WWI 1st Infantry Division

8/3/2019 WWI 1st Infantry Division

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ARBHTCIffillCAt CORPS HISTORICAL STUD!

THE U t S D W B W : A I ANSAUVIELE

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The 1st Division at AnsauvilleJanuary - April 1918

byRexmond C. Cochrane

GAS WARFARE IN WORLD WAR IStudy Number 9

U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPSHISTORICAL STUDIES

U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical OfficeOffice of the Chief Chemical OfficerArmy Chemical Center, Maryland

1958


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The 1st Divis ion at Ansauvi l le Jamtary - April 1918

Prepared byRexmond C. Cochrane, Ph.D.

Under Contraot DA-18-1O8-CML-6214with

U.S. Army Chemioal Corps

Th is i s an ac cep ted dr af t stud y on gas warfare in World War I

. E \ CUEfilEBrigadier General^ USAA ss t CCmlO fo r P la nn in g k Dootrine


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THE 1 s t DIVISION AT ANSAUVILLEJanuary Apr i l 1918byRexmond C. Cochrane

N a r r a t i v e pageThe Firs t Expedi t ionary Divis ion # ## 2Gas In s t r uc t io n in the 1s t Divis ion . . . 7A r t i l l e ry Duel 16Gas for Raids 0 . o 27The F i r s t German Spring O ff en siv e. . . 37Major Gas Attack hZThe New Ar s in e s . * U6

A n a l y s i sB a t t e r y a nd C o u n t e r - b a t t e r y . . . h&C a su al ty R ep ort . . . . . . . . . h9"W e. . . touched them up qui te a b i t . . , " 53

MapsMap No. 1 Lo ca tion o f th e 1 st D iv is io n , Sep 1917 Apr 1918 hSke tch Vue Panoramique, A nsa uville Se ctor 11Map No. 2 1s t FA Ba t te ry Disp os i t ion , 29 J a n . . . . . . . . 1Map No. 3 A r t i l l e r y and Inf an try D isp os it io n, 29 Jan 17Map No. h Gas P ro je ct or A ttac k, 26 Feb 21


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THE 1st DIVISION AT ANSAUVILLEJanuary - April 1918

The 1st Division arrived in France without, apparently, any gas trainingwhatever. Before going into combat it received not only the most completecombat training of any division in the AEF but the most thorough gas training.And gas training pamphlets, directives, and orders that later divisions were *to seem ignorant of or profess not tp have received, seem to have been immediately available anc carefully studied by the 1st Division.

Respite this, the division was to make all the mistakes of human natureand inexperience when under gas attack that the other divisions later made,with the result that during its operations in both the Ansauville sector, heredescribed, and subsequently in the Montdidier sector (the subject of a laterstudv), it was to suffer more gas casualties than small arms or artilleryshell casualties. As General Bullard said:Gas is such an intangible thing that men are only with great difficulty madeto guard themselves against it. A state of instruction adequate against thedanger is extremely hard to obtain....Our gas officers were almost hystericalin their efforts to teach and impress our new troops; but knowledge and realefficient training came only after hard experience.i

The present study of the initial operations of the 1st Division concernsnot only the gas training of the division but in particular a unique aspectof its experience not referred to in the well-known catalogue of "firsts" of

Lt. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War(New York, 1925), pp. 193 - 19h.

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It was perhaps the first and last division to suffer more artfor the principal target of both enemy HE and

at Ansauville was the 1st Division artillery, not the infantry.On both quiet and active fronts in the months to come, the infantry would

the principal, or even exclusive, target of enemy fire, and it was to suffer,would seem, from doctrine developed by the AEF for the special protectionthe artillery, as a result of the eariy experience of the 1st Division,

The First Expeditionary DivisionOn 2 May 1917, a month after the American declaration of war, Maj . Gen.J. Pershing received word that he was to go to France with four infantry

and an artillery regiment.2 He "construed this message to mean thatse troops w=re to form a division," and on 16 June 1917 the "First Expe

Division," made up of the 16th, 18th, 26th, and 28th Infantry Regwhich had recentIv seen field service under Pershing"s command on theborder, mailed for France. With them went not one but two artillery

the 5th and 6th FA, followed later by the 7th FA.3

Ltrs TAG to CG Southern Dept Ft Sam Houston, 23 and 26 May 1917, sub:for foreign service (World War Records, First Division^Vol. 1 ) . The documents in each of the 21 volumes, hereafter cited as

are bound chronologically.

Persh ing, My Experiences in the World War (wew York, 1931), I , 2 - 3 .is message was the genesis of the kO,OOO~man American divis io n (with corpsd army t ro o p s ) , more than twice t.i si ze of French, B r i t i s h , or German d iv iIn July 1917, Pershinc lc - ' ^n s Sec in France secured formal adoption OJ.is divis ion. Ib id . , I , 100 The American --Hv-iqion, which th e French treated as a Corps, s a i " u l d"on account ui unsui table recrui t ing and replacement pl an s, [ s i nc e!t could not be hoped that a command once depleted or reduced below a properbe promptly filled up aga in" (Persona l i t i es , pp. 75 - 76).

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On lJU July 19175 while Pershing began organizing AEF he ad qu art er s, 1s tD iv is io n he ad qu ar te rs was set up at Go ndrecourt, northw est of Neu;'chateau (MapNo. 1 ) , w ith M aj. Gen. W illiam L. S ib e r t in command. By e a r ly September th een gi ne er , s ig n a l , and medical components of the div ision had ar ri ve d, th e a r t i l l e r y under Br ig . Gen. Charles P. Summerall had le ft for the tra in in g areaa t La Valdahon, and th e formal tr a in in g of the div isi on began.

The 1s t Div isio n was th e o nly one in th e AEF t o have su ff ic ie n t time t oundergo the entire course of training in France prescribed by GHQ AEF.^ Thisplan al lowed one month for a cc lim atiz atio n and inst ru ct io n under French t u t e lage in th e b a tt a li o n s and lower un it s . The second month was spent lea rnin gtren ch warfare t a c t i c s , wi th French ba t ta l io ns in a quiet se ctor . During thelast month, back of the l ine, the combined division trained in the tactics ofopen w ar fa re . The div is io n was then considered ready to take over a sector onth e f i g h t i n g f ro n t .5

As i t began training in the practice trenches at Gondrecourt , the divisionwas issued both the French M-2 gas mask and the British small box respirator

History of the First Division during the World War^ compiled by the Socof th e 1st Div (P hi la de lp hi a, 1922), p . 37 1. Hereafter c i ted as His tory.MS, H is to ri c a l S ketch of th e F ir st Division in the World War (211; p p . ) ,p . 16 (1 st Div Box 1 1 , 11 .10. Here after ci te d as H ist Sketch . Since thenarrat ive of operat ions in the His tory and in the His t Sketch are essent ia l lyth e same, for convenience th e Hist Sketch w ell be most freq uen tly c it e d .

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FIRST DIVISIONSTATIONS1^17 - Ap r 1916


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BR), With them the troops receiv ed the ir f i r s t tra ining in gas warfare asgas alarms with imitation gas clouds were used to give skill in putting on

d wearing th e gas mask." Spe cial a tten tio n jwas given to pe rfe cting the menadj ust in g the mask within s ix seconds of th e alarm and to impressing on them

es si ty of st r ic t gas disc ip lin e. And they were tol d repeatedly that

Adequate as th e gas tra in in g may have appeared at the tim e, i t could not

era tions t o come. It seems probable that i t may have been li k e the tr ai ni ng

Ready for experience under actual trench conditions, on lh October the

en Lu ne vi lle and Nancy, in L orraine.^ On the night of 21 October, a b at

sid e corresponding u n its of the 18th French Divisio n and began tr ai ni ng in

Hist Sketch, p. 18.

Hist Sketch, p. 19.FO 1 , 1 s t D iv , U:OC P.M . , 1 1 Oct (R ecords l )


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dures . The ba t ta l io ns and b at te r i es were rot a te d a t ten-day in ter va lsn t i l a l l had been a t the f ro nt .

The 1s t D ivision was re li ev ed on th e ni gh t of 20 November and re tu rn edo G ondrecou rt, having lo st 36 men k i l l e d , 36 wounded, and 11 cap tur ed .?

ck at G ondrecourt, th e div isio n was str ipp ed of larg e numbers of i t s o ff ic er s ,OOs, and men to f i l l out GHQ st af fs and furn ish tr a in in g ca dr es , and re fi l l e d

rom replacem ent un it s coming from th e st a t e s . On 1h December, at Pershing's

Gen, Ro bert L , B u ll a rd , who had o r ig i n a l l y commanded th e 2nd Briga de andre re c e n tl y had been commandant of th e schools of th e 1st D i v i s i o n , ^ After

it at e gas would compel everyone to p ut on th e gas mask as though h is l i f eh " ^ The 1st Divisio n was read y to go in to the l in e on i t s

Warning Notice, Opns Sec, 1st Div, 13 Nov (Records 1)$ Hist Sketch, p, 28.67, 1st Div, 20 Nov (Records 5), said lU were killed, 3h wounded, 11 captured.Bullard, Personal i t ies , pp. 95 - 96; Peyton Co March, The Nation at WarNew York, 1932 ), pp . 266 - 268; L t r , TAG P a r is to CG 1s t Div 18 J u l 1917,Divis ional t ra ining (Records 2) .

1 Hist Sketch, p. 32O

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Gas Instruction in the 1st DivisionDespite the gas defense exercises from September on, a gas organization

was not set up in the division until December, when 2nd Lt. D. B. Wright wasappointed Div isio n Gas O ffi ce r, with a sta ff of regimental and ba tta lio n gas

12o f f i c e r s and gas NCOs. Implying tha t i t was an innovation , the appointmentof gas o ff ic e r s in th e b at ta li on s "thought necessary due to the large numberof v il l a g e s occup. by the D ivi sio n, andcooto provide trained gas of fic er swho might take the place of R0GOo's who might be assigned elsewhere or become casualties* n ^

A course of instruction was begun at once that included nine hours oftraining in offensive and defensive use of gas, with the troops carrying outmaneuvers w hile masked. Gas mask d r i l l and maneuvers, however, were hamperedby a serious shortage of both British and French masks, and defective maskson hand had to be reissued for drill purposes,, " The shortage had s t i l l not12 Opns memo 1*8, 1st D iv , 1 Dec (Records 20); GO 19, 1st Div, 23 Dec(Records 5>).13

Ltr, DGO 1st Div to C of Gas Serv, 31 Dec 1917, sub: Rpt for month ofDec (Records 20). Because they were- supernumeraries, GO 79 said BGOs mighthave duties other than gas officer* Gas NCOs were to have no other dutieswhen in contact with the enemy. Note: Memo, Div Adj 2nd Div, 5 Jan (2ndDiv Box 36, 6k.6), designated RGOs but no BGOs,Ik Memo h%, 1s t D iv, 1 Dec 1917, sub: In str uc tio n and tr ai n in g - Gas(Records 2 0 ); l t r , DGO t o C of Gas Se rv , 31 Dec, abov e.

