnera b le. Since W orld W ar II, revolutionary storm s have b e e n rising in this are a, and tod ay they have b e com e the m ost im porta nt force d irectly pound ing U.S. im perialism . The contra d iction b etween the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Afric a a nd Latin Am eric a and the im perialists he a d e d b y the United States is the principal

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contra d iction in the conte mporary world . The d evelopm ent of this contra d iction is prom oting the strug g le of the people of the whole world a g a inst U.S. im peria lism and its la ckeys. Since W orld W ar II, people’s war has incre asing ly d em onstrated its power in Asia,

Afric a and Latin Am erica. The peoples of China, Kore a, Vietna m, Laos, Cub a, Ind onesia, Alg eria a nd other countries have wag e d people’s wars a g a inst the im perialists and their la ckeys a nd won g re at victories. The classes le a d ing these people’s wars m ay vary, and so m ay the bre a d th a nd d epth of m ass m ob ilization and the extent of victory, but the victories in these people’s wars have very m uch wea kene d a nd pinned d own the forces of im perialism , upset the U.S. im peria list plan to launch a world war, a nd b e com e m ig hty fa ctors d e fend ing world pea c e. Tod a y, the cond itions are m ore favoura b le than ever b e fore the wa g ing of

people’s wars b y the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Afric a and Latin Am eric a a g a inst U.S. im perialism a nd its la ckeys. Since W orld W ar II and the succ e e d ing ye ars of revolutionary upsurg e, there has

b e e n a gre at rise in the level of politic al consciousness and the d e gre e of org a nization of the people in all countries, and the resources availa b le to them for m utual support and aid have gre atly incre ased . The whole c apita list-im perialist system has b e com e d rastically weaker and is in the process of incre asing convulsion and d isinteg ration. After W orld W a r I, the im peria lists la cke d the power to d estroy the newb orn socialist Soviet state, b ut they were still a b le to suppress the people’s revolutionary m ovem ents in som e countries in the parts of the world und er their own rule and so m aintain a short period of com parative sta b ility. Since W orld W a r II, however, not only have they b e e n una b le to stop a num b er of countries from taking the socialist roa d , b ut also they are no long er c apa b le of hold ing b a ck the surg ing tid e of the people’s revolutionary m ovem ents in the are as und er their own rule.

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U.S. im perialism is strong er, b ut a lso m ore vulnera b le, than any im perialism of the past. It sets itself a g a inst the people of the whole world , includ ing the people of the Unite d States. Its hum a n, m ilitary, m aterial and fina ncia l resources are far from sufficient for the re alization of its a m b ition of d om inating the whole world . U.S. im perialism has further we akene d itself b y occupying so m a ny pla c es in the world , over-rea ching itself, stretching its fing ers out wid e and d ispersing its streng th, with its re ar so far away a nd its supply lines so long . As Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung has said , “W herever it com m its a g g ression, it puts a new noose around its neck. It is b esieg e d ring upon ring b y the people of the whole world . ” 1 When com m itting a g g ression in a foreig n country, U.S. im peria lism c an only

em ploy part of its forces, which are sent to fig ht an unjust war far from their native land and therefore have a low m orale, and so U.S. im perialism is b eset with gre at d ifficulties. The people sub jected to its a g g ression are having a trial of streng th with U.S. im perialism neither in W ashing ton or N ew York, neither in Honolulu nor Florid a , b ut are fig hting for ind epend enc e and fre e d om on their own soil. Once they are m ob ilized on a broa d sc ale, they will have inexhaustib le streng th. Thus superiority will b e long not to the Unite d States b ut to the people sub je cted to its a g g ression. The latter, thoug h apparently wea k a nd sm all, are re ally m ore powerful than U.S. im peria lism . The strug g les wa g e d b y the d ifferent peoples a g a inst U.S. im perialism reinforce

e a ch other and m erg e into a torrential world wid e tid e of opposition to U.S. im perialism . The m ore successful the d evelopm ent of people’s war in a g iven re gion, the larg er the num b er of U.S. im perialist forces that can b e pinned d own a nd d eplete d there. W hen the U.S. a g g ressors are hard pressed in one pla c e, they have no alternative but to loosen their g rip on others. There fore, the cond itions b e com e m ore fa voura b le for the people elsewhere to wa g e strug g les a g a inst U.S. im perialism and its la ckeys.

