PREFACE

The much respected English Historian C.V Wedgwood once wrote "it has been

said that without passion there might be no errors, but without passion there

would certainly be no history".

We are writing history with the present report on a miscarriage of justice which will

sorely enlighten each and every one of us on all the weaknesses of our system. But

to succeed in our immense task, we need that the Republic itself accepts the

principle that we can go wrong. And when we have wronged any human being, we,

as citizens of the Republic, will fail in our duties if we do not stand up to right the

wrongs that we have done. "We"... yes, as justice is delivered by the State in the

name of each and every one of us.

In the past centuries, justice was done in the name of the Monarch on the grounds

that he/she is the representative of God on Earth and therefore cannot do anything

wrong.

Today, we must never fall into the trap of self-complacency when it comes to the

search for the truth.

Truth will remain elusive if we choose to close our eyes. And the choice is here for

each and every one of us to make, without any sort of frontier. We will only make

history when we humbly, yet boldly decide to expose and confront the flaws

crippling our system, thus letting the whole truth flourish of its own strength and

light. No compromise or concession can exist in a Republic pointing towards

exposure of the bare truth.

While venturing in the alleys of justice to correct its eventual shortcomings, we

may certainly come to err. However, each and every one of us may also come to

the point of reaping the fruits of a job well done.

History itself will judge if we were keeping doing wrong or attempting with the

drive of passion to mend what was within our reach to mend.

Rama Valayden27th June 2013

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This report is dedicated to all those who abhor Miscarriage of Justice and

all forms of Injustice.            

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DISCLAIMER This report contains information obtained from as far as possible within the Republic of Mauritius where there is no Freedom of Information Act. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information. This report or any part may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, provided necessary references are made. Direct all inquiries or acknowledgements to Me. Rama Valayden, Teeluck Court, Port- Louis 2013 Printed in the Republic of Mauritius by Graphic & Prints Ltd

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Contents

Acknowledgements vi Methodology vii Foreward Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Part 1 Wrongful Convictions

Chapter 2: Safety of convictions and Miscarriage of Justice 5 Chapter 3: Are we immune to a Miscarriage of Justice? 8 Chapter 4: A Tunnel vision 11 Chapter 5: Victims of Miscarriage of Justice 21 Chapter 6: Miscarriage of Justice around the world 28

Part 2 Criminal (In)justice System Chapter 7: The Police Enquiry 34 Chapter 8: Preliminary Enquiry 71 Chapter 9: Assizes 82 Chapter 10: The ‘Thupsee Brothers’ saga 91 Chapter 11: Witness Li Tung 104 Chapter 12: Time is of the essence! 121 Part 3 Mysteries Chapter 13: The mutilated body 125 Chapter 14: The red wire 134 Chapter 15: An Empty safe 136 Chapter 16: Convenient disappearance 139

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Part 4 Disconcerting facts

Chapter 17: Impartiality of Trial Judge 155 Chapter 18: Exclusion of a potential member of the Jury 157 Chapter 19: The expert from Scotland Yard 159 Chapter 20: Threatening letters 161 Chapter 21: Raymond Zamir 162 Chapter 22: Mrs. Latour 165 Chapter 23: Police misleading the Prime Minister 173 Chapter 24: Fire Services 175 Part 5 Exculpatory evidence Chapter 25: The tape 179

Chapter 26: Confessions 182 Chapter 27: CCTV cameras 185 Chapter 28: Sequestration case 188 Chapter 29: Iron pole 190 Part 6 Escadron de la Mort Chapter 30: Who were they? 191 Part 7 An analysis Chapter 31: The bigger picture 195 Part 8 Post 27th June 2013 Chapter 32: What’s next? 199 Part 9 Recommendations Chapter 33: Our recommendations 212 Part 10 Annexures

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‘To the living we owe respect To the dead we owe only the truth’

Voltaire

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Acknowledgment This Report was made possible thanks to the support and advice of many individuals and organisations. The team of lawyers who conducted this enquiry would like to thank everyone who contributed to this endeavour. Special thanks go to those who have lost their eternal loved ones in the Amicale arson but who had the courage to go through the ordeal once again to help us in our quest for truth. We are also especially grateful to those who have been working within the different governmental services, such as the Police and Fire Services who have jeopardized, hope not, their careers in providing to us invaluable information and pointers. We would also like to acknowledge all the lawyers who have encouraged us throughout our enquiry. A number of experts generously gave their time for the cause. We are grateful to them. We acknowledge the support of our dearest families that had to bear with us, the burden of our tantrums, worries and absences. We deeply acknowledge the moral support of the general public in Mauritius and abroad which has boosted our morale.

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Methodology

The idea behind the enquiry conducted by myself and a group of

lawyers, on a pro-bono basis, was to shed the light on the arson

which occurred at L’Amicale de Port Louis, a game house, in

Mauritius, on the 23rd May 1999.

The objective of the report is to publish the findings of our enquiry

together with our conclusions and critics as regards to the manner in

which the Police enquiry was conducted.

A number of disturbing facts have also come to light in respect of the

Preliminary Enquiry and the Assizes. These will also be addressed in

the report.

The first step was to gather all the files containing court transcripts,

depositions and all other documents produced in court. Thereafter,

requests were made to the general public for those who had

information to come forward and share it with us.

We have also painstakingly attempted to get in touch with all the

persons who we thought could provide help to us including police

officers, retired police officers, members and ex members of the SSU,

the SMF and the firemen who attended L’Amicale de Port Louis on

that fateful night, bouncers and other employees of the game house,

people residing in the neighbourhood of L’Amicale de Port Louis

and many more individuals whom we believe could help us in our

quest for justice.

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We have interviewed more than 115 persons, many of whom had

never been interviewed by the police regarding the events of the 23rd

May 1999.

Some of those persons, whilst voluntarily giving information to us,

have asked us not to reveal their identities. Others chose to remain

anonymous for now but have promised to come forward if there is a

Commission of Enquiry or other enquiry by the police.

Finally, some witnesses have not only agreed to impart information

to us but have also sworn affidavits to that effect, which are annexed

to this report.

We have also retained the services of experts including British

forensic experts to assist us in certain areas of our enquiry.

1

ON MONDAY 20 NOVEMBER 2000 – AFTER RECESS

Before Honourable P. Lam Shang Leen, Judge

Criminal Session:- State v. Sumodhee & Ors.

 

 

All accused present

Parties represented as above

 

 

COURT:- Well, let us have the jurors, please. Yes, Mr. Foreman, have you

reached a verdict?

MR. FOREMAN:- Yes, My Lord. After deliberations, we have found Accused

No. 1 guilty as charged by a majority of 8:1, Accused No. 2, guilty as charged

by a majority of 8:1, Accused No. 3, guilty as charged by a majority of 8:1 and

Accused No. 4, guilty as charged by a majority of 8:1. Thank you, My Lord.

COURT :- Thank you, Mr Foreman.

Inform the Accused that the Jury has found them guilty as charged.

MR INTERPRETER:- The have been informed accordingly, My Lord

(…)

COURT:- Accusés Nos. 1, 2, 3 et 4, bannes Jurés fine trouve zotte

coupables 8 contre 1, zotte ine tender. D’apres la loi, avant mo passe

sentence, zotte énan quitechose pou dire, ou bien pénan narien pou dire ?

2

ACCUSED NO. 1 :- Mo innocent dans ca case la

COURT: D’accord, ok.

ACCUSED NO. 2 :- Mo innocent Missié, mo maintenir mo innocence.

Mo donne avis d’appel.

COURT :- Oui. Laisse mo fini passe sentence, après ou va dire.

ACCUSED NO. 3 :- Mo innocent depuis lor la terre, depuis cotte Bon

Dieu aussi mo pou innocent

ACCUSED NO. 4 :- Mo ene innocent, malgré ca mo rode l’appel.

COURT :- OK. Bon d’apres la loi ene seul sentence qui enan: “penal

servitude for life for all of them”

1. This guilty verdict represents multiple failures at all levels of our Criminal Justice

system.

2. A double injustice was caused:

- Firstly, to those who had lost their lives on that fateful evening of the 23rd May

1999, to their respective families and close ones

- Secondly, to the four convicts who have now spent more than 14 years behind

bars for a crime they did not commit.

3. At that time, the convictions appeased public pressure. Our justice system, had in the

mind of the average citizen, delivered justice and a dark page of the Country’s history

could be turned.

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4. The assizes lasted for 11 days. Several witnesses deponed including defence witnesses.

5. It took the jury a little under two hours to deliberate and reach a verdict.

6. Prior to the Assizes case, the four accused faced a Preliminary Enquiry together with

five other persons. The preliminary enquiry spanned over a period of several months

during which 59 witnesses deponed.

7. At the Assizes:

Sheik Imran Sumodhee, hereinafter referred to as Mounou, then Accused No. 1,

Khaleeloudeen Sumodhee, hereinafter referred to as Bébé, then Accused No. 2,

Abdool Naseeb Keeramuth, hereinafter referred to as Zulu, then Accused No. 3,

And

Muhammad Shafiq Nawoor, hereinafter referred to as Fico, then Accused No. 4

Were accused to have on the 23rd May 1999 set fire to a game house known as

‘L’Amicale’, situated in the capital city of Port Louis, which fire caused the death of

seven persons.

8. The victims included a pregnant woman and two children who all died of an

unspeakable horror. The horrendous crime did, quite understandably, spark public

outrage.

9. The police enquiry immediately focused on the fans of a local football team, the Scouts

Club and for cause, the 23rd May 1999 was also the final day of the local football

season whereby the Scouts Club, traditionally the standard-bearers of the Muslim

community, were playing against Fire Brigade, a football team, customarily drawing its

support from the Creole community in a match that would decide the Mauritian football

league title.

10. The match was being played at Anjalay Coopen Stadium, Belle Vue, in the north of the

island.

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11. Scouts Club needed a draw to retain the championship. Their opponent, Fire Brigade,

required victory to snatch the title.

12. Midway through the second half, Scouts Club scored but the goal was disallowed. In

the 89th minute Fire Brigade scored, Scouts Club subsequently had another goal ruled

out and the former were proclaimed champion. Sensing injustice, the Scouts fans

rioted, assaulted the referee and destroyed some 345 seats, numerous washbasins,

toilets, windows and other facilities at the stadium.

13. More seriously, the incidents continued outside the stadium where some football fans,

turned hooligans, set fire to sugar cane fields around Anjalay stadium. The incidents

eventually spilled over in Port Louis.

14. The next morning, Mauritius woke up and learned about the tragedy whereby 7 people

had lost their lives during the incidents of the night before.

15. The four convicts have claimed their innocence from Day 1. Fourteen years

later, it is with the same vigour that they say, all they want is to die with their names

cleared.

16. This report which is the result of an extensive enquiry conducted into the

horrific events of the 23rd May 1999 will shed the light on all aspects of the

Amicale Case in an unprecedented manner.

17. It will be demonstrated in no uncertain terms that the Amicale Case is a gross

Miscarriage of justice whereby the factually innocent ones have been

convicted.

18. The end result of that gross miscarriage of justice derives from several root

causes.

19. Before going into the core of the report, it is useful at this juncture to

understand the terms ‘wrongful conviction’ and ‘miscarriage of justice’; and to see

how Countries, around the world, have recognised their existence and have

5

 

Part 1: Wrongful Conviction Chapter 2 Safety of conviction and Miscarriage of Justice

 

20. Unlike the natural sciences, where the proof of a theory must satisfy the strict tests of

falsification, the guilt or non guilt, in Criminal Law, is a tested to the standard of

‘beyond reasonable doubt’.

21. Sadly, the following quotation extracted from the House of Lords’ ruling in the case of

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Shannon [1974] 59 Cr.App.R.250 clearly illustrates

that the criminal justice system is fallible and innocent victims can be, and are, wrongly

convicted:

 

‘The law in action is not concerned with absolute truth, but with

proof before a fallible human tribunal to a requisite standard of

probability in accordance with formal rules of evidence.’

 

22. The history of successful appeals against criminal conviction in this country and

worldwide highlights the practical limitations of criminal trials, showing that

‘probabilities’ are not certainties; and that there are a whole host of different ways that

people can be wrongly convicted.

23. As a matter of fact, people do get wrongfully convicted and after exhausting all their

avenues, they usually find themselves sitting powerlessly behind bars devoid of any

hope whatsoever. They just wait for their sentence to pass by as they gradually lose

their family ties, their loved ones and finally become institutionalised.

24. The question which begs to be answered is: What do we do about them?

 

25. The first sensible thing is to shoulder our responsibilities and acknowledge the

undisputed fact that system can go wrong sometimes.

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26. In 2000, UK’s then Prime Minister Tony Blair apologized to the Guildford Four1

convicts for their wrongful conviction. In a letter personally signed by him, Mr. Blair

acknowledged the “miscarriage of justice” which they suffered as a result of their

wrongful convictions.

27. Hon. Tony Blair said:

“I believe that it is an indictment of our system of justice and a matter for the greatest

regret when anyone suffers punishment as a result of a miscarriage of justice. There

were miscarriages of justice in your husband’s case, and the cases of those convicted

with him. I am very sorry indeed that this should have happened.”

28. Criminal law is informed by the principles of due process as to what constitutes a fair

trial. A major concern of the courts is with the integrity of that process, with what

might be called the ‘safety of convictions’.

29. It is in this context that a distinction should be made between the terms ‘miscarriage of

justice’ and ‘wrongful conviction’ of an innocent person.

30. Whilst ‘miscarriage of justice’ is a term that is frequently and notoriously invoked, very

little has been done by way of decisions clarifying the term.

31. A 'miscarriage' means literally a failure to reach an intended destination or goal. A

miscarriage of justice is therefore, mutatis mutandis, a failure to attain the desired

end result of 'justice'.

32. In a judgment delivered on the 11th May 2011 by the Supreme Court of the United

Kingdom, Britain’s most senior judges formulated a test in determining whether a

miscarriage of justice has occurred. The Court said that there would be a miscarriage of

justice:

 

‘when a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that the evidence against a

defendant has been so undermined that no conviction could possibly be based upon it.’ 1 See Chapter 6

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33. According to Dr Michael Naughton (Reader in Sociology and Law at the University of

Bristol, UK), a miscarriage of justice occurs whenever a conviction is found to be

unsafe.

34. That is, while actual innocence may not be established, it is shown that the conviction

was attained on grounds that give serious cause for anxiety about its safety.

35. The term miscarriage of justice can therefore be contrasted with a case of ‘wrongful

conviction’ of an innocent person in which case an accused party is convicted a crime

they did not commit or put in another way, the conviction of the factually innocent.

36. It is possible of course, for the two notions to coexist in a single case: An accused party

being accused of a crime they did not commit and being found guilty on grounds that

are subsequently found to be unsafe.

37. This report demonstrates with certainty that the convictions of Mounou, Bébé, Zulu and

Fico at the Assizes caused the greatest miscarriage of justice in the history of Mauritius.

38. It will also be demonstrated that their conviction is, without the shadow of a doubt, a

case of wrongful conviction.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Chapter 3:

Are we Immune to a Miscarriage of Justice? 39. With the total absence of any mechanism to recognise and deal with wrongful

convictions in this country, one could be forgiven to think that we are immune from

any form of miscarriage of justice.

40. In fact, our judicial system, unlike those of countries like Canada, India, Singapore,

Australia, United States of America or New Zealand, has never come under public

scrutiny for reasons of miscarriage of justice.

41. Does that mean we are immune? Has there been no wrongful conviction in the

Mauritian history?

42. It is fair to say that Anglo-based criminal justice systems, like the one we have in

Mauritius, are arguably less prone to wrongful convictions than any other justice

systems in the world.

43. This is because of the number of safeguards that exist, for example:

a. An accused person is presumed innocent throughout.

b. The prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

c. The Accused has the right to counsel and to present evidence.

d. Accused persons have the right to be tried by a jury of their peers, at least in the

most serious of cases.

e. A labyrinth of evidentiary rules exclude irrelevant or prejudicial information

f. The Constitution guarantees a significant number of rights to accused persons.

44. Furthermore, in the event of a conviction after trial, appeals may be made to a Court of

Appeal and ultimately to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

 

45. Despite these safeguards, other countries having a similar criminal justice system, like

the ones mentioned above, have come to terms with the fact that wrongful convictions

do exist.

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46. Acknowledging that the system, despite all the safeguards, sometimes fails, was a giant

step for these countries since the number of exonerations following wrongful

convictions are now counted in their thousands; and with the advent of the DNA testing

technology, countless wrongly convicted persons have been saved from several years of

imprisonment and in more serious cases, life imprisonment or even death penalties.2

47. In the United States, a national registry of exonerated persons was recently set up and it

has emerged than more than a staggering 2000 people were wrongly convicted of

crimes they did not commit and served a number of years in prison before being

exonerated.

48. In the United Kingdom convictions in cases like the Birmingham Six, the Guildford

Four or the Maguire Seven have been declared ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ and were

quashed after those wrongly convicted had each spent more than a dozen years in

prison for crimes they did not commit.

49. Public confidence in the criminal justice systems in these countries has been shaken

because wrongful convictions represented a triple failure of justice:

 

‘an  innocent  person  has  been  convicted  and  imprisoned;    

 

the  truly  guilty  person  was  allowed  to  go  free  and,  potentially,  commit  

further  crimes;  and  finally,    

 

the  victim’s  family,  who  had  a  sense  of  closure  with  the  conviction,  have  

been   re-­victimised   by   opening   an   emotional   wound,   which,   with   an  

increasingly  cold  evidentiary  trail,  may  never  be  healed.’3  

 

 

 

2 Several reviews have been conducted in Canada (The Marshall inquiry, The Sophonow Inquiry, The Morin Inquiry) and in the United Kindom (Birmingham Six, Guildford Four). 3 Wrongful Convictions: The Effect of Tunnel Vision and Predisposing Circumstances in the Criminal Justice System by Bruce A. Macfarlane Q.C

10

 

50. However the silver lining was that these countries, having come to terms that the

system failed and acknowledging the existence of wrongful convictions did the right

thing in finally offering justice to those wrongfully convicted persons.

51. In addition, Commissions were set up, not only to exonerate those who have been

wrongfully convicted, but also to examine what exactly went wrong in the system to try

and prevent such injustices from occurring again.

52. In fact, the impact of wrongful convictions in Canada has reached through to the

Supreme Court of Canada which in various judgments has noted:

‘that both substantive criminal law and the law of evidence must take into account the

reality of wrongful convictions when courts are called upon to shape (or reshape)

Canadian law.’4

53. It would have been all too easy to deny any system failure, dismiss the claim and turn

the page, but that would mean that the countries would have failed to face up with their

responsibilities towards their citizens and would also leave the door open to more cases

of wrongful convictions.

54. The various commissions that have been set up in the above named countries all came

with their different recommendations on the root causes of miscarriages of justice and

wrongful convictions as well as recommendations on their prevention.

55. One issue which was common to all the countries and which has been identified as a

leading cause of miscarriage of justice and/or wrongful conviction, was the existence of

‘tunnel vision’ at the enquiry stage.

4 Supra – also U.S. v. Burns, (2001) 1 S.C.R. 283; R v. Trochym, 200 SCC 6; Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police, 2007 SCC 41

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Chapter 4:

A Tunnel vision  

56. Tunnel vision, which has been identified as a leading cause of wrongful convictions

worldwide, has been defined as:

“the single minded and overly narrow focus on an investigation or prosecutorial

theory so as to unreasonably colour the evaluation of information received and one’s

conduct in response to the information”5

57. The role of the prosecuting authorities has received considerable judicial comment,

with frequent emphasis upon the inherent fairness that is integral to its role.

58. The following is a passage from the judgment of Boucher v. The Queen, where Rand J

said:

‘It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not

to obtain a conviction, it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be

credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a

duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is represented; it should be

done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength but it must also be done

fairly. The role of the prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his

function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none

charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed

with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of

judicial proceedings.’

5 Morin Inquiry (Recommendation 74) and quoted in the FPT Heads of Prosecutions Committee report of the working group on the prevention of miscarriages of Justice (Canada)

12

59. Within the context of tunnel vision, Prosecutors and State Counsels ought to

consistently strive to independently assess the police investigation and the evidence

against an accused.

60. In a report on the prevention of miscarriages of justice which is published on the

website of the Department of Justice of Canada (www.justice.gr.ca), the following

factors were identified as potential contributors to the State’s tunnel vision, that is,

impairing the proper role of the State Counsel:

a. Close identification with police and / or victim

b. Pressure by the media and/or special interest groups ; and

c. Isolation from other perspectives

61. There have been three Commissions of Inquiry into wrongful convictions in Canada so

far and all three have commented on the perils of tunnel vision and have made

recommendations for police and Crown education on the topic.

 

I.The   Royal   Commission   into   the   Donald   Marshall,   Jr.,  

Prosecution.    

 

The  Marshall  Inquiry  emphasised  the  need  for  a  separation  between  

police  and  Crown  functions:  

 

  ‘We   recognize   that   cooperative   and   effective   consultation   between  

the  police  and  the  Crown  is  also  essential  to  the  proper  administration  

of   justice.   But   under   our   system,   the   policing   function   –   that   of  

investigation   and   law   enforcement   –   is   distinct   from   the   prosecuting  

function.  We  believe   the  maintenance  of  a  distinct   line  between   these  

two  functions  is  essential  to  the  proper  administration  of  justice.’  

 

It  must  be  noted  that  our  Mauritian  legal  system  is  very  similar  to  the  

Canadian   legal   system   in   that   both   have   their   foundations   in   the  

British  common  law  system    

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II.The Inquiry regarding Thomas Sophonow

The Sophonow Inquiry recommended regular, mandatory training for

police officers on tunnel vision:

- Tunnel vision is insidious. It can affect an officer or, indeed, anyone

involved in the administration of justice with sometimes tragic results. It

results in the officer becoming so focussed upon an individual or incident

that no other person or incident registers in the officer’s thoughts. Thus,

tunnel vision can result in the elimination of other suspects who should

be investigated. Equally, events that could lead to other suspects are

eliminated from the officer’s thinking. Anyone, police officer, counsel, or

judge can become infected by this virus.

- I recommend that attendance annually at a lecture or a course on this

subject be mandatory for all officers. The lecture or course should be

updated annually and an officer should be required to attend before or

during the first year that the officer works as a detective.

- Courses or lectures that illustrate with examples and discuss this

problem should be compulsory for police officers and they would

undoubtedly be helpful for counsel and judges as well.

 

III. The Commission on Proceedings involving Guy Paul Morin

The Morin Inquiry extended the above recommendations to include

Crown Attorneys:

14

Recommendation 74 – Education respecting tunnel vision

One component of educational programming for police and Crown

counsel should be the identification and avoidance of tunnel vision. In

this context, tunnel vision means the single minded and overly narrow

focus on a particular investigative or prosecutorial theory, so as to

unreasonably colour the evaluation of information received and one’s

conduct in response to that information.

Recommendation 92 – Structure of police investigation

Investigating officers should not attain an elevated standing in an

investigation through acquiring or pursuing the “best” suspect or lead.

This promotes competition between investigative teams for the best lead,

results in tunnel vision and isolates teams of officers from each other.

62. Unfortunately Mauritius is not immune from tunnel vision and as things stand there are

no practices currently in place to prevent tunnel vision.

63. Unless the various stakeholders, including defence counsel, are not warned and guided

there are bound to be cases where innocents will unfortunately be jailed while the real

culprits let on the loose.

Recommendations on Tunnel Vision:

The MacFarlane Paper

64. In a paper entitled ‘Wrongful Convictions: The Effect of Tunnel Vision and

Predisposing Circumstances in the Criminal Justice System’, Bruce A. MacFarlane Q.C

discussed two critical factors that have arisen in the cases of wrongful convictions in

jurisdictions such as Canada, the United States and other Commonwealth counties.

 

 

15

65. He stated that despite the diversity in the legal, political and social environments of

these jurisdictions ‘the similarity in causal patterns and trends is at the same time both

chilling and disconcerting.’

66. Firstly, he analysed the existence of environmental factors or “predisposing

circumstances” that foster wrongful convictions to occur in the first place, including so

called “noble cause corruption”, an ends-based police and prosecutorial culture that

masks misconduct as legitimate on the basis that the guilty must be brought

successfully to justice.

67. Secondly, he examined “tunnel vision” which he said leads to justice system

participants to focus prematurely on a single suspect.

68. Of the “Predisposing Circumstances” in the Criminal Justice System, MacFarlane Q.C

noted that:

‘Criminal investigations and trials take place in the context of the social,

political and economic conditions of the time. In theory, criminal

investigations and trials involve an objective pursuit of the truth, but in

practice there are many subjective factors that influence the course of

events. “Justice” may be blind, but in reality the various players making

up the justice system are very human and they bring their own

perspective, experiences, biases, aspirations and fears to the decisions

they make.’

69. Scholars have focussed on reforms concerning “immediate” causes at the front end of

the system – such as eyewitness identification, lack of Crown disclosure, police or

prosecutorial misconduct and the inducement of false confessions.

70. These causes have singly or in combination been the cases of wrongful convictions in a

significant number of cases throughout the Commonwealth.

 

16

71. The MacFarlane paper instead focuses on several much more fundamental – and less

visible – environmental or “predisposing circumstances” that foster wrongful

convictions:

‘These predisposing circumstances are often below the criminal justice

system’s radar screen, and for that reason they are much more difficult to

deal with. Typically, they can be found within one or more of the

following institutional or social contexts, or a combination of them:

a) public and media pressure on law enforcement agencies to solve a crime

and successfully prosecute the perpetrator, especially in cases of horrific

violence where the public has been outraged by its commission;

b) cases where the public reacts to the background or circumstances

surrounding the alleged offender, especially when he or she is perceived

as being an “outsider” or a person originating from an unpopular,

disadvantaged or minority group linked to criminal activity generally;

c) so-called “noble case corruption”, which for our purposes may be

described as an ends based culture that encourages investigators to blind

themselves to their own inappropriate conduct, and to perceive that

conduct as legitimate in the belief that they are pursing an important

public interest; and

d) an investigative environment that allows if not encourages the provision

and acceptance of pre-analysis and pre-decision-making information that

may be irrelevant, speculative, incomplete, out of context or simply

wrong.

17

There are at least two principal themes that underlie these

predisposing circumstances. The first concerns the reaction of the public

to a case, particularly where it involves horrific violence directed toward

a child or woman, or the death of a child in tragic circumstances. The

second involves the reaction of justice system participants to public and

media perceptions of the case, with resulting feelings of pressure to solve

the case and provide assurances of public safety, and with speed

becoming the overarching objective.’

72. Bruce A. MacFarlane Q.C. noted that public outrage in high profile cases can translate

into intense pressure on the police to arrest and on prosecutors to convict with speed

becoming the overriding factor:

‘High-profile criminal cases, particularly those involving gruesome facts,

tend to inflame community passions and create intense, almost hydraulic,

pressure on investigators to solve what happened and arrest those

responsible, and on prosecuting authorities to successfully convict those

charged. Public and media pressure probably forms the most intense

predisposing circumstance, and poses the greatest risk for distorting

normal decision making in the criminal justice system.’

73. In a 1932 United States study on wrongful convictions entitled ‘Convicting the

Innocent’, Professor Edwin Borchard of Yale University described several

environmental factors that allowed wrongful convictions to occur.

74. The first involved public pressure to solve horrific crimes:

‘(I)t is common knowledge that the prosecuting technique in the United

States is to regard a conviction as a personal victory calculated to

enhance the prestige of the prosecutor. Except in the very few cases

where evidence is consciously suppressed or manufactured, bad faith is

not necessarily attributable to the police or prosecution; it is the

environment in which they live, with an undiscriminating public clamor

for them to stamp out crime and make short shrift of suspects, which

often serves to induce them to pin a crime upon a person accused.’

18

‘Public opinion is often much to blame as the prosecutor or other

circumstances for miscarriages of justice. Criminal trials take place

under conditions with respect to which public interest and passions are

easily aroused. In 14 of the cases in this collection in which the frightful

mistake committed might have been avoidable, public opinion was

excited by the crime and moved by revenge to demand its sacrifice, a

demand to which prosecutors and juries are not impervious. This can by

no means be deemed an argument for the abolition of the jury, for judges

alone might be equally susceptible to community opinion. But it is a fact

not to be overlooked.’

75. He explained how this can contribute to tunnel vision:

‘Tunnel vision sometimes sets in. The investigative team focuses

prematurely, resulting in the arrest and prosecution of a suspect against

whom there is some evidence, while other leads and potential lines of

investigation go unexplored. It is now clear that that is precisely what

occurred in the cases of Morin and Sophonow.’

THE BIRMINGHAM SIX

76. The Birmingham Six case provides an illustration of how tunnel vision inevitably led to

a miscarriage of justice:

The   pressure   caused   by   public   opinion,   media   and   political  

commentaries  to  charge  swiftly  and  then  secure  a  conviction,  arises  in  

all  jurisdictions  

 

 

 

 

 

19

During   the   1970s   bombing   campaign  waged   by   the   Irish   Republican  

Army  (IRA)  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  public  saw  the  IRA  as  a  “public  

enemy   number   one”,   and   anyone   of   Irish   descent   was   a   potential  

suspect.  

 

The  resulting  public  pressure  generated  an  atmosphere  in  which  state’s  

authorities   sought   to   convict   despite   the   existence   of   ambiguous   or  

contradictory  evidence.  

 

It  also  caused  scientists  working  in  government  operated  laboratories  

to  feel  aligned  with  the  prosecution,  resulting  in  a  perception  that  their  

function  was  to  support  the  theory  of  the  police  rather  than  to  provide  

an  impartial,  scientifically  based  analysis.  

 

They  had,  as  was  later  found  by  the  courts,  become  partisan.  

 

Six  Irish  Catholic  men,  usually  referred  to  as  the  ‘Birmingham  Six’,  were  

charged  with  21   counts   of  murder,   convicted  by  a   jury,   and   spent  16  

years  in  jail  before  being  freed  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  1991  

 

The  Court   concluded   that   several   of   the  police   investigators   “were  at  

least  guilty  of  deceiving  the  court”  

 

It  is  now  clear  that  distortion  in  normal  investigative  and  prosecutorial  

decision   making   processes   in   the   cases   of   the   Guildford   Four,  

Birmingham   Six,  Maguire   Seven   and   Judith  Ward   led   to   terrible   and  

notorious   miscarriages   of   justice.   While   all   of   the   defendants   were  

ultimately  released  from  jail,  and,  in  the  case  of  the  Guildford  Four  and  

Maguire  Seven,  the  Prime  Minister  issued  a  formal  apology,  emotional  

scarring  was  deep  for  all  of  them.  

 

 

 

20

77. MacFarlane  emphasised  that  raising  awareness  of  the  existence  of  tunnel  vision  is  

essential.   He   recommended   that   seminars   for   police   and   prosecutors   should   be  

held,   allowing   frank   discussion   of   tunnel   vision   and   stated   that   police   should  

continue  to  pursue  all  reasonable  lines  of  enquiry  even  where  a  viable  suspect  has  

been  identified.    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

21

Chapter 5:

Victims of Miscarriage of Justice  

78. Having come to terms with the fact that miscarriages of justice and wrongful

convictions do occur and that this country just like any other is prone to the danger of

convicting innocent persons, we have seen what should be done in order to reduce those

risks.

79. But how about those who have already been wrongfully convicted and are powerlessly

behind bars serving a sentence for crimes they did not commit? What should be done?

Are there any remedies available to them?

Prerogative of Mercy

80. The prerogative of mercy is regarded as the only means to remedy an injustice. It is

most often used to ameliorate the harshness of sentences imposed by our courts of law.

81. Before looking at the operation of prerogative of mercy in this country, it is helpful to

look at the situation in England, for after all, this is where we inherited this concept

from.

82. For centuries in England, the royal prerogative of mercy was the sole means to remedy

an injustice. It was most often used to ameliorate the harshness of sentences imposed by

the courts.

83. Later, through the early 19th century, when there were over 200 offences carrying the

death penalty in the statute books, it provided a means of affording clemency to those

convicted of relatively minor capital offences.

 

84. However, it was not just an exercise of mercy: It also operated to temper the

inadequacies of substantive law before the development of common law or statutory

defences, such as insanity and self-defence.

22

85. Finally, it also came to provide a safety net when judicial appeals had been exhausted.

86. In a sense therefore, the coming to existence of the prerogative of mercy was an

acknowledgment of the fallibility of the judicial process; that the rules of evidence did

not always lead to the correct outcome so far as guilt or innocence was concerned.

87. In Queen Victoria’s time, the responsibility for determining petitions for the exercise of

the prerogative passed from the Sovereign to the Home Secretary.

88. The responsibility was also delegated to the governors of colonies and, later, to the

governors-general of the dominions.

89. In Mauritius, the exercise of the prerogative of mercy is grounded in our constitution.

Section 75 provides as follows:

75. Prerogative of mercy

(1)The President may –

(a) grant to any person convicted of any offence a pardon, either free or subjectto

lawful conditions;

(b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, of

the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for any offence;

(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on

any person for any offence; or

(d) remit the whole or part of any punishment imposed on any person for an

offence or of any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the State on account

of any offence.

23

(2) There shall be a Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy (referred to in this

section as "the Commission") consisting of a chairman and not less that 2 other

members appointed by the President, acting in his own deliberate judgment.

(3) A member of the Commission shall vacate his seat on the Commission-

(a) at the expiration of any term of appointment specified in the instrument of his

appointment; or

(b) where his appointment is revoked by the President, acting in his own

deliberate judgment.

(4)(a)In the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by subsection (1), the President

shall act in accordance with the advice of the Commission.

(b) The President may request the Commission to reconsider any advice tendered by it

and shall act in accordance with such advice as may be tendered by the Commission

after such reconsideration.

(5) The validity of the transaction of business by the Commission shall not be affected

by the fact that some person who was not entitled to do so took part in the proceedings.

(6) Where any person has been sentenced to death (otherwise than by a court martial)

for an offence, a report on the case by the judge who presided at the trial (or, where

http://www.gov.mu/scourt/doc/showDoc.do?dk=Act No. 48 of

1991&dt=Ahttp://www.gov.mu/scourt/doc/showDoc.do?dk=Act No. 28 of

2003&dt=Aa report cannot be obtained from that judge, a report on the case by the

Chief Justice), together with such other information derived from the record of the

case or elsewhere as may be required by or furnished to the Commission shall be taken

into consideration at a meeting of the Commission which shall then advise the

President whether or not to exercise his powers under subsection (1) in that case.

24

(7) This section shall not apply in relation to any conviction by a court established under

the law of a country other than Mauritius that has jurisdiction in Mauritius in pursuance

of arrangements made between the Government of Mauritius and another government or

an international organisation relating to the presence in Mauritius of members of the

armed forces of that other country or in relation to any punishment imposed in respect of

any such conviction or any penalty or forfeiture resulting from any such conviction

90. It needs to be pointed out that additionally, akin to the powers of the Home Secretary in

the United Kingdom, the President has the power, under Section 21 of the Criminal

Appeal Act 1955 to refer a case back to the Supreme Court to be heard and determined

by the Court as in the case of an appeal by a person convicted.

91. The fact that section 21 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1955 has never been put into

operation goes a long way to tell the story of the wrongfully convicted in Mauritius.

92. There remains the Prerogative of Mercy. Is this though a viable option for those who

claim having been victims of wrongful convictions? For after all, it does not innocent

the prisoners, it merely mercies them.

93. In England, amid claims of miscarriages of justice and wrongful convictions, concerns

grew over the effectiveness of the available options as a remedy to cure such travesties.

94. That factor coupled with the growing awareness of the constitutional tension inherent in

the pardoning process led to a re-evaluation of the way in which the prerogative of

mercy was being exercised.

25

The Criminal Cases Review Commission

95. On 14th March 1991 Paddy Hill, Hugh Callaghan, Richard McIlkenny, Gerry Hunter,

Billy Power and Johnny Walker with Chris Mullin MP stood outside the Old Bailey

free after 16 years having had their convictions overturned for the murder of 21 people

in two pubs in Birmingham.

96. It was that scandalous miscarriage of justice that ultimately shook public confidence in

the justice system.

97. As an immediate response, a Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) was set

‘to examine the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in England and Wales in

securing the conviction of those guilty of criminal offences and the acquittal of those

who are innocent(…)’.

98. It was also, among other terms of reference, required to consider whether changes were

needed in ‘the conduct of police investigations.

99. The Royal Commission reported to Parliament in July 1993 and recommended the

establishment of an independent body to consider suspected miscarriages of justice:

The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC).

100. In particular, the RCCJ concluded that successive Home Secretaries under the old

system for investigating alleged miscarriages of justice were not proactive in weeding

them out and were even failing to refer potential miscarriages of justice back to the

Court of Appeal for political as opposed to legal reasons.

101. In brief, the CCRC’s role is to receive, investigate and assess applications received

where there has been a possible miscarriage of justice.

102. It is empowered to refer the case to the Court of Appeal where the Commission is

satisfied that there is a real possibility the conviction would be quashed if the case

were referred to the Court and that possibility arises due to evidence or argument not

being raised in the earlier proceedings.

26

103. The CCRC has, as at 31st December 2012, referred 512 cases to the Court of Appeal of

which 328 have been quashed.

104. The achievement is quite remarkable, considering that those 328 victims of

miscarriages of justice or wrongfully convicted persons had prior to their applications

to the CCRC exhausted all their appeal avenues but were still considered guilty.

Case Statistics - Figures to 31 December 2012

Total applications*: 15710

Cases waiting: 404

Cases under review: 733

Completed: 14770 (including ineligible) 512 referrals

Heard by Court of Appeal: 466 (328 quashed, 138 upheld, 0 reserved)

*Total applications includes 279 cases transferred from the Home Office when the

Commission was set up in 1997.

105. The CCRC was viewed with a great deal of interest from other jurisdictions that see

it as a possible extension to their own criminal justice system to solve their

miscarriage of justice / wrongful conviction problem.

106. For instance, the CCRC spawned the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission

(SCCRC), which started its work in April 1999 and the Norwegian Criminal Cases

Review Commission (NCCRC), which came into force on 1st January 2004.

107. We believe that the creation of such a body is a necessity in our Mauritian legal

system for it will greatly enhance public confidence in the criminal justice system, it

will give hope and bring justice to those wrongly convicted and will be able to

contribute to reform and bring improvements in the law.

27

108. This is why a criminal cases review body ought to be established. The British and

Scottish model is a good one. Staffed by experienced lawyers, forensic and police

experts, cases are reviewed to see if there are grounds for arguing a wrongful

conviction. If the case meets the required threshold, it is sent back to the court for an

assessment to be made about guilt; and in some cases, the length of sentence if it is

found that a person committed a crime but a less serious one.

28

Chapter 6:

Miscarriage of justice around the world

109. Various commissions of enquiries, inquests and governments around the world have

acknowledged the fact that Courts of Law have, on many occasions, wrongfully

convicted (and sometimes executed) innocent people.

110. Governments, of course, are not too keen on wrongful conviction inquiries and there

are many prisoners in this nation who are serving sentences for crimes they did not

commit. Wrongful conviction inquiries can reveal police or prosecutorial misconduct,

or poor forensic practices. Governments are morally compelled to compensate

victims of wrongful convictions. In summary, relying on the political process to grant

a person their right to have new evidence tested is unfair because the urge to resist the

establishment of such inquiries outweighs the imperative to ensure justice is done.

111. However, Governments, and particularly the Attorney-General as first law officer,

ought to be taking the lead on ensuring that justice is done and that if there are real

doubts about a person's conviction for a serious criminal offence that has resulted in

his loss of liberty for a lengthy period, move to establish an inquiry immediately.

112. The following aims to bring to the attention of the reader the situation in various

countries worldwide.

113. Around the world people are tried everyday, before various courts of law. Evidence

is gathered, witnesses are summoned, lawyers use all their available tools provided

under the law to fight for the cause of justice and the court of law has the final say

when it comes to serving justice. Despite all the legal mechanisms present, one can

yet be wrongly convicted.

29

114. As shocking and distressful as it may be, courts of law, around the world, have on

many occasions found that they have wrongfully convicted, despite the presence of

expert evidence and the jury’s verdict. Whilst exoneration remains a cure to a

wrongful conviction, those who have been wrongfully convicted have a very slim

chance of being exonerated.

115. Unfortunately, most of the times our criminal legal systems do not contemplate

beyond evidence adduced at trial and appeal; they do not question potential failures

occurring throughout an enquiry and the possibility that a jury could have been

misled about the truth.

A FEW EXAMPLES: AUSTRALIA In 1984, Richard Doney was wrongly convicted for the offence of

importation of cannabis resin. The Prosecution’s case rested heavily on

the testimony of an alleged accomplice and an expert witness confirming

the handwriting of Richard Doney. He was sentenced to a term of 20

years imprisonment. Subsequently the Court found that the testimony of

the alleged accomplice was unreliable and that an eyewitness gave

evidence contrary to the expert witness. Following two trials and three

appeals he was released on parole in 1995 after having served over six

and a half years in jail. In 2001 he was acquitted when the NSW Court of

Criminal Appeal ruled unanimously that new evidence had established

reasonable doubt and that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

116. In Australia, a pro-bono project run by Griffith University brings together lawyers,

academics and law students to work together to free innocent persons who have been

wrongly convicted. Students work under the guidance of academics and instruction of

lawyers. This group actively works on wrongful conviction and other types of

injustice within the criminal justice system.

30

USA In 1994, Damien Echols was sentenced to death, Jessie Misskelley, Jr.

was sentenced to life imprisonment plus two 20-year sentences, and

Jason Baldwin was sentenced to life imprisonment after being found

guilty by a jury for the murder of 3 eight year old boys. Poor Police

inquiry, inadequate forensic evidence, coerced confessions, jury

misconduct and fabricated evidence led to their conviction. In 2011, 17

years later, crucial new DNA evidence of their innocence has been

uncovered including crime scene DNA that absolves the three young men

and points to others. Some of the country's leading pathologists found

that much of the forensic evidence presented to the jury, which helped to

convict the young men, was false and not consistent with the cause of

death nor wounds found on the bodies. In 2011, the prosecutors and the

defense talked and an agreement was reached for the three convicts to

proclaim their innocence even if they pleaded guilty, and, minutes later,

walked out as free men.

In 1984, Darryl Hunt was charged with murder due to inconsistencies

occurring during the early phases of the case. The 19-year-old Hunt was

charged with the rape of a local copy editor, Deborah Sykes. No physical

evidence linked Hunt to the crime, but there were claims, later proven to

be false. He was convicted by an all-white jury,and sentenced to life

imprisonment. In 1994, DNA testing cleared Hunt of any sexual assault,

and because sexual assault was at the heart of the murder case, the

murder charges were then in question. In December 2003, Willard E.

Brown confessed to the 1984 rape and stabbing death of Deborah Sykes

after DNA testing linked him to the crime. His confession led to the

release of Darryl Hunt, who had served about 19 years of a life sentence

for a crime he always denied committing.

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117. In the USA, the Innocence Project was set up as a nonprofit legal clinic dedicated to

exonerating wrongfully convicted people through DNA testing and reforming the

criminal justice system to prevent future injustice. The Innocence Project has freed

260 people imprisoned for crimes they did not commit. The project also operates in

the UK and is known as the Innocence Network UK (INUK) which deals with

alleged victims of wrongful conviction. INUK has to date actively assisted in setting

up 34 innocence projects in Universities in England, Scotland and Wales and in a

corporate law firm.

CANADA

In 1959, Steven Murray Truscott, was sentenced to death in for the

murder of 12 year old Lynne Harper. He was only 14 at the time. His

death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, Truscott was

scheduled to be hanged on 8th December 1959; however, a temporary

reprieve on 20th December 1959 postponed his execution to 16th February

1960 to allow for an appeal. On January 22nd January 1960, his death

sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. In 2001, Truscott sought a

review of his 1959 murder conviction. Hearings in a review of the

Truscott case were heard at the Ontario Court of Appeal. In 2007, after

review of new expert pathology and gastroenterology evidence, as well as

archival documents that relate to the credibility and reliability of the

evidence of the doctor who performed the autopsy on the body of Lynne

Harper, the court concluded that this material, which was not considered

at trial , qualified as fresh evidence which significantly undermined the

medical evidence relied on by the prosecution in the prior proceedings.

The court declared that Truscott's conviction had been a miscarriage of

justice and as such, acquitted Truscott of the murder. On 7th July 2008,

the government of Ontario awarded him $6.5 million in compensation.

