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World Nuclear Association (WNA)
WNA‟s Views on Bridging Science and
Values in Radiological Protection
1
Sylvain Saint-PierreDirector, WNA Outreach Initiative
Director for Environment and Radiological Protection
World Nuclear Association
2nd OECD/NEA workshop
on Science & Value in RP
Vaulx-de-Cernay, France
November 30 to
December 2, 2009
I) Setting the Scene
2
GAPScience in
RP
Values in
RP
Essential Practical Bridges for Stakeholders
Clarity on
Radiation-Risk:Definitions &
Numerical
Benchmarks
Practical
Applicability
& Potential
Implications
of RP Criteria
Regulations
Commensurate to
Actual Risk
Adds VALUENeed to aim towards a common risk-based approach for all sources
of exposure to ionising radiation
II) Public Interest in RP
3
• Pesticides and genetically modified seeds use for crops
• Chemicals and toxins in products
• Pollutants in drinking water
Should the public be more interested in RP than
anything else? Why? Test: „What are your interest
in‟ and „What you really want to know about‟ e.g.
If no or little interest => ≈ public & radiation-risk
If interested, what basics would you look for? e.g.
• Is the risk controlled by government/industry, How it is controlled,
Is it Safe (limit), What is your situation compared to others?
III) Scientific Risk, Public Health Safety,
and Stakeholder
Scientific risk & public health safety should not
be confused
• Scientists => Spectrum of risks
• Public => Safe or Unsafe
4
International & more local contexts (national and
site-specific) should also not be confused
• International: Valued participation requires competency
• More local: Valued participation of any affected parties
Confusion and ambiguities around the famous “Is
it safe?” (for very low doses < 1 mSv/y)
Most of the elite club of international RP experts
would genuinely answer…?
IT DEPENDS! (…thinking about scientific risk)
…spiralling downwards in endless explanations
that most people cannot understand
5
IV) Clarity on Radiation-Risk:
Public Communication
Is it Safe?
It depends…
• inspection reports
• air strip length
• engine reliability
• meteorological conditions
• etc
6
IV)... Radiation-Risk: Public Communication
After a week of work, would you be interested in
these details? - Never mind participating
Also, let‟s not confuse
This… That…
7
IV) ...Radiation-Risk: Public Communication
Dose limits build in comfortable safety margins
Time
Annual dose limit = 1 mSv/y
Around 100-200 mSv
Certainly no public health issues for doses < 1 mSv/y!
8
Around 1,000-2,000 mSv mSv
IV)...Radiation-Risk: Public Communication
Question - “Is it Safe?” (for doses < 1 mSv/y)
YES – Cannot afford any ambiguity on Safe or UnSafe Adds VALUE
This is the most important responsibility/duty of
the RP community – not yet fulfilled
Too scientific/vague definitions of deterministic
& stochastic risks rather maintain ambiguities –
the RP „sin‟ starts there
9
IV) Clarity on Radiation-Risk:Definition and Numerical Benchmarks for USERS
Adds VALUE
USERS need clearer definitions of radiation-risk
with numerical benchmarks
10
Dose > 1,000-2,000 mSv-Deterministic risk= meaning a health risk attributed to an exposed individual
Dose > 100-200 mSv-Stochastic risk= meaning a probability of a health risk to a given individual
among an exposed population
Dose < 100-200 mSv-Radiation risk is inconclusive, Stochastic risk is theoretically assumed
Dose < a few mSv/y- Risk so tiny that it is not part of real public health safety because radiation-
induced cancer cannot be distinguished from general cancer rate
IV) ...Definitions & Numerical Benchmarks
Adds VALUE
RP community alone falls short to fully investigate
all factors which underpin RP criteria
•Especially valid for the Practical Applicability & Potential
Implications (also part of scientific investigations)
•Also valid for broader issues that go beyond RP
11
V) Process to Set Robust RP Criteria (Users)
Adds VALUE
ICRP-IAEA must improve the process to develop
and set robust RP criteria for USERS
IAEA best to address practical applicability,
potential implications and broader issues
- provided that RP Reps from Member States also
rely on broader input (not just RP)
Should not underestimate this IAEA key role
which also serves to develop broad consensus
12
V) Process to Set Robust RP Criteria (Users)
Adds VALUE
13
Problem (1): Control of exposure depends on what
easily falls within scope of nuclear-RP regulators
•Sources (nuclear industry) that easily fall within this
scope are excessively controlled
•Otherwise comparable (higher) exposures are poorly or
not controlled (medical, air transport, other industries)
VI) Fixing Imbalanced Policies for Public Exposures
Adds VALUE
Should aim towards a common health-risk approach for
the control of all sources of exposure to ionising radiation
Problem (2): Control policies are too strict for
“tiny” public exposures from nuclear
To the point to lose sight that such doses have no
real impact on public health safety
•Natural variability of general background cancer rate (all
causes) is equivalent to a few mSv/y
14
Adds VALUE
VI) Fixing Imbalanced Policies for Public Exposures
Real gain in public radiation safety cannot be
invoked at such “tiny” public exposures
“Small square”: where it counts the most for the public!