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Everything is d ivisib le. And so is this colossus of U.S. im perialism . It c an b e split up and d e fe ate d . The peoples of Asia, Afric a and Latin Am eric a and other reg ions c an d estroy it pie c e by piec e, som e striking at its he a d a nd others at its fe et. That is why the gre atest fe ar of U.S. im peria lism is that people’s wars will b e launched in d ifferent parts of the world , and particularly in Asia, Afric a and Latin Am eric a, a nd why it re g ard s people’s war as a m ortal d a ng er. U.S. im perialism relies solely on its nucle ar we apons to intim id a te people. But

these weapons c annot save U.S. im perialism from its d oom . N ucle ar we apons c annot b e use d lig htly. U.S. im perialism has b e e n cond em ne d b y the people of the world for its towering crim e of d ropping two atom b om b s on Japan. If it uses nucle ar weapons a g a in, it will b e com e isolated in the extrem e. Moreover, the U.S. m onopoly of nucle ar we apons has long b e e n b roken; U.S. im peria lism has these weapons, but others have them too. If it thre atens other countries with nucle ar weapons, U.S. im perialism will expose its own country to the sa m e thre at. For this re ason, it will m e et with strong opposition not only from the people elsewhere but also inevita b ly from the people in its own country. Even if U.S. im perialism b razenly uses nucle ar we apons, it c annot conquer the people, who are ind om ita b le. However hig hly d evelope d m od ern we apons a nd technic al equipm ent m a y b e

a nd however com plic ated the m ethod s of m od ern warfare, in the final ana lysis the outcom e of a war will b e d e cid e d b y the sustaine d fig hting of the ground forces, b y the fig hting at close quarters on b attlefield s, b y the political consciousness of the m en, b y their coura g e a nd spirit of sa crifice. Here the wea k points of U.S. im perialism will b e com pletely laid b a re, while the superiority of the revolutionary people will b e broug ht into full play. The re a ctionary troops of U.S. im peria lism c annot possib ly b e end owed with the coura g e a nd the spirit of sa crifice possesse d b y the revolutionary people. The spiritual atom b om b , which the revolutionary people possess, is a far m ore powerful a nd use ful weapon tha n the physic al atom b om b .

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Vietna m is the m ost convincing current exa m ple of a victim of a g g ression d e fe ating U.S. im perialism b y a people’s war. The United States has m a d e South Vietna m a testing g round for the suppression of people’s war. It has carried on this experim ent for m any ye ars, a nd everyb od y c an now see that the U.S. a g g ressors are una b le to find a way of coping with people’s war. On the other ha nd , the Vietna m ese people have broug ht the power of people’s war into full play in their strug g le a g ainst the U.S. a g g ressors. The U.S. a g g ressors are in d a ng er of b eing swa m ped in the people’s war in Vietna m . They are d e eply worrie d that their d e fe at in Vietna m will le a d to a cha in re a ction. They are expand ing the war in a n attem pt to save them selves from d e fe at. But the m ore they expand the war, the gre ater will b e the cha in re a ction. The m ore they esc alate the war, the he avier will b e their fa ll and the m ore d isastrous their d e fe at. The people in other parts of the world will see still m ore cle arly that U.S. im perialism c an b e d e fe ate d , and that what the Vietna m ese people c an d o, they c an d o too. History has proved and will g o on proving that people’s war is the m ost effe ctive weapon a g a inst U.S im perialism a nd its la ckeys. All revolutionary people will le arn to wa g e people’s war a g a inst U.S. im perialism and its la ckeys. They will ta ke up arm s, le arn to fig ht b a ttles and b e com e skilled in wa g ing people’s war, thoug h they have not d one so b e fore. U.S. im peria lism like a m a d b ull d ashing from pla c e to pla c e will finally b e burned to ashes in the blazing fires of the people’s wars it has provoked b y its own a ctions. N otes 1. Mao Tse-tung, Statement Supporting the People of the Congo (Leopoldville) Against U.S. Aggression, November 28, 1964.