32

118. In Canada, principally as a result of a consultation paper published by the Department

of Justice in 1998, the Canadian Criminal Code was amended to allow for the

Minister of Justice to delegate to a person of suitable standing the powers of a

Commission under Canada’s Inquiries Act. The Commissioner has all the usual

robust investigative powers of a commission of inquiry and reports to the Minister.

NEW ZEALAND

In 1995, David Cullen Bain was convicted of the murders of his parents

and sibling and was served with a life imprisonment sentence. In 2007,

following new evidence found, Bain was successful in his appeal to the

Privy Council. His conviction was quashed and retrial was ordered. In

2009, 14 years later, Bain was retried and was acquitted on all five

charges in June 2009 after five hours and 50 minutes of deliberations.

UNITED KINGDOM

In 1974 Judith Ward was convicted of murder of several people caused

by a number of IRA bombings in 1973. Judith Ward spent 18 years in

jail before her conviction was quashed in 1992.Her lawyers argued the

trial jury should have been told of her history of mental illness. The

Court of Appeal concluded that Ward's conviction had been "secured by

ambush". They said government forensic scientists had withheld

information that could have changed the course of Ms Ward's trial. She

was finally released in 1992 having served 18 years in prison.

The Birmingham Six’ were six men who were jailed for life in August

1975 after 21 people were killed by bombs in two Birmingham pubs. In

1991 their appeal was allowed in the light of new evidence of police

fabrication and suppression of evidence which successfully dismantled

both the confessions and the 1975 forensic evidence. Their conviction

was quashed by the Court of Appeal. In 2001, a decade after their

release, the six men were awarded compensation ranging from £840,000

to £1.2 million.

34

Part 2: Criminal (In)Justice System Chapter 7: The Police Enquiry

 

1. This  chapter  of  the  report  aims  to  assess  the  manner  in  which  the  police  

enquiry  was  conducted  in  the  Amicale  case.    

 

2. However,   before   looking   at   that   aspect,   it   is   helpful   to   understand   the  

morale   of   the   police   force   at   the   time   and   the  way   in  which   operations  

were  being  carried  out.    

 

Morale  within  the  police  force    

3. Following   the  riots  of  February  1999,  members  of   the  Police   force  were  

left   feeling   dejected.   No   prompt   decisions   or  measures  were   taken   and  

improvement  within  the  police  force  was  not  encouraged.    

 

4. The   then   Commissioner   of   Police  was   suspended   and   there  was   even   a  

motion  before  the  National  Assembly  to  destitute  him  as  Commissioner  of  

Police  with  some  support  within  the  rank  and  file  of  the  police  force.  That,  

in  itself,  caused  a  certain  disruption  within  the  police.  

 

5. Messrs.   Shattock   and   Nandy,   two   non   Mauritian   citizens,   who   were  

appointed   as   advisors,   were   involved   in   all   operational   and   security  

arrangements  despite  the  fact  that  they  were  only  advisors  with  no  good  

knowledge   of   crowd  disorders   and   the   psyche   of  Mauritians   in   cases   of  

riots   and   disorders.   They   had   no   local   knowledge   and   were   not   fully  

aware  of  the  history  and  peculiarities  of  certain  areas.  

 

6. The  amalgam  between  operational  work   and   advisory  work  were  made  

more   conspicuous   by   routine   and   frequent   interventions   by   the   above-­‐

named  advisors  on  the  day  to  day  running  of  the  police  force.  

 

 

 

35

7. The  morale  of  the  police  force  was  not  in  any  way  helped  by  the  presence  

of  Messieurs   Shattock  and  Nandy  who  were  perceived  as  being   the   real  

bosses  of  the  police  force.  They  were  interfering,  or  at  least  perceived  to  

be  interfering,  on  a  daily  basis,  in  the  routine  affairs  of  the  police.  

 

8. In  1999,  after  the  Amicale  arson,  in  a  heated  exchange  on  the  “duo”  at  the  

National  Assembly,  Honourable  Paul  Berenger  even  said  “that  the  sooner  

these  two  gentlemen  are  thanked  for  their  services  the  better”.  

 

Pre-­match    

9. Another   aspect  which  needs   to  be   analysed  before   looking   at   the  police  

‘enquiry’  itself  is  the  whole  organisational  operation  prior  to  the  football  

match.  

 

10. On  the  18th  May  1999,  Police  issued  a  press  communiqué  in  relation  to  the  

football  match  of   the  23rd  May  where   the   supporters   of   each   respective  

clubs  were  informed  of  the  routes  which  were  to  be  used  by  them  to  and  

from  the  stadium.  

 

11. There   were   also   two   separate   parking   lots   allocated   for   each   set   of  

supporters  and  the  parking  lots  were  under  close  CCTV  monitoring.  

 

12. Even  the  roads  leading  to  the  stadium  were  being  monitored  by  CCTV.  

 

13. The   total   number   of   tickets   sold  were   7,   465.   The   Fire   Brigade   and   the  

Scouts  Club  were  each  given  a  quota  of  4000  tickets  but  an  additional  300  

tickets  were  allocated  to  the  Scouts  Club  at  their  request.  

 

14. The   Mauritius   Football   Association   (MFA)   also   issued   VIP   and  

complimentary  cards  totalling  around  300.  

 

 

 

 

 

36

 

15. Because  of   the  sensitive  nature  of   the  match   itself   coupled  with   the   fact  

that   there   were   reports   from   the   National   Intelligence   Unit   warning   of  

potential  disorders  on  the  23rd  May  1999,  the  following  units  and  officers  

were  present  at  the  stadium:    

 

i. Around  120  regular  police  officers    

ii. 198  officers  from  the  Special  Supporting  Unit  (SSU)    

iii. 59  officers  from  the  Traffic  Branch      

iv. 9   officers   from   the   Central   Crime   and   Investigation  Division  (CCID)  

 v. 3  police  photographers  

 vi. 5  officers  from  the  National  Intelligence  Service  (NIU)  

 vii. 1  whole  company  of  the  Special  Mobile  Force  (SMF)  

 viii. 1   whole   unit   of   the   Groupement   d’Intervention   de  

Police  Mauricienne  (GIPM)    

16. Ninety   eight   officers   of   the   SSU   and   sixty   officers   of   the   SMF   were  

stationed  at  the  Line  Barracks.  

 

17. There  was  also,  in  the  stadium,  a  control  room  with  televisions  linked  to  

38  cameras  inside  the  stadium  and  8  cameras  outside  the  stadium.  

 

18. All  the  police  stations  throughout  the  island  were  on  alert  but  a  disturbing  

fact  which  has  come  to  light  is  that  the  following  key  police  stations  were  

undermanned:  

 

a. Abercrombie  Police  Station  b. Trou  Fanfaron  Police  Station  c. Plaine  Verte  Police  Station  d. Vallee  Pitot  Police  Station  e. Pope  Henessy  Police  Station  f. Government  House  Police  Post  g. Line  Barracks  Police  Station  

 

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19. Despite  the  fact  that  there  is  a  history  of  incidents  at  the  Police  Stations  of  

Vallee   Pitot   and   Plaine   Verte,   no   SMF   or   SSU   nor   additional   staff   were  

posted  to  these  stations.  

 

20. The  Information  Room  then  under  the  supervision  of  SP  Ramen  was  also  

poorly   staffed   and   the   NIU   desk   at   the   Line   Barracks   was   not   fully  

operational.  

 

21. Despite  the  NIU  reports,   there  were  no  dissuasive  patrols  by  the  SMF  or  

the  SSU  on  the  23rd  May  1999  either  before  or  after  the  after  the  match.  

 

22. Prior   to   the   match   and   despite   the   findings   of   the   Ahnee   Commission  

(following   the   Zamalek   vs   Sunrise   FC   match   24th   March   1996)   no  

meetings  were  organised  between  the  force-­‐vives  of  the  localities  and  the  

police  to  encourage  dialogue.  

 

23. It   is   apposite   at   this   stage   to   quote   an   extract   of   the   ‘Findings   of   the  

Commission  of  Inquiry’  chaired  by  L  Robert  Ahnee:  

 

REPORT  OF  THE  COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  APPOINTED  TO  INQUIRE  INTO  THE  DISTURBANCES  AT  ANJALAY  STADIUM  AND  PLAINE  VERTE  ON  24  AND  25  MARCH,  1996    On  the  17  April,  1996  the  President  of  the  Republic  appointed  me  as  Chairman  of  a  Commission  of  Inquiry  to  inquire  :-­    

(a) into  the  disturbances  that  occurred  before,  during  and  after  the   football   match   between   Zamalek   of   Egypt   and   Sunrise  Flacq  United  at  Anjalay  Stadium  on  Sunday  24  March,  1996;    

(b) into  the  riots  and  disturbances  that  took  place  in  Plaine  Verte  on  24  and  25  March,  1996    

(c) in  particular,  into  what  extent  those  responsible  for  the  said  disturbances  and  riots  at  Anjalay  Stadium  and  at  Plaine  Verte  were  organised;  and    

(d) into   the   causes   and   circumstances   of   the   disturbances   and  riots;    and   to   report   thereon   and   to   make   recommendations   as  appropriate        

38

On  the  24  March,  1996  at   the  Anjalay  Stadium,  Belle  Vue,   the  local   football   team   Sunrise   Flacq   United,   champion   team   of  Mauritius,  had   to  play  a  decisive  match  against  Zamalek,  one  of   the   best   football   teams   of   the   African   continent,   in   the  context  of  the  “Coupe  d’Afrique  des  Clubs  Champions”    The  hearing  of  the  witnesses  started  on  the  14  May,  1996.  118  persons  were   heard,   the   last   one   on   10  October,   1996,   at   the  27th  sitting  of  the  Commission    Extract  from  para  2.2:  ‘They  were  from  all  the  branches  of  the  Police,  namely  163  officers  and  men  from  the  regular  force,  one  full  Unit  and  three  sections  from  the  S.S.U.,  about  25  men  of  the  Special  Mobile  Force  (S.M.  F)  and  a  dozen  from  the  N.I.U.  The  organisation  even  provided   for  photographers  as  well  as  two   officers   whose   role   was   to   film   on   video   cassettes  whatever   could  be   of   importance   to   the  Police.   These   two  artists,   however,   returned  bredouilles   as   they   considered   that  nothing  worth  filming  had  occurred  in  the  spots  of  the  Stadium  where  they  were  posted’    ‘Nor   is   there   enough   evidence   to   allow   the   Commission   to  conclude   that   there   was   any   pre-­concerted   plan   to   foment  disturbances  and  encourage  people  to  riot  in  Plaine  Verte  area  on  the  24  March.  The  evidence,  on  the  other  hand,  shows  that  experience  has  taught  the  Police  to  be  always  on  their  guard  in  the   region  whenever   the   Scouts   Club   is   called   upon   to   play   a  football  match  anywhere   in  Mauritius.  For  reasons  alluded   to  earlier,  that  football  team  has,  particularly  within  Plaine  Verte,  a  group  of  supporters  or   fans  whose  reactions  are  not  always  prompted   by   their   enthusiasm   for   football   and   whose  “chauvinism”  and  hooligan-­like  manners  are  often  a  source  of  embarrassment  for  the  said  Club.  ’    ‘6.6  Statistics  prove  that  the  fans  of  the  Scouts  Club  have,  in   one  way  or  another,   been  at   the   source  of  most   of   the  disturbances   connected   with   First   Division   football  matches.  The  M.F.A  has,  on  numerous  occasions,  even  been  compelled  to  take  against  the  Scouts  Club  sanctions  which  have   penalised   it   for   the   bad   conduct   of   its   so-­called  supporters.   There   is   even   evidence   that   some   time   ago  when   the   M.F.A   met   at   the   seat   of   the   Association,   at  Chancery   House   in   Port   Louis,   to   consider   disciplinary  action  against  a  player  of  the  Scouts  Club,  a  small  crowd  of  persons   believed   to   be   supporters   of   the   said   club  assembled   in   the  vicinity  of  Chancery  House   in  what  was  perceived  as  an  attempt  at  intimidation.’    ‘6.8   It   was   therefore   not   difficult   for   a   few   excited   and  possibly   organised   hooligans   coming   back   from   Anjalay  Stadium   to   succeed,   in   a   few   minutes,   to   arouse   the  passions  of  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  area  by  spreading  the  false  news  that  the  Police  had  not  only  mishandled  Moslem  

39

spectators   but   that   they   had   killed   two   young   men,   one   of  whom  was   even   said   to   be   the   son   of   the   apparently   popular  mufti  of  a  nearby  Mosque!        In   less   than   no   time   the   rumour   gathered   momentum   and  hundreds  of  determined  Moslems  were  soon  in  front  of  the  two  Police   Stations   to   shout   their   anger   and   cry   for   revenge   for  those  killed.’    ‘7.8  Mr  Ramboccus  was  not  the  only  person  to  express  the  view  that   unless   the   Authorities   soon   decide   to   do   something   to  incite,   by   persuasive  means,   the   creation   of   regional   or   other  teams  which  would  attract  l’elite  d’ou  qu’elle  vienne  and  drive  our  present  Clubs  carrying  with  them  their  “communal”  past  to  disappear   from   our   scene,   the   “communal   hooliganism”  already  present   in  our  Stadia  may  become  even  stronger  to  explode  one  of  these  days,  with  the  possibility  of  serious  consequences  for  the  whole  country.’    

Police  inaction  after  the  match    

24. Despite   Plaine   Verte   Police   Station,   the   NIU   and   the   Information   Room  

being  aware  of  the  fact  that  there  was  an  angry  crowd  marching  riotously  

towards   the  offices  of   the  Mauritius  Football  Association   (MFA),  no  SSU  

nor  SMF  Units  were  sent  to  Chancery  House,  where  the  offices  of  the  MFA  

are  situated.  

 

To  note:     It  would  have  taken  under  three  minutes  for  the  SMF  or  the  SSU  get  to  Chancery  House  from  the  Line  Barracks.      

 The  phone  calls  

 

25. On  the  23rd  May  1999,  prior  to  the  match,   the  fire  services  of  Port  Louis  

received  not  less  than  18  phone  calls  which  were  proved  to  be  false  alerts.  

Nonetheless,   the   fire   services   had   to   react   and   send   their   limited  

resources  to  attend.    

 

26. After   the   match,   even   more   calls   were   made   to   the   hotlines   of   the  

Government   Fire   Services   so   much   so   that   the   service   which   was  

equipped  with   no   less   than   six   hot   lines   (No.   995)   was   inundated   as   a  

result.  

 

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27. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  most  of   these  calls  were  made  to  act  as  a  

diversion  mechanism.  

 

28. An  enquiry  concerning  the  answering  system  of  the  different  phone  calls  

was  not  done.  Same  would  have  revealed:  

a. The  provenance  of  the  calls  b. The  nature  of  the  calls  c. The  different  calls  between  the  Information  Room  and  the  Control  

Room  of  the  Fire  Services.    

29. A  disconcerting  element  which  has  emerged  as  a  result  of  the  enquiry  is  

the   fact   that   the   fire   services   were   asked   to   stay   within   their   barracks  

since  there  were  apprehensions  that  there  could  be  an  impending  attack  

on  key  Government  buildings.    

 

30. If   there   was   such   an   apprehension  why  were   the   SMF   not   informed   of  

same   immediately?   Alternatively,   had   the   SMF   been   informed   but   no  

response  ensued?  

 

31. The  end  result  was  that  the  Fire  Services  did  not  respond  as  promptly  as  

it  should  have.    

 

The  ‘Investigation’    

 

32. Various  aspects  of  the  investigation  shall  be  looked  at  under  two  broader  

sub  categories:    

 

a. The   initial   enquiry   at   the   scene   of   crime   leading   into   an   arson  

investigation.  

b. The   subsequent   part   of   the   enquiry   which   will   look   at   the  

development  of  the  enquiry  and  the  arrests  made.    

The  Arson  Investigation  

 

33. It  needs  to  be  pointed  out  from  the  outset  that  no  scientific  evidence  

whatsoever  links  any  of  the  four  convicts  to  the  arson  at  Amicale.  

 

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34. The  decisions  made  and  the  actions  taken  at  the  outset  of  an  investigation  

at   a   crime   scene   play   a   pivotal   role   in   the   resolution   of   a   case;   and   the  

importance   of   careful,   methodological   and   meticulous   approach   of   the  

investigators  to  the  crime  scene  is  all  the  more  important  considering  that  

this   is   usually   the   unique   opportunity   to   preserve   and   recover   physical  

clues..  

 

35. While  all  crime  scenes  are  unique,  experts  worldwide  seem  to  agree  that  

there   are   fundamental   principles   of   investigating   a   crime   scene   and  

preserving  evidence  that  should  be  practiced  in  every  case.    

 

36. When  it  comes  to  an  arson  investigation,  the  task  gets  even  more  arduous  

for   the   investigator   who   will   often   take   a   very   subjective   approach   to  

understanding  the  fire.  

 

37. Let  alone  the  fact  that  the  investigators  involved  in  the  Amicale  case  had  

no   training   whatsoever   when   it   came   to   an   arson   investigation   of   that  

magnitude,  even  theories  concerning  fire  investigations  which  were  then  

considered   as   acceptable   worldwide   have   since   been   found   to   be  

unreliable  and  unfounded.  

 

38. Leading  US  fire  expert  John  Lentini  who  wrote  a  paper  on  the  mythology  

of  arson  investigation  said  the  following  as  regards  to  misconceptions  in  

fire  investigations:  

‘Fire  investigation  involves  the  comparison  of  the  investigator’s  

“expectations”  with  his  perception  of  the  behavior  of  the  fire.  If  

those  expectations  are  not  properly  “calibrated,”  the  result  will  

be   numerous   errors.   In   the   17th   century,   when   the   scientific  

community  was  first  getting  organized,  it  was  understandable  

that   misconceptions   about   fire,   such   as   the   phlogiston   and  

caloric   theories,   should   exist.  What   is   surprising   is   that   after  

three   centuries   of   scientific   examination   of   fire,   myths   have  

been  added  rather  than  dispelled.  ‘1  

1 The Mythology of Arson Investigation by John J. Lentini, CFEI, F-ABC Scientific Fire Analysis, LLC

42

 

39. Be  that  as  it  may,  the  level  of  amateurism  with  which  the  enquiry  was  

conducted   is  shocking.   It  was  most  disrespectful   towards  the  seven  

people  who   had   lost   their   lives   and   the   four   others  were   about   to  

have  their  lives  shattered.  

 

40. Our   enquiry   has   revealed   that   the  miscarriage   of   justice   in   the  Amicale  

case   can   largely   be   attributed   to   the   acts,   doings   and   omissions   of   the  

investigators.  

 

41. The   scene   of   crime   itself   was   only   secured   hours   after   the   first   police  

officers  arrived  on  the  spot.  Members  of  the  public  were  free  to  roam  the  

scene  of  crime  thus  dramatically  increasing  the  risk  that  crucial  pieces  of  

evidence  be  tampered  with  or  at  least  contaminated.    

 

To  note:   The   police   case   theory   and   the   evidence   adduced   by   the  

prosecution  was,  inter  alia,  that:    

 

i. Molotov  cocktails  were  hurled  at  the  Amicale  building  both  

from  Royal  Street  and  Emmanuel  Anquetil  Street.    

ii. Three  cars  were  set  on  fire.  One  of  them,  which  was  parked  

along   Royal   Street   right   in   front   of   the   entrance   of   the  

Amicale   building   caused   the   Amicale   signboards   to   catch  

fire.  

iii. The  Amicale  building  itself  caught  fire  as  a  result  of  the  two  

aforementioned  causes.  

iv. Projectiles  including  petrol  bombs  which  were  hurled  at  the  

entrance   found   on   Emmanuel   Anquetil   Street   bounced   off  

the  ‘accordeon’  door,  which  was  caused  to  be  shut,  onto  the  

street.  

v. An  iron  rod  which  was  allegedly  used  to  lift  and  turn  over  a  

car  which  was  then  set  alight  was  left  on  the  scene  of  crime  

   

 

 

 

43

42. The  amount  of  vital  pieces  of  evidence   left  behind  at   the   scene  of   crime  

was   therefore   considerable.   Yet,   before   any   photographs  were   taken   of  

the  scene  of  crime  or  any  documentation  made  in  relation  to  the  position  

of  every  piece  of  evidence  which  littered  the  streets  on  the  corner  of  Royal  

Street   and   Emanuel   Anquetil   Street,   a   pay   loader   from   the   SMF   was  

brought  on  spot  to  clear  the  road  of  all  these  crucial  pieces  of  evidence.  

 

   

 

 

44

 

Note:   At   the   time   when   the   scene   of   crime   was   cleared   of  

debris  and  key  pieces  of  evidence,  the  police  had  no  clue  as  to  

the  authors  of  the  arson.  This  begs  the  question,  why  was  

the   scene   of   crime   cleared   up   so   quickly?   IGNORANCE  

AND  AMATEURISM?  

 

43. No  subsequent  analysis  was  carried  out  in  respect  of  any  of  these  physical  

pieces  of  evidence  such  as:  broken  bottles   (as   there  should  have  been   if  

the  prosecution  version  is  to  be  given  any  credence),  burnt  motorcycles,  

the  iron  rod  and  other  projectiles  allegedly  hurled  at  the  building.    

 

44. Not   even   an   inventory   of   the   items   found   on   the   streets   around   the  

building  was  carried  out.  

 

45. The   initial   inspection   of   the   building,   exercise   which   is   of   crucial  

importance,  was  carried  out  by  Dr.  B  H  Surnam,  Police  Medical  Officer,  in  

the  presence  of  Mr.  Rene  and  CI  Fullee.    

 

46. From  the  findings  of  that  inspection2,  which  is  just  over  a  page  long,  it  can  

be  gathered  that  the  inspection  was  most  superficial  and  that  no  exhibits  

were  collected  at  that  time  and  no  photographs  were  taken  apart  from  the  

photographs  of  the  bodies  of  the  victims.  

 

47. The  following  table  puts   into  perspective  on  the  one  hand  the  standards  

and   procedures   that   ought   to   be   followed   in   the   normal   course   of   an  

enquiry3;   and  on   the  other  hand  what  was  actually  done   in   the  Amicale  

case.    

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 Annexe 1 3 Crime Scene Investigation: A guide for law enforcement. U.S. Department of Justice

45

 

THE  PRINCIPLE  

 

 

WHAT  WAS  ACTUALLY  DONE  

 

Careful,   thorough   investigation   to  

ensure  that  potential  physical  evidence  

is  not  tainted  or  destroyed  or  potential  

witnesses  overlooked.  

 

 

It  will   be  demonstrated   in   this   Part   of  

the  report   that   there  was  no   thorough  

investigation,   how   evidence   had   not  

been  collected  and  how  witnesses  were  

ignored.  

 

 

Physical   evidence   has   the   potential   to  

play   a   critical   role   in   the   overall  

investigation   and   resolution   of   a  

suspected   criminal   act   and   the  

realisation  of  this  potential  depends  on  

actions   taken   early   on   in   the   criminal  

investigation  at  the  crime  scene.    

 

 

No   actions  were  done   to  preserve   any  

kind  of  physical  evidence  at   the  scene.  

On   the   contrary,   the   scene   of   crime  

(Corner   Royal   Emmanuel   Anquetil  

Street)   were   cleared   of   potentially  

crucial   pieces   of   evidence   only   hours  

after  the  attack,  while  it  was  known  to  

the  police   that   some  people  who  were  

inside  the  building  had  lost  their  lives.  

 

 

An   important   factor   influencing   the  

ultimate   legal   significance   of   scientific  

evidence  is  that  investigators  follow  an  

objective,   thorough   and   thoughtful  

approach.    

 

 

The   police   case   theory   in   the   Amicale  

arson   was   most   simplistic   and   naïve.  

Many   factors   such   as   immense   public  

and  political  pressure  combined  with  a  

certain   degree   of   noble   cause  

corruption   led   to   a   serious   case   of  

tunnel  vision  by  the  investigating  team.    

 

 

Need   to   recognise   and   preserve  

physical   evidence   that   will   yield  

reliable   information   to   aid   in   the  

investigation.    

 

Crucial  pieces  of  evidence   that  did  not  

match  the  police  case  theory  were  cast  

aside  and  not  given  any  consideration.  

(Eg.   Safe,   The   red   wire,   Debris   inside  

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  Amicale,   CCTV   footage   inside   and  

outside   Amicale,   the   debris   on   the  

street  outside  the  casino  etc.)  

 

 

Since  investigations  may  change  course  

a  number  of  times  during  an  enquiry,  it  

is   important   that   investigators  

consider   all   the   evidence   including  

statements  from  witnesses  or  suspects  

carefully   in   their   objective   assessment  

of  the  scene  since  part  of  the  evidence,  

initially   thought   irrelevant,   may  

become   crucial   to   a   successful  

resolution  of  the  case.    

 

 

There  was   no   objective   assessment   of  

evidence   in   the   Amicale   case.  

Statements   had   not   been   recorded  

from  some  witnesses  who  were  on  the  

locus   or   who   were   working   inside  

Amicale.  

 

One   of   the   most   important   aspects   of  

securing  the  crime  scene  is  to  preserve  

the   scene  with  minimal   contamination  

and  disturbance  of  physical  evidence.    

 

 

This   principle   of   the   investigation   has  

been  blatantly  overlooked.  Members  of  

the   public   were   allowed   on   the   crime  

scene   after   the   police   arrived   on   the  

locus  and  the  payloader  of  the  SMF  was  

used   to   clear   the   streets   of   physical  

evidence.  

 

 

The   initial   response   to   an   incident  

ought  to  be  expeditious  and  methodical  

and   the   principle   is   that   the   initial  

responding   officer(s)   ought   to  

promptly,  yet  cautiously,  approach  and  

enter   crime   scenes,   remaining  

observant   of   any   persons,   vehicles,  

events  and  potential  evidence.  

 

 

There   was   no   prompt   intervention  

from   either   of   the   emergency  

authorities.  No   systematic   observation  

was   carried   out   by   the   initial  

responding  officers.    

47

 

The  initial  responding  officers  ought  to  

be   aware   of   any   persons   or   vehicles  

leaving   the   crime   scene   and   whilst  

approaching   the   crime   scene  

cautiously   should   scan   the   entire   area  

to   thoroughly   assess   the   scene.   The  

initial  responsing  officers  ought  to  also  

be   aware   of   any   persons   or   vicinity  

that  can  be  related  to  the  crime.    

 

 

The  present   enquiry  has   revealed   that  

no   record  was  made   of   persons   and   /  

or   vehicles   leaving   the   crime   scene.  

The   immediate   vicinity   of   the   game  

house  was  not  subjected  to  any  search  

and  residents  living  in  the  surrounding  

streets   were   not   questioned.   This  

would   have   undoubtedly   helped   the  

authorities.  

 

It   is  yet  another  fundamental  principle  

of   crime   scene   investigation   that   the  

investigators   should   remain   alert   and  

attentive  and  assume  that   the  crime   is  

still   ongoing   until   determined   to   be  

otherwise.    

 

 

In   the   present   case,   as   it   will   be  

illustrated   in   the   chapter   entitled   ‘The  

red   wire’,   there   is   a   strong   likelihood  

that   the   police   unknowingly   helped  

suspects   to   escape   from   the   scene   of  

crime   or   which   was   used   by   the  

getaway  gang.  

 

The   controlling,   identifying   and  

removing   of   persons   who   enter   the  

crime  scene  and  the  movement  of  such  

persons  is  an  important  function  of  the  

initial   responding   officer(s)   in  

protecting  the  crime  scene.    

 

The   crime   scene   was   not   only   the  

Amicale   building   itself   but   also   the  

street  along  corner  Emmanuel  Anquetil  

and  Royal  Street.  There  was  no  control  

whatsoever   of   the   crime   scene   since  

members  of  the  public  were  allowed  on  

the   scene.   Crucial   pieces   of   evidence  

such  as   the   ‘Iron  Rod’  appears   to  have  

been  tampered  with.  

 

 

It   is   the   duty   of   the   initial   responding  

officers  to  identify  all  individuals  at  the  

scene  such  as:  

 

 

There  has  not  even  been  an  attempt  to  

try   and   identify   suspects   or  witnesses  

at  the  scene  of  crime.  This  enquiry  has  

revealed   that   witnesses   voluntarily  

48

Suspect/s:   Secure   and   separate  

Witness/es:    Secure  and  separate  

 

came   forward   but   the   police   did   not  

even  take  down  basic  information  such  

as  a  contact  address  or  number.    

 

 

Further,   the   initial   responding  

officer(s)   have   a   duty   to   define   and  

control   boundaries   providing   a  means  

for   protecting   and   securing   the   crime  

scene  until  the  handover  is  made  to  the  

investigators.    

 

 

It   was   not   until   around   midnight,   at  

least   five   hours   after   the   crime   had  

been   committed,   that   control  

boundaries   were   set   up.   Before   that  

time   the   crime   scene   remained  

exposed.   It  was  not  only  contaminated  

as   a   result   but   also   pieces   of   evidence  

had  been  tampered  with.  

 

 

The   initial   responding  officer(s)   at   the  

crime   scene   must   produce   clear,  

concise,   documented   information  

encompassing   his   or   her   observation  

and   actions.   This   documentation   is  

vital   in   providing   information   to  

substantiate   investigative  

considerations.    

 

 

The   statements   put   in   by   the   initial  

responding   officers   are   brief,   vague  

and  incomplete.  As  a  result  of   this,   the  

investigators   were   deprived   of   vital  

information.   Some   statements   were  

put  in  weeks  after.  

 

It   is  of  paramount   importance  that  the  

investigator   in   charge   establishes   a  

path  of   entry   /   exit   to   the   scene   to  be  

utilised  by  authorised  personnel  and  to  

evaluate  the  initial  scene  boundaries.  

 

There   is   no   evidence   that   such   an  

exercise   was   carried   out,   resulting   in  

further   contamination   of   the   scene   of  

crime.    

 

Further,   a   secure   area   for   temporary  

storage   of   evidence   should   be  

established  in  accordance  with  rules  of  

evidence  and  chain  of  custody.  

 

Only   a   minimal   amount   of   evidence  

was  collected  on  the  scene  of  crime  on  

the  night  of  the  23rd  May  1999.  

49

 

Witnesses   to   the   incident   need   to   be  

identified   by   means   of   a   valid   ID   and  

separated.   The   surrounding   area  

should   be   canvassed   and   the   results  

documented.    

 

Key   witnesses   were   allowed   to   leave  

the   area   without   being   asked   to  

provide   any   means   of   ID   or   contact  

details.  Worse  some  were  even  allowed  

to   enter   into   the   Amicale   building  

without  any  proof  of  identity.  

 

The  scene  assessment  is  a  crucial  stage  

of   the   enquiry   since   it   allows   for   the  

development   of   a   plan   for   the  

coordinated   identification,   collection  

and   preservation   of   physical   evidence  

and   identification   of   witnesses.   It   also  

allows  for  the  exchange  of  information  

among  law  enforcement  personnel  and  

the   development   of   investigative  

strategies.    

 

No  such  scene  assessment  was  carried  

out.  It  was  left  to  the  officer  of  the  FSL  

to   pick   and   choose   which   piece/s   of  

evidence   he   thought   fit   of   bringing  

back   to   the   laboratory   for   scientific  

examination.  

 

At  this  stage,  written  and  photographic  

documentation   provides   a   permanent  

record.    

 

               

 

Apart  from  the  pictures  of  the  corpses,  

no   documentation   of   any   form   was  

made   at   this   stage   of   the   enquiry.  

Pictures  of  the  locus  especially  in  front  

of  the  entrances  of  Amicale  situated  on  

Royal   Street   and   on   Emmanuel  

Anquetil   Street   would   have   provided  

an   invaluable   insight   into   the   kind   of  

projectiles   which   had   been   thrown   at  

the  building.    

 

An  assessment  of  the  scene  determines  

what  kind  of  documentation  is  needed.  

(e.g.   photography,   video,   sketches,  

measurements,  notes)  

 

 

The   scene   of   crime   itself   was   not  

photographed   on   the   23rd   May   1999.  

Even   when   done   afterwards,  

photographs  had  been   taken  sparingly  

and  in  black  and  white!  (In  arson  cases,  

50

The   whole   scene   should   be  

photographed   using   overall,   medium  

and   close-­‐up   coverage.   Victims,  

suspects,  witnesses,  crowd  and  vehicle  

should  also  be  photographed.    

 

The  photographing  should  also  include  

additional   perspective   such   as   aerial  

photographs,   witness’   view   and   the  

area  under  body  once  body  is  removed.    

 

Videotape   should   be   used   as   a  

supplement  to  photos.    

 

colour   photographs   are   very   helpful)  

Photographs   of   key   areas   of   the  

building  (stairs,  office,  hole   in   the  wall  

etc.)   had   not   been   taken.   Photographs  

of  key  pieces  of  evidence  had  not  been  

taken:  safe,  shutters  on  Royal  Street.    

 

Photographs   had   not   been   taken   of  

witnesses’  view.    

 

Videotaping   which   required   the   most  

basic  equipment  but  which  would  have  

provided   a   permanent   record   of   the  

immediate  aftermath  of   the  arson  was  

not  carried  out.    

 

As   regards   collection   of   evidence,   the  

principle   is   that   the   collection   of  

evidence   should   be   prioritised   to  

prevent   loss,   destruction   or  

contamination  of  evidence.  

 

 

Evidence  that  could  be  collected  on  the  

night  of   the   tragedy   include:  Debris   in  

front   of   the   entrances   of   Amicale,  

Debris   (if   any)   on   the   balcony   of  

Amicale,   the   safe,   the   red   wire,   all  

broken  pieces  of  bottle.  In  fact  not  only  

had   these   not   been   collected   on   the  

night   itself,   but   these   vital   pieces   of  

evidence  had  never  been  collected.  

 

The  investigating  team  should  conduct  

a   careful   and   methodological  

evaluation   considering   all   physical  

evidence   possibilities   (e.g.   biological  

fluids,  latent  prints,  trace  evidence).  

 

These  were  not  even  looked  for.  Not  on  

the   night   of   the   23rd   May   1999,   not  

even  afterwards.  

 

A   progression   of   processing   /  

collection   methods   should   be   carried  

out   so   that   initial   techniques   do   not  

 

The   members   of   the   investigation  

team,   through   no   fault   of   their   own,  

were   not   aware   of   even   these   simple  

51

compromise   subsequent   processing  

collection  methods.    

 

and  logical  methods.  

 

As   soon   as   possible,   document   the  

body  and  the  surrounding  area  in  both  

detail   and   wide   area   context  

photographs.    

In  colour,  photograph:  

- The  body  before   it   is  disturbed,  

including   all   exposed   body  

surfaces.   Take   detail   shots   of  

any   patterns,   blast   effects   and  

injuries.    

- the   removal   of   the   body   (after  

tracing   the   outline   of   the   body  

on   the   floor   in   chalk,   tape,   or  

string)   and   any   changes   in   the  

body   during   that   process.   This  

process  ought  to  be  videotaped  

- The   location   where   the   body  

was   found   after   the   body   has  

been  removed.    

- After   the   body   has   been  

removed   to   a   separate   location  

for   examination,   photographs  

ought   to  be   taken  of  any  burns,  

injuries,  and  patterns.  Close-­‐ups  

ought   to   be   taken   with   a   scale  

indicator   (i.e.,   ruler)   in   the  

photograph.    

- Clothing,   separately   from   the  

body,  front  and  back,  inside  and  

 

Only  one,  black  and  white,  photograph  

had   been   taken   of   each   body.   The  

photograph  was  an  overall  view  of  the  

body  and  no  detailed  shots  were  taken  

of  the  injuries.    

 

 

The  photograph  is  of  such  poor  quality  

that   it   is   almost   impossible   to   even  

discern  the  body.  

 

The   actual   location   where   the   bodies  

were  found  had  not  even  been  marked  

at  all.  

 

No  photographs  had  been  taken  of   the  

location  where  the  body  was  found.  

 

No   photographs   were   taken   of   the  

clothing   of   the   deceased.   This   would  

have   immensely   helped   in   terms   of  

analysing  burn  patterns  etc.    

52

outside.    

 The   scene   may   contain   many   other  

important   items   and   conditions  

besides   the   body.   Physical   evidence  

such   as   burn   patterns,   trace   evidence,  

or  serological  evidence  may  be  present  

on   clothing,   furniture,   walls,   ceilings,  

floors   and   other   items.   These   items  

may  also  provide  clues  to  the  actions  of  

victims   and  others   before,   during,   and  

after   the   fire.   The   investigator   should  

examine  all  these  items,  including  their  

condition,   orientation,   and   function  

and   add   the   observations   to   his/her  

timeline  of  the  incident  and  analysis  of  

what  happened.  

 

 

The  approach   to   the   investigation  was  

most   simplistic.   Scientific   involvement  

was  minimal  and  the  investigation  was  

carried  out  based  on  the  hunches  of  the  

investigators   rather   than   sound  

investigation  techniques.    

 

Conduct   a   thorough   inspection   of   the  

structure   to   determine   if   there   were  

violations,  illegal  uses,  prior  violations,  

criminal   activities,   or   other  

circumstances   that   may   inform   the  

investigation.    

 

 

No   such   inspection   had   been   carried  

out.  Our  enquiry  has   revealed   that   the  

Amicale   building   was   under   CCTV  

monitoring   both   from   the   inside   and  

from   the   outside.   However   this   had  

never   been   brought   to   light   by   the  

police   enquiry.   Has   this   fact   escaped  

their   attention   or   was   it   deliberately  

hidden?  Either  way,  it  shows  that  there  

was  no  thorough  investigation.      

 

 

48. It  may  well  be  that  none  of  the  above  were  of  a  deliberate  nature  but  the  

unfortunate  consequence  was  that  innocent  lives  have  been  destroyed  by  

well-­‐meaning  but  naive  investigators.  

 

53

49. What   comes   next   however,   adds   insult   to   injury.   It   concerns   the   fire  

report,   the   backbone   of   any   arson   investigation,   which   was   drawn   up  

following   the   inspection   of   the   locus   by  Mr.     Beeharry,   Scientific  Officer  

posted  at  Forensic  Science  Laboratory  (FSL).  

 

50. A   typical   report4   should   usually   address,   under   different   headings,   the  

following:      

 

ix. The  circumstances  leading  to  the  fire  situation    

This  will   include   a   summary  of   how   the   fire  brigade  were  

alerted  to  the  fire  and  eye  witness  accounts  

 

x. The  fire  itself  

This   will   include   the   details   of   the   extent   of   the   fire   and  

what   was   burning   when   the   fire   fighters   arrived,   their  

actions   in   putting   out   the   fire,   including   anything   they  

moved,   destroyed,   opened/   closed  during   the   process   and  

relevant   extracts   from   statements   made   by   individual  

firefighters.  

 

 

 

xi. Details  of  the  premises  

This  will  usually  include  the  plans,  the  type  of  property,  its  

dimensions,   the   number   of   floors,   the   materials   of  

construction  and  typical  contents.  

 

xii. The  fire  investigation  

Outlining   the   membership   and   coordination   of   the   fire  

investigation  team.  

 

xiii. The  survey  of  the  exterior  of  the  property  

Outlining   the   process   which   is   always   carried   out   of  

surveying  the  outside  of  the  property  involved  to  establish  

if  there  were  any  indications  of  unusual  circumstances.   4 Annexe 2

54

 

xiv. Survey  of  the  interior  of  the  property  

This   will   detail   the   process   of   entering   the   property   and  

systematically   examining   each   room   to   assess   the   damage  

and   the  possible   cause,   establishing  areas  of  most  damage  

and   examining   such   areas   in   detail   and   taking   samples   as  

required.    

 

xv. Origin  of  fire  

This  will  outline  the  conclusions  reached  as  a  result  of   the  

surveys,  allowing  the  observations  to  be  assessed  to  give  an  

agreed   indication   of   where   the   fire   started   and   how   it  

spread.    

 

xvi. Examination  and  excavation  of  fire  scene  

Outlining   the   detailed   search   undertaken   in   the   area  

identified   as   the   most   probable   point   of   origin   and  

investigations   as   regards   to   the   ignition   sources,  

accelerants  and  burn  patterns.    

 

 

 

xvii. Fire  loading  in  area  of  origin  

Explaining  how  the  fire  would  be  expected  to  develop  if  the  

materials  typically  present  in  the  area  had  been  involved  in  

the   fire:   If   the   fire   damage   was   more   than   would   be  

typically  expected  it  would  be  indicative  of  the  introduction  

of  flammable  material  /  accelerant  etc.    

 

xviii. Possible  causes  of  ignition  

Having  regards  to  the  probable  area  of  origin  /  seat  of  fire.  

 

xix. Fire  development  and  spread  

Analysing   whether   the   damage   caused   throughout   the  

property  is  consistent  with  the  suspected  area  of  origin.  

 

55

xx. Cause  of  fire  

A  statement  of  the  most  credible  explanation  of  the  fire  and  

conclusions  

 

51. The   fire   report   in   the   Amicale   case   does   not   make   any   mention  

whatsoever   of:   The   circumstances   leading   to   the   fire   situation,   the   fire  

itself,   the   investigation,   the   survey   of   the   exterior   of   the   property,   the  

origin  of  the  fire,  the  examination  and  excavation  of  the  fire  scene,  the  fire  

loading   in   the   area   of   origin,   the   fire   development   and   spread   and   the  

cause  of   fire.  The  survey  of   the   interior  of   the  property  was  only  briefly  

dealt  with  no  plans  annexed  or  dimensions  given.  

 

52. Upon  request  to  provide  us  with  a  report  of  an  arson  case  where  several  

people  have  died  as  a  result,  Bericon,  a  firm  of  English  experts  in  forensic  

science  has  communicated  to  us  with  an  outline  of  an  investigation  into  a  

case  of  house  fire  arson.  

 

53. Therein,  it  was  stated  that  the  fire  report  in  a  case  where  six  people  had  

died  as  a  result  was  fifty  four  pages  long  including  plans  and  photographs.    

 

54. In   the   Amicale   case,   the   fire   report   drawn   up   by   Mr.   Beeharry   was  

contained  on   two  singles  pages  of  A4  paper.5   It  was  most  simplistic  and  

contained  no  plans  and  no  photographs.  

 

55. Before  coming  to  the  contents  of   the  fire  report   itself,   it   is   interesting  to  

note   that   in   England,   the   report   is   drawn   up   by   the   fire   service  

investigator  supported  by  the  forensic  scientists.  The  investigation  is   led  

by   the   fire   service   investigator   but   is   multi-­‐agency   involving   the   fire  

brigade  investigator,  the  fire  brigade  incident  commander  (i.e  in  charge  of  

the  fire  fighting  operation),  the  police,  the  scene  of  crime  officers  and  two  

independent  forensic  scientists.    

 

56. One  would  expect  that  in  Mauritius  as  well,  officers  from  the  fire  fighting  

service  are  called  to  participate  in  the  drawing  up  of  the  report  since,  after  

all,   they   fought   the   fire.  However,   shockingly,   in   the  Amicale   case,   not   a   5 Annexe 3

56

single  officer  from  the  fire  fighting  service  was  involved  in  the  writing  of  

the  report.    

 

57. Instead,   in   the  Amicale   case,   the  report6  was  a  one-­‐man   job.  There   is  no  

indication   as   to   who   collected   the   few   exhibits   or   under   whose  

instructions   they   were   collected   or   even   why   they   were   collected.   In  

Court,   Mr.   Beeharry   stated   that   he   merely   smelled   some   rubble   in   the  

building  and  decided  not   to   send   them   for   further  examination  since  he  

did  not  detect  the  smell  of  petrol!!  

 

58. In   the   report,   Mr.   Beeharry   gave   his   own   very   subjective   and   limited  

explanation   about   the   fire.   There   is   no   indication   as   to   the   relevant  

experience   or   qualifications   of   the   said   D   Beeharry   mentioned   in   the  

report.  

 

59. This  is  where  it  really  started  to  go  wrong  for  the  four  convicts:  A  proper  

investigation   at   that   stage   and   an   elaborate   report   drawn   up   by  

competent   and   experimented   team   would   have   subsequently  

demonstrated   that   the   prosecution   case   theory   as   presented   at   the  

Assizes  could  not  stand.  

