WWII Airdromes Defense History

8/9/2019 WWII Airdromes Defense History

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,FM 1-26c '1RESTRICTED

ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUALDEFENSE OF AIRDROMES~GES} ',~' ~' 'yAIt DEPART:\IE~'T,1 .~, .WASHI~GTON 2;;, D. C., 15 Aprill!)44.

[ 1-26, 20 January 1!H4, 11'1 ('haJl~e


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WAR DEPARTMENT,WASHINGTON25, D. C., 20 Janu~ry 1944.

FM 1-26, Army Air Forces Field Manual, Defense of Air-dromes, is published for the information and guidance cfall concerned.

[A. G. 300.7 (11 De(~43).]By OR!?EROF THE SECRETARYE>FWAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,.Chief of staff.

OFFICIAL:J. A. VLIO,

Major General,The Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:R and HI (3); Bn 1 (6).(For explanation of symbols see FM 21-6'>

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678-910-1213-1920-22

63-6768-7172-7374-7778-8182-8485-9798-99

TABLE OF CONTENTSParagraphsClIAFTER 1. GeneraL ..:___________________ 1-5

ClIAPTER 2. Forms of attack on airdromes.SECTION I. GeneralII. SabotageIII. Ground attack "-IV. Aerial bombardment and strafingV. Airborne attackVI. Chemical attack

ClIAPTER 3. Troops for defense of airdromes.SECTION I. Factors infiuencing assignment oftroops for defense______________ 23II. Troops available for defense 24-30ClIAPTER 4. Defense against sabotage 31-34CHAPTER 5. Active defense.SEC'1'ION I. GeneraL_..:_______________________ 35II. Organization of the ground:.. :.._ 36-44III. Antiaircraft defense 45-51IV. PersonneL 52-54V. Employment ,of the defense 55-62

ClIAPTER 6. Passive defense.SECTION I. DispersionII.' CoverIII. CamouflageIV. ObstaclesV. Alarm systemsVI. Damage controlVII. Protection against chemicalsVIII. Demolition

ClIAPTER 7. Plans and training.SECTION 1. GeneraL :..______ 100-104. II. Content of plans for local grounddefense 105-108

I III. Trainlng_________________________ 109NDEX _

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2-3 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL

and lay-out of an airdrome are being decided, mattersaffecting its defense must be given full consideration.td. The means made available for the defense of an air-

drome depend upon the probable forms of attack to whichit may be subjected, the effect that its loss or neutralizationwill have on military or naval operations, and resources ofthe theater commander.e. Enemy capabilities have important bearing on the prep-arations for defense of an airdrome. The most accurateinformation .possible must be obtained concerninJ the fol-lowing: the enemy's air power; the number of his basesavailable and their distances from the airdromes to be de-fended; the number of his carriers; the distance of the air-1drome from his naval bases whether or not he has localnaval superiority, whether or not he has local air superiority;and the situation of the ground forces.e 3. DEFINITIONS.-a. Airdrome.-An airdrome is a landingfield at which military facilities for shelter, supply, and re-pair of aircraft have been. provided (AR 95-35). For thepurposes of this manual, "airdrome" is considered a genericterm for all military landing fields.b. SecuritY.-8ecurity is the all around protection of the

command. It is obtained through effective measures toprevent surprise and interference by the enemy, to insuresecrecy for plans and movements, and to retain freedom ofaction. It involves special measures against espionage, sabo-tage, subversive activities, attack by hostile aviation On-eluding airborne troops), attack by chemical agents, andattack by ground forces.c. Local dejense.-Local defense is the active and passivedefense of an airdrome provided by its commander with the

personnel, armament, and equipment. under his command.The object of local defense is to enable friendly aircraft tocontinue to operate from the airdrome, to protect aircrafton the ground, installations, and 'personnel, and to denythe use of the airdrome to the enemy.

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DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES 3-4

d. Local ground dejense.-Local ground defense is the localdefense of the airdrome against ground forces or airbornetroops. Specifically it excludes counteraction by aircraftor by the fire of antiaircraft artillery against aircraft. Its'object is to deny to the enemy the area encompassing allvital buildings, installations, landing' fields and dispersalareas, and' adjacent terrain from' which he could renderthe airdrome inoperative by aimed small-arms fire. 4. RESPON~IBIL1Ty.-a. Responsibility for. the security of'an airdrome rests with the local airdrome commander.lIe is directly responsible for the local defense against sab-otage, espionage, and attack by organized enemy forces tothe extent of the resources under his command.


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5 ARMYAIR FORCESFIELDMANUAL 5. COMMAND.-The airdrome commander commands allunits assigned for the local 'defense of the airdrome and. is responsible for their training and operation. (See FM100-15'> He normally appoints as defense officer the com-mander of one of his local ground or antiaircraft defenseunits and requires him to assume immediate command ofall units available, primarily for defense, and to assumein his name immediate respons. ibility for the training andoperation of all troops used in the defense. The airdromecommander will ordinarily discharge his respon5~bility forthe safeguarding of military property and for the preventionof sabotage, espionage, and the compromise of classified iri-formation and materiel principally through an intelligence'officer (S-2).

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES

CHAPTER 2FORMS OF ATTACK ON AIRDROMES

6-7

. -. ; ParagraphsSECTION I. General ~______________________________ 6

II. Sabotage_______________________________________ 7III. Ground attack .:._____________ 8-9IV. Aerial bombardment and strafing 10-12V. Airborne attack 13-19VI. Chemical attack -;. 20-22

SECTIONIGENERAL

II 6. FORMSOF ATTACK.-All airdromes are liable to sabotageand subversive action, and all within the range of enemyaction are lia.ble to external attack. Attacks may occur atany time, singly or repeatedly, for the purpose of neutraliza-tion, destruction, or occupation of the airdrome by the en-emy to secure a point of departure for further ground or airoperations. Attack will normally be characterized by speedand surprise, with means or organization designed to accom-Plish specific tasks. It is to be expected that the enemy willemploy aircraft with demolition, fragmentation, and incen-diary bombs, machine guns, automatic cannon, and chem-icals; ~nd airborne or ground forces, with armored vehicles,either singly or in combination. If the mission of the enemyis neutralization or destruction, it is to be expected that hewill employ chemicals of a persistent or lethal type. Attacksmay be classified as sabotage, ground attack, aerial bombard-ment, airborne attack, and chemical attack.

SECTIONIISABOTAGE

7. FORMS OF SABOTAGE.-Sabotage is the destruction ofproperty or disruption of facilities by stealth or by methods

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7-8 ARMYAIRFORCESFIELDMANUAL

FIGURE l.-8abotage. jdesigned to suggest accident. Typical forms are damage to'tools and shop machinery, hidden damage to aircraft to Icause failure. in :tIight, contamination of gasoline and oil'supplies, disruption of the power system, and widespread'and utter destruction by explosives. Methods of sabotage 1Ivary widely and are suggested by the habits of personnel andthe arrangement .of installations as well as by the immedi.late object of the saboteur. Probably the most effectiveinstrument is :tIre, especially if it results in the detonation jof explosives.

SECTIONIIIGROUND ATTACK

II 8. OVERLANDAIDs.-The most probable ground attack onan airdrome is by mechanized raidi,ng column. Strong hOS.:tile armored forces may be encountered 50 to 100 milesbehind the general front of the field armies. Overland6


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DEFENSEFAIRDROMES 8-11raids may come after wide flanking movements or fromtroops which have assembled after successful infiltration.Such action is probable when the situation at the frontis fluid or confused. Attacks may come with little warn-ing and will be rapidly pushed home with a large volumeof automatic small-arms fire and light-cannon fire. 9.. GENERALDVANCE.-Thedefense of the airdrome againsta general hostile advance is the defense of a fixed positionor a terrain feature by conventional methods, a responsi-bility of the territorial commander.

SECTIONVAERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND STRAFING

10. GENERAL.-Themost common form of attack on air-dromes is aerial bombardment. Various missiles may beemployed-demolition bombs, fragmentation bombs, incen-diary bombs, chemical filled bombs, and chemical spray.Strafing by aircraft weapons is a certain component oflow-flying attack. The attacks may come from any altitudeand from any direction. Harassing attacks may be made toslow down operations or interrupt normal use of the field.Attacks in force, intensive or sustained, may be made todestroy. aircraft on th-e ground, airdrome facilities and in-stallations, fuel reserves, bomb dumps, routes of communi-cation, and personnel, or to neutralize the airdrome throughdestruction of the runways . 11. HARASSINGTTACK.-Harassing attacks are character-izedby surprise, deception, and hit-and-run tactics. tfilefamiliar types are minimum altitude bombing and machine-gun and cannon fire by fighter aircraft. The favorite tar-gets are grounded planes. Not only is the airdrome strafedbut often the surrounding terrain is thoroughly covered,usually with incendiary bullets. It is likely that extensiveattacks will be preceded by careful reconnaissance andplanning.