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ade up when the division left for the frontoParallel with the troop instruction, all officers and NCOs in the divi

sion received a course of six lectures on gas defense, given by the gas officers. To supplement the lectures, the gas officers had instructions tomake full use of AEF Pamphlet 2^3, "Defensive Measures against Gas Attacks,"which had been prepared by the Gas Service in October 1917, a month after theestablishment of that service in the AEFo1? "In this pamphlet," said Lieutenant Wright, "you will find some variations from that in the correspondingBritish pamphlet. These are intentional variations and not oversights."(He did not describe the variations, and without the British pamphlet theyhave not been identified.)

The emphasis in the lectures was on the cloud gases, of which "chlorineand phosgene at present are the most important,Tl Not until the fifth lecturewas mention made of "the German paralysant," prussic acid, said to have been

used on the Russian front* (The 1st Division was later to use it, in the No. hrench gas shell.) In that lecture too appeared a brief description of "probably the most important shell gas at the present time,, .the so-called MUSTARDAS," with the statement that "probably more casualties have been caused byhis gas since its introduction in July of this year than by all the rest of

the war." Mustard gas burns were said to take from three to

Standing Trench Orders issued by the regiments and battalions in Febnd Mar a l l r efer , to the pamphlet, ind ica ting i t was av ai lable throughout


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five weeks to heal and made a man "practically useless for that length oftime." Its least effect on the eyes was loss of vision for from three daysto three weeks. The gas also had some effect as a vapor, especially on perspiring parts of the body.1^

What appears to have been the Division Gas Officer's first gas disciplineproblem centered on '. ~ "isuse of the gas mask carrier, anda division orderwas JLs sued making unit commanders responsible that "ABSOLUTELY NOTHING of any

in the Gas Mask Satchel except the gas mask."1? Six monthslater this order had been forgotten. In a memo to his gas officers, the Division Gas Officer said:In the satchel of salvaged masks are found everything from clothing to wristwatches. Most of these salvaged masks come from the hospitals and very likelythe men were casualties from removing the mask because they could not breathedue to carrying things in the satchel which get under the canister and closethe inlet valve.All Gas Officers should see that the satchel, as well as mask, is inspected and[that] the practice of using the satchel as a carryall is discontinued.^

Less than two weeks after its exercises in the "defensive and offensiveuse of gas with actual gas and gas bombs," the 1st Division was pronounced

16 Ltr and at ch d syn op se s of l e c t u r e s , Ch Gas Off 1 st Div to RGOs and BGOs,3 Dec 1917 9 su b: Lectures on Gas Defense (Records 20 ). 17

GO h, 13 Jan (Records ).18

Memo, DGO to GOs, 1st Div, 26 Jun, n.s, (1st Div Box 7, 63.6).

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qualified to take its place at the front, and on 7 January received ordersto relieve a part of the 1st Moroccan Division in the Ansauville sector,north of Toul.1? The Ansauville sector was dominated by Mont Sec, a hillheld by the enemy which commanded the wooded plain through which the Germanand French trench works wound their way (see Sketch). The terrain was otherwise fairly level, broken up only by wooded areas and the shell craters ofthree years of stabilized warfare*

In the Ansauville sector the division came under Passaga's XXII Corps ofthe First French Army, commanded by General Deben ,y0 Supply functions of thedivision, however, remained with the embryo I American Corpso Although therelief was completed 18 - 21 January, command of the sector was retained bythe adjacent 69th French Division until 5 February, when it passed to the 1stDivision.20

From the point of view of gas warfare, the condition of the 1st Divisionon arrival in the sector was not auspicious The 28th Infantry was short2,600 English respirators and was not to receive them until February. And_

18th Inf WD, 10 Jan (Records 16); Hist Sketch, po Ul. On 28 Feb, Pershingwas to report it depressing that after ten months there was but one division"just barely ready" for the field. It was 6 Mar before he thought the 1st Divready at last to take the offensive (My Experiences, I, 33U, 338).

Memo, Col. Fox Conner, OS GHQ AEF fo r CofS GHQ AEF, 19 J an , s u b : F i r s tDiv (Records l); FO h, 1st D iv, Feb (Records l )

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the 18th Infantry, which had started out from Gondrecourt with both itsFrench and English masks, had lost or damaged large numbers of them on themarch. As 1st Lt. Robert A. Hall, the Regimental Gas Officer, said:The logs on the march of S.B.R.s & French masks was unusually large. Thedamage to French masks, due to*..getting wet through, despite the fact thatthe French masks were being worn under the overcoat as required, was unusually large ^It is probable that the experience of the other regiments was similiar.

The division was warned on coming into the sector that a great deal ofgas was being used by both sides and that the Germans on this front wereusing mustard gas, which, in the form of "yperite," was still under development by the Frencho The troops were told that now that they were in thefield it was of special importance. [that they become] accustomed to wear[ing] their gas masks for long periods and to march or work with their maskson." 22

The warning was punctuated by a gas bombardment of French artillerypositions which the division had just reconnoitered, in which w60 men were

Entries in 28th Inf WD, 22 Jan - 5 Feb (Records 17) ; ltr. RGO, 18th Infto DGO, 30 Jan, sub: Rpt on Regtl Gas Activities (Records 13).

Lt. A. B, Butler (Actg Adj, later Opns 0 1st FA Brig, and finally ADCto Gen. Summerall), Jnl of Opns, 12 Jan (Records 11). Hereafter cited asADC Jnl Opnso FO 1, 1st Div, Hi Jan, par 5(b) (Records l ) o The same parin TO 8, 30 Mar, read: "march at quick and double time and work with theirmasks on." See also Misc Memo, 1st Div, 17 Jan, sub: Mustard Gas(Records 6) .

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badly burned with 'mustard gas1 at position #12 & others were burned atposition #16" (Map No. 2).?3 A week later, as the 1st Brigade moved intothe trenches, 200 gas cases were seen being evacuated from the Moroccan divisionto the right of the incoming troops.2^1

At the direction of the French corps commander, General Passaga, instruction were posted in every dugout and shelter in the 1st Division areaon proper procedure during a mustard gas attack. The troops were told toput on the British mask when the first gas shell fell and to keep it on forfour hours after a gas bombardment. Anyone passing through a gassed area wasto beat and shake his clothes before entering a dugout, and to use soap sudsas first aid treatment for liquid mustard on the skin. Further instructionsfrom Passaga in late January were based on recent gas attacks against theh2nd Division, where most of the casualties had occurred as a result offaulty gas proofing of dugouts and of poor gas mask discipline, J

The instructions, however, did not prevent a soldier from washing hishands in a shell hole filled with mustard-contaminated water. He was "badlyburned." And as might be expected, the knowledge that Ansauville was a highlyactive gas front set off a spate of false gas alarms almost nightly in the

ADC Jnl Opns, 16 Jan.

Bullard, Personalities, p. iyJa

Instru 2 and h, 1st Div, 26 and 31 Jan, sub: Gas Defense (Records 1 ).

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> / M ^

SECTORt% JANUARY 1918

MAP NO. Z

Ik


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d i v i s i o n s e c t o r , ^ To th e d ir e c ti o n s in t he AEF gas pamphlet th a t contaminated dugouts and

s h e l t e r s were to be promptly evacuated and tha t where po ssib le men were to bewithdrawn from contaminated a re a s , a div is io n memo e ar ly in Fe bruary addedtha t a l l ba t te ry un i t s were a t once to e s tab l i sh dupl ica te pos i t ions about00 yards from t h e i r f i r s t po si tio ns and were to withdraw to them when th eo th e rs were rend ere d u nte na ble by mustard g as . The memo al so r ep eat ed muchof the e a r l i e r in st ru ct io n on masking and f i r s t a id , and pointed out th a t"P ro tec tio n is a matter of secon ds."^ ' S t i l l another memo said th at gasglove s and ch lo rid e of l ime would be sh or tly issued to a l l ar t i l l e r y , machinegun, s i g n a l , and me dical u n i t s . The months at Ansau ville were to provethat the ar t i l le ry ra ther than the infantry needed the most gas protec t ion*I t would be th e on ly time in the experien ce of th e AEF th at t h i s was 30.26 D a il y Op er at io ns Report (DOR), 1st Div , 30 - 31 Jan (Records 1 2) ; Memo6, 1s t Br ig , 28 Jan (Records 7 ) .27 AEF Pamph 2 ^3 , pp . 2 , 13 (SHQ AEF Box 1727, fo l D); In s t ru h, 1st Div,7 Fe b, s ub; Def Measures ag ai nst Gas (s upp l'g Rego No. 2^3 [re v is ed ] GHQAEF, 30 Nov 1917) (Records i ) .The or ga ni za tio n of a lt e rn a te b a tt er y emplacements had been the sub ject ofMemo 2 1 , 1 s t FA B ri g , 23 Jan (Records 9), bu t may no t have been ac ted on a ton ce . The memo i s n ot ed in ADC J n l Opns, 23 Ja n .28 G - 1 memo, 1 s t D iv, 6 Feb ( Re cord s 6 )


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Artillery DuelGeneral Bullard's first act upon assuming command of the division sector

was to issue instructions saying: "There are no orders which require us towait for the enemy to fire on us before we fire on him; do not wait for himto fire first. y The division had been given a small daily allotment of No, h(cyanogen chloride) and No. 5 (phosgene) gas shells and had begun to fire themat once. On 1 February almost 80 were fired, probably for registration, andthe next day Lieutenant Butler wrote in his journal: "Our 155's fired 1?Urounds - mostly gas shells on seven German batteries." This was apparentlyin reply to 25 phosgene or diphosgene shells, recognized by their "peculiarswish and wobbly sound in passage," that fell harmlessly near the 6th FA inHazelle woods that day (Map No. 3).3 On 3 February, following a brigadebarrage of 6,750 HE shells, Butler reported happily that "the French are verymuch upset because we fired so long and fast."