 

60. Instead,   there   had   been   a   casual   investigation   which   was   itself   littered  

with   omissions   by   the   investigators   and   which   investigation   led   to   an  

appallingly  brief  and  intellectually  limited  fire  report.    

 

61. The   English   experts   have   also   been   commissioned   to   provide   us  with   a  

review  of   the   fire   science   evidence   concerning   the  Amicale   arson  which  

was  presented  at  the  Assizes.  

 

62. The  review,   in  its  entirety,   is  annexed  to  this  report  and  marked  Annexe  

4.7  

 

63. Numerous  shortcomings  have  been  highlighted  by  the  experts:  

 

7 Annexe 4

57

a. The  fact  that  there  was  no  indication  of  how  the  vehicles  (the  

three  cars,  including  one  in  front  of  the  Royal  Street  entrance  

of   Amicale   and   the   motorcycles)   were   ignited   or   whether  

they  were  burning  prior  to  the  fire  in  the  building.  

 

In  regards  to  the  forensic  site  examination  

 

b. No  indication  as  to  the  occupancy  or  use  of  the  ground  floor  

of  the  building  which  housed  the  casino.  

 

c. No  detailed  description  of  the  materials  of  construction,  their  

mass  or  volume  or  details  of  their  distribution  or  orientation  

throughout  the  building.  

 

d. No  indication  as  to  the  number  and  position  of  stairways,  or  

lifts,  between  the  two  floors,  whether  they  were  open  plan,  or  

if  there  were  fire  doors  between  them.  

 

e. No  supporting  evidence  within   the  report   to   indicate  why   it  

was  assumed  that  anything  was  thrown  at  the  windows.  

 

f. No  mention   in  the  report  of  attempts  to  detect  the  presence  

of   volatile   liquids   or   fire   accelerants   other   by   smelling  

specific  items.    

 

g. No   indication  of   the  evidence  used   to  conclude   the  presence  

of  multiple  seats  of  fire.  

 

h. Difficulty   in   understanding   how   the   conclusion   that   an  

accelerant  was  used  and  that  there  were  multiple  seats  of  fire  

was  reached.  

 

 

 

 

 

58

Examination  of  Exhibit  

 

i. Report  of  exhibit  is  limited  to  a  superficial  description  of  the  

item   and   the   fact   that   no   evidence   of   fire   accelerant   was  

detected  on  it.  

 

j. No  indication  as  to  what  technique  was  used  to  establish  that  

there  was  no  accelerant  present.  

 

k. No   indication  as   to  where   the  exhibit   came   from  within   the  

building,  how  it  was  taken,  stored  and  transported  and  why  

it  was  collected.  

 

l. Impossible   to   determine,   from   the   report,   whether   an  

accelerant  was  found  or  not  on  the  exhibit.  

 

m. No   indication   in   the   forensic   site   examination   of   systematic  

attempts  to  determine  the  presence  of  accelerants,  although  

the  conclusion  is  that  they  were  used.  

 

Examination   In   Chief   and   Cross   Examination   of   the   Report  

Author  

 

n. The   confusing   answer   given   by   Mr.   Beeharry   when  

questioned   about   the   reason   for   his   conclusion   that   there  

were  multiple  seats  of  fire.  

 

Other  shortcomings:  

 

o. The  report  of  the  site  examination  is  not  detailed  enough  to  

indicate   what   factors   were   considered   during   the  

investigations.  

 

p. Several  aspects  expected  to  be  considered  are  not  commented  

on.  

 

59

q. The   report   should   have   included   a   detailed   examination   of  

the  property  with  notes  on  the  layout  and  construction  of  the  

rooms  

 

r. Consideration  ought  to  have  been  given  as  to  the  precise  seat  

of   fire,   the   possible   ignition   sources,   the   properties   of   the  

materials  present  and  their  fire  behaviour.  

 

s. Procedures   ought   to   have   been   followed   to   determine   the  

possible  presence  of  accelerant.    

 

t. Although   there   is   indication   that   the   fire   in   the   Amicale  

building   was   not   uniform,   which   suggests   a   possible   area  

where  the  fire  could  have  started,  the  theory  is  not  developed  

further  in  the  report.  

 

u. No  indication  that  any  accelerant  was  used.  

 

v. No   indication   in   the   fire   report   that   the   distribution   of  

materials  inside  the  building  (such  as  false  ceilings,  panelled  

walls,   wooden   furniture   and   draperies)   was   established   or  

their  fire  properties  investigated.  

 

w. No   indication   as   to   how   the   conclusion   that   there   was  

multiple  seats  of  fire  is  reached.  

 

64. It   is   also   the   view   of   the   forensic   experts   that   there   appears   to   ‘no  

scientific   evidence   to   indicate   that   an   external   fire   source,   such   as   a  

Molotov  cocktail,  was  thrown  into  the  building  from  the  street’.  

 

65. The  review  concludes  by  stating  that   ‘there  appears  to  be  no  scientific  

evidence   adduced   from   the   report,   the   examination   of   evidence   or  

the   subsequent   court   exchanges,   to   indicate   conclusively   how   the  

fire  at  L’Amicale  started’.    

 

60

66. It   is   to  be  noted   that   the  review  also  makes  mention  of   the   fact   that   the  

fire   report   is   ‘very   short   both   in   length   and   detail’,   that   it   is   of   ‘limited  

value’   and   that   the   lack   of   exhibits   collected   from   the   scene   for  

subsequent  laboratory  examination  is  surprising  

 

67. Some  specific  questions  have  also  been  put  by  us  to  the  experts  as  regards  

to:  

 

a. The  likelihood  of  finding  evidence  of  Molotov  cocktail   in  

the  rubble  at  L’Amicale.    

 

It  is  stated  in  the  review  that  evidence  of  any  bottle  glass  on  

the  balcony  floor  would  have  been  detected  if  the  debris  was  

examined  in  detail.  

 

b. The  probative   value   of   using   only   a   smelling   technique  

(as  was  the  case  in  Amicale)  to  detect  petrol  vapour.  

 

The  answer  was  that   the  use  of   the  human  nose  as   the  only  

detection  method  should  not  be  relied  upon  and  offers  only  a  

cursory  and  not  very  sensitive  examination.  

 

c. What   ought   to   have   been   done   to   find   out   what   the  

building   looked   like  before   the   fire  and   the  significance  

of  this  

 

It  is  stated  that  all  information  concerning  the  building  prior  

to   the   fire   would   be   relevant   towards   understanding   the  

development  and  the  spread  of  the  fire.    

 

 

It   is  also  mentioned  that  the  building  owners,  occupiers  and  

maintainers  should  have  been  approached  to  provide  details  

of  the  materials  used,  construction  techniques,  the  position  of  

doors   and   lifts   etc.   and   the   distribution   of   furniture   within  

the   various   rooms.   Further,   furniture   and   fabric  

61

manufacturers   should   have   been   approached   to   obtain  

details   of   their   products’   fire   performance.   Similarly,   fire  

fighters   should   have   been   asked   if   they   noted   any   specific  

pattern   of   burning   whilst   they   attended   the   fire.   It   is  

mentioned   that   all   of   this   would   help   to   inform   the  

investigator  when  he  was  trying  to  reconstruct  (in  theory  or  

practically)  the  development  of  the  fire  and  would  also  have  

helped  determine  the  seat  of  the  fire.    

 

d. The  manner  in  which  the  report  is  incomplete  

 

- No   details   of   qualification,   experience   and   accreditation   of  

the  author  of  the  report.    

- No  details  as  to  the  information  which  he  has  relied  upon  in  

making  the  report.    

- No  detailing  of  the  substance  of  the  facts  given  to  the  author  

which  are  material  to  the  opinions  expressed.  

- No   mention   of   who   carried   out   any   examination,  

measurement,  test  or  experiment  on  behalf  of  the  author,  let  

alone  their  qualifications  and  experience.    

- No   statement   on   behalf   of   the   author   to   the   effect   that   he  

understands   his   duty   to   the   court   and   to   declare   that   the  

report  is  true  and  accurate  to  the  best  of  his  knowledge.  

- The  fact  that  the  report  is  brief  with  limited  detail  about  the  

building,   the   damage   done   by   the   fire   and   the   subsequent  

investigation.    

- Too   little   information   to   explain   or   justify   the   conclusions  

drawn  from  it.  

- No  details  as  to  how  the  conclusion  that  there  was  an  intense  

fire  was  reached.  

- No  indication  as  to  the  suspected  mode  of  fire  spread  (flame  

spread,  radiation,  component  failure)  

- No  mention   is  made  of   the   fire  properties  of   the   furnishings  

or  draperies  which  could  account  for  rapid  fire  spread.  

 

 

62

 

How  the  enquiry  unfolded?      

68. If   the   examination   of   the   scene   of   crime   and   the   scientific   part   of   the  

investigation   had   been   catastrophic,   the   way   in   which   the   enquiry  

unfolded  was  just  as  bad.  

 

69. Whether   it  was  as  a   result  of   the  huge  public  and  political  pressure,   the  

lack   of   adequate   training   and   equipment,   bad   faith   on   behalf   of   certain  

police  officers,  just  plain  incompetence  or  the  combined  effect  of  all  these  

elements,  tragic  consequences  ensued.  

 

70. Arrests  had  to  be  made  and  had  to  be  made  quickly  and  the  police  force  in  

general   had   to   be   seen   as   being   proactive   even   if   it   meant   arresting  

individuals  and  building  up  a  case  around  them.  

 

71. The   firsts  arrests  were  days  after   the  23rd  May  1999.   Initially  9  persons  

were  charged  with   the  offence  of  arson  on   the  building  of  Amicale,   they  

were  all  subsequently  released.  There  has  been  no  explanation  why  these  

people  were  arrested  in  the  first  place  and  why  they  had  been  released.  

 

72. Many   more   arrests   were   made.8   Some   of   these   people   arrested   made  

allegations  and  gave  names  to  the  police.  This  in  turn  led  to  their  release  

and  arrests  of  other  persons.  

 

73. Initially,   it   emerged   that   a   distinction   had   to   be   made   between  

hooliganism  of  the  Scouts  Club  supporters  and  the  act  of  terrorism  carried  

out  at  L’Amicale  de  Port  Louis.  

 

74. Nonetheless   nearly   all   persons   arrested   in   connection  with   the  Amicale  

arson  were  fans  of  Scouts  Club.  

 

75. Some   of   these   persons   who   were   called   by   the   police   made   the   first  

allegations  against  the  four  convicts.  

  8 Annexe 5

63

76. In   fact,   at   that   stage,   all   there   was   against   the   four   convicts   were  

allegations  made   by   people   who   had   themselves   been   arrested   or  

called  by  the  police.  No  witness  had  come  forward  voluntarily  by  his  

own  free  will  and  incriminated  any  of  the  four  convicts.  

 

77. As   the   enquiry   progressed,   the   police   case   theory   took   a   dramatic   turn.  

Contrary  to  what  was  stated  to  the  effect  that  a  distinction  had  to  be  made  

between  the  acts  of  hooliganism  and  the  act  of  terrorism,  the  police  was  

now  of  the  opinion  that  it  was  the  supporters  of  the  Scouts  Club  who  had  

set  fire  to  Amicale.  

 

78. A   tangent   has   to   be   made   here   to   focus   on   the   situation   of   one   of   the  

convicts:  Abdool  Naseeb  Keeramuth  also  known  as  Zulu.  

 

79. Zulu  who  was  arrested  on  29th  May  1999  was  admitted   to  hospital  on  a  

few  days  later.  (Hospital  file  number:  764014)  

 

80. The  latter  had  to  be  hospitalised  as  he  had  savagely  been  beaten  up  by  the  

police.  He  narrates  in  detail  in  his  affidavit9  the  terrifying  ordeal  he  had  to  

go  through:  

 

‘I   was   taken   from   Albercrombie   police   station   to   Baie   du  

Tombeau  police  station.  Over  there,  an  officer  told  me  that  I  

was   now  at   the   slaughter   house   and   that   I   could   shout   and  

cry  all  I  wanted  and  that  I  would  get  no  help.  He  told  me  that  

I   could   get   beaten   up   and   they   could   even   kill  me   and   that  

nobody  would  care.  Those  were  the  words  he  used:  

 

‘La   tone   vine   dans   l’abbatoire   la.   To   capave   crier,   plorer  

personne  pas  pou  gagne  to  compte.  

La  nou   capave  batte   toi,   touye   toi   tout  personne  pas  pou  

gagne  to  compte  meme’  

 

9 Annexe 6

64

I  was  in  fact  severely  beaten  up.  I  was  handcuffed  and  made  

to  sit  on  a  chair  and  received  slaps,  punches  and  kicks.  I  was  

also  beaten  up  with  a  thick  ruler  and  a  big  book.  

 

I   remember   in   particular   an   officer   named   Inspector   Callee  

who  pulled  my  hair  and  sideburns  really  hard.    

 

Afterwards,  chunks  of  my  hair  fell  out  when  I  ran  my  fingers  

through  my  hair.  I  was  also  vomiting  blood.’  

 

81. His  wife  who  visited  him  at  the  hospital  confirms  in  her  witness  statement  

given   to  us10   and  did   confirm   to   the  press   at   the   time   that  her  husband  

spoke  of  police  brutality  when  she  visited  him.  

 

82. She  explained  how  the  latter  was  vomiting  blood  on  his  hospital  bed.  

 

83. However,  after  being  hospitalised,  Zulu  who  was  very  young  at  the  time,  

was   told   by   a   senior   officer   in   charge   of   the   enquiry   that   if   he   did   not  

make  allegations  of  police  brutality,  he  would  be  bailed  out  soon.  

 

84. Zulu  naively  believed  that  officer.  

 

85. Another   innocent   convict   deserves   particular   attention   at   this   stage   is  

Muhammad  Shafique  Nawoor,  alias  Fico.    

 

86. An  alleged  witness,  who   in  Court   stated  how  he  was   forced   to   implicate  

Fico,  was  brought   to  Albercrombie  Police   station  by   the   enquiring   team  

for  a  confrontation  exercise.  However,  he  stated  upon  being  confronted  to  

Fico  that  he  never  saw  him  at  L’Amicale.  

 

87. That  witness  was   brought   back   to   Line   Barracks   then   brought   again   to  

Albercrombie   Police   station   and   confronted   one  more   time   to   Fico   and  

identified  him  on  that  occasion.    

 

10 Annexe 7

65

88. That   in   itself  was   a  most   serious   irregularity.  How  could  a  witness  who  

negatively  identified  an  accused  party  be  brought  back  minutes  later  and  

made   to   participate   in   another   identification   exercise   with   that   same  

party?  

 

89. Meanwhile,  the  police  enquiry  was  drawing  to  a  close.  Most  of  those  who  

had  made  allegations  against   the   four  accused  were  being  detained  and,  

interestingly,  were  all  released  once  they  had  implicated  the  four  convicts.  

 

Accused  No.  1  was  formally  charged  on  26th  July  1999  Accused  No.  2  was  formally  charged  on  26th  July  1999  Accused  No.  3  was  formally  charged  on  9th  August  1999  Accused  No.  4  was  formally  charged  on  27th  July  1999    

 

90. Two  months  after   the   incident,   the  enquiry  was   complete.  Nine  persons  

were  provisionally  charged  and  were  to  face  a  preliminary  enquiry.  

 

91. There  had  been  only  one  line  of  enquiry  and  it  was  about  Scouts  Club  

fans.  No  other  line  of  enquiry  had  been  explored.  What  if  those  who  

perpetrated   the   attack   used   the   fans   as   a   cover   to   commit   the  

despicable  act?  The  police  enquiry  did  at  no  point   in   time  envisage  

that  as  a  possibility.11  

 

92. During  the  enquiry,  no  independent  witnesses  had  come  forward  by  their  

own   free   will   to   implicate   any   of   the   four   convicts.   No   statements   had  

been   recorded   from   the   fire   people   and   the   immediate   neighbours   of  

Amicale  and  surroundings  had  not  been  contacted.  

 

93. Other  disturbing  facts  about  the  police  enquiry  include  the  fact  that:  

 

a.  The   alibis   of   the   Amicale   Four   (Mounou,   Bébé,   Zulu   and  

Fico)  have  remained  unverified  

 

 

11 See Chapter entitled ‘The bigger picture’

66

b. Despite   the   innocent   convicts   stating   that   they   had   no  

objection  that   the  police  collect   the  clothes   they  had  worn  

on   the   23rd  May   1999,   these   clothes  were   never   collected  

and  sent  to  the  FSL.  

 

c. No   statements   were   taken   from   officers   of   the   SSU   who  

came   on   the   spot   at   around   19:05hrs.   For   instance,  

Superintendent  Joganah  who  was  among  the  first  to  attend  

the   locus   was   not   requested   to   give   a   statement   to   that  

effect   nor   interviewed   as   to   what   he   saw   when   he   first  

attended  the  site.  

 

d. The   owner   and   staff   of   Shamping   Restaurant,   located   on  

Emmanuel   Anquetil   road   next   to   Amicale   and   which   was  

operational   as   from  17  00  hrs  were  not   requested   to  give  

statements  nor  even  interviewed  by  the  police.  

 

e. Neighbours  (i.e.  workers,  staff  of  Onu  restaurant)  were  also  

never   interviewed  nor  were  they  requested  to   furnish  any  

details   to   the   police   despite   the   fact   that   the   police   could  

have  potentially  collected  vital  pieces  of  information  with  a  

view   to   elucidate   the   time   of   the   incidents   and   ultimately  

arrest  the  real  perpetrators.    

 

f. Staff   of   Lai  Min   restaurant   located   on   Royal   Street  where  

more  than  15  persons  made  an  eruption  to  steal  money  and  

alcoholic  drinks  were  not  even  questioned  by  the  police  as  

to   whom   they   saw,   whom   they   could   recognize,   how   the  

perpetrators  were  dressed  or   the   time  of   the   incident  and  

the  duration  of  the  operation.  

 

g. A  crucial  piece  of  information  revealed  by  our  enquiry  is  to  

the   effect   that   Lai  Min   restaurant  was   fully   operational   as  

from  18  00  hrs  and  that  clients  of  Lai  Min  would  park  their  

cars  in  front  of  the  restaurant.    

 

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h. However,   the   police   officers   investigating   the   incident   did  

not   find   it   useful   to   question   these   clients  with   a   view   to  

obtain   vital   pieces   of   information   as   to   what   they   could  

have  seen.  

 

i. Note  there  that  the  red  car  parked  in  front  of  Lai  Min,  which  

Thupsee  believed  was  the  car  of  the  Sumodhee,  could  have  

been  the  car  of  a  client  attending  the  restaurant  at  the  time.  

It   had   never   been   confirmed   that   this   red   car   was  

effectively   the   car   in   which   the   Sumodhee   brothers   had  

travelled.  The  number  plate  of  that  red  car  had  never  been  

identified.  

 

j. No   taxi   drivers   whose   base   of   operation   were   at   Royal  

street   and   Joseph   Riviere   street   were   questioned   by   the  

police   as   to   their   whereabouts   on   the   day/time   of   the  

incident  and  as  to  what  they  had  seen  if  they  were  at  their  

base  of  operation.  

 

k. The   ‘marchand  boulette’  who  was  working   at   the  material  

time   and   people   residing   on   top   of   the   building   opposite  

L’Amicale   including   some  expats  were  not  questioned  nor  

interviewed.  Yet  our  inquiry  has  revealed  that  those  people  

had  a  clear  view  of  the  incident  as  they  were  seen  watching  

the  fire  from  their  balconies.  

 

l. The   police   did   not   deem   it   fit   to   inquire   from   the  

businesses,  and  other  neighbours  of  Amicale  as  to  whether  

they   phoned   the   police   to   report   any   incident   and   if   they  

did,  which  police  station   they  called.  The   timings  revealed  

by   these   calls   would   have   been   essential   to   give   to   the  

investigators   a   clear   picture   as   to   the   timings   of   the  

incidents.  

 

 

 

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m. CCTV  cameras  were  existent   in  1999  and  were  introduced  

for  instance,  by  the  State  Bank  in  the  early  1990’s  and  soon  

after,  other  banks  followed  suit.  The  crowd  which  left  from  

Chancery  House  to  L’Amicale  would  have  passed  in  front  of  

a  few  of  those  banks.  However  none  of  these  CCTV  cameras  

had  been  examined  by  the  police,  including  that  of  the  Bank  

of  Mauritius.  

 

n. Banks  providing  ATM  (Automated  Teller  Machine)  facilities  

were   all   equipped   with   CCTV   cameras   which   covered   a  

certain   perimeter   around   the   machine.   Our   investigation  

has   revealed   that   the   ATM   of   the   HSBC   branch   located  

metres   from   L’Amicale   was   damaged   during   the   incident.  

An  interesting  point  to  note  is  that  once  damaged,  the  ATM  

would   generate   an   information   sheet   (known   as   journal)  

with   the   time   it   ceased   operation.   This   sheet   could   have  

helped  in  establishing  the  time  of  the  incident.  This  was  not  

investigated  by  the  police.  .  

 

o. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  the  car  of  witness  Li  Tung12  

was  not  set  on  fire  in  the  way  that  the  said  witness  stated  at  

the   assizes.   Our   enquiry   has   revealed   that   there   was   a  

Liverpool  FC  towel  on  the  backseat  of  the  car  of  witness  Li  

Tung  and  that  the  radio  cassette  of  the  car  was  abstracted  

by  some  looters  who  then  put  it  in  the  towel  and  carried  it  

away.  It   is  only  after  that   incident  that  some  motorcyclists  

with   pillion   riders   wearing   green   scarves   on   their   faces  

stopped  by  the  car  and  set  it  on  fire.  The  burnt  car  was  not  

properly   examined   since   a   thorough   examination   would  

have   revealed   the   absence   of   the   audio   cassette   which  

would   have   helped   the   investigators   understand   what  

really  happened  to  the  car  of  that  witness.  

 

12 See Chapter entitled ‘Witness Li Tung’

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To   note:   Who   could   have   known   about   the   Liverpool   FC  

towel   incident   unless   they   had   really   witnessed   or  

participated  in  the  larceny?  

 

94. One   last   issue   which   needs   to   be   addressed   in   regards   to   the   police  

enquiry  was   the  absence  of   investigation   in   relation   to   the  observations  

made  by  Chief  Inspector  Fullee:  

 

a. CI   Fullee  was   the  most   senior   police   officer  who  was  working   in  

the   vicinity   of   L’Amicale   on   the   23rd   May   1999.   He   was   the  

responsible   officer   as   regards   to   the   operation   of   Trou   Fanfaron  

Police  Station.  

 

b. Senior   officers   at   Plaine   Verte   Police   Station   liaised   with   him   to  

make  the  necessary  road  traffic  diversions  on  that  day.  

 

c. He  was   quite   reactive   when   he   saw   the   first   signs   of   fire.   At   an  

early   stage,   CI   Fullee   became   aware   that   an   SMF   van   has   been  

overturned  at  Belle  Vue  round  about.    

 

d. It   was   under   his   instructions   that   Police   Officer   Padaruth   was  

placed   on   a   fixed   point   at   the   corner   of   Royal   and   Emanuel  

Anquetil  Street  just  in  front  of  L’Amicale.  When  the  van  in  which  he  

was   travelling   dropped   officer   Padaruth   at   the   fixed   point,   he  

noticed   that   there  was   a   group   of  motorcycles   roaming   the   area  

with  the  apparent   intention  to  create  disorder.  That  was  at  about  

18  00  –  18  05.  

 

e. One   of   his   officers   also   noticed   a   rather   strange   fact:   A   person  

dressed  in  burqa  who  was  standing  right  in  front  of  L’Amicale.13  

 

f. CI   Fullee   was   patrolling   in   a   police   van   to   supervise   the   area.  

Through  the  police  radio  and  mobile  phone,  he  was  appraised  of:  

13 Our enquiry has revealed that it was customary for Bahim Coco to wear a burqa on some of his missions. Was it therefore just a strange coincidence that a person wearing a burqa was in front of a gamehouse at that particular time.

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- A  crowd  gathering  at  Khadafi  square  - The  presence  of  a  mob  in  front  of  Vallee  Pitot  Police  

Station  - An  attempt  to  set  fire  at  a  Petrol  Station  in  Plaine  verte  - The  attack  on  a  bus  going  to  the  North  along  Military  road  - The  arson  of  Bus  at  Royal  Street  - The  assault  of  Police  Officer  Padaruth  - The  crowd  of  alleged  Scouts  Club  fans  present  at  la  gare  

du  nord.    

g. Sensing  that  the  situation  could  take  a  turn  for  the  worse,  he  tried  

to   contact   the   Information   Room   to   ask   for   assistance   but   to   no  

avail.  He  went  back  to  Trou  Fanfaron  Police  Station  to  arm  himself.  

 

95. If the observations of CI Fullee had been given the consideration it deserved, it

would have become clear for the investigators that there was a bigger plot

going on.  

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Chapter 8: Preliminary Enquiry  

96. At  the  preliminary  enquiry,  nine  persons  answered  charges  of  murder.  

 

97.  They  were:  

 

Accused  No.1  Sheik  Imran  Sumodhee,  alias  Mounou       Age  at  the  time           38     Profession  at  the  time         Self  employed     Address  at  the  time                           18,  Crimea  Street               Vallee  Pitot  

 Accused  No.2  Khaleeloudeen  Sumodhee,  alias  Bébé       Age  at  the  time               37     Profession  at  the  time           Owner  of  bakery     Address  at  the  time           18,  Crimea  Street    

    Vallee  Pitot    

Accused  No  3  Abdool  Naseeb  Keeramuth,  alias  Zulu       Age  at  the  time                   20     Profession  at  the  time             Dholl  puri  seller    Address  at  the  time                                               36,  Impasse  Lenepveu  

Vallee  Pitot    

Accused  No  4  Muhammad  Shafiq  Nawoor,  alias  Fico       Age  at  the  time               19            Profession  at  the  time             Unemployed              Address  at  the  time                               Mamadekhan        lane                 Pamplemousses  

 Accused  No  5  Salim  Gounjaria,  alias  Salim  Gaetan       Age  at  the  time               29     Profession  at  the  time           Hawker     Address  at  the  time                 17  Corps  de  Garde  Street               Plaine  Verte      Accused  No  6  Nazeem  Lauloo       Age  at  the  time               34     Profession  at  the  time         Cake  seller     Address  at  the  time       18  Louis  Xavier  Street               Port  Louis  

     

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Accused  No  7  Abdullah  Ismaelkhan  Neeyamuthkhan       Age  at  the  time           35     Profession  at  the  time         Hawker     Address  at  the  time       4  Boulevard  Hugon               Vallee  Pitot    Accused  No  8  Mohammad  Rumjaun,  alias  Mamade       Age  at  the  time         42     Profession         Lorry  Driver     Address  at  the  time       20  Crimea  Street               Vallee  Pitot  

 Accused  No  9  Asraf  Ally  Boodhoo,  alias  Asraf       Age  at  the  time       38     Profession         Hawker     Address  at  the  time       No.  4  Hungarian  Street               Vallee  Pitot  

 

 

98. There   were   74   witnesses   who   were   on   the   list   of   witnesses   for   the  

prosecution.   59   witnesses   deponed   in   the   preliminary   enquiry   which  

spanned  over  a  period  of  nearly  nine  months.  (between  25th  October  1999  

up  to  14th  July  2000)  

 

99. Out   of   the   59   witnesses   who   deponed,   8   witnesses   deserve   a  

particular  attention  since   they  were   the  only  witnesses  who  had   in  

their   statements   given   to   the   police,   incriminated   the   accused  

parties.  

 

100.  Those  eight  witnesses  were:     Mr.  M.  A.  Thupsee  

Mr.  M.  I.  Oozeer  Mr.  H.  M.  Janee  Mr.  A.  Z.  Soyfoo  Mr.  M.  R.  Thupsee  Mr.  M.  R.  Jannoo  

                        Mr.  M.B.  Emambacus  Mrs.  M.  Latour  

         

 

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101. The  following  are  the  extracts  of  their  depositions  in  Court,  reproduced            

verbatim:  

 

Deposition  of  Mohammad  Iqbal  Oozeer,  alias  Mio:      ‘When   the   police   arrested  me   on   10.6.99   they   told  me   they  had   to   check  my  motor   cycle,   to   get   the   horsepower   at  my  place.      In   fact   they   did   not   take  me   to  my   place.   They   took  me   to  Abercrombie  Police  Station  in  a  room  at  the  back.  There  the  police  told  me  if  I  had  set  fire  to  Amicale.      When  I  told  them  no,  they  got  angry  and  started  to  shout  at  me,  they  told  me  that  now  where  you  are  you  have  come  on  board  the  vessel  Titanic  they  told  me  that  it  is  a  sank  ship.      They  told  me  if  you  want  to  come  out  when  the  ship  is  sank  I  must   “coule   les   autres   pour   to   sorti”.   Either   this   of   you  have  to  sink  in  their  place  (…)      The  police   even   told  me   that   there   is  no  one   to   get  me  out.  They  will   decide  who  will   be   released  on  bail   and  who  will  not.  (…)  They  asked  me  what  I  own,  a  house,  they  will  make  me  sell  my  Cite  house  (…)      In  the  meantime  they  had  beaten  me  up  and  they  told  me  to   see  who  will   rescue  me.   I   told   them   I   have  my  mother  who  is  an  old  person.  They  asked  me  to  co-­‐operate  with  them  and  they  will  “range  l’enquete  la.”(…)      They  asked  me  my  age,  I  told  them  I  am  28  years  old.  One  of  the  police  officers  told  me  that  he  is  55  years  old  and  he  is  not  sure  to  be  100  years  old  to  see  me  being  released  from  prison  after  45  years.      When   I   asked   them   to   have   a   counsel   the   police   asked  me  who  I  was.’  (sic)  (Emphasis  added)  

 ‘The   statetement   as   it   is,   the   police   had   already   signed  and   then   they   asked   me   to   sign.   One   police   officer   was  writing   and   then   he   signed   the   statement   and   then   he   told  another  police  officer  “faire  li  signe  sa”    I  had  no  choice  than  to  sign  as  I  was  being  beaten  up  and  I  was  traumatised.  The  statement  is  not  mine  but  that  of  the  police.’    ‘I   did   not   give   the   statement   voluntarily   but   it   was  through   “chantage   la   police”.   Because   the   police   said  they  will  lock  me  up’    

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‘And  you  saw  Salim  Gaetan,  Mounou,  Bebe,  Fico  et  Zoulou  throw  cocktail  Molotov?  A:   No  it  is  the  police  which  asked  me  to  say  so.’    (…)    ‘Q:   On   16.6.99   the   police   took   you   to   Beau   Bassin  

Prisons?  A:   Yes    Q:   For  what  reasons?  A:   They  told  me  that  I  was  going  to  go  to  Prisons.  They  

took  me  from  Terre  Rouge  Police  Station,  they  took  me  to  Abercombie  Police  Station  and  at  Albercombie  they  told  me  that  they  are  taking  me  to  the  prisons.  In  the  yard  of  the  Beau  Bassin  Prisons  when  we  stop  there  were   another   car   in  which  were   other   police  officers   they   told   me   “guette”   to   reste   la   meme’.  They  told  me  they  are  going  to  make  me  see  two  Sumodhee  Brothers;  I  only  have  to  nod.’  

     (…)    Q:   Have  you  ever  complained  concerning   the  pressure  

put   by   the   police   on   you   and   the   beating   you   have  received?  

A:   I   have   not  made   any   complaint   but   I   waited   to   be  given   the   opportunity   of   explaining   myself   under  oath.  

   

Q:     Is   the   fact   that   you   were   very   scared   the   main  reason  why  you  signed  the  statement?  

A:   Pas   juste   sa.   Si   la   police   pas   ti   faire   chantage  caution   are   moi,   si   zotte   pas   ti   batte   moi   et   si  zotte  pas   ti  dire  qui  zotte  pou  attaché  case  avec  moi  mo  pas  ti  pour  signer.  

(...)    

Q:     The   other   reason   is   that   you   were   beaten   up.   Did  you  see  the  doctor?  

A:   Yes.  I  do  not  know  the  date.  If  you  say  it  is  15.6.99  it  may  be  so.  I  do  not  know  the  doctor.  The  doctor  ask  me  if  I  am  well.  I  did  not  answer  him.  The  doctor  was  in  a  hurry  to  go.   I  did  not   talk   to   the  doctor  and  he  did   not   examine  me.   Concerning   the   beating   up   on  10.6.99  in  the  evening  at  Terre  Rouge  Station  in  the  diary  book  when  I  (??)  been  locked  up  I  had  footache  and   I   was   feeling   pain   at  my   leg,   I   was   screaming,  asking   the   police   to   open,   they   took   time   to   come.  When   they  were  opening   the  door   I   told   the  police  officer  I  had  pain  at  my  foot  and  I  wanted  to  be  taken  to  the  hospital.  

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  The  police  officer  took  me  to  his  Superior.  The  latter  asked   me   where   I   had   pain   I   removed   my   jean  trousers   and   showed  him.  The  police   chief   told  me  that   he   would   not   take   me   to   hospital.   On   the  contrary   he   told  me   “qui   to   croire   la   case  mama  ici”.  The  police  did  not  write  what  I  said  that  I  was  beaten  up  by  the  police  and  I  got  injured  but  it  was  written   “Mone  sape  depi   lili  dans  cellule  et  mo   fine  gagne  du  mal”.  It  was  written  in  English  “falling  from  bed,  bruises  at  Left  knee”.  It  was  written  on  10.6.99.  It  is  written  in  the  diary  book.  I  did  not  fall  from  bed.  (…)’  

   

Deposition  of  Hussain  Mohamade  Janee    

‘Q:   Did  you  give  the  statement  to  the  police?    A:   This   is  my  statement  with  my  signature  but   the  

words  are  not  mine.    ‘The  police   told  me  “sa  ki  zotte  pour  dire   to  dire  pareille  coumme  sa  et  si  to  pas  dire  coumme  sa  nous  pour  metre  sa   case   la   lors   to   la   tete  et   si   jamais   to  devire   l’enquete  pas  croire  qui  to  pour  saper  are  nous.  Et  aussi  zotte   ine  dire  moi   to  content   travaille  Securicor,   to  content  veille  l’hotel,  to  pour  alle  veille  Prison  la  haut.’’    ‘Q  :     When  you  said  «  «la  police   fine  dire  ou  dire  bannes  

zaffaires  sinon  zotte  pour  mettre  sa  case  la  lors  ou  la  tete  ,  what  do  you  mean  ?  

A  :   La   police   fine   dire   moi   si   to   pas   accuse   sa   bannes  dimloune  qui  la  police  fine  montrer  moi  c’est  a  dire  Fico  et  Zoulou’  

 ‘The  statement  which  I  gave  to  the  police,   the  police  did  not  write  it  down.  I  listened  to  what  they  told  me  to  say.  Either  I  listened  to  what  they  are  saying  or  they  will  lock  me  up.’    ‘The   CID   did   not   write   my   statement.   They   told   me   “to   pe  cause  menti  to  banne  camarade  zotte  tous  pe  cause  vrai.  Zote  tous  pou  sorti,  toi  to  pour  fermer  parcequi  to  pe  cause  menti  et  zotte  dire  moi  deux  noms  si  pas  mo  conne  zotte  parmi  sa  nom  la  in  dire  moi  Fico  eck  Zoulou.’    ‘I   implicated   someone   by   pressure   from   the   police   and  among  the  ones  I  implicated  was  Fico  and  Zoulou’    ‘Ti  dire  moi  coumme  sa  si  mo  pas  ecoute  zotte  pas  blier  qui  mo  pas  pour  saper  ar  zotte’  

       

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Deposition  of  Abdool  Ziyaad  Soyfoo    

‘I  know  the  police  ask  me  a  question  concerning  a  boy  who  had   come   with   me   and   had   asked   me   for   money   to   buy  petrol.   But   I   did   not   see.   I   told   them   yes   because   there  was   too  much   pressure   on  me   and   being   given   that   I  never   entered   a   CID   office   I   could   not   bear   the  pressure.   The   police   told   me   “pas   amene   role   malin  sinon  nous  faire  ferme  toi”  

 Yes   I   said   so   to   the   police   because   «d’apres   qui   zotte   fine  pose  moi  sa  question  la  zotte  ti  demande  moi  si  aine  garcon  nommer  Fico  ti  demande  toi  casse  pou  acheter  l’essence  mo  finne  dire  zotte  non  et  zotte  ti  dire  moi  to  aine  menteur  et  zotte   pe   fatigue   mo   latete   et   zotte   pe   dire   moi   qui   mo  conne  li  et  zotte  ti  dire  moi  qui  tant  qui  to  amene  role  malin  nous  pas  pour  largue  toi  et  seule  solutionj  qui  ti  aina  mo   fine   reponde   zotte   oui   pour   qui   zotte   capave  laisse   moi   aller   et   arrete   fatigue   mo   la   tete.   Et   mo   pa  absent  l’ecole  parcequi  mo  aina  pour  compose  Form  V.  

   

Deposition  of  Mohamed  Bilall  Emambacus    

‘Q.    When  you  told  the  police  all  these  things  at  Baie  du  Tombeau  what  happened  then.  The  police  asked  me  if  I  noticed  anything?  

A.   I  told  them  no  because  mo  pas  ti  alle  guette  dimoune  dans  zotte  figure  moi.  Then  they  started  to  revolt.  By  they   I  mean   the  CID  Officer.  There  was  about  10  of  them  at  the  back  of  the  station  in  a  room.  They  were  not  in  uniform  

 Q.   What  do  you  mean  by  ‘revolter’?  A.   They  told  me  I  am  lying  and  I  replied  that   I  am  not  

lying.   They   told   me   “pas   tode   vine   faire   malin   ici  nous   meme   nous   ene   grand   malin.”   There   was   a  table  in  the  room.  I  do  not  know  of  what  they  were  talking  among  themselves,  one  of  them  went  out  and  after  2  minutes  he   returned  and  brought  a  pair  of   handcuffs   and  a  piece  of  wood   and   a   (??)  One  CID   Officer   told   me   “to   bisin   coze   tout   la   verite”  Seulement   to   pas   pour   alle   la   cage.”   He   continues  “mo   connais   to   ene   bon   garcon   to   ene   sel   garcon  pour   to   papa   to   ena   responsibilite,   to   enan   ene   la  boutique   pour   controller   to   envie   alle   la   cage   ou  soit  to  envie  rester.”  

 Then  they  started  to  encircle  me  i.e  the  10  CID  Officers,  then  one  of  them  “risse  mo  carabis  cote  droite”  He  told  me  “toi  to  pas  pou  comprend  toi”.  He  made  me  remove  my  shirt.   I  did  not  want  to  remove  my  shirt.  They  got  hold  of  me  and  they  removed  my  shirt.  In  fact  I  had  a  T  Shirt  on  me.  

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I   remained   bare   chest.  They   started   to   beat  me  with   the  piece  of  wood  at  my  back.  I  received  several  blows.  They  were  hard  blows.  Then  they  beat  me  on   the   “plat   lipied”.  After  removing  my  T  shirt  I  was  made  to  rest  on  the  table  by  my   belly.   It   is   then   that   they   beat  me   at  my   back   and   “plat  lipied”  (footpalm).  The  one  who  pull  my  side  burns  again.  On  several  occasions   they   told  me   “to  pou  dire   to  pas  pour  dire”  I  told  them  I  do  not  know  anything.  Then  after  some  15  minutes  they  lifted  me  and  made  me  sit  on  a  chair.  They  handcuffed    me  with  my  hands  at  the  back  because  when  they  were   pulling  my   side   burns.   I   had   pains   and   I   tried   to  prevent   them   with   my   hands   that   is   why   they   placed   my  hands  at  the  back.  I  was  still  at  Baie  Du  Tomeabu.  It  was  then  12.00  or  13.00.  They  continued  asking  me  what  I  had  seen.  I  told  them  I  did  not  remark  anything.  Then  they  gave  me  three  names   of   people.   The   names   were   Moonoo,   Zoulou   and  Fico.   They   asked   me   whether   I   saw   the   3   persons   at   the  Stadium  I  told  them  no.    Then  they  asked  me  if  I  saw  them  at  Plaine  Verte.  Then  I  told  them  no.  I  told  them  it  is  the  first  time  I  am  hearing  those  names  and  I  don’t  know  them.    They  placed  Reza  Thupsee  in  front  of  me.  Then  Reza  Thupsee  told  me   “Nous   pas   ti   alle   Amicale”   in   front   of   all   the   police  officers.   I   told  him  yes.  He   told  me   “to  pas  conne  Moonoo   li  travaille  dans  Boulanger  li  enan  ene  van  blanc”  I  told  him  no    Q:   Then?  A:   He  told  me  “to  pas  conne  Fico  qui  virer  la  rue  Paul  et  

Virginie.  I  told  him  no.  The  he  told  me  “to  pas  conne  Zoulou  ki  vende  Dholl  pourri”  I  told  him  no.  

 Then   the   CID   Officers   asked   me   a   question.   They   told   me  “Missie  Emambaccus  la  cote  ou  ete  la  ou  au  milieu  su  ou  porte   cote   droite   ou   pou   alle   la   cage   si   ou   vire   cote  gauche  ena  25  banane  prison  ladans”    Q  :   On  which  side  did  you  decide  to  ‘vire’?  A:   Tellement   ti   ena  pression   lors  moi  avec   la  peur  

monne  dire  zotte  oui  mo  conne  zottes    Q.   Who  are  ‘zotte’?  A:   Moonoo,  Zoulou  et  Fico”  

   

Deposition  of  Mohammad  Riaz  Jannoo    

‘Q.   When  you  gave  the  statement  you  spoke  the  truth?  A.   The  police  told  me  to  say  it  is  the  very  car  which  I  

saw.    

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Q.   “Sa   meme   l’auto   qui   tous   dimoune   qui   ti   dans  Khadafi  Square  fine  suivre  li  partout  et  sa  lheure  la  ti  capave  cers  six  heures  tanto.”  Did  you  say  this  to  the  police  

A.   I  said  so  under  pressure.    

Q.   And   you   add   “Mo   sure   et   certain   mo   pas   pe   faire  aukene  erreur  lors  sa  l’auto  la”  Did  you  say  so  ?  

A.   Yes  under  pressure    They   asked   me   if   I   will   retain   a   Counsel   before   giving   a  statement.  I  was  thinking  about  it  when  they  told  me  “ene  ti  z’affaire  sa”’  

 

102. The   above   extracts,   reproduced   as   they   appear   in   the   court  

proceedings   make   for   a   very   distressful,   disturbing   and   alarming  

reading.  

 

103. Seven  of  the  key  witnesses  for  the  prosecution,  out  of  eight,  who  had  

previously  levelled  accusations  against  the  accused  parties  narrated  

in  detail  how  they  had  been  forced,  tortured  and  even  in  some  cases  

brutalised   by   the   police   in   giving   their   statements   implicating   the  

accused  parties.  

 

104. All  seven  of  these  witnesses  explained  how  the  statements  were  not    

theirs  but  rather  statements  which  they  were  given  no  choice  but  to  

sign.    

 

105. It  was  not  the  aim  of  the  enquiry  and  it  is  not  the  aim  of  the  report  to  

address  in  full  the  issue  of  police  brutality.  

 

106. However,  the  correlation  between  police  brutality  and  miscarriages  

of  justice  cannot  be  underestimated.    

 

107. It  needs  to  be  borne  in  mind  though  that  the  above  were  extracts  of  

depositions   of  witnesses   for   the   prosecution   who   had   no   motive  

whatsoever   to   lie   in   court.   Yet   they   all   explained   how   they   were  

forced  to  sign  statements  doctored  by  the  police.  

 

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108. With   the   exception   of   Azad   Thupsee,   none   of   these   witnesses  

deponed  at  the  Assizes.  

 

109. There   was   no   subsequent   enquiry   into   the   allegations   of   police  

brutality  and  misconduct.  

 

110. The   mere   fact   that   seven   witnesses   for   the   prosecution   made  

allegations  that  they  have  been  forced  and  blackmailed  by  the  police  

in   inculpating   the   accused   did   much   more   than   just   arousing  

suspicion  of  police  misconduct.  

 

111. It   tainted   the   whole   investigation   and   no   fair   trial   could   possibly  

have  ensued  following  the  deposition  of  those  witnesses.  

 

112. Nonetheless,  based  solely  on  the  extremely  flimsy  accusation  of  Reza  

Thupsee,  the  Amicale  Four  were  committed  to  stand  trial  the  assizes.  