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11 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 12-14 12. ATTACKIN FORCE.-Attacks in force are conducted insuch strength that their successful completion will bringto an end or seriously weaken the operational use of theairdrome .. They may vary from a single intense raid byseveral flights to sustained high and minimum altitude bom-bardment and strafing concentrated within a few hours orSuccessfully repeated for many days. A steady flow of air-craft to the attacked area may be expected, with one ortwo flights coming over the target in rapid succession. Re-connaiesance planes will obtain target information, weather

. data, and probably pictures before the attack and during theProgress ofa sustained assault. Such attacks may be thebeginning of an attempt by the enemy to seize the airdromefor his own use. If so, he is likely to spare the runways asmuch as possible so that he may land troop carriers whenresistance has been sufficiently reduced.

SECTIONV.AIRBORNE ATTACK

13. GENERAL.-a. Airborne attack culminates in assaultby troops landed by parachute or from airplanes or gliderson. or near the objective. Its salient characteristic is thespeed with which it can develop. Its normal developmentis as follows: extensive reconnaissance, intense preliminarybombardment and. strafing, landing of parachute troops andperhaps glider troops, reinforcement from troop carrierPlanes, either on or off the airdrome. But any or all phasesof the attack may occur simultaneously.

b. If an airdrome within reach of enemy aircraft is lo-cated in a strategically important area or if one becomesimportant because of a large-scale offensive, such an attackmust be considered probable . 14. RECONNAISSANcE.-Preparations for airborne attack arenormally characterized by great care and thoroughness.The area of the objective will be subjected to extensive anddetailed preliminary reconnaissance to determine the extent

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14-17 ARMYAIRFORCESFIELDMANUALand dispositions of troops and to obtain complete and ac-curate weather information. Reports of secret agents andenemy sympathizers concerning defense installations and,military forces in the vicinity. and concerning the probable 1attitude of the civilian population will probably be avail-able to the enemy. During the period of preliminary recon-naissance light bombing and strafing attacks to bring aboutdisclosure of clefensive gun positions will probably be ex-perienced. Close observation will normally be continuedthroughout the attack . 15. F'IFTH-COLt.TMNACTIVlTy.-Prior to the attack, in-creased activity by enemy sympathizers may be expected .. 16. PRELIMINARYBOMBARDMENT.-a. Airborne attack on adefended area such as an airdrome will usually be precededby intense aerial bombardment to destroy defenses whichmight interfere with subsequent operations. High-altitudebombing will normally~e followed by low-level bombing andstrafing. All grounded aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, and;ground defense installations will be targets of special im-lportance. Antimorale attacks may also be made in whichthe enemy strafes or bombs indiscriminately. The bom-bardment and strafing will be continued during the landingof airborne troops. It will be lifted from only the actualjllanding places.. b. Aerial bombardment may not precede operation of para-chute and air-landing troops when they are employed onmissions requiring surprise. .. 17. PARACHUTEROOPs.-a. Parachute troops will normallybe employed for the first landing of an airborne attack toseize key points or to destroy definite objectives such as'antiaircraft batteries, headquarters, defense positions, andcommunications systems in preparation for the arrivnl of'air-landing troops. Other functions are to harass and tocreate diversions and, when they are dropped in small num-bers over large areas, to destroy bridges and generally in-

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DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES 17

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17 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUALterrupt transportation. to prevent communications. to (lis-close targeLs with signals for bombardment, to cause con-fusion and panic, and to make contact with enemy sym-pathizers.b. Most of the equipment of parachute troops is usuallydropped in containers bearing colored markings or attachedto colored parachutes to indicate the section to which theYbelong. This equipment may include machine guns, lIIor-

FIGURE 4.-E quipm cnt container (G erm an).

tars, antitank guns. mountain guns, infantry guns, lIamethrowers, tools, spare parts for the defenders' motor trans-port, bicycles, motorcycles, and even light; cars. Additionalequipment and food is dropped on signal.

c. To drop the members of a unit within a small areafor quick assembly the carrier planes will approach in for-mntion. The jump will be made from an altitude of 200 to500 feet so that the descent will require about 20 seconds.

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DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES

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It is possible to land a company within an area 250 by 600Yards so that they can be assembled with weapons 10 to 15l11inutes after the first man jumps. The troops may first be

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17-19 ARMYAIRFORCESFIELDMANUALlanded widely scattered over the locality to confuse, harass,and dissipate the defender's forces. They will not ordinarilybe dropped in the midst of defending troops, who can quicklydispose of them before they can free themselves of theirharness and assemble, b.ut will normally be droppe.d in depthlround the airdrome or area selected for attack. . .d. The first task of parachute troops will be to collectand assemble weapons and. munitions dropped separately by jparachute and to form their units. Once assembled theybecome light infantry with high fire power but limited mo-bility. This fire power can be sustained, however, only bythe early reception of supplementary ar.1munitioi.i. 18. GLIDERTROOPS.-a. Glider troops are normally em-ployed in support of parachute trops, although they may beused for the first landing. Their tactical missions will .1101'-mally include the silencing of antiaircraft guns covering theline of approach of troop carriers, the seizure of positionsfrom which they can provide covering fire for the landingof other airborne troops, the provision of storm tr~ops capa-'ble of concentrated fire power for the capture of key points,and the disrupting of communications. Objectives of theindividual units may be planned as part of a company mis ,sion which fits into a detailed plan of attack. ib. Gliders can land where other aircraft cannot-in anyarea where 25 to 50 yards of reasonably flat surface is avai1~

able.c. On landing, the glider troops deplane as rapidly as pos-

sible. Reserve ammunition and equipment are left in theglider. If attacked on landing, glider troops quickly takeup defensive positions. 19. AIR-LANDINGTROOPS.-With the landing of troops car-riel' planes the flght for the airdrome passes into its thirdphase. The air-landing troops constitute the main attack-ling force. Their mission will be to reinforce the parachutetroops and consolidate their gains, to attack the more heavilydefended positions, and to destroy or drive out completely the

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defense personnel. Air-landing troops are provided with theUsual equipment of ground troops, including light artillery,armored carriers, scout cars, and perhaps light tanks. Nor-

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19 ARMY AIn FORCES FIELD MANUAL

mally platoons. or similar units. and their equipment willbe landed simultaneously. Deplaning and unloading will re-quire only a f~w minutes. The seizure of prepared fields

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 19-22Willnot be essential, as roads or smooth ground will suffice forlandings. Crash landings may be attempted on terrainunsuitable for normal landings.

'SECTIONVICHEMICAL ATTACK

20. GENERAL.-The use of airplanes to project chemicalsbrings' to the airdrome an ever present danger of. chemicalattack. Cruising radius and capacity are the chief limits onsWift-striking chemical attacks.

I 21. OBJECTIVESFAERIALCHEMICALTTACKS.-Chemical at-tacks from the air may be made to attain any of severalobjectives. a. To inflict casualties on personnel. .b. To render airdromes unfit for use through neutraliza-tion or contamination of airplanes on the ground, hangars,and facilities for maintenance, administration, housing, andstorage of material and supplies, by means of persistentvesicant agents.c. To harass personnel by using lacrimators or toxic smokesto cause them to mask and thus lower their efficiency.d. To cover with smoke to prevent effective defense of theairdrome. .e. To destroy various airdrome installations by means of

incendiaries.f. To affect morale . 22. TYPES OF AERIALCHEMICALATTACK.-An attack withchemical agents may be made with persistent gas, nonper-Sistent gas or toxic smoke, screening smoke, or incendiaries.These may be employed in impact bombs, airburst bombs, orSpray. The most probable attack is one in which persistentchemicals are employed, almost certainly with high explosivesand possibly with incendiaries. Both air-burst and impactbombs will be dropped on the airdrome and around it to keepthe landing area under gas concentration as long as possible.

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22 ARMY AIR FORC~S FIELD MANUAL

Defense is difficult, as personnel and material must be pro-tected against chemicals and, at the same time, against otherweapons of attack.

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES

CHAPTER 3TROOPS FOR DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES

231

ParagraphsoE;CTION 1. Factors influencing assignment of troops for de-fens________________________________________ 23II. Troops available for defellse 24-30

SECTIONIFACTORS INFLUENCING ASSIGNMENT OF 'TROOPSFOR DEFENSE 23. LIMITING CONSIDERATIONs.-The size and compositiO~of the g2rrison of any particular airdrome is primarily de-pendent upon the number of troops available in the theaterand the decision of the theater commander to allocate suchtroops for the defense of air force installations.a. The assignment of defense units is dependent upon theresources of the theater commander. It may not be pos-sible to provide at every airdrome the complement of troops,armament, and equipment needed for defense against allContinge-ncies. Economy of force forbids the dispersion oflarge numbers of men and weapons for the defense of manyfixed and lImited areas. It is not expected that all air-dromes, unsuppcrted, resist indefinitely an aggressive enemydetermined to capture them. If for several hours the de-fenders can prevent him seizing their field and bringing inlarge airborne reinforcements, they have performed their~ission. Area reserves must, however, be capable of arriv-lng within a very short time to convert the defense from alocal problem to one of greater magnitude.b. The assignment of defense units is influenced by the

range of enemy action. In respect to their location, air-dromes may be classified as follows:

(1) Airdromes which will probably be free from externalattack. Their principal defense requirement is interiorguard.