On 5 Febuary, two heavy batteries shelled the enemy gun positions that"we believe were responsible for [shelling #12 position on 16 January].Gave them plenty of gas. 2nd Bn PC ?th FA at Rambucourt was shelled & gassed

29 Instru 1, 5 Feb, sub: General Instructions (Records l),* Hist Sketch,p. 395 cf. ADC Jnl Opns, 13 Jan.30 Ltr, RGO 18th Inf to C of Gas Serv, U Feb , sub: Rpt of Shell At k (GAF1st Di v ). This is the first gas atk reported by Spencer, "History of GasAttacks upon the AEF during the World War," I, 1 - 2 (CMLHO).

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"* co te z. ii ST .

^-" ' M_(Si$i

MAP NO. 3


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[in return]," Battery #12 was shelled again that day, and on 7 FebruaryLieutenant Butler said that as a result "three men from Bty A, 6th FA wentto the hospital this morning [with] faces and eyes burnedo" Upon investigation it was learned that a single mustard gas shell in the HE bombardmenthad hit a corner of a temporarily evacuated gun pit, soaking its logs. Fourmen, not three, were subsequently hospitalized31

Under the prodding of 1st Division fire, the artillery of the 78thReserve Division opposite^ responded in kind, stepping up its fire fromless than 100 rounds i day to more than 800 by the end of the month. DuringMarch the daily enemy fire was to range between 00 and 1,000 rounds a day,with at least two bombardments of 2,000 or more HE rounds0

The artillery gas duel continued on 20 February and again on the morning of 21 February when "a few gas shells" on a battery northeast of Beaumonton the Beaumont-Flirey roed resulted in two casualties.^ G - 2 failed, however, to report the 75 mustard gas rounds on the same battery on the evening

31 ADC Jnl Opns, 2 - 7 Feb; ltr, RGO 6th FA to C of Gas Serv, 10 Feb, sub:Mustard Gas Casualties (GAF-lst Div); Memo 38, 1st FA Brig, 7 Feb (Records9 ) ; Spencer, I, 332

The 259th Regt, 78th Res Div, was in the trenches opposite the 1st Div,The 76th Res was relieved by the UOth Div on 28 - 29 Mar, according to DailyIntelligence Summary (SOI) that date (Records U ) ,33 SOI and DOR, 20 - 21 Feb.

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of 25 February. The Regimental Gas Officer estimated that no more than 60mustard gas rounds had been thrown over in three HE and gas volleys, mostof them going over the position by about twenty yards. Oiled slickers,gloves, and masks were at once put on and there were no casualties.3h

The duel suddenly ceased to be anything like equal when on the earlymorning of 26 February "the enemy delivered a heavy gas attack on the Remieres wood....The suddenness and the violence of the attack, coupled withthe overwhelming fumes of the gas, were.. .horrifying." The commander of thetrench mortar battery in the wood said the attack "was very sudden [and] wecouldn't tell whether it was HE or gas. It all came down in one burst....The dugout door was blown in & the gas just rolled ino"3

This was a enemy projector attack, originally intended to climax threenights of artillery shelling with 1300 rounds of unspecified gas, in preparation for an elaborate raid under the code name of "Einladung." Following the projector shoot, long range artillery planned to gas the southernhalf of the Bois de ftemipres with blue cross (diphenylchloroarsine) shell,

3U ~~Hanslian, "Gasangriffe an der Amerikanischen Front," pp. 67 - 68(CMLHO); 78th Res Div WD, 25 Feb (World War Records, First Division, GermanDocuments, Vol. I ). Unless otherwise noted, all references to German documents will be to this volume. See also ltr, RGO 5th FA to C of Gas Serv,27 Feb, sub: Gas shell bombardment (GAF-lst Div); ADC Jnl Opns, 25 Feb,said the shells fell near btys #203 and #18 - wno harm done."

Hist Sk, p. h2; quote in ADC Jnl Opns, 27 Feb.35


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"to effect gas alarms and reduce the combat efficiency of the enemy," whileminenwerfers put down a three-minute fire wav e. The surprise raid , simultaneous with the fire wave, was to be made at dayb re ak . Only the projector attack was carried out; the raid for some reason was deferred until1 March.

On the morning after *u^ "*tack, G - 2 reported that "about 70 bom bs,210-mm, chlorine and ph^ C f T-^.' had been launched between 0132 and 0lU5 fromtrench mortar project cry sited west of the Eois de ua Sonnard. G - 3 agreedwith the estimate of 0 bombs and suggested that they had been fired in re taliation, "as we have on two or three occasions fired gas at them and haveunquestionably touched them up quite a bit more than they hav* bp^n beforeip this sector for a long time,"3?

A more accurate estimate was General Bullard's report that two volleys,each of KX) 18-cm minenwerfer shells, eighty percent of them phosgene, hadcrashed "with a loud explosion and bright flare of light" in the Bois deRemieres and in the trenches west of the wood (Map No, U ) .

36 Arko 78 WD, 17 Feb; 78th Res Div Order [for Einladung], 22 Feb; 78thRes Inf Brig Order, 25 Feb.37

SOI and DOR, 25 - 26 Feb, These "trench mortar projectors" were theGerman version of the British Livens Projector, first used in a gas attackin April 1917. The German projector reached the field that December.38

Ltr, CG 1st Div to CG XXXII Corps, 27 Feb, sub: Gas Attack (Records 1 2 ) .

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1 B o is de laSonnard

ATTACKOH 18* INFANT*/

fefc 191*


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Hanslian and 78th Reserve Division records indicate a much larger gasshoot. Of 810 projectors loaded with phosgene flasks, 10 with the newGerman gas, diphenylch lor oar sine, and 80 with high explosive, 807 were launched in the first salvo at 023 S and Ii2 in the second salvo at 0320. The mis sion, to produce casualties with almost lh tons of phosgene,39 had beencarried out on a clear, cold night by the 35th Pioneer Battalion, againstthe dugouts and supply rail lines in the Bois de Remie res. Observing thegreat white cloud that formed over the Bois de Remieres and then settleddown on the wood, the 35th Pioneers believed the attack a success. ButHanslian, on the basis of records available to him, which indicated that thewood was sparsely occupied at the time, considered the attack a failure.**0

German reports that two 1st Division batteries were gassed with yellowcross on the morning of the projector attack and three more "very effectivelygassed" the next morning, 27 February, are not confirmed by the division.**1

Total casualties as a result of the projector attack were reported byG - 2 as 3 killed and 9 "injured." There were no corrections to this report,

Eig ht hundred of th e s tan da rd 18-cm minenwerfer bombs, w ith 16.k9pounds of phosgene each, would total 6.6 tons, not lluho Hanslian, pp. 8 - 16; 78th Res Div WDScA rec or ds ; Spencer, I , 6 - 23 .A month l a t e r SOI and DOR, 20 - 21 Mar, quoted a p ris one r as say ing t h a t900 pr oj ec to rs had been fire d, about hal f of which f e l l in t h e i r own li n e s ,keeping them out for two days. If t r u e , th i s would exp lain th e dif fer en cebetween Bullard's and Hanslian's shell counts.

78th Res Div WD, 26 - 27 Feb.

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The commander of the 3rd Battalion, 18th Infantry, in Remieres Wood, said thatthe time between the first flash and the gas release was so brief ;hat manyof the men inhaled the gas before they could adjust their lespirators. Mostof the second salvo landed among his reserve platoon and in the trench mortararea in the woods where the men were in their dugouts and were not on thealert At daylight, the battalion medical officer reported one man dead, anofficer and an enlisted man severely gassed, and 20 others slightly gassed,but this total did not include the machine gun company, trench mortar orartillery details in-the area0 It was believed that their casualties wereheavier than those among the infantry*,^

The 1st Brigade War Diary that day reported 3 dead and 8 men severelygassed because they failed to get their masks on quickly enough, and 28other gas casualties as a result either of removing their masks too soon oreating food impregnated with gas0 The G - 3 daily report said that duringthe day casualties increased "until 61 cases have been reported., Seven aredead and there will probably be two or three moreo"^ There would have beenhalf as many casualties, said General Bullard, except that some of the NCOslet the men remove their masks a half hour after the last shell fell, and

SOI, 2 - 26 Feb; ltr, CO 3rd Bn Inf to 00 18th Inf, 26 Feb,sub: TM Gas Shell Barrage (Records 13)0

1st Brig WD, 26 Feb (Records 16)$ DOR, 25. - 26 Feb

23


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after daylight men were permitted to work in the area without masks. Theycontinued to work unmasked even though the odor of phosgene was strongly inevidence in the woods as late as Ii8 hours after the attacko^

The medical history of the division, reporting this as "the first German gas attack on U o S. troops, " said that 62 gas cases were admitted tothe hospital, with four deaths among them later.^ The final count of casualties was reported by the Division Surgeon, who said that 2 men died inthe field and 83 were evacuated Of those evacuated, 6 died within five tosixty hours after reaching the gas hospital at Menil la Tour There wereapproximately 230 men in the area at the time, chiefly in the trench mortarbattery and Company K, 18th Infantryok6

In a supplementary report, the commander of the 3rd Battalion described the panic that had seized some of his men following the initialsalvo of bombso One man in panic stampeded and knocked down two others adjusting their masks0 He rushed down the trench screaming and made no attempt to put on his respirator,, He died shortly after reaching the dressing

L tr , CG 1 st Div , 27 Fe b, ab ove , and l t r , BGO MC Bn 1st Brig to CO 1 s tB ri g , 28 Feb (Records l )kS MS. H is t of Med D ep t, 1 s t D iv, lli Jan 1920 (Med Dept Box 33 98 , f o l l ) .The er ro r i s pe rp etu ate d in M edica l Department of th e UoSoAo i n t h e WorldWar, v o l . I I I , F i e ld Op era t ions (W ash ing ton . 1925 ) . p

Ltr, Lto Colo Ho Go Shaw to Ch Surg AEF and Ch Sure 1st F r Army, 1 Mar,sub: Gas Attack (Med Dept B o x 3398, fol 8 ) o


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station. Another man threw himself in the bottom of the trench and began toscream. Two others trying to adjust his respirator had their own pulled offand were gassed. He was finally carried out of the area but died not longafter. Another private couldn't find his respirator and became panic-stricken.Vhen it was found and finally adjusted, he claimed it was broken and changedinto his French mask, breathing in gas while he changed. On the way to thedressing station he repeatedly pulled the French mask away from his face andbreathed the gas laden air, and died shortly after reaching the station.An officer was gassed while shouting to the men to keep their respirators on.