 

Note:  Was  there  a  nexus  between  the  Amicale  Four?  

 SUMODHEE  BROTHERS    The  Sumodhee  brothers  were  well  known  Scouts  supporters.      The   father   of   the   two   Sumodhee  brothers  was   a  well   known   fan   of  the  Scouts  Club  since  the  days  of  Muslim  Scouts.  It   is  well  known  by  those   who   were   involved   in   the   Club   that   at   the   time   when   his  business  was   flourishing,  he  helped   the  Muslim  Scouts  whenever  he  was  asked  to  make  financial    contributions.    On  the  day  of  the  Scouts  v/s  Fire  match,  the  father  was  in  the  official  lodge   of   the   MFA.   The   two   brothers   were   in   the   ‘premiere’   of   the  Anjalay  stadium.      None  of  them  knew  or  had  known  Fico  or  Zulu  before  their  arrest.    FICO    Fico,  young  supporter  of  Scouts  Club  was  18  at  the  time.  He  did  not  know   and   had   never   been   in   contact   with   the   Sumodhee   brothers  prior  to  his  arrest.      Fico  did  not  share  any  common  friends  with  the  Sumodhee.  Fico  used  to   live   far   away   from   the   Sumodhee   brothers.   The   Sumodhee  brothers  and  Fico  are  from  two  different  backgrounds.        

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KEERAMUTH    Keeramuth,  supporter  of  Scouts  Club  did  not   form  part  of   the  circle  of  the  Sumodhee  nor  was  he  a  distant  friend  of  them.      Keeramuth  was  a  sort  of  a  ‘loner’,  who  attended  matches  on  his  own  and  used  to  meet  people  on  his  way  to  the  stadium  without  any  pre  coordination.    

   

113. There  was  only  the  evidence  of  Reza  Thupsee  to   implicate  convicts  

1-­‐4.    Reza  Thupsee  was  NOT  called  at  the  Assizes.  

 

114. The  Court  could  not  and  should  not  have  relied  on   the  evidence  of  

Reza  Thupsee  to  commit  the  Amicale  Four  to  the  assizes  since:    

 

a. Reza  Thupsee  was  a  mental  patient.  

b. After  implicating  the  Amicale  Four  in  his  statement,  he  narrated  in  

detail  how  he  was  forced  to  implicate  those  four  innocent.  

c. He   was   treated   as   a   hostile   witness   and   then   given   a   perjury  

warning  and  informed  about  the  prison  sentence  that  could  ensue  

if  he  failed  to  depone  as  per  his  statement.  

d. Even   then   he   maintained   that   he   was   forced   to   implicate   the  

Amicale  Four.  

e. He  was  subsequently  arrested  and  detained  for  perjury.  

f. It   is   only   after   his   release   on   bail   that   he   came   again   at   the  

Preliminary  Enquiry  and  implicated  the  Amicale  Four.  

 

115. How  could   the   lives   of   the  Amicale   Four   rest   in   the  palms  of   such   a  

person?  

 

116. Another   issue   arising   out   of   the   Preliminary   Enquiry   and   which  

deserves   particular   attention   is   the   fact   that   a   number   of   witnesses  

including   those   who   worked   at   L’Amicale   were   never   called.   In  

particular,   there  was   a  worker   of   the   game   house   named  Mr.   Latour  

who  was  working  at   the  material   time  and  whose  name  appeared  on  

the  list  of  witnesses  for  the  prosecution.  Mr.  Latour  was  never  called  to  

depone  before  the  Preliminary  Enquiry  or  at  the  Assizes.    

 

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117. Mr.  Latour   is  adamant   that   (i)   the   shutters  of  L’Amicale  were  opened  

from  the  inside  (ii)  there  were  only  two  or  three  police  officers  present  

inside  L’Amicale  and  (iii)  The  police   took  a   long  time  to  arrive  on  the  

locus  after  they  were  made  aware  of  the  incidents.  

 

118. Another  worker  who  was  at  the  locus  at  the  material  time  but  who  was  

not   called   at   the  Preliminary  Enquiry   is   one  Mr.  Hugo,   a   bouncer.  He

was posted at the entrance giving on Emmanuel Anquetil Street. Our

enquiry has revealed how Hugo gave a statement to the police which was in

contradiction with what PC Seeneevassen had stated in his statement. Only

Mr. Seeneevassen was called at the PE and the Assizes. The evidence of

Mr. Hugo would have revealed whether he saw any Molotov cocktail or

other incendiary devices used against L’Amicale. There is also no

indication as to why he did not take part in any reconstruction exercise

especially in view of the fact that he was the person to have shut the

accordeon doors of the entrance on Emmanuel Anquetil Street. Finally, is it

correct that Hugo put the time of the incident at least 30 minutes earlier

than the time stated by PC Seeneevassen?  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Chapter 9: Assizes  

119. After   a   record   time   of   only   four   months   from   the   end   of   the  

preliminary  enquiry,  the  assizes  case  started.    

 

120. At  the  Assizes,   the  case  that   the  prosecution  set  out   to  prove  was  

that14:  

 - At   about   6   and   6.10   p.m.,   an   angry   crowd   had   gathered   at  

Khadafi   Square.   They   were   mad   at   the   referee   and   at   the  

outcome  of  the  match  at  Anjalay  Stadium.    

 

- It   was   at   about   that   time   that   Mounou   arrived   at   Khadafi  

Square  in  a  red  car  which  he  was  driving.  

 

- Bébé  was   seated   in   the  passenger   seat  next   to  Mounou  and  

there  were  two  other  passengers  seated  in  the  rear  of  the  car.  

 

- As  soon  as  Mounou  stopped  his  car,  he  addressed  the  crowd  

and   urged   them,   ‘anou   alle   craze   MFA’.   MFA   meaning   the  

Mauritius  Football  Association  which  office  is  situated  in  the  

Chancery  House.  

 

- Mounou  slowly  drove  his  car  towards  Cathedral  Square  and  

the  mob   that   had   gathered   at   Khadafi   Square   followed   the  

car.    

 

- It  was  at  about  that  time  that  Fico  purchased  Rs.  10/-­  worth  

of  petrol  at  a  petrol  station  on  Desforges  Street.  

 

- Mounou  parked  his  car  opposite  Cathedral  Square  next  to  the  

New  Court  House  and  pointed  to  Chancery  House  and  urged  

the  crowd:  ‘crazer’.  

 

14 As per the opening speech for the prosecution.

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- The  crowd  hurled   stones  at  Chancery  House  and   then  came  

back  on  Cathedral  Square  and  on  the  way  they  broke  window  

panes  at  the  New  Court  House  and  also  damaged  lamp  posts  

on  Cathedral  Square.  

 

- Mounou  then  told  the  crowd  to  follow  him  to  L’Amicale  and  

he  drove  his  car  at  a  slow  speed  leading  the  mob  along.  

 

- At   about   7   p.m.,   Mounou   parked   his   car   opposite   Lai   Min  

Restaurant.  Mounou  again  urged  the  crowd  ‘crazer’  and  the  

crowd  threw  stones  at  L’Amicale  de  Port  Louis.  

 

- Mounou,  Bébé,  Zulu  and  Fico  smashed  the  cars   that  were   in  

the  vicinity  of  L’Amicale  de  Port  Louis  and   set   them  on   fire.  

The  flames  from  the  cars  spread  to  the  building  which  housed  

L’Amicale  de  Port  Louis  

 

- At   about   that   time   there   were   several   motorcyclists   who  

came  on  the  spot  opposite  L’Amicale.  One  of  the  motorcyclists  

stopped   next   to   Mounou   and   he   showed   him   a   rucksack  

which  contained  Molotov  cocktails.  

 

- The  motorcyclist,  following  the  instructions  of  Accused  No.  1,  

lit   cocktail   Molotovs   and   threw   them   on   the   first   floor   of  

L’Amicale  de  Port  Louis.  

 

- As  a  result  of  the  fire  from  the  Molotov  cocktails  and  the  fire  

which  had  spread  to  the  building  from  the  flames  of  the  car,  

several   seats   of   fire   merged   together   and   burnt   the   whole  

building.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

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121. Mr.  S.  Boolell  ended  his  opening  speech  by  stating:    

 

‘It   is   the   case   for   the   Prosecution,   Ladies   and   Gentlemen   of  

the   Jury,   that   the   four   accused   did   wilfully   set   fire   to  

L’Amicale   for  a   reason   that   is  unknown  and   this   caused   the  

death   of   seven   persons   who   were,   at   the   time,   inside   the  

building.’  (sic)  

 

122. The   evidence   which   was   adduced   by   the   prosecution   to  

substantiate  their  case  was  as  follows:  

 

- An  NIU   officer   deponed   to   the   effect   that   he   saw   the   red   car   of  

Mounou  and  Bébé  at  Khadafi  Square  at  18  20.    

 

- Azad   Thupsee,   the   main   witness   for   the   prosecution   who   had  

previously  made   allegations   of   police   brutality  which   forced   him  

into  implicating  the  Amicale  Four  and  who  had  changed  his  version  

over  and  over  again  deponed,  in  chief,  under  oath,  to  the  effect  that  

he  allegedly  witnessed  ALL  of  the  following:  

 

i. He  saw  Mounou  and  Bébé  at  Khadafi  Square  at  about  

6  p.m.  

ii. He   heard   Mounou   shouting:   ‘qui   zotte   apé   attane,   a  

nous  alle  craze  MFA’  

iii. He  saw  the  car  leaving  Khadafi  Square  and  proceeding  

towards  the  MFA.  

iv. He   followed   the   crowd   and   on   the  way   to  MFA,   Fico  

asked  him  for  Rs.  10  to  buy  petrol.  

v. He   saw   Mounou   park   his   car   opposite   New   Court  

House.  

vi. The   crowd   went   down   Lislet   Geoffroy   Street   and  

following  the  orders  of  Mounou  started  hurling  stones  

at  the  building    

vii. He  saw  Mounou  throw  a  stone  at  Chancery  House.  

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viii. At  some  point   in  time  the  crowd  came  back  up  Lislet  

Geoffroy   Street   and   onto   Cathedral   Square  where   he  

saw  more  damage  being  done.  

ix. Mounou  then  ordered  the  crowd  ‘a  nous  alle  faire  ene  

letour  l’Amicale’  and  drove  off.  

x. He  decided  to  go  home  but  then  changed  decision  and  

followed   the   crowd   on   foot   and   upon   reaching  

L’Amicale   de   Port   Louis,   he   saw   a   red   car   parked   in  

front  of  Lai  Min  restaurant.  

xi. He  reached  L’Amicale  at  around  18  30  –  18  45.  

xii. He  saw  Mounou,  Bébé,  Zulu  and  Fico  damage  cars.  

xiii. He  saw  Fico  pouring  petrol  onto  one  of  the  cars.  

xiv. He  saw  Mounou,  Bébé,  Zulu  and  Fico  set  fire  to  the  car.  

xv. He   saw  a  motorcyclist  who   approached  Mounou   and  

showed  the  contents  of  his  rucksack  to  the  latter.  

xvi. He  saw  that  the  rucksack  contained  Molotov  cocktails.  

xvii. He  heard  Mounou  ordering  the  motorcyclist  to  throw  

the  Molotov  cocktails  at  L’Amicale.  

xviii. He  saw  the  motorcyclist  hurling  the  Molotov  cocktails.  

 

Mr.  Li  Tung,  an  in  extremis  and  very  controversial  witness    deponed,  in  chief,    to  

the  effect  that  he  allegedly  saw  the  following:  

 

i. He  parked  his  car  in  front  of  the  entrance  of  L’Amicale  and  

went   to   have   dinner   with   his   relatives   in   Shamping  

Restaurant  which  is  located  next  to  L’Amicale.  

ii. At   some   point   in   time   he   heard   noise   coming   from   the  

corner  of  Emmanuel  Anquetil  and  Royal  Street  .  

iii. He  left  the  restaurant  to  go  check  up  on  his  car.  

iv. He  stood  opposite  L’Amicale  on  Royal  Street  where  he  saw  

Fico  and  Zulu  damaging  and  setting  fire  to  his  car.  

v. He  noticed  Molotov  cocktails  being  hurled  at  L’Amicale.  

vi. He  went  back   to  Shamping  Restaurant  and   then   left   in   the  

car  of  one  of  his  relatives.  

To  note:  Prior   to  his  deposition   in  Court,  Mr.  Li  Tung  had  

given   a   statement   to   the   police   on   the   24th   May   1999  

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whereby   he   stated   that   he   lost   his   car   in   the   incidents  

which  occurred  at  L’Amicale  but  that  he  did  not  personally  

witness  any  of  the  incidents.  

He   never   implicated   Zulu   and   Fico   until   after   the   Assizes  

case   had   started.   No   identification   procedure   had   been  

carried   out   but   instead   he   was   made   to   make   a   dock  

identification  of  Zulu  and  Fico  at  the  Assizes.  In  a  judgment  

delivered  by  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal,  it  was  ruled  that  

the   testimony   of   Mr.   Li   Tung   in   respect   of   the   dock  

identification  ought  to  be  disregarded.  

 

123. Finally,   there   was   also   witness   Khalill   Peerbux   who   deponed  

during  examination  in  chief  that  Fico  allegedly  came  to  buy  Rs.  10  

worth  of  petrol  at  Cadamally  petrol  station.  

 

124. However,  in  his  first  statement  given  to  the  police  on  the  15th  July  

1999,   the   said   Khalill   Peerbux   stated15   in   respect   of   those   who  

came  to  buy  petrol  that   ‘mo  pas  conne  sa  banne  dimounes  la  ni  mo  

pour   capave   reconnoitre   zotte.   Zotte   figure   meme   mo   pas   ti  

remarquer.  ’  

 

125. He  explained  during  his  deposition  at  Assizes  the  circumstances  in  

which   he   was   made   to   give   the   second   statement   whereby   he  

implicated  Fico.  He  explained  how  the  police  told  him  ‘enan  chance  

fermer  la  dans’  and  how  he  was  scared.  

 

126. At  the  Assizes,  witness  Peerbux  admitted  having  spoken  the  truth  

in  only  one  of  his   statement.  He  was  clearly  not  a   trustworthy  or  

reliable  witness.  

 

127. The  material   evidence   for   the  prosecution   rested   therefore   solely  

on  the  evidence  adduced  by  witnesses  Azad  Thupsee  and  Louis  Fan  

Fong   Li   Tung.   An   analysis   of   their   testimony  will   be  made   in   the  

course   of   the   next   two   chapters.   Suffice   it   to   say   at   this   juncture  

that,   Azad   Thupsee   cannot   by   any   stretch   of   imagination   be   15 At folios 116512 - 116513

87

believed  and   that   the  Criminal  Court  of  Appeal  has  ruled   that   the  

dock  identification  of  witness  Li  Tung  ought  to  be  discarded.    

 

128. As   regards   the   evidence   of   the   NIU   officer,   it   is   not   disputed   by  

Mounou  and  Bébé  that  they  were  at  Khadafi  Square  at  about  18  20.    

 

129. Apart   from   the   three   above   named   witnesses   (Azad   Thupsee,   Li  

Tung  and  Khalill  Peerbux)  there  were  no  other  witnesses  called  by  

the  prosecution  who   implicated   in  one  way  or  another  any  of   the  

Amicale  Four.  

 

130. The  accused  parties  did  not  depone  at  the  Assizes.  

 

131. The   summing   up   of   the   Presiding   Judge   was   the   issue   of   much  

controversy   so   much   so   that   a   ground   of   appeal   which   was  

common   to   the   Amicale   Four   specifically   addressed   the   issue   by  

stating  that  the  Learned  Judge’s  directions,  language,  inflammatory  

tone   as   could   be   gathered   from   the   digital   recording   of   the  

summing   up   were   a   clear   invitation   to   the   jury   to   believe   Azad  

Thupsee’s  evidence  and  to  convict  the  Amicale  Four.  

 

132. Before   the   appeal   was   heard,   Counsel   on   behalf   of   the   Amicale  

Four16,  all  moved  that  a  copy  of  the  digital  recording  of  the  Learned  

Judge’s  summing  up  be  made  available  to  them.    

 

133. The  court  however,  set  aside  the  motion  and  refused  that  a  copy  of  

the   digital   recording   of   the   summing   be   communicated   to   the  

defence.  

 

 

134. Other  matters  of  concern  at  the  Assizes  were,  inter  alia,:  

a. That   in   view   of   the   complexity   of   the   trial,   the   jury,   by  

deliberating  and  having  their  lunch  at  the  same  time  could  

not,  in  under  two  hours,  have  carefully  sifted  and  weighed  

16 Messrs R. D’Unienville, Q.C, M. Sauzier, Rex Stephen, D. Kwan Tat, B. Desvaux de Marigny, S. Oozeer, B Padiachy, S Bhukory and Miss A. Rambaruth.

88

the   evidence   presented   to   them   and   examined   all   the  

complex  issues    raised  by  the  prosecution,  the  defence  and  

those  placed  before  them  by  the  Learned  Judge.  

 

b. That   the   Learned   Judge   failed   to   direct   the   jury   that   from  

the   outset   the   police   did   not   conduct   a   fair   and   impartial  

investigation,  especially  by  failing  to  investigate  and  verify  

at   the   appropriate   time,   the   alibis   of   the   Amicale   Four  

mentioned   in   their   respective   defence   statements   to   the  

police;  and  that  their  failure  to  secure  the  items  of  clothing  

worn   by   the   Amicale   Four   on   23rd   May   1999   for  

examination   by   the   Forensic   Science   Laboratory   with   a  

view  to  either  assuring  their  presence  at  the  scene  of  fire  or  

eliminating  them  as  suspects,  especially  as  the  Amicale  Four  

were  in  police  custody.  

 

c. That   the   Learned   Judge   misdirected   the   jury   when   he  

stated   that,   Counsel   being   present   at   the   recording   of   the  

statements  of  the  Amicale  Four,  no  fault  should  therefore  be  

found   with   the   police   who   did   not   secure   the   items   of  

clothing  worn  by  the  Amicale  Four  on  the  material  date  for  

further  examination  by  the  FSL.  

 

d. That   the   Learned   Judge   misdirected     the   jury   by   telling  

them   that   there  was  no  need   to  probe  whether   the  police  

had  failed  to  act   fairly  by  not  checking  the  alibis  raised  by  

the   Amicale   Four   and   by   not   collecting   their   items   of  

clothing  for  forensic  analysis  and  that  this  issue  should  not  

cloud  their  deliberations.  

   

e. That  the  Learned  Judge  misdirected  the  jury  in  law  when  he  

conveyed   to   them   that   collection   by   the   police   and  

examination   of   clothes   by   the   FSL   and   the   verification   of  

alibis  was  not  important,  as  according  to  him,  it  could  only  

bolster  the  prosecution’s  case.  

 

89

f. That   in   view   of   the   dubious   evidence   on   record,   the  

warning  of  the  Learned  Judge  to  the  jury  about  the  need  for  

corroboration  was  grossly  inadequate.  

 

g. That   the   Learned   Judge  was   wrong   to   convey   to   the   jury  

that  witness  Azad  Thupsee  did  not  have  an  axe  to  grind  or  a  

purpose   of   his   own   to   serve   by   giving   evidence   for   the  

prosecution  and  implicating  the  Amicale  Four  in  the  offence  

charged.  

 

h. That  the  Learned  Judge  should  have  given  a  clear  warning  

to  the  jury  about  the  dangers  inherent  in  the  testimony  of  a  

witness   such   as   Azad   Thupsee   who   had   so   often  

contradicted   himself,   who   had   previously   stated   under  

solemn   affirmation   before   other   Courts   and   to   the   Police  

and  other  persons   that   the  Police  had  beaten  him  to   force  

him  to  implicate  the  Amicale  Four  and  who  had  also  stated  

in   Court   on   a   motion   for   bail   in   a   provisional   charge   of  

perjury   against   him   that   he   had   not   lied   at   Preliminary,  

meaning   that   the   Amicale   Four   were   not   involved   in   the  

case.  

 

i. That   the   Learned   Judge   was   wrong   to   conclude   his  

summing-­‐up  to  the  jury  by  telling  them  that  the  evidence  of  

Azad   Thupsee   was   “unsatisfactory   but   not   unworthy   or  

unreliable  ”,  thus  usurping  the  functions  of  the  jury.  

 

j. That   the  Learned   judge   failed   to  direct   the   jury   to   the   fact  

that  the  evidence  of  witness  Vinissen  Abel  –  a  journalist  of  

L’Express  newspaper  –  was  to  the  effect  that  Azad  Thupsee  

spoke   freely   to  him  on  10th   June  1999   to  denounce  police  

brutality.   On   the   contrary,   the   Learned   Judge   presented   a  

one-­‐sided   and   incomplete   picture   of   Mr.   Vinissen   Abel’s  

evidence.  

 

 

90

 

 

 

k. In   respect  of  Witness  Li  Tung,   the  Learned   Judge   failed   to  

give  a  clear  warning   to   the   jury   to  exercise  caution  before  

acting   on   the   unsupported   evidence   of   Mr.   Li   Tung,  

especially  when   there  was  evidential  basis   to   suggest   that  

the  evidence  of  witness  Li  Tung  may  be  unreliable.  

 

l. The   Learned   Judge   was   not   fair   in   his   assessment   of   the  

conditions   in  which  Mr.  Li  Tung  made  his  observations  on  

23rd  May  1999  and   failed   to  highlight   the  weaknesses  and  

contradictions  in  the  identification  evidence  of  Mr.  Li  Tung.  

 

m. The  Learned  Judge  failed  to  direct  the  jury  as  to  the  glaring  

difference  between   the   version  of  Mr.   Li  Tung   and   that   of  

Azad  Thupsee  on  the  following  –  

 

- The  length  of  hair  of  Fico.  

- The  number  of  people  before  L’Amicale  

- The   time   the   motorcyclists   allegedly   came   near  

L’Amicale  

 

135. The   above   are   only   a   few   of   the   numerous   issues   that   drew  

concern  and  that  arose  at  the  Assizes.  

 

136. The  next  two  chapters  will  now  address  in  specific  the  evidence  of    

witnesses  Azad  Thupsee  and  Li  Tung.    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Chapter 10: The Azad Thupsee saga  

137. On the 2nd June 1999, Azad Thupsee was arrested for the charge of

Arson causing death at L’Amicale de Port-Louis.  

 

138. He signed various statements in the month of June 1999, which

incriminated the Amicale Four. Azad Thupsee explained that he saw a

small crowd gather around a red Proton Wira, registration 3211 0C 96

at Khadafi square, in which Imran Sumodhee alias Mounou was seated

in the driver seat and his younger brother, Khaleel Sumodhee alias

Bebe was seated next to him in the passenger seat.  

139. This witness changed his account of events of several occasions:  

 

92

How he changed versions:

This is what Azad Thupsee publicly stated as regards to his visit with Me.

SHAKEEL MOHAMMED on the 10th June 1999

Thupsee stated having gone to see Me. Shakeel Mohammed in the company of his

brother Reza and one Krishnen Darmalinghum, an employee of the Sumodhee to

explain how he was subject to police brutality and was coerced by the police to

implicate the 4 accused parties in the arson of l’Amicale. Me. Mohamed

accompanied Thupsee to Line Barracks but a declaration could not be made.

10th June- VINISSEN ABEL – JOURNALIST

Thupsee repeated to Mr. Abel, journalist at L’Express newspaper, what he had told

to Me. Shakeel Mohammed. Thupsee repeated that he was forced by the police to

implicate the four accused parties. Mr. Abel caused an article to be published on the

following day to that effect.

11th June- Me. RAMA VALAYDEN

Again, Azad Thupsee publicly accepted the fact that he had gone to the office of

Me. Rama Valayden on the 11th June 1999 to seek advise as to the steps to be

followed since he had been subjected to police brutality and forced to implicate the

Amicale Four. Me. Valayden asked him to write it all down and to come and see

him back on Monday 14th June 1999.

3rd June 1999: IMPLICATING the Amicale Four

After being himself arrested in the Amicale case, Thupsee provided details of how

allegedly Mounou was seated on the window sill of the car and shouted “anou alle

craze MFA” in Khadafi Square. This eye witness went on to state that how the

Amicale Four participated in the arson on the 23rd May 1999. Soon after he had

made the allegations, Thupsee was released from police custody.

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12th – 13th June 1999: EXCULPATORY DOCUMENT

In a document, annexed to this report17 , which bears the signatures of both Azad

and Reza Thupsee, they explain how they never saw the Sumodhee brothers at

L’Amicale and how they have been forced to implicate them.

14th June 1999: Me. Manoj Appado

More complaints of police brutality made to Me. Manoj Appado.

01st December 1999: PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY

Azad Thupsee yet gave another version. Thupsee took the prosecution by

surprise when he explained that he cracked under police pressure and was

coerced into signing statements incriminating the four innocent convicts.

  17 Annexe 8

14h June 1999: SEQUESTRATION ALLEGATION

Thupsee gave a statement to the police expressing that he had in fact been

sequestrated by two other Sumodhee brothers (who were not implicated in the

Amicale case), one K. Darmalinghum and a fourth person. His version was that he

had been sequestrated and was forced to exculpate the Sumodhee in the aforesaid

document. A sequestration case was eventually lodged against the four persons.

94

140. When   confronted   with   the   police   statements   he   signed   in   June  

1999,  Thupsee   said   that  he  was  not   aware  of   the   contents  of   the  

statement.   Thupsee   maintained   that   he   was   forced   to   sign   the  

statements  in  June  1999  and  that  he  was  not  aware  of  the  contents  

of  same.    

 

141. At   that   stage,   the   prosecuting   Counsel   declared   him   as   a  hostile  

witness   and   a   perjury   warning   followed.   Despite   the   perjury  

warning  Thupsee  maintained  that  he  was  forced  to  incriminate  the  

four  accused  parties.  As  he  maintained   this  new  version  Thupsee  

was  charged  with  perjury  by  the  Magistrate.    

 

142. Arrested,  hand  cuffed  and  sent  to  custody  on  remand,  Thupsee  was  

first   detained   at   Alcatraz,   a   prison   notorious   for   police   brutality  

that  caused  the  death  of  Kaya  only  3  months  earlier.  A  week  later  

Thupsee   was   transferred   to   Beau   Bassin   Prison,   then   sent   to  

Grande  Riviere  North  West  Prison.  This  was  the  first  time  Thupsee  

served   time   behind   bars   and   it   all   happened   in   a   short   lapse   of  

time.  On  the  05th  of  January  2000  Thupsee  was  granted  bail  for  the  

offence   of   perjury   after   having   been   detained   In   3   different  

prisons.  

 

143. At   the   time   Azad   Thupsee   was   very   young   and   about   to   get  

married  but  he  was  now   in  a  precarious  position   facing  potential  

severe  legal  consequences.  Tremendous  pressure  suddenly  rested  

on  the  shoulders  of  Azad  Thupsee.  However,  when  the  perjury  case  

was  called,  he  pleaded  Not  Guilty.  

144.  

06/11/99: ASSIZES PROCEEDINGS

Thupsee was again called to depone. This time Azad Thupsee stated that what he

persistently claimed to be the truth during the Preliminary Enquiry was in fact false

and implicated the Amicale Four.

 

95

145. In  fact   just  before  Azad  Thupsee  began  to  depone,  he  was  offered  

immunity  from  pending  and  /  or  future  prosecution  by  the  DPP.  

 

146. This   man   who   once   succumbed   to   pressure   was   faced   with   a  

difficult   dilemma,   whether   to   maintain   what   he   has   persistently  

claimed  with  numerous  persons  and  on  numerous  occasions  to  be  

the  truth  or  to  simply  go  back  to  his  original  version.    

 

147. He   proceeded   with   deponing   under   immunity   claiming   that   his  

original  version  was  the  truth.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

96

STATEMENTS IMPLICATING ACCUSED

SEQUESTRATION CASE

STATEMENT 02/06/99: “ene peu ti moment après ene groupe dimoune finne entoure ene l’auto qui ti arreter dans coin la rue Pamplemousses et Magon cot robot” “moi et tous mo banne camarade qui mo fine nommer la fine approche cote l’auto la. Ti eina ene l’auto rouge, proton wira so chauffeur ti Imran Sumodhee qui appelle aussi Mounou et so frère khalil qui appelle Bebe ti are li par devant. STATEMENT 03/06/99 “sa l’auto privee No.3211 OC 96 mark Proton Wira Couleur Rouge qui mo fine trouver dans la cour derriere station Abercombrie mo reconnaitre sa l’auto qui mo fine mentioner dans mo l’enquete qui mo finne donne la police hier mercredi le 02 june 99 STATEMENT 03/06/99 “Mounou ti assize lor la porte devant cotte chauffeur et mo fine tende li ape dire qui zote ape attende, nous alle craze MFA” STATEMENT 26/06 99 “ le 02/06/99 dans buro CID PL [n] mo ti donne aine l’enquete dans sa zaffaire la et samedi le 05/06/99 dans Buro CID PL (n) mo fine montrer la police sa trios zommes qui mo ti dire dans mo lenquete la qui mo conne zotte lor nom Mounou, Bebe et Zoulou” “Zoulou et FICO ensembles avek les autres dimoun p crase 2 lauto qui ti devant L’Amicale “ STATEMENT 02/06/99 “Mounou ti assize lors la porte devant cote chauffeur mo tande li ape dire qui zote ape attendre nous alle craze MFA” STATEMENT 53226 “avant qui nous rentre dans la rue tourraine Fico qui mo conne li bien li ti ape reste la rue Gorah Issac vis a vis mosque ti approche moi et ti dimande moi Rs.10 por acheter lessence et li ti dire moi pou alle mette di feu” 02 june 99 “ mo fine tanne Mounou dire nou alle crase L’Amicale”?.

AZAD THUPSEE Conceded that: He was aware that there was a fire at l’Amicale He was not present at l’Amicale during the fire Had sign the statements as a result of physical abuse He did not give the alleged “sequestration” statement to the police on the 14th june 1999 but rather only signed it In relation to the sequestration allegation he stated that in fact he went camping with those persons on several occasions in the past and that in fact there had been no sequestration. He confirmed that, in his statement dated 14 June 1999, the period of time during which he stated that he was allegedly sequestrated he was in fact free.

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PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY

ASSIZES

Q: You signed the statement 02/06/99? A: “yes because I was under pressure from police.” When statements put to THUPSEE, his answers are: “This does not remind me of anything” “I don’t remember this” “mo pas finne donne sa l’enquet la, banla fin force moi signer.” “I did not give a statement. I was forced to sign the papers so as to be free.” “I don’t remember anything, they made me sign those papers” “I did not give such a statement to the police” AZAD THUPSEE DECLARED HOSTILE BY PROSECUTOR Q: in your statement you said you saw Fico throwing petrol on a parked car which was next to L’Amicale entrance…? A: “I did not give any statements to the police.” Q: when we are talking about papers it related to the identification of the car? A: “I was shown the car and asked whether I knew it. I replied in the affirmative.” Q: on the 25/6/99 after you had been released you gave a statement to the police whereby you recognized and identified accused no.1,2,3 in relation to Amicale case? A: “2 CID officers caught hold of me and told me we shall bring you before the person as you passed by you make a sign with your head.” Q: on the 14 June 99 at about 15:30 you identified accused no.4 one called FICO in relation to incident at Amicale? A: “The CID Officer came to fetch me at home, do not Know which day and date. My mother was at home. One Officer CID told my mother “Kala nous prend ou garcon pou amen lie ne ti moment” I boarded the car and went with them.” AZAD THUPSEE GIVEN A PERJURY WARNING “when I alighted the bus at Plaine Verte I went to eat and drink” “CID Officers asked me if I knew FICO if I knew where he lives. I had a friend who was working at the factory with me, he was living in the yard of Fico. I told the CID officer he lives at Gorah Issac Street opposite the mosque. Azad Thupsee never inculpated the Amicale Four at the Preliminary Enquiry and was eventually arrested for Perjury.

To justify his stand in the course of the Preliminary Enquiry Azad Thupsee said: “Mo ti obliger faire sa parski banne fami Sumodhee ti p mette pression lor moi. Zotte ti p dire moi mo bizin faire sa. Meme dailleur li fine déjà fair dimounes sequester moi ek mo frer, mo ti dans zot control en dehors, ceki zot dir moi faire mo bizin faire, zot ene banne dimoun dominair…Moi ek mo bannes camarades mo fine peur, mo fine obliger aller, tension banal pas conner ki kapav fer moi.” Azad Thupsee then stated, in contradiction to his previous statements the following: “mo na pas ti cause menti le temps mo ti deposer dans l’enquete preliminaire” Q: Eski ou ti dire la Police fini montrer, oune alle monter la police l’endroit, eski ou ti dire sa parole la dans ou l’enquete qui la police ine prend qk ou après ou fine montrer la police cotte ou ti ete, le temps ou ti trouve Fico ek Zulu apè craze l’auto avec roches, pousse zotte pou bloque l’entrée l’Amicale, arose l’essence et mette dife et après place divant l’Amicale cotte mo ti trouve Mounou et Bebe ape avoye roches lor l’Amicale? Ou ti dire sa? A:Dans qui l’enquete sa? Q: Le 14 Juin, 1999? A: mo pas rapelle. Q: Vers qui l’heure ou ti arrive cotte l’Amicale? A: Capave vers les 6 heures et demie ou sept heures moins quinze.

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The physical impossibilities of Azad Thupsee  

148. The   first   spot   where   witness   Azad   Thupsee   allegedly   saw   the  

Sumodhee   brothers   in   Port   Louis   on   the   23rd   May   1999   is   at  

Khadafi  Square.  The  Sumodhee  brothers  were  in  a  proton  wira  car.  

 

149. However   his   testimony   as   to   what   he   saw   and   heard   at   Khadafi  

Square   cannot   stand  good  because   if  Azad  Thupsee  was  near   the  

car  or  within  hearshot  of   the   car,   as  he   claimed   to  have  been,  he  

would  have  certainly  seen  the  occupants  seated  at  the  back  of  the  

car  the  more  so  that  the  said  occupants  were  known  to  him  as  he  

was  staying  at  the  place  of  the  Sumodhees.  

 

150. A  point  of  concern  is  that  he  had  allegedly  been  following  a  crowd  

from  Khadafi  Square  to  New  Court  House  but  apart  from  his  group  

of   friends   and   three   of   the   four   convicts,   he   did   not   know   or  

remember   any  other  person  who  was   in   the   crowd.   Surprisingly,  

his  brother  Reza  Thupsee  who  was  with  him  did  not  notice  anyone  

either.  

 

151. The   second   spot   from   where   Azad   Thupsee   allegedly   saw   the  

Sumodhee  brothers  was  in  front  of  the  New  Court  House.  Elements  

of  concerns  as  regards  to  this  are:  

 i. From   where   he   was   allegedly   standing,   it   was   not  

physically  possible  to  observe  what  was  happening  in  

front  of  Chancery  House  because  of  the  topography  of  

the  area.  

 

ii. It  was  equally  physically   impossible  for  witness  Azad  

Thupsee  to  hear  and  recognise,  in  a  rowdy  and  riotous  

crowd   of   about   200   persons,   according   to   him,   the  

voice  of  Mounou  even  if  the  latter  was  shouting.  

 

 

 

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iii. If   the   red   proton   wira   of   the   Sumodhees   was  

effectively,   as   stated   by   Azad   Thupsee,   parked  

opposite   New   Court   House   building,   Azad   Thupsee  

who   allegedly   stood   at   that   very   spot   could   not  

possibly  have  failed  to  see  the  other  occupants  of  the  

car   when   they   returned   to   the   car.   Azad   Thupsee  

allegedly   saw   that   car   effecting   a   U-­‐turn   on   Pope  

Henessy  street  and  leaving.  

 

iv. It   is   surprising   that   Azad   Thupsee   missed   the  

incidents   (Blanche   Birger   and   New   Court   House)  

which  happened  across   the   road   from  where  he  was  

standing   (i.e   4   –   5   metres   in   front   of   him)   but   yet  

manages   to   see   what   was   happening   in   front   of  

Chancery  House  which  was  at  least  25  metres  further  

down  the  road  from  where  he  was  standing  and  at  the  

bottom  of  a  steep  slope  which  would  not  be  in  his  line  

of  vision.  Added   to   that,   it  was  dark  and   there  was  a  

crowd  of  about  200  persons.  

 

152. Yet,  another  point  of  concern  is  the  fact  that  on  his  way  back,  when  

he   turned   into   Dauphine   street   and   reached   the   corner   of  

Dauphine  and  Sir  William  Newton  street,  he  allegedly  heard  ‘banes  

vitres   p   crazer   dans   batiment   Emmanuel   Anquetil’   (breaking   of  

window  panes  in  the  Registrar  Building)  which  is  on  the  other  side  

of   the  block  and  completely  out  of   sight   from  where  he  allegedly  

was.  Yet,  he  knew  precisely  which  building  was  being  attacked.  

 

153. Furthermore,   before   turning   into   Dauphine   Street,   it   is  

questionable   how   Azad   Thupsee   completely   missed   out   on   the  

most  obvious  of  incidents  so  far  i.e  the  incident  and  fire  in+  front  of  

Pope  Henessy  Police  station.  Even  when  Azad  Thupsee  reached  the  

corner  of  Sir  Virgil  Naz  and  Sir  William  Newton  street,  he   fails   to  

see   the   incidents   in   front   of   Pope   Henessy   police   station   (only  

metres  away  from  him).  In  fact,  our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  Azad  

Thupsee  did  in  fact  witness  those  incidents  but  if  he  had  revealed  

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in  his  statement  to  have  witnessed  the  said  incidents  he  would  not  

have  been  in  a  position  to  testify  that  he  allegedly  saw  the  start  of  

the  incidents  at  L’Amicale18.  

 

154. The   third  and   final   spot   from  where  Azad  Thupsee  allegedly   saw  

the   Amicale   Four   was   at   the   corner   of   Royal   and   Emmanuel  

Anquetil  Street19.  Our  enquiry  has   revealed   that   it  was  physically  

impossible   for   Thupsee   to   see   and   hear,   amidst   the   rowdy   and  

riotous  crowd,  the  fact  that  it  was  dark  (to  note:  the  sunset  on  the  

23rd  May   1999  was   at   17   3920),   the   noise   and   the   general   hurly-­‐

burly  what  he  claimed  to  have  seen  and  heard,  inter  alia:    

 

- The  faces  of  the  Amicale  Four.  

- What  was  allegedly  being  said  between  the  Amicale  Four.  

- That  a  motorcyclist  allegedly  stopped  next  to  Mounou.  

- What  the  motorcyclist  allegedly  said  to  Mounou.    

- That   the   motorcyclist   had   a   backpack.   It   is   to   be   noted  

that   Azad   Thupsee   failed   to   notice   the   colour   of   the  

backpack  but  managed  somehow  to  see  what  was   inside  

that  backpack.  

- What   was   inside   the   backpack   of   the   motorcyclist.   He  

stated  that  he  allegedly  saw  bottles.21  

- Details  of  the  contents  of  the  backpack:  such  as  brands  of  

the  different  bottles.  

- The  fact  that  the  bottles  were  allegedly  Molotov  cocktails.  

- The   fact   that   the   said   Molotov   cocktail   contained   sand,  

petrol  and  a  wick.  

- What  Mounou  allegedly  said  to  the  motorcyclist.  

 

18 See chapter entitled ‘Time is of the essence’ 19 See Figure 1 at the end of the chapter. 20http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/astronomy.html?n=201&month=5&year=1999&obj=sun&a fl=-11&day=1 21 We have visited the locus and performed tests on several occasions which demonstrated that Thupsee could not possibly have seen what was inside the backpack on the motorcyclist even if he did see the motorcyclist.

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155. Despite   seeing   all   of   the   above   details,   Thupsee   failed   the   most  

obvious  of  details:  the  items  of  clothing  worn  by  the  Amicale  Four  

and  their  colour.  

 

156. Our  enquiry  has  also  revealed  that  it  was  physically  impossible  for  

a   person   who   was   seated   on   a   motorcycle   or   autocycle  

immediately   in   front   of   the   Amicale   building   to   light   and  

successfully   launch   a   Molotov   cocktail   into   the   first   floor   of   the  

Amicale  building.    

 

157. One  very  interesting  fact  which  has  been  revealed  upon  a  scrutiny  

of   what   happened   at   the   reconstruction   exercise   of   the   8th   June  

1999   is   that  Azad  Thupsee  at  no  point   in   time   inculpates  Bébé   in  

the   arson   of   Amicale.22   He   showed   the   spot   from  where   he   was  

standing  and  from  where  he  saw:  

 

(i) Bébé  and  Mounou  allegedly   ‘flinging   stones   at  

L’Amicale’    

(ii) Fico   and   Zulu   allegedly   damaging   cars   and  

setting  fire  to  the  cars  

(iii) Mounou   allegedly   giving   instructions   to   a  

motorcyclist   to   throw   ‘pints’   at   L’Amicale  

which   the   motorcyclist   did   and   as   a   result   of  

which  L’Amicale  caught  fire.    

 

158. Even  if  it  is  assumed  that  the  flames  from  the  cars  which  Zulu  and  

Fico  had  allegedly  set  on  fire  contributed  to  Amicale  catching  fire,  

Bébé   has   not   been   mentioned   by   Azad   Thupsee   of   having   done  

anything  at  all  which  might  have  caused  Amicale  to  catch  fire.  

 

 

 

 

 

  22 Annexe 9

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159. Furthermore,  another  damning  proof  that  Azad  Thupsee  had  been  

lying  in  Court  was  as  regards  to  the  cars  which  were  on  fire:  

 

- Azad  Thupsee  stated  that  two  cars  were  rolled  up  

to   block   the   entrances   of   the   Amicale   building.  

According   to   Thupsee   one   car  was   used   to   block  

the  entrance  along  the  Royal  street  while  the  other  

was  used  to  block  the  entrance  along  the  Emanuel  

Anquetil  Street.  

 

- However,  a  picture  produced  by  Mr.  Chetty,  press  

photographer   showed   that   the   two   cars   were   in  

fact   on   fire   on   Royal   street.   This   is   in   complete  

contradiction  with  the  evidence  of  witness  Li  Tung  

as  well.  

 

- This   is   the   blatant   proof   that   Azad   Thupsee   had  

been  lying  in  Court  since  it  cannot  be  that  after  the  

cars  were   placed   at   the   entrances   of   the   Amicale  

building,   they  were   returned  back   to  Royal   street  

for   press   photographer   Mr.   Chetty   to   take   the  

snaps.  

 

- Furthermore,  another  picture  taken  by  Mr.  Chetty  

clearly   shows   that   the   distance   between   the  

burning   car   and   the   entrance   of   Amicale   was   at  

least  the  width  of  the  pavement  (about  2  metres  at  

that   particular   spot)   which   again   gives   Thupsee  

the   lie  when   the   latter   stated   that   the   car   in   fact  

blocked  the  entrance  of  Amicale.  

 

- Finally,   the   evidence   adduced   by   SP   Noel   and   PC  

Boodnah  is  to  the  effect  that  two  cars  were  on  fire  

on  Royal  Street  and  one  was  on  fire  on  the  corner  

of  Emanuel  Anquetil  Street  and  Royal  Street.  This  

again  demonstrates  that  Thupsee  had  been  lying  in  

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Court  when  he  stated  that  a  car  blocked  the  entry  

of   the   Amicale   building   on   Emanuel   Anquetil  

Street.  

 

160. Mounou  and  Bebe  were  convicted  SOLELY  on  the  evidence  of  Azad  

Thupsee.  

 

 

 

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Chapter 11: Witness Li Tung  

161. The  testimony  of  Mr  Louis  Fan  Fong  Li  Tung,  Chief  Health  Inspector  

at  the  Municipality  of  Beau-­‐Bassin/Rose-­‐Hill  sealed  the  fate  for  Fico  

and  Zoulou  (Then  Accused  Nos.  3  and  4).  

 

162. Their   lives  and   that  of   their   families   forever  changed  as  a   result  of  

the   testimony   of   Witness   Li   Tung.   What   follows,   is   a   critical  

assessment  of  the  circumstances  which  led  to  the  testimony  and  the  

testimony  itself.    

 

163. Witness  Li  Tung  gave  a  statement  to  the  police  on  the  25th  May  1999.  

In   that   statement   he   stated   that   on   the  23rd  May,   he   left   his   car   in  

front   of   ‘L’Amicale’,   went   to   have   dinner   at   a   restaurant   and   came  

back  one  hour  later  to  find  his  car  completely  burnt.    

