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L/UIIIIV11L VIA
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No. 3523
PRUJECT PEi'RFI1LWKE AUDIT REPURT
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT(CREDIT 277- MI)
Junp 29- 1981
Operations Evaluation Department
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance ofheir nafel chdiast.n It- cntments wwaye nt oterwise ur ulCuSv withut IAurl D autshorization.
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0T1DDVMV VnTUTWAT ETC
1971 (at Appraisal) US$1.00 = CFAF 555fr1rA 0 1 (VIOC TTC1 IQOn
Ur~ I ft.U -V- An I -
1973-79 (Estimatedi Average U0±.uu VV - AI
of Disbursements) CFAF 1,000 = US$2.13
1978 (at Completion) US$1.00 = CFAF 451
CFAFr 1,0010 =
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
1 kilometer (km) 0.62 miles
I hectare (ha) 2.47 acres
1 kilogram (kg) 2.2 pounds
1 metric ton (ton) 2,204 pounds
ABBREVIATLUNS
FAC Fonds d-Aide et de Cooperation
IDA International Development Association
IER Institut d-Economie Rurale
OACV Operation Arachides et Cultures Vivrieres
ODEM Operation Developpement de 1'Elevage Mopti
ORM Operation Riz Mopti
SCAER Societe de Credit Agricole et d'Equipement Rural
r!-1% f^vvi9q AT i Ter r%11 atrwitLIFLL U%E, V1%&IL0 I
RKUJECT PFRKMANE AUULX- KEPUK
MALL: MUTi KIC RKUJET
(CREDIT 277-MLI)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
Preface ..........................................................Project Performance Audit Basic Data Sheet ............................ iiHighlights ....................... ................................ iv
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
I. SUMMARY ............................................. 1
II. MAIN ISSUES .......................................... 3
A. Project Design ................................... 3B. Agricultural Credit ... . ................ ........... 6C. Farmer Institutions ............................. 7D. Technical Package and Agricultural Extension ....... 8E. Monitoring and Evaluation .... .......... 10F. Project Impact at Farm Level ................... 12
Annex I
Table 1 Participants by Farmers and non Farmers ............ 14Table 2 Distribution of Holdings per Family ................ 14
ATTACHMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I. BACKGROUND ....................................... 15
II. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL .............................. 16
III. IMPLEMENTATION ......................................... 18
IV. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT ............................... % .... 22
V. ECONOMIC IMPACT .................................... 26
VI. PERFORMANCE ............................................ 28
VII. SPECIAL ISSUES - LESSON LEARNED ........................ 30
Annexes 1 - 3 31-38
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World bank authorization.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT
(CREDIT 277-MLI)
PREFACE
This is a performance audit of the Mopti Rice Project in Mali forwhich Credit 277 was approved in December 1971 in the sum of US$6.9 millionwhich was increased to US$9.5 million and closed fully disbursed in September1980.
The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by theOperations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR)dated December 1980. The PCR was prepared by the West Africa Regional Officeon the basis of an execution report prepared by the project authority in June1978.
An OED mission visited Mali in August 1980. Discussions were heldwith officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and the project authority. Theinformation obtained during the mission were used to test the validity of theconclusions of the PCR.
The audit memorandum is based on the mission's discussions, oninterviews with Bank staff, and on a review of the Appraisal Report No.PA-107a dated November 9, 1971, the President's Report No. P-999 of Decem-ber 9, 1971, the Credit Agreement dated January 6, 1972, the PCR and corre-spondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issuescontained in relevant Bank files.
A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower for comments onApril 29, 1981; none were received.
The audit finds that the PCR covers adequately most of the project's
salient features and the PPAM generally agrees with the main conclusions.However, in addition to summarizing the objectives and results of the project,
the PPAM expands upon some issues which are not, or only briefly, mentioned in
the PCR: deficiencies in technical design, farmer institutions, and monitor-ing and evaluation, because of their importance to this as well as other
agricultural projects in the same region.
The valuable assistance provided by the Government of Mali andthe nroiect staff met durine the prenaration of this report is gratefullyacknowledged.
- ii -
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT(CREDIT 277-MLI)
KEY PROJECT DATA
Appraisal Actual orTtem Exnctation C,irrant- at-4mnaa
Total Proiect Cost (US9 million) 9.4 13.1
Overrun (%) 39Credit Amount (TTq millinn) A9 o ,/a
Disbursed 9.5Date Mninr Phycirnl rnmnnnantc rnmnitaA OA/75 09/7
Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 100 95Pronortion of Time Overrun (7) - 17
Economic Rate of Return (%) 14 17
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements/TTC4 '80 VWqU4vaen#-*
FY73 FY74 FY75 vY76 FY77 Fv70 v70 Fon
Esiae 900n 11, 7nn 9; Qf0f Q,71.A 01 1 Kt* n, 1.O In n O nfIJO~~ ~ I.O tL -. W .JW '.J A 'JJ 'JV'J S .U 7, -tU 7.JV U -P
Actual 1,280 4,250 6,900 8,300 8,700 9,100 9,300 9,500
Estimated % 106.6 114.8 116.9 95.0 95.0 96.5 97.9 100
Actual orItem Original Revisions Est. Actual
V 4 rst M1-4d-- In Fi1es or Tm et-abl1e ^1-1,nIre.V.L L 11ICLLuiL -LLL E.±±cb U L L aU. ' U / .1 1 /I
Government s Application 06/27/70LTego LaUJ - //.L -LV/ 40/i 0/I/7
Board Approval 12/21/71 - 01/06/72Creuit Agreement vate Ui/Uo// - 01/U6/72Effectiveness Date 04/17/72 07/01/72 06/26/72%,-Losing Date va / ~-. /I0 1.3 /~ /0 9/3/8
Borrower Republic of MaliExecuting Agency Operation Riz MoptiFiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31Folow-on Project Name Second Mopti Rice ProjectCredit Number 753-MLIAmount (US$ million) 15.0Credit Agreement Date 12/08/77
/a Including Supplementary Credit of US$2.6 million.
- iii -
MISSION DATA
Sent Month/ No. of No. of Man- Date ofitem D Year Weeks Persons weekaLa Report
Identification KMWA 05/69 2.2 3 6.6 06/28/69
10/24/69Preparation I RMWA/HQ 10/69 1.2 2 2.4 11/06/69Preparation II RMWA 01-02/70 2.4 1 2.4 03/16/70Preparation Ill RMWA U-lU//U 1.0 2 2.0 10/19/70Appraisal HQ/RMWA 04-05/71 4.6 4 22.4L.b 05/20/71
Total 11.4 35.8
Supervision I HQ 05/72 0.8 2 1.6 06/09/72Supervision II HQ 10/72 1.6 1 1.6 10/27/72Supervision III HQ 06/73 1.5 2 3.0 07/31/73Supervision IV HQ/RMWA 05/74 1.6 3 4.8 06/28/74Supervision V HQ 11/74 2.0 2 4.0 12/24/74Supervision VI HQ 04-05/75 2.0 2 4.0 06/02/75Supervision VII HO 11/75 0.2 1 0.2 12/05/75Supervision VIII HQ 01/76 1.6 3 4.8 03/03/76Supervision IX HO 11/76 3.4 4 13.6 12/22/76Supervision X HQ 05/77 2.6 2 5.2 06/22/77Supervision XI HO 11-12/77 1.0 2 2.0 04/28/78
Supervision XII HQ 02/78 0.6 1 0.6 02/28/78SunerviRion XTTT HO 11/78 1.2 9 9.4 19/04/78
Total 20-1 47.8
NaMt! U1 UULLeCecy ALULrevLaL.Lu) Mali Frane (Mr)Year:
Appraisal Year average (71.) Exchange Rate: US$1 MF555.42Intervening Years Average US$1 = MF469.60Completion Year Average (1978) US$1 = MF431.L1
/a Total manweeks may overestimate the actual number of manweeks spent onthe project since some supervision missions also covered other projects inMali.
/b Includes two weeks each by two additional mission members who were notpresent for the entire duration of the mission.
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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT
HIGHLIGHTS
The project which was the bank Group s first operation in Mall sagricultural sector aimed at raising paddy production by 35,000 tons throughthe construction of three polders and the rehabilitation of five polders inthe Niger flood plain, deep plowing, equipment and staffing of the projectauthority, establishment of a seed farm and technical assistance to projectmanagement.
Most of the project works were completed on schedule with theexception of three polders and construction of buildings which were completedabout three years behind schedule. Because of adverse topographic and pedo-logic conditions discovered only during project implementation, the totalproject area was reduced from 31,000 ha to about 26,000 ha.
The project's objectives were not fully achieved mainly for climaticreasons, shortcomings in the technical design, wild rice infestation and lackof adequate agricultural credit. Yields have reached only 50% to 70% of theappraisal forecast. However, despite the decrease in area and productioncompared with projections, the project's ERR is now reestimated at 17%,compared to 14% calculated at appraisal, because the economic price of riceincreased by more than 300% over appraisal projections.
The following points may be of special interest:
- In spite of its limitations, the controlled flood irrigationsystem offers benefits to a large number of farmers at low costper ha and does not require drastic changes of existing farmingsystems (PPAM para. 13);
- deficiencies in technical design exacerbated the limitations ofthe controlled flood system (PPAM paras. 12 and 14, PCR paras.3.07-3.09);
- the lack of an agricultural credit component had adverse effectson the project (PPAM paras. 18-20);
- the project failed to promote farmer organizations to dealwith credit, marketing, extension, land distribution and costrecovery (PPAM paras. 21-22);
- farmers' attitudes vis-a-vis the technical package were dictated
more by technical constraints and the prevailing socio-economicenvironment than by ignorance and irrationality (PPAM paras.23-25);
- monitoring and evaluation had little impact on managementsdecision-making process (PPAM paras. 30-31); and
- the cost recovery rate was good despite low yields and heavier
taxation than initially foreseen; inconsistencies are evident in
required cost recoveries in Bank assisted irrigation projects(PPAM paras. 33-34).
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
MALI: MOPTI RICE PROJECT(PVDTT ?77-MTTI)
I. SUMMARY
Background
h. 1L Niger RiVE LLUUU jid.Ltb L UW LL6ULLauL L-C -LUW±Hg diea :West Africa. Mali had traditionally been an exporter of rice until the 1960s
when stagnating prouuction anU increaUig population causeu L LU Ut LUUr m LL
importing country. To reverse this trend, Mali embarked on a program to
construct polders and introauce improved rice cu_LivaLiUn over an area U
approximately 120,000 ha, about 55,000 ha of which were located in the Mopti
area. Government submitted a request for DA' s assistance to help in the
development of this area.
2. The project, which was the Bank Group's first operation in Mali's
agricultural sector, was identified by the Bank s Resident Mission in West
Africa (RMWA) in May 1969. The project was prepared by the Government withthe assistance of consultants financed by UNDP and French Aide (FAC). Tne
feasibility study was issued in January 1971 and appraisal took place inApril/May 1971. Negotiations were held on October 1971. Board presentation
took place on December 21, 1971 and the Credit Agreement was signed on January
6, 1972.