There was no doubt, Lt. Col, R. Hf Griffiths concluded, that a largenumber of the gas cases that developed some time after the attack were theresult of failure to observe well-known precautions, and he pointed to thefact that rice for breakfast that morning was allowed to stand exposed forseveral hours in the trench before being eaten. He ordered this report on

) 7the failure of gas discipline to be read to all companies of the battalion. '

On ?8 February, a division memo said that men who had become casualtiesten to fifteen hours after the cttack were those who had not got their maskson quickly enough, had changed to the French mask, or had removed theirhi Ltr, 00 3rd Bn to CO 18th Inf, 2? Feb, sub: Suppl Rpt on TM Bombardment in Center F (Records 13 and 1st Div Box 76, 33.6). Note: They may betypographical errors but Lecture h in the lectures on gas defense (Records20) specifically said that both food and water exposed to cloud attackgases might be used.


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masks a few minutes after the attack ended. Henceforth, troops in the alertarea were to wear the British mask at the alert position at all times, evenwhile sleeping, and were to change to their French mask only when the

) ftBritish mask "became torn or punctured, and as a last resort.

nU

On the day after the bombardment of the 18th Infantry, the 16th Infantrycautioned its troops that they might be next on the German pioneer schedule.French Intelligence, issuing this belated warning of the presence of thepioneers, described the patterns of enemy minenwerfer emplacements for suchgas cloud shoots and the tell-tale signs, "a sea of fire and large amounts of

hosmoke in the enemy lines," that signaled the discharge of the projectors.^'Although the 35th Pioneers had planned a second attack on Flirey followingthat on Remieres, i. was not made, and after digging out their projectorsthey.left the. sector.^0

Determined not to be caught by such an attack again, the division during the rest of its stay at Ansauville made continuous efforts to spot projector installations and neutralize them before they could be completed*UB G - 3 .1 n st ru 18 , 1st Div, 28 Fe b, sub : Gas Defense (Records 1 ) .

Doc 98, Hq l6th Inf (1st 3iv B o x 70, 32*l) .SO SOI and DOR,. 20 - 21 Mar, quoted a p ri so n er a s say ing t h a t in dig gingout the m is fi re s, a bli nd s h el l exploded, ki l l in g 10 and wounding 30. 78thR e 3 D 1 aiidy 78th Res Brip War D ia rie s, 3 Mar (sources a and k, Qenrian Doc^"ujnents), r ep or t 12 k i l l e d , 26 wounded and 7 k i l l e d , 30 wounded, re sp ec ti v el y ,as a re su l t of the exploding s h el l .

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On 28 February, said Lieutenant Butler, the heavy batteries fired for anhour on an area where gas cylinders or projectors were believed to be sited.On h March, G - 3 reported sounds above the Bois de Remieres resembling theemplacing of projectors and a bombardment was called for at once. On 9 March,U8U l-mm rounds of HE were put on a target below St. Baussant on what wasthought to be a projector site, (Similarly, the enemy fired U00 HE roundsinto the trenches west of Xivray on 9 March where the mounting of Americangas projectors was suspectedo)

On 10 March, sounds like the construction of either trench mortar orgas projector emplacements was heard in the Bois de ,ia Sonnard and silenced,and two days later an allied Diane observed three parallel trenches just eastof Sto Baussant that resembled gas projector emplacements. All guns of thedivision fired a concentration on a supposed site on the evening of lU Marchand other suspected emplacements were shelled on 17 and 19 March. The projector attack of 26 February was well remembered.,''

Gas for RaidsI t was in p re p ar a t i o n for one of th e many ra id s ca r r ie d out by bo th

s i de s on th e A ns au v i l l e f ron t l a t e th a t win te r t h a t a t 0^ 30 on 1 M arch

DOR, 3 - 18 Mar; ADC J n l O pns, 28 F eb , 19 Mar; t e l g , Co l King CofS 1 s tDiv to Colo Conner G O GHQ AEF, $ A. M a , 9 Mar (Records 12 ); 78 Res Div WD,9 Mar.

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52

there suddenly came down upon the right sub-sector, held by the 18th Infantry,a tornado of bursting shells and bullets and every battery was deluged withhi'-h explosive shell and mustard gas.. ..Trenches, parapets, shelters and emplacements were demolished.. .some so completely that they were never rebuilt.5This vivid description is not supported by 0 - 3 so far as gas is concerned,and G - 2 reported only between 700 and 9!?0 HE shells on the Bois de Remieresand Bois du Jury that morning. Yet the 6th FA said that several of its batteries were heavily bombarded that morning with HE, mustard gas, and phosgene,though there were no gas casualties. The trench mortar battery in Remieresescaped the attack, said Lieutenant Butler, since it "was not in its place

because of the way it was knocked up in the gas attack of Feb. 27th, " ^The G - 3 daily report of casualties showed 2h killed, 30 wounded, and

2 gassed on 1 March, with two-thirds of the killed and wounded occurring inthe German raid that followed the bombardment. The War Diary of the 78th ,Reserve Division said nothing about gas, but only that it had bombarded thetrenches north of Remieres with 720 HE projector shells prior to its raid.The raid by four assault companies was frustrated by the "weak occupation ofenemy position...considering the number of dugouts." Nevertheless, twomachine guns and 13 prisoners from the 18th Infantry were brought back, at a

Hist Sketch, p. kh*

u -IT u- v' ^ 8 Feb/o 1 M a r R G 0 6 t h F A t 0. ' CofGas Serv, 2 Mar, sub:as shell bombardment (OAF - 1st Div); ADC Jnl Opns, 1 Mar; Spencer 1, 2h.

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55

coat to th e r a id ers of 5 k i l le d , 59 wounded, and 12 missing . #*Although the ra id on 1 March and a bombardment with 3,000 HE shells on

the Bo i s de Remieres and Bo i s du Jury on 3 March were j a r r ing , they did notstop 1st Division pians for two ra id s of iis own on h March. A t o t a l of 173guns, including French auxiliary batteries brought in for the raid, beganth e prep ara to ry f ir e on the German b a t t e r i e s , with "about half the shotsgas." Over 5>2OO 75-mm, 1,1*00 175-mm, and 650 trench mortar, 90-mm and95-mm rounds had been fi re d , p ri nc ip a ll y in the Lahayville and S t . Baussants e c to rs , when the dawn ra id by the 1st Brigade was cal led off and plans forthe evening ra id were abandoned. The Engineers had st ar te d too la te th atmorning, got l o s t , and had fa iled to cut the enemy wire with th e ir bangaloretorpedoes.55

The 78th Reserve Division seems to have been aware only of the gas shellsfi re d in t h i s preparato ry bombardment, for i t reported th a t from 0200 to 0300between 6,000 and 7,000 gas rounds had been fired on its battery positions

259th Res Regt, Rpt to 78th Res Brig, 1 Mar, sub: Einladung ra id ;78th Res Div, Rpt to Hq 38th Res Corps, 3 Mar (78th Res Div WD&A). Almost100 pages of data are given to this raid in the German Documents.

SOI, 3 - h Mar; ADC Jnl Opns, 3 & h Mar Lt


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57

and rea r areas* Ca sua lties were not reported*The German estimate o gas sh e ll may not have been gr eat ly exaggerated,

even though i t would mean tha t much more than ha lf th e rep orted shots ( i . e . ,3,625) were gas* They may ac tua ll y have to ta led aLnost 6,000 While deniedin a postwar a r t i l l e r y summary of sp ec ial s he ll s fir ed by the brigade, whichshows a to ta l of only 297 l5$-mm Noo h and No0 5 sh ell s fired on h March,the Operations Office r of the brigade said t ha t "cons iderable gas was usedfor n eu tr al is at io n }.n a rai d in the ^n sauv ille sector ea rly in March, recordsof which were not re+a ined,"-*'

Three days l a t e r , a t 1818 on 7 March, 0 - 2 reported an en,emy bombardment of ba t t e r ie s in the Bois de la Hazolle and on the Rambucourt-Beaumontroad with approximately 150 gas s h e l l s , followed by a rep ea t sh el ling with120 gas sh e l ls a t 1100 on 8 March, The 78th Reserve Div ision sa id that at o t a l of 68U 77-mm and 105-mm yellow cross s h e l ls were f ired during the twoWirkungsschiessen (fires for effect), z 1800 and midnigh t, 7 March*

J678th Res ^iv WD, h Mar; 78th Res Brig WD, h Mar (source d).There is e v i n c e th a t 5^973 gas =hplls were fir ed in the h Mar preparat iono See l t r CG 1st FA Brig tc CG 1st Div, 12 Mar, sub: Rpt uponOpnsoooll Mar; r p t , Special Shells fi re d 0 0 oJan Nov 1918, sub: OffensiveUse of Gas by 1st FA Brig (Records ll;)*

58 SOI, 7 - 8 Mar; 78th les Div WD, 7 and 8 Mar; Hanslian, p; 69.

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The gas of fic ers of the 5th and 7th FA recorded a to t a l of 280 mustardgas shell s in the two bombardments, those on the 5th FA bracketing th e gunp os it io ns . Except th a t a l l ra tio ns for the noon meal on 8 March had to becondemned, no harm was done and the regiments had no ca su al ties to report.Whether he was an arti lle ryman or infantryman, G - 3 did not say, but theonly gas cas ua lty recorded th at day was a man who fe l l into a contaminatedshell holeo^9

The frequency of the gas shellin g of the ba tt e ri e s r esu lted in an orderth a t day th at rubber boo ts, an ti-ga s g loves, and an ti-g as su its for each manwere henceforth to be kept at a l l ba tt ery and machine gun po sitions and ata r t i l l e r y command post s , and were to be provided for a l l str etc he r bearers andsignal linemen in the division," 0 This became standard equipment also forFrench ar till erym en with the d iv isi on , who la te r reported th at they wereequipped with the M-2 and ARS masks, American rubber boots , o il skin jumpers,and mittens, as items of individual protection, and chloride of lime, soapywater, and bicarbonate of soda for co llec tive pro tec tion .