 

164. In  fact  when  questioned  by  the  police  about  whom  he  suspected  

could   have   burnt   his   car,   he   stated   that   he   did   not   suspect  

anybody   because  when   he   came   back   from   the   restaurant   his  

car  had  already  been  burnt  down23  and  that  he  had  not  seen  any  

incident.  

 

165. Based  on  his  statement,  Witness  Li  Tung  was  initially  of  no  probative  

value  for  the  prosecution  because  he  did  not  see  anything  material.  

 

166.  This  is  why,  although  his  name  was  on  the  list  of  witnesses  for  the  

prosecution,  he  was  not  called  to  depone  at  the  Preliminary  Enquiry.  

 

167. At  the  Assizes  his  name  appeared  again  on  the  list  of  witnesses  but  

he  was   treated  as  an  unimportant  witness  until   the  13th  November  

2000  when  he  was  called  to  give  evidence.    

 

23 ‘mo pas suspecter personne, mais mo sur qui li enan relation avec ce qui ti enan sa nuit la lor l’Amicale’

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168. A  couple  of  days  prior  to  that,  Mr.  Li  Tung  met  a  high  ranking  police  

officer  and  stated  to  him  that  he  had  more  to  say  about  incidents  of  

the  23rd  May  1999.    

 

169. That  was  when  he  gave  a  statement  detailing  that  he  allegedly  saw  

Zulu  and  Fico  setting  fire  to  his  car.  That  statement  came  more  than  

a  year  and  a  half  after  the  incident,  on  the  eve  of  his  deposition  and  

was  in  complete  contradiction  with  his  first  statement.  

 

170. The  controversy  with  Mr.  Li  Tung  started  with  the  date  at  which  he  

claims   to   have   been   to   the   police   station   to   give   his   statement.   In  

court,  he  persistently  maintained   that  he  gave  his   statement   to   the  

police  on  the  day  following  the  arson  at  L’Amicale,  that  is  on  the  24th  

May   1999   after  meeting  with   his   legal   adviser,   Sir   Hamid  Moollan  

Q.C..  However,  Sir  Hamid  Moollan  Q.C,  who  was  called  as  a  witness  

on  behalf  of  Accused  No.  3  stated  that  in  fact  witness  Li  Tung  came  to  

see  him  between  the  26th  and  28th  May  1999.      

 

171. The  only   thing   in  common  between  the  statement   that  Mr.  Li  Tung  

first  gave  to  the  police  and  his  testimony  in  Court  on  13th  November  

2000  was  that:  

 

a. On   the   fateful   night,   he   went   to   have   dinner   in  

Chinatown  and  left  his  car  in  front  of  ‘L’Amicale’.  

   

b. He  reached  the  restaurant  at  about  18  45  to  19  00  after  

leaving   his   car   right   in   front   of   the   entrance   of  

‘L’Amicale’  on  Royal  Street.    

 

c. Prior   to   coming   to   the   restaurant,   he   stopped   at   his  

brother’s  place  at  Mare  Gravier,  some  20  minutes  drive  

away  from  Port  Louis.  

 

 

 

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172. The  second  controversy  regarding  witness  Li  Tung  was  as  regards  to  

how  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  reached  L’Amicale  around  18  

45  –  19  00.  He  stated  that  he  knew  he  had  left  his  brother’s  place  at  

Mare  Gravier  around  18  20  –  18  30  since  he  heard  the  18  30  news  

on  the  radio  during  which  news  he  learnt  about  the  incidents  which  

have  occurred  after  the  match.24  

 

Contradictions:   Now,   it   is   a   fact   that   in   May   1999,   the  

only  radio  station  operating   in  Mauritius  was   that  of   the  

Mauritius   Broadcasting   Cooperation.   There   were   no  

private   radio   stations   and   our   enquiry   has   revealed  

that   in   1999,   there   were   no   news   in   either   English,  

French   or   Creole   at   18   30   on   any   of   the   channels   of  

the   MBC.   Furthermore,   witness   Li   Tung   completely  

fails   to   mention   that   a   police   officer   was   giving  

instructions  to  divert  traffic.  

 

173. At  the  assizes,  he  explained  how  allegedly:  

 

a. after  parking  his  car  in  front  of  the  entrance  of  L’Amicale,  

he   then   proceeded   to   Shamping   restaurant   where   he  

waited   for  his   relatives   to  arrive  and   then  went  upstairs  

where   they     booked   a   table   near   a  window   overlooking  

Emanuel  Anquetil  Street.    

 

b. Thereafter,   before   him   or   his   relatives   had   the   time   to  

order,   he   heard   noises   coming   from   outside   and   looked  

through  the  window  to  see  what  he  described  as  a  crowd  

which   has   gathered   at   the   corner   of   Emanuel   Anquetil  

and   Royal   Street  which   he   thought  was   a   procession   or  

something  of  the  like.    

 

24 ‘J’ai quitté (Mare Gravier) vers les 6.20 heures / 6.30 heures parce que en cours de route j’ai mis la radio. On est en train de donner les informations qui commencent a 6.30. Je ne sais pas quelle epoque, en tout cas j’ai ecouté les informations.’

107

c. He   noticed   that   a   majority   of   the   people   in   the   crowd  

were  wearing  green  and  white  tracksuits.    

 

d. He  then  decided  to  go  see  what  was  going  on  since  his  car  

was   parked   in   that   area   but   as   he   was   going   out,   the  

owner  of  the  restaurant  advised  him  not  to  go  out  since  it  

was  not  safe.  He  went  out  nonetheless.    

 

e. The   first   thing   that   he   saw   when   he   came   out   of   the  

restaurant  was   that   on   his   right   side,   on   Royal   Street,   a  

crowd   of   about   50   people   with   some   of   them   stoning  

‘L’Amicale’.  

 

Contradiction:   It   is   interesting   to   note   at   this   stage   the  

enormous   difference   between   the   number   of   people  

present  outside  L’Amicale  according  to  Azad  Thupsee  and  

according  to  Li  Tung.    

 

f. He   crossed   the   road   and  walked   over   to  Royal   Street   to  

get   a   better   view   of  where   his   car  was   parked.   He   then  

crossed  Royal  Street,  crossed  Emanuel  Anquetil  Street  so  

that   he   was   now   standing   opposite   ‘L’Amicale’   on   the  

other  side  of  the  road  from  where  his  car  was  parked.    

 

g. He  saw  a  few  people  taking  out  their  cars  from  that  area  

and  when  he  attempted  to  go  and  get  his  car,  he  noticed  

what  he  described  as  the  leader  of  the  group:  a  young,  tall  

guy  who  was  of  a  light  complexion.  

 

h. He   asked   that   person   not   to   damage   his   car   but  

immediately  afterwards  another  guy  who  he  described  as  

short,   thin  with   thick  hair  used  an   iron  bar   to  smash  his  

rear  windscreen.  

 

 

 

108

i.  He  made  a  few  steps  back  and  saw  the  tall  guy  trying  to  

unearth   a   pole.   At   about   the   same   time,   the   other   guy  

broke  the  driver’s  window  of  his  car,  took  something  out  

of   a  bag  and   threw   it   in   the   car.  He   then  made  a   certain  

gesture  and  flames  started  to  rise  from  his  car.    

 

174. Another   major   issue   which   arises   here   is   as   regards   to   the  

description  of  Fico.  This  is  an  extract  of  his  cross  examination  by  Me.  

I.  Mamoojee,  Counsel  for  Fico,  on  this  particular  issue:  

 

‘Q.   Vous   avez   dit   hier   losque   l’avocat   de   la  

poursuite  vous  a  posé  des  questions,  que  

vous   avez   vu   un   grand   monsieur   qui  

ressemble   a   un   «mulatre  »,   est-­‐ce   que  

vous   pouvez   dire   a   la   Cour   comment  

etaient  ses  cheveux  ce  soir  la  ?  

A.     Le  cheveux  normal  

 

Q.   Qu’est   ce   que   vous   comprenez   par  

‘cheveux  normal’  ?  

A.   Il   n’a   pas   de   cheveux   coupés   a   la   brosse,  

c’est   pas   touffu   comme   certaines  

personnes  ont,  c’est  juste.’  

 

175. He  stated  that  Fico  had  ‘normal  hair’  and  when  asked  what  he  meant  

by  normal  he  said  that  he  had  short  hair.  

 

176. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  at   the  time  Fico  had  shoulder   length  

hair.   This   is   confirmed   by   the   description   of   Fico   entered   on   his  

personal  file  at  the  prison  when  he  was  incarcerated  just  weeks  after  

the  23rd  May  1999.  

 

To  note:  Furthermore,  enquiry  reveals  that  Fico  was  not  

in   a   habit   of   tying   his   hair   which   means   that   any  

movement,  even  the  slightest,  will  show  the  hair   flowing  

in  the  direction  or  sometimes  in  different  directions.  

109

 

177. Mr.  Li  Tung  then  stated  that  a  group  of  people  together  with  the  tall  

guy  overturned  the  car  that  was  next  to  Paris  Studio  using  the  pole  

that  the  tall  guy  just  unearthed.    

 

Contradiction:  Thupsee  who  was  allegedly,  at  that  same  

time,   standing   a   few  metres   away   from   Li   Tung   did   not  

notice  any  of  this.  Is  anyone  of  them  speaking  the  truth?  

 

178. According  to  him,  shortly  afterwards,  the  other  person  who  set  fire  

to  his  car  threw  something,  which  he  had  in  his  hand,  on  the  balcony  

of  the  first  floor  of  the  building:  

 

‘Q.          (...)  La  qu’est  ce  que  vous  faites  ?  

 A.   ‘(…)  A  ce  moment  j’ai  vu  la  personne  qui  est  courte,  qui  est  

maigre,  qui  a  mis  le  feu  dans  ma  voiture,  je  vois  qu’il  lance  

une  affaire  dans  sa  main.  Il  lance  ca  sur  le  premier  etage  du  

batiment.’  (sic)  

Q.                  Il  lance  une  affaire  sur  ?  

A.      Sur  le  balcon.’  

 

Double  Contradiction:   Li  Tung  stated  that  the  Molotov  

cocktail   hit   against   the   balcony.   If   that   was   the   case   why  

were  no  remnants  of  Molotov  cocktail  found  on  the  balcony  

or  on  the  road.  

 

Furthermore,   according   to   Azad   Thupsee,   the   Molotov  

cocktail  was  thrown  from  someone  sitting  on  a  motorcycle  

and  who  followed  the  orders  of  Mounou.    

 

179. He   then   decided   to   go   back   to   the   restaurant   and   went   back   the  

same  way   that   he   came.  When   he  was   next   to   ONU   restaurant,   he  

noticed   many   motorcycles   which   had   been   set   on   fire   in   front  

L’Amicale’s   exit   on  Emanuel  Anquetil   Street.  Note   that  he  does  not  

see  any  car  as  alleged  to  be  there  by  Azad  Thupsee.    

 

110

180. At  that  point  in  time,  he  allegedly  turned  around  and  saw  a  group  of  

persons  pushing  a  car  which  was  upside  down  on  Royal  Street  from  

the  direction  of  Lai  Min  restaurant   towards  L’Amicale.  The  car  was  

then  pushed   in  between   the  car  which  was   in   front  of  Paris  Studio  

and  his  car  which  was   in   front  of   the  entrance  of  Amicale  on  Royal  

Street.  

 

‘(…)  A   ce  moment   la,   je  vois  un  groupe  de  personnes  en  

train  de  pousser  une  voiture  qui  sortait  du  cote  de  Lai  Min  

pour  emmener  devant  L’Amicale.  Finalement,  ils  ont  pu  

pousser   la   voiture,   juste   arrivé   comme   si   entre   ma  

voiture   et   l’autre   voiture   qui   etait   devant   Paris  

Studio.’  

 

Contradiction:   According   to   Li   Tung   therefore,   there  

were  two  cars  which  were  overturned  (the  car  in  front  of  

Paris   Studio   on   Royal   Street   and   the   car   which   was  

pushed  from  the  direction  of  Lai  Min  restaurant  towards  

L’Amicale,   on  Royal   Street).  However,   according   to  Azad  

Thupsee,   one   car   on   fire   was   blocking   the   entrance   of  

L’Amicale  on  Royal  Street  while  another  car  was  pushed  

to   block   the   entrance   of   L’Amicale   on   Emanuel   Anquetil  

building.  

 

181. Furthermore,  the  testimony  of  Li  Tung  does  not  match  what  can  be  

seen   from  the  picture  which  was   taken  by  a  press  photographer  at  

around  19  20.  That  either  means  that  Mr.  Li  Tung  lied,  that  the  police  

tampered   with   the   evidence   and   pieces   of   evidence   or   that   press  

photographer  Mr.  Chetty  lied.  

 

182. In  any  case,  our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  he  could  not  possibly  have  

seen  where  the  car  was  pushed  to  from  where  he  was  standing.    

 

183. He  then  proceeded  to  go  back  to  the  restaurant,  met  his  family  and  

they  all  went  home  in  the  car  of  the  relatives.  

 

111

184. The  next  morning,  he  went  to  ‘L’Amicale’  first  to  check  out  if  his  car  

was   still   there,   then   he   allegedly   went   to   seek   legal   advice   at   the  

office  of  a  barrister.    

 

Contradiction:   Sir   Hamid   Moollan   Q.C   gives   witness   Li  

Tung  the  lie  on  this  and  states  that  in  fact  Li  Tung  came  to  

see  him  between  the  26th  and  28th  May  1999.  

 

185. He   then  went   to   the  police   station  where  he  stated   that  he  did  not  

see  anybody  nor  did  he  suspect  anybody  regarding  the  arson  of  his  

car.  

 

Alarming   points:       His   reasons   given   at   the   Assizes   for  

having   lied   to   the   police   are   fear   of   reprisal   and  

concerning  the  insurance  of  his  car.  This  does  not  stand  

to  reason:    

 

- If  he   feared  reprisal,  why  did  he   then  come  depone  at   the  

assizes?    

- As  regards  the  insurance,  he  explained  that  he  thought  that  

if  he  were  to  say  he  saw  the  people  who  set  fire  to  his  car,  he  

would   not   be   able   to   make   an   insurance   claim   since   the  

incident  would  count  as  riot.  However  the  converse  is  true:  In  

a   case   such   as   the   present   one,   if   nobody  was   identified   as  

setting  fire  to  Li  Tung’s  car,  the  incident  would  be  classed  as  

riot  and  he  would  not  get  any  cover  from  his  insurance.  

 

186. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  in  fact,  Li  Tung  became  aware  of  that  

fact   which   is   why   he   came   at   the   assizes   and   stated   that   he   saw  

people   setting   fire   to  his   car.   It  was  ONLY   to  be  able   to  make  an  

insurance  claim.  

 

187. Our   enquiry   has   revealed   that   in   fact   he  was   compensated   for   the  

car.    

 

112

188. Mr.  Li  Tung  was  therefore  a  crucial  eye  witness.  However  it  needs  to  

be   taken   into   consideration   that   whatever   he   claims   to   have   seen  

was  in  a  very  particular  context:    

 

a. It  was  dark.  

b. There  were  many  people  around.  

c. There  was  a  riotous  situation.  

 

Is  Mr.  Li  Tung  trustworthy?  

 

189. Taking  all  of  the  above  into  consideration,  it  cannot,  by  any  stretch  of  

imagination,  be  said  that  the  deposition  of  Mr.  Li  Tung  is  capable  of  

belief.    

 

190. A  few  more  examples  of  blatant   lying  by  Mr.  Li  Tung  are  worthy  of  

mention:  

 

Lying  under  oath  

‘Q.   Lisez  a  haute  voix  ce  que  vous  lisez.  

 A.   Le  probleme,  j’ai  pas  porté  mes  verres  pour  voir.  

 

Q.   Vous   n’avez   pas   porté   vos   verres?   Vous   portez   des  

verres  ?  

A.   Non,  je  ne  porte  pas.’  

 

Lying  in  statement  

‘Q.   Dans   votre   premiere   enquete   que   vous   aviez   donné,  

datant  le  25  Mai  1999,  vous  aviez  dit  mo  pas  fine  sorti,  

est-­ce  que  c’est  vrai  ?  

A.   C  ‘est  pas  vrai  votre  Seigneurie  

 

Q.   Mais  vous  admettez  avoir  dit  ca  a  la  Police  ?  

A.   Dans   l’enquete   que   j’avais   donné   –   la   premiere  

enquete  ?  

 

Q.   Oui  

113

A.   Oui.   Et   puis   j’ai   dit   que   je   suis   retourné   une   heure  

temps  apres.  Apres  que  je  suis  rentreé  dans  Shamping,  

une  heure  temps  apres  je  suis  retourné,  a  ce  moment,  

je  vois  ma  voiture  completement  brulée.  

 

Q.   Ca  aussi,  vous  avez.....  ?  

A.   C’est   pas   vrai,   parce   qui   j’ai   caché   une   bonne  

partie.’  

 

 Lying  to  the  insurance  

‘Q.   Hier   losque   vous   deposez,   lorsque   l’avocat   de   la  

Poursuite   vous   a   posé   une   question,   entre   autres  

raisons,   pourquoi   vous   n’avez   pas   dit   la   vérité  

pendant   tout   ce   temps   la,   pendant   un   an   et   demie,  

vous   avez   dit   que   vous   avez   peur   que   l’assurance   ne  

vous   rembourse   pas   pout   votre   voiture.   Est-­ce   qu’on  

peut   savoir   aujourd’hui,   Monsieur   Li   Tung,   lorsque  

vous   avez   fait   une   declaration   a   l’assurance,   quelle  

declaration  vous  avez  dit  concernant  votre  voiture  ?  

A.   Meme  declaration  que  j’ai  donné  a  la  Police,  premiere  

declaration.  

 

Q.   C’est  a  dire  ?  

A.   C’est   a   dire   que   je   suis   retourné   une   heure   temps  

apres  sur  le  lieu,  ma  voiture  a  completement  brulé.  

 

Q.   Donc,  vous  avez  menti  a  l’assurance  ?  

A.   Pas  menti.’  

 

191. It  is  clear  that  he  lied  to  the  insurance  company  in  order  to  get  paid  

but  he  maintained  under  oath  that  he  did  not  lie.  Which  is  which?  He  

was  clearly  manipulating  the  facts.  

 

192. Can  the  lives  of  two  persons  (Zulu  and  Fico)  and  that  of  their  families  

be  shattered  based  on   the  evidence  of  a  witness  who  blatantly   lied  

under  oath  and  admitted  hiding  the  truth  from  the  police?  

114

193. Even   if   it   is  assumed  that  Mr.  Li  Tung  has  seen  what  he  claimed  to  

have  seen,  the  following  shows  why  he  cannot  be  believed:  

 

Alarming   point:   The   next   morning,   he   learns   from   the  

radio   that   people   have   died   in   the   fire   on   the   previous  

night.   However,   when   he   goes   to   the   police,   he   says  

nothing   about   what   he   saw   although   the   police   were  

appealing   for   witnesses   to   come   forward.   At   that   stage  

nobody  had  been  arrested  yet  but  the  only  concern  of  Li  

Tung  was  that  if  he  were  to  tell  to  the  police  what  he  saw,  

he  might  not  get  the  insurance  money  for  his  car.  This  is  

the   kind   of   person   whom   we   are   dealing   with   here.   7  

people  have  died  on  the  previous  night.    A  day  of  national  

mourning   was   declared.   According   to   him,   he   saw  

everything.  He  could  have  helped  the  police  from  day  one.  

But  he  only  cared  about  his  insurance.  

 

194. Another  point  of  great  concern  is  the  dock  identification  of  Zulu  and  

Fico  by  Mr.  Li  Tung.  Dock  identification,  which  involves  the  witness  

indetifying   the  accused   for   the   first   time   in   court  has  been  held  by  

various  decisions  of   the  Court  of  Appeal   in  England  to  be  a  serious  

irregularity.  

 

195. The   following   is   an   analysis   of   the   technical   aspect   of   dock  

identification:  

 

From   Archbold   Criminal   Pleading,   Evidence   and  

Practice  (2008)  Paragraph  14-­42:  

 

‘The   identification   of   a   defendant   for   the   first   time   in   the  

dock   is   both   an   undesirable   practice:   see   R.   v.  

Cartwright,10   Cr.App.R.   219,   CCA;   and   a   serious  

irregularity:  see  Edwards  v.  Queen,  The(2006)  150  S.J.  570,  

PC.    

 

 

115

Although   a   trial   judge   retains   a   discretion   to   permit   a  

dock   identification,   it   is   submitted   that   in   practice   the  

exercise  of  such  discretion  should  not  even  be  considered  

unless:  

 

(a)   a   defendant   has   refused   to   comply   with   a   formal  

request  to  attend  an  identification  parade,  and    

 

(b)  none  of  the  other  identification  procedures  has  been  

carried  out  as  a  result  of  the  defendant's  default.    

 

As   the   police   may   adopt   a   satisfactory   identification  

procedure   in   respect   of   a   refractory   defendant   (see,   for  

example,   the  method  adopted   in  R.   v.   Kennedy   (unreported,  

March  20,  1992),  ante,  §14-­39),  it  is  now  difficult  to  conceive  

of  circumstances  in  which  a  trial  judge  would  permit  a  dock  

identification.   Where   a   witness   volunteers   a   dock  

identification,  the  summing  up  should  make  it  plain  that  

such  evidence  is  undesirable;  that  the  proper  practice  is  

to   hold   a   parade;   and   that   the   evidence   should   be  

approached   with   great   care:   Williams   (Noel)   v.   Queen,  

The[1997]   1   W.L.R.   548,   PC.   If   a   jury   is   not   discharged  

after   such   an   identification,   it   is   incumbent   upon   the  

judge  to  direct  them  to  give  it  little  or  no  weight:  Edwards  

v.  Queen,  The  ([2006]  UKPC  23),  ante.  

 

(…)  

 

For   an   analysis   of   the   dangers   of   dock   identifications,   see  

Holland  (James)  v.  HM  Advocate,  The  Times,  June  1,  2005,  PC,  

where   it   was,   nevertheless,   held   that   permitting   such   an  

identification  was  not  per  se  incompatible  with  the  right  to  a  

fair  trial.    

 

 

116

Factors   to   weigh   in   the   equation   of   whether   an   accused  

had   had   a   fair   trial   would   include   whether   he   was   legally  

represented,  what   directions   the   judge   had   given   about  

identification   evidence   and   the   significance   of   the  

contested   evidence   in   the   context   of   the   prosecution  

evidence  as  a  whole.’25  

Decision  of  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  

in    the  case  of  Goldson  and  Devon  McGlashan  v.  The  

Queen  (Jamaica)  [2000]  UKPC  9  (23rd  March,  2000):  

15.   In   England,   the   obligations   of   the   police   to   hold  

identification   parades   are   contained   in   a   Code   of   Practice  

issued  by   the  Home  Secretary  pursuant   to   section  66  of   the  

Criminal  Evidence  Act  1984.  The  language  of  the  Code  is  not  

for   present   purposes   material,   because   there   is   no   similar  

code   in   Jamaica,   but   its   effect   was   summed   up   by  

Hobhouse  L.J.  in  Reg.  v.  Popat  [1998]  2  Cr.App.R.  208,  215  

by   saying   "There   ought   to   be   an   identification   parade  

where  it  would  serve  a  useful  purpose".  

16.  Their  Lordships  will  give   two  English  examples  of   this  

principle  being  applied  in  cases  in  which  there  was,  as  here,  

a   dispute   over   whether   the   accused   was   in   fact   a   person  

known,  or  sufficiently  known,  to  the  witness.  […]    

18.  Their  Lordships  consider  that  the  principle  stated  by  

Hobhouse   L.J.   in  Reg.   v.   Popat  [1998]   2   Cr.App.R.   208,  

215,  that  in  cases  of  disputed  identification  "there  ought  

to   be   an   identification   parade   where   it   would   serve   a  

useful   purpose",   is   one   which   ought   to   be   followed.   It  

follows   that,   at   any   rate   in   a   capital   case   such   as   this,   it  

would  have  been  good  practice  for  the  police  to  have  held  an  

identification   parade   unless   it   was   clear   that   there   was   no  

point  in  doing  so.  

25 Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (2008) Paragraph 14-42

117

This   would   have   been   the   case   if   it   was   accepted,   or  

incapable  of  serious  dispute,  that  the  accused  were  known  to  

the   identification  witness.  At   least   in  the  case  of  McGlashan,  

that  does  not  appear  to  have  been  the  position  here.    

19. But the question is, as their Lordships have said, whether

the failure to hold a parade has caused a serious miscarriage of

justice. In Reg. v. Conway and Reg. v. Fergus the convictions

convictions were set aside as unsafe and unsatisfactory

because, in the absence of a parade, the evidence of

identification adduced by the prosecution was too weak to

support a conviction. In  Conway  the previous acquaintanceship

claimed by the witnesses was relatively slight and even its

credibility was impaired by the woman's initial denial that she

knew the man at all. In  Fergus  the claimed previous knowledge

was very slight indeed. Furthermore, in  Conway  the accused

had, with the backing of the Code, requested an identification

parade and it had been refused.

196. The  Counsel  for  both  Zulu  and  Fico,  rightly  objected  that  Mr.  Li  Tung  

proceeds  to  a  dock  identification  of  the  accused  parties.  

 

197. Arguments   were   heard   but   the   objection   was   set   aside   by   the  

Learned   Judge.   The   Learned   Judge   stated   that   it   was   not   an  

identification  exercise  but  a  mere  recognition  since  witness  Li  Tung  

had  seen  the  Amicale  Four  at  the  Preliminary  Enquiry.  The  Learned  

Judge  was  plainly  wrong.  

 

Was  it  a  recognition  or  an  identification?  

 

198. The   Learned   Judge   based   himself   on   the   fact   that  Mr.   Li   Tung   had  

seen   Zulu   and   Fico   previously   when   they   were   brought   at   the  

Preliminary  Enquiry.  

 

 

 

 

118

199. The  following  is  an  extract  of  an  authority  on  this  particular  issue:  

 R  v  Fergus  [1992]  Crim  LR  363:    

‘As   to   the   first   of   those   matters,   this   court   of   course  

recognizes   that   a   distinction   is   to   be   drawn   between   the  

case  of  the  complainant  who  claims  to  have  recognized  his  

assailant   as   a   person   whom   before   the   commission   of   the  

alleged   offence   he   already   knew   well   and   that   of   the  

complainant   who   claims   to   identify   as   his   assailant   a  

person  whom  he  has  never  seen  before  the  incident.    

 

Even   in  a   recognition  case   there   is  a  danger   that  an  honest  

witness   may   be   mistaken.   According   to   the   well-­known  

authority  of  Turnbull  [1977]  QB  224  or  65  Cr  App  Rep  132  at  

either   pages   228   or   138:   ".   .   .   even   when   the   witness   is  

purporting   to   recognize   someone  whom   he   knows,   the   jury  

should   be   reminded   that   mistakes   in   recognition   of   close  

relatives  and  friends  are  sometimes  made."  Nevertheless  the  

danger  of  mistake  in  such  a  case  is  obviously  less  than  in  an  

identification  case:  see  the  judgment  of  the  court  in  Byrne  &  

Ors  (unreported)  decided  on  11th  April  1990.    

 

Where   the   complainant   claims   to   recognize   a   person  

whom   he   does   not   know   well   but   has   only   seen  

previously  once  or  on  a   few  occasions  his  evidence  may  

well   require   to   be   treated   as   evidence   of   identification  

rather   than   recognition.   The   better   he   knows   the  

defendant   the   more   the   jury   are   entitled   to   treat   his  

evidence   as   that   of   recognition,   but   of   course   the  

opposite  is  also  true.’  

[…]  

In   our   view  one   previous   sight   of   Joseph   Fergus   did   not  

make   this   a   case   of   recognition;   it   remained   a   case   of  

identification.    

119

It   follows  that  we  conclude  that   the  Recorder  was  wrong  to  

allow  the  question,  "Do  you  see  in  court  the  person  to  whom  

you  have  referred  as  Joseph  Fergus"  to  be  asked.  The  answer  

was   of   course   a   critical   part   of   the   prosecution's   case  

against  this  appellant.  

It  follows  that  there  was  a  material  irregularity  in  the  trial  of  

this   appellant,   which   renders   this   conviction   unsafe   or  

unsatisfactory.’  

 

200. Therefore,  the  fact  that  Mr.  Li  Tung  had  seen  the  accused  parties  at  

the  Preliminary  Enquiry  did  in  no  way  mean,  for  the  purposes  of  the  

law,  that  it  was  a  recognition  exercise.  What  mattered  was  whether  

Mr.  Li  Tung  had  seen  the  accused  parties  prior  to  the  23rd  May  1999.    

He  had  never  seen  them  before  that.  

 

201. To  make  matters  worse,  witness  Li  Tung  stated  that  he  had  seen  the  

pictures  of  the  accused  parties  in  the  newspapers.  

 

202. What   is  of  an  even  greater  concern   though   is   the   fact   that  no  clear  

warning  was  given  to  the  jury  in  respect  of  the  dangers  of  relying  on  

a  dock  identification.  

 

203. It  transpires  from  the  above  authorities  that  dock  identification  is  a  

serious  irregularity  which,  on  its  own,  renders  a  conviction  unsafe  or  

unsatisfactory.  

 

204. The  Court   of  Appeal  which  had   the  opportunity   to  offer   redress   in  

fact  made  matters  worse.  

 

205. Whilst   recognising   that   the   identification   of   Li   Tung   ought   to   be  

disregarded,  the  Court  of  Appeal,  went  on  to  state  that  the  jury  still  

had  the  evidence  of  Azad  Thupsee  which  incriminated  the  Zulu  and  

Fico.  

 

120

206. What   the  Court  of  Appeal   therefore  did,  was   to  substitute   itself   for  

the  jury;  something  which  cannot  and  should  not  have  been  done.  

 

207. The  reason  why  it  should  not  have  been  done  is  simply  because  the  

Court  of  Appeal  could  not  possibly  have  known  whether  the  jury  did  

believe  Azad  Thupsee  as  regards  Zulu  and  Fico.    

 

208. It  could  well  have  been  the  case  that  the  members  of  the  jury  relied  

solely  on  the  evidence  of  Li  Tung  to  incriminate  those  two.  Therefore  

the   Court   of   Appeal,   whilst   acknowledging   that   the   dock  

identification   should   be   disregarded,   was   clearly   wrong   in  

substituting   itself   for   the   jury   but   unfortunately,   for   financial  

reasons,  no  appeal  was  made  to  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  

Council.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

121

Chapter 12: Time is of the essence!  

209. According   to   our   enquiry,   at   18   47   hrs,   an   entry   was   made   by   a  

senior  officer  in  the  visitors  book  of  Pope  Henessy  police  station.  It  

read  ‘Area  quiet’.    

 

210. Thereafter,  within  a   few  minutes   (approx  18  50  hrs  –  18  51  hrs)  a  

wardress  came  at  the  Station  to  ask  permission  to  make  a  call.  

 

211. An   NIU   officer   who   had   earlier   left   the   station   to   go   and   enquire  

about   the   situation   in   front   of   Chancery   House   ran   back   to   the  

station.  (approx  18  52  hrs)  

 

212. Two  Fire  Brigade  FC  supporters  who  were  in  the  parking26  in  front  

of   St   Louis   Cathedral  made   obscene   gestures   at   a   group   of   Scouts  

Club   fans  who  were   coming   from   Lislet   Geoffroy   Street   onto   Pope  

Henessy  Street.  One  of  the  supporters  managed  to  flee  and  the  other  

went  into  the  direction  of  the  police  station  to  seek  refuge.  The  latter  

was  chased  by  a  mob  of  Scouts  Club  hooligans.  

 

213. Within   a   minute   (approx   18   53   hrs),   the   supporter   barged   in   the  

station   shouting   for  help.  The  door  of   the   station  was   immediately  

closed  behind  him.  

 

214. The  mob,   feeling   that   the   police   was   in   fact   offering   protection   to  

somebody  who  had  insulted  them  was  infuriated.  

 

215. The   situation   degenerated   (approx   18   55   hrs)   so  much   so   that   an    

autocycle  was   set   alight   and   then  ushered   towards   the  door  of   the  

police  station  and  projectiles  were  hurled  at  the  police  station.  

 

216. There   was   no   power   supply   interruption   and   the   police   radio  

network  was  functioning  properly.  

 

26 The parking in 1999 was found in front of the Cathedral, along Pope Henessy Street

122

217. The  whole  situation  lasted  not  more  than  ten  minutes.  

 

218. SP  Ramen  caused  a  unit  of  the  SSU  to  go  to  the  Pope  Henessy  Police  

Station:  

 

To   note:   According   to   the   version   of   the   police,   the   Fire  

Brigade  was   delayed   in   its   response   to   attend   the   arson   at  

L’Amicale   because   allegedly,   there   was   a   group   of   persons  

who  was   blocking   the   entrance   of   the   Fire  Brigade   Station.  

This  cannot  be  the  case  since  the  SSU  convoy  which  reached  

Pope  Henessy  police  station  passed  the  Fire  Brigade  Station.  

If   there  were  people  who  were  blocking   the  entrance  of   the  

Fire   Brigade   Station,   the   arrival   of   the   SSU   convoy   would  

have  caused  them  to  be  dispersed.  

 

219. There  is  undisputed  evidence  to  the  fact  that  L’Amicale  was  already  

on  fire  before  19  00.  

 

220. According  to  the  version  of  the  prosecution,  Mounou,  Bébé  and  Fico  

had  all  participated  in  the  incidents  at  Chancery  House.  

 

221.  Mounou  and  Bébé  have  also  stated  in  their  respective  affidavits  that  

they  were  in  front  of  Chancery  House  at  some  point  and  when  they  

came  back  up  Lislet  Geoffroy  Street   they  went  down  Pope  Henessy  

Street   towards   the  police  station.  There  reaching   they  saw  that   the  

situation   could   potentially   get   out   of   hand   and   they   decided   to   go  

home.    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

123

To  note:  It  takes  a  minimum  of  three  to  four  minutes,  by  car,  

to  get  to  L’Amicale  from  Pope  Henessy  police  station.  On  foot,  

it   takes   a  minimum  of   fifteen  minutes.  On   that   assumption,  

even  if  we  were  to  believe  witness  Azad  Thupsee,  Mounou  and  

Bébé  would  have   reached  L’Amicale  after  19  00   taking   into  

consideration   the   time   it  would   have   taken   to   regroup   and  

walk   back   from   Pope   Henessy   police   station   to   New   Court  

House  where  allegedly,  according  to  Thupsee,  the  Sumodhee  

parked  their  car  and  thereafter  drive  to  Amicale.  Fico  would  

have  reached  some  11  –  12  minutes  later.  

 

222. The   timings   inserted   in   the   missing   documents27   would   have  

therefore   clearly   demonstrated   that   three   of   the   four   innocent  

convicts   who   were   present   at   the   MFA   incidents   and   the   Pope  

Henessy  Police  Station  incidents  (18  47  hrs  onwards)  could  not  have  

been  at  L’Amicale  at  the  time  it  was  set  on  fire  (At  latest  19  00  hrs).  

 

223. It   is   to   be   noted   that   witness   Azad   Thupsee   who   was   present   on  

Pope   Henessy   street   watching   the   MFA   incidents   conveniently  

missed  the  whole  Pope  Henessy  police  station  episode  (which  took  

place   not   more   than   50   metres   down   the   road).   The   reason   is  

because  if  he  admitted  being  there  and  stated  that  he  witnessed  the  

Pope  Henessy  police  station  incident  (which  he  did  in  fact  witness),  

he   could   not   then   state   having   been   at   L’Amicale   to   witness   the  

arson  being  committed.      

27 See Chapter entitled ‘Convenient Disappearance’

124

Part  3:  Mysteries    

1. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  a  few  mysteries  surrounding  the  arson  at  

L’Amicale,  none  of  which  were  given  any  consideration  by  the  police  

investigators.    

 

2. These  mysteries,   for   unknown   reasons,  were  not   canvassed  before  

the   trial   court   either   and   even   after   the   convictions   of   the  Amicale  

Four  no  explanations  were  sought   from  any  quarters   in  an  attempt  

to  elucidate  those  mysteries.  

 

3. What   can   be   said  with   certainty   though,   is   that   due   consideration  

needs  to  be  given  to  these  facts  since  they  confirm,  together  or  their  

own,  the  cold  hard  truth  that  there  is  more  to  the  Amicale  arson  than  

just  four  unhappy  football  fans  or  even  hooligans  for  that  matter.  

 

4. The  mysteries  that  are  directly  connected  with  the  Amicale  building  

itself  are:    

 

a. A  mutilated  body  which  was  found  on  the  second  floor  

of  the  building.  

 

b. A  red  electrical  wire  which  was  found  tied  to  the  second  

floor   balcony   and   according   to   various   testimonies,  

some  people  escaped  the  building  using  the  said  wire.  

 

c. The   safe   of   the   game   house   which   was   found   several  

metres  away  from  the  place  where  it  was  kept  and  more  

importantly,  it  was  forced  open  and  empty.  

 

5. A   second   issue  which  will   be  brought   to   your   attention  under   that  

part   concerns   the   convenient   and   mysterious   disappearance   of  

various  documents  which  would  have  disculpated  the  Amicale  Four    

as  the  authors  of  the  arson.  

125

 

Chapter  13:  The  mutilated  body  

 

6. Of   the   seven   bodies   that   were   found   in   the   Amicale   building,   the  

body   of   Mohamed   Fawzee   Abdool   Hakim   deserves   particular  

attention.  

 

7. It  was  at  about  22:40  on  the  23rd  May  1999,  when  Dr.  B.  H.  Surnam,  

Police   Medical   Officer,   accompanied   by   Mr.   René,   Assistant  

Superintendant  of  Police,  Chief  Inspector  Fullee  together  with  other  

members   of   the   police   force   and   fire   services   entered   the   Amicale  

building.  

 

8. Six   bodies   were   found   on   the   first   floor   of   the   building.   Upon  

autopsy,  none  of  the  bodies  were  found  to  bear  any  kind  of  fractures  

whatsoever.  The  only  body  to  be  found  on  the  second  floor  was  that  

of  Mohamed  Fawzee  Abdool  Hakim.    

 

9. In  his  report1  dated  2nd  August  1999  concerning  the  examination  of  

the  Amicale  Building,  Dr.   Surnam  made   the   following   observations  

regarding  the  body  of  Mr.  Hakim:  

 

‘On  the  2nd  floor:  

There   was   the   body   of   a   charred   male   adult   in   a   supine  

position   with   partial   eventration   of   the   abdominal  

organs’  (Emphasis  added)  

 

10. The   single   fact   that   the   body   of   Mr.   Hakim   presented   a   ‘partial  

eventration’  of   the  abdominal  organs  raises  serious  questions  as   to  

what  could  have  happened  to  Mr.  Hakim  prior  to  his  death.  

 

11. No   explanations   were   provided   as   to   what   could   have   caused   the  

‘partial  eventration’  of  the  abdominal  organs.  

1 Annexure 1

126

 

12. However,  the  autopsy  report2  of  the  body  of  Mr.  Hakim  should  have  

sent  alarm  bells  ringing.    

 

13. That   autopsy   report,   which   was   never   given   the   attention   it  

deserves,   noted   that  Mr.  Hakim  bore   the   following   injuries,   among  

others:  

‘3rd  degree  burns  of  front  of  chest  with  a  large  opening  over  

right   flank   measuring   30   x   13   cm   with   exposure   of   right  

diaphragm  and  liver.  

 

Dislocation  of  right  elbow.  

Fracture   dislocation   of   right   wrist,   right   hand   being  

reduced  to  a  stump.  

Dislocation  of  left  elbow.  

Fracture  dislocation  of  left  wrist,  left  hand  being  reduced  to  

a  stump.  

Fracture  lower  end  of  right  femur.  

Fracture  dislocation  of  right  ankle,  right  foot  being  reduced  

to  a  burnt  mass.  

Fracture  lower  end  of  left  femur.  

Fracture   dislocation   of   left   ankle   with   left   foot   being  

reduced  to  a  burnt  mass.’  

14. The  internal  examination  of  the  head  of  the  deceased  revealed  even  

more  fractures:  

 

i. ‘Fracture  right  temporal  bone.  

ii. Fracture  outer  table  right  upper  occipital  bone.  

iii. Fracture  right  lower  occipital  bone.  

iv. Curved  fracture  right  frontal  bone.’  

2 Annexure Autopsy report

127

 

 

 

 

128

 

15. Could   those   injuries   have   been   caused   prior   to   the   death   of   Mr.  

Hakim?  If  so,  what  caused  them?  Why  was  Mr.  Hakim  alone  on  the  

second  floor?  All  these  questions  have  remained  unanswered  so  far.  

 

16. It  was  of   capital   importance   to   investigate   further   into   the   injuries  

borne   by  Mr.   Hakim   for   the   simple   reason   that   the   version   of   the  

prosecution  was   to   the   effect   that   the  Amicale  building  was   set   on  

fire   from   the   outside:   at   no   point   in   time   did   any   of   the   convicted  

persons  go  into  the  building.  

 

17. What   then  caused  could  have  caused  so  many   fractures?  No  debris  

was  found  on  the  body  of  Mr.  Hakim  which  could  have  accounted  at  

least  for  some  of  the  fractures.  

 

18. Further,  the  body  was  found  on  the  second  floor  therefore  excluding  

any   possibility   that   the   fractures   were   caused   by   a   fall   from   the  

upper  floor.  

 

19. At  this  juncture,  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  level  of  carbon  monoxide  

present  in  each  of  the  different  bodies:  

 

 

 

 

 Name  of  Deceased   Level  of  Carbon  Monoxide  

Catherine  LAI  YAU  TIM   82%  

Eugenie  LAI  YAU  TIM   72%  

Jean  Alain  LAW  WING   46.8%  

Jeannette  RAMBORO   50.6%  

Yeh  Ling  LAI  YAU  TIM   77%  

Fawzee  Abdool  HAKIM   27%  

Babooram  LUCKOO   36.4%  

 

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20. The   level   of   carbon  monoxide  present   in   the  body  of  Mr.  Hakim   is  

considerably   lower   than   the   levels   found   to   be   present   in   the   six  

other  bodies.  

 

21. The  significance  of  this  is  that  Mr.  Hakim  did  not  breathe  in  as  much  

smoke  as  the  other  victims.    

 

22. One  question  begs  to  be  asked:  

 

Could   he   have   been   beaten   up   and   left   for   dead   by   those   who  

perpetrated  the  attack?  

 

23. Why  would  that  be?  To  get  grasp  of  the  possible  motive  behind  such  

a  barbarous   act,   it   is   necessary   to  understand  who  Mr.  Hakim  was  

and  why  he  was  in  the  building.  

 

24. Mr.  Mohamed  Fawzee  Abdool  Hakim,  nicknamed  ‘mangouse  ’  was  42  

years  old  at  the  time.  

 

25. Our   enquiry   has   revealed   that   Mr.   Hakim   has   been   working   at  

l’Amicale  for  over  a  number  of  years  prior  to  the  23rd  May  1999.  

 

26. Mr.  Hakim  was  the  person  who  used  to  open  and  close  the  premises.  

He  knew  the  building  inside  out.    

 

27. He  was   in   fact   a  man   of   trust   for  Mr.     Jean   Noel   Lai   Yau   Tim,   the  

owner   of   the   game   house,   so   much   so   that   he   was   even   offered  

accommodation  just  a  few  metres  away  from  the  gamehouse  by  Mr.  

Lai  Yau  Tim.    

 

28. In  return,  we  have  been  told  by  those  who  were  close  to  Mr.  Hakim,  

that   the   latter   was   most   devoted   in   his   work   and   despite   his  

relatively  small  built,  he  would  not  hesitate  to  put  his  life  at  risk  for  

that  of  his  boss.  

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29. He  was  also  the  type  of  person  who  would  not  hesitate  to  voice  out  

any   suspicious   transaction   in   the   casino   and   bring   same   to   the  

attention  of  Mr.  Lai  Yau  Tim.  

 

30. Mr.  Hakim  knew  all  the  regulars  of  the  casino.  

 

31. Mr.  Hakim  also  knew  most  of  the  notorious  criminals  of  the  region.  

This  included  some  of  the  members  of  the  Escadron  de  la  mort.3  

 

32. We  know  also  for  a   fact   that  members  of   the  said  squadron,  and  in  

particular   Bahim   Coco,   were   ruthless   killers   who  would   not   falter  

when  it  came  to  taking  the  life  of  an  innocent  witness.  