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Chapter-9 The Khrushchev Revisionists are Betrayers of People’s War The Khrushchev revisionists have com e to the rescue of U.S. im perialism just

when it is m ost panic-stricken and helpless in its e fforts to cope with people’s war. W orking ha nd in g love with the U.S. im perialists, they are d oing their utm ost to spre a d a ll kind s of arg um ents a g a inst people’s war a nd , wherever they c an, they are schem ing to und erm ine it b y overt or covert m e ans. The fund a m ental re ason why the Khrushchev revisionists are oppose d to people’s

war is that they have no faith in the m asses and are a fraid of U.S. im perialism , of war a nd of revolution. Like all other opportunists, they are blind to the power of the m asses a nd d o not b e lieve that the revolutionary people are c apa b le of d e fe ating im perialism . They sub m it to the nucle ar b la ckm ail of the U.S. im perialists and are a fra id that, if the oppressed peoples a nd nations rise up to fig ht people’s wars of the people of socia list countries repulse U.S. im peria list a g g ression, U.S. im peria lism will b ecom e incensed , they the mselves will b e com e involved a nd their fond d re am of Soviet-U.S. co-operation to d om inate the world will b e spoile d . Ever since Lenin led the gre at O ctob er Revolution to victory, the experienc e of

innum era b le revolutionary wars has b orne out the truth that a revolutionary people who rise up with only their b a re hand s at the outset finally succ e e d in d e fe ating the ruling classes who are arm ed to the teeth. The poorly arm ed have d e fe ate d the b etter arm ed . People’s arm ed forces, b e ginning with only prim itive sword s, spe ars, rifles and ha nd -g rena d es, have in the end d e fe ate d the im peria list forces arm ed with m od ern a eroplanes, tanks, he avy artillery and a tom b om b s. Guerrilla forces have ultim ately d e fe ated reg ular arm ies. “Am ateurs” who were never trained in a ny m ilitary schools have eventually d e fe ate d “professiona ls” gra d uated from m ilitary

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a c a d e m ies. And so on and so forth. Thing s stub b ornly d evelop in a way that runs counter to the assertions of the revisionists, and fa cts are slapping them in the fa c e. The Khrushchev revisionists insist that a nation without nucle ar weapons is

inc apa b le of d e fe ating a n enem y with nucle ar weapons, whatever m ethod s of fig hting it m ay a d opt. This is tanta m ount to saying that anyone without nucle ar weapons is d estined to com e to grie f, d estined to b e bullied a nd a nnihilated , a nd m ust either c apitulate to the enem y when confronte d with his nucle ar weapons or som e und er the “protection” of som e other nucle ar power and sub m it to its b e ck and c all. Isn’t this the jung le law of survival par excellenc e? Isn’t this helping the im perialists in their nucle ar b la ckm ail? Isn’t this openly forb id d ing people to m ake revolution? The Khrushchev revisionists assert that nucle ar we apons a nd strate gic rocket

units are d ecisive while conventional forces are insig nific ant, and that a m ilitia is just a he ap of hum a n flesh. For rid iculous re asons such as these, they oppose the m ob ilization of a nd relianc e on the m asses in socialist countries to g et prepared to use people’s war a g a inst im perialist a g g ression. They have sta ke d the whole future of their country on nucle ar we apons and are eng a g e d in a nucle ar g a m b le with U.S. im perialism , with which they are trying to strike a politic al d e a l. Their theory of m ilitary strate gy is the theory that nucle ar we apons d e cid e everything . Their line in arm y b uild ing is the b ourg eois line which ig nores the hum an fa ctor a nd se es only the m aterial fa ctor and which re g ard s technique as everything a nd politics as nothing . The Khrushchev revisionists m aintain that a sing le spark in any part of the world

m ay touch off a world nucle ar confla gration a nd b ring d estruction to m ankind . If this were true, our planet would have b e e n d estroye d tim e and tim e a g ain. There have b e en wars of national lib eration throug hout the twenty ye ars since W orld W a r II. But has a ny sing le one of them d eveloped into a world war? Isn’t it true that the