59Ltr, RGO 5th FA to C of Gas Serv, 8 Ma r, sub: Gas shell bombardment;ltr, RGO 7th FA, 9 Mar (GAF-lst Di v) ; ADC Jnl Opns , 7 and 8 Mar; Spencer, I,

25 - 28. Note : Since hospital admission lists for this period have not survived, daily casualties cannot be checked. Data in the Analysis indicate manymore gas and wound casualties than are revealed by the records used in thenarrative.60 Instru 20, 1st Div, 7 Mar, sub: An ti-gas equipment (Records l)61

Rpt on opn at Cantigny, VII I Gp, 177th Fr Trench a r ty , 2 Jim (Recordsl i i ) . The Appareil Re spir ato ir e Sp ec iale or ARS mask was a l a te development byth e French . I t was comfortable to wear but complicated to make and was inshort supply.

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The raids planned for h March were finally carried out on the morningand afternoon of 11 March, despite the fact that for 2\\ hours preceding themorning raid...the position of Battery D and Headquarters, 2nd Battalion,2nd Battalion, 6th Field Artillery [in the Bois de la Hazelle] was keptunder a concentration of mustard gas, mingled with high explosive shells....Nevertheless, the men served the guns, wearing their gas masks, during both raids. At the end of the evening raid, all officers and menwere evercome by the gas and were evacuated. A completely new personnel,dressed in rubber clothing and gas masks, moved the guns during the nightto a new position.In the same gas attack the position of Battery A, 7th Field Artillery, alsowas "so heavily and continuously shelled and gassed that...it was necessary

to move that battery" too.Available records of the 78th Reserve Division say only that on 10 March

two of their batteries were shelled with gas and in exchange they shelled anenemy battery with yellow cross. Hanslian reports data indicating that theattack on the battery in Hazelle woods was carried out by 78th Reserve Division artillery between 1800 - 2000 with U21 yellow cross and green cross102-mm shells. * There is no evidence of a bombardment lasting for 2lj. hours.

Lieutenant Butler wrote in his journal on 11 March:Although #15 [Battery D] was gassed heavily last ni?ht & the Dersonnel...withdrawn, they returned for the coup de main [in the morningj & served theirguns with their gas masks & gas clothes on....[In the evening] gas was stillpretty thick around #15....After the evening r*d everyone in #1$ [was] withdrawn [to Ansauville] except a sentinel at each gun....Guns will be moved tothe gas position in the morning.

62 Hist Sketch, p. 1*8.63

78th Res Piv WD, 10 Mar; Hanslian, p. 70.

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The 6th FA gas officer said that almost 600 phosgene and mustard gas shellsfell around the battery in the Bois de la Hazelle and on the night of IDMarch 2 officers and 18 men were evacuated, most of them with acute conjunctivitis as a result of taking their masks off too soon.^ There were tobe many more oa^lties, for the officers and men remained in the gassedarea, ignoring the presence of the mustard gas that had been fired with thephosgene.

Just how effective this mustard gas was is evident from Butler's entryof 12 March:The guns in D Bty were moved [today] from #15, which it still full of gas,to position #87. Seven officers and 50 men are in the hospital with burned eyes, all from D Bty. (Two gas officers, a doctor & battery officers &officers from 2nd Bn, 6th FA. Hdqtr's)...,2nd Bn, 6th FA Hdqtrs have beenmoved*

On 22 March he added: "Position #l is still unoccupied & the enemyseems to know because he doesn't shel^ it any more." The enemy apparentlyhad a tap on the line into #l, said Butler, for on 20 March, hearing twotelephone men testing the wire there, he had ijnmediately put gas on theposition and both men became casualties*

The reported gassing of the 7th FA battery in the bombardment seems tohave occurred on the evening of 11 March, when $0 mustard gas shells werelanded in the rear of the battery position. This may have been the "burstof gas on the [battery] position in the southwest portion of Hazelle Wood,"

6ULtr, RGO 6th FA to C of Gas Serv, 11 Mar, sub: Gas shell bombardment(GAF-lst Div); Spencer, I, 29.

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3

which the German division said it fired at 2100 on 11 March, and was morelikely some form of green cross (phosgene or diphosgene) rather than yellowcross gaso The artillerymen, though masked, were said to have been affectedby the fumes for two and a half hours, after which the effects wore off. Allthose exposed then washed with soap suds and bathed their eyes with salt water.There were no casualties and no mention of evacuation of the position."5

Returning to the raids on 11 March, which were made by 60 men from the18th Infantry above Remieres wood that morning, and by 60 men from the 16thInfantry against Richecourt in the evening, 0 - 2 said that "at :0 a.m.our artillery dropped a heavy bombardment and barrage on salient Remieres...[including] gas shells., .into Lahayville at :55" With the auxiliary Frenchbatteries back in position for the raids, over 32,000 shells were fired on10 - 11 March as the artillery, instead of the Engineers with their torpedoes and petards, was used to cut four gaps in the wire. "All firing onthe enemy's batteries was executed with gas shell, and three of the lightbatteries fired gas shell on the positions at St. Baussant and Lahayvillethroughout both raids." The raiders both in the morning and evening forayswere said to have stayed about twenty minutes in the enemy salients and in

Ltr, RGO 7th FA to C of Gas Serv, 12 Mar, sub: Enemy gas shell bombardment (GAF-lst Div); Spencer, I, 30; 78th Res Div, Morning'rpt, 12 Mar (item5h6); 78th Res Div WD t 11 Mar.


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both cases re tu rned w i thout pr iso ne rs . 6Although th ey re po rte d see ing a p a t r o l of 30 men, the Germans seem to

have been wholly unaware of thes e ra id s , but thought a fu ll- sc al e at t ac khad been planned which had been broken up by th e ir an ni hi la tio n f i r e . The"s tro ng t o r r e n t i a l f i re on La hay vil le, S t . Baussant, Sonnard Woods and therear areas" that morning had been of more concern and was estimated at10,000 - 12,000 ro un ds . The 155-mm gas s h e ll s were mistaken for tr enc hmortar gas s h e l l s . "The gas was str on g, tea r-p rod uc ing , and so dense inSt. Baussant that one could see for not more than a distance of three meters."In the evening th e deadly fi r e was re pe ate d, with an estimated 6,000 round s."In th e main th e enemy used gas am m un itio n... .The rea son of the enemy f ir ehas not been determ ined." C as ua ltie s as a r e s u l t , presumably, of the twobombardments were said in the evening report of the 78th Reserve Divisiont o be 6 wounded and 10 gass ed , bu t t he War Diary showed 2 k i l l e d , 15 wounded,and 22 gassed that day,67

According to a re po rt of sp ec ia l sh el ls f ir ed by the 1st FA Brigade,these gas casualties were caused by 2,066 No. 5 (phosgene), including some66 SOI, 10 - 11 Mar ; ltr, CG 1st FA B rig to CG 1st Div, 12 Ma r, sub: Rptupon Opns .. .during raids executed Mar 11 (Records lh)'f ADC Jnl Opns, 11 Ma r.67 78 th Res Inf B ri g , Advance R pt , 11 A .M ., 11 Mar ( i tem 52 8); 78 th ResD iv . Even ing r p t , 11 Mar (i te m 538)$ 78 th Res Div , Morn r p t , 12 Mar (i t em5 E 5 ; 7 8 th Res Djv WD, 11 Mar.


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proportion of No. h (cyanogen chloride) , shells f ired that morning, and2,31*5 No. U and No. 5 s h e ll s in th e evenin g.68 in ad d it io n , 850 smokeshells were fired in the box barrage for the morning raid and another 850that evening, for a total f ire of U,Ull gas shells , 1,700 smoke shells , and32,000 HE. If the German ca su al ty data are to be b el ie v ed , i t was an eno rmous expend iture for small r e s u l t s .

The continuing a r t i l l e r y duel is eviden t in Arko 78 re po rts th atbursts of nonpersistent gas as well as yellow cross gas were put on 1stDiv ision ba tt e ri e s on 15, 16, and 17 March. The di vi si on re po rte d k gasc a s u a lt ie s on 17 March on ly. German re c o rd s , however, do not confirm t h e i r"la rg e number of gas s h e l l s . . . f ir e d int o the Bois de Remieres about h a.m."on 19 March, not th e "new dep arture " record ed th a t day when a h o s t il e a i r plane "dropped several rubber balls 18-inches in diameter and f i l led withliquid mustard gas in 1-2 [Hill 2l|6].fl There appear to have been no casual t ies resul t ing f rom ei ther event . 9

Another un usu al oc curren ce happened on 23 March when a t 11 p.m. an a i r plane was observed at grea t hei gh t to shut off h is motor, volpXane [ i . e . gl id e]68 Rp t, Spec Sh ell s fi re d by 1st FA B ri g, Jan - Nov 1918, n .d . (Records111). The 2,066 gas s h e l l s comprised 990 155-mm and 80 75-mm s h e l l s f i r e dby the brigade and 996 75-mm sh el ls f ir ed by the atchd French a r t i l l e r y .The 2,3145 gas s h e l l s comprised 992 155-mm, 357 75-mm, and 996 75-mm sh e l l s .69

Ar ko _7 8 WD, 15 - 17 M ar; SO I an d DOR, 18 - 20 Ma r) ADC J n l Op ns , 21 Mar.

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71

and throw out over the Beaumont-Jury road bombs which exploded in the air,giving out a reddish-biue cloud which came down and spread. It is believedto be gas,G - 3 reported it as "a cloud of mustard gas." Two days later the divisionsaid: "This report has been verified until it seems to be a fact."7

The First German Spring OffensiveThe airplane attack with gas occurred during a series of daily mustard

gas attacks on Seicheprey from 21 - 2 March, when, according to Hanslian,a total of 1,325 77-mm and 10^-mm yellow cross shells were fired in hour-long attacks on the village. In the late afternoons or evenings of each ofthose days, amounts ranging between 16*0 and 35>O gas shells were fired on thetroop dugouts in Seicheprey and southeast of the village,lx It was part ofthe demonstrations taking place all along the Western Front, in conjunctionwith the first of the great German offensives in the spring of 1918, and wasthe only time a village in the 1st Division sector was gassed.

For almost a month previous to the German assault at Arras on 21 March,

7 0SOI and 1KB, 23 - 2li Mar; l t r King CofS 1s t Div to Conner. 9 A .M. ,2^ Mar (Records 1 2 ). N eit he r the gas ba llo on s nor gas bombs seem tohave caused any casual t ies .Hanslian, pp. 71 - 72, says they began on 21 March. 78th Res Div records show only that on 22 Mar "our btys shelled...the dugouts at the southeast exit of Seicheprey with 30 rounds of yellow cross," and on 23 Mar "weshelled dugouts in Seicheprey with yellow cross."