 

To  note:     During   a   hold   up   which   the   escadron   de   la  

mort   perpetrated  at   Flic   en  Flac,  Bahim  Coco  

nearly   killed   a  member   of   his   own   team  who  

had  uttered  his  name  in  public.  

 

33. Whether   Mr.   Hakim   was   savagely   beaten   up   and   left   for   dead  

because   he   tried   to   protect   the   interests   of   his   boss   or  whether   it  

was  simply  because  whoever  perpetrated   the  attack  was  known  to  

Mr.   Hakim   who   spotted   them,   only   an   in   depth   enquiry   will  

enlighten  us.  

 

34. What   we   do   know   is   that   at   the   time,   no   explanation   were   ever  

sought  or  given   to  account   for   the  mutilated  body  of  Mr.  Hakim  or  

worse,  that  aspect  was  not  even  inquired  into.  

 

35. The  medico  legal  report  itself  failed  to  address  certain  key  issues:  

 

i. Whether  the  damage  on  the  items  of  clothing  worn  

by  the  deceased  matched  the  damage  to  the  body.  

3 see Chapter entitled 30

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ii. Assessment   of   the   burn   patterns   on   the   clothing  

and   on   the   body   (What   do   the   burn   patterns   say  

about  the  victim's  actions?  About  their  interaction  

with   the   fire?   About   the   fire   dynamics?   Do   burn  

patterns  on  body  and  clothing  match?)    

 

iii. Whether   the   body   injured   prior   to   the   fire?   If   so,  

how  might  the  injuries  have  happened.  

 

36. Furthermore,  the  following  were  not  even  carried  out:  

 

a. Internal   tissue   tests   for   drugs,   poisons,   and   volatile  

hydrocarbons    

b. External   tissue   burn   patterns   analysis   (including  

determination  of  antemortem  and  postmortem  wounds)    

c. External   tissue   near   burns   tests   for   vital   chemical   or  

cellular  response  to  burns    

d. Additional  x-­‐rays  in  view  of  the  number  of  fractures.  

e. Determination  of  the  mechanism  of  burn  injury  (thermal  

or  chemical;  radiant,  conducted,  or  convected)    

f. Trace   evidence   and   burn   pattern   testing   of   the   body,  

clothing,  and  personal  effects    

g. Ignitable   liquid   testing   as   appropriate   on   the   body,  

clothing,  and/or  effects  and  items  found  with  the  body    

 

 

37. The  position  of  the  body  should  have  also  aroused  suspicion  since  it  

was  most  unusual  for  a  victim  in  an  arson  case  to  be  found  lying  on  

the  back,  unless  there  had  been  foul  play  prior  to  the  arson.  

 

To  note:  The   following   is  an  extract  of   the  Court  proceedings   in  relation   to  

the  production  of  the  photos  of  the  bodies:  

 

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‘Court:   Yes,  but   the   fact   that   the  medical   evidence  or  what  

not,   it   is   not   disputed   either   by   the  Defence   that   7  

persons   died.  What   is   the   purpose   of   putting   these  

photos?  

 

Mrs.  A.  Narain  Ramloll:   Well,   it   is   a   practice  made   before   the  

Court   it  would  show  what  exactly   the  

effect  of  the  …  bodies  and  the  position  

in  which  those  bodies  were  found.  

 

Court:     Do  you  mean  the  Court  will  have  to  investigate  into  

that  as  well?  

 

Mrs.  A.  Narain  Ramloll:   It   means   that   when   the   Members   of  

the   Jury   will   have   the   medical   legal  

reports  in  front  of  them  and  they  look  

at   the   photographs,   they   will   ….  

Exactly.  

 

Court:     What  the   Jury   is   interested  to  know  is   that   they  

died  in  the  fire.  That  is  all.’  

 

38. Had   the   photographs   been   given   due   consideration,   the   unusual  

position  of   the  body  would  have  been  noticed  straight  away.   It   is  a  

matter   of   great   regret   that   the   photographs   were   played   down   in  

such  fashion  by  the  Learned  Judge.  

 

39. Thereafter,  the  medico  legal  report  was  not  given  any  consideration  

whatsoever   by   the   investigators   despite   the   fact   that   it   clearly  

aroused  suspicion.  There  was  no  line  of  enquiry  into  the  suspicious  

death  of  Mr.  Hakim.  An  enquiry  would  have  revealed:  

 

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a. Whether   the   position   where   the   body   of   Mr.   Hakim  

was   found   could  be   expected   given   the  occupancy  of  

the  structure.    

b. If  not,  how  Mr.  Hakim  got  there  and  why?  

c. That   there  was  no   relation  between   the  place  where  

the  victim  was  found  and  the  seat  of  fire.  

 

40. This  enquiry  has  commissioned  a  pathologist  to  review  the  medico-­‐

legal   report   of   all   of   the   victims,   their   toxicology   reports   and   the  

depositions  of  the  doctors  in  Court  and  in  the  light  of  his  review,  to  

answer  certain  specific  questions  put  by  him.  

 

41. The  report  of  the  pathologist  is  herewith  annexed  in  its  entirety.4  Its  

conclusion  reads  as  follows:  

 

 

‘In  view  of  the  non  specified  ante  or  post  mortem  burning  or  charring  and  the  skull  fractures  which  are  certainly  non-­fire  related,   I   am   of   the   opinion   that   the   skull   fractures   in  particular   were   due   to   injuries   sustained   prior   to   the  burning  and  that,  at  the  time  of  fire,  victim  was  lying  on  the  floor   over   the   back   and  was   dying   or   in   an   unconscious  state   from   his   head   injuries   and/or   other   undetected  body  injuries.’  

 

42. We  have  also  retained  the  services  of  a  British  Forensic  Pathologist  

to  provide  us  with  a  review  of  the  autopsy  report  of  Mr.  Hakim.  This  

report  is  due  to  be  communicated  to  us  in  three  months  time.  The  CV  

of  Dr.  Hamilton  of  forensic  access,  is  herewith  annexed.  

   

              4 Annexe 11

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Chapter 14: The red wire    

43. The   existence   of   the   red  wire   is   confirmed   by   Farook  Mahadoo,   a  

worker   of   L’Amicale   who   has   been   interviewed   in   respect   of   the  

present  enquiry.  

 

44. As  per  the  police  plan  and  photographs,  the  red  wire  was  in  fact  tied  

to  the  balcony  of  the  second  floor  of  the  Amicale  Building  on  Royal  

Street.  

 

45. The  red  wire  formed  part  of  a  much  larger  coil  of  electrical  wire.  

 

46. A   senior   police   officer   who   was   among   the   first   police   officers   to  

arrive   on   the   locus   explained   how   persons  who  were   still   trapped  

inside   Amicale   upon   his   arrival   were   escaping   from   the   building  

using  the  red  wire.    

 

47. However,  this  cannot  be  correct  for  the  following  reasons:  

 

a. Witness  Seeneevassen  who  deponed  at  the  Preliminary  

Enquiry  and   the  Assizes  made  mention  of   the   fact   that  

he  had  asked  everybody  who  was  on  the  second  floor  to  

get  down.  

 

b. It   also   does   not   stand   to   reason   since,   if   the  wire  was  

really   a   means   of   escape   for   those   trapped   inside   the  

building,  it  was  tied  to  the  second  floor  rather  than  the  

first   floor  of   the  building   thus,  making   it   a  much  more  

difficult  operation.    

 

c. If   the  wire  was   really   tied  by   those   trapped   inside   the  

building,   the  person/s  who   tied   the  wire   is/are  heroes  

who   helped   saved   many   lives.   However,   it   was   never  

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known  who  tied  the  said  wire.  Nobody  came  forward  be  

it  to  the  police  or  the  press.  

 

d. Nobody  who  climbed  down  the  building  using  the  wire  

came  forward  either.  

 

e. All  those  who  had  used  the  red  wire  on  that  fateful  day  

have  so  far  remained  mysterious  and  anonymous.    

 

f. Last   but   not   least,   our   enquiry   has   revealed   from   an  

undisputable   source5   that   the   coil   of   electric   wire   did  

not   come   from   within   the   Casino.   It   had   in   fact   been  

brought  in,  seemingly,  for  a  specific  purpose.  

 

48. What  has  been  confirmed  is  that  there  were  people  who  came  down  

using   that   red   wire.   The   same   people   were   allowed   to   leave   the  

scene  immediately  and  no  questions  were  asked  to  them,  no  identity  

requested   and   they  were   not   even   asked   to  wait   on   the   spot   until  

contact  details  were  taken  from  them.  

 

Who  are  these  people?      

 

49. The  police  enquiry  ought  to  have  revealed  same.    

 

To  note:  The  attention  of  the  police  should  have  been  drawn  

to  the  effect  that  the  red  wire  was  tied  on  the  balcony  just  a  

few  metres  away  from  the  spot  where  the  body  of  Mr.  Hakim  

had  been  found.    

 

50. Our  enquiry  has  led  us  to  conclude  that  those  who  used  that  red  wire  

did   in   fact   participate   in   the   arson   at   L’Amicale   and   used   the   red  

wire  to  escape  from  the  locus.  

5 That person shall come forward when there is a new enquiry or a commission of enquiry in regards to the case.

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Chapter 15: An empty safe  

51. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  that:  

 

a. the  safe  which  was  located  inside  the  office  of  the  first  

floor   of   the   game   house   had   been   displaced.   No  

explanation   has   ever   been   forthcoming   as   regard   to  

this  disturbing  fact.  

 

b. According   to  our  enquiry,   a  bunch  of  keys,   including,  

according   to   our   enquiry,   the   keys   of   the   safe,   were  

found   on   the   shoulder   of   the   late   Mrs.   Lai   Yau   Tim  

when   in   fact   they   should  have  been   in   the  drawer  of  

the   table   inside   the  office.  Again,  no  explanation  was  

given  to  this  rather  strange  fact.  

 

c. The   safe   was   found   opened   with   all   of   its   contents  

missing.   No   tests   were   carried   out   to   ascertain  

whether   there   was   any   debris   inside   the   safe   and  

whether   the   debris   was   what   remained   of   the  

contents  of  the  safe.    

 

d. The   safe   could   not   have   been   displaced   by   water  

pressure  of  the  fire  fighters.  

 

52. The   building   remained   under   police   surveillance   and   there   is   no  

reason  to  believe  that   the  safe  had  been  displaced  by  unauthorised  

individuals  after  the  police  had  taken  possession  of  the  building.    

 

 

 

 

137

 

   

 

 

 

 

138

53. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  that:  

 

a. The  safe  appeared  to  have  been  forced  open  (as  can  be  

seen   from   the  picture)   indicating   that   a   robbery  was  

carried  out.  

b. Sustained  fire  damage  in  its  interior  part.  

c. Was  emptied  of  all  its  contents  and  valuables  without  

leaving  any  trace.  

 

54. The   investigation  did  not   address   this   rather   troubling   issue   at   all.  

No  questions  were  asked  to  the  owner  of  the  game  house  as  regards  

to:  

a. The   location   of   the   safe   in   the   building   prior   to   the  

arson.  

b. The  capacity  of  the  safe  to  resist  fire.  

c. The   amount   of  money  which  was   kept   in   the   safe   at  

the  time  of  the  arson.  

d. Other  valuables  which  were  kept  in  the  safe.  

 

55. If  a  robbery  was  carried  out  at  the  game  house,  then  the  whole  case  

theory   for   the   prosecution   (that   convicts   1   –   4   set   fire   to   Amicale  

from  the  outside)  does  not  stand  good.  

 

56. Instead,  what  appears  to  have  been  the  case  is  that  whoever  carried  

out  the  robbery  also  committed  the  arson  and  used  Scouts  Club  fans  

as  a  cover  for  their  horrendous  act.  

 

57. Again,  the  police  did  not  even  consider  this  as  a  possibility.    

 

58. A   proper   investigation   should   in   fact   have   shed   the   light   on   this  

issue.  

 

 

 

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Chapter 16: Convenient disappearance  

59. Our   enquiry   has   revealed   highly   distressing   and   alarming   facts  

concerning   the   unavailability   /   disappearance   or   otherwise   of  

documents,  which  would  have:  

 

Shed  a  different  light  on  the  events  of  the  fateful  day  of  

the  23rd  May  1999.  

 

Exculpated  the  four  convicts.  

 

Helped  to  find  the  real  culprits.  

 

Helped  the  authorities  to  draw  lessons  for  the  future.  

 

60. The   disappearance   of   documents   or   evidence   in   relation   to   any  

highly   publicised   case   is   bound   to   have   a   negative   impact   in   the  

mind   of   the   average   citizen   since   it   creates   suspicion   and   loss   of  

confidence  in  the  judicial  system.  

 

61. The   following   documents   containing   information   pertaining   to   the  

May  and  June  1999  could  not  be  retraced:  

 i. Diary  Book  of  Pope  Henessy  Police  Station  

 

ii. Occurrence  Book  of  Pope  Henessy  Police  Station  

 

iii. Visitors  Book  of  Pope  Henessy  Police  Station  

 

iv. Reports  of  the  National  Intelligence  Unit  (NIU).  

 

v. Diary  Book  of  Trou  Fanfaron  Police  Station  

 

 

140

vi. Books   in   relation   to   the   movement   of   the   Groupe  

d’Intervention   de   la   Police   Mauricienne   (GIPM)   and   the  

Special  Mobile  Force  (SMF).  

 

vii. Logbook  of  the  Information  Room  (IR)  of  the  police.    

 

viii. Diary  books  of  Baie  du  Tombeau  Police  Station  and  Baie  

du  Tombeau  CID.  

 

ix. Diary   books   of   Albercrombie   Police   Station   and  

Albercrombie  CID.  

 

x. Diary  book  of  Plaine  Verte  Police  Station  

Diary  Book  of  Pope  Henessy  Police  Station  

 

62. Diary   and   Occurrence   books   are   documents   of   major   importance  

which  are  kept  in  any  police  station.  Precise  information  relating  to  

all  the  events  happening  in  the  area  falling  under  the  jurisdiction  of  

the  police  station  as  well  as  to  events  within  the  police  station  itself  

are  recorded  in  these  books.    

Facts  

 

63. On  the  23rd  May  1999,  Pope  Henessy  police  station  was  attacked  by  a  

group  of  hooligans  of  the  Scouts  Club.  

 

64. Pope   Henessy   police   station,   like  many   police   stations   throughout  

the   island  was   on   red   alert   on   that   day.   Our   enquiry   has   revealed  

that   Pope   Henessy   Police   Station   was   undermanned   on   that  

particular   day   despite   the   fact   that   this   particular   station   was  

responsible  for  the  majority  of  government  buildings  of  the  area  as  

well  as  the  District  and  Supreme  Courts.    

 

65. On   the  24th  May  1999,  all   the  police  officers  who  were  working  on  

the  previous  day  were  suspended  from  duty.  They  were:    

 

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(i) Sergeant  1077  Gengadoo    

(ii) Constable  2466  Soobhug  

(iii) Constable  5503  Soodhun  

(iv) Constable  6106  Gopaul  

 

66. Entries  were  made   in   the   Diary   Book   and  Occurrence   Book   of   the  

23rd  May  1999  concerning  the  following:  

 

(i) The   names   of   the   officers   who   were   on  

duty  on  the  23rd  May  1999.  

(ii) The  numerous  calls  received  from  IR  and  

other  Police  Station.  

(iii) The   time   at   which   the   station   was  

contacted  by   the   Fire  Brigade   requesting  

police  escort   to  attend  a   fire  near  Mohun  

hotel.  

(iv) The   time   at   which   a   police   vehicle   was  

detailed   to   escort   the   Fire   Brigade   to  

attend  the  said  fire.  

(v) The  time  at  which  the  police  vehicle  came  

back   from   its   duty   and  whether   the   Fire  

Brigade   did   in   fact  manage   to   attend   the  

fire.  

(vi) The  time  at  which  an  officer  from  the  Fire  

Brigade   inserted   an   entry   in   the   book   of  

Pope  Henessy  police  station.  

(vii) The   time   information  was   received   from  

IR   of   potential   trouble   near   or   around  

Chancery  House.  

 

(viii) The   exact   time   at   which   an   NIU   officer  

came   from   Chancery   House   to   inform  

Pope   Henessy   Police   Station   of   the  

situation.  

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(ix) The  exact  time  at  which  a  wardress  called  

in   at   the   station   and   the   purpose   of   her  

visit  (allegedly  to  make  a  phone  call).  

(x) The   time   at   which   a   supporter   of   Fire  

Brigade  FC  with  his   football   team     jersey  

on   him   burst   into   the   police   station  

alleging   that   a   group   of   Scouts   Club  

supporters  is  chasing  him.  

(xi) The   time   at   which   the   group   of   Scouts  

Club   supporters   arrived   in   front   of   the  

police  station.    

 

67. In   every   police   station   there   is   a   Visitors   Book   which   is   kept   for  

entries   made   by   senior   officers   under   whose   responsibility   the  

police  station  falls.  

 

68. According   to  our  enquiry,  at  18  47,  an  entry  was  made  by  a  senior  

officer   in   the   visitors   book   of   Pope   Henessy   police   station.   It   read  

‘Area  quiet’.    

 

Comments  

 

69. The  above  entries  would  have  confirmed  our   findings  that  convicts  

Mounou  and  Bébé  could  not  by  any  stretch  of  imagination  be  present  

at  L’Amicale  at  the  time  the  arson  was  committed  since  they  were  in  

front  of  the  Police  station  at  the  time  a  motorcycle  was  set  on  fire  at  

the  said  Police  station.  

 

70. It  is  the  policy  during  riots  that  Fire  Brigade  units  are  escorted  when  

they   attend   a   call.   The   entries   in   the   Diary   Books   would   have  

confirmed  the  time  at  which  Pope  Henessy  Police  Station  received  a  

call  from  the  Fire  Brigade  informing  them  that  they  needed  an  escort  

to   attend   an   incident   whereby   a   bus   was   set   on   fire   near   Mohun  

Hotel.    

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71. In   fact,   according   to   our   enquiry,   that   incident   occurred   before  

18:15,   thus   indicating   that   there  were  numerous   seats  of   incidents  

which  occurred  before  the  arson  at  L’Amicale.    

 

72. The   Visitors   book   would   have   mentioned   the   name   of   the   senior  

officer  who  visited  the  station  and  confirm  the  existence  of  the  entry  

made  at  18:47.  

 

73. The   Diary   Book   would   have   confirmed   whether   in   fact   the   police  

station  was  undermanned.  

 

74. The   Diary   Book   would   have   revealed   the   name   of   the   Police  

wardress  who  came  in  the  station.  

 

75. The  Diary  Book  would  have  given  the  name,  age  and  address  of  the  

Fire  Brigade  supporter  who  came  to  seek  refuge  in  the  police  station  

since  he  was  escorted  back  home  by  the  police  officers.  

 

76. It  would   have   also   revealed   the   name   of   the   representative   of   the  

Fire  Brigade  who  was  made   to   insert  an  entry   in   the  diary  book  of  

Pope  Henessy  police  station  and  the  time  of  that  entry.  

 

77. It  would  have  also  shown  the  movement  of  the  police  vehicle  which  

escorted  the  Fire  Brigade.    

 

The  reports  of  the  National  Intelligence  Unit  (NIU)  

Facts  

 

78. There  were  3  NIU   reports   in   relation   to   the  match  of   the  23rd  May  

1999:  Scouts  Club  v/s  Fire  Brigade.  They   related   the  apprehension  

of  the  NIU  that  there  might  well  be  incidents  on  that  same  day.  

 

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79. It   was   even   stated   in   one   of   the   reports   that   a   group   could  

potentially   stir   up   trouble   on   that   day   irrespective   of   the   result   in  

the  football  match.  

 

80.  The   first   report   caused   the   police   to   liaise   with   the   Ministry   of  

Defence  as  well  as  the  Ministry  of  Youth  and  Sports  in  an  attempt  to  

avoid  any  potential  mishaps  on  that  day.  This  report  also  prompted  

the  police  to  do  the  following:  

 

a. Making  use  of  36  cameras  in  the  stadium  as  well  as  the  

other  cameras  in  the  car  parks  of  the  stadium.  

b. Having   a   very   strong   police   presence   at   the   stadium  

including   police   photographers   and   members   of   the  

GIPM.  

 

81. In  its  second  report  the  NIU  made  a  list  of  potential  trouble  makers  

for  the  23rd  May  1999.  It  was  proposed  in  the  report  that  CCID  and  

other  CID  officers  keep  a  24  hour  watch  on  these  persons.    

 

82. The  third  report  dated  19th  May  1999  related  to  information  that  at  

least  12  motorcycles  which  had  been  stolen  had  forged  registration  

plates  affixed  on  them  and  that  these  motorcycles  were  going  to  be  

used  for  incidents  feared  and  mentioned  in  the  first  report.  

 

83. Finally,   the  NIU  was   in  possession  of   information   to   the  effect   that  

players   of   Scouts   Club   and   Fire   Brigade   had   been   contacted   by  

betting  people  in  an  attempt  to  fix  the  results.  In  fact,  in  the  morning  

of  the  23rd  May  1999,  Week  End  newspaper  relayed  the  information.  

 

84. According   to   the   standard   practice  within   the  NIU,   the  NIU   officer  

posted  at  a  specific  place  or  at  a  public  activity  must  inform  his  desk  

at  Line  Barracks  (which  is  located  in  a  separate  building)  if  there  is  

any  information  which  is  going  against  the  normal  course  of  events.    

 

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85. On  the  said  day,  the  NIU  desk  was  undermanned.  

 

86. All   the   call   logs   between   the   NIU   agents   and   the   desk   at   Line  

Barracks   in   respect   for   the   23rd   May   1999   have   remained  

untraceable.  

 

Our  Comments:  

 

87. These  three  reports  are  now  missing  but  at  the  time,  after  they  had  

been  prepared,  they  were  sent  to  the  relevant  authorities  for  actions  

to  be  taken  accordingly.    

 

88. However,  we  note  with  great  concern  that  only  the  first  report  was  

acted  upon.    

 

89. The   second   report  was   given  only   cursory   attention   in   as  much   as  

there  was  no  24  hr  watch  but  the  persons  mentioned  in  the  list  were  

only   looked  for   in  the  stadium;  and  when  the  authorities  found  out  

that   those  persons  were  not  on   the  stadium,  no   further  action  was  

taken  in  order  to  ascertain  the  location  of  their  whereabouts.    

 

90. In   relation   to   the   third   report,   no   action  whatsoever  was   taken  by  

the   Authorities.   Our   enquiry   has   in   fact   revealed   that   some   of   the  

trouble  makers  responsible   for   the  arson  at  L’Amicale,  Mona  Store,  

Marcel   Store   and   incidents   at   MTC   were   travelling   in   a   group   on  

motorcycles  /  autocyles.6    

 

91. As  regards  to  the  information  received  by  the  NIU  and  relayed  to  the  

relevant  authorities  on  the  eve  of  the  game  as  to  the  match  fixing,  no  

actions  were  taken.  

 

92. It   is   important   to   note   that   there  were   three   NIU   agents   at   Plaine  

Verte  near  Khadafi  Square  as  from  17:00  hrs  on  the  23rd  May  1999.  

6 See Chapter entitled ‘The bigger picture’

146

 

93.  The  call  logs  of  the  NIU  would  have  revealed:  

 

i. The   time   at   which   a   crowd   started   to   gather   at    

Khadafi  Square  

ii. The   time   at   which   the   crowd   left   towards  

Chancery  House.    

iii. These  calls  logs  would  have  also  revealed  whether  

the  Information  Room  was  effectively  made  aware  

of  this  fact  and  would  have  shed  the  light  as  to  who  

was  responsible  for  the  fact  that  no  prompt  actions  

were  taken.      

 

Diary  Book  of  Fanfaron  Police  Station  

 

94. The   Diary   book   of   Fanfaron   police   station   cannot   be   retraced.   It  

would  have  indicated:  

 

i. The  number  of   police   officers  who  were  on  duty  

on  that  day.  

 

ii. The  number  of    police  officers  who  were  on  extra  

duty  at  L’Amicale  actually  signed  in  to  go  to  work  

at  L’Amicale.  

iii. The   exact   time   at   which   the   police   station  

received  the  news  regarding  road  traffic  problems  

and  the  remedial  actions  which  were  taken.  

 

iv. The   exact   time   at   which   police   officers   were  

posted  at  different  corners  of  Royal  Street.  

 

v. The  exact  time  at  which  they  were  informed  of  the  

incidents   in   the  area,   including   the  setting  of   fire  

in  a  bus  near  Mohun  Hotel.  

147

 

vi. The   time   the   assault   on   one   of   the   police   officer  

posted  on  Royal  Street  was  reported.  

 

vii. The  time  at  which  CI  Fullee  came  to  the  station  to  

arm  himself.  

 

viii. The   time   at   which   smoke   was   first   seen  

emanating  from  Amicale.    

 

ix. The   time   at   which   the   information   was   relayed  

from   Fanfaron   Police   Station   to   the   Information  

Room  of  the  police.  

 

x. Whether  any  police  vehicle  was  used  to  convey  a  

police  officer  to  hospital  before  18  30  hrs.  

 

xi. Whether   any   weapons   from   Fanfaron   went  

missing  on  the  23rd  May  1999.  

 

xii. Whether  any  bus  was  stoned  on  Militaire  Road.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

Comments:  

 

95. All   of   the   above   information  would   have   been   obtained   (from   the  

Diary  Book  of  Fanfaron  Police  Station  and  would  have  enabled   the  

light  to  be  shed  on  all  of  these  issues  had  the  diary  book  of  the  Police  

station  been  found.  In  fact,  our  enquiry  has  revealed  that:  

 

148

a) The  police  station  of  Fanfaron  was  undermanned.  

b) Out  of  the  7  –  8  police  officers7  who  were  paid  to  perform  

extra  duty  at  L’Amicale,  only   two  were  actually  present  at  

L’Amicale.  

c) The  police  station  was  made  aware  of  road  traffic  problems  

at   around   17   40   and   Police   Officers   were   posted   at   the  

corners  of  Royal  Street  around  1800.  

d) One   of   these   officers,  was   assaulted  minutes   after   he  was  

posted.  

e) At   about   the   same   time,   information   was   received   at   the  

police   station   to   the   effect   that   a  bus  was   set   on   fire  near  

Mohun  Hotel.  

f) CI  Fullee  came  at  the  station  to  arm  himself  before  18  30.  

g) The   arson   at   L’Amicale   occurred   very   shortly   after   a   fire  

was   set   near   Mohun   Hotel   and   the   same   group   who   was  

involved  in  that  incident  were  also  involved  in  the  arson  at  

L’Amicale.  

h) A  weapon  of   the  police  station  was  reported   to  have  gone  

missing  on  the  23rd  May  1999.  

 

 

 

Books  in  relation  to  movement  of  the    GIPM  and  the  SMF  

 

96. The   books   showing   the   movement   of   the   GIPM   and   the   SMF   are  

untraceable.    

 

Logbook  of  Information  Room  

 

97. The  Information  Room  is  the  equivalent  of  the  nervous  system  of  the  

Police  Force.    

7 Five of these police officers are Caporal 1686 Dunputh, Constable 2079 Emrith, Constable 3805 Seeneevassen, Constable 1481 Nuckchady, Constable 6317 Pookhun

149

98. The  telephone  logbook  of  the  Information  Room  would  have  shown  

all   the   calls   emanating   to   and   from   the   Information   Room   thus  

indicating  the  precise  timings  as  the  events  unfolded.  

 

Comments:  

 

99. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  the  Information  Room  was  appraised  

of   the   incidents   which   broke   out   as   the   match   was   drawing   to   a  

close.   Since   it   was   common   knowledge   that   supporters   of   Scouts  

Club  gather  at  Khadaffi  Square  after  football  games  played  at  Anjalay  

Stadium,  was  the  information  that  incidents  broke  out  relayed  to  the  

relevant   authorities?   If   this   was   done,   why   no   actions   had   been  

taken  to  increase  police  presence  in  the  area?  

 

100. The   logbook   would   have   also   shown   at   what   time   the   incidents  

broke   out   in   Port   Louis   i.e   Stoning   of   a   bus   along   Military   Road,  

Setting  of  a  bus  on  fire  near  Mohun  Hotel,  Arson  at  L’Amicale,  Arson  

at  Mona  Store,  Arson  at  Marcel  Store,  Incidents  at  MTC,  Incidents  at  

MFA.  

 

101. Further,  the  logbook  of  the  Information  Room  would  have  disclosed  

at  what  time  the  Information  Room  was  made  aware  of  the  fact  that  

a   riotous  crowd  was  moving   from  Khadaffi  Square   to   the  offices  of  

the  Mauritius  Football  Association.  

 

102. The   logbook   of   the   Information   Room   would   have   also   shown   at  

what   time   the   Information   Room   requested   the   support   from   the  

SSU.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

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103. It   would   also   have   revealed   a   host   of   other   information   which,  

together  with  the  other  findings  of  the  report,  would  have  confirmed  

amongst  other  facts:  

 

a. The   inaction  of   the  authorities  and   the  consequences  

of  the  inaction.  

b. There   were   two   sets   of   disturbances:   One  

spontaneous   from   hooligans   and   a   second   one   well  

prepared  and  premeditated   from   terrorists  using   the  

hooligans  as  cover.  

 

104. That  logbook  has  unfortunately  disappeared.    

 

Diary  Book  of  Baie  du  Tombeau  Police  Station  and  CID  

 

105. Yet   another   convenient   disappearance   is   that   of   the  Diary  Book   of  

Baie  du  Tombeau  Police  Station.    

 

106. That   Diary   Book  would   have   shown   the  movement   of   the   persons  

who   had   been   arrested   in   connection   with   the   arson   at   L’Amicale  

and  who  were  at  some  point  in  time,  for  no  specific  reason,  brought  

to  Baie  du  Tombeau  Police  Station.  Our  enquiry  has  revealed  acts  of  

police  brutality  on  the  person  of  Fico.8  

 

Diary  books  of  Albercrombie  Police  Station  and  CID  

 

107. Those  diary  books  would  have  confirmed  amongst  other  issues:  

 

a. The   time   at   which   incidents   started   in   that  

area.  

b. The   way   in   which   the   witnesses   who  

implicated   the   convicts   were   treated   prior   to  

incriminating  the  convicts.  

8 Annexe 12

151

c. That   the   police   investigation   was   flawed   in  

respect   of   the   way   in   which   identification  

procedures  were  carried  out.  

 

Diary  book  of  Plaine  Verte  Police  Station    

 

108. The  Diary  Book  of  Plaine  Verte  police  station  has  also  conveniently  

gone  missing.  Our  enquiry  has   revealed   that  at  a   first   instance,   the  

page  of  the  Diary  Book  relating  to  the  23rd  May  1999  had  been  torn  

off  from  the  book.  Thereafter,  the  book  itself  had  disappeared.    

 

109. That  Diary  Book  would  have  confirmed:  

 

a. The  time  at  which  a  crowd  started  to  gather  at  Khadafi  

Square.  

b. The   time   when   the   crowd   started   to   thin   out   and  

regroup  at  Vallee  Pitot.  

 

The  records  from  the  Fire  Brigade  

 

110. The   records   from   the   Fire   Brigade   station   would   have   revealed  

among  other  facts:  

 

a. The  number  of  officers  affected  at  the  station  on  that  

day  and  the  equipment  that  were  at  their  disposal.  

b. The   numerous   phone   calls   received   even   before   the  

match  started  and  the  nature  of  these  phone  calls.  

c. The   time  at  which  a   first  unit  of   the  Fire  Brigade   left  

the  station  to  attend  a  request  at  La  Nicoliere.  

d. The  time  at  which  the  Fire  Brigade  received  a  request  

to   attend   a   fire   whereby   a   bus   had   been   set   ablaze  

near  Mohun  Hotel.  

e. The   time   at   which   the   Fire   Brigade   contacted   Pope  

Henessy  police  station  to  request  for  police  escort.  

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f. The  time  at  which  a  unit  left  the  station  to  attend  the  

request  and  the  time  it  came  back.  

g. Whether  above  request  was  in  fact  attended  to  and  if  

not,   the   reasons   given   why   it   was   not   possible   to  

attend.  

To   note:   Our   enquiry   has   revealed   that   in   fact   the   Fire  

Brigade   could   not   attend   the   request   since   a   second  

police  escort  requested  from  Trou  Fanfaron  police  station  

did  not  turn  up.  

 

h. The   time  at  which   the  Fire  Brigade  was  appraised  of  

the  fire  at  L’Amicale..  

 

i. The  time  at  which  the  Fire  Brigade  responded  to  that  

request.  

 

j. Whether  there  was  in  fact  a  riotous  crowd  which  was  

blocking  the  entrance  /  exit  to  the  barracks.  

 

k. The   time   at   which   a   unit   of   the   SSU   came   to   the  

barracks  to  escort  the  Fire  Brigade  to  Amicale.  

 

l. The  number  officers  who  were  involved  in  fighting  the  

fire  at  L’Amicale.  

 

The  diary  book  of  Vallee  Pitot  Police  Station  

 

111. The  diary  book  of  Vallee  Pitot  police  station  would  have  revealed  the  

time   at   which   there   were   incidents   in   Vallee   Pitot   and   in   front   of  

Vallee   Pitot   Police   station   and   why   they   did   not   intervene   when  

Marcel  Store  was  being  looted.  

 

153

112. It  would   also   have   revealed   the   name   of   the   officers  who  were   on  

duty  at   that   time  and  the  response  which  ensued  following  reports  

of  the  incidents  at  Vallee  Pitot.  

 

113. There  would   also   have   been   entries  made   following   attendance   of  

police  officers  to  the  said  incidents.  From  these  entries,  the  following  

would  have  been  known:-­‐  the  number  of  persons  who  were  involved  

in  the   incidents,   the  means  of   transport  which  were  used  and  their  

modus  operandi.    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Part 4: Disconcerting facts  

114. Our   enquiry   has   revealed   a   number   of   other   disconcerting   facts.  

Those  deserving  particular  attention  are:  

 

a. The   fact   that   the  Presiding   Judge  at   the  Assizes  had  attended   the  

funeral  of  a  few  of  the  victims.  

b. The  fact  that  a  member  of  the  jury  was  excluded  only  by  reason  of  

his  religious  belief.  

c. The  exclusion  of  the  conclusions  of  the  expert  from  Scotland  Yard.  

d. That   there   had   been   numerous   threatening   letters   sent   to   the  

owner  of  L’Amicale  de  Port  Louis  prior  to  the  23rd  May  1999.  

e. The  situation  in  relation  to  witness  Raymond  Zamir  

f. The  evidence  of  Mrs.  Raymonde  Latour  regarding  Salim  Goonjaria.  

g. The  Police  misleading  the  Prime  Minister.  

h. The  situation  regarding  the  Fire  Services  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

155

Chapter 17: Impartiality of trial judge?  

115. It  had  been  reported  that  the  judge  who  subsequently  presided  the  

Assizes  in  the  Amicale  case,  raised  a  court  session  in  order  to  attend  

the  funeral  of  some  of  the  victims.    

 

116. Senior  Counsel  Yusuf  Mohamed  who  appeared  for  convicts  Mounou  

and  Bébé  also  revealed  to  us  during   the  course  of  our  enquiry   that  

when   he   became   aware   that   the   said   judge  who   had   attended   the  

funeral  of  the  victims  of  the  Amicale  arson  was  going  to  preside  the  

assizes  in  the  Amicale  case,  he  immediately  took  steps  to  inform  the  

then  Chief  Justice  ,  Hon.  Pillay,  of  the  perception  of  bias.  

 

117. In  fact,  Senior  Counsel  has  revealed  how  he  went  to  seek  advice  from  

one  of  the  most  senior  barristers  in  the  profession.  

 

118. He  was  advised  to  see  the  Chief  Justice  and  explain  the  situation  so  

that  another   judge  be  appointed.  Mr.  Mohamed  S.C  did  in  fact  meet  

the  Chief  Justice  and  explained  how  it  was  in  the  interests  of  justice  

that  another  judge  be  appointed  as  to  limit  any  perception  of  bias.  

 

119. However,   the   request   of   Senior   Counsel   was   turned   down   by   the  

Chief  Justice  thus  putting  the  Judge  himself  in  a  difficult  position.  

 

120. There  is  no  doubt  that  the  perception  of  bias  was  a  real   issue  since  

by   attending   the   funeral   of   some   of   the   victims   of   the   arson,   the  

presiding   judge   could   not   subsequently   be   perceived   as   being  

impartial.  

 

121. Impartiality   normally   denotes   the   absence   of   prejudice   or   bias.   Its  

existence  or  otherwise  can  be  tested  in  various  ways.  

 

156

122. In   England,   the   Courts   have   distinguished   between   a   subjective  

approach,  that  is,  endeavouring  to  ascertain  the  personal  conviction  

or   interest   of   a   given   judge   in   a   particular   case   –   and   an   objective  

approach  –   that   is   determining  whether   the   said   judge  has  offered  

sufficient  guarantees  to  exclude  legitimate  doubt  in  this  respect.9    

 

123. In  applying   the  subjective   test,   the  Court  has  consistently  held   that  

the  personal  impartiality  of  a  judge  must  be  presumed  until  there  is  

proof  of  the  contrary.  

 

124. The  Courts  have  recognised  the  difficulty  in  establishing  impartiality  

based   on   the   subjective   approach   and   for   this   reason   have,   in   the  

vast   majority   of   cases   raising   impartiality   issues,   focussed   on   the  

objective  test.    

 

125. However,   there   is   no  watertight  division  between   the   two  notions,  

since   the   conduct   of   a   judge  may  not   only  prompt  objectively  held  

misgivings  as   to   impartiality   from  the  point  of  view  of   the  external  

observer   (the  objective   test)  but  may  also  go   to   the   issue  of  his  or  

her  personal  convictions  (the  subjective  test).  

 

126. As   to   the   second   test,   it   means   determining   whether,   quite   apart  

from  the  personal  conduct  of  any  of  the  members  of  that  body,  there  

are  ascertainable  facts  which  may  raise  doubts  as  to  its  impartiality.  

In  this  respect,  even  appearances  may  be  of  some  importance.    

 

127. In   the  Amicale   case,  whether  viewed   from  a  subjective  or  objective  

approach,   it   cannot  be   said   that   the  presiding   judge  was   impartial,  

having  himself   raised   a   court   session   in   order   to  be   able   to   attend  

the  funeral  of  the  victims.  

 

 

 

9 Disciplinary and Regulatory Proceedings – 7th Edition – Brian Harris OBE QC

157

Chapter 18: Exclusion of a potential member

of the Jury  

128. The   following   is   an   extract   of   the   Court   proceedings   of   the   assizes  

dated  6th  November  2000  as  regards  to  the  empanelling  of  the  jury:  

 

                     ‘MR.  REGISTRAR:-­     Gokulsing  Kamal  Prakash  Anand  

 

COURT:-­     No.   36   –   Gokulsing   Kamal   Prakash   Anand,   Finance  

Officer.  

 

MY.  Y.  MOHAMED  SC  :-­   I  do  not  challenge  him,  My  Lord.  

 

COURT  :-­   The  State?  

 

MR.  S.  BOOLELL  :-­   No  challenge,  My  Lord.  

 

COURT  :-­   Anything  to  say?  

 

MR.  GOKULSING  KAMAL  PRAKASH  ANAND:-­  This  is  not  my  real  

name  

 

COURT  :-­   This  is  not  your  real  name?  What  is  your  real  name,  

then?  

MR.  GOKULSING  KAMAL  PRAKASH  ANAND  :-­   I   have   changed  

my  name  to  Jamaloodeen  Mohamed.  

 

COURT  :-­   Pardon!  

 

MR.  Y.  MOHAMED  SC  :-­   Jamaloodeen  Mohamed  

 

COURT  :-­     Any  document  to  show  that?  

 

158

MR.  Y.  MOHAMED  SC  :-­  This  is  not  a  ground  for  challenge.  

 

COURT  :-­   When  was  that?  

 

MR.  GOKULSING  KAMAL  PRAKASH  ANAND  :-­   (Inaudible)  

COURT  :-­   Then   you   should   have   informed   the   Master   and  

Registrar.  

MR.  GOKULSING  KAMAL  PRAKASH  ANAND  :-­   (Inaudible)  

COURT  :-­   No,  it  is  an  ID,  in  your  ID  card  –  well,  he  is  an  officer  

of  the  Supreme  Court.  

 

MR.  Y.  MOHAMED  SC  :-­   He  is  an  officer  of  the  Supreme  Court?  

 

MR.  REGISTRAR  :-­   He  was  working  here.  

 

COURT  :-­   He  was  working  here  –  you  don’t  want  him?  

 

MR.  Y.  MOHAMED  SC  :-­   No,  I  want  him.  

 

MR.  BOOLELL  :-­   So,  we  are  challenging.’  

129. It   is  clear   from  the  above  extract   that   this  potential  member  of   the  

jury  was  challenged  and  subsequently  excluded  from  the  jury    panel  

because   he   had   changed   his   name   from   Gokulsing   Kamal   Prakash  

Anand  to  Jamaloodeen  Mohamed.  

 

130. Counsel   for   the   prosecution   had   no   objection   when   that   person  

stated   his   name  was  Gookulsing  Kamal   Prakash  Anand.  When   that  

same   person   stated   he   had   changed   his   name,   Counsel   for   the  

prosecution  challenged  him.  

 

131. No   reason   had   to   be   given   by   Counsel   for   the   prosecution   for   the  

challenge  but  it  is  most  evident  from  a  reading  of  the  above  why  that  

particular  member  of  the  jury  was  excluded.    

 

159

Chapter 19: The expert from Scotland Yard  

132. The   government   of   Mauritius   retained   the   services   of   Mr.   John  

Michael   Donohue,   Detective   Chief   Superintendant   of   Police,   of  

Scotland  Yard  in  order  to  investigate  into  the  Amicale  arson  and  also  

the  Ghorah  Issac  drive  by.  

 

133.  Mr.   Donohue   arrived   in   Mauritius   on   13th   September   1999   and  

stayed  for  a  period  of  four  and  a  half  weeks.  

 

134. During   the   period   of   assignment,  Mr.   Donohue  was   provided  with  

free  board  and   lodging,   free  return   first  class   ticket   from  the  UK  to  

Mauritius,  logistics  support  including  personal  computer,  telephone,  

mobile  phone,  fax,  chauffeur  driven  car  as  well  as  a  team  of  persons  

on  whom  he  could  count  for  support.  

 

135. He  was  also  given  Rs.  25,  000  per  week  and  a   further  Rs.  2000  per  

week  to  cater  for  out  of  pocket  expenses.    

 

136. Mr.   Donohue   was   therefore,   clearly   expected   to   help   the   local  

investigation  in  a  substantive  manner  in  view  of  the  treatment  which  

was  accorded  to  him.  

 

137.  However,  the  findings  of  Mr.  Donohue  were  never  made  public  and  

the   preliminary   enquiry   had   already   started   before   Mr.   Donohue  

finished  his  assignment.  

 

138. In   fact,   our   enquiry   has   revealed   that   the   Detective   Chief  

Superintendant   of   Police  was   puzzled   as   regards   to   the  manner   in  

which  the  investigations  in  both  the  L’Amicale  and  the  Ghorah  Issac  

case  were  carried  out.  

 

160

139. Our  enquiry  has  also  revealed  that  Mr.  Donohue  in  fact  subscribed  to  

the  view  of  the  French  military  officer10  who  described  the  attack  on  

L’Amicale   as   a   well   premeditated   crime   of   a   military   or   terrorist  

nature  rather  than  spontaneous  actions  from  hooligans.  

 

140. It  has  also  come  to  light  that  the  police  officers  who  were  requested  

to  work  with  Mr.  Donohue  were  not  forthcoming  to  help  the  latter  in  

his  endeavour  to  find  the  truth.  

 

141. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  Mr.  Donohue  was  taken  aback  by  the  

fact   that   the   preliminary   enquiry   had   already   started   when   the  

investigation   itself   contained   so   many   flaws,   grey   areas   and  

unanswered  questions.  