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U.S. im peria lists’ pla ns for a world war have b e e n upset precisely thanks to the wars in Asia, Afric a, and Latin Am eric a? By contrast, those who have d one their utm ost to sta mp out the “sparks“ of people’s war have in fa ct encoura g e d U .S. im perialism in its a g g ression and wars. The Khrushchev revisionists cla im that if their g eneral line of “pe a c e ful

coexistence, pea c e ful transition and pe a c e ful com petition” is followed , the oppresse d will b e lib erated a nd “a world without weapons, without arm e d forces and without wars” will com e into b eing . But the inexora b le fa ct is that im peria lism and re a ction he a d e d b y the Unite d States are ze alously prim ing their war m a chine and a re d aily eng a g e d in sang uinary suppression of the revolutionary peoples a nd in the thre at and use of arm ed forc e a g ainst ind epend ent forces. The kind of rub b ish pe d d le d b y the Khrushchev revisionists has alre a d y ta ken a gre at toll of lives in a num b er of countries. Are these painful lessons, paid for in b lood , still insufficient? The essenc e of the g enera l line of the Khrushchev revisionists is nothing other tha n the d em a nd that all the oppressed peoples and nations a nd all the countries which have won ind epend enc e should lay d own their arm s and pla c e them selves at the m ercy of the U.S. im perialists a nd their la ckeys who are arm e d to the teeth. “W hile m a g istrates are allowed to b urn d own houses, the com m on people are

forb id d en even to lig ht la m ps. ” Such is the way of the im peria lists a nd re a ctionaries. Subscrib ing to this im perialist philosophy, the Khrushchev revisionists shout at the Chinese people stand ing in the fore front of the fig ht for world pea c e: “You are b ellicose!” Gentlem en, your a buse a d d s to our cred it. It is this very “b ellicosity” of ours that helps to prevent im peria lism from unle ashing a world war. The people are “b e llicose” b e c ause they have to d e fend them selves and b e c ause the im perialists a nd re a ctionaries force them to b e so. It is a lso the im perialists a nd re a ctionaries who have taug ht the people the arts of war. W e are sim ply using revolutionary “b e llicosity” to cope with counter-revolutionary b e llicosity. How c an

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it b e arg ued that the im peria lists and their la ckeys m a y kill people everywhere, while the people m ust not strike b a c k in self-d e fenc e or help one another? W hat kind of log ic is this? The Khrushchev revisionists re g ard the im perialists like Kenne d y and Johnson as “sensib le” a nd d escrib e us tog ether with a ll those who d a re to c arry out arm ed d e fenc e a g ainst im peria list a g g ression as “b e llicose”. This has reve ale d the Khrushchev revisionists in their true colours as the a c com plices of im perialist g a ng sters. W e know that war bring s d estruction, sa crific e and suffering on the people. But

the d estruction, sa crific e and suffering will b e m uch g re ater if no resista nc e is offere d to im perialist arm ed a g g ression and the people b e com e willing slaves. The sa crifice of a sm a ll num b er of people in revolutionary wars is repaid b y security for whole nations, whole countries and even the whole of m ankind ; tem porary suffering is repaid b y lasting of even perpetual pe a c e and happiness. W ar c an tem per the people and push history forward . In this sense, war is a gre at school. W hen d iscussing W orld W ar I, Lenin said ,

The war has b roug ht hung er to the m ost civilized countries, to those m ost cultura lly d evelope d . On the other ha nd , the war, as a trem end ous historical process, has ac c elerated social d evelopm ent to an unhe ard -of d e g re e. 1 He a d d e d ,

W ar has shaken up the m asses; its untold horrors a nd suffering have awa kene d them . W ar has g iven history m om entum and it is now flying with locom otive spee d . 2 If the arg um ents of the Khrushchev revisionists are to b e b elieved , would not that

m ake Lenin the worst of a ll “b e llicose elem ents”? In d ia m etric al opposition to the Khrushchev revisionists, the Marxist-Leninists

and revolutionary people never take a g loom y view of war. Our attitud e toward s im perialist wars of a g g ression has a lways b e e n cle ar-cut. First, we are a g a inst the m, and second ly, and second ly, we are not a fraid of them . W e will d estroy whoever atta cks us. As for revolutionary wars wa g e d b y the oppresse d nations and peoples,