Project Design
3. The total project area was planned to cover 31,000 ha of the Mopti
region. The project's objective was to raise paddy production by 35,000 tonsin 1982 through the introduction of a controlled flood system, improved
seeds, improved and timely plowing and seeding, and application of fertil-izers. A total of 7,800 farmers (4.25 ha/farm) were expected to be reached by
the project which originally consisted of (i) the construction of 3 polders
covering 13,300 ha and the rehabilitation of 5 polders with an area of 13,ZUUha, (ii) deep plowing on 10,300 ha, (iii) housing, building, vehicles, farmmachinery, staffing and operating cost of the project authority (O.R.M.).',(iv) an applied agricultural research program, (v) the establishment of aseed farm and (vi) technical assistance, to project management and for prepar-
ing the feasibility study of the Second Mopti Rice Project. At governmentrequest, technical assistance to the agricultural credit institution waseliminated from the project description.
1/ Operation Riz Mopti.
- 2 -
4. Total proiect cost was estimated at US$9.4 million: IDA's contribu-tion was US$6.9 million while FAC financed technical assistance (US$0.7million). A supplementary IDA Credit of US$2.6 million and an increase inFAC's contribution amounting to US$0.5 million were made in 1975 to cover theeffects of the dollar devaluation. minor changes in Droiect design and costincreases.
Project Implementation
5. The Project became effective in June 1972. In spite of initalrtlnva in tendering nnd Awnrdinp contracts most nf thp irriontinn works wre
completed by mid-1976 as foreseen with the exception of three polders whichwere completed 32 months hohind chedulo For nnstruction fn buildings
delays in completion were even longer partly due to cement shortages. Cer-tai problems were encoun tered du-- -g imleenato resutin in modfi---
tions of the works. Because of adverse topographic and pedologic characteris-tics discovered only duiringcxcuin the total project area wsreduced from
31,000 ha to about 26,000 ha. In 1974, technical insufficiencies of thehydr a.ulic.. s tructures aresu.Ol.ted.~L in .. ~t unotrle f.L~. t'.looding
6 affctn t-U±1 po'ders.UC.
and the loss of 800 ha of already cultivated land. The long delays experi-eceAI.C in JJ.J 1, 15A-n cos.J t rucUt i b,ad a neaau .va ctiveipato L.Ie opertion L.Lo tiL e
Project Authority.
6. Project cost estimates were revised in June 1973, May 1974 and
were mainly due to cost escalation of civil works, management and extensionrVce. GVeLLLenCL LUnLLUULL0O LU dLUJ=k_L LULD WeLC LUdUE CVdLdU.U 111
time and kept pace with the progress of works.
Project Impact
7. The project's objectives were not fully achieved mainly for climatic
reasons. rullowing the Li,/iJ an( i droughts, when only 1/3 and 1/2 orthe developed areas could be inundated, the net cultivable area of each polderhad to be redefined and was reduced Dy 16%. Yielas were lower than estimatedand do not show a sustained increase as anticipated; this was due to limited
adoption of improved cultivation techniques and to wild rice infestation.However, when compared with the "without the project" situation, yields are onaverage 1.5 times higher but have reached only 50%/ to I of the appraisalforecast. Because of inadequate incentives due to low official paddy prices,farmers try to sell as much as possible in the parallel market. The grossvalue of production per farm reaches between 50% and 65% of appraisal esti-mates while actual family net incomes amount to 647 - 12% of appraisal projec-tions.
8. The agricultural credit component aiming at expanding ox-drawn cul-tivation fell short of expectations because of (i) increases in the price ofbullocks, (ii) inefficiency of the government agency responsible for supplying
- 3-
oxen an. eq4
JpmentL, t,4,*% *U~ -A (- +-, 4
ties of farmers in repaying loans after the bad harvests during drought.I.Credi was also used uy UR' UML urching.LI tractors, threshersL anu. tlersL L o
provide services to farmers; ploughing and sowing were, however, limited dueto few requests from1 farmersL ad ULRb equipweiI- ___1euaie UI~UL~~U
9. Despite certain imprUvements i1troduceu in 1L7/7It, performance of
the seed farm has remained unsatisfactory. Faulty methodology and lack ofcompetent supervision prevented complete acnievement of initial objectives of
the agricultural research component. Conclusive results, however, havebeen obtained as regards cultivating techniques which are being used in theMopti II project.
10. In accordance with the Credit Agreement, levies were to be chargedto farmers to cover annual operation and maintenance costs and to recover alldirect investments over a 35-year period. Levies were imposed from 1974 on ata much faster rate than anticipated, although ORM adopted a policy of exempt-ing farmers most affected by cropping hazards from these levies. The presentlevel of the levies is adequate to compensate for recurrent costs, but recov-ery of investment costs proved not feasible because it would place too heavy aburden on farmers' low net incomes.
11. Despite the decrease in area and production compared with appraisalprojections, the project's ERR is now estimated at 17%, as opposed to 14%calculated at appraisal, because the economic price of rice increased by morethan 300% over appraisal projections.
II. MAIN ISSUES
A. The Project Design
12. The PCR considers the limited efficiency of the "controlled flood"irrigation system as the main issue and stresses that despite investments
in structures (dikes, inlet and outlet structures), sufficient rainfall andits timely distribution has a decisive influence on the cropping cycle andyield (para. 7.01). The extent of risk attributable to insufficient rainfall
has only come into focus in recent years and was not considered at appraisal.Although the audit shares this view, it also finds that intrinsic limitationsof the "controlled flood" system were exacerbated by shortcomings of thetechnical design: canals and drains had insufficient capacity to properlyflood and drain the rice fields; some of the intakes suffered from weakstructures as well as erosion problems, and the quality of the hydraulic
structures was not fully satisfactory. Most of these problems were eliminated
during project implementation, but ORM had still not received adequate racksfor intake structures and drainage problems were not eliminated for the
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Soufouroulaye polder at the time of the mission. In this polder, farmers alsocomplanedabou inAn, fic'n ce-r Ano_l/
13. The PCR concludes that because of its 14mita-f-4- the controlled
flood system might be inappropriate for the Mopti region. In the audit'svi4w +-- co+-ole- flood system should, however, becmae wIth ps
sible alternative irrigation systems which have been reviewed by the rural
flood was the only feasible economic solution for the Mopti area. Exorbi-LanL cUsts UL LUtal water contrlU in Liall \over TTvO-s)uWulua" -Uc LL %UVLY
Hy,LLW~I WO./1JI G , forceLtIe 'ov'ern=
ment to limit construction of such schemes to heavily populated areas whereUGUUl LLUpptlu Cb ledbii b UL LU fL-dl WOIr t rUe aALeLLaVCs aLe fasULC
(Kayes, Timbouctou and Legou). Under prevailing conditions in the Mopti area,the controlled flood system permitted improving living conditions of thousandsof families at a low cost per ha and without drastic changes of the existingfarming system. Iu ne 1opti region, the alternative is not a more sopnis-
ticated irrigation scheme but only the "no project" solution.2/ The 1972,1973 ana i77 cropping seasons snowea tnat "no project means no crops while
the polders remained the only productive areas in the Mopti region. Thisexplains continuous farmers' interest for polders despite the limitationsof the controlled flood system and subsequent disappointing yields by outsidestandards.
14. In addition to the rehabilitation of old poiders and construction ofnew polders, land preparation (deep ploughing) was an important physicalcomponent to reduce wild rice infestation. A provision of deep ploughing on10,300 ha was allowed at appraisal after chemical treatment considered at thefeasibility stage had been eliminated on economic grounds. Wild rice intesta-tion is still a serious problem and the PCR tries to explain this unsatisfac-tory situation by the lack of farmerso collaboration (para. 4.04). The auditdoes not support this view and thinks that wild rice infestation should bemainly attributed to insufticient deep ploughing. Deep poughing has beencarried out only on 8,900 ha because "the contractor for the rural works,
1/ Soufouroulaye polder should have been mentioned in para. 3.06 of the PCRwhich lists polders where considerable completion delays occurred.
2/ The Region argues that between controlled flood as it has been prac-ticed and the fully controlled irrigation there is a wide range ofdevelopment possibilities, like partial levelling, contour levees andditches, improvement of water conveyance networks and partial pumping,which could be used according to the physical characteristics of eachindividual polder and which have not yet been envisaged either forMopti I or Mopti II Projects. These actions would partially offset theshortcomings of the controlled flood system that, in spite of itsmerits, is highly dependent on rainfall and river floods. Before decid-ing on a simple controlled flood system or any improvements to it, anagroclimatologic study needs to be carried out.
-5-
who had also carried out the deep ploughing, abandoned the residual works in19ia, preferring to pay the statutory penalty. in uibauenLC, Ll " C uaL.V7
contractor could be induced to undertake the deep ploughing.' It is notsurprising then to observe the worst situation in OLa polders aiu moLe specif-ically on the Mopti-Sud polder where no deep ploughing was ever undertaken.The lesson is that under prevailing conditions deep ploughing has Lo De
considered as a prerequisite prior to land allocation to farmers. This wasdone under the Mopti H1 Project which planned systematic deep ploughing ofnew poldeys and on 10,200 ha of the Mopti I polders and two other existingpolders.±-'
15. In the audit's view, the deficiencies in technical design andinsufficient deep ploughing are the main reasons for which "the success of theharvest is still dependent on climate and the incremental benefit is compara-tively low.".J The audit does not support the PCR's assessment that "theproject could not offer the water control necessary to induce farmers to fullyparticipate with the project. As a result, smaller lots per family werecropped and cultivation standards have remained low." It was found that onlyin the Dia Tenenkou polders farmer participation was contingent on efficientwater control. Areas cultivated in these polders are marginal and irrigationworks do not significantly improve water control over natural conditions which
it should be noted, are exceptionally good. As a result, yields of the DiaTenenkou polders were generally lower than yields outside during projectimplementation. This was not the case in most other polders where effects of
the rainfall deficit were less pronounced during the dry years (1972/73,1973/74, 1977/78). In those polders farmers' attitude vis-a-vis the projectwas more influenced by socio-economic considerations than by water avail-ability. The case of the Sarantomo Syn polder is a good illustration: aftertwo consecutive years during which there was no harvest at all, allocation ofland and the number of beneficiaries remained at the same level, which demon-strates continuous farmers' interest in the project despite its poor technicalperformance.
16. Allocation of smaller lots per family was not brought about by anylack of farmers' interest but, on the contrary, as a deliberate policy tosatisfy all or more requests and in addition had to take into account the
1/ Mopti II Project Appraisal Report, para. 13.
2/ The Region notes that deep ploughing is necessary when infestationreaches such proportions that no other solution is possible; it is not aprerequisite of rice cultivation but the only remedy after years of badcultivation practices.
3/ PCR. nara. 7.01.
equipment available to farmers.1/ The project's 1973/74 annual report showsthat only 792 of farmers who ronue-stpd ho1dingg were in fact allocated a lot.
The 1978 report of the "Evaluation Unit" indicates (para. 11.13) that 66.67%of sa=ple farms hvmanaedthieir siz- 9-5-6-47 (mnst of them under twohectares) have increased their holdings and the remaining 7.9%, with decreases
-in thbeir ac.reage, wer the largea fa-rms (abovey 6; ha)-
17. C Specal mention should be made of the attention given fo rpQnlvp nyv
likely problems with livestock in the design of the project's polders. Unlikeother irrigation schemes in the sahelian Zon.2/ th xtnie,sko h
project area by cattle herds during the dry season was anticipated and provi-
SiOnS were mad~e for a"_ut access to gras4-n-if-Mn
tion of a livestock component in the Mopti II project design was less success-
ful anG las led t LseLious arguments etween -frmes and hradamen out theBougoula polders project where dikes now render access to traditional grazingareas impoSSIDLe. An attempt LU Leblve tL±L PaUV ew was maUc nd
ODEM. projects.