 

142. Mr.   Donohue   was   also   puzzled   by   the   fact   that,   even   if   witness  

Thupsee  was  to  be  believed,  the  police  made  no  effort  whatsoever  to  

try  and  look  for  those  persons  who  were  responsible  for  fabricating,  

carrying,  distributing  and  hurling  the  Molotov  cocktails.    

 

143. Finally,  Mr.  Donohue  was  highly  critical  of  the  whole  of  the  scientific  

aspect  of  the  investigation.  

 

144. What  is  a  matter  of  huge  concern  however,  is  that  the  investigators  

did  not  deem  it  necessary  to  wait  for  the  conclusions  of  Mr.  Donohue  

and   started   the   preliminary   enquiry   even   before   Mr.   Donohue  

completed  his  mission.    

 

145. What  was  the  point,  then,  of  retaining  the  services  of  Mr.  Donohue  if  

no  use  whatsoever  was  made  of  his  findings?  

 

 

 

 

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161

Chapter 20: Threatening letters  

146. Our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  prior  to  the  23rd  May  1999,  the  owner  

of  the  casino  had  on  many  occasions  received  letters  of  threats  from  

anonymous  sources.  

 

147. Those  letters  urged  Mr.  Jean  Noel  Lai  Yau  Tim  to  cease  the  operation  

of  the  casino.  

 

148. Mr.  Jean  Noel  Lai  Yau  Tim  left  the  matter  in  the  hands  of  the  police.  

However,   no   action   whatsoever   was   taken   by   the   relevant  

authorities  at  the  time.  

 

149. Be  that  as   it  may,  after  the  arson  of  the  23rd  May,  the   least  that  the  

investigators   ought   to   have   done  was   to   open   a   line   of   enquiry   as  

regards   to   the   anonymous   letters   previously   received.   This   was  

never  done  or  even  considered  by  the  police.  

 

150. The   fact   that   threats   had  been  made   to   the   owner   of   L’Amicale   on  

many  occasions  well  before   the   tragic  events  of   the  23rd  May  1999  

goes  to  show  that  there  were  some  people  or  a  group  of  individuals  

who  clearly  had  issues  as  regards  to  the  operation  of  that  particular  

game  house.  

 

151. This   also   reinforces   the   idea   that   the   arson   of   L’Amicale   was   a  

premeditated  act.      

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

162

Chapter 21: Raymond Zamir  

152. Three   key   workers   who   were   working   at   the   gamehouse   at   the  

material  time  were  not  heard  by  the  court  at  the  Preliminary  inquiry  

nor   at   the   Assizes.   By   their   mere   presence   at   the   locus,   their  

evidence  would  have  undoubtedly  been  enlightening.  

 

153. The   three   key   workers   were:   Raymond   Zamir,   Hugo   and   Johnny  

Latour  

 

154. Among   the   three   witnesses,   Raymond   Zamir   deserves   particular  

attention.  

 

155. At   the   Assizes,   the   representative   for   the   Director   of   Public  

Prosecutions   stated   that   no   witness   statement   had   been   recorded  

from  the  said  Raymond  Zamir.  

 

156. Is   that  statement  true?   Is   it  correct   to  state   that  Mr.  Zamir  was  not  

known   to   the  police   or   that   he  did  not   turn  up   for  police   enquiry?  

Had  Raymond  Zamir  participated  in  a  reconstruction  exercise?11  

 

157. During  the  course  of  the  enquiry,  Raymond  Zamir  has  been  retraced.  

This  is  what  he  stated  when  interviewed:  

 

i. As  from  the  24th  May  1999,  he  went  at  the  premises  of  

L’Amicale  everyday  for  several  consecutive  days  in  an  

attempt   to   ascertain   what   would   be   his   future   job  

prospects.  

ii. He  was   available   and  most  willing   to   cooperate  with  

the  police.  

iii. He  went   to   Line   Barracks   ad   he  was   interviewed   by  

the  police.  

11 Annexe 14

163

iv. He  was  photographed  by  police  photographer  during  

a  reconstruction  exercise.  

v. He  was   required   by   police   officers   to   show   the   spot  

where  he  was  standing  on  the  23rd  May  1999.  

vi. He  was  called  by  the  police  on  numerous  occasions.  

vii. He  was  witness  no.  5  on   the   list   of  witnesses   for   the  

prosecution.  

viii. His   presence   was   recorded   by   the   Honourable  

Magistrate  on  a   few  occasions  until  he  was   informed  

that  he  was  not  required  to  depone.  

ix. He   was   made   to   sign   certain   papers   at   the   Line  

Barracks.  

 

Our  interview  with  Raymond  Zamir  also  revealed  that:  

 

158. He  was  the  security  guard  posted  at  the  door  of  Amicale  situated  on  

Royal   street   giving   access   to   the   ground   floor   of   the   game   house  

where  there  were  slot  machines.    

 

159. He  watched  the  said  football  match  on  television  in  the  game  house  

and   was   aware   of   the   incidents   at   Anjalay   stadium   following   the  

match.  

 

160. After  the  ceremony  whereby  Fire  Brigade  were  crowned  champions,  

he  went  out  on  the  pavement  to  take  some  fresh  air  when  suddenly  

he   saw  what   he   believed   to   be   a   crowd   of   Scouts   Club   supporters  

mainly  dressed   in   red   and   green   coming   from   la  gare   du  nord  and  

taking  the  road  adjacent   to   Jhummah  Mosque  and  then  turning   left  

i.e.   onto   Royal   Street   towards   L’Amicale.   According   to   him,   it   was  

around  18  00hrs.  The   threatening  behavior  of   the  crowd  was  clear  

and  according   to   the   instructions  as   to  what   to  do   in   those   type  of  

situations,  he  immediately  came  back  inside  the  building,  closed  the  

shutters  and  locked  it  them  from  inside  with  a  padlock.    

 

164

161. This   was   the   routine   procedure   to   be   carried   out   whenever   there  

were  incidents  or  that  incidents  were  thought  to  be  imminent.  This  

had   been   done   on   previous   occasions   pending   the   arrival   of   the  

police.  

 

162. He  was  the  person  who,  later,  with  the  help  of  another  worker  broke  

the  padlock12  to  allow  people  to  get  out  of  the  building.  

 

163. He   was   surprised   to   learn   that   a   police   officer   who   was   inside  

L’Amicale  claimed  to  have  broken  the  padlock.13  He  was  even  more  

surprised  to  learn  about  the  second  version  of  the  police  to  the  effect  

that  the  shutters  were  opened  from  the  outside  by  the  police.  

 

To   note:   The   shutters   were   not   smashed   and   were   in   a  

usable  state  even  after  the  fire.  If  the  shutters  were  opened  

from  the  outside  by  the  police,  there  would  have  been  some  

sort  of  trace  left.  

 

164. At   no   time   did   he   see   any   cocktail   Molotov   being   hurled   at   the  

Amicale.  

 

165. The   alert   to   the   police   was   given   at   an   early   stage   and   he   was  

puzzled  as  to  why  the  police  only  came  on  spot  after  19  00  hrs.  

 

166. When  the  SSU  eventually  came  on  the  spot,  there  were  a  few  persons  

who  were   trapped   on   the   first   floor   of   the   balcony   and   they  were  

helped  by  the  members  of  the  public  and  SSU  to  get  down.  

 

167. A  police  officer   listened   to  his  version  of   facts  minutes  after  he  got  

out.  

 

 

12 In the chaos, the keys to the padlock had been lost. 13 Witness PC Seeneevassen claimed to have broken the padlock.

165

Chapter 22: Mrs Latour  

168. Mrs.   Marie   Raymonde   Latour   was   the   only   witness   for   the  

prosecution  who  by  her  own  free  will  gave  statements  to  the  police  

implicating   one   of   the   accused   parties   at   the   Preliminary   Enquiry  

(PE).  

 

169. At   the   PE   itself,   Mrs.   Latour   was   again,   the   only   material   witness  

who   did   not   make   any   allegation   of   police   pressure   in   order   to  

implicate  that  accused  party.  

 

170. In  fact,  Mrs.  Latour  deponed  in  a  very  coherent  manner  against  that  

accused   party   despite   the   fact   that   in   May   1999,   Mrs.   Latour   was  

living  with  that  same  accused  party.  

 

171. The  name  of  that  Accused  party  is  Salim  Goonjaria.  In  her  deposition,  

Mrs.  Latour  explained  how:  

 

a. She  met  Salim  Goonjaria  on  the  21st  May  1999  and  the  

latter  stayed  at  her  place  at  Cite  Dubreuil.  

b. He   left   on   Saturday  morning   and   she   did   not   see   him  

until  Monday  the  24th  May  1999.  

c. She  had  contact  with  him  by  phone  on  Sunday  the  23rd  

May   1999.   Salim   called   her   from   a   mobile   (No.  

2532597)   which   bill   was   produced   in   Court   to   her  

house  phone  (No.  6655339).  

d. A  number  of  calls  were  made  between  Salim  Goonjaria  

and  herself.  

 

 

172. When   queried   about   the   tenure   of   the   phone   conversations,   Mrs.  

Latour  revealed  the  following:  

 

166

‘Then   I   asked   him   “kifer   bannes   dimoune   fine   mette   dife  

dans   L’Amicale.   Ene   peche   sa”   He   told   me   “Le   mal   fine  

detruire”  

 

I   told   him   “ene   peche   sa”   because   he   told   me   that   there  

were  people  inside  the  L’Amicale.  

 

At   the  background   I   could  hear  noise.   I  heard  him  talking  

only  to  MIO  whist  he  was  talking  to  me.  

 

When  he  was   talking   to  me  his   voice  does  not   seem   to  be  

normal  as  usual.  By  not  being  normal,  it  appeared  that  it  is  

a  person  who  has  problem  and  he  was  somewhat  nervous.  

He   was   talking   aloud.   The   tone   of   his   voice   was   “un   peu  

brutal”  (…)  

 

173. During  her  deposition,  Mrs.  Latour  was  referred  to  the  statement  she  

had   given   to   the   police   and   she   agreed   as   to   its   contents.   The  

following  are  extracts  of  her  statement  dated  15th  June  1999:  

 

Folio  53329  –  53330:    

‘Li   fine   re   telephone  moi   vers  5  heures,   la   li   fine  dire  moi,  

guette  dans  television  pe  passe  sa  banne  boute  la,  guette  sa  

banne  goal  la  mo  pas  ti  dire  toi  fine  vende  sa.  Ti  fini  vende  

sa  match  la  Rs.  300,  000  et  li  fine  coupe  telephone.’  

 

‘Salim  fine  dire  moi  pre  cote  faire  la  priere  ena  ene  maison  

de   jeu   sa   meme   zot   be   crasse   ca.   Ena   ene   cinquantaine  

dimoune  derriere  moi.  Li   fine  dire  moi   ena  banne   familles  

beaucoup,  banne  madame  pe  souffert  parcequi  dans   la   fin  

du   mois   beaucoup   banne   mari   perdi   zotte   casse   dans  

L’Amicale   et   mo   papa   aussi   quand   li   ti   tipti.Le   mal   pe  

detruire’  

 

167

‘Salim   dire   moi   mo   bizin   reste   la   pour   guetter   le   mal   pe  

detruire.   Ce   qui   ena   pour   arriver   pe   arriver.   Pas   bisin   to  

tracasser.’  

 

‘Salim   fine   repone   moi   Raymonde   pas   bisin   tracasse   pas  

pou  arrive  moi  nanier.  Mo  pas  pou  gagne  nanier  la  dans.’  

 

‘Mo   la   case,   travaille   qui   ti   ena  pour   faire   in   fini   faire.   Le  

mal  fine  detruire.’  

 

174. At  folio  53333  of  her  statement  dated  15th  June  1999,  Mrs.  Latour  

explained   what   happened   when   she   confronted   Salim   Goonjaria  

about  the  incidents  of  the  23rd  May  1999:  

 

‘La  mo  dire   Salim  qui  mo  pas   pour  marier   avec   li.   Li   dire  

moi  bondie  fine  envoye  pour  faire  travaille  la  et  travaille  la  

finne  faire.’  

 

 

175. In  cross  examination,  Mrs.  Latour  stated  that  the  whole  duration  of  

her  conversation  with  Salim  Goonjaria    over  the  phone  on  the  night  

of  the  23rd  was  20  –  25  minutes.  

 

176. However,  when  confronted  with  the  bill  that  had  been  produced,  the  

calls   between   the   cellphone   and   the   house   phone   of   Mrs   Latour  

totalled  only  2.43  seconds.  

 

177. That  was  a  major  discrepancy  and  clouded  testimony  of  Mrs.  Latour  

who  had  been  consistent  so  far.  

 

178. Since   there   was   little   evidence   apart   from   the   deposition   of   Mrs.  

Latour  against  Salim  Goonjaria,  the  latter  was  not  committed  to  the  

Assizes.  

 

168

179. Our  enquiry  however  has  shed  new  light  on  that  aspect  of  the  case.  

 

180. First  of  all,  our  enquiry  has  revealed  that  at  the  time  Salim  Goonjaria  

had  two  mobile  phones.  One  borrowed  from  Mrs.  Latour,  which  bill  

had  been  produced  in  Court  and  another  one  for  himself  which  bills  

had  never  been  produced  or  even  retraced  by  the  police.  

 

181. The  calls  between  Salim  Goonjaria  and  Mrs.  Latour  totalling  20  –  25  

minutes   had   in   fact   and   truly   occurred   and   were   made   from   the  

other   phone   Salim   Goonjaria   had   in   his   possession   and  which   bill  

was  never  produced.  

 

182. Our   enquiry   has   also   revealed   that   Salim   Goonjaria   was   directly  

implicated   in   the  arson  at  L’Amicale.  The   following   is   an  extract  of  

the  affidavit  of  Convict  No.  1,  Mounou14:  

 

‘On  the  way  to  the  MFA  the  procession  came  to  a  halt  and  a  

person   whom   I   know   by   the   name   of   Salim   Goonjaria  

approached  the  car,   leaned  over  at  my  window  and  stated  

the  following  to  me:  

 

“Moonou  a  nous  alle  brule  Amicale  mo  armee”    

 

Salim  Goonjaria  told  me  that  he  was  armed  and  to  go  with  

him  and  set  fire  to  l’Amicale’  

 

I   ignored   him   and   carried   on   in   the   procession.   However,  

Salim   Goonjaria   came   back   and   I   noticed   that   he   had   a  

black  satchel  in  his  possession  which  he  wanted  me  to  keep  

in   my   car.   I   refused   and   carried   on   with   the   procession  

towards  MFA.  

 

 (…)  

14 Annexe 15

169

 

In   the   year   1999   when   I   was   on   remand   at   Beau   Bassin  

prison  on  one  particular  afternoon,  I  was  sitting  in  a  group  

of   other   inmates   and   the   said   Salim  Gounjaria  who   I   had  

mentioned  earlier  and  who  was  also  arrested  in  connection  

with  the  Amicale  case,  said  the   following  to  me   in   front  of  

the  others,   ‘Mounou  mo  conne  toi,  to  ene  beau  frère.  To  

innocent,   zotte   tous   ki   la   innocent.  Mo   pas   pe   capave  

dormi.  Alors  mo  p  demande  zotte   excuse  moi.  Mo  pou  

prend   tout   charges’,   meaning   Mounou,   I   know   you,   you  

are  my  brother  in  law.  You  are  innocent  and  so  is  all  of  you.  

I   cannot   sleep   and   I   am  asking   all   of   you   to   forgive  me.   I  

will  bear  all  of  the  consequences.    

 

Upon  hearing  that  statement,  Nazim  Laulloo  who  was  also  

arrested  in  the  Amicale  case  and  was  in  the  group  with  us,  

asked  Salim  Goonjaria,  what  would  happen  if  he  were  to  be  

released  after  the  preliminary  enquiry.    

 

Salim   Goonjaria   replied   that   if   that   is   so,   then   he  will   go  

home   and   will   implicate   anyone   who   makes   allegations  

against  him.  

 

That   was   witnessed   by   the   following   people:   my   brother  

Bébé,  Issa  Peertum,  Nazim  Laulloo  and  Mahmade  Ramjane.  

 

On  another  occasion,  Salim  Goonjaria  stated  the   following  

to   me   ‘Mounou,   si   to   ti   garde  mo   sacoche   la   avec   toi,  

capave   Amicale   pas   ti   pou   bruler’   meaning  Mounou,   if  

you  had  kept  the  satchel  I  gave  you  on  the  23rd  May  1999,  

Amicale  would  not  have  burnt  down.  

 

I  asked  him  what  he  meant  and  he  replied  that  the  satchel  

contained  incendiary  devices.  

170

 

However,   after   a   few  weeks   passed   by,   the   said  Goonjaria  

changed  his  attitude.  He  stated  that  he  had  found  a  way  out  

of   the   case   and   that   he   would   implicate   anyone   who  

revealed  the  truth  about  what  he  had  stated  in  prison.  

 

Since   I   had   faith   in   our   justice   system,   I   knew   that   there  

could  not  possibly  be  any  evidence  against  me  and  that  the  

witnesses   would   speak   the   truth,   I   did   not   deem   it  

important   to  do  anything  about  what  Goonjaria   stated   to  

us  especially  in  the  light  of  his  threats.  

 

Moreover,   in   prison   I   became   aware   of   the   existence   of   a  

terrorist  group  by   the  name  of   ‘Escadron  de   la  Mort’  with  

whom  Salim  Goonjaria  was  apparently  associated  with  and  

in   the  circumstances   I  did  not  want   to  do  or   say  anything  

which  might  endanger  the  lives  of  my  wife  or  sons.  

 

183. The   following   is   an   extract   of   the   affidavit   sworn   by   Mr.   Imran  

Muthy15   who   met   with   Salim   Goonjaria   when   he   was   detained   at  

GRNW  prison:  

 

At  some  point   in  1999,   the  exact  date   I   cannot  remember,  one  Salim  Gounjaria  was  brought  to  Grande  Riviere  North  West  prison.    The   said  Gounjaria  was  made   to   stay   in   the   same  yard  as  myself   and   with   other   remand   prisoners   named   Laulloo,  Neeyamuthkhan  and  Boodhoo.      I  remember  an  occasion  when  Mr.  Laulloo  was  crying  as  he  could  not  bear   the   fact   that  he  was  accused  of  a  crime  he  did   not   commit.   That   happened   in   front   of   the   said  Gounjaria.    Shortly  after  that  episode,  the  said  Goujaria  approached  me  and  told  me  that  he  had  something  to  tell  me.    

15 Annexe 16

171

We   had   a   private   conversation   whereby   he   told   me   the  following:      ‘Mo  dire  ou  ene  zafer,  mo  enan  respect  pou  ou.  Mo  dire  ou  ene  zafer  franc.  Mo  pas  pe  capave,  ca  travail  la  moi  kine  fer  ca.’    When  I  asked  him  what   ‘job’  he  was   talking  about,  he  replied:  ‘L’Amicale  la,  moi  kine  fer  ca.’    Our   conversation  was   cut   short   because   it  was   the   end  of  the  break  and  we  had  to  go  back  to  our  cells.      Then,   in   a   subsequent   conversation,   he   told   me  everything  about  the  L’Amicale  case:  He  explained  with  who  he  carried  out   the  attack,  how  was   it   carried  out  and  why  it  was  carried  out.    He  told  me  he  could  not  keep  it   in  his  chest  anymore  since  he   was   seeing   first   hand   how   innocent   people   were  suffering.    I  remember  asking  him  why  he  had  carried  out  the  attack  and  he  replied  that  he  used  to  be  a  gambler  and  that  he  his  wife  left  him  for  that  very  reason  and  that  L’Amicale  was  a  nuisance  which  had  to  be  eliminated.      He  explained   that  a  new  game  was  recently   introduced   in  L’Amicale   which   many   of   his   ‘brothers’   were   playing   and  losing   their  money.   He   said   it   was   a   job  which   had   to   be  carried  out.      He   also   told   me   that   he   was   ready   to   assume   his  responsibility  if  he  were  to  be  convicted  for  a  maximum  of  ten  years.      He   also   explained   to   me   how   before   setting   out   on   his  mission,   he  went   at   a   place   called   ‘Montagne   ti   bassin’   at  Vallee  Pitot  and  told  me  that  one  of  the  name  of  one  of  the  persons  who  carried  out  the  attack.    I   have   communicated   the   name   to   the   lawyers   currently  enquiring  into  this  case  and  I  am  ready  to  give  this  name  to  the  police  or  to  any  Commission  of  Enquiry.    He  told  me  how  their  mission  was  to  ‘elimine  roulette’,  since  that  was  the  new  game  which  was  introduced  at  L’Amicale.    He  also  explained  to  me  how  after  setting  fire  to  L’Amicale,  they  were  on  their  way  to  set  fire  to  the  Mauritius  Turf  Club  

172

when   one   person   whom   he   referred   to   as   ‘Barahim’  convinced  them  not  to  go  forward  with  their  plan.    He   also   confessed   to  me   how  himself   and   the   person  who  was  accompanying  him  attacked  and  rampaged  a  tavern  in  Vallee  Pitot.  

 

184. The  following  is  an  extract  of  the  affidavit  of  Issac  Peertum16:  

 

Whilst  I  was  on  remand  at  Beau  Bassin  Prison  in  yard  no.  5.  I  met  the  nine  persons  who  had  been  arrested  in  connection  with   the   L’Amicale   case   and   who   were   awaiting   for   the  Preliminary  Enquiry  in  that  case.    During   the   Preliminary   Enquiry   into   the   Amicale   arson,   I  still  remember  that  on  one  particular  afternoon  at  around  16   15   –   16   30     I   was   in   the   company   of   a   few   inmates  including  the  one  Salim  Goonjaria.    

We  had  just  performed  the  prayers.    Just  after  the  prayers  were  over,  Salim  Goonjaria  stood  up  and  addressed  all  those  in  the  Amicale  case      He  presented  his  apologies  and  said  words  to  the  effect  that  those  persons  who  were  accused  should  not  have  been  here  since   he   had   committed   the   Amicale   arson   and   not  them.    

 

185. So  there  we  have  it,  a  self  confessed  criminal  who  is  presently  free.    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

16 Annexe 17

173

 

Chapter 23:

Police misleading the Prime Minister  

186. In   a   parliamentary   session   (No.   B/480),   Mr.   D.   Jeeha   (Second  

Member  for  Grand  Baie  and  Poudre  d’Or)  asked  the  Prime  Minister  

and  Minister  of  Defence  and  Home  Affairs)  ‘whether  in  regard  to  the  

Police  officers  who  were  on  duty  at   the  L’Amicale  de  Port  Louis  on  

23rd  May   last,  he  will,   for   the  benefit  of   the  House,  obtain   from  the  

Acting  Commissioner  of  Police  information  as  to  (…)  (b)  what  action  

was  taken  by  the  Police  officers  to  rescue  human  lives  from  the  fire  

and  what  help  they  received  from  headquarters.  ‘  

 

187. In  his  reply,   the  Prime  Minister  stated  that  he  was  informed  by  the  

Acting  Commissioner  of  Police:  

 

a. ‘that   there   were   five   Police   officers   on   the   spot  

performing  extra  duty  (…)’  

b. ‘Some  250  persons  were   still   blocked   inside   the  building  

as   the  steel  roller  shutters  were   locked  and  could  not  be  

opened.   Besides,   burning   cars   and   motorcycles   were  

blocking  entrances  and  all  exits.  

While  efforts  were  being  made  from  inside,  SSU  personnel  

under   the   orders   of   the   superior   officers   helped   to   clear  

the  entrance  on  the  Royal  Street  and  force  open  the  steel  

roller  shutter  to  enable  the  trapped  persons  evacuate  the  

building.  ’  

 

188.  Our  enquiry  has  in  fact  revealed  that:  

 

i. There   were   only   two   police   officers   at   L’Amicale  

when  the  fire  broke  out.  

 

174

ii. There  were  only  two  exits,  both  of  which  had  been  

locked  from  the  inside.  

 

iii. There   were   no   cars   which   had   been   placed   with  

the  specific  purpose  of  blocking  the  exits.    

 

iv. It   was   the   employees   of   the   casino   who   forced  

open  the  roller  shutter.  At  the  time  when  the  roller  

shutter  was  opened,  police  assistance  had  not  yet  

arrived  on  the  scene.    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

175

Chapter 24: Fire services  

189. On   the   1st   July   1998,   the   Municipality   of   Port   Louis   Fire   Brigade  

merged  with  the  Government  Fire  Services.  

 

190. Before   1st   July   1998,   the   Municipality   was   responsible   for  

maintaining  a  Fire  Brigade  Service  for  our  capital  city.  

 

191. No  inspection  of  Amicale  had  ever  been  conducted  out  prior  to  1998  

by   the   Municipality.   Furthermore,   no   inspection   had   been   carried  

out  by  the  Fire  Services  prior  to  the  23rd  May  1999.  

 

192. As  no  inspection  had  been  carried  out,  our  enquiry  has  not  been  able  

to  say  whether  there  were,  in  the  building:  

 

Fire  escape  routes  

Fire  extinguishers    

Fire  Alarms  

Any  other  fire  fighting  equipment  

 

193. Until  May  1999,  the  only  enactment  providing  for  safety  measures  in  

respect   of   workplaces   is   the   Occupational,   Health   and   Safety   and  

Welfare  Act  1998.  

 

194. In  the  absence  of  record,   it  can  be   inferred  that  both  the  Municipal  

Council   and   the   Government   have   failed   to   fullfill   their   statutory  

obligations.  

 

195. Since   the   Amicale   arson,   the   ministry   of   Local   Government   has  

advised  the  local  authorities  to  request  new  applicants  in  respect  of  

any  new  development  to  seek  and  obtain  a  dire  clearance  from  the  

Government  Fire  Services.  (Vide  Section  8  of  the  Building  Act  1919)  

176

a. Note:   According   to   our   inquiry   the   building   of   Amicale  

did   have   an   internal   stair   case   leading   to   the   rooftop   of  

the   building   which   in   turn   gave   an   easy   access   to  

Shamping   restaurant.   Police   officers   performing   extra  

duty   at   L’Amicale   came   to   know   the   existence   of   that  

internal   stair   case   only   during   the   reconstruction  

exercise.    

 

196. Our  inquiry  revealed  that  :  

 

i. Around   18:20   on   the   23rd   May   1999   the   fire  

services   of   Port-­‐Louis   were   informed   by  

telephone   that   a   bus   had   been   set   on   fire   at  

Royal  Road  not  far  from  Mohun  Store.  

 

ii. The  fire  services  requested  the  support  of  Pope  

Henessy  Police  to  escort  them  to  the  spot  as  it  

was   a   case   of   rioting.   The   police   escorted   the  

fire   services   but   upon   reaching   near   Royal  

Street,   they   stopped   escorting   them   on   the  

ground  that  the  area  where  the  bus  was  on  fire  

was   not   within   the   boundaries   allocated   to  

them.  In  fact,  it  was  under  the  responsibility  of  

Trou   Fanfaron   Police   station   which   the   fire  

services   tried   to   contact.   However,   no   contact  

had  been  made  because  the  telephone  line  was  

constantly   busy.   The   fire   services   decided   to  

return   to   their   barracks.   On   arriving   at   the  

corner   of   Desforges   Street   and   Pope   Henessy  

street   they   noticed   a   crowd   near   St   Louis  

Cathedral  Square.    

 

177

iii. One  member  of  the  Fire  Services  was  delegated  

to   make   an   entry   at   the   Pope   Henessy   Police  

Station.  At  the  Barracks  the  officers  had  dinner.  

 

iv. On  the  23rd  of  May  more  than  80  acres  of  sugar  

cane  plantation  were  set  on  fire  

 

v. As   from  17:00  on   the  23rd  May  1999,   the  Fire  

Services   at   Maillard   Street   Port-­‐Louis   were  

flooded  with  calls  so  much  so  that  they  did  not  

know  which  request  to  attend.  

 

vi. Around   17   00   hrs   one   crew   was   sent   to   la  

Nicoliere   to  attend  a   fire   that  was  set   in  sugar  

cane  fields  at  La  Nicoliere.  

 

vii. The  fire  services  were  understaffed  on  the  23rd  

May   1999.   No   heed   had   been   paid   to   the  

previous   calls   for   the   recruitment   of   fire  

fighters.  

 

viii. Only  one  person  in  the  whole  team  was  trained  

in  the  operation  of  the  long  ladder.  

 

ix. According  to  SP  Pierre  Noel,  after  he  made  the  

request   for   the   assistance   of   the   fire   services,  

he  was  informed  that  the  fire  fighters  could  not  

leave   their   barracks   to   attend   the   fire   at  

L’Amicale   since   there   was   a   riotous   crowd   in  

front  of  the  barracks.  

 

 

 

 

178

‘I  called  the  Information  Room,  Headquarters  of  

the  fire  Brigade  and  Fire  services  of  Port-­Louis.  I  

was   informed   by   the   fire   services   of   Port-­Louis  

that   they   could   not   leave   the   line   Barracks  

because  they  were  blocked  by  a  hostile  group  of  

persons’17  

 

x. The   IR  on   that  day  was  under   the  supervision  

of  SP  Ramen.   If   there  was  effectively  a  riotous  

crowd   in   front   of   the   barracks,   why   had   SP  

Ramen   not   done   the   needful   to   disperse   that  

crowd   prior   to   the   request   for   assistance?   It  

cannot   be   that   the   IR  was   not   aware   of   same  

since  there  was  no  communication  problem  on  

that   day   and   the   police   radio   network   was  

functioning  properly.  

 

xi. Our  investigation  reveals  that  at  no  time  there  

was   a   riotous   crowd   blocking   the   fire   people  

from  going  to  Amicale.  

 

xii. Again,   no   statements   were   taken   from   the  

police  by  the  fire  people.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

17 Extract of the deposition of SP Noel at the Preliminary Enquiry

179

Part 5: Exculpatory evidence Chapter 25: The tape  

197. At  some  point   in  time  prior  to  19th  February  2003,  Fazil  Sumodhee  

gave   a   tape   to   his   legal   advisers   which   tape   was   a   recording   of   a  

conversation   between   himself   and  witness  Azad  Thupsee   after   the  

convicts  were  convicted.  

 

198. The  gist  of  the  conversation  is  that  is  that  Azad  Thupsee  admits  lying  

at  the  Assizes  and  says  that  he  had  no  choice:  “Aster  ki  mo  trouver  

prefere  mo  vine  temoin  ki  moi  ki  mo  pou  faire.  Penan  aucaine  choix,  

to  comprends  la?  Bon  mone  calculter  comme  si  dire  franchement  de  

dire  hein  mone   calcule   sa   to   conner  magistrate   ti   beze  moi  15   ans  

prison  lor  sa  zafer  perjure  la.”  

 

199. The  conversation  in  effect  supports  to  a  large  extent  the  contention  

of   the  Defence  at   the  Assizes  and  Azad  Thupsee  repeatedly,   in   that  

conversation   that   the  Sumodhee  brothers  are   innocent  and   that  he  

lied  at  the  Assizes.  

 

200. The  original  of  that  tape  has  been  made  available  to  us  in  the  course  

of  our  enquiry  and  it  will  be  produced  at  any  Commission  of  Enquiry  

that  eventually  will  be  set  up.  

 

201. The   tape  and   its   transcript  were   the  subject  of  a  motion   to  adduce  

new  evidence  but  the  Court  turned  down  the  motion.  

 

202. Since  there  was  no  explanation  as  regards  to  the  circumstances  and  

the   background   facts   relating   to   the   recording,   this   enquiry   has  

investigated  further  in  this  specific  regards.  

 

203. Our  enquiry  has  revealed:  

a. Azad   Thupsee,   who   was   then   residing   in   the   Police   flats   of  Bell  Village,  had  been  calling  Fazil  Sumodhee,  the  brother  of  Convicts  1  and  2,  many  times  before  the  recording.  

180

 b. In  fact  Azad  Thupsee  was  calling  Fazil  Sumodhee  to  ask  what  

could   be   done   as   regards   to   the   Amicale   case   since   he  was  finding   it   difficult   to   live   with   the   lies   he   had   previously  stated  in  court.    

c. Fazil   Sumodhee,   who   was   in   the   company   of   his   brothers  Mounou  and  Bébé  as  from  13  30  to  19  00  on  Sunday  the  23rd  May  1999  knew  that  his  brothers  were  innocent  and  for  him  Azad  Thupsee  is  a  dangerous  liar.    

d. Furthermore,   Fazil   Sumodhee   had   seen   how   manipulative  Azad  Thupsee  was  since  day  one.    

e.  On   the   day   when   the   conversation   was   recorded,   Azad  Thupsee  called  Fazil  Sumodhee  asking  the   latter   to  call  him  back  on  another  number  because  of  fears  that  his  calls  were  being  taped.    

f. Because   of   the   aforementioned   reasons,   Fazil   Sumodhee  decided  to  record  the  conversation  with  Azad  Thupsee      

g.  Before  calling  back  Azad  Thupsee,  Fazil  Sumodhee  borrowed  a  recorder  from  his  close  friend  of  his.    

h. Fazil   Sumodhee   then   called   Azad   Thupsee   on   the   number  which   the   latter   had   provided   to   him   and   recorded   the  conversation.  

 

204. In  our  humble  opinion,   the  Supreme  Court   in   refusing   to  allow   the  

recording  and  the  transcript  to  be  admitted  as  new  evidence  missed  

out  on  important  issues  and  both  the  tape  and  the  transcript  should  

have  be  admitted  as  new  evidence.  

 

205. Investigators   involved   in   the   enquiry   who   had   the   opportunity   of  

probing   lengthily   into   Fazil   Sumodhee,   who   in   fact   is   a   very   sick  

person,   to  be  economical  with  words,  have   come   to   the   conclusion  

that  he  is  telling  the  truth  in  relation  to:  

Where  he  was  on  the  23rd  May  1999.  His  non-­‐involvement  in  the  alleged  sequestration  case.  The  recording  and  the  story  leading  to  the  recording.  

 

206. In   the   light   of   all   the   new   evidence   revealed   by   this   enquiry,   we  

believe  that  in  the  interests  of  justice:  

181

I. That   the   call   logs   as   regards   to   phone   number   from  

which   the   calls   were   made   to   and   from   Fazil  

Sumodhee,  in  relation  to  the  tape,  be  revealed.  

 

II. That   the   tape   itself,   is   made   the   subject   of   further  

investigation.  

 

III. That  a  voice  test  is  carried  out  since  even  if  the  truth  

of   the   conversation   is   not   true,   the  mere   fact   that   it  

was   Thupsee   voice   will   mean   the   final   nail   in   the  

coffin  of  lies  of  Thupsee.  

 

182

Chapter 26: Confessions  

 

207. Khadaffi  Oozeer  was  arrested  on  the  22nd  November  2000  by  CID  (S)  

following  a  search  at  his  house  whereby  firearms  and  other  weapons  

were  discovered.  

 

208. The   subsequent   enquiry   led   to   the   dismantling   of   Escadron   de   la  

Mort.  

 

209. Khadafi  Oozeer  mentioned  in  his  statement  given  to  the  police  that  

he  would  wish   to  make   revelations   concerning   the   cases   in  which  

L’escadron  de  la  mort  was  involved.  

 

210. His   barrister,   at   the   request   of   Khadafi   Oozeer   himself,   stated   in  

court   that   he   would   only   make   those   revelations   to   Inspector  

Raddhoa.  

 

211. In  a  statement  given  on  the  5th   January  200118,  2  months  following  

the  conviction  of  Amicale  Four  had  been  convicted,  Khadafi  Oozeer  

explained   in   detail   how   the   attack   on   L’Amicale   had   been   planned  

well   in   advance,   who   planned   the   attack,   who   participated   in   the  

attack  and  how  the  attack  was  perpetrated.  

 

212. The  last  paragraph  of  that  statement  reads  as  follows:  

‘Concernant  ca  deux  frères  Sumodhee  la,  mo  sur  et  certain  qui  zotte  pas   fine  prend  part  dans  du   feu  Pope  Henessy  ni  dans   L’Amicale   parce   qui   mo   ti   tout   le   temps   present  partout  dans  tous  ca  banes  evenements  la.’  

 

213. Another  person  who  made  revelations  about  the  attack  on  L’Amicale  

was  one  Toorab  Bissessur.  

 

18 Annexe 18

183

214. He   first  made   the   revelations   to   an   investigator  of  our  police   force  

who  was   sent   on   a  mission   to  Madagascar   specifically   to   record   a  

statement  from  him.  

 

215. The   latter,   apart   from   what   he   stated   to   the   police,   repeated   the  

revelations   to   a   group   of   three   journalists   who   visited   him   at   La  

Bastille  Prison.  

 

216. During   the   course   of   the   meeting   with   the   journalists,   Toorab  

Bissessur  narrated   in  detail   how   the   attack  on  L’Amicale  had  been  

planned  since  1996  and  by  who  it  was  planned.  

 

217. From  the  tenor  of  that  conversation,  it  is  clear  that  the  Amicale  four  

are  all  innocent.  

 

218. Hatim  Oozeer  was  another  member  of  Escadron  de  la  mort  who  was  

arrested   by   the   Flying   Squad   in   or   around   December   2000   at  

Ambrose  Street  Rose  Hill.  

 

219. The  latter  in  an  interview  with  the  arresting  team  and  with  members  

of  the  MCIT  revealed  that  Escadron  de  la  mort  was  implicated  in  the  

arson  at  L’Amicale.    

 

220. In  December  2000,  following  the  arrest  of  Afzal  Chummun,  the  latter  

in  absence  of  his  Counsel  late  Me.  Mario  Helene,  gave  indications  to  

the  investigators  regarding  the  arson  at  L’Amicale.  

 

221. Furthermore,  it  was  revealed  during  the  interview  at  the  MCIT  that  

he  was  once  working  at  L’Amicale  himself.  

 

 

 

 

 

184

 

222. During   the   interview   of   the   abovenamed,   it   became   to   the  

knowledge   of   the  MCIT   that   the   foiled   attempt   at   Jumbo  Rose  Hill,  

another   game   house   belonging   to   the   family   of   Jean   Noel   Lai   Yau  

Tim,   where   a   police   lost   his   duty   revolver   was   committed   by   the  

Escadron  de  la  Mort.  

 

223. Despite  of  clear  indications  at  the  time  and  evidence  to  back  up  the  

relevations,  the  MCIT,  on  the  wrong  assumption  that  the  matter  had  

already  been  dealt  with  and  hence   could  not  be   subject   to  another  

enquiry,   the   latter   (MCIT)   did   not   proceed   with   a   full   fledged  

investigation  in  the  matter.  

 

224. Finally,   one   Azad   Nandoo,   also   ex   member   of   the   Escadron   de   la  

mort,   confessed   to   Salim   Khodabaccus19,   just   before   going   on   run  

which   ended   in   him   committing   suicide,   that   the  Amicale   Four   are  

innocent  since  it  was  his  team,  the  Escadron  de  la  mort  who  planned  

and  perpetrated  the  act.  Salim  Khodabaccus  related  same  to  an  MP.20  

 

To  note:  In  the  case  of  Azad  Nandoo,  his  van  was  seen  by  

various   witnesses   who   have   been   heard   during   the  

enquiry.  It  was  revealed  that  the  said  van  was  passing  by  

L’Amicale   at   the  material   time   on   the   23rd  May   1999   as  

well   as   leading   a   group   of  motorcyclists  who   set   fire   to  

Ishwarlall   store   and   Mona   store.21   Our   enquiry   further  

revealed  that  on  the  23rd  May  1999,  at  around  19  30,  he  

made   a   deposition   at   the   Plaine   Verte   police   station  

whereby   he   stated   that   the   rear  window  of   his   van  was  

damaged.  

 

 

 

19 We have interviewed the said Salim Khodabaccus who is ready to swear an affidavit as to this. 20 The MP is also willing to swear an affidavit as to this. 21 Annexure Goolfee

185

Chapter 27: CCTV Cameras  

225. There  were  36  CCTV  cameras  installed  in  the  stadium  as  mentioned  

earlier.   The   cameras,   excluding   those   in   the   parking,   totalled   180  

hours  of  footage.    

 

226. The  defence  was  never  informed  of  the  existence  of  the  footage  nor  

had   it   transpired   at   the   preliminary   enquiry   or   at   the   assizes   that  

there  was  such  footage.  

 

227. Our   enquiry   has   revealed   that   the   footage   was   viewed   by   the  

investigators   at   Line   Barracks.   The   viewing   of   the   180   hours   of  

footage  took  place  in  under  2  hours.  

 

228. How   the   footage   could   have   been   of   a   considerable   help   for   the  

defence:  

 

a. In  relation  to  convict  No.  4,  Fico,  the  footage  would  have  

shown   that   he   had   an   altercation   with   the   main  

prosecution   witness   Azad   Thupsee   on   the   stands.   It  

would  have  also  shown  the  clothes  worn  by  him  on  that  

day.  

 

b.  In  relation  to  convict  No.  3,  Zulu,  the  footage  would  have  

shown   that   in   the   parking   of   the   stadium,  main  witness  

for   the   prosecution   Azad   Thupsee   indeed   remitted  

firecrackers  to  Zulu  for  the  latter  to  bring  same.  It  would  

have   also   shown   that   Zulu   did   bring   the   firecrackers  

inside   the   stadium   but   did   not   remit   it   back   to   Azad  

Thupsee.   It   would   have   further   shown   Azad   Thupsee  

asking  other   fans   to  pass  on   the  message   to  Zulu   for   the  

latter   to   return   his   firecrackers.   Finally,   it   would   have  

shown  that  after  the  match,  Azad  Thupsee  waited  for  Zulu  

186

to  ask  him  for  the  firecrackers.  It  would  have  also  shown  

the  clothes  worn  by  him  on  that  day.  

 

c. In   relation   to   convicts  1   and  2,   it  would  have   confirmed  

with  whom  Mounou   and   Bébé   travelled   to   the   stadium,  

who  were  they  seated  with  in  the  stadium,  with  who  they  

went   back   to   the   car;   and   how   they   picked   up   one  

Mamade   Ramjane   on   the   way   back   home.   The   footage  

would  have  also  shown  the  clothes  they  were  wearing  as  

well  as  the  time  they  left  the  stadium.    

 

d. The   footage   would   have   also   confirmed   whether   the  

persons   listed   on   the   NIU   list22   were   in   fact   on   the  

stadium.  

 

e. The   footage  would  have  confirmed  where  Azad  Thupsee  

was  on  the  stadium  and  at  what  time  he  left  the  stadium.  

 

CCTV  at  L’Amicale  de  Port  Louis    

229. The  CCTV  footage  comprised  of  the  following  :  

 

a. Footage  from  the  cameras  inside  the  game  house  

b. Footage   from  a   camera  which  was   affixed  on   a  building  opposite  

L’Amicale  and  directed  at  the  entrance  of  the  game  house  on  Royal  

Street.  

 

230. The  footage  would  have  revealed:  

a. Whether  there  was  in  fact  a  group  of  motorcycles  which  

came  in  front  of  the  game  house.  

 

b. If  so,  the  time  at  which  this  group  of  motorcycles  came.  

22 Refer to the Chapter entitled to ‘The convenient disappearance’

187

c. At  what   time   fire   broke   out   at   L’Amicale   and   how   the  

fire  broke  out.  

 

d. The   exact   sequence   of   events   as   regards   to   the   cars  

which  were  set  on  fire.  

 

e. The   time   at   which   people   started   to   gather   around  

L’Amicale.  

 

f. Whether   there   were   cocktail   molotovs   hurled   at  

L’Amicale  and  if  so  by  whom.  

 

g. Whether   there   were   other   projectiles   hurled   at  

L’Amicale  and  if  so  by  whom.  

 

h. The   number   of   police   officers   who   were   present   in  

L’Amicale.  

 

i. Whether   there   were   incidents   inside   the   gamehouse  

and  if  so  the  time  at  which  the  first  incidents  occurred.  

 

j. What  really  happened  to  the  safe.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

188

Chapter 28: Sequestration case  

231. During   our   enquiry,   several   persons   expressed   their   concerns   as  

regards  to  the  sequestration  case  and  its  outcome;  and  we  therefore  

feel  the  need  to  address  this  issue.  

 

232. Witness  Azad  Thupsee  stated  at  the  preliminary  enquiry,  under  oath,  

that  he  was  forced  by  the  police  to  implicate  the  innocent  convicts.  