15
Doses > 1,000-2,000 mSv
Deterministic risk = meaning
an health risk to a given individual
Doses > 100-200 mSv
Stochastic risk = meaning a
probabilistic risk to an individual
among a population
Public dose limit = 1 mSv/y Useful tool for management but a
poor indicator of real public health
Doses < 100-200 mSv
Theoretically-assumed
stochastic risk
Doses < a few mSv/y
Risk is so tiny that it
becomes irrelevant
VI) Fixing Imbalanced Policies for Public Exposures
10 -
2.4 -
1 .0 –
0.4 –
0.14 -
0.1 -
0.04 -
0.01 -
0.001 -
0.0001
World average exposure to background
natural radiation Public dose limit = 1 mSv/y
Common Exemption = 0.01 mSv/y
Diagnostic medical x-ray examinations
One single chest x-ray
One transatlantic flight
(North America to Europe)
Most exposed people to discharges from
nuclear sites over the entire yearNuclear reactors
Nuclear fuel cycle
Breaking News: Medical increased average
exposure from ≈ 3 to 6 mSv/y ! – USA data
16
CT scans+
Nuclear medecine
The rationale (common health risk approach)
for the control of public exposures is poor
Note: At very low doses, there is no trade-off between health detriment & notions likes equity, benefits, etc.
Public radiation doses (mSv)
VI) Fixing Imbalanced Policies for Public Exposures
17
As a case in point of the imbalance: Average annual individual doses
Nuclear power < 0.1% of average annual individual doses
Medical ≈ 14%, Natural background radiation ≈ 85%
Are the largest efforts on strictly controlling „tiny‟ public
exposures from nuclear sound – compared to all exposures?
VI) Fixing Imbalanced Policies for Public Exposures
18
A case in point of the imbalance: Change in average annual individual
doses due to insufficient control in the medical sector (US data)
VI) Fixing Imbalanced Policies for Public Exposures
Change
due to CT
scans and
nuclear
medicine
VII) Cases of interest: Radon, Medical,
Cardiovascular
Radon – Uranium Mining
Remains to be seen if a change of generic risk factor is
appropriate/applicable to recent or new uranium mines
WNA‟s letter to ICRP (c.c. IAEA):
1) Low-doses uranium mines are more related to modern mines
2) Smoking is a large confounding factor – uranium ore dust is an extra one
3) Expressed as radon concentration in air introduces greater uncertainties
19
Adds VALUE
Unclear if evidences will lead to a higher, constant or
even lower radon risk factor for uranium mines
VII) ...Radon, Medical, Cardiovascular
Radon – Uranium Mining
Scientific investigations not just about epidemiology,
biokinetics, dosimetry and related modelling
Practical applicability and potential implications are key:
1) Mine types: new/recent vs old; wet vs dry; underground, open-pit and ISL
2) Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Russia, South Africa and Uzbekistan
3) Other site-specific factors: ore characteristics, age of the air, etc.
20
Adds VALUE
Need balance in generic risk factor between aggregating
too different mines and too much details at very low doses
VII) ...Radon, Medical, Cardiovascular
Radon – Uranium Mining
„Process‟ and „Time‟ (3-5 yrs+) to fully investigate all
factors as part of new RP criteria are key
No room to unduly rush a change to find out in a few years
that it was incorrect – implications are too large
IAEA upcoming workshop in December is welcome
BSS revision ends in 2010 OR launch radon investigations
21
Adds VALUE
VII) ... Radon, Medical, Cardiovascular
Medical
•CT scans & nuclear medicine pose concerns. Routine
lower medical exposures remain understandably
uncontrolled as risk is too low (+ benefits)
•Yet routine exposures in nuclear are even lower
(+benefits of nuclear in terms of planet-wide protection)
Cardiovascular
•IAEA BSS draft gives numerical benchmarks that quickly
help Users knowing if topic is relevant or not
22
VIII) Foreseen RP Improvements in Nuclear
Refocusing RP on real safety gains
1) RP for workers, especially the most exposed
– Typically addressed via RP measures
2) Risk of public exposures from major accidental releases
– Typically addressed via nuclear safety measures (against core melt down
and loss of containment) and emergency preparedness
23
Adds VALUE
Reminder: Optimization (not minimization!)
There is no real gain in public radiation safety associated
with any extra measure for normal radioactive discharges
Currently offered new NPPs are all Super Safe
24
1. Choices in low-carbon Energy Sources2. Climate Change3. Planet-wide consequences on Environment & Health
With nuclear having a key rapidly growing role
IX) World Challenge on Environment & Health
• Can no longer afford safety standards that disregard benefits of nuclear
• Urgent that fictive safety do not hinder benefits
Government are urge to tackle this challenge
At the core of this World Challenge
Adds Greatest VALUE
Thank you for your attentionQuestions? [email protected]
World Energy Outlook 2008
Electricity generation and CO2 emissions
What if the challenges of CCS for fossil fuel and of the great expansion of renewable
cannot be met in time? Is „ready-to-deploy‟ nuclear sufficiently accounted for?
25
18,921
33,265
30,186 28,997
Going from ≈ 19,000 to 30,000 TWh
over 2006 to 2030Reducing CO2 emissions from 11.4 Gt
down to ??? over 2006-2030
11.4
18.0
12.8
8.2
Over 2006-2030:Hydro ≈ x 2
Other Renewable ≈ x 12!
Nuclear ≈ x 2
Fossil fuel ≈ flat or down
(with CCS)
World population:
1950: 2.5 billions; 2009: 6+ billions; 2050: 9 billions