B. Agricultural Credit
18. Agricultural credit which was considered an important component at
appraisal was eliminated at Government s request CUL.LLIg negotiti.ons. I.
retrospect, this decision had adverse effects on the project since SCAER/
aDility to supply farmers wLi farm equipment was limIteU. At appFateam, vahad little control and limited influence on credit organization as well as on
credit allocation and delivery. This problem was recUonized and pointed out
in the appraisal report: "Although the operations now administer agricul-
tural credit, the burden of financing farm inputs sold on credit still rests
with SCAER. SCAER has never had sufficient working capital of its own to fi-
nance its activities and has always relied on direct government assIsa 1
1/ The Region doubts that the actual farm size being smaller than antici-
pated at appraisal results from a deliberate policy of ORM. The linlited
equipment of farmers and their consequent inability to effectively cope
with larger units might have been a much stronger reason.
2/ See PPAR Senegal Polders OED Report No. 2777, dated December 1979.
3/ Operation Developpement de l'Elevage Mopti.
4/ Societe de Credit Agricole et d'Equipement (the agricultural credit
agency).
5/ CPS notes that the costs of administering credit can be so high, and the
default rates excessive due to poor crops that one might argue that,
economically speaking, a straight grant package would be cheaper, espe-
cially since inputs are already heavily subsidized.
- 7 -
(Appraisal Report, Annex 4, p.2). As a result, credit terms were unfavor-able (20% cash and repayment in two 40% annuities) and, to a large extent,credit availability was restricted. This was noted by the November/December1977 supervision mission which noted that "this aspect of project should beaccorded priority in the coming months in order to seek a more satisfactorysolution well in advance of the next cropping season" (para. 12).
19. Lack of credit for bullocks turned out to be one of the main con-straints. The cost of a pair of bullocks was about 150,000 MF in 1977 andincreased to about 200,000 MF by 1980. The shortage of draft animals alsoexplains the slow progress of putting to more effective use the farmers'equipment and the relative decrease of plowing. As a consequence of theGovernment/Bank agreed institutional arrangements. ORM never felt resnonsible
for credit problems and never referred to the unsatisfactory credit situationeither in its Proiect Execution Renort or in its 1977/78 and 1978/79 annual
reports. Rates of credit recoveries were not considered key indicatorseither by the extension service or by the evaluation unit and hencp it iq not
surprising to find little information on this matter in Bank documents.
20. The credit system's failure to function adequately is a majorshortonming of this nrniet and the lak of nrovision fora crdI o mnonent
within the project is a serious omission of the Mopti I project. As shown inthe chapter on agricultural1 extension (praras. 23 - 24A) , tehIa rogess--was, and still is, highly dependent on the availability and proper use of farmaqipmnmrt. T -n. Out .i -d -,,t ari--u
1#,u1.-- credi4t ,F xtesion actvte -F4.444 nr,
have only a limited impact on production in the Mopti polders. There shouldbeo a cl-e 1 4.-, .- A cooperation betweenn agri cul4tural -r-A4+- -- 4--,.,ettk-..
ing, input supply, and extension at project level. A good example of asuc e SfUl 4 ntegart-n is 44-e Mq14 C-A qn,4a4 -TIt 1 --- e ^-- - . 1 .~
by the Mopti II project which includes a credit component to be managed byAUM0. uuwcyck LHC AG.L ACMGRD LUOL LLuUweL LveUrLCIeLD LUL UU LU.A -s VC nUL
been solved and are still not recognized when it is concluded that "generally,oxen aLe pLULcure Uy fLLrm ULcly LLUm Lhe LLUae b Lhis appedLb LU
work satisfactorily, no change is envisaged in this procedure and oxen are, inconsCquence, nU coveted uy Lue creuit programme."
fl. 1lrmL -AILu-I.ons
I-A* Un.L&e mULe LecentC LL1 G A11t.U C L.iU.LULdL UL ctL, iHbL.LUL.LOLU
building was not considered as an issue. The need for farmer institutionswas, nowever, recogunieu uy Lue Decemuer 1910 Supervision mission wnicn
reported that: "marketing tasks will become even more of a burden as marketedproduction increases. No ready soluLIon is In signt DUt It is hoped that moreemphasis on farmer's groups, functional literacy programs, etc.,...will allow
1/ Mopti II Appraisal Report, Annex 5, Appendix III, para. 3.
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a gradual allocation of marketing tasks to farmers' representatives."!1 Thesame issue was raised again in a project report prepared by ORM, which recon-mended the establishment of farmer village groups to manage agriculturalcredit through the reorganization of the Malian cooperative system. Theimplementation of this cooperative program is expected to create "professionalinstitutions of rice farmers able to self-manage irrigation schemes and theirequipment."2 /
22. Promotion of farmer associations was not considered under thefollow-on project in spite of including an adult literacy component. Theabsence of any efforts to establish farmer organizations was also commentedon in previous OED reports of two other Bank financed irrigation proiects:Cameroon SEMRY Rice and Senegal River Polders.31 It was found that in mostirrigation Droiects. proiect authorities aDpear reluctant to nromot farmerorganizations which in their view could strengthen the farmers' bargainingpower and. as a side effect. reduce the authorities' leverage. On the onehand, farmers contribute, through the payments of levies, to the reimburse-ment of Droiects investments- which imnlies at least that thev should havesome rights in decision making.-- On the other hand, to insure optimum useof irrigated land. nroiert authoriton intend to ratnin ho victh- t- evictfarmers who do not properly till allocated lands. In the case of this proj-ect- ORM waq uinqble to establish a nPrPzry dinloriie with farmar. The f4.1A
staff's power in deciding on land distribution is in no way balanced orcountered by farmer organizations and recent exnprienre hqr Qhnwn thnf thicsituation could lead to abuses.- Project management is well aware of thisnrohlpm and shares the n,dit' s vier n the need for promoting farmer organiza-tions to deal with credit supply and recovery, marketing, extension, leviesonllprfinn AnA lanfi r1i.trihiutionn_
D)_ Technical Packrage ndA Agricuiltural Extension
91 Analysis of the farmers' response to th tehla
limited to a general comment by the PCR on their refusal to adopt crop inten-contributesCXO* to cost recver, thiso i a tificati
OJ UP%-LVL.LJLVL I-,ZPULL, LJC:_LLJL)CL L71V, LULLM!A~ JU, PZLLa. 1.
~) I (\fl1A ~ ~ -J 11T~ 1 C170 - 11'VKW JEdI L. ACULUI 1)j~.JL _JII L710,p i.
-I OD Report bilos. 42054 anu 2777, dated March 191 and December 1979.
/ CPS staff points to the fact that although farmers pay a levy whichcontributes to cost recovery, this does not constitute a justificationfor their participation in project decision-making. Such a participa-tion, however, might be desirable from a production point of view.
5/ Reallocation of field staff by new project director revealed that somefield workers abused their power in arbitrary land allocation.
attitude can be attributed mainly to "plagues and unsatisfactory flooding ofpoiders" ,- and partly to ORM s work organizaLiOn of eXtensiUn WoE.
However, there are also additional more specific reasons explaining thefarmers attitudes towards different package components. For some components,farmers' responses have been positive and this was recognized during the MoptiIt appraisal.-, Sativa varieties are now totally accepted within theproject area and are also widely used outside.
24. The Mopti II Appraisal also gives an explanation for the delays inadopting line sowing: ...introduction of line sowing, the prerequisite foreffective weeding and for making good use of fertilizer was retarded by thelack of a seeder adapted to local conditions. Following the identificationand acquisition of a suitable type, line sowing has begun on a modest scaleand has reached about 6% of the cultivated area in 197/7/.o Line sowing wasundertaken only on 17% of the planted areas in 1978/79. Main reasons for theslow adoption of line sowing were both the small number of seeders (128 in1977) and their low productivity (21 ha per seeder instead of 40 ha). Theaverage area annually sown by seeders is more dependent on rainfall patternsthan on the farmers' good intentions. The use of bullocks for sowing in thepolders is contingent on sufficient intervals between rainfalls and, there-fore, extension staff have sometimes recommended hand sowing when waiting forthe seeders. The lack of ox-mechanized weeding was not due to farmers'unwillingness but to lack of adequate equipment; the modified ARIANA hoe wasnot then supplied to farmers by SCAER. Substantial price increases and lackof adequate medium-term credit explain the shortage of plows and oxen (only41% of farmers were adequately equipped).3/
25. Because of these technical and financial constraints the impact ofextension staff remained minimal.k/ The project proved again the old exper-ience that the farmers' attitude vis-a-vis a technical package is more dic-tated by technical constraints and the socio-economic environment than by
1/ PCR, para. 4.04.
2/ "The substitution of sativa rice varieties for the traditional glaberimarice was unexpectedly rapid and is now complete, far ahead of appraisalestimates." Mopti II Appraisal Report, Annex 4, para. 18.
3/ CPS staff notes that (i) no research has apparently been done, or at-tempts made at mobilizing the farmers' own resources and that credit wasnot necessarily the best alternative means of stimulating purchase ofequipment, and (ii) the fact that more than a quarter of land owners inthe polders are absentees suggests that the situation is more complex.
4/ This was also noticed in another project (see OED Report No. 2054,Cameroon SEMRY Project, dated March 1978).
- Ij~ n
ignorance and irrationality. Recognizing the constraints, the project shouldhave paid Less attention to extension and more to the institutional aspects orthe credit and supply systems.
E. Monitoring and Evaluation
26. The audit thinks that special mention needs to be made of the workachieved by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (MEU) officially established inJanuary 1977. The creation of MEU was not explicitly foreseen at appraisalbut the Credit Agreement made provision for socio-economic surveys to becarried out by consultants under the Mopti II feasibility studies. Theconsultants first visited Mali in July 1974 and February 1975. The objectiveof the socio-economic analysis was to establish a farm classification based onthe following criteria:
- Ethnic group
- Age of household head
- Main professional activity
- Farm area
- Farm equipment
- Number of resident active males in household
This study reveals some interesting findings. A breakdown or participants byfarmers and absentee land owners shows the importance of the absentee elementon polders close to the Mopti Sevare agglomeration. Acreage of holdings perfamily shows that in some polders the percentage of holdings with more than 6ha is relatively large (19% in Soufouroulaye, 18% in Tenenkou), while onaverage, small holdings under 4 ha account for 80% of farms but only for 60%of total area. Details are given in Annex 1, Tables 1 and 2. These findingsseem to indicate that appropriate covenants need to be considered in futureagreements to avoid allocation of Bank funds to population segments whichcannot be considered as members of the "target groups."
27. Monitoring and evaluation should have required more attention andguidance by the Bank to make findings of the unit more meaningful. Analysisof the budget of 66 farms during the 1978/79 campaign concludes that ox-drawnfarm equipment may not be profitable on small holdings (under 3 ha). However,this analysis may not be fully conclusive because use of oxen and equipment onfields outside the polders (natural flooding of fields used for rice cultiva-tion and rainfed cereal fields) has not been taken into account. Malianproject staff are convinced that the most significant criteria for farmclassification are: (i) paddy areas cultivated outside polders and (ii) areasof dry land crops. Unfortunately, these additional lands were not yet consid-ered by the Evaluation Unit.