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so far from opposing them , we invaria b ly g ive them firm support and a ctive aid . It has b e e n so in the past, it rem ains so in the present and , when we grow in streng th as tim e g oes on, we will g ive them still m ore support a nd aid in the future. It is sheer d a y-d re am ing for anyone to think that, since our revolution has b e e n victorious, our nationa l construction is forg ing a he a d , our nationa l wealth is incre asing a nd our living cond itions are im proving , we too will lose our revolutionary fig hting will, a b a nd on the c ause of world revolution and d isc ard M a rxism -Leninism a nd proletarian internationalism . O f course, every revolution in a country stem s from the d e m a nd s of its own people. Only when the people in a country are awakene d , m ob ilized , org a nize d a nd arm ed c an they overthrow the re a ctionary rule of im perialism and its la ckeys throug h strug g le; their role c annot b e repla c e d or taken over b y any people from outsid e. In this sense, revolution c annot b e im porte d . But this d oes not exclud e m utua l sym pathy a nd support on the part of revolutionary peoples in their strug g les a g a inst the im perialists and their la ckeys. Our support a nd aid to other revolutionary peoples serves precisely to help their self-reliant strug g le. The propa g a nd a of the Khrushchev revisionists a g a inst people’s war and the

pub licity they g ive to d e fe atism and c apitulationism tend s to d em oralize and spiritually d isarm revolutionary people everywhere. These revisionists are d oing what the U.S. im perialists are una b le to d o the mselves a nd are rend ering the m gre at service. They have gre atly - encoura g e d U .S. im perialism in its war a d ventures. They have com pletely b etrayed the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory of war and have b e com e b etrayers of people’s war. To win the strug g le a g a inst U.S. im perialism and c arry people’s wars to victory,

the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people throug hout the world m ust resolutely oppose Khrushchev revisionism . Tod a y, Khrushchev revisionism has a d wind ling aud ienc e am ong the

revolutionary people of the world . W herever there is arm ed a g g ression a nd

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suppression b y im peria lism and its la ckeys, there are bound to b e people’s wars a g a inst a g g ression and oppression. It is certain that such wars will d evelop vig orously. This is an ob jective law ind epend ent of the will of either the U.S. im perialists or the Khrushchev revisionists. The revolutionary people of the world will sweep away everything that stand s in the way of their a d vance. Khrushchev is finished . And the successors to Khrushchev revisionism will fare no b etter. The im perialists, the re a ctionaries a nd the Khrushchev revisionists, who have all set them selves a g a inst people’s war, will b e swept like d ust from the sta g e of history b y the m ig hty b room of the revolutionary people.

* * * * * *

Gre at chang es have taken pla c e in China and the world in the twenty ye ars since

the victory of the W ar of Resista nc e Ag a inst Japan, chang es that have m a d e the situation m ore fa voura b le than ever for the revolutionary people of the world a nd m ore unfavoura b le than ever for im peria lism and its la ckeys. W hen Japanese im perialism launched its war of a g g ression a g a inst China, the

Chinese people ha d only a very sm all people’s arm y a nd a very sm all revolutionary b a se are a, and they were up a g a inst the big g e st m ilitary d espot of the East. Yet even then, Com ra d e Mao Tse-tung said that the Chinese people’s war could b e won a nd that Japa nese im perialism could b e d e fe ate d . Tod ay, the revolutionary b ase are as of the peoples of the world have grown to unprec e d ented proportions, their revolutionary m ovem ent is surg ing as never b e fore, im perialism is weaker tha n ever, a nd U .S. im peria lism , the chieftain of world im perialism , is suffering one

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d e fe at a fter another. We c a n say with even g re ater confid ence that the people’s wars c an b e won and U .S. im perialism c an b e d e fe ate d in a ll countries. The peoples of the world now have the lessons of the Octob er Revolution, the

Anti-Fascist W ar, the Chinese people’s W ar of Resistanc e and W ar of Lib eration, the Kore an people’s W ar of Resistance to U.S. Ag g ression, the Vietna m ese people’s W ar of Lib eration a nd their W ar of Resista nc e to U.S. Ag g ression, a nd the people’s revolutionary arm ed strug g les in m a ny other countries. Provid e d e a ch people stud ies these lessons well and cre atively inte grates them with the concrete pra ctice of revolution in their own country, there is no d oub t that the revolutionary peoples of the world will sta g e still m ore powerful a nd splend id d ra m a s in the the atre of people’s war in their countries a nd that they will wipe off the e arth onc e and for a ll the com m on enem y of all the people’s, U.S. im peria lism and its la ckeys. The strug g le of the Vietna m ese people a g a inst U.S. a g g ression a nd for natural

sa lvation is now the focus of the strug g le of the people of the world a g a inst U.S. a g g ression. The d eterm ination of the Chinese people to support and aid the Vietna m ese people in their strug g le a g a inst U.S. a g g ression and for natural salvation is unsha ka b le. N o m atter what U.S. im perialism m ay d o to expand its war a d venture, the Chinese people will d o everything in their power to support the Vietna m ese people until every sing le one of the U.S. a g g ressors is d riven out of Vietna m . The U.S. im perialists are now cla m ouring for a nother trial of streng th with the