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(2) Airdromes which may be subject to occasional long~range attacks by bombers. Their principal ground defensewill be passive defense. ' ' ,(3) Airdromes which may be subject to frequent bombingand strafing attacks by aircraft but yet which are not within'range of serious attack by airborne troops. Their' defenders:will rely princIpally upon antiaircraft, fire andmeasures.(4) Airdromes which may be subject to frequent bombingand strafing attack by aircraft and are within the range ofattack by airborne troo'ps or by ground forces. Theirrequires troops to provide antiaircraft and local ground'defense.c. The size of an airdrome garrison is also detenuined bthe strategic and tactical situations in the area. Attacks onarea airdromes will be conditioned by the nature andof friendly and enemy operations., The possession of air'superiority and its degree are factors of great influence. Thelnumber, location, and operations of troops in theare matters which may be fundamental in determining the'extent of the local ground defenses. Likewise, the strategic1value of an airdrome may be the reason for the presence o, ground forces in the vicinity and the key to their dispositions. In relation to the extent of friendly forces in the area'and' their disposition, there are four types of problemslocal defense for airdromes-' ' (1) Those of airdromes which are completely isolated,as island airdromes, but which are important. Here, insense, the area and the' airdrome are the same, the strategivalue of the surrounding area deriving from theof the airdrome. As no reinforcements are possible, ament or a larger force may be present. for defense, and thecommand of the airdrome, to the extent of itssubordinate to the command of the defense forces.(2) Those of airdromes in an area defense which areportant but which can rely on area troops for resistance

pasSive

defense

success

vicinity

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presenceregi

defense

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DEFENSEFAIRDROMES 23-24against all-out attacks. Their need is for sufficient localdefense to repel nuisance attacks and delay surprise thrusts.

(3) Those of advanced airdromes in areas where the situ-ation i$ fiuid and area troops cann'ot be diverted to defendthem. Although these fields are important, they must de-fend themselves with the resources under local command.(4) Those of airdromes in areas without area troops butnot important enough or near enough to the enemy to bethreatened by major action. Their ground defense requiresonly interior guard.d. A requirement for adequate antiaircraft protection existsat aU airdromes within reach of enemy aviation. This can-not be neglected, for air attack against any airdrome will bemore frequent and must be considered. more likely than any

other form of attack.SECTION II

TROOPS AVAILABLEFOR DEFENSE 24. 'GENERAL.-Thereare several types of units whiC'hmaybe available to the airdrome commander for defensive -pur-:Poses;airdrome and squadron personnel, ground force unitsassigned for local ground defense, aviation engineers, anti-aircraft artillery assigned or attached,' chemical warfareservice detachments, and military police (aviation) com-panies. Nearby reserves of theat~r forces may also be avail-able for support. A forward-area airdrome might have thefolIowing forces available to defend it:a. Personnel from two fighter squadrons based at the air-dromes, plus airdrome operational personnel and quarter-:master and ordnance personnel.b. A small infantry unit assigned for local defense.e. One company of 'aviation engineers.d. One or more antiaircraft' artillery automatic weapons

batteries.e. One chemical warfare service platoon.f. One infantry unit in reserve at some distance.21


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25-27 ARMYAIRFORCESFIELDMANUAL 25. AIRDROMEANDSQUADRONERSONNEL.-An airdrome willhave available for defensive purposes at least its own assignedsquadron personnel and that of any squadrons which use it asa base, that is, air force personnel connected with adminis-tration or operation of facilities, quartermaster and ord-nance personnel, and ground crews, pilots, and flight crewsoff duty. Although primarily occupied with other duties,they are trained in the use of infantry weapons. They arenormally employed in close-in defense and in forming sup-porting pa.rties. If no other forces are available, they mustalso be used for counte!attacking d.isorganized parachute,.troops. ." 26. ASSIGNEDINFANTRy.-a. If available, infantry assigned.for the purpose forms the principal element in the local.ground defense. ,

b. The mission of such units is, with the assistance ofall other available local forces, to meet airborne attack during

tand shortly after landing, to hold the airdrome against anylform of attack until the arrival of reinforcements, and toremove by counterattack any threat to the defended areaA part of the unit is used to establish the flxed defensesof the airdrome and to provide local security for dispersedaircraft and installations. The remainder is organized as.one or more striking forces as the situation requires. 27. AVIATIONENGINEERS.-a. Aviation engineer units al:eespecially organized, equipped, and trained to meet the needsof the Army Air Forces for engineer work in a theater ofoperations. They are assigned to air forces and air task'forces as required. In general, their organization is similar'to that of combat and service units, but the battalion, con-sisting of battalion headquarters, three lettered companies,'and a medical section, is the usual field operating unit. Sep-'arate engineer aviation companies are organized as requiredfor particular missions, being identical with the letteredcompanies of the battalion. Company armament includeScaliber .50 machine guns and an antitank gun.

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 27-28b. Aviation engineers have the general engineer mISSIon

of facilitating the advance of friendly forces and hinderingthe advance of the enemy, usually by engineer constructionbut at times by taking part in combat. Their most importanttasks are to construct advanced airdromes, to camouflagethem, to maintain them under enemy bombing, and to assistin their defense.


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~-, There are several t~.P(~Sof supply HIlll ~el'n(~e Ulllts of. tile",Chemical "~ul'fare Hel'viee aSSif.,'11ed~) dut~. with the Army Air. Forces. The!5e units, when 'nsHi;rned ~ ) 1 ; nttu('he

b. When defenslye measures r('qulre defense against chemicalattack, purtieularly whrn' contamlnutlon results from enemyof pel'sistent agents, the Chemical Warfal'e Service units nre

i available to SUllt>rvlse and assist \the trained decontamination",crews from hase units and to render t~chllklll assistall('e in. dealing with major


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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 31-32

CHAPTER 4DEFENSE AGAINST SABOTAGE

31. CONTINUITYOFMENACE.-It can never be assumed thatany area is free from the menace of the saboteur. He isas likely to be found in the combat zone as in the zone of theinterior. He is likely to appear in peace as well as in war.lie may be an enemy' agent or a disaffected individual offriendly nationality. .' . . 32. V~GILANcE.-a.Defens~ against sabotage is a matter ofefficient interior guard. Stationary watchmen or rovinggUards who avoid routine movements are more effective thansentries who follow a set method of walking post. A systemof checks on the guard and general protective system shouldbe a part of the plan. Inspections by individuals not knownto the guards may reveal laxity or other defects. An officershould be detailed to make a study on ways anc~.means ofsabotage in the area and to report his conclusions to thecommanding officer.b. There should be a continuous survey of personnel who'have access to the area. Means of identification should beprOVided for persons not in uniform, and special passesshould be required for entrance into restricted areas. Theduty of examining credentials should be assigned to superiorguards. If the loyalty or mental balance of an individual isdOUbted, he should be especially watched and denied ap""Proach to sensitive areas until a true estimate of him hasbeen obtained. Aid in forming such estimates should beSought from other agencies. On most fields aircraft willbe the most valuable military equipment. Unidentified in-diViduals must not be allowed in their vicinity except under.constant surveillance. If there is the slightest possibility ofany unknown individual having access to baggage, preflightchecks should be routine.

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I 33-34 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUALI 33. M ATERIAL O BSTACLES.-a. The work of the sab~teur is,I. greatly impeded by the use of wiring or fencing to restrict tentrance and exit so that personnel can be subjected to in.!spection. and to isolate the more sensitive and vital instal.lations, such as power plants or gasoline supply points. Whenlsufficient wire is not available for these purposes, a system of

I signs and printed orders designed to control movement will!greatly assist guards, as attention can be concentrated on anYindividual who disregards them.

b. In areas where it is possible to employ it, lightinglessens the po",sibility of sabotRge at night. Guards should jbe provided with flashlights.a 34. REFERENCE.-A discussion of methods of sa::>otage andprotective measures is available in TM 19-225.

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DEFENSE OF AlRDROMES

CHAPTER V

35

ACTIVE DEFENSE8 ': ParagraphsECTION I. General 35II. Organization of the ground .,. 36-44llI. Antiaircraft defense,;. ----------------- 45-51IV. Personnel .:._52-54V. EJ.nployInent of the defense 55-62..

SECTION IGENERAL .

35. BASIC PRINCIPLES.--a. The local ground defense of anairdrome is a relatively static defense of the runways or land-ing areas and vital airdrome installations, and a mobile de-fense of possible areas for the landing of airborne troops inthe' vicinity. The static defenses are located to cover thelanding strips with heavy fire and to deny important avenues,of approach. The location of the striking forces.is~dictatedby the extent and location of other areas suitable for hostilelandings and the routes of communication to them. Fix(;ddefended localities are prepared for the mobile' strikingllarties to occupy in the event that enemy forces are able toorganize in large groups. These defended localities are. located on key terrain points from which delaying action can,be effected.b. Antiaircraft artillery protection of forward area air-.dromes is of the utmost importance and must. be considered.both in planning airdrome installations and in planning the.ground defense.c. All planes should be put in the air as quickly as possibleUPon the approach of an enemy. They are parked to avoidunnecessary taxying, and crews are informed of the order oftake-off. If simultaneous take-offs are possible, the directionof each plane is indicated by reference to markers on the fieldOr features of the more distant landscape. A standing oper-

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35-37 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL 1ating procedure designed to reduce last minute instrUCtions\to a minimum should be adopted and rehearsed. If attackis imminent, planes are periodically warmed up by groundcrews or pilots.

SECTIONIIORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND

36. AREAOF DEFENSE.-The area to be defended is deter-mined only after a careful estimate of the situation in whicbthe terrain and the available forces are the dominant con}siderations. In most situations the maximum practicable1objective is the security of adjacent terrain from which the.~~e~rome can be rendered Inoperative by aimed small-arniSi 37. PRINCIP~ESOF ORGANIZATION.-a.Sector delens~.-Nor-,'mally the local ground defense of an airdrome is a sector~defense in depth. The area to be defended is subdividedestablishing sectors with a comm9,nder and troops designatedlfor the defense of each. Sectors extend from a central point'on the airdrome outward and provide cut-of-pie divisions olthe area to be defended (see fig. 9).'b. Delense in depth.-Defense in depth is 8ecured by a sys-tem of centers of resistance, gun positions, obstacles, road

blocks, and fox holes planned for the delivery of coVering.fire upon important objectives and terrain. The inner de)fense positions should give mutual support. Outlying areas1in the sectors are patrolled and defended by the sectorfense forces .. Reinforcement is provided for by mobile strik-ing forces and by reserves formed from airdrome personnel.c. All-around delense.-Whenever possible, defense posi-'tions are prepared for all-around defense. .d. Alternate positions.-Inorder to' defeat enemy air recon'"

n'aissance alternate positions for weapons and men are dugso that the defense is flexible and elements can be shiftedwithout loss of effectiveness.

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C:l.r SECTOR

DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES

SCALE IN YARDS__ 1250 500 750 lOOO

c P SECTOR.

37-38

. e. Sajety.-Plans of fire and movement must be preparedand executed so that friendly elements do not fire into eachother. Such plans are particularly important in airdromedefense because airborne attacks may come from so manydirections that friendly fire will be difficult to control. . 38. RECONNAISSANCE.--a. Before other than emergencydispositions are made, a thorough reconnaissance of the

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::::in surrou::~:g:::0:1::::::" S:::I:'Lbe unde~taJDetailed consideration should be given to the possibilities ofattack under various conditions of time and weather. Thtdefense commander should not be satisfied with initiaJ'dispositions dictated by obvious features of the terrain, butshould plan such additional or alternate positions as wiltpermit him to make best use of his forces when conditionlchange with the wind, the weather, the time, and the customlof the enemy. . Jb. Each place airborne troops can land must be determined,but shifts in the wind or changes in its velocity increase 01

decrease the natlU'al hazard of an area f0r an enemy land)ing. Under certain conditions landings may be impossiblJin a given area. For dropping parachute troops with thlminimum of casualties from the descent a fairly clear areJ200 by 500 yards is required. Such a minimum space caJnot be used if the wind should be blowing perpendicular tJits long aXis~ and the defense will consequently give it lesattention than when the wind is blowing parallel to thllong axis. Dispositions should constantly be shifted, acJcording to such changing circumstances. The direction an4velocity of the wind and the state of the weather are im}portant considerations in the plan for defense against an!form of aerial attack. High winds may increase the hazar&of dropping sufficiently to prevent the :use of parachutJtroops altogether. On the other hand, high winds reducdthe distance required for airplane landings. and augmen~the number of potential landing sites .. Low clouds anJlimited visibility may prevent the coordinated arrivalelements over the landing area and cut down the ratewhich troops and supplies can be landed. The timeinitiating and conducting operations will be determinedlargely by the weather forecast. .c. The enemy's customs of attack should be considered 11.

making dispositions. 39. TYPES OF DEFENSE POSITIONs.-a. Centers oj resistance.-(l) Key elements in the organization of the ground

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are strong centers of resistance. Each is provided with aSUPply of weapons, ammunition, food, and water and iscapable of withstandi g a short siege.

(2) The principal mission of the inner centers of resistanceis to deny the landing strips and adjacent open areas to the

'41

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OJD::I0..- Dead areas are coordinated

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48-49 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL J. as :hown SO that an adjacent g~ covers the dea-

area of each gun. -, . '~2. Gun batteries.-At altitudes above 2,500feet the ap'. proach most. favorable to the bombers is perpen.dicular to the strip. The gun batteries are Placed,500to 3,000yards out from the center of the striP.. perpendicular to its length.


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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 49-52(4) Any. airplane. committing a hostile act may be taken

Under fire., b. All personnel must be thoroughly trained in visualrecognition. .c. Restrictions on opening fire will be placed in effect bythe airdrome commander. Control is exercised through theantiaircraft artillery commander. Restrictions imposed onfire are normally the minimum consistent with coordinationof the air defense and to insure the safety of friendly aircraft . 50. LOC'ALAIR G~ARDS.-All fire units must be protected bylocal air guards. (See par. 79'> Guards must be providedWith means of communication for transmitting warning ofapproaching planes . 51. SMALL-ARMSFIRE AGAINSTAIRCRAFT.--a. Properly de-livered small-arms fire is an effective method of counter-attacking low-flying airplanes. Its effectiveness dependsuPon the training of personnel and upon their constantalertness. The result of small-arms fire upon -aircraft isnot to be measured only by the count of planes actuallybrought down. Damage to radio, mechanical, and electricalsYstem'S' is frequently inflicted by rifle and machine-gunbUllets which, though it may not prevent the plane fromreturning to its base, necessitates extensive repair. Damagecaused by the passage of a bullet through a wing or controlSUrface requires repair work that may prevent at least oneoPerational flight. There is also an important effect uponthe morale of troops employing their weapons against low-flYing aircraftb. PM 21-45', 23-5, 23-6, 23-7, and 23-10 explain the tech-nique of directing small-arms fire against aircraft.

SECTIONIVPERSONNEL

52. GENERAL.-a. All troops stationed at an airdrome willbe. considered available for its defense when needed. The

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52-54 ARMYAIRFORCESIELDMANUALorder of availability will be the following: ground defenstroops; aviation engineer troops; chemical warfaredeeontamination troops and other service troops; Army Ai!Forces troops whose mission is administration or operatio~maintenance, and repair of aircraft; and other troops Withi1supporting distance. All personnel should have someduty assigned and be drilled in its performance. All personnel" not actually engaged at the moment in the maintenance or operation of aircraft must be prepared to engag.in the fire fight. . 1b. All pers(,nnel must keep gas masks, weapons, andmunition close at hand. When the alarm sounds they winreport to, previously designated assembly areas, armed anJjead for combat.. . ' 53. F'IxED"DEFENsEs.-Ingeneral, armed airdrome personnel

shoul~ man less vital static defenses in order to freetroops for mobile operations. Such posts can be leftpar'\tially manned or unoccupied until the ground defense isplaced on the alert. It is necessary, however, to havetain defensive positions manned continually. Antiaircraft ,weapons must always be ready to fire, as must, to a lessetlextent, antitank weapons on likely routes of approach andmachine-gun posts in vital areas. For all such assignments,'no reliance initially should be placed upon men who have 9:full-time job that will demand their presence at anothet,part of the airdrome. Airborne attacks develop too rapidl~to permit them. to man posts at any distance. Available air-:drome personnel can be employed to reinforce centers of. resistance. Dispersed personnel should be employed to create', small islands of resistance near their place ofThis practice will establish a series of garrisoned pointsto form a defensive zone that will limit the movements of'enemy troops who break through or land on, the airdrome'itself in order to attack special installations. .1 54. STRIKINGFORCESANDRESERVES.-a.Striking forceSshould be composed of troops especially trained for ground'

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 54-56defense. Enemy airborne units may be expected to consistof troops who have received special training. Defensive units;sent against them should consist of troops of correspondingcaliber.b. A final reserve can be formed from air force troopsWho have formed at assembly points at locations where thelarger numbers of .air force personnel are 'occupied.

SECTIONVEMPLOYMENT OF THE DEFENSE

55.' GENERAL.-Successful defensive tactics are based onadequate security measures and proper use of fire andmaneuver. A proper evaluation of the terrain and an esti-. mate of the situation are of first priority. Based on these,the defense is planned in accordance with established in-fantry and antiaircraft tactics . 56. MINIMIZINGEFFECTSON BOMBARDMENT.--a. Before aattempt at airborne or ground attack, bomba;ctment anstrafing will normally be directed at defense and opera-tionaLinstallations, at the outlined perimeter of the fieland along the edges of surrounding woods, at housing areas~and at any location that suggests a remunerative targetI,. Special defense forces can survive only by keeping undecover in concealed locations in the vicinity of the airdrombut not on it or its perimeter or in any place the enemmay be anticipated to suspect and bomb because of itaptness for concealment.b. During the initial bombardment machine guns another guns sited for ground defense normally remain concealed and reserve their fire for their primary targets. LikeWiseunder certain conditions some of the antiaircraft weapons may remain silent. Preliminary bombing or strafinruns are often made with small force to provoke the defensinto revealing dispositions.