 

233. Subsequently,  he  changed  his  version  and  stated  that  he   lied  at   the  

preliminary   enquiry   because   he   had   been   sequestrated   by   two  

Sumodhee   brothers   other   than   Mounou   and   Bebe   and   two   other  

persons.  

 

234. A   charge   of   sequestration  was   levelled   against   those   four   persons  

mentioned  by  Thupsee.    

 

235. The  outcome  of  that  sequestration  case  was  crucial:  

 

a. If  the  charge  of  sequestration  was  proved  against  the  

above   mentioned   persons,   it   would   mean   that   Azad  

Thupsee   was   indeed   sequestrated   and   that   he   was  

speaking  the  truth.  

 

b. Likewise,   if   no   conviction   for   the   sequestration   case  

ensued,   it   would  mean   that   Azad   Thupsee   had   been  

lying.  

 

236. The   sequestration   case   was   heard   before   the   assizes   case   started  

and  the  court  had  reserved  its  judgment.  

 

237. However,   on   the   18th   October   2000,   the   Court   invited   Counsel   on  

both   sides   to   offer   arguments   as   to   whether   a   count   of   the  

information  was  defective  or  not.  

189

 

238. The   case   was   fixed   for   arguments   and   subsequently   the   court  

reserved  its   judgment  to  the  16th  November  2000,  four  days  before  

the  end  of  the  assizes.  

 

239. However,   on   the  16th  November,   the  prosecution  moved   to   reopen  

its   case.   Defence   Counsel   objected   and   the   matter   was   fixed   for  

arguments  on  the  28th  November.  

 

240. On  the  28th  November  2000,   the  DPP   filed  a  nolle  prosequi  against  

the  accused  parties.  

 

241. In  the  meantime,  on  the  20th  November  2000,  the  Amicale  Four  had  

been  found  guilty  at  the  Assizes.  

 

242. There  never  was  any  conviction  in  the  sequestration  case.  

 

243. The  chronology  of  the  sequestration  case  can  lead  one  to  all  sorts  of  

inferences.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

190

Chapter 29: The ‘iron’ pole  

244. An   ‘iron’   pole   which   was   used   to   overturn   cars   had   been  

fingerprinted  by  the  police.  The  issues  relating  to  the  iron  pole  are:  

 

i. Was  it  effectively  an  ‘iron’  pole?  

ii. Why   were   fingerprints   taken   from   the   pole   never  

presented  as  evidence  at  the  trial?  

iii. Why  was  the  pole  not  brought  at  the  Preliminary  Enquiry  

and  Assizes?  

 

245. Our  enquiry  revealed  that  the  poles  used  by  the  Municipal  Council  of  

Port  Louis  in  1999  were  wooden  poles  and  not  iron  poles.  

 

246. Had   the   fingerprints   deliberately   been   kept   aside   or   was   it   by  

mistake  or  gross  negligence  that  they  were  never  used?  

 

247. Either   way,   innocent   men   cannot   be   made   to   pay   for   mistakes   or  

negligence  with  their  lives.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

191

PART 6 : ESCADRON DE LA MORT  

248. Since, during the course of our enquiry, the mention of ‘Escadron de la

Mort’ repeatedly came up, it is necessary for the benefit of the reader to

understand who formed part of the Escadron de la Mort.  

 

249. The term Escadron de la Mort was first used publicly after the Gorah

Issac murders, which took place on the 26th October 1999 at Gorah Issac

Road on the eve of the Municipal elections of 1999.  

 

250. Several months before the Gorah Issac Murders, the NIU, in a report, did

reveal that there was an organisation within the city of Port Louis

militating against drug traffickers. However this organisation had

completely radicalised itself to have recourse to violent means to get rid

of drug traffickers in Port Louis.  

 

Chapter 30: Who were they?  

251. The following is a summary of the facts behind each of the main

protagonists of the Escadron de la Mort:  

 

Bahim Coco

• The  head  of  the  Escadron  de  la  Mort.  

• Former  muscle  man  of  ‘Five  Stars’  gang.  

• Initially  an  anti-­‐drug  activist.  

• Active  within  the  Black  Muslims  movement.  

• Was  the  handyman  of  Hassen  Ameer  alias  Turkie  

• Stevedore  and  gave  a  hand  to  Sir  Gaetan  Duval  to  stop  the  dockers  

strike.  

• Brother  of  Issop  Tole  but  had  publicly  denounced  and  renounced  his  

brother.  

• Committed  suicide  at  Albion  on  22nd  December  2000.  

Khadafi Oozeer: • His  involvement  in  the  Escadron  was  merely  that  of  a  courier  for  Bahim  

Coco  

192

• Active  member  of  the  Mouvement  Civique  Nationale  

• Arrested  and  his  subsequent  revelations  led  to  a  new  enquiry  into  the  

Ghorah  Issac  case  

• His  barrister  was  late  Me.  Elias  Oozeerally  who  publicly  stated  that  

Khadafi  Oozeer  will  only  cooperate  with  the  DI  Raddhoa.  

Hatim Oozeer: • He  was  the  driver  of  the  Escadron.  

• Former  drug  addict  turned  into  an  anti-­‐drug  activist  

• Was  the  star  witness  in  the  Preliminary  Enquiry  into  the  triple  murder  of  

the  Ghorah  Issac.  

• Confessed  and  gave  several  statements  to  DI  Raddhoa  some  in  presence  

of  his  Bar  at  Law  and  some  without  the  assistance  of  a  Counsel.    

Toorab Bissessur: • Very  close  to  Bahim  Coco  and  Hizbullah  

• Was  active  up  to  1997  when  he  left  for  Madagascar.  

• Major  involvement:      

Ghorah  Issac  triple  murder  

Hold  up  of  MCB  Curepipe  

Hold  up  Pharmacie  Pather  

Hold  up  of  SCB  Curepipe  

Liyakhhat Polin Sniper  and  respected  within  the  hunting  community  as  the  best  shot.    

Very  close  to  Bahim  Coco  and  was  also  known  to  be  very  close  to  Celh  

Meeah.  

Major  Involvement:    

• Ghorah  Issac  triple  murder  

• Hold  up  of  MCB  Curepipe  

• Hold  up  Pharmacie  Pather  

• Hold  up  of  SCB  Mesnil  

• MCB  Belle  Mare,  Attempt  against    

Riaz Jamaldeen

193

Was  the  son  in  law  of  Bahim  Coco  and  was  responsible  for  the  logistics  

to  carry  out  the  attacks  of  the  Escadron  

Major  Involvement:  

All  cases  of  the  Escadron  and  was  the  middle  man  between  

Bahim  Coco  and  the  other  Escadron  members  when  Bahim  

Coco  was  incarcerated  for  the  case  of  Ghorah  Issac.  

Committed  suicide  at  Beemanique  on  16th  December  2000  

Azad Nandoo Sniper  

Active  member  of  Mouvement  Civique  Nationale  

Major  Involvement:    

All  major  cases  including  Ghorah  Issac  

Recruiting  agent  

Committed  suicide  on  16th  December  2000  at  Beemanique  

 

Noorani Boodhoo alias Bhai Noor Responsible  for  intelligence  work.  

Major  Involvement:  

All  major  cases  including  Ghorah  Issac  

Committed  suicide  at  Beemanique  on  16th  December  2000  

Afzal Chummun alias Dilait Caillé Responsible  for  cleaning  up  of  traces  after  an  attack.  

Ex  police  officer.  

Linked  with  firearms  found  at  the  place  of  Khadafi  Oozeer  

Major  Involvement:  

MCB  Belle  Mare  

Wiehé  case  

Jumbo  Rose  Hill  hold  up  

Islam Mohammedally alias Islam Pakistannais Close  with  Bahim  Coco.  

Left  the  country  before  the  Escadron  was  dismantled.  

194

Initially  thought  to  have  gone  to  Turkey  and  now  believed  to  be  in  

Pakistan.  

Major  Involvement:  

On  the  night  of  Ghorah  Issac  triple  murder,  he  was  involved  in  

the  stealing  of  a  red  van  from  a  Malaysian  couple  at  Flic  en  

Flac  

 

252. According   to   our   investigation,   the   following   code   of   conduct   was  

imposed  by  Bahim  Coco  on  the  members  of  the  group:  

 (a) never  to  be  seen  in  public  together  

(b) never   to   divulge   even   to   one’s   wife   their   belonging   to   the  

organisation    

(c) the  money  ‘obtained’  from  any  action  were  be  used  for  good  

causes  after  excluding  expenses  

(d) never  to  call  one’s  name  in  public  

(e) Not   to   indulge   in   any   illicit   activity   so   as   not   to   attract   any  

police  attention    

(f) To  strictly  observe  all  Muslim  rituals  if  arrested  to  observe  the  

right  of  silence  and  not  to  divulge.  

 

253. Many of the members of the Escadron were very close to the Hizbullah

political party but our investigation revealed that Bahim Coco had an

agenda of his own.  

 

254. Some   members   of   the   Escadron   were   also   very   close   to   the  

Mouvement  Civique  Nationale   (MCN)  and   to   Salim  Khodabaccus   in  

particular.  

195

Part 7: An analysis Chapter 31: The bigger picture  

255. A question which, at all costs, should have been answered was:  

‘Were all the events of the 23rd May 1999 linked or isolated?’  

256. Irrespective of the answer, another question which begged for an answer

was whether the events were spontaneous or organised?  

 

257. Unfortunately the police did not analyse the events which took place on

the 23rd May 1999 from a wider perspective.  

 

Why did the police fail to look at the wider picture?  

258. That may have been because there were no proper briefing or debriefing

meetings and furthermore, the lack of coordination among the different

units have caused widespread concerns as to the way in which the police

force was being managed. The morale within the police force was also at

its lowest point at that time. Punitive transfers were common and the

situation was therefore definitely not conducive for a good and proper

enquiry.  

 

259. Another reason is because the police force promised to the public that

they would find the culprits quickly, hence adding pressure on the

investigators.  

 

260. Furthermore, important and confidential information as to the line of the

enquiry adopted by the police was in the public domain. Thus, giving a

lot of time for the real culprits to reassess the situation.  

 

261. There was an inbuilt tunnel vision culture within our police force due to

sheer amateurism.  

 

 

196

 

What  were  the  incidents  that  occurred  on  the  23rd  May  1999?    

262. There   was   a   widespread   disorder,   as   never   witnessed   before   at  

Anjalay  Coopen  stadium,  despite   the  36  cameras  zoomed   in  on   the  

spectators  which  were  meant  to  act  as  a  deterrent.  

 

263. Sugarcane  fields  were  set  on  fire  on  an  unprecedented  scale.  

 

264. Avalanche  of  phone  calls  before,  during  and  after  the  football  match  

to  Port  Louis  Fire  Services.  

 

265. Unusual  amount  of  phone  calls  to  Quatre  Bornes  and  Curepipe  Fire  

Services.  

 

266. Information   Room   was   jammed   with   so   many   phone   calls   and  

incoming  calls  on  999  were  left  unattended.  

 

267. Most  Police  Stations  were  on  alert  but  were  undermanned.    

 

268. An  SMF  van  was  attacked  by  motorcyclists.  

 

269. Buses  and  other  vehicles  were  being  stoned  at  different  areas.  

 

270. Despite   being   fully   aware   of   blackspots   within   the   outskirts   and  

inside  the  capital,  those  black  spots  were  left  unattended.  

 

271. A  team  of  hooded  persons  were  openly  stoning  buses  at  the  corner  

of  Military  and  Pamplemousses  roads.  

 

272. Police   officer   Padaruth  who  was  posted   right   in   front   of   L’Amicale  

was   assaulted   and   had   to   flee.   Thirty   minutes   later   a   crowd  

assembled  in  front  of  L’Amicale.  

 

197

273. A  group  of  five  to  ten  persons  stopped  a  bus  along  Royal  Street  and  

forced  all  the  passengers  to  leave  the  said  bus.  That  bus  was  then  set  

on  fire  in  front  of   ‘La  Scierie  Goollam’.  The  intention  was  to  cause  a  

diversion  but  this  was  avoided  thanks  to  the  prompt  intervention  of  

neighbours  and  clients  of  Mohun  Hotel.  

 

274. Gathering  of  a  riotous  crowd  in  front  of  Vallee  Pitot  Police  Station.  

 

275. There   was   a   group   of   motorcyclists   circulating   rapidly   and  

threatening  people  and  causing  various  disturbances.  

 

276. Attacks  on  the  following  properties:  

i. Chancery  House  ii. Blanche  Birger  iii. Registrar  building  iv. Offices  of  some  lawyers  v. Street  lamps  

 277. Attempted  attacks  on  petrol  stations.  

 

278. Road  blocks  which  had  been  put  up  by  those  creating  the  disorders.  

 

279. Spontaneous   attack   on   Pope  Henessy   Police   Station   triggered   by   a  

Fire  Brigade  Supporter.  

 

280. Attacks   on   the   Registrar   building   did   not   last   long   since   the  

motorcyclists,   mentioned   earlier   informed   the   crowd   that   ‘Lakaz  

Satan’  was  on  fire.  

 

281. Attacks  on  Mona  Mini  Market  and  Vallee  Pitot  Store  (Opposite  Vallee  

Pitot  Police  Station)  

 

282. Lai  Min  restaurant  was  attacked  and  alcoholic  drinks  stolen.  

 

283. The  HSBC’s  Automatic  Teller  Machine  was  damaged.  

 

198

284. Gathering   in   front   of   the   stables   at   Champ  de  Mars   (considered   as  

another  place  of  sin  by  some).  

 

285. Attempts   to   further   divert   the   attention   of   the   police   force   by  

circulating  the  rumour  that   the  Government  House  would  be  burnt  

down.  

 

286. The  modus  operandi  was  the  same:  

i. A   number   of   motorcyclists   came   on   the  spot  prior  to  each  incident.  

ii. Incendiary  devices  had  been  used.  iii. Perpetrators  were  masked.  iv. Places   and   activities   considered   within  

the   Muslim   community   as   being   sinful  were  systematically  targeted:  

 I. Places  selling  alcohol  II. Betting  places  III. Banks  (because  of  their  trade  in  Interests)  IV. Place  renowned  for  prostitution  

 

287. The   police   completely   failed   to   enquire   as   to   whether   all   of   the  

incidents  mentioned  above  were  in  fact  linked.  

 

288. According   to   the   prosecution   version,   a   group   of   motorcyclists  

suddenly  came  along  Royal  Street  and  one  of  them  stopped  by  Sheik  

Imran  Sumodhee  (Mounou)  and  showed  the  latter  a  bag  containing  

Molotov   cocktails.   Thereafter,   Mounou   asked   that   motorcyclist   to  

hurl  same  at  L’Amicale.  

 

289. Why  is  it  then  that  the  police  did  not  find  it  necessary  to  enquire  as  

to  whom  that  motorcyclist  was?  

 

290. Finally,  why  was  it  that  the  police  did  not  consider  that  the  Escadron  

de   la   Mort   could   be   involved   in   a   way   or   another   into   the   attack  

when   it  was  well  known   to   the  police   that   the  group  was  active   in  

Port  Louis.  

199

Chapter 32: Affidavits and witnesses

statements  

291. The   gist   of   the   affidavits   and   witness   statements   which   have   not  

been  referred  to  so  far  is  as  follows:  

 

 

Name  

 

 

Gist  

 

Iqbal  Auckle  

(Affidavit)  

 

 

Corroborates  Mounou’s  version  

 

 

 

Jihaad  Khodabaccus  

(Affidavit)  

 

One   of   the   two   persons   who   can   confirm   that  

Mounou   and   Bebe   are   factually   innocent   in   the  

Amicale  case  since   Jihaad  was   in   the  company  of  

Mounou  and  Bebe   for   the  whole  day  on   the  23rd  

May  1999  until  late  at  night.  

 

 

 

Mahmade  Ramjane  

(Affidavit)  

 

The   second   person   who   can   confirm   the  

innocence  of  Mounou  and  Bebe  since,  he  also,  was  

in   their   company   from   the   moment   they   left  

Anjalay  Coopen  until  they  reached  home.  

 

 

 

Azmat  Ally  

(Affidavit)  

 

 

 

 

Further  proof  that  Azad  Thupsee  is  a  liar  

200

 

 

Mrs.  Deenmohamed  

(Affidavit)  

 

 

 

Corroborates  Bébé’s  version  

 

Mr.  Noordaully  

(Affidavit)  

 

 

 

Corroborates  Bébé’s  version  

 

 

Yusouf  Ruhomally  

(Statement)  

 

 

Confirms   the   version   of   Amicale   worker   Mr.  

Toorub  who  heard  explosions.  

 

 

 

Reaz  Auckle  

(Affidavit)  

 

 

Corroborates  Mounou’s  version  

 

 

 

Raffick  Goolfee  

(Statement)  

 

 

Confirms   the   involvement   of   Azad   Nandoo,   the  

hooded  motorcyclists  and  the  bigger  picture  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

201

Part  6:  Post  27th  June  2013    

292. Following   the   symposium   of   the   27th   June   2013,   an   appeal  will   be  

made   to   the  President   of   the  Republic   to   exercise   his   discretion   in  

accordance  with  S.  21  of  the  Criminal  Appeal  Act  1955.  

 

293. Section   21   of   the   Criminal   Appeal   Act   1955   provides   as  

follows:  

 

Criminal  Appeal  Act  1955      21     Prerogative  of  mercy    Nothing  in  this  Act  shall  affect  the  prerogative  of  mercy,  but  the   President   of   the   Republic,   on   the   consideration   of   any  petition  for  the  exercise  by  him  of  the  prerogative  of  mercy,  having   reference   to   the   conviction   of   a   person   before   the  Supreme   Court   or   to   the   sentence   (other   than   sentence   of  death)  passed  on  a  person  so  convicted  may,   if  he  thinks  fit,  at  any  time  –    

(a) refer  the  whole  case  to  the  Court  and  the  case  shall   then  be  heard   and   determined   by   the   Court   as   in   the   case   of   an  appeal  by  a  person  convicted;  or    

(b) where   he   desires   the   assistance   of   the   Court   on   any   point  arising   in   the   case  with   a   view   to   the   determination   of   the  petition,  refer  that  point  to  the  Court  for  its  opinion  and  the  Court   shall   then   consider   the   point   so   referred   and   furnish  the  President  of  the  Republic  with  its  opinion  on  the  point.    

 

294. Section   2   of   the   Criminal   Appeal   Act   1955   defines   “Court”   as  

meaning   the   Court   of   Criminal   Appeal   established   under   section   3  

(1).    

 

295. Section  3  (1)  of  the  Criminal  Appeal  Act  reads  as  follows:  ‘There  shall  

be  a  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal,  and  the  Chief   Justice  and  the  Puisne  

Judges  shall  be  Judges  of  that  Court.’  

 

202

296. In  1995,   the  Abolition  of  Death  Penalty  Act  was  passed  with   effect  

from  the  14th  of  December  of  that  same  year.  In  the  same  breath,  S21  

of   the   Criminal   Appeal   Act   1995   was   amended   to   reflect   the  

abolition  of  death  penalty.  

 

297. It   is   clear   from   a   reading   of   section   21   of   the   Criminal   Appeal   Act  

1955  that   the  President   is  empowered   to  refer  a  whole  case   to   the  

Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  for  the  case  to  be  heard  as  an  appeal  by  a  

person  convicted.    

 

298. Furthermore,  S  16  (2)    of  the  Criminal  Appeal  Act  provides  that:  

 (2)  The  Court  may,   if   it   thinks   fit,  on   the  application  of  an  appellant,   admit   the   appellant   to   bail   pending   the  determination  of  his  appeal  in  accordance  with  the  Bail  Act.  

   

299. It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Criminal  Appeal  Act  1955  also  provides  that  

the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  has  supplementary  powers  which  have  

unfortunately  sparingly  been  used.  

 

300. These   supplementary   powers   enables   the   Court,   if   it   thinks   it  

necessary  or  expedient  in  the  interest  of  justice,  to:-­‐    

 

i. Order   the  production  of  any  document,  exhibit  or  other   thing   connected   with   the   proceedings  (whether  produced   at   the   trial   or   not)  where   the  production   appears   necessary   for   the  determination  of  the  case  

 ii. Order   any   witnesses   who   would   have   been  

compellable  witnesses  at  the  trial  to  attend  and  be  examined  before  the  Court,  whether  they  were  or  were   not   called   at   the   trial,   or   order   the  examination   of   any   such   witnesses   to   be  conducted   in   the   manner   provided   by   rules   of  court  before  any   judge  of   the  Court  or  before  any  officer   of   that   Court   or   before   any   Magistrate   or  other   person   appointed   by   the   Court   for   the  purpose,   and   allow   the   admission   of   any  depositions  so  taken  as  evidence  before  the  Court  

 

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iii. Where  any  question  arising  on  the  appeal  involves  prolonged  examination  of  documents  or  accounts,  or   any   scientific   or   local   investigation,   which  cannot   in   its   opinion   conveniently   be   conducted  before   the   Court,   order   the   reference   of   the  question  in  the  manner  provided  by  rules  of  court  for   inquiry   and   report   to   a   special   commissioner  appointed  by  them,  and  act  upon  the  report  of  any  such  commissioner  so  far  as  it  thinks  fit  to  adopt  it;  and  

   

iv. appoint  any  person  with  special  expert  knowledge  to  act  as  assessor  to  the  Court  in  any  case  where  it  appears   to   it   that   such   special   knowledge   is  required  for  the  proper  determination  of  the  case,  and  exercise   in   relation   to   the  proceedings  of   the  Court  any  other  powers  not  inconsistent  with  this  Act  which  may  for  the  time  being  be  exercised  by  the  Supreme  Court  on  appeals  in  civil  matters,  and  issue   any   warrants   necessary   for   enforcing   the  orders  or  sentences  of  the  Court.  

   

301. In  the  case  of  De  Boucherville  v  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  

(1991   SCJ   279),   the   former   Chief   Justice,   Sir   Victor   Glover   stated  

that   the   Section   21   remains   the   only   remedy   available   to   anyone  

who  wishes   to   challenge   his   conviction   after   appeal   avenues   have  

been  exhausted.    

 

302. The  cases  of  Muktar  Ali  &  Gulam  Rasool  v  State   (1993  SCJ  46)  and  

Roger  France  Pardayan  de  Boucherville   v  The  State  of  Mauritius  &  

Ors   (1996   SCJ   237)   also   briefly   acknowledged   Section   21   of   the  

Criminal  Appeal  Act.  The  barristers  involved  in  those  cases  were  no  

lesser  than  Sir  Gaetan  Duval  Q.C  and  Guy  Ollivry  Q.C.    

 

303. However,   according   to   our   extensive   research   and   Senior   Counsel  

well  versed  in  criminal  matters,  the  section  has  never  been  put  into  

application.  

 

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304. Recently  in  India,  a  group  of  14  former  judges  of  eminence  has,  in  a  

petition  addressed  to  the  President,  sought  the  latter’s  intervention    

under  Article  72  of  the  Constitution.  

 

Can  the  enquiry  be  re  opened?  The  Michaela  Harte  case  in  Mauritius  

 

305. On   10th   January   2011,   Mrs.   Michaella   Mcareavey   Harte   an   Irish  

national  aged  28  was  found  dead  in  her  hotel  room  at  Legends  Hotel  

Grand  Gaube.  

 

306. Two  persons   namely  Mr  Avinash  Treebohun   and   Sandeep  Moonea  

were   arrested   and   subsequently   charged   for   murder.   After   a  

protracted   preliminary   enquiry   the   case   was   lodged   before   the  

Assizes  on  22nd  May  2012.  

 

307. After  several  weeks  of  trial  which  was  given  huge  publicity,  the  jury  

returned  a  resounding  unanimity  verdict  of  Not-­‐Guilty.  

 

308. Following  the  verdict,  the  Honourable  DDP  stated  that  there  were  to  

be  an  independent  fact  finding  committee  which  would  be  set  up.    

 

309. In  an  answer  to  a  PNQ  from  the  Leader  of  the  Opposition  Hon.  Paul  

Raymond  Berenger,  the  Honourable  Prime  Minister  replied:  

 

“yes   I   am   aware   (of   the   statement   of   the   DPP)   but   after  

consultation,   Mr   speaker   Sir,   we   think   that   the   best   way  

forward  is  for  the  institution  of  a  Judicial  Inquiry  (…)”  

 

310. The  Honourable  Leader  of  the  Opposition  asked:  “may  I  know  since  

what   is   being   proposed   in   the   Judicial   Inquiry?   Am   I   right   in  

understanding  that  there  will  not  be  a  full  police  inquiry  re-­‐opened  

looking  for  other  possible  culprits?”  

 

205

311. The  Honourable  Prime  minister  replied:  “No.  no,  no,  Mr  Speaker  Sir.  

The  police  inquiry  will  be  ongoing.  I  am  working  at  the  possibility  of  

getting  the  help  of  experts  from  abroad  to  assist  the  police  because  

we  have  to  find  the  guilty  in  this  case”.  

 

312. The  enquiry  was  effectively   reopened  under   the   supervision  of   the  

Deputy   Commissioner   of   Police   Mr.   Sooroojbally   and   a   team   of  

dedicated  and  experienced  investigators.    

 

313. Further   scientific   tests   were   carried   out   in   France.   Investigators  

from  Ireland  participated  in  a  reviewing  of  the  evidence  and  to  date,  

police  is  still  inquiring.  

 

314. If  a  police  enquiry  has  been  reopened  in  a  case  in  which  the  accused  

parties  were  acquitted  why  can’t  a  police  enquiry  be  re-­‐opened  in  a  

case  where  disturbing  factors  and  new  evidence  come  to  light  even  

when  accused  parties  have  been  found  guilty.  

 

The  Hillsborough  Disaster  -­  England    

315. On   15   April   1989,   96   Liverpool   fans   were   crushed   to   death   and  

hundreds   more   injured   on   the   steel-­‐fenced   terraces   of   Sheffield  

Wednesday's   stadium,  which  was  hosting   that   year's  FA  Cup   semi-­‐

final.  

 

316. The   inquiry   into   the   disaster   led   by   Lord   Chief   Justice   Taylor  

established  that  the  main  cause  was  a  failure  of  police  crowd  control.  

 

317. In  his  interim  report  on  4th  August  1989,  Lord  Justice  Taylor  wrote  

that  the  key  element  of  police  control  at  fault  was  the  failure  to  close  

off  the  tunnel  leading  to  pens  3  and  4  once  Gate  C  had  been  opened.  

 

318. Lord   Justice   Stuart-­‐Smith  was   appointed   to   review   "new"  evidence  

which   had   not   been   submitted   to   the   inquiry   or   inquests   and   also  

206

dozens   of   police   and   witness   statements,   apparently   critical   of  

police,  which  had  been  altered.    

 

319. Lord   Justice   Stuart-­‐Smith's   conclusion  was   that   the   fresh   evidence  

did  not  add  anything  significant  to  the  understanding  of  the  disaster,  

and   that   while   statements   should   not   have   been   edited,   this   was  

simply  an  "error  of  judgement".    

 

320. Jack  Straw  accepted  the  findings  and  ruled  out  a  new  inquiry,  but  in  

August   1998   the   Hillsborough   Family   Support   group   brought  

charges  of  manslaughter  against  David  Duckenfield  and  his  deputy,  

Superintendent  Bernard  Murray,  in  a  private  prosecution.    

 

321. The   case   came   to   trial   in   2000.   After   six  weeks   the   jury   found  Mr  

Murray   not   guilty   of   manslaughter,   and   said   it   could   not   reach   a  

verdict  on  Mr  Duckenfield.    

 

322. What   followed,   over   an  11-­‐year   period,   were   various   different  

modes  and  levels  of  scrutiny,  including  Lord  Justice  Taylor's  Interim  

and   Final   Reports,   civil   litigation,   criminal   and   disciplinary  

investigations,   the   inquests   into   the   deaths   of   the   victims,   judicial  

reviews,   a   judicial   scrutiny   of   new   evidence   conducted   by   Lord  

Justice   Stuart-­‐Smith,  and   the   private   prosecution   of   the   two   most  

senior  police  officers  in  command  on  the  day.  

 

323. Despite   this   range   of   inquiry   and   investigation,   many   bereaved  

families   and   survivors   considered   that   the   true   context,  

circumstances   and   aftermath   of   Hillsborough   had   not   been  made  

public.   They   were   also   profoundly   concerned   that   following  

unsubstantiated   allegations   made   by   senior   police   officers   and  

politicians   and   reported  widely   in   the  press,   it   had  become  widely  

assumed   that   Liverpool   fans'   behaviour   had   contributed   to,   if   not  

caused,  the  disaster.  

 

207

324. In   2009,   at   the   20th   anniversary   of   the   disaster,   Andy   Burnham,  

Secretary   of   State   for   Culture,   Media   and   Sport,   announced   the  

Government's   intention   to  effectively   waive  the   30-­‐year   rule  

withholding   public   records   to   enable   disclosure   of   all   documents  

relating  to  the  disaster.  

 

325. In  July  2009  the  Hillsborough  Family  Support  Group,  supported  by  a  

group   of   Merseyside   MPs,   presented   to   the   Home   Secretary   a  

case  for   disclosure   based   on   increasing   public   awareness   of   the  

circumstances   of   the   disaster   and   the   appropriateness   of   the  

investigations  and  inquiries  that  followed.  

 

326. The   Home   Secretary  met  with   representatives   of   the   Hillsborough  

Family   Support   Group;   and   in   January   2010   the   Hillsborough  

Independent  Panel,  chaired  by  James  Jones,  Bishop  of  Liverpool,  was  

appointed.  

 

327. A  parallel  can  be  drawn  in  the  case  of  Amicale  in  as  much  as  since  it  

is   widely   believed   that   the   true   facts   and   circumstances   of   the  

Amicale  arson  had  not  been  made  public.  

 

328. In   the   case  of   the  Amicale  Four,   only   a   commission  of   enquiry  will  

enable   the   truth   to  shine   forth  and   finally  give  a  sense  of   justice   to  

the  families  of  the  victims  and  the  four  innocents.  

 

329. The  wider  repercussion  of  a  Commission  of  enquiry  is  that  it  will  set  

the  stage  for  major  reforms  as  regards  to:  

a. The  manner  in  which  police  investigations  are  carried  out  b. The  facilities  and  training  which  need  to  be  provided  to  the  

police   force   since   without   the   adequate   tools,   the   police  cannot  be  expected  to  perform  to  the  required  standard  

c. A  total  review  of  the  way  in  which  the  Fire  Services  are  to  operate  

d. An  overhaul  of  our  Forensic  Science  Laboratory  and  Scene  of  Crime  Officers.  

e. The  judiciary  and  (non)  finality  of  justice.      

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     Terms  of  reference  for  commission:    

330. The  following  is  a  non-­‐exhaustive  list  of  proposed  terms  of  reference  

for  an  eventual  Commission  of  Enquiry:  

 

331. Whether   all   scientific   were   fully   probed   into   by   our   scientific  

laboratory  and  whether  there  was  a  need  to  refer  the  specimens  and  

findings   of   our   laboratory   to   international   expert   laboratories   for  

further  investigation.  

 

332. Whether  the  death  of  Mr.  Hakim  could  have  been  caused  by  reasons  

other   than  burns  and  whether   the   injuries   found  on  his  body  were  

ante  mortem  or  post  mortem.  

 

333. Whether  the  Escadron  de  la  mort  has  been  involved  in  the  arson  of  

Amicale;  and  if  yes,  what  was  the  degree  of  their  involvement.  

 

334. Whether  the  police  has  by  act,  omission  or  otherwise  been  derelict  

in  their  duty  in  investigating  or  failing  to  investigate:    

 

a)     the  arson  at  L’Amicale  de  Port  Louis  

 

b)   the  arson  of  the  bus  near  Mohun  Hotel    

 

c)     the  stoning  of  MFA,  Blanche  Birger,  New  Court  House,  lamp  

posts  at  Cathedral  square,  Anquetil  Building  and  the  offices  

of  notaries  and  attorneys    

 

d)     the  stoning  and  attack  on  the  Pope  Henessy  Police  Station    

 

e)     the  chronology  of  events  at  Pope  Henessy  Police  Station    

 

209

f)     the  different  NSS  reports  more  particularly   the  report  one  

week  before  the  23rd  May  1999  specifying  that  there  might  

be  trouble  following  the  football  match    

 

g)     the  different  calls  received  by  the  fire  police  station  of  Port  

Louis,  Quatre  Bornes  and  Curepipe    

 

h)     the  different  phone  calls  and  information  received  at  IR  and  

follow  up  actions  taken,  if  any    

 

335. Whether  actions  were  taken  by  the  responsible  police  officer  at  the  

scene   of   crime   to   prevent   any   contamination   so   as   to   preserve  

evidence.  

 

336. To  enquire  into  what  was  done  by  the  police  to  trace  the  ‘donor’  of  

the   pre-­‐fabricated   Molotov   cocktail   if   ever   they   did   believe   the  

version  of  Thupsee.  

 

337. Whether  the  police  did  review  the  180  hours  of  video  tape  and  what  

actions  were  taken  following  same.  

 

338. Whether  the  police  did  forward  all  materials   in  relation  to  the  case  

to  the  DPP.  

 

339. Whether  the  DPP  did  forward  all  documents  received  by  the  police  

to  the  defence.  

 

340. Whether  any  action/s  was  /  were  taken  following  the  report  of  the  

Chief  Scotland  Yard  investigator,  Mr.  Donohue.  

 

341. Whether   the   inquiry   started   by   late   Chief   Inspector   Raddhoa   in  

relation   to   the   involvement  of   the   ‘Escadron  de   la  mort’  was   taken  

over  or  followed  up.  

 

210

342. Why  statements  were  not  taken  from  the  following:  

 

a. The  Fire  people  

b. The  employees  of  Amicale  

c. The  injured  persons  who  could  have  easily  been  traced  back  

as  their  addresses  were  available  in  hospital  records.  

d. The  owners  or  persons  present  in  the  following:    

 

i. Li   Shing   Tit   which   building   is   located   at   Anquetil  

Street,  Port  Louis  

ii. The   then   ONU   Restaurant   situated   at   Corner  

Anquetil  and  Royal  Roads.  

iii. The   various   neighbours   living   opposite   Amicale   or  

along   the   route   which   the   mob   has   allegedly  

followed  

 

e. The   taxi   drivers   present   at   Taxi   Stand   next   to   Amicale   and  

along  Emmanuel  Anquetil  Street.    

f. Punters  and  players  who  were  inside  Amicale  

 

343. Whether  the  police,  inquired  on  the  threats  received  prior  to  the  23rd  

May  1999  by  Mr.  Lai  Yau  Tim,  owner  of  Amicale.  

 

344. Whether  the  police,  was  in  possession  of  letters  allegedly  remitted  to  

them  by  Mr.  Lai  Yau  Tim.  

 

345. Whether  there  was  a  CCTV  at  Amicale  and  which  camera  was  posted  

opposite  Amicale  itself.  

 

346. Whether  the  police,  in  the  different  meetings  prior  to  the  match,  did  

the   needful   in   the   light   of   the   report   of   Justice   Ahnee   to   secure  

Khadafi  Square,  and  if  not,  why  not.  

 

211

347. Whether   the  police   secured   the  Diary  book,  Occurrence  book  and/  

or  log  book  of    

a. Pope  Henessy  Police  station  b. Police  Post  of  the  Government  House  c. Vallee  Pitot  Police  Station  d. Trou  fanfaron  Police  Station  e. Albercrombie  Police  Station  f. Harbour  Police  Station  g. The  Information  Room  including  its  log  book  h. Diary  book  and  other  documents  and  telephone  log  book  of  

Fire  Brigade  of  MCPL  i. The   log  book  of   all   phone   calls   of   the  CEB  of   la  Poudriere  

Street,  Port  Louis      

348. Whether   the   police   did   the   needful   to   contact   the   relevant   private  

security  firms  in  order  to  have  their  reports  and  CCTV  footage.  

 

349. How   to   prevent   and   minimise   Miscarriage   of   Justice   within   our  

system?  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Chapter 31: Recommendations

 

350. In  Mauritius,  there  are  no  principles  and  protocols  established  when  

it   comes   to   disposal    or   preservation   of   exhibits   and   therefore   any  

accused   party   /   appellant   wishing   to   examine   exhibits   again   for  

further  scientific  tests  or  to  challenge  the  tests  done  at  the  time  may  

find  it  difficult  to  do  so.  

 

351. We   propose   that   a   protocol   be   established   to   provide   guidance   as  

regards   to   how   exhibits   are   preserved.   Exhibits   such   as   weapons,  

clothes,  DNA  sample,  etc  are  to  be  preserved  for  a  period  of  twenty  

years   and   scientific   report   concerning   same   are   to   be   kept   as  

protected  data  for  a  period  of  no  less  than  60  years.  

 

352. Exhibits  and  also  any  other  items  collected  at  the  place  of  the  crime  

are   to   be   kept   in   three   different   packaging   so   as   to   enable   further  

scientific  test  and  at  the  same  time  prevent  any  cross  contamination.    

 

353. It   is   also  proposed   that   the   scientific   laboratory   in   a   small   country  

like  Mauritius  should  be  under  the  aegis  of  a  newly  created  Ministry  

of  Justice  and  not  under  the  Prime  Minister  or  Minister  in  charge  of  

Home   Affairs   since   there   can   clearly   be   conflict   of   interests   or  

motivations  to  hide  the  truth.  

 

354. We   further   propose   that   the   Forensic   Scientific   Laboratory   (FSL)  

becomes   a   protected   body   with   quasi   constitutional   status   of  

independence  so  as  to  ensure  that  there  is  no  interference  by  other  

entities  of   the  constitution  and   further   the   laboratory   is   to  open   to  

the  defence   to  have   tests  carried  out   if  need  be  on   their   terms  and  

reference.    

 

213

355. Even   though   the   term  of  Ministry  of   Justice   and  Minister  of   Justice  

has   been   used   since   independence,   Mauritius   does   not   have  a  

Ministry  of  Justice.  

 

356. Instead  the  cabinet  of  Ministers  in  Mauritius  consists  of  an  Attorney  

General   responsible   for   the  Attorney  General’s  office.  The  Attorney  

General,  according  to  the  constitution  must  be  a  barrister  and  once  

nominated,   if  he  has  not  been  elected,  has   the  same  powers  as  any  

Minister   within   the   cabinet.   It   is   clear   that   in   the   absence   of   a  

Minister   of   Justice   or   Ministry   of   Justice,   there   is   no   one   or   no  

institution  which  will  promote  the  advancement  of  justice.  

 

357. We   propose   that   no   photos   of   the   Accused   parties   or   any  

information   which   could   lead   to   the   identification   of   the   Accused  

parties,  whether  by  way  of  photographs  or  address  or  place  of  work  

be  published  in  the  press  unless  that  person  is  a  public  figure.  

 

358. In   a   list   of   scheduled   cases,   among   others,   murder,   manslaughter,  

rape,   terrorism   cases,   dangerous   drugs   cases   where   trafficking   is  

averred,  arson  causing  death,  the  Police  is  to  digitally  video  record,  

at   the   first   opportunity   witnesses   and   data   recorded   are   to   be  

preserved  as  exhibits.  

 

359. The   police   is   under   no   duty   to   disclose   post   conviction   evidence.  

Often,   the   Police   have   in   their   possession   evidence,   which   if  

produced  would  prove  the  innocence  of  a  convict.  We  propose  that  

protocols  and  guidelines  are  established  to  deal  with  the  process  of  

post  conviction  evidence.  

 

Commission  for  prerogative  of  mercy    

360. At  the  moment  the  Commission  for  prerogative  of  mercy  (CPM)  has  

been  presided  by  a  former  Chief  Justice.  The  seat  of  the  prerogative  

of  mercy  is  surprisingly  situated  at  the  office  of  the  Prime  Minister.    

 

214

361. We  propose   that   there   shall   be   a   full   time   chairperson   of   the   CPM  

with  two  assessors  which  shall  have  its  seat  separate  from  the  Office  

of  the  PM.  

 

362. We   further   propose   that   there   be   arrangements   made   for   the  

commission   of   the   prerogative   of   mercy   to   hear   viva   voce   some  

petitions  where  listening  to  the  witnesses  and  barristers  plea  might  

assist   to   come   to   the   right   conclusion   the   more   so   as   institutions  

despite  all  safeguards  can  still  fail.  

 

363. Prosecuting  Counsel  appearing  at  the  trial  court  must  not  appear  on  

appeal   because   there   is   an   inherent   danger   that   as   human   being  

what   we   become   biased   and   influenced   by   ego,   thus   opening   the  

door  for  tunnel  vision  again.    

 

364. During  our  enquiry,  we  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  Mauritius  

is  not  an  exception  to  the  phenomenon  of  false  confessions,  the  more  

so   in   highly   publicised   case.   Police   enquiring   officers   have   a  

tendency   to  act  hastily  and   to  close  all  avenues  of  enquiry  because  

they  have  under  their  hands  a  confession  .    

 

365. A  confession  can  be  false  for  numerous  reasons  and  the  police  must  

always   be   on   alert   that   someone   showing   no   signs   of   disturbance  

mentally  or  physically  may  still  produce  a  false  confession.  

 

366. We   propose   that   all   confessions   must   stand   the   test   of   physical  

possibility   and   temporal   possibility   which   must   be   supported   by  

independent  witnesses  or/and  scientific  evidence.    

 

367. We  propose,  for  the  purpose  of  accuracy,  that  every  police  officer  is  

given   a   police   notebook   where   he   is   requested   to   note   important  

events  which  came  under  his  attention  while  carrying  out  his  police  

duty.    

 

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368. In  Mauritius  such  police  notebooks  are  kept  for  a  period  of  five  years  

and  then  they  are  destroyed.  Huge  criminal  trials  may  take  at  least  3  

–  4  years  before  they  are  heard  before  a  jury  (save  exceptions)  and  

before   the   case   is   disposed   before   the   JCPC,   7   years   would   have  

passed  by.  

 

369. Often  we   have   heard   in   Court,   for   example   in   the   case   of   State   vs.  

Charles  (2012)  that  police  notebooks  are  not  available  because  they  

have  been  destroyed  due  to  floods.  We  therefore  propose  that  police  

officers  must  on  a  daily  basis  upload  their  recorded  information  on  a  

computer.  

 

370. A   PE   will   be   effective   if   it   is   done   with   the   objective   to   further  

enquire  on  what  the  police  has   found  during  their   inquiry.We  view  

with  much   concern   that   challenges   put   forward   by   counsel   at   the  

level  of  Preliminary  Enquiry   (P.E)  have  been   turned  down  because  

sufficient  powers  are  not  delegated  to  the  District  Magistrate  to  act  

as  an  inquisitorial  Magistrate  thus  leaving  this  arena  to  the  Defence  

and  Prosecution  counsel.  

 

371. We  propose   that   the  Magistrate   is   to   give   a   finding  which   shall   be  

public.  

 

372. We   further   propose   that   the   law   be   altered   to   allow   the   PE   to   be  

conducted   by   Magistrates   of   the   Intermediate   Court   instead   of  

District   Court   because   murder   and   others   being   cases   carrying   a  

heavy  penalty  cannot  be  left  in  the  hands  of  Magistrates  having  two  

of  three  years  experience  at  the  bar.  

 

373. The  role  of  the  NIU  is  as  its  name  indicates,  to  gather  intelligence  in  

order   to   help   the   nation   against   any   possible   avoidable  

dangers.  Unfortunately   there   is   no   control    on   the   activity   of   the  

NIU.  For  example  ,  during  election  times,  they  do  opinion  polls.  Their  

budgets  are  not  known.  

216

 

374. That   the   secret   service   presently   known   as   the   National   State  

Service  (NSS)  must  become  independent  of  the  police  force.  It  should  

have  its    separate  budget,  structure  and  infrastructure.  

 

375. The   NSS   is   to   fall   under   the   direct   responsibility   of   an   inter-­‐

parliamentary   committee   or   of   a   parliamentary   committee  

comprising  of     members   from   all   sides   of   the   house  which  will   be  

seating   on   a   regular   basis   to   monitor   the   work   performed   by   the  

NSS.  

 

376. The  law  is  to  be  amended  and  the  intelligence  service  should  also  be  

responsible  to  provide  social  information  to  the  house  in  order  that  

they  may  be  rooted  towards  the  necessary  institution.  

 

377. The whole fire services need to be overhauled and tuned to the demand

of the present century. We observed the following:  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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‘Truth alone will endure, all the rest will be swept away before the tide of time’

Mahatma Ghandi