- 11 -
9AR A sincl nold r chii1d hp t-kpn aq th hqic unit for qnV qnrin-
economic analysis. The variables selected by the MEU would then become repre-sentatve for the farm r1.qQifirtion of Pach noldr where hqnir naramPtr.
(hydraulic and climatic conditions as well as the farming system) are thesame. ome of the Anluicn reached need to be more carefully evaluat,d
Good performance achieved in the Sofara polder can be explained by the factthat there a-re few other opportunitieS for r4ce -utvto UtSide. thn
polder in the Sofara area. By contrast, lack of farmers' response in the Dia
outside the polders and the marginal water control improvement offered by ir-rigation works. C_-. polders where ra infed crops ar\motn Soufouroulaye)$slow progress of hoe weeding on project fields can be explained by the compe-LiLU UCLWeeH Ly anALL igated lande.. Farmers giVe priUity LU hand wCeuing
of dry lands when weeds, as they see it, are more serious competitors for thesoils resiUdul mibIwre.
Z. lThe "fingllA system" approachl, i.e., loo'.L[ L ± Ld_LUIdLVLe
irrigation as well as dry farming, was totally lacking during project imple-mentation. MEu is now well aware of the importance of taking into account all
farm activities inside and outside polders, irrigated and rainfed crops,agriculture and livestock production. Tne findings of such comprehensiveanalysis will be useful for agricultural extension and should give a soundbasis for better coordination between different agencle-z' which work in thearea, and in the past have tried to influence the same farmers sometimes withwhat must have appeared to them as conflicting information.
30. Institutional aspect of monitoring and evaluation also deserves somecomment. In this respect, it is interesting to compare the Integrated RuralDevelopment (UACV)t' and the Mopti Projects. In ORM, the evaluation unit isintegrated in the project structure and part of the agro-socio-economic divi-sion, with very few links to IER.--' On the other hand, OACV's Monitoringand Evaluation Unit was directly under IER's control and had little influenceon project management. Different institutional structure of MEU had, however,little impact on project management. The methodology applied by both units(sample surveys of farms) focused more on evaluation than on monitoring andhad little impact on management's decision-making process. In the audit'sview, the reason for the MEU's limited impact was that monitoring and evalua-tion objectives were formulated too vaguely.
1/ Mopti Rice Project, Mil Mopti, CMDT, ODEM.
2/ See OED Report No. 3274, Mali Integrated Rural Development, dated Decem-ber 1980.
3/ Institut d'Economie Rurale (a department of the Ministry of Rural Dev-elopment).
- 12 -
31. Mopti project staff and, more specifically, extension staff have notyet discovered how to make use of the wealth of information collected by MEU.The audit found, however, a growing awareness among project management andstaff of the need for more precise assessment of what kind of informationis needed at different levels of project management for extension, for re-search, for credit and for marketing. Closer cooperation has now been estah-lished between the project MEU and the IER Evaluation Unit. This shouldfacilitate better coordination between monitoring, evaluation and annliedagricultural research.
F. Project Impact at Farm Level
32. Farm budgets presented in the PCR (Annex 3, Table 4) refer only toone farm tvnpe: the one qtah1ished in P-i-tinc nolderz Tn the without
project situation, however, the appraisal report dealt with two farm types:thnse in Arictina nolders and fArms outside pnldere Actually, there are5,600 farms that fall under the second category. For these families, theprnoe- Js even -or i pn-atnt be-usec pady p,roduciion OU+-.4A- __IoA
virtually nil in years of poor flooding (as it actually happened in 1972,1973, 1977 IQ7Q)~ A. -- *--A.l note inoter bank f4nanced
..... 6 L & CLL.AULL
projects,- the Mopti project also benefitted from the "drought effect;"inroeae -- _-i fonln dueA1 to wate - r contrl even 4f not sufceto some
polders, was greatly appreciated by farmers during the years when polder cropswere the only crops avai. le. An additional benefit that Sh-ouldAlob
taken into account is that in average years of good flooding, there are sub-a..c.tL LLS...CO ~ ' - I 6-
5tJ II 'U - -%Z VWJU.LO LLUC LUV LLM W.LUK:b9LICU
use of project introduced Sativa varieties.
33. On the other hand, farmer incomes are reduced by the levies col-lcec e tocver annuall uperation anu maitencance cvst. A-tgtt muaieLtL tU U L VV. aLLLa.L UkJL~L UII OLI UI.iLLtIaLIt L b . LIb L.LIgi .LY UUI1PLIUblZeU
by the PCR (para. 4.15), the recovery rate was good in spite of generally pooryields anu heavier taxatun Luan initially foreseen (liu Kgina instead or Du
kg/ha in 1977). The Appraisal Report of Mopti II apparently did not sharedts analysis unu p.upoueu that "to ensure Luat rarmers in the project area
make an equitable contribution towards project costs, the development levywill be raised above the level envisaged under the first MoptI Rice Project.Assurances were obtained at negotiation that the current policy of periodi-cally raising the development levy would De continued until a levy of 24Ukg/ha is reached in 1982."2/ The audit, however, strongly supports the PCRconclusions that it would be unrealistic at prevailing official prices to tryto recover investment costs and that the farmers' contributions to projectcost recovery have to be sought through farm-price increases and not throughincrease of paddy quantities.
1/ See PPAR of Cameroon SEMRY Rice and Senegal Polder. OED Report Nos.2054 and 2777, dated March 1978 and December 1978.
2/ Mopti II Project Appraisal Report, para. 6.11.
34. In this context, it is interesting to compare Mopti with otherirrigation projects in West Africa. Under the Cameroon Sr-AcY prOject, thefarmers' share in cost recovery was limited to cover the field operation andmaintenance costs of the irrigation network. Direct investments are to be
recovered through surpluses generated by the SEMRY marketing operations. Atcompletion time, "part of the costs of the services provided Dy SE was notcharged directly to farmers but covered by SEMRY s operating budget;"1/this was considered equitable because of sizeable income differences bet-ween the north and the rest of Cameroon." In the case of Senegal Polders, theappraisal objectives were similar to those of the Mopti project. Farmerlevies were supposed to recover all "project operation and maintenance costsand all direct investments including taxes chargeable to the project. !L"At completion, water charges actually paid by farmers were adequate tofinance operating and maintenance costs of the perimeter'T and creditrecovery is similar to Mopti-s (87% in 1977). In the audit's view, there areinconsistencies in approaching cost recoveries in irrigation projects whichneed to be eliminated. 4/
35. Farm gate prices have been a main issue in Bank relations withMalian Government3/ and the PCR (para. 7.02) reminds that "the Associationhas occasionally been able to obtain significant increases in producer pricesbut, due to Government's over-concern with processing cheap cereals for
influential urban customers, these successes have always been temporary andsoon eroded by inflation." In this context, a lesson can be learned fromproject experience. Prices on the parallel market are sensitive to annualproduction levels and it is a fact that during drought years these prices were
far above official levels. There is, however, a remarkable exception: in
1975/76 at harvest time, market prices were below official prices but ORM was
unable to buy all paddy brought in by farmers because of a shortage of market-ing funds and storage facilities. This supports a finding of the Mali Integ-rated Rural Development audit that marketing is not only a price but also anorganizational problem. Shortages of marketing funds and bags have been achronic problem plaguing most development projects in Mali.
1/ OED Report No. 3051, Cameroon SEMRY, dated March 1978, paras. 7.5 - 7.6.
2/ Senegal Polders Appraisal Report, para. 6.10.
3/ OED Report No. 2777, Senegal Polders, dated December 1978, para. 4.02.
4/ The Region-s point of view reflects the Bank guidelines in this matter(OMS 2.25 and CPM 2.10) i.e., the recovery criteria should be a trade-offbetween the need to get paid for the water delivered, the country'spolicy in this matter, and the capacity of farmers to pay. This means
that each case has to be examined on its own merits and constraints, andalthough uniformity might be desirable at regional or national level,that uniformity should not be taken as a must.
5/ SPP nED Renort No. 3274, Mali Integrated Rural Development (OACV),dated December 1980.
- 1. -
Tab~le ±
Participants Area Attributed
Farmers Other Profes- Farmers OthersPolder %_ sions % % %
Mopti Sud 56 44 65 35Ibetemi 28 72 35 65Soufouroulaye 92 8 96 4
Mopti Nord 67 33 68 32Karbaye 83 17 86 14Diambacourou 85 15 87 13Sofara 62 38 74 26Syn 89 11 89 11Tenenkou 71 29 93 7Dia 6ý 37 63 37
Total 73 27 81 19
Table 2
Distribution of Holdings Per Family
ha. ha. ha. ha. ha. ha.Polder 0 to 2 2 to 4 4 to 6 6 to 8 8 to 10 above 10
Mopti Sud 26 48 22 4Ibetemi 61 28 5.5 5.5Soufouroulave 26 36 19 9 3.5 6.5Mopti Nord 45 47 6.3 1.3 0.3Karbe 52 35 9 4Diambacourou 25 65 10Sofarn 60 31 9Syn 34 53 9 3 1Tenenkou 27 37 18 7 7 4
Dia 28 68 4
Average % 36 44 12 4 2 2
- 15 -
MAL I ATTACHMENT
MOPTI RICE PROJECT(Credit 277-MLI)
COMPLETION REPORT I
I. BACKGROUND
an1 T Tune 1070 tl= 1a"r ma 4: phe Dcpi T± of M",1 mshm4tted a& - ------------------- -- ---.. - -request for IDA assistance to help finance a project to promote rice produc-t LO b-YSmL IO I.? d =.LZ- in -LheI0J t.L 44. a IL t"I I ce LMr Li.Ve fL .U OU PLdI la in -
December 21, 1971 the Association approved a Credit of US$6.9 million for theproject, which was the Bank Group's first operation in Mali's agriculturalsector and followed two Credits made in 1966 and 1970 for transportation.
1.02 . The Niger River flood plains are an important rice growing area inWest Africa. Mali had traditionally been an exporter of rice until the1960s when stagnating production and increasing urban consumption caused itto become a net importing country. To reverse this trend, Mali embarked ona program to construct polders and introduce improved cultivation over anarea of approximately 120,000 ha, about 55,000 ha of which were located inthe Mopti area. The Mopti Rice Proiect (Operation Riz Mopti) and theparallel EDF financed Segou Rice Project (Operation Riz Segou) were thelirst stae of this nroram.
tion through the construction and rehabilitation of polders along the Bani
introduction of successive packages of improved inputs, implements andpractices. Over the 9ix-year project implementation perio (1972-197), theproject was expected to cover 31,100 ha and to reach 7,300 farm families.
1.04 Total project cost, including taxes, was estimated at US$9.4million; the IDA contribution was US$6.9 million while French Aid (FAC)financed technical assistance (US$0.7 million) provided by consultants. Atthe request of Government (July 17, 1974) and after favorable recommendationof the Statutory Committee, a supplementary IDA Credit of US$2.6 million wasmade in 1975 to cover the effects of the dollar devaluation, minor changesin project design and cost increases. FAC also increased its contributionby US$0.5 million. The project was executed by Operation Riz Mopti, an"Operation de Developpement." which has its headquarters in Sevare near Mopti.Project implementation started on June 1, 1972, and physical works werevIrtual Iv r-omnl eed by the mfidle of 1976. At rovernment'q rnipqt the
closing date was extended to September 30, 1979 to complete some minor works.