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57-61 ARMYAIR FORCESFIELD MANUAL 57. ALERTNEss.-Alertness is the flrstessential of defensiveoperations. At all times, even during the height of a bom-bardment, some men must be on the lookout to guardagainst surprise . 58. OBSERVATIONSYSTEM.-For proper employment of thedefense it is essential the defense commander have a spottingsystem for accurately identifying danger points. The sys-tem should include observation posts and patrols.


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DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES- 61

action to capture or destroy small groups of attackers beforethey can organize.b. Advantages 0/ the attack.-Airborne troops, particularly

llarachute troops, have a definite advantage over the de-fender in that the area selected for landing may be anywherewithin a wide range and that the actual location and timeof the landing can be kept secret until the descent is begun.Several landings can be made simulta'neously to place thedefense at the further disadvantage of uncertainty as towhere the main effort of the attack is to be made. Under thethreat of reinforcing immediate successes, the attacker canforce the defense to disperse its forces or perhaps tempt itto improper use of them. In effect, the defense must guardagainst the sudden advent of the fire power and holdingllower of hostile infantry within its own lines.c. Advantages 0/ the de/ense.-(l) Until they are organ-

ized on the ground, airborne troops are dispersed and lightlyarmed infantrymen hampered by the necessity of freeingthemselves nom parachutes, gliders, or transports and ofCollecting and assembling weapons or unloading them. Dur-ing the first few minutes after their arrival t-hey can bedestroyed by a fraction of the number of defenders.(2)~or about 30 seconds before the jump, a transport plane

loaded with parachute troops levels off at a low altitudeand flies a straight course toward the landing area. As ittakes about 10 seconds for a squad and its equipment to bedischarged, the transport is flying slowly along a straightCOurse for a total period of about 40 seconds, an easy target.Parachutists are practically helpless during their descent andin the period immediately following their landing when theymust collapse their parachutes and get o~t of their harness.Materiel containers must then be located and unpacked andthe squads or larger units must assemble. As the landingllattern of "a squad is large, its average length being about4QO yards, assembly takes an appreciable period of time.

(3) Gliders are extremely vulne'rable if they come low overhostile troops. As their flight is very slow, the troops they

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FIGURE 15.-Parachute troops landing.50


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carry can be destroyed before the landing .. Fire directedat the forward part may reach the pilot and cause the gliderto crash. Landings. on bad ground, even. if the. glider isnot smashed, may temporarily shock or stun the troops.d. Employment of heavy weapons.-The necessity for rapid

entry into action against airborne troops dictates that heavyWeapons be located in firing positions. Artillery is normallylimited to direct fire .. Its primary targets are gliders ortransport planes halted or moving slowly on the ground.e. Time of opening fire.-Time of opening fire is controlled

to conceal the locations of weapons and organizations untilthey can be employed with best effect. outguards open fireon transport planes and parachutists as soon as they areWithin range and maintain intensive fire. The reserve ele-ments in concealed areas hold their fire until they are com-mitted to action or are directly in the path of descendingtroops. Heavy weapons normally open fire on appropriatetargets of opportunity as they arrive within suitable range.Some antiaircraft weapons may remain silent to deal withthe main attack when it develops. When transport planescome in for a landing, the defender must be ready with fire-POWer and the maximum possible surprise to inflict heavycasualties on the initial landing party.f. Counterattack.-(l) Regardless of antiaircraft fire, inany airborne attack of force some troops must be expected

to effect a landing. The defender must attack and destroythem before they can assemble and develop an effective force.Landing fields and other vulnerable areas can best be pro-tected by fast-moving hard-hitting striking forces equipped

, with automatic weapons capable of high-angle fire, lightcannon, armored vehicles, and transportation which can de-stroy the attacker before he completes his landing or organ-izes on the ground. Later counterattacks should be under-taken only with strong. fire support and by the methodswhich would be necessary against any other ground force.The character of action by the airdrome defenders, however,

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61 ARMY AIR FORCES FlELD MANUAL '1must be offensive, and time is the element of greatesttimportaI}.ce. . J(2) Parachute troops must be attacked immediately. If,parachutists land close by, it is essential that the personnellof even small defense posts sally out to attack themautomatic weapons, grenades, rifles, and bayonets. A small,determined' force can cope with several times its number:of parachutists if it attacks the instant they hit the ground~For 30 seconds after landing parachute troops are quiUhelpless, for 2 minutes they are more or less helpless, an1for the 3 to 5 minutes it requires for them to begin organ",izing and diBging in they are very vulnerable. If they arenot destroyed during this time, reserves must bemitted in sufficient force to isolate or destroy them before;they can organize into larger units and move on vitalfor completion of their mission or before .they can beinforced. It must be expected that forces moving to thecounterattack will be strafed by the enemy's supportinlaviation. Troops constantly need to take advantage of cove~to minimize the effects of the fire of the enemy's aircraft.Successful counterattacks may be turned into failure if tb~attackers do not find cover before being counterattacked iI1their turn by hostile aircraft. . 'j

(3) Armored vehicles are of .the utmost value in th{counterattack. They should be concealed in relatively safepositions during the preliminary bombardment and brougb\into action during the critical stage of the groundwhich may subsequently. develop.. They must be regarded'as striking units and must not be employed in a staticin lieu of fixed defense posts to cover any predeterminedareas or any particular approaches. Their primary mission.is offensive action to cause as many casualties, as. damage to equipment, and as much confusion among landedtroops as possible. They must not be allotted such taskscarrying messages or hunting down parachute troops dis. persed individually over the countryside. After deliveringtheir attacks they shOUldbe withdrawn and held in reserve'

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FIGURE 16.-Tanks attacking parachute troops.53


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61 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUALto meet further threats. Because of their'speed, armor, fir)power. and weight, tanks are especially valuable for attackJng parachute troops as they land. While parachutists arJtruggl~ng .with their harness, tanks. should cruise amonjthem, crushing them and their equipment. Half-track1shotlld not come close enough to be the targets for lian~grenades. Their loads of troops should get out and attac~las skirmishers or dig in for holding fire. Scout cars mabe used to screen the movement of. a striking force tothreatened area. Rifle troops should follow closely behinarmored vehicles. These troops should, if possible, beby truck close to the area of initial employment. Personnecarriers may be u~ed to transpo.rt small combat grOUPS'o th

J.attack of enemy positions ...

(4) Some members of a counterattacking force must bdetailed to collect or destroy arms containers andcontents or, in haste, to hide their distinctively colored parachutes. All personnel should give special attention to anparachutes of a color in a minority, as they may mar~weapons, officers, rallying points, etc. If there is anyarms containers may be dragged down wind by their para',chutes. Movement in this direction will insure early con',tact with parachutists and facilitate the capture of their.equipment. Every effort should be made to confuse sup'porting aircraft by firing captured Very pistols and layingout captured signal strips and flags. Patrols shouldsent out to capture supplies dropped at later periods or to:cover them with fire, but striking forces and reserves shouldnot be weakened during the attack on the airdromes to'supply details to mop up small isolated groups of para}chutists who may have dug in. These elements shOUld'disposed of in detail later.g. Feints.-A parachute attack will probably be accompanied by feints. Dummies may be dropped at oneand the troops for the attack at another. It mustfore be quickly determined in every instance whether dum

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61DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES

llliesor troops are being dropped. Dummies hit the groundhard and bounce. If there is even a slight wind, they are\)Ulled along lifelessly by the parachute. The differencelllost visible from a distance is the absence of efforts likethose made by parachutists to control their descent. Unlessthe terrain is free of obstacles, genuine parachutists will beobserved maneuvering their parachutes to land in a favorable\)lace by twisting their bodies and pulling their shroud linesas they. near the ground.h. Interference with communications.-The success of anairborne attack depends largely upon radio. and visual com-lnunications. In the early stages of the operation the reportsreceived at enemy headquarters from reconnaissance air-craft are the basis for determining detail of subsequentoPerations. In the later stages information must be hadfrom units on the ground by means of radio Ol' visual signals,It may be possible to jam the enemy's radio traffic with goodreSUlts, and his visual signals can be copied and repeated tohis confusion. .i, Plans for action.-The details of the execution of ageneral plan of action against airborne trooPs (see par. 105and 106) cannot be evolved until actual dropping or landinghas begun and it becomes possible for the defenders todiscern the enemy's intentions. ~ach unit commander, how-"ever, should attempt to anticipate the various forms theattack might take in the area assigned to him and preparea plan fer each imagined possibility. Any plans given to thetroops should be simple and flexible and not tied down un-alterably to geographic localities, as it cannot be foreseenWhere the enemy will drop his troops or land his gliders orthat he will succeed in placing them where he wants to placethem. The important factor is that his troops are extremelyVUlnerable immediately after landing; consequently, it is theaim of the defense to conserve its strength until the enemy ison the ground and then to attack vigorously no matter howbadly it may appear to .be outnumbered. Each commanderlnust visualize exactly what he is going to do in each con-

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6l~62 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL. tingency during the few critical minutes ~ost favorable this success. Counterattacks should be rehearsed by trooPSassigned to the -sector. . 62. DELAYINGACTION.-It is probable that the forces avail-able for the local defense of the airdrome Will. be consisten~with the battle situation in the area. The local grounOdefense is normally a delaying action fought to hold the1airdrome or to deny its use to the enemy until supportingforces in the area can come up.