Chinese people, for another larg e-sc ale ground war on the Asia n m ainland . If they insist on following in the footsteps of the Japanese fascists, well then, they m a y d o so, if they ple ase. The Chinese people d e finitely have ways of their own for coping with a U.S. im perialist war of a g g ression. Our m ethod s are no secret. The m ost im portant one is still m ob ilization of the people, relia nc e on the people, m a king every one a sold ier a nd wa g ing a people’s war.

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W e want to tell the U.S. im perialists onc e a g ain that the vast oc e an of several hund re d m illion Chinese people in arm s will b e m ore than enoug h to sub m erg e your few m illion a g g ressor troops. If you d are to im pose war on us, we sha ll g a in fre e d om of a ction. It will then not b e up to you to d e cid e how the war will b e foug ht. W e shall fig ht in the ways m ost a d vanta g e ous to us to d estroy the enem y a nd wherever the enem y c an b e m ost e asily d estroyed . Since the Chinese people were a b le to d estroy the Japanese a g g ressors twenty ye ars a g o, they are certainly still m ore c apa b le finishing off the U.S. a g g ressors tod ay. The naval a nd air superiority you b oast a b out c annot intim id a te the Chinese people, and neither c an the atom b om b you bra nd ish at us. If you wa nt to send troops, g o ahe a d , the m ore the b etter. The will annihilate as m a ny as you c an send , and c an even g ive you rec eipts. The Chinese people are a gre at, valia nt people. W e have the coura g e to should er the he avy b urd en of com b a ting U.S. im peria lism a nd to contrib ute our share in the strug g le for fina l victory over this m ost ferocious enem y of the people of the world . It m ust b e pointe d out in all seriousness that a fter the victory of the W ar of

Resistanc e Ta iwan was returned to China. The occupation of Taiwan b y U.S. im perialism is a bsolutely unjustified . Taiwa n province is an ina liena b le part of Chinese territory. The U.S. im perialists m ust g et out of Taiwan. The Chinese people are d eterm ine d to lib erate Taiwa n. In com m em orating the 20th a nniversary of victory in the W ar of Resistanc e

Ag a inst Japan, we m ust also point out in all sole m nity that the Japanese m ilitarists fostered b y U.S. im perialism will certainly rec eive still severer punishm ent if they ig nore the firm opposition of the Japanese people and the people of Asia, a g a in ind ulg e in their pipe-d re am s and resum e their old roa d of a g g ression in Asia. U.S. im perialism is preparing a world war. But c an this save it from its d oom ?

W orld W a r I was followe d b y the birth of the socialist Soviet Union. W orld W ar II was followe d b y the em erg e nce of a series of socialist countries a nd m any nationa lly

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ind epend ent countries. If the U.S. im perialists should insist on launching a third world war, it c an b e stated c ateg oric ally that m any m ore hund red s of m illions of people will turn to socialism ; the im perialists will then have little room left on the g lob e; and it is possib le that the whole structure of im perialism will collapse. W e are optim istic a b out the future of the world . W e are confid ent that the people

will b ring to an end the epoch of wars in hum a n history. Com ra d e M a o Tse-tung pointed out long a g o that war, this m onster, “will b e fina lly b e elim inated b y the prog ress of hum an society, and in the not too d ista nt future too. But there is only one way to elim inate it, and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war. ” 3 All people’s suffering from U.S. im perialist a g g ression, oppression and plund er,

unite! Hold aloft the just b a nner of people’s war and fig ht for the c ause of world pe a c e, national lib eration, people’s d em ocra cy and socialism ! Victory will certainly g o to the people of the world ! Long live the victory of people’s war!

N otes 1. V.I. Lenin, “For Bread and Peace”, Collected Works, Eng. ed., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, Vol. XXVI, p. 386.

2. V.I. Lenin, “The Chief Task of Our Day”, Collected Works, Eng. ed., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, Vol. XXVII, p. 162.

3. Mao Tse-tung, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War”, Selected Works, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. I, p. 182.