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the 1st Division had been on the alert as warnings were issued that theenemy was conducting "maneuvers of rupture" preparatory to a sudden offensivesomewhere on the Western Front, "Harassing fire on trenches, communications,PCs, OPs, and artillery emplacements, especially with gas shells, can be

72expected for days preceding as well as immediately before the assault."But the 1st Division, harassed and harassing in return almost daily, did notrecognize the demonstration for the offensive.

The offensive began on the morning of 21 March when 6U specially trained German divisions, after a short artillery preparation with an unusually highproportion of gas shells (estimated at 200,000 to 2^0,000 blue and green crossshells) attacked the Third and Fifth British Armies between the Oise andScarpe rivers on a hO-mile front from Arras to La Fere (see Map No. l ) . Bythe end of the fifth day, the British had lost more than 1^0,000 men andthe Germans had driven a 37-mile salient almost to Amiens, the capture ofwhich would probably have separated the British and French armies. On 28March, as the British armies rallied, the French made a furious counterattackat Montdidier, the point of deepest penetration, but could not retake the city.The German admance, however, had been brought to a halt.

Three days before, on 25 March, with the shattering of the allied lineson the Western Front apparently a matter of days, Pershing met with Petain

Tnstru 15, 1st Div, 27 Feb, sub: Prov ision for a l l a l e r t s ; In st ru 23,lli Mar, su b: Orde rs in case of Corps A le rt (Records l )

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at Compiegne and put at his disposal a l l the American forces in France, totake their ptece in the battle line or to be used to relieve French divisionsfor the battle. 73 The re sult was an order for the re l ie f of the 1st Divisionin Lorraine . I t was to proceed at once to Picardy, where the batt le was thenraging.7**

Meanwhile, the 1st Division waited out the repercussions of the battleto the northwest. Capto Louis So Davis, who replaced Lieutenant Wright asDivision Gas Officer on 20 March, did not report the gas at tack on Seichepreyon 21 March, but said .hat 650 mustard gas shel ls fe l l in the village on theafternoon and evening of 22 March, that another attack was made with 200shells on 23 March, and 250 more on 2\x March - a t o ta l of 1,100 mustard gasshe l ls . As of the 25th, there had been 19 men evacuated, a l l from the f i r s ta ttack. The attac k on 2li March had resu lted in no casua lties "except a few

r Peye cases" [s ic jo Whether any of the casual ties occurred among the 800 r e placements that were being equipped and trained in gas protection during theweek of the gas attacks on Seicheprey, Davis did not say.

Although there is no evidence that Seicheprey was evacuated following73 My Exp erienc es, I , 353 - 356, 361* - 365.7li 70 6, 1s t Div , 28 Mar; FO 8 , 1st Div, 30 Mar; His t Sketch , p . 51 .75

Ltrs, DGO 1st Div to CGO I Corps, 25 Mar and 31 Mar, sub: Weekly Narrative Rpt (GAF-lst Div),


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the first attack, Hanslian assumed that it must have been, in view of thefew reported casualties, or else that much of the gas thereafter had fallenoutside the town,

G - 3 reported the shelling of Seicheprey on three niphts only in theperiod 21 - 2 March and indicated that the 20 gas casualties it reportedhad all resulted from the first bombardment with over 600 mustard gas shellson the evening of 21 March. G - 3 showed no casualties from the bombardmentsit reported on 2k and 2 March. G - 2 reported a single shelling of Seiche-prey in the period, on 23 March. There was little agreement between G -2 ,G - 3, and the DGO on the shelling and no recognition of a pattern.'"

Lt. Col. Hanson E. Ely, commander of the 28th Infantry, whose troopswere in the Seicheprey area at the time, said nothing of the gas attack on21 March but reported that approximately U5>0 mustard and chlorine shellshad fallen in the area on the early evening of 22 March, causing 17 seriouscasualties. He was considerably exercised about the inability of the artillery to protect his men. When the gas shells began falling he called forretaliation fire but neither the gas nor the HE that had been fired had beensufficient to still the German batteries. His artillery liaison officer informed him "that it is very difficult for the artillery to get gas shells,and the amount they have on hand is not sufficient for a gas bombardment ofthis kind." Colonel Ely asked that more gas shells be obtained, to put the

DOR and SOI, 21 - 26 Mar; cf. Spencer, I,76


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division "on a par with the French and English for protection against suchgas shell bombardments,"

Queried by General Bul la rd , General Summerall pointed out th e d i f f i cu l ty of si le nc in g the German b a t t e r i e s . There were 6 of them agadjist h is21 then in act io n. Even had su ffi cien t gas sh el l been av ai la bl e, he sa id , upto noon on 23 March "the weather was favorable for emission of enemy gas;hence i t was not favorable for our gas," In one 2U-hour pe riod , the enemyb a t t e r i e s had fir ed 720 sh el ls [including gas s h e ll s ? ]. He had fire d 1,390s h e l l s , "including 600 r e t a l i a t i o n ." But on the afternoon and evening of23 March, when meteoro log ica l cond itions became favorab le, said GeneralSummeirall, h is a r t i l l e r y had put hOO gas sh el ls on S t. Baussant, Lahayville,and Camp de la Sc hlu cht, a cluste r of enemy dugouts ea st of Maizerais,??

The postwar summary on the use of spe ci al s he ll s in dica tes tha t 171gas s h e l ls were f ir ed on a number of enemy ta rgets on 21 March, 70 on 22March, but with favorable weather, 70 155-ram and 559 75-mm gas shells were

7Rfired on 23 March and another 517 75-mm gas shells on 2\x March, Whilethese widely scattered "gas concentrations" with nonpersistent gases putdown by the brigade may have harassed the enemy, they were not likely to

77 Ltr and inds , CO 28th Inf to CG 1s t Div, 23 Mar, sub: Gas She lls(Records 13) ; MR, 22 - 23 Mar; ADC Jn l Opns, 22 Mar, reports th e gas reta li a ti o n t ha t nig ht, not 23 Mar.78 Rpt , Spec Shell s fi re d by 1st FA Brig, Jan - Nov 1918 (Records

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produce large numbers of casualties, particularly when any quantity of No. h(cyanopen chloride) shell wa3 used. No. h gas tended to flash on burst anddisintegrate.

Major Gas AttackThe 1st Division was s t i l l in Lorraine when i t su ffered i t s f i r s t major

gas at t ac k .7 9 Between the hours of 2130 - OO3O on 28 - 29 March, G - 2 r e porte d th a t 1,000 HE, ga s, and ince nd iar y s h e l ls were fi re d on Rambucourt,in an at tempt to ne ut ra l iz e four ba tt e ri e s th e r e . The 6th FA said th a t i|00to 600 phosgene and mustard gas she ll s had fa ll en on si x of i t s b a t t e r i e s inth e su rp ri se gas bombardment. Three o ff ic e rs and 11 men were ev ac ua ted .These may have been from th e squad rep or ted by Lie uten ant B utle r to havetaken off th e ir masks because th ey were too warm. Th eir se rg ea n t, who hadbeen "mentioned before for coolness under fire, will be tried as soon as hegets out of the hospi ta l ." 8 0

19 GO 2$, F i r s t Army, 15 Qct (8 9th Div Box 1U8), def ined a major m ustardgas bombardment as "2,000 or more 7 caliber shell, or equivalent quantitiesof mustard gas in other c a li b e r s ." No sim ilar d ef in it io n has been found fornon -pe rs is te nt gas bombardments. A t o t a l of 10,000 gas sh el ls i s a r b i t r a r i lyassumed to be a major no n- pe rs is te nt gas at ta ck .80

Ltr, RGO 6th FA, to C of Gas Serv, 29 Mar, sub: Gas shell bombardment(GA^-lst Div); ADC Jnl Opns, 29 Mar; ltr, CO 1st Bn 6th FA to CO 6th FA,28 - 29 Mar, sub: Rpt of action night of Mar 28 (1st Div Box 101, 33.6).


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The 7th FA repor ted 350 gas sh e ll s on four of i t s b a tt er ie s, with 6c a s u a lt ie s r e s u lt in g when a si n g le 1 0-ram mustard gas s h e ll exploded in agun p i t . The 26th Infan try estim ated 800 phosgene and mustard gas s h e ll sin i t s are a, with just 2 cas ua lties as a re su lt. Altogether, these unitsreported approximately 1,650 gas shells and 22 casualties.^!

A ctu ally , according to Hanslian, the entire a r ti ll e ry of the 78th Reserve Division was organized to fire an extensive bombardment on 1st Divisio n ba tte ry p os iti on s with U,76O blue cross and 5,530 green cross sh e ll s a t o t a l of 10,290 rounds. Despite 1st Division rep orts, there is no ev idence th at any mustard gas was used in th e bombardment. Much of the e f fec tof the attack was believed to have been nullified when, soon after thebombardment began at 2130, strong winds and rain squalls sprang up, and themission was ca lled off before it s com pletio n,^

The D ivis ion Gas Officer reported c or re ct ly tha t only blue and greencr os s s h e l l s had been used and that t he y f e l l on Rambucourt and Mandres, ons ix b a tte r ie s in the 6th FA and two in the 5th FA, He confirmed that the h ighwind that sprang up shortly after the shelling began had greatly reducedprobable c a s u a lt ie s . N ev ert he less , 25 men were evacuated, and one man,

81Ltrs, RGO 7th FA, RGO 26th Inf to 0 of Gas Serv, 29 Mar (GAF-lst Div);Spencer, I, 3 5 - 3 8 ; SOI and DOR, 28 - 29 Mar, reported 2 officers and 11men gassed.

82 Hanslian, pp 73 - 7iio 78th Res Div WD, 28 Mar, said the second partof the gas fire was postponed on account of storm and rain.