1/ The Completion Report, dated December 1980, was prepared by the West AfricaReRional Office on the baRis of an exection r prne ared by k O.R .InJune 1978.
- 16 -
1 k* REPAXK.AILUN ABU APPKAlAL
Chronology
2.01 The project was identified by the Bank's Permanent Mission in
West Africa (PMWA) in May 1969. At that time the greater part of the total
200.000 ha under rice cultivation was unimproved rice land: about 60,000 ha
of improved rice polders, financed by FAC, EDF, and UNDP/FAO, were undert-ultivation. TTNflDP with FAO as executine azencv. had begun a oroiect in the
Niger delta area around Mopti in 1965 and had made a survey of all thepolders in the area* The May 199e-nn1914I~9 tIIAAA~ I-har 2
feasible rice project could be implemented in the Niger delta, provided thatan, approprit extesio wa-saL~U -- ---- -9--
paddy were revised. French Aid (FAC) was willing to finance the feasibilitystudy, to be carried out by French consultants, and the engineering S-udy
for the Mopti-North polder. In October 1969 a PMWA mission visited Bamako
to discuss with the FAC mission the terms of reference for the feasibility
study.
2.02 The project was prepared by Government with the assistance ofconsultants financed by UNDP and FAC. A PMTJA preparation mission visitedBamako in January/February 1970. Following the preparation mission it was
decided to limit the Bank project to the Hopti region, while EDF wouldconcentrate on the Segou region. The feasibility study was issued inJanuary 1971.
2.03 Appraisal took place in April/May 1971. The mission was com-paod of an engineer An economisr An aoritutiralisr a onnanitant crAditr------ -------------------- I------specialist, an environmental health consultant, and the PMWA staff member4..ivolved 1.9a project prear 1.-
4nn- e, M .
4- 4- --- "e..n4n,--A 4. noe.,..
dence shortly after appraisal were: (i) major problems with the agricul-tural credit aspect of te project, (II e rule uf tne Soete de CreditAgricole et d'Equipement Rural (SCAER) in the procurement of agricultural
inputs; (iii) Government4s contribution to project financing; and (iv)
notification of the proposed project to the states party to the Interna-
tional Niger Water Agreement.
2.04 Negotiations were held on October 27, 1971. At Government'srequest during negotiations, technical assistance to the agricultural credit
institution was eliminated. Board presentation took place on December 21,1971. and the Credit Agreement was signed on January 6, 1972.
.. %J' J ... e p.-------------------- - -- --- ----- --- v-
the trend of increasing rice imports which was registered in the late 1960s.Operation iz, create .Ln 190,9 to deve.lop C-Utii-Y-C-StiOn 10YCW-6L1I%
flooding in the Niger River flood plains, was split into Operation RizSegou, financed by the EDF, and Operation Riz Mopri (On) for which rinan-cial assistance was provided by IDA and technical assistance by FAC. Theproject's objective was to raise paddy production by 35,000 tons by 1982.The total project area was planned to be 31,000 ha. Yields were to increase
- 17 -
from 0.70 t/ha (traditional outside polders) and 0.88-t/ha (traditionalwithin polders) to 1.86 t/ha. These increases were to be achieved throughthe introduction of a controlled flooding system* of improved seeds,improved and timely plowing and seeding initially, and through line-sowing,intensive weeding and the application of fertilizer in the later stages. Atotal of 7,300 farm families were expected to be reached by the project(4.25 ha/farm). 40% of the farmers were expected to adopt the completepackage; a further 20%, the package without fertilizer; while 20% of thefarmers would only use improved seeds and annly prescribed plowing and
harrowing techniques. The remaining 20% would continue to apply traditional
4.0O The project originally consisted of:
- the construction of three polders with an area of 13,JUU ha;
- the rehabilitation of five polders with an area of 13,200 ha;
- land preparation (deep plowing) on part of the new and therehabilitated polders as well as on one further existing polder,altogether on 10,300 ha;
- construction of offices, houses, workshops, stores, and sheds;
- acquisition of vehicles and farm machinery (tractors, trailers,
threshers, and seeders);
- an applied agricultural research program;
- establishment and operation of a seed farm;
- technical assistance for project management;
- staff and operating cost of the project authority.
The project also included the feasibility study for the second Hopti Rice
Project.
* The controlled flooding system consists of enclosing the area tobe developed with a dike provided with inlet/outlet structures whichare camahlat% rirnnina avaa waern to or Alei4na ~ fi-rnm
the river-by gravity. Water flows are improved by deepening existingnatural channels. Soil preparation and Sowing are done after the firSt
rains.. At the time of irrigation when the river water level allows,theC loWer finge6 of theC PUoLd"r (forK floatingL rIce) iZ rapidlJy fLooded;-the higher fringe is flooded at a pace equivalent to the rate of growthof the rice plants. When the river is low and the crop is ready,fields are drained by the same channels as those used for irrigation.The system is highly dependent on timing and magnitude of floods and onrainfall for soil preparation and for seeding.
- 18 -
III - IMPLEMENTATION
Effectiveness
3.01 The originally envisaged date of effectiveness was April 17,t-- - t -34. A - -197/L* Three conditions of effectivens were required uJY t-nC %,LMLuA6 Z%16-=-
ment. (a) The opening by the Borrower of a special account for ORM's
personnel expenditures, (b) recruitmenc of engineering consultants to assist
in the supervision of the works and (c) the establishment of ORM. Govern-
ment was not able to fulfill the two first conditions in time and the Credit
did not become effective until June 26, 1972. However, this delay of about
two months did not affect the implementation schedule.
Procurement
3.02 Procurement of major civil works and supply of equipment were made
thrnu-h TCR and contracts wera awarded in accordance with Bank iuidelines.
Construction of buildings was procured through local bidding procedures.F^ilirg aurenc4ot of the cnt-eract for maior civil works (nara 6.05). ORM
executed certain minor works by force account.
3.03 Fertilizers and ox-drawn farm implements were obtained annuallyby SCAM" and supplied to VR.W. fo dsr±V±o o ame
.1.04 Consucants ror supervision or works, stuais, and technicsa1assistance were chosen after international consultation and negotiations
on contract conditions.
Starting-Up of Works
3.05 Due to late tendering and the need for adjusting the beginning of
works to the dry season, civil works did not start until March 1978, one year
later than envisaged at appraisal. For the construction of buildings, delays
were even longer (1.5 years). Recruitment of consultants, in particular
those providing technical assistance to ORM management, progressed much more
natisfactorily and this team started to work very close to the effective
date.
Progress of Works
3.06 The actual implementation schedule of works as compared to the
appraisal forecast is Illutratd in M-..ex 1 IML -, Ac '
tion dates of construction of irrigation infrastructure and buildings and of
deep ploughing are given below:
- 19 -
Appraisal Actual Delay kmonths)
Infrastructure and Annexes
- Dia TenenkouRehabilitation July 1973 July 1974 12Ploughing June 1973 July 1974 13
- SoufouroulayeConstruction July 1973 Not completed
Ploughing May 1974 June 1974 1
- Mopti NordPasc rTtila T w1r 1 074 Ter1Trr TOTA
Ploughing May 1975 June 1975 1
- Seed Farm and Research St.(Constr.) July 1974 July 1974 0
- Sofara (Construction) July 1973 July 1973 0
- Sarantomo (Ploughing) May 1974 March 1974 2
- Karbaye (Rehabilitation) July 1972 March 1975 32
- Mopti Sud (Rehabilitation) July 1972 March 1975 32
-- Ibetemi (Rehabilitation) July 1972 March 1975 32
&I V A,.7 I A. * . I -r,..
Seo" stgeVf .- 17 1 JL71 j.Y1r
In spite of the initial delays in tendering and awarding, most of theirrigation works were completed by mid 1974 as foreseen. Considerabledelays occurred, however, in the Dia Tenenkou polder and in the rehabi-
litation of the Karbaye, Mopti-Sud and Ibetemi polders. As for the con-
struction of buldings, delays in completion were still longer (about twoand a half years) due, in part, to cement scarcity (1972 - 1974).
Irrigation Works
3.07 Modifications in the works were introduced during execution.Tn viw of better water control and in order to decrease maintenance
charges, gates were placed in every structure, and dikes and new accessr aAdSw -ow.Stru c~-o te e. W 1 A T 41 1 4t-e% n The nIin ina n" etzan
ploughing was also modified due to pedalogic constraints. When large costteulea Credt wksof n e (pr4 e,y ere p.Atil rsumd
the Supplementary Credit was granted (para 1.04) they were partially resumied.
- 20 -
and drains had insufficient capacity to properly fill and drain the ricefLds-L.; WJome of. t1he inL4ake strucL%uLes suffred=% fro,m Stabrility) a&nd erosionWLproblems, and because of topographic and pedalogic features discovered onlyduring execution, the total area was reduced from 31,090 ha to 26,100 ha.(para 4.02)
3.09 The quality of construction of canals and dikes was satisfac-
tory. However, due to technical insufficiencies, the same does not apply tothe hydraulic structures. In 1974, this meant uncontrolled flooding in two
polders with the loss of 800 ha of already cultivated land.
Buildings
3.10 Some modifications and additions were introduced in this part ofthe projae-. These ha aonnated to abonu PM 107.5 millin. The aoMdelays experienced in the construction of the buildings were mainly due to
the local contractor and the shortage of cement in Mali. These delaysresulted iu serious nUconveniences for the auzlal operation of ua sinceoffice buildings and lodging for local staff and expatriates were notavailable for a long time. in general, the quality is not satisfactory.
Costs
3.11 The appraisal report estimated net of tax project costs at US$9.42million, equivalent to MF 5,238 million at the prevailing rate of MF 556per US dollar. The cost estimate included physical contingencies of 15% forembankments, canals and intake regulators, 10% for buildings, studies andengineering supervision, and 5% for equipment of the agricultural research;it also included price continzencies of 8% per year for civil works, studiesand engineering supervision, 10% per year for heavy equipment, 6% per yearfor clAriAq- AT nPr var for oneratina costs and It nr vaar for farmequipment. IDA was to finance US$6.9 million (MF 3,836 million), or 73% of-ue costs. rAP TTCCf 7 m4 4114 -- tMW 101 -4114^-N ,^v- V ^- #4h- cosete and
Government US$1.8 million (MF 1,010 million), or 19% of project costs. TheLUAJA C~ueu.Lt was reinforce W.L L -W1J-JlJ-o by Agreemen dated~ rp~..L.
1975 (para 1.04). FAC and Government increased their contribution propor-tionally.