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES

CHAPTER 6PASSIVE DEFENSE

63-64

Paragraphs

SECTIONIi. g~~~r~:~~======================================~~~i\~: g~~~~~~~~=====================================vi: ~~~~g:Y~~~~~l=================================II. Protection against chemicals 85-97VIII. Thlmolition .;. 98-99

SECTIONIDISPERSION

63. GENERAL.-Dispersion is an essential measure in thePassive defense of an airdrome. Normally there should benothing in the landing area but those planes which are onthe alert. . 64. AIRCRAFT.-It is of the utmost importance to avoid the'grouping of aircraft on the ground. Planes not in revet-lllents should be in groups of three planes, each plane at least150 Yards from the next and each group at least 200 yardsfrom any plane or other group. Revetments should be 150feet apart in similar groups. Airplanes, revetted or un-revetted, must not be parked along straight lines nor inContinuation of the runways or other natural bombing orstrafing runs. Fighter aircraft are kept near the down-windends of the runways, ready to take off with a minimum lossof time in the event of an attack. Special precautions shouldbe taken at night to disperse planes which are not on thenight alert. If planes are not to be flown, they are moved. off the field. Bombardment and reconnaissance planes aredispersed at some distance from the airdrome. A mile isnot excessive if it facilitates concealment. Extent of dis-Persal depends, however, not only on local terrain but alsoon the requirements for protecting the aircraft from sa:Jotage

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMESSECTIONII

68-70

COVER

68. PERSONNEL.-At all installations such as headquarters,SUPply points, engineering maintenance, aircraft dispersalareas, and defense positions, and in all housing areas or anyplace habitually occupied, air raid shelters must be providedfor personnel. The special trench, braced to resist earthshock, is the simple3t protection and one of the best. Thetrace of these trenches is either a chevron or an L to permitoccupants to take shelter in a leg which is perpendicular tothe direction of flight of a strafing plane. If it is not possibleto dig trenches because of the soil, effective protection againstheavy machine-gun fire can be had by setting up oil drumsfilled with sand. For aircraft combat crews, overhead cover,SUfficient at least to withstand splinters, must be providedif they are to secure the rest to perform their subsequentl11issions without undue loss of men and material. Dugoutscan be made to serve . 69. AIRCRAFT.-Revetments provide supplementary pro~~c-:tion for dispersed aircraft. They reduce damage from bombfragments but do not prevent effective strafing. They drawfire if. they -.are not wall concealed, and they are extremelyhard to ca~'ouflage. The commander of the airdrome shoulddetermine whether or not they are to be constructed. AWar Department order prohibits their construction in theContinental United States without specific authority. Elabo-rate revetments are seldom constructed. Good ones can beconstructed quickly by throwing up U -shaped embankmentsof earth high enough to hide a plane from horizontal view.'I'heir openings should face in different-directions. Sand bagsfilled with the spoil from other works can be used for theirconstruction. Sunken revetments are inadvisable . 70. ST0RESANDEQUIPMENT.-Normally, all storage at fieldairdromes will be above ground in dispersed revetments. For

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMESSECTION III

72

CAMOUFLAQE 72. GENERAL.-Camouflage is any and every means of con-cealing, disguising, or obscuring the airdrome or its installa-tions, planes, materiel, and personnel so that the enemy findsit difficult to recognize or identify his target. The extremehnportance of taking adequate camouflage measures cannotbe overstressed. Continuous and effective efforts for dis-gUise or concealment are vital to the defense of an airdrome.Camouflage discipline must be thorough and rigorously ob-Served. Troops and installations unsatisfactorily camou-flaged are not likely to survive for local defense or for anyother mission. The more successful the deception, the lessthe airdrome will look like an airdrome, the less attention itWill draw from the enemy. The more effective the camou-flage, the more installations and the more personnel will en-dUre for attack and defense. Although camouflage officers ofthe aviation engineers are available for technical advice andthe planning of large-scale projects, camouflage is the job ofall personnel, .who must be indoctrinated with the necessityof constant effort and vigilance and made to understandthe underlying principles of good camouflage as well as thellleans and methods of. achieving it. W'hat hundreds havelabored to dOj.one can carelessly or thoughtlessly undo. Good.camouflage in the field does not of necessity demand elaborateprefabricated materials nor specially schooled direction andlabor. Time spent in careful planning and common senseelllployed in the use of existing local cover and .concealmentand local materials, supplemented if necessary with simpleartificial devices, will result in good camouflage, while noamount of special equipment will take the place of thought-fUl planning and good camouflage discipline. If it is real-iZed what will give a position away to the enemy, much equip-lllent and labor will not be needed to disguise it. If it isnot realized what will give a position away, all the equipmentin a base supply depot will not suffice.

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66/91

DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 75-77Dlace. Various other obstructions afford a measure ofSecurity. Large and heavy objects such as concrete pipes,Concrete blocks, useless vehicles, rock-filled drums, steel tetra-hedrons, or cut trees will suffice. Roads which might be usedfor the landing of air transports can be blocked by puttingObstacles along the shoulders high enough to catch the wingsOr by stretching cables across the road high enough to permitthe passage of vehicles.c. The successful temporary obstruction of operationalfields and runways is difficult. About the only quickly placedtemporary obstructions are motor v~hicles which can bedriven on and parked or objects which can be hastily towedinto position. The unused portion of landing grounds inOperation should not be permanently blocked, as night land-ings of friendly planes, without lights and under variousWeather conditions, are in themselves sufficiently hazardousWithout further complications . 76. ANTIMECHANIZEDBSTACLEs.-Concealed or camouflagedObstacles should be use'd on all approaches to the airdromeWhich are not needed for its defense. Even though a ground1llechanized threat does not exist, protection should be .P~g-vided against tanks light enough to be transported by air.,(See PM 5-30 concerning location and construction.) 77. BARRI~~SAGAIN~TPERSONNEL.-At airdromes where theSituation indicates possibility of attack by airborne or groundtroops, all positions which are to be defended should be givenas complete wire protection as will not interfere with con-cealment. The order of erecting available wire should be,around gun emplacements near the outskirts of the defense,around gun emplacements within the defended area, aroundother defense positions, and across access to more dangerousavenues of approach and defiladed areas. Defense wiringshould be carefully planned to prevent disclosure of posi-tions. Symmetrical' or circular outlines are normallyavoided. The construction of common types of protectiveWiring is shown in FM 5-15.

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78-80 ARMYAIRFORCESFIELDMANUALSECtIONV

ALARM SYSTEMS 78. LOCALALARMSYStEM.-An effective local alarm system. is essential. Normally every airdrome will be included inan Aircraft Warning Service (see FM 1-25) established bYhigher authority which will notify the local airdrome com.mander of the approach of hostile aircraft. Warning willalso be received from the Antiaircraft. Artillery Intellig.nceService (see FM 4-106). A local alarm system of sentinelsand observation posts, adequate communications, and warn.ing signals, is, however, necessary to supplement outsidewarning services and to alert personnel upon hostile ap.proach . 79. SENTINELSANDOBSERVATIONosTs.-Sentinels shouldbe posted and observation posts maintained at strategicpoints outside the airdrome to give the alarm for approach.ing hostile aircraft, to warn of chemical attack, and to actas spotters in case of airborne or ground attack. Personnelat these posts. should be trained in the recognition of air.craft. .All areas likely to be attacked by airborne or groundtroops must be kept under continuous observation. Spottersmust be on the alert for parachute or air-landing troopsand be prepared to guide friendly troops to their landingplaces. Prov.ision must be made for the immediate verifica-tion of reports of the dropping of parachute troops. Infriendly territory maximum advantage should be taken ofthe services of civil organizations which can be formed andtrained to report attacks by parachute troops, air-landingtroops, or mechanized forces. An AAAIS, if present, will.provide the basis for an observation system. 80. COMMUNICATIONs.-Theobservation system is compar.atively useless without unfailing communications .. Tele-phone, radio, and improvised signals must be ready forimmediate report of impending attack .. The time for. warn.