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thought slightly gassed with phosgene, fell down dead the next day whileworking in the trenches. Captain Davis also reported to General Bullard hisobservation that ambulance company men had made the gassed walk from the aidpost to the ambulances, and sit up on the trip from Mandres to Menil la Tour.As a result of Bullard1s orders it was not to happen again,3

In better weather the gas attack of 28 March, with the remaining blueand green cross shells, was said to have been completed beginning at 2330on 31 March.^ There is no G - 2 report available for that date, but G - 3said that from 2200 - 0300, 31 March - 1 April, the village of Seicheprey,the trenches above the village, Beaumont, Mandres, and Rambucourt werebombarded with HE, shrapnel, and gas shells. Two men were killed, 2 wounded,and 8 gassed. "The bombardment was mostly directed at the batteries but was

Ofquite scattered, creating a gas atmosphere."In little wind and high humidity, said the 6th FA, "phosgene, mustard

and tear gas swept the roads and batteries for five hours." A n batteriesof the regiment were subjected to the gas and HE bombardment, resulting in29 eye cases, 21 of them in one battery where the men, in the absence oftheir officers, removed their masks. The 7th FA estimated 3,500 gas shells,S3

Ltr, DGO to CGo I Corps, 31 Mar, sub: Weekly Narr Rpt (GAF-lst Div).Hanslian, p. 75; 78th Res Div WD, 31 Mar.

85* * > 3 1 Map - 1 Apr; msg , King CofS to Con ner, 9 A.M . , 1 Apr (Reco rds

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most of them phosgene but some mustard gas, "mixed with many more high explosive shells," that resulted in 3 gas casualties among five battery positions.00 The attack came at a tijne when "the roads were full of our division marching out and the 26th Division marching in. ...One man [at Mandres] from the 26th Division was gassed. He had no gas ma sk ." ^

Captain Davis estimated that a total 3,00 yellow, blue, and green crossshells of 77, 105, and l0 caliber had been fired in this "very heavy gasbombardment" on the batteries of the division. He reported "only 32casualties," a tribute to good gas discipline." The division did not recognize the bombardment as a repeat or continuation for the failure of theearlier one. "We think," the Chief of Staff wrote, "it was due to nervousness on the part of the Boche; that the movement [i.e., the relief then inprogress] on this side made him afraid that something was going to happen.H 89

As the Analysis shows, there were probably more than 57 gar

86Ltrs, RGO 6th FA, RGO 7th FA to C of Gas Serv, 1 Apr, sub: Enemy gas

shell bombardment (GAF-lst Div and Records H O .87

ADC Jnl Opns, 1 Apr.88

Ltr, DGO to CGO I Corps, 11 Apr, sub: Narr Rpt, Week ending 6 Apr(GAF-lst Di v); Spencer, I, 39. The 1st FA Brig did not agree on the discipline. See Memo 93, 1st FA Brig, 30 Mar (Records 9 ) .

Msg, King to conner, 2 Apr (Records 12),

- us-


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90

casualties as a result of this major gas attack, but not enough more tomake it anything like an enemy success. The 1st Division was never to knowwhat, except for bad weather, it had escapedo

The New ArsinesThe gas attack on the 1st Division on 28 - 29 March was probably one of

the first on American troops in which diphenylchloroarsine (blue cross) wasused, and though it was recognized as such by the Division Gas Officer, thenew gas was not remarked by anyone else reporting on the attack. Just theday before this attack, an operations memo reported that "the ejiemy has ablue cross shell which emits smoke, not in itself poisonous, but composed ofsmall particles which penetrate our masks, and irritate the throat and lungs.These shells are always followed by poison gas shells" [i.e., phosgene ordiphosgene - green cross]o

As a matter of fact, the blue cross shell was not new. Small quantitiesof it were first introduced on the British front in the summer of 1917, withgood results. The Germans appear to have thought so highly of the shell thatthey at once put it into mass production, turning out vast numbers of bothblue cross and colored or variegated (Buntkreuz) shells, the latter containing

Opns memo 10 , 26th In f , 27 Mar (R ecords 10); CWS WSI, 10 Apr. Cf. ServiceN ote , 2nd FA B rig 3 Apr (2nd Div Box bT,}, on th e in tr o d u c ti o n in March ofblue cross sh e l l "with one-quarter of i t s charge of so l i d i f ie d ar s in e that i spulver iz ed on burs t" and green cross - 2 sh el l , t r ip le- ch ar ge d with "super-P llV ? ? 2 * f f(, carbon, and chloride of diphenylarsine (trichlormethyl chloroformate)."


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both phosgene and diphenylchloroarsine.?1 The blue corss shell was apparentlythe secret weapon for the spring offensives of 1918, for they were apparentlyfirst used in great quantities in the attack of 21 March. Two months later,after the introduction of the ethyldichloroarsine shell (yellow cross-1),these two gas shells were to comprise as high as 70 percent of the gas firedin preparation for the attack launched from the Chemin des Dames on 27 May.92

Few besides gas officers seem to have been immediately aware of the newgases. Lieutenant Butler, for emample, never mentions them but refers onlyto the three gases of ASF pamphlet 253* chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas;and G - 2 speaks of "gas resembling chlorine," "a gas causing nausea, sneezingand coughing," and "sneeze gas."93 "Sneeze gas," though sometimes applied tochloropicrin, became the common name for the arsines. It was June before areference in an intelligence report is found to "Chlorine Arsine and BromineArsenic. ^

The 1st Division was to be in Picardy when the great German offensivesof May and June were launched in that area. But a whole week passed afterbeing ordered to that front before the division cleared the sector at Ansauville.

9 1Maj. Gen. C. H. F ou lk es , "Gas!" The Sto ry of t he S p ec ia l Brigade (Edinburgh, 193U), pp. 2i48 - 1*9, 328.

92 See appendices to SOI 55 and 58, 1st Div, 20 - 21 and 23 - 2k Jun(Records h)*93 SOI 5, 6, and 29, 1 - 2, 2 - 3, 25 - 26 May.9h

SOI hi, 8 - 9 Jun.- hi


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ANALTKIS

Battery and Counter-batteryGeneral Bul la rd 'a order to s t i r up th e enemy, upon h i s a ssuming command

in the re la t ive ly quie t Ansauvi l l e sec tor in ear ly February , was carr ied outd i l i g e n t l y b y h i s a r t i l l e r y and h i s r a i d i n g i n f a n t r y . H is G - 3 s e c t i o n r e corded 35,2 98 s h e l l s f ir ed in the pe rio d U - 28 February, 90,1*69 rounds fi re din th e month of March, and 2,133 through 2 A p ri l , for a t o t a l o f 127,900rounds . Inc luded in t h i s t o ta l were 9 ,25 1 No. 1* and No. 5 gas sh e l l s* ??

Enemy a r t i l l e r y , according to G - 3 , f i re d h alf as many rounds in r ep ly .Almost 21,^10 rounds were record ed f a l l i n g i n the se ct or in Febru ary, Ul,558in March, and l i ,122 in ear ly A pr i l - a t o t a l of 67, 190. G - 2 d a i l y re

96po rts show le s s than half th at t o t a l of enemy s h e l l or 28 ,99 2. However,G - 2 attempted to est im ate , a s G - 3 did no t , the gas sh e l ls inclu ded in i t sd a i l y t o t a l s of enemy f i r e . These add up to l e s s than 500 , not counting theco rr ect ion on the 900 p r o je c t i le s in the 26 February at ta ck . German data

95 Compiled from DOR, 1st Div, h Feb - 2 Apr (R eco rds 1 2 ) . Memo, BMO 1 s tFA B r ig , 27 Feb 191 9, su b: Ammo expen ded by 1 s t ^A B ri g show s 93 ,6 3 6 75-ramand 26,2 27 155-mm s h e l l s fi r e d between 23 Jan - h A pr, a t o t a l o f 1 1 9 ,8 6 3 .A d e ta il e d breakdown of t h i s t o t a l appears in 1s t FA Br ig Ammo Rp t, 23 Jan- 11 Nov. Gas s h e ll s are rep orted in R p t , S p e c i a l S h e l l s . . . ( a l i n R ec or dsHi). 96 DOR, 2 Feb - 2 Apr. Beg innin g 12 Feb , G - 2 re po rte d 7, 03 5 s h e l l stha t month, 21,957 in Mar and ea rl y Apr. Lt B u tl er 's freque nt but i n complete s h e l l counts in h i s journal agree wi th G - 3 rather than G - 2i a t a .

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in the nar ra t ive , however , ind ica te tha t wi th tha t p ro jec to r a t t ack , theto tal of gas shel ls f i red agains t 1s t Divis ion bat tery pos i t ions in Febr u a r y and March approxim ated 13>9OO rounds?? Although t h i s ap pea rs somewhat h ig h, in view of the r e s u lt s obtaine d, i t does not seem pos sible toque s t ion i wi thout fur ther data o

Casualty ReportAs a r e s u l t o f the increased a r t i l l e r y f i re , gas a t t ac ks , and f requen t

r a id s on the An sauvil le fr on t , the c as ua lt i es between 18 January and 31March, s ai d th e d iv isio n h is to ry , were 6 of fic er s and 137 men k il le d , 19o f f ic e r s and 38U men wounded, and 3 men cap ture d, for a t o t a l of 5h9 b a t t l ec a s u a l t ie s . Gas cases were not d is t inguished. ,"

G - 3 rec o rd s, which begin on 2 February, rev ea l a to t a l of 38 c asu a l t i e s a t An sa uv ille : 79 o ff ic er s and men k il l e d , 160 wounded, 123 gassed,and 23 accidentally wounded, and indicate that the greater number of thek il le d and wounded occurred d uring enemy or divis ion r a i d s , as a re su lt ofenemy s n ip e r s , or were occasioned by a se ri e s of unaccountable gun bur st samong th e b a t t e r i e s 0W91

Narrative, pp* 22, 30 , 32, 37, h3 - Ui.98

History, p 6h; page 337 shows another total of99

For t he gun bursts, see ADC Jnl Opns, 27 Feb and passim.

k9


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A postwar report, based on then available DGO records, showed 1U officers and 113 men gassed in the Ansauville sector,100 Greater either thanthe G - 3 total of 123 gas casualties or that of the DGO is the total of 221officers and men evacuated as gas cases and 9 gas deaths, found by an actualcount of gas casualties in the narrative. It is estimated that 163 or 70percent of these gas casualties were artillerymen or service troops with theartillery.101

Still higher gas casualties appear in an undated document apparently prepared by the Division Surgeon, which reports a total of 327 gascases admitted to the gas hospital at Menil la Tour, as well as 13 gasdeaths, between 21 February and h April:

Admissions DeatjisWeek ending 28 Feb

7 Mar13 Mar21 Mar28 Marh Apr

6UU3101*67h90Wf

60002


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To this total of 3U0 should be added the 59 cases reported in this charton 28 February as remaining in the hospital from gas attacks prior to thatda te . The re su lt in g to ta l of 399 represents a considerable increase overthe 230 gas ca su a lt ie s found in the na rra tive. Furthermore, i t i s probablya minimum total since there is no medical record of gas cases between 18January, when the division came into the line, and 28 February, exceptth os e remaining in the fi e ld gas ho sp ita l on the la tt er date.