3.12 Appraisal estimates and actual costs are indicated in Annex 3,Table 1. Project cost estimates were revised in June 1973, May 1974, andNovember 1974, and the results can be summarized as follows:
Appraisal June 1973 May 1974 November 1974 Actual
HF million 5,238 5,666 5,898 6,132 6,020r 100 10 1146 117 115
~1,- --4a Oft 4-cwea ic I5 r, 'Y ~ eDd W Q llnw -Ra~~rT'f %M n t1 a
&"-~~ - - ---- ---- ho eve
percentage becomes 39% when the cost is expressed in dollars. (The averagerate Tr Ck, -JLujc M- XT - ..CO m L I 1 LTT & - T1 CCK C 'lrate during tne projct was L U'J. 1-1 -+-do agaist L U Qg - KKI -Ja aW C6C&1a.pa.LQCL.;*
- 21 -
3.13 The table indicates that:
(1) Three of the prolect components cost less than estimatedwith savings on the order of MF 529 million. This was due tothe slow oace of implementation of agricultural research,the failure to expand farmers' ox-drawn cultivation and
%A;Thes saving ofr thoe r lrgel excede by he cos
increase in civil works and, principally, in managementand extension services. The former resulted from adjustmentsand additional works; the latter was mainly due to theincrease in operating costs that resulted directly from theoil crisis of 1974.
3.14 In short, in spite of the high inflationary period during whichthe project was implemented, the 15% global cost overrun is very moderatecompared to that experienced by most other projects of this period in Maliand elsewhere. The devaluation of the dollar led to financial difficultieswhich were solved by a reinforcement of the Credit and of the local contri-bution.
Disbursments
3*15 The IDA Credit was to be disbursed against:
- 100% of foreign expenditures for the purchase of equipmentana venicles;
- 80% of total expenditures of civil works;
- 100% of total expenditures for services of engineering consultants:
- 45% of total expenditures for operating expenses of ORM includingsalaries, and
- 95% of total expenditures of operating expenses of the agricul-tural research station, including salaries and consultantservices for the carrying out of a feasibility study for asecond agricultural project in the Mopti region.
The chart of Annex 2 compares appraisal estimated and actual disbursements^f tha TTA r7-a4r
18 months but the devaluation of the dollar, additional works and the priceescalation due to the oil crisis of 1973/74 led to an increasing pace ofdisbursement in relation to appraisal estimates. In August 1975 a Supple-mentary Credit of US$2.6 million was granted and until mid 1978 actualdisbursements were about US$0.5 million below the revised estimates. Buttoward the extended completion date of Sept. 30, 1979 this difference narrowedto about US$86,000. This balance has now been fully disbursed.
- 22 -
3.17 Payments for irrization works and buildings were made on the basis ofmonthly statements of expenses prepared by the contractors and certified by'
0P' an/orGP.Mospa-ents wre made und- e the dir-tparce
.3*0 JV umen LI.LuJuuu Lu project costs were always made avallaulein time and kept pace with the progress of works.
IV - AGRICULTURAL IMPACT
Objectives
4.01 The objectives of the project were to increase rice productionthrough the construction and rehabilitation of polders along the Baniand Niger Rivers, and to improve rice cultivation techniques through theintroduction of successive packages of improved inputs, implements andnaretiop_. At Annraial the nrnioet wan IYrtd to emvpr i1-1nn ha And tnreach 7,300 families. As developed hereafter, the objectives of the projectwere not fiilTv Ai-hi2vimd_ mqinlY fnr i -ntrnl1lAh riAno (relim;atl)
4O2 ase( on tue experieuce from tne drough years of t7iti aus
1973/74, when only 1/3 and 1/2 of the developed areas were inundated,and because of the inaccuracies of topographic maps, the net cultivable areaof each polder was redefined. Both the upper and the lower fringes ofpolders were eliminated, and the probability of inundation was increased
from 90% to 95%. The total cultivable area became 26,100 ha instead of the
31,100 ha estimated at appraisal (a reduction of 16%). Annex 3, Table 2indicates the progress of the area put under cultivation and comparesestimates before and after revision. The drops in 1973/74, 1978/79, and1979/80 are due not only to the intrinsic inaccuracy of the estimates butalso to the farmers' fear of cultivating after the failures and disappoint-ments of dry years. as well as to the lack of seeds which resulted frcm ooharvests of preceding years.
4.03 Table 2 of Annex 3 also gives estimated and actual yields for the
understanding of the actual achievements. The actual yields differ substan-tially depending on whether they are related to the -sown area- or the"harvested area." The former in the recorded period varies from 33% to 86%of the latter. The average is 920 kg/ha against 1,260 kg/ha. Again it is the
period 1972/74 and the 1977/78 campaign which show the lowest ratios. This
because of the unfavourable climatic conditions of those years. Totalannual rainfall was well below average and its distribution in time uneven.
Therefore, losses occurred as a result of interrupted germination and growthat the beginning of the crop cycle and the late arrival of floods in the
case of rice planted on the higher fringes.
- 23 -
4.04 In spite of the corrective factor introduced by using harvestedareas, yields were lower than estimated and do not show a sustained increaseas anticipated. The average of the period was 926 kg/ha against 1,280 kg/haat appraisal. This was due to a stagnation in cultivation techniques,contrary to anticipated improvements, mainly with respect to weeding andline-sowing. The lack of farmers collaboration led to wild rice infesta-tion which can only be corrected by deep ploughing as is presently beingdenp udear rhp qpconi Monti Prniaet. Hnwpvpr- this nroblem was not ganara-
lized all over the area. Certain polders showed better response than others.
marginal, farmers participation in the project was better. Plagues andunsatisfactoryflodn o..UJ.L the po~JLu.Lers wer UrZeCtl resOn-1J.L- C_. I.-
and uneven yields, and were also an important factor in farmers' refusal toadopt crop intensive cultivation methods as foreseen at appraisal. However,when compared with the "without the project" situation, yields are an average1.5 times higher. Although below estimates, production was satisfactory inthe period 1974/77.
4.05 Table 3 also indicates the tonnage marketed by ORM and its per-centage of the production. The relatively low figure is explained bythe lack of incentive offered by the official paddy-price; farmers try asmuch as possible to sell in the parallel market, limiting their sales to ORMto repayment in kind of services and water charges, and a compulsory deli-very quota for the marketing agency OPAM.
Agricultural Equipment
4.06 The Credit provided for the purchase of agricultural equipment,
threshing, transportation). Even though farmers were receptive to the useof ox-drawn implements, its normal development was hampered by (i) the priceof bullocks (dramatically increased due to the scarcity of cattle in yearsof drought, competition from the cattle export market, and demand on thepart of richer cotton farmers); (ii) the inefficiency of SCAER (officialorganism in charge of supplying agricultural inputs); (iii) the rise inequipment prices; and (iv) the difficulties of farmers in repaying-creditafter the bad harvests of dry years.
4.07 As far as equipment for ORM is concerned, 32 tractors, 46threshers and 34 trailers were purchased in addition to other minor equip-ment. This gave ORM the opportunity to provide services to farmers innloehi,nc thrPshing_ and transportation. Ploughin2 was aimed orincipallyat eliminating wild rice infestation. Deep ploughing had to be undertakenin a systmatic fashion under the follo-1- prjc Nfoptf± TT_ The tyne o%f
equipment purchased was not well suited to moving heavy soil, the tractors
paddy and inputs. Threshing operations were satisfactory and most of theequipment found adequate. Farmers use of threshing services provided by ORwas positive. Transportation equipment was used mainly during the threshingperiod moving threshers and carrying the paddy from the farms and to therice-mill. Maintenance of this equipment has been assured by the ORM workshop.
- 24 -
4.08 In general, the equipment pool of ORMU was underutilized and in-adequately maintained. Ploughing and sowing was very limited due to fewrequests from farmers and, despite farmers' participation, available thresh-ing capacity far exceeded its use.
Seed Farm and A2ricultural Research
4Q Teia finein nf fhp qppd farm uJa to nrndnie anna Mn1litv qPOA
to replace the traditional farm seeds. The already existing farm in the
not considered adequate and the Credit provided for the construction of anew one in tne Zopti-L'Nor area. It started UperatiUnS L12 7/tQ.
4.10 Results on the whole were disappointing. Bad management andinsufficient supervision by ORM led to wild rice infestation, improperwater control and low yields. Despite certain improvements introduced in
1977/78 the performance of the seed farm has remained unsatisfactory.
4.11 Agricultural research focused on yield responses to variouscultivation techniques (seed spacing, timing of ploughing, intensity ofweeding), on methods of eradicating wild rice and on labor requirements of a
4-ha type model farm with varying use of equipment. Faulty methodology anda lack of comnetent sunervision prevented complete achievement of initial
objectives. However, conclusive results have been obtained, in particulars re-ards cultivrating tech.,inques which a _ra 1haie i in the M,ansi TT
project.
Farmer's Income
4.12 The project appraisal estimated that some 7,300 farmers wouldgrow paddy, increasing their paddy acreage from 2.6 ha to 4.0 ha per tarm.At the same time yields would increase, and net family cash income wasestimated to reach KI 132,795 at full development (1982). In the "withoutthe project" situation, the family net cash income was FM1 104,480. There-fore the increase due to the project would be, in L971 terms, FM 28,315.This cash income would be equal to the gross value of production, minusfamily consumption and production costs.
4.13 Annex 3, Table 4 gives farm budgets as estimated at appraisal and.a comnarison with the actual situation in 1977/78. Two actual scenarios
are indicated: (1) "average years of good flooding" and (2) "average yearso_ f1 p-_ _ r ,lod n, I" -ra f F-,, r %^h t h 1- "wil tj In" a.nd "vr - t ,u t ner Jec- " a 4 r.q I n -4 ^" 2
are shown. The following conclusions can be drawn from this table.
a) The size of actual farm units is one half the appraisalestimate and is close to that existing before the project.
This reflects limited equipment of farmers and their conse-quent inability to effectively cope with larger holdings.
- 25 -
b) Actual yields are 50% to 70% of the forecast. This is duemainly to adverse natural conditions (irregular flooding anduntimely and insufficient rainfall even in years of goodflooding) which affected the normal progress of the cropping
i-rl anti lari rn tha Ina nF an~rm m-r=na,
^.N Tbegrss~ value~ o., prdcto jper fJarm is between 56. and. 655% of4
the appraisal estimate. This obviously results from thesmaller cultivated area and from the lower yields mentionedabove. The gross value of production per ha increased by 12%to 29% due to the price of paddy.
d) Production costs per ha decreased as compared to appraisal byabout 15% because of the less intensive type of cultivationpracticed by farmers.
e) The actual family net revenue is 64% - 72% of the appraisalexpectations because of the smaller farm size, but the netrevenue per man-day is 46%-60% higher because a) less time wasspent in the field than projected and b) the orice of oaddyincreased. The.change in net annual income per capita followsthar of nor revenue0
fN T" a, -- It thea.. a lo be ee "e ac *tuations
"with" and "without project" is much better (1.4 - 2.4) than
Cost Recovery, Levies
4.14 Following appraisal recommendations and in accordance with section3.08 of the Credit Agreement, levies should be charged to farmers to coverannual operation and maintenance costs and to recover, over 35 years, alldirect investment. The schedule and amount of levies, the corresponding pro-ject revenues and project expenditures as estimated at appraisal are:
Project Revenues FM/ha
Years 1 to 5 60 kg/ha/year at FM 30/kg 9,000Years 6 to 10 120 kg/ha/year at FM 28/kq 16tw0Years 11 to 35 180 kg/ha/year at FM 28.5/kg 128,250
154,050
Project Expenditures
Direct Investment FM 2,998 million 103,0240 & M (35 years) FM 630 million 21,649
124,673
- 26 -
4.15 Levies have been imnosed on farmerg from 1974 onward at a much
faster pace than anticipated. The following table indicates levies, revenues,
kg/ha FM/kg FM/ha for (1000) (7.)