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DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES 80-82

ing is often so short that vehicles or runners will not suffice.Complete dependence cannot be placed on anyone methodof communication (see par. 44b). ,The signal system mustalso provide for the rapid communication of warning tohigher headquarters or to the nearest agency of the Aircraft''Warning Service. 81. WARNINGIGNALs.-Aset of signals, both audible andVisual,must be devised for warning personnel. The systemshould be based on a general alarm signal, preferably a sirenOr special horn, to alert the command. This signal can befOllowedby another general signal which will send all per-sonnel to battle stations. Special signals are needed. . If the'hostile mission is one of aerial bombardment only, as much ofPersonnel as possible will take cover, but to resist airborneattack or ground attack local ground defense plans must bePut into operation. Special signals, such as the striking of asteel triangle or the sounding of a klaxon horn or combina-tions of signals,'must be available for gas attack. Means togive information or orders' may be. required. Local signalCOdesare extremely useful and not difficult to improvise. AlOUdspeal~ersystem has many advantages.

SECTION VI,~i... DAMAGE CONTROL

82. GENERAL.-Provision must be made for emergencydamage control. Fires must be controlled and incendiariesdealt with immediately. Communications must be main-tained. Decontamination of installations essential to thedefense. may, be necessary. Damage to vital installationslllust be given emergency repair if it is required that theairdrome continue to operate under attack. If friendly planes,are in the air or are to be put into the air, one runway mustbe kept in condition for use. Speedy repairs depend largelyOnadvance preparations and training and the use of equip-lllent rather than hand labor. (See TM 5-255,)

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83-87 . ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL .1 83. PLANSANDCOORDINA'IION.-Detailed plans and effective.coordination are required. A damage control officer Should.be appointed to assist the defense officer by directing all re~pair actiVities. Details must be organized to control and'repair damage as it Occurs. Fire plans and efficient fire~fighting squads must be ready. Details must also be organ~ized for th~ maintenance of communications and the repairof runways. Damage control details will normally be organ~ized from appropriate service' troops available, augmented ifnecessary by specially trained Army Air Forces personnel.During an attack only the minimum repair details will beexempted from the general defense and will be at emerg:ncystations. Additional personnel, if reqUired, will be obtamedfrom the fighting personnel under control of the defenseofficer. . 84. REPAIRSAFTERATTACK.-All service personnel who can tbe spared will be released by unit commanders to work unde:-the general supervision of the damage control officer. Tosurvey the extent of damage and to establish priority of work,a hasty reconnaissance shOUld be undertaken immediately.

SECTIONVIIPROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICALS 85. GENERAL.-All personnel must be trained and condi~'

tioned so that they will be able to carry out their dutiespromptly and efficiently during a chemical attack. Chemicaldefense plans must be hased on What the enemy can do, not~n what it is thought he will do. 86. GAS DISCIPLINE.-Gas discipline is essential. All per~sonnel should feel that the security of the command dependsupon" the orderly and prompt execution of the protective,procedures in Which they have been drilled. 87. PROTECTIONY DISPERSION.-Dispersion of aircraft and,airdrome facilities, installations, and equipment is a primary,means of d~fense against chemical attack.

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I DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 88-90 88. PROTECTIONYGASPROOFING.-Materieland installationsnecessary to the fUI).ctioning of the airdrome must be pro-tected against chemicals. The communications center andthe operations and control centers should be gasproof. Al-though it is neither necessary nor feasible to provide gas-Proof protection. for all installations at an airdrome, everystrUcture which is. protected against bombing can be gas-proofed. Those structures which are to be protected againstgas must also be at least blastproof and splinter proof. (Seep~ 21-40 and TM 5-310.) .III 89. RUNWAYSANDLANDINGAREAs.-Chemical agents dorelatively little direct damage to runways or landing areas,althOUgh mustard type agents will contaminate the grass onturfed fields. The greatest difficulty will result from the useOfpersistent gas to delay repair of damage caused by higheXPlosives. The contamination of a large area of a runwayOrlanding ground will, however, interfere with its use by air-craft. Neutralization of the chemicals by prompt decontami-nation is the primary defensive measure. For bomb cratersOr for small areas. satisfactory results can be had from thestandard demustardizing apparatus, but for larger areas, suchas runways, a motor-driven unit is required. No special1lleasures against incendiaries are necessary other than tokeep grass and brush cut back from dispersed aircraft andbUildings. .

,.~ 90. PROTECTIO~~ AIRCRAFT.-Ifpossible, aircraft should beProtected from contact with liquid chemicals, but revetmentsWhich are proof against chemicals in liquid form. will notordinarily be provided. Overhead cover for large bombard-1llent planes is not normally practicable. Except for thelargest planes, however, protection against overhead anddrifting sprays should be provided. Covers o! impermeablelbaterial for cockpit, engine, and propellers are effective andShOUldbe employed, when available, to protect planes notbeing used or serviced.

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91-93 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL 91. EXPLOSIVESAND INFLAMMABLESTORES.-Explosives andiinftammables are not appreciably affect.ed by chemi~alscept when the liquid comes in contact with metallIC Conjtainers. Storage of gasoline and other fuels undergrounadequately protects them from chemical contaminationwell as from incendiaries under ordinary conditions. MagaJines and similar bUildings Used for storing explosives giV;tsufficient protection. Bombs, munitions,. g.asoline, oil, anequipment stored in the Open shoUld. be protected by gas"proof tarpaulins. . 92. FACILITIESFOR REPAIR ANDMAINTENANCE.-The protection of facil1Ues for repair and maintenance will vary witbjhe degree of expOsure of the airdrome and the time, per ...sonnel, and materials which are available for construction'jIf bombproof repair shops are bUilt, they should alsogasproofed. Easily damaged equipment; such as paraChutes,and bomb sights, should be keP.t in blastproof, fire-reSistant ..gasproof storage. 93. PROTECTION. OF PERSONNEL._a. General.-Personnelishould be required to have gas masks availahle at all time~iand, since attack .b~ persist.ent chemicals is one of the b~sttmeans for neutralIZIng an aIrdrome, should be provided

. clothing impregnated for protection. Each man should have'la designated place to go during chemical attack, and shouldbe drilled to go immediately to his place Without confusion'l.With only those excepti~ns necessitated ~y the defense plan,.these places shOUld proVIde overhead and vertical protectionagainst chemical spray.b. Gas alarm system.-The "alert" signal announcing theprobable approach of hostile planes should be the signal

for waking sleeping personnel, Closing gasproof shelters, andcovering airplanes, trucks, food supplies, and water. The"gas alarm," however, should not be given until it is neces":sary for men to mask. Alarms should be located over theairdrome to relay the warning from anYone part of the fieldto all others. The main alarm should be located at the

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FIGURI .. lB.-Camouflaged auxiliary alarm made from truck axle.

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ARMYAIRFORCESFIELDMANUAL3-94operations office, and auXiliary alarms should be placedmen are habitually at work.C.' Gas sentries.-Gas sentries should be posted at or

all gas alarms, gasproof shelters, working parties, anding men. Guards stationed at the headqua'rters of variousunits and at important instalIations should also be trainedjn the duties of gas sentries.

d. SheUers.-Gasproof shelter can normally be provided1nly for those installations that must be kept in operation~during the attack. Installa tions seriously impaired in operating efficiency When personnel is masked should be givenpriority. , One or two bombproof gasproof shelters may beplaced at each end of the landing area, one at the operations,office, and one at the first aid station or at any other im"portant installation. Per~onnel engaged in actiVities re",Quiring a number of men should at a mihimum be providedWith overhead Cover adequate to protect them from spray-and With vertical cover, SUch 2.S that afforded by imperme ..able paulins, which can be shifted as the wind changes. 1m..pervious covers should be liberally provided for fox holes.e. First ald.-The medical serVice should provide a specialorganization for the prophylaxis and treatment of gas cases./; Warning slgns.-Warning signs should be promptlY.'.

posted at all contaminated areas. ,Vigilance is required toprevent contamination from contact with objects, structures.and ground splashed with vesicants. The first to move afterthe attack must be the decontamination squads, which mustprepare and mark off paths before actiVities can be resumedsafely. .g. Decontamination stations.-Men contaminated by liquidchemicals must be required to report at once to a decon"tamination station. Assembly Points can be designated indistant areas so that contaminated men may be transportedby trUCk.

94. PROTECTIONFDEFENSENSTALLATIONS._Fewefense in-stallations can be protected against chemicals. Antiaircraft

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 94-98gUns cannot be given protective cover and still function. AtsUch installation~ protective clothing must be worn. OtherWeapons may be given cover overhead against spray. but somelllen at each gun should wear masks and protective clothingat all times when attack is possible. Frequent changes ofShifts are necessary to reduce fatigue caused. by wearingSUch clothing ... 95. CHEMICALWARFAREDEFENSECENTER.-Separate storageshoUld be given to materials and equipment used for decon-tamination. Decontamination squads should assemble at thestorage point upon the "alert" signal... 96. PLANs.-For every ~irdrome an integrated chemicaldefense plan is required. Because of the technicality of thedefense measures and the specialized training necessary.~hemical Warfare Service troops should be available for itseXeCUtion.II 97. REFERENcEs.-See FM 21-40 and TM 5-310.