Q uestionab le, in comparison with the data of the di vi sion hi st ory , i sthe Division Surgeon's report of total casualties at Ansauville of 5 off ic e r s and 51 men ki l l e d , 12 of fi c ers and 138 men wounded, and XU o ff ic er sand 509 men gassed, for a to ta l of 729 ca su a lt ie s. Yet that to ta l of 729(56 k i l l e d , 673 gassed and wounded) approximates th e 671* gassed and wounded(323 g as se d, 351 wounded) reported elsewhere by the D ivi sio n Surgeon. *In view of the report tabu lating weekly admissions of gas ca su al tie s, thereseems l i t t l e doubt that gas cases exceeded wound cases at Ansauville.

For purposes of computation th i s study w i l l accept 56 as th e numberkilled, 3^1 (though unquestionably excessive) as the wounded, and thef a i r l y ce rt a in figu re of 399 as the number gassed. The enemy fire d a minimum t o t a l of 67,190 ar t i l l e r y s h el ls against the 1st D ivi sio n, of which approximately 139900 were gas s h e l l s . Although in one heavy bombardment f o l lowed by a raid, two-thirds of the killed and wounded resulted from the

Both se t s of fig ur es appear in MS. Hist of Med Dept, 1s t D iv, Hi Jan1920, pp. 3, h (Medical Dept Box 3398, f o l 1 ).


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raid (narrative, p. 28), it is assumed here that all casualties were fromartillery and not small arms fire. Thus the U07 killed and wounded wouldrepresent one casualty for every 130 HE shells, and the 399 gas casualtieswould represent one casualty for every 3 gas shells.

Seldom again during the war would so many gas shells be required toproduce a gas casualty, least of ail in the 1st Division.

More remarkable is a computation for the 78th Reserve Division, basedon its admitted casualties of 30 killed and 175> wounded [and gassed?] in themonth of March. ^ That month the 1st Division artillery alone fired approximately 1*8,700 HE rounds, and with attached French artillery, fired 7,673gas shells into the enemy sector. Assuming the "wounded" to include gas

casualties, and none were small arms wounds, 275 shells were required foreach German casualty.

One other computation, with probably more accurate data, may be made that for the projector attack of 26 February (narrative, pp. 22, 2UK Of900 projectors prepared, 8U9 were fired in two salvos. Since 80 were filledwith high explosive, it may be assumed that at least 780 of the phosgene-filled projectors were launched to achieve the crash concentration. Noallowance will bejnade for the "half" of the bombs later reported by a prisoner to have fallen inside the German lines. 1st Division gas casualties asa result of this attack were 77 hospitalized and 8 dead, or 37 percent ofthe men exposed. They represent one casualty for every nine projector shells,

10a ^ ^78th Res Div WD, 31 Mar.


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a considerably higher ratio than had been achieved with artillery shells.This is not remarkable considering the proportion of gas to weight of vehi cl e in projector and a r t i l l e r y gas sh el ls (approximately 50 percent and10 percen t re spectiv ely ) , but i t is remarkable when compared with the effec tiveness of a r t i l l e r y gas shell s in la te r gas at tack s, where but fouror five sh el ls were su ffic ien t to produce a casualty,

"Wee.touched them up quite a b i t . , . " ^G - 3 reported that the divis ion a r t i l l e ry firec} a "gas concentration

on an a ctive battery " on both 16 and 17 March and again on 28 March, butthese a re the only references in the daily reports for the period at Ansauv ille th at the division re ta li at ed against the enemy with gas fi re ,

B utl e r' s jou rna l ind ica tes much more frequent use of gas, and th is isconfirmed by the a r t i l l e r y brigade summary which indicates th at the brigadefi re d gas she ll s on 39 of 6b of the days ( l February - h April) while in theAnsauville secto r- On some days it fired no more than 20 rounds. Thegre ate st number of rounds , It ,it ll were fir ed for raids on 11 March. Alto geth er, at leas t 9,2l rounds of gas were fired , including ii,002 155-mmrounds, 3,2^7 75-mm rounds, and 1,992 75-rnm rounds fi red by the Frencha r t i l l e r y - most of i t phosgene, with some proportion of cyanogen chloride .The to t a l of 9,2 l does not include the 6,000 rounds probably fired on hMarch, but for which no positive record remains (see narrative, p. 30).

Narrative, p. 20*105


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During February, the division was allowed less than 100 rounds of gasshell per day. In March, as a brigade memo shows, this was increased andeach 7S-mm battery was authorized to maintain 2,780 HE, 220 shrapnel, and600 gas shells at its position, as well as 1,500 HE and 300 gas shells ateach l5-mm battery position.

General Bullard was to say that "The gassings- the enemy was giving uswere more than answered. The French gas which we were using was very deadly and the enemy had a wholesome fear of it." While General Bullard'sstatement was not strictly true, its general accuracy was reflected in theG - 3 report in late Ma^ch that "the anxiety of prisoners [captured in araid on 28 March] to take their gas masks with them showed the effectivenessof our gas bombardments."^'

As interesting as the allotment of gas shells by the French to a newand untried American division was the willingness of the division to use it.

In the months to come, the divisions in the field were either to complainthat they could get little or no gas shell, or in some cases were to show amarked reluctance to fire such gas shell as was allotted to them, in the hopethat the enemy would not return the gas fire. All who like the 1st Divisionrecognized the necessity of opposing gas with gas and valued its employmentin tactical operations, were to complain that they could not get the quantitiesof gas shells they requisitioned.

106Memo, 1st FA Brig, 18 Mar, sub: Arty Ammo (Records 9 ) .

107Personalities, p. 1^9; DOR, 28 - 29 Mar.

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It was, of course, the repeated "touching up" of the enemy artillerywith gas on the Ansauville front that led to retaliation and to the highincidence of gas casualties amona the artillerymen. The result was thatthe greater number of gas memos and instructions issued by the division weredirected to the artillery rather than to the infantry, 1^ Supplementaryinstructions to AEF pamphlet 253 also tended to show special concern forthe artillery. In general it may be said that the requirements of alternate battery positions, relief teams, and maintenance of complete individual gas protective equipment for artillery personnel were developed on theassumption that the artillery was the principal target of enemy gas fireand that it would have to continue to fire during and after gas bombardmentswhile the infantry remained in gasproof dugouts until any g*s in their areahad dissipated* It was some time before the frequency of gas attacks on theinfantry demonstrated that their gasproof dugouts were gas traps more oftenthan not.

Events in the winter and spring of 1918 served to increase the concernfor the protection of artillery. The period was marked by rapid changes inmethods of gas warfare, first as a result of develooing doctrine by theGermans in the use of mustard gas, aid by their introduction Into the field

of the arsine gases. One result, apparently, based on the enemy's use of

Cf. memos cited in the narrative; ltr, Asst D0O to CG 1st FA Brig, 21Mar, sub: Defensive measures against mustard gas (1st Div Box 57 > 63.32);memo 90, 1st FA Brig, 21 Mar (Records 9 ) ; ltr, CG 1st FA Brig to CG 1st Div,21* Mar, sub: Rpt on TM Positions (Records lii).

108


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gas and their own use in retaliation, was the formulation by the French ofthe doctrine that "gas shells are most often used for the neutralization of

109batteries, giving the best results for this purpose."Both von Hutier at Riga and von Bulow at Caporetto, in September and

October 191 7, demonstrated the effectiveness of a short intensive preparation with gas on the opposing artillery and massive high explosive fire onthe infantry just before an attack. In the spring offensives of 1918,Ludendorff was to improve on this tactic by using great quantities of thenew arsine gases, following them with lethal phosg ene. By employing thesegases on the artillery and hitting the infantry on his front with HE frommassed minenwerfers, he created the gaps in the line for his deep penetration and maneuvers of rupture. H

Through the winter and spring of 1918 mustard gas continued to be usedin large quantities principally to interdict terrain and neutralize opposingbattery positions. One of the last large-scale uses of mustard gas was thefive-day saturation with over 2^0,000 yellow cross shells, on 11 - 16 March,of that portion of the British front outside the attack zone, prior to the109 Instru on O ffensive Action of Large Units in B a tt le , 31 Oct 1917, pp .167 - 168 (GHQ AEF G - 5 Sc ho ol s Box 1 727).110

CWS Weekly Summary of Information (hereafter CWS WSI), 2\x Apr, 5 Jun,12 Jun, 31 Jul (WD Hist Box 289); Div Info Bulletin, 2h Jun (2nd Div Box106); Extracts from a German Document, n.d. (89th Div Box 20, 33.21).


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offensive on 21 M arch .111 But in the final months of the war, in theire f fo r ts to conserve the ir dwindling supply , the Germans discovered theeff ec tiv ene ss of mustard gas, as well as of the harassing and le th al gases,in small daily concentrations on troop po si ti on s. 1 1 2

With the opposing infantry as the principal target, the Germans devel*

oped the Gas Uberfa ll or burst of f i r e , a short surpr ise fi re on small t a r gets; the Verseuchungsschiessen or zone concentration fire on terrainimportant for the enemy to occupy; the Schwadenschiessen or sheet f i r e , foruse against troop areas; and HE-gas fire, against moving objects. 11^ Allthese methods were based on multiples of 100, tha t i s , 100 rounds per ta rge t ,100 rounds per hect ar e, 100 rounds per hour, with the re su lt th at German gasatt ac ks in the clo sin g months of the war were made with gas sh el ls by thethousands, at most, and no longer by the hundreds of thousands.

If these German developments had th e ir impetus in conservation of gasammunition, they were a lso made necessa ry by the insi sten ce of the AEF onconducting th e i r operations by open warfare methods. And the s iz e and inexperience of the American divi sio ns made th e ir infan try ra th er than th e ir111 CWS WSI, 27 Mar, h Apr,112 CWS WSI, 10 Apr.113 French Tenth Army Bull eti n , 21 Sep, sub: Methods and Conditions ofGerman Gas-Shell Firing (1 st Army Box 26, 22.31, fol li).


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artillery the logical gas target.The infantrymen of the AEF were to have no reason to question the

effectiveness of the relatively small gas attacks that they experienced,and no doubt about the intended target. But so far as the 1st Division atAnsauville knew, the principal gas target was the artillery, not the infantry.