1973 - - - - -
1974 60 40 2,400 32,968 831975 100 40 4,000 49,312 831976 120 40 4,800 72,315 911977 140 45 6,300 74,917 90
It should be stressed that in spite of the generally poor harvests and theheavier taxation than initially foreseen, farmers have been rather respon-sive to paying. which is shown by the high collection rate. However, ORhas always adopted the policy of exempting from levies the farmers mostaffpnted hv nrnnninv hazards. On the whnle the cnrrPqnondinq area hag been
about 23% of the attributed areas, but it is not contained in the totalfrom whic a oleto ^r.rr3e r drvd
and maintenance costs. Adding the repayment of service charges (ploughing,liue-sowiug and thrensing) Uts percentage increases by about o%. Tne
difference is being offset by the margin on paddy/rice sales. This meansthat the present level of development levies is adequate to compensaterecurrent costs, but the recovery of investment costs by surcharging farmersis not feasible in a short term because it would be too heavy a burden andtheir already low net revenue (between US$210 and $260 per fauily) could bedrastically reduced. With the new cultivated areas under the Mopti II pro-ject and with an adequate cereals price policy a balanced budget, inclL.ingamortization, would be possible.
V - 7COOMTC TMPArT
5.01 The appraisal report estimated the ERR of this project at 14%.Ina its assumptions, 50% of investmen and oPeratig oss veLteL6yaoperating period of the agricultural research station were deducted, sincebenefits would also accrue to farmers outside the project area. The esti-mated cost of the second stage studies were also deducted. The sensitivityanalysis indicated that the rate of return would drop to 10.8% if the paddyfarmgate prices were be 15% lower and would go up to 16.7 should yields be2.2 t/ha instead of 1.86 t/ha.
5.02 Annex 3, Table 5 indicates the data for the actual calculation
of the economic rate of return. 1/ The following assumptions have been
made:
/ filedr ond the es are cotain o tin Cte wr.npa of i-na
filed in the West Africa Information Center.
- 27 -
a) Areas and Yields. For the "with the project" situation, actualareas haVC UCCU ta&Cn LLUE 172/ LHEDUgt 178./* ru Chen to 19ua linear progression to the maximum attainable cultivable acreage.After 1990 and until the end of the period, a constant area equal tothat maximum. It is assumed that in discount terms climatic vagarieswhich might change cultivable areas do not substantially affect thecalculations. The same criterion has been applied to yields. Inthe "without project" situation cultivated area projections of theAppraisal Report (Annex 14) have been taken with some adjustments:(1) for 1972, 1973, 1977, and 1978: 50% of estimates due tounfavorable climatic conditions. (2) for other years: 0.84 ofestimates, this coefficient meaning the reduction of cultivable landdue to tonoaranhic adinstments (nra L.n9). VipldQ ha" Noon t->."
as 0.6 of actual results or present estimates for the "in theT%^ AaraI 11 a tion Fr the ",t '4 A -- A-- -It - tionthecoefficient has been 0.4. *
b) Economic Prices. Substitution prices for paddy have been esti-mated following a procedure similar to chat used in appraisingMbpti II (Annex 10, Table 4b) and by applying World Bank PriceForecasts (January 1980). For the period 1972-1979, actualcurrent dollars were used; from 1979 onward the calculation isbased on forecasts using 1979 constant dollars.
c) "Investment and ReDlacement" are the actual amounts. Local costswere multiplied by the standard conversion factor 0.88, the same asthat used for the Mopti II appraisal.
d) "Operating Costs and Staff" are actual amounts multiplied by thesam~e Rtand;trd Mf nqr, ,_qQv rF0.8
e) "Inrementl Fa.mL1bor is based on an estimated to-"a'-or
input of 80 man-day/ha and 57 man-day/ha for the situation "in" ande . . IJ.% L.L C .6. LLL .6 CL J WLLI -Ucly ( LICI LIA
been valued at FM 310/man-day or FM 272 using the same standardcowversion factor.
f) "Production costs without the project" were estimated followingthe same criteria as appraisal (Annex 14, Table 1) but with theactual cultivated areas.
5.03 The increase by three points of the ERR as compared with appraisalis not surprising in spite of the decrease in actual areas and productioncompared to appraisal estimates. The main reason for the increase is thatthe economic price of rice is more than three fold the apraisal exnectations.A sensitivity analysis shows that even if the cultivated area would notincrease from the present level- the FRR would be about InT.
* Average criterion taken at appraisal.
- 28 -
Consultants
6.01 Consultant's input in this project has been related to (1)
supervision of works, (2) preparation of studies for the second phase of theMopti irrigation development, and (3) technical assistance to ORM.
6.02 Supervision of works was the responsibility of the Rural En2ineering
Department assisted by a foreign consulting firm which supplied two techni-rian for a tntal of 34 man-monthq Th nPerformannn of thict rninnting firm
was considered unsatisfactory due to its lack of previous experience of hydro-
of some works, faulty calculations leading to the collapse of an outletstructure anu Lack o JUJtiati-V= auu u u 4u6L y LU u=4.Lug With cuULLcLUrsE.
6.03 The carrying out of the studies for second phase irrigationdevelopment was the responsibility of the Study Bureau of the Rural Engi-
neering Department which, however, sub-contracted some topographic mappingand pedalogic surveys to private ccnsultants. These consultants performedsatisfactorily both in time and in quality of work.
6.04 The Credit provided financing for technical assistance to ORMmanagement to a maximum of five expatriates; this number would graduallydecrease toward the end of project implementation. All were recruited from
the same consulting firm and their performance was satisfactory.
Contractors
single contractor, after international competitive bidding. Due to the
Q4 y LU -L y. L ~L ., LVL CL .3WAJ&.t_L6 %JJ CLkA. . %.LL= "CL6..A.ULC &=aA --. 6 CL"UL
to the unsatisfactory quality of some works (hydraulic structures) the
contract was suspended and completion of works awarded to four other con-tractors. This was done when most of the works were completed. In fact, thefirm left for another job and preferred to pay penalties. Financial arrange-ments of the initial contract were satisfactorily settled. ORM itself also
executed some works by force account. Most of the contractors performedsatisfactorily with the exception of the firm in charge of supplying andinstalling the gates for the hydraulic structures. Due to unacceptable
delays this contract was terminated in August 1978 and another firm resumed
the works after approval of the Association. These works are completed.
6.06 For the construction of buildings, after a long delay in eva-lintfa f-ae a d hfninina TTA qmnraI. th- offer of thp lowst biddar
elapsed. In September 1979, the contract was finally awarded based onconsu"'ttion among b4LAArs -d aproe bir TnA* Cn. 4v^Iat-m cmnll1
buildings for which contractors would have been difficult to find wereexecuted oy uR unuer rce account.
- 29 -
Suppliers
6.07 Procurement of equipment was monitored by IDA and no significantdelays or ornblms P-nPriAnred.
6.8 hepefomaceofSAER asa QupplUer of fertilizers and" farmimplements was not satisfactory. Lack of organization, liquidity andmnagmenut led to defice suppLies and, despLe of GovernmenL subsidies,very high prices. Direct purchase without passing through SCAER has beenstrongly advocated by URM to eliminate these inconveniences.
Borrower
6.09 After some delays in the starting phase of the project, implemen-tation took on momentum and ORM, under the strong management of itsDirector General, improved its performance substantially. Part of thepoor results in production and farmers' participation can be attributed to0:RM's weak organization of extension work which overemphasized classroomtraining with inadequate field work, and to its inability to establish adialogue with farmers.
6.10 ORM reported the project's progress regularly. Financial state-
6e1s Th aural Engineering reepoaent wa np1unmibse for the supervi-sion of works and preparation of the second phase studies. Its staff couldnot offset the deficiencies in the technical assistance provided by theconsultant (referred to in para 602) which led to the failures in thesupervision of works. However, Its performance in preparing the secondphase studies was satisfactory both in terms of quality of work and time.
Bank
6.12 After an identification mission in May 1961, the Bank sent threepreparation missions (one in 1969 and two in 1970). Appraisal took placein April 1971. Identification and preparation were primarily the responsi-bility of RWA. The total number of man-weeks in the field spent in iden-tification, preparation, and appraisal was 35.8.
6.11 Th Bank sArt 11 sunervfsion mi_sqiR twn npr vear from 1977to 1978 with the exception of 1973 when there was only one mission. Thetotal numbr F man-weeks sent r the A7aR A Via of the m4ic2n<
had the participation of an engineer. The continuity was average with the~'..k 'JJ.. -& / A. . 1 U .1. ~ k 644~~
in the initial period of project implementation.
6.14 Given the occurrence of uncontrollable events (droughts and theoil crisis of 1974) during the implementation period, it can be concludedthat the project's main objectives as defined at appraisal were achieved.Supervision missions and follow-up letters often urged Government to takemeasures which could have improved overall project performance, i.e. an
- 30 -
increase of the farmgate price of paddy and improvement of the extensionservices. However, the response was not always encouraging, particularly
with respect to the producers' price issue. Better technical preparationwith adequate mapping would have permitted an adequate estimate of thecultivable area, and a more realistic judgment of the management servicescnuld have nrPvPnrAd rhe onst overrun nf rhic rnmnananro
VII - SPECIAL ISSUES - LESSON LEARNED
7.01 The main issue of this project, which was never fully seizedat the time of definition of the follow-up project (Mopti II), is thematter of "controlled flooding' irrigation. The recurrent droughts ex-perienced in the early 1970s showed the need to redefine the areas in orderto guarantee a higher probability of inundation. But experience with Mopti1I has indicated that this is not enough. The amount and the timely distri-bution of rainfall (which do not necessarily relate directly with theflood) have a decisive influence on the normal progress of the croppingcycle, crop survival and yields. Despite investment in structures (pro-tective dikes, inlet and outlet structures) the success of the harvest
is still dependent on the climate, and the incremental benefit is com-naratiuvV inW Th arnt nf the rick rf iTiifFioianr ?-infnll has onlycome into focus in recent years; there has possibly been a permanent de-
O~-- - to e ~ 111 nlm arlier A-nA- s in -- 4 -1 - -
1950s and the 1960s. To clarify these aspects an agro-climatologic study
LL%* LJWML ordered. L 1. Lb LV .LUt_-L.L.L~ LLM .LiiLU ofpast recent years and the probability of adequate rainfall in time to meetinitial cropping needs.
7.02 Because of the bad climatic conditions, the project could not offerthe water control necessary to induce farmers to fully participate with theproject. As a result, smaller lots per family were cropped and cultivationstandards have remained low. In spite of the efforts of the extension ser-vices of ORM were not able to offset farmers- fears. Unattractive producerprices, a general problem in Mali, is a further contributing factor. TheAssociation has occasionally been able to obtain significant increases inaroducer orices but due to Government's over concern with nrocessing cheancereals for influential urban customers, these successes have always beentemporary and "soon eroded by inf lation.
- 31 -
1R1=
i971 1972 97! i97
.-ratu ":r ar "*xuz* a? r a: -. in-. -. .. .••-•
P *ia - -.
z amt~timn••• --- a.....=fr.=Z •• -c -^ - --
.43,• .A Se ae Sea h 3
- *clf atla-r~
4ora1u:::a I""
-a.-:oo a
F. ahIltT o - -.- h. -1-1-.. eha.rs -3ita paa -L.... ........
- "1t n
'.z..-ta.e
-- "mera Sid Opna -- .m.