SECTIONVIIIDEMOLITION

II 98. GENERAL.-a. If an airdrome is liable to capture and ifits possession intact.would be of material advantage to theenemy. plans for its"defense must include measures to pre-Vent or delay its use by him. The complete demolition ofan airdrome. however. is a major operation which requirestime and a large amount of explosives. Although instal-lations and equipment present no unusual problem. the de-struction of landing areas. is difficult. Lack of. time mayllrevent complete demolition. The following 'list suggestsllriorities and personnel for demolition:

(1) Runways and taxiways-aviation engineers.(2) Remainder of landing area-aviation engineers.(3) Routes of communication to the airdrom.e-engineers.(4) Construction equipment. at the airdrome-aviationengineers ..

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98-99 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL(5) Technical bUildings-air force ground troopsengineer help. Supplies of gasoline, oil, and bombs-air force groun jtroops.(7) Motor vehicles and unserviceable aircraft-airground troops. '. . . "(8 ) Housing-air force ground troops with engineerb. Accomplishment of the complete list of demolitionswould so effectively destroy the airdrome as to deny its u~e tothe enemy without an entire rebuilding. , '

99. METHODs.-The methods of, carrying out demolitioI1!llust be decided on the location, as they will largely depen~on the time available and the type of constructions. Pave,l runways present the most Jifficult problem. They may bcratered by means of explosives or torn up bygrubbers. Bangalore torpedoes may be placed whn the

occasion arises, in holes under the runways made by.zontal dril!s, or in cUlverts constructed at a depth of abou30 inches when the runway was built. To crater aeffectively will require rows of charges placed across the run-way at. 5-yard intervals every 100 yards, a task reqUiring;much tIme, trained personnel, and a large amount of explo:,sive. Grassed landing areas can be destroyed witheffectiveness by bulldozing or Plowing 20-foot bandsthem every 50 yards. Wet weather operation may be irn-peded or prevented if patches of the tUrf are killed by spray-,ing heaVily with engine oil. Booby traps planted in da~-Iaged areas, underneath soil and tied to obstructions,slow reconstruction. The standard demolitiondescribed in PM 5-25 may. be applied to installations and,facilities. If it appears that a well-camouflaged fieldfall into enemy hands without complete or effectivetion, it should be marked for subsequent bombing by somereadily discernible sign which will be difficult to remove'iSuch a mark may be made by plowing, burning, or staining',the runways portion with a cross approximately 100 yardSacross.

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DEFENSEOFAIRDROMES 100-103

CHAPTER 7PLANS AND TRAININGs ParagraphsECTION I. GeneraL 100-104

II. Content of plans for local ground defense 105-108III. Training ~__ 109SECTIONGENERAL

100. RESPONSIBILITY.-The commanding officer of an air-drome will make and announce a plan for its defense. Hemay delegate the preparation of the basic plan and the co-ordination of the plans of specialists (chemical, ordnance,~tc.) to a defense officer . 101. RECONNAISSANCENDSURVEYS.-To prepare effectivetllans, the commanding officer and other personnel mustreconnoiter carefully the airdrome, the surrounding areas,and routes of movement in the vicinity. A survey must bemade of the facilities, installations, and equipment im-mediately available, ~nd one of the locality and its inhabit-ants to determine what facilities and installations are avail-able to supplement them. 102. INSPECTIONSANDTESTs.-The commanding officer willtlrovide for the instruction of all personnel in their essentialduties under the defense plans. He will conduct inspectionsto insure that the continuous security measures are effectiveand will prescribe alerts by day and by night to test theeffectiveness of the various alert plans and the operationalefficiency of the personnel involved . 103. STANDINGPERATINGROCEDURE.-Eachunit of the de-fense will establish appropriate. and effective procedureadapted to operating conditions and conforming to that,established by the airdrome commander. Standing Operat;.

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103-105 ARMYAIRFORCESFIELDMANUALing Procedure will be devi~ed to expedite those features ofoperations which permit definite or standardized executiol1without loss of effectiveness. 104. LIAISON \VITH SUPPORTINGUNITS.-Defense planS,should be coordinated with those of all theater reservesmay be dispatched to assist the local defense. Such prosP~c'ltive reinforcements should be familiar with the organizatlO11of the ground before they are called in. Range cards, for,example. may be made for field artillery whether the guns arein the-local defense or with supporting units. .

SECTIONI ,CONTENT OF PLANS FOR LOCAL GROUND DEFENSS, 105. GENERAL.-All defense plans sh?uld contemplate tbe,immediate defense of the airdrome by means of only existing,facilities, fortifications, weapons, and troops and With'littletr no warning. In drawing them up tl1e principles outlinedin FM 101-5 for the preparation of combat orders should beobserved; Each unit should have definite, concise instrucJtions concerning the responsibilities aI?-d duties of its'sonnel for each anticipated major contingency. uniformit~~of the parts of the plan is desirable to facilitate coordinatiolland understanding by personnel transferring or changin." duties within the command. If it is within the capabilitieSof the enemy to execute any form of attack or sabotage, :1 .plan to defeat such attack will be made as soon as the in"stallation exists. Initially, and in mobile situations, the plaIlmay be quickly conceived and announced orally. ' In static'situations, it will be deliberately prepared and written .. Tbe'amount of detail contained in a plan varies inversely witbthe experience and state of training of the troops who are toexecute it. Whatever their form and extent, such plans'cover the following points:,a. Observation, alarm, and communication system. -b. Day and night recognition signals for friendly aircraft.c. Camouflage and dispersion. 'J74 -. ].

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DEFENSEOF AIRDROMES 105-106d. Organization of the ground-areas to be defended,

Weapon emplacements, fields of fire, obstacles, and obstruc-tions.e. Assignment of personnel to assembly areas for combat

Or for shelter.f. Immobilization of vehicles not used by the defenders.g. Damage control.h. Defense against chemical attack.i. Liaison with reserves and all possible supporting forces.i. Emergency evacuation of aircraft.k. Demolitions to prevent seizure and use of the airdromeby hostile forces .

106. PLANNING,-a. The capabilities of the enemy'will beevaluated and the defense prepared accordingly.b. Friendly troops in the area will be contacted with a view

tv forming a coordinated defense. .c. Care will be taken, in assigning the various units to thedifferent forces, that units working or living in a sector are

assigned where possible to forces operating in that sector.d. All personnel (including transients) at a station will be

accounted for in the plan. Provision will be made for thefinal use, if necessary, of all troops in the active defense of thestation ..e. A mobile striking force or forces will be provided for.f. A reserve force ~lll be provided for, prepared to exploit

any success or to intervene at any threatened point.g. Care will be taken to specifically designate commanders

for the sectors, the striking forces, the reserve, and otherechelons of the defense force.h. Each force will prepare the sector allotted to it for op-erations.i. Most of the plan can and should. be shown on an oper-

ations map.i. Specialist officers, when available, will be required tol>repare those parts of the plan, particularly annexes, per-taining to their specialties.

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106 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUALk.Whenever feasible, the plan will be supported by a

plete and concise statement of the situation for theof personnel who might be requir~d to carry out itswithout having had an opportunIty to make thorough mveStigation and reconnaissance of the conditions involved. ft,list indicative of the considerations to be coveredIt is to be taken as a guide and not as a complete ca.talog 011all the factors which may exist in any given situation.


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DEFENSEOFAIRDROMES 107 107. OUTLINEMODELOF A PLAN.-An outline model of adeliberately conceived written plan for the defense of aforward-area airdrome follows: It is to be used only asa guide for form and content. As no two installations areexactly alike, the situation and solution presented here shouldntot be blindly applied. In addition to one fighter squadron,he presence of one infantry battalion and one battery ofautomatic weapons antiaircraft artillerY is assumed.

DEFENSE PLAN(Name of station)(Date of issue)

ASSIGNMENT OF TROOPS~!\s assignments will change because of transfer of units, etc., theyl':eiShown on a separate page of the plan so that it may easily besed and reissued as necessary to keep it up to date.)!\ Force-Co. A, 306th Inf. Bn, reinforced by such detachments ofthe Heavy Weapons Co. and Antitank Platoon, Hq. Co.,306th Inf Bn, as may be assigned.50 men from 795th Fighter Sq.Commander: Company Commander, Co: A, 306th Infn p Bn.orce-Co. B, 306th Inf Bn, reinforced by such detachments ofthe Heavy Weapons Co. and the Antitank Platoon, Hq.Co., 306th Inf Bn; as may be assigned. \ .

50 men from 795th Fighter Sq.Commander: Company Commander, Co. B,306th'C Inf Bn .. Porce-Co. C, 306th Inf Bn. . .12 %, -ton trucks' and 12 %, -ton trailers from the HeavyWeapons Co., 306th Inf Bn.4 1V2 -ton trucks from Hqs. Co., 306th Inf Bn.2 1Y2-t.on trucks from 795th Fighter Sq.Commander: Company Commander, Co. C,' 306thb Inf Bn. .Porce-Battery A, 425th A. A. A. A. W. Bn. Commander: Battery Commander, Battery'A, 425thA. A. A. A. W. Bn.Force-100 men from 795th Fighter Sq.

Documents

WWII Airdromes Defense History