- Aw r t1 . 1•.4.... *-.arfi•---
- Constreet a - - .. -.• == =- -l."cor y-- "• - -- .-- 1 . -- 1 -•
- 32 -
MAL ANNE= 2
MOPTI RICE PROJECT(Credit 277-KLI)
COMPLETION REPORT
DISBURSEMENTS
muHilion
10.
6
.4
- AppralsalRøvision After Cradit Suppl=nc
- Actual
1973 1974 1975w ' 1976 l7/9 4.157
FY74 TY75 FT76 FY77 FY7FY79
- 33 -
MOPTI RICE PROJECT Table 1(Credit 277-MLI)
COMPLETION REPORT
DISBURSEMT TABLE(US$'000 Equivalent)
Appraised 1/ ActualOuarter Ending Appraisal Revised
Estimate
09/30/1972i2/31/217 3001l 10 2
03/31/1973 70006/30/1973 1,200 1,28309/30/1973 1,70012/31/1973 2,450 2,58303/31/1974 3,050 -06/30/1974 3,700 4,25009/30/1974 4,300 -12/31/1974 5,050 5,91803/31/1975 5,450 6,86906/30/1975 5,900 6,90009/30/1975 6.100 8.000 7.74012/31/1975 6,350 8,120 8,09103/31/1976 6,45n 8,430 8,18006/30/1976 6,600 8,740 8,272nQil1Q76 6,600 8,910 8,351
12/31/1976 6,650 9,090 8,543e3 / / l977 6 ,70 0l 1 ^e,51V-if i./ J- ii up,iv 7 ,L. U , gi.
06/30/1977 6,750 9,160 8,70809/30/1977 6,800 9,220 8,82412/31/1977 6,850 9,290 8,82403/31/1978 6,900 9,360 8,89506/30/1978 - 9,430 9,08009/30/1978 - 9,470 9,27512/31/1978 - 9,500 9,28203/31/1979 - - 9,29206/30/1979 - - 9,30809/30/1979 - - 9,30912/31/1979 9,42403/31/1980 9,424
1/ With additional US$2.6 million of the Amendment to the CreditAgreement dated April 1.1, 1975J
MALI - 34 - ANNEX 3MOPTI RICE PROJECT Table 1
(Credit 277-MLI)
ESTIMATES AND ACTUAL COSTS(in FM million)
Appraisal Actual(May 1971) (March 1977)
CIVIL WORKS- Embankments and canals 1.114 1,839- Intake regulators 261 453- Deep ploughing 411 249- Buildings 363 505- On-farm works - 76
Sub-total 2,149 3,127
ENGINEERING SUPERVISION 124
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH- Transportation and Research Equipment 35 10- Office and Laboratory Equipment 18 6- Personnel Expenditures 143 32- Operating Costs 52 28
Sub-total 248 76
FARM MACHINERY- Ox-drawn equipment 292 1- ORM Equipment 223 427
Sub-total 515 428
MANAGEMENT AND EXTENSION SERVICE- Transportation Equipment 59 110- Office, lodging and other equipment 48 134- Salaries Expatriate Personnel 353 651- Salaries Local Personnel 297 519- Operating Costs 202 651
Sub-total 959 2,065
SECOND STAGE STUDIES- Equipment 22- Topography and Soil Surveys 190- Feasibility Study 154
Sub-total 366 324CONTINGENCIES 877 -
TOTAL 6.020
US$ Equivalent million 9.4 13.1
US$1 = FM 556 US$1 - 458 1/1/ Average rate during the disbursement
periodNOTE: Proiect cost estimates were revised in June 1973 (FM 5,666 million), in May 1974
(FM 5,898 million) and in November 1974 (FM 6,132 million)
MALIMPTI B E PROJECT(Credit 277-MLI)
COKPLETION JRREPOT
AGRICLTURAL IMPACT
(Cultivated z]reaB, yields and production)
19723 4 197L4/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/0 81 g81/82 1982/81. CULTIVATED AREA (HA)
1.1 Appraisal Estimate 5,970 11,470 17,230 20,010 22,630 25,25) 27,830 å8,390 29,960 30,520 31,0901.2 Revised Estimate /5.010 9,630 14,470 16,8oo 19,000 21,200 23,360 23,830 25,150 25,620 26,1001.3 - Actual 5,474 7,493 13,862 16,o?8 17,224 18,805 17,778 16,192 - - -1. 4 - % tc appraisal 92 65 80 80 76 74 64 57 - - -1.5 % to revised
estimate 109 78 96 96 91 89 76 68 - - -
2. YILDS (Ko/HA)2.1 Appraisal 880 1,010 1,200 1,290 1,410 1,530 1,650 1,770 1,830 1,860 1,8602.2 Actual 2/ 265 5O 1,397 1,147 1,392 884 873 - - - -2.3 Percentage 30 50 116 89 99 58 53 - - - -
3. FRODUCTION (T)3.1 - Appraisal Estinate 5,250 11,580 20,680 25,810 31,910 38,630 44,27o 48,480 51,170 53,050 54,1103.2 - Revised Estimate 1/ 4,430 9,760 17,410 21,830 26,870 32,53 37,280 40,820 43,090 44,670 45,5603.3 - Actual 1,450 3,750 19,360 18,440 25,40o 16,620 15,230 - - - -3.4 - Percentage 33 38 111 84 95 51 41 - - - -
1/ Reduced in the same proportion on total area to be developed, i.e. 26,100 ha: 31,090 0.839Per ha sown
MALI
MPTI RICE PROJECT(Credit 277-MLI)
COMPLETION REPORT
AGRICULTURAL IMPACT
ACTUAL RESULTS
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80
1. Attributed Area (ha) 6,960 9,300 16,276 21,158 21,330 21,212 19,530 18,9202. Number of Farms N.A. 3,304 6,495 8,790 8,975 9,095 8,880 7,8553. Area per Farm (ha) 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.44. Sown Area (ha) 5,474 7,493 13,862 16,078 17,224 18,805 17,778 16,1925. 4/1 in % 79 81 85 76 81 89 91 866. Harvested area (ha) 1,808 3,954 11,968 12,703 14,890 13,367 14,332 -7. 6/4 in % 33 53 86 79 82 71 131 -8. Yields per sown area kg/ha 265 500 1,397 1,147 1,392 884 873 -9. Yields per harvested area kg/ha 800 948 1,618 1,451 1,705 1,243 - 1,083 -10.Production (t) 1,450 3,750 19,360 18,440 25,400 16,620 15,530 -11.Marketed (t) - - 3,490 6,731 8,886 3,277 2,901 -12.11/10 in % - 18 37 35 20 19 -
kliS
- 37 -
ALTANN. 3m= ncz ?ROJECT q..
(Crd.t 277-MLI)
YuL1 Develop- t:ou A rers 3t ood Iaccc=i i .erage imars 2 r n
nt Project WLch Preject Vichouc Prajac with Projact Withouc ?roject
Averade Farm jaIlc a h 4 2Yttid (kg/ha f sovn area) 1,860 1,150 1,300 800 900 400Average Far unit ?roducclon (kg) 7,440 4,600 2,600 1,600 1,300 800Paddy Pricas (74/kg)
a) official 30 30 45 45 45 45b) marke - - 60 60 75 75
Sold chrough official chanels (kg) 7,440 4,600 800 - 350 -Sold e...e,a m.r,et - - Lso• 1.600 1.450 800Groa valum of production 223,200 138,000 144,000 96,000 124,500 60,000Producion comts 85,725 1/ 28,900 36,354 2/ 20,084 2/ 37,194 2/ 23,084 2/Nac revaau' . 117,475 110K 1i7,a In 7n5,916 7 ,at 36,916Som. conaumpcion 4,680 3/ 4,60 12,000 4/ 12,000 / LS,000 4/ L,000 /Na£ cash Incom 132,795 10 95,646 63,916 82,306 2.1916Nect rvnua/man-day -2 2/£02 7 /672 19 7/ 373 2/Sec amnual revenut per capita 22,913 f/ 18,183 f/ 17,941 T/ 12,653 5/ 14,551 5/ 6,153 5/
(Us$ equi.) (41) (43) (37) (26) (30) (13)
/ An= 16. Table 1 of Appraisal Report2/ Complacion Roart working papers in WA Filas3/ Anx 16, Table 1 of the Appraisal RepartZ/ 200 kg of paddy oer family at the market price5/ Aa an aver :. ;:rsz"/Umily
COMPLETION REPRT
RATE OF RETURN CALCULATION
Year Incremental Economic Value of Investment Operating Staff 2/ Incremental Prod. Costa Benefits MinusPaddy Prod.1/ Price 2/ Incremen- and Replace- Costs 3/ Farm Labour 2/ Without Costs
tal Prod. ment 3/ Prject V(ton) G MF m. MF m.MF m. F m. m. m. M.
1972 - - 38 20 87 55 19 - 18173 980 63 62 1,224 37 122 64 30 -1, 35574 2, 400 128 307 1, 471 60 227 76 69 -1, 45875 10,870 92 1,000 723 120 205 98 77 - 6976 10, 670 56 598 96 152 236 103 84 9577 15,250 63 961 93 190 223 234 54 27578 12, 470 89 1.,110 35 190 223 204 57 51579 10,950 66 723 535 190 223 80 84 - 221
1980 8,530 87 742 67 190 223 57 88 29381 9,000 89 801 393 190 223 72 98 2182 10,5G0 91 961 63 190 223 87 100 498'83 12,2,40 94 1,151 - 190 223 103 101 73684 14,110 96 1,355 35 190 223 103 101 90585 16,210 98 1,589 353 190 223 103 101 82186 18,590 100 1,859 - 190 223 103 101 1,44487 20,990 102 2,141 416 190 223 103 101 1,310 ®
88 23,5-' 104 2,447 130 190 223 103 101 1,90289 26,230 106 2,780 159 190 223 103 101 2,206
1990 29,230 108 3,157 35 190 223 103 101 2,70791 29,410 108 3,175 353 190 223 103 101 2, 40792 29,410 1c8 3,175 - 190 223 103 101 2,76093 29,410 108 3,175 234 190 223 103 101 2,52694 29,410 108 3,175 63 190 223 103 101 2,169795 29,410 108 3,175 182 190 223 103 101 2,57896 29,410 108 3,175 102 190 223 103 101 2,165897 29,410 1o8 3,175 512 190 223 103 101 2,24898 29,410 108 3,175 - 190 223 103 101 2,76099 29,41o 108 5,175 234 190 223 103 101 2,526
2000 29,410 1o8 3,175 63 190 223 103 101 2,6971 29,410 108 3,175 - 190 223 103 101 2,7602 29,410 108 3,175 35 190 223 103 101 2,725 113 29,410 108 3,175 '535 190 223 103 101 2, 225 44 29,410 1o8 3,175 67 190 223 103 101 2,693 m5 29,410 108 3,175 393 190 223 103 101 2,367 L
6 29,410 1o8 3,175 63 190 223 103 101 2,697
L a;ged 6 months in relation to inputs2/ 45- consr.umed at Bamako and 55% at Mopti
/ Local ccsts affected by a SCF = 0.88 ER 17%
