Yearley Aquinas on Providence Anglican Theololgical Review 1967.pdf

7/27/2019 Yearley Aquinas on Providence Anglican Theololgical Review 1967.pdf

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LEE H. YEARLEY 4

powering sense of mission, and their willingness to intervene

royal and political affairs, (d) The prophetic speeches at Maand in the Old Testament utilize the messenger form of addrecontain oracles of salvation and conditional judgment, and shoparallel usage of oracles against the nations, (e) Israelite prphetism's proclamations of unconditional judgment and higethical and theological concerns are not to be found in the Ma

texts, but these were scarcely present in early Israelite propheeither.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON PROVIDENCEAND PREDESTINATION

LEE H. YEARLEY

The idea of providence/predestination is one of the most p

plexing and important of all Christian ideas. The nature each and the distinction between them are difficult to speciSpeaking generally, providence signifies God's control as efficicause and as the exemplar of the created order of actualizatioPredestination is based in providence but relates solely to intlectual creatures, their end of union with God, and the spec

care needed to bring them to that end.Th id i l l t d ith l t ll Ch i ti d


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4 ST. THO MA S ON PREDESTINA TION

ingly there are insurmountable problems whichever way the

question is answered. If it is held that he does not, then hislack of control in the world makes him irrelevant to great sec

tions of life, imperils the traditional doctrines of Creation and the

Incarnation, means he is not omnipotent as there are powers he

cannot control, and radically changes the sense of justification

and one of its corollaries, the theological virtue of hope. How

ever, if it is held that he does, then large problems also arise. For

if God rules effectively, free will appears to be a myth and

moral responsibility a delusion; God causes evil and personally

damns the reprobate; the Incarnation is demeaned; nearly in-

solvable problems are raised about the nature of and reason

for the Creation; and, as all things happen of necessity, the ob

viously contingent causality of the world is denied.

Obviously, put in this form the problem can only lead to a

series of dilemmas: faith demanding some kind of effective re

lation of God to the world; the obvious construction, nature, and

moral activity of the world demanding some form of contingency,

some kind of freedom. And so the problem becomes how to

describe the nature of God's control over the world without deny

ing the insights of either faith or reason. How then does Godact in the world? In what manner? By what means? And why has

he chosen those means and that manner?

Thomas' attempt to describe "how" and "why" God works is

one of the most ambitious, complete, and perceptive in the

Christian tradition. Moreover, for two reasons Thomas is par

ticularly relevant to our age. First, he had an awareness, something like our own, of both the integrity of natural processes and


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LEE H . VE ARLE Y 4

thinking by his insistent emphasis on the transcendent power an

perfection of God, and the centrality of the supernatural end which man is called. The "exit from" and "return to" Godthe underlying form of the Summais the essential fact of lifMaintaining and relating both these perspectives was one of hcentral theological concerns, as is shown clearly in his work providence and predestination.

Before ending these general remarks, four notes on my mannof interpreting Thomas' work on this subject: First, I will focdirectly on the question of "how" and "why" God acts in tworld. As with any other basic theological problem, numeroother questions are directly related to it: theological ones suas the nature of miracles, more philosophic ones such as t

possibility of an a se Being acting outside himself. These quetions are relevant and can shed much light on Thomas' positioBut once entered, the labyrinth is endless and usually contaithe fabled bull as well. Second, my main emphasis will be the relation of God to man, not God to the natural world, tformer being the more comprehensive and significant probleThird, I will be stressing the distinctive characteristics of provdence and predestination. The differences between the two areal, reflecting the unique position of man in the created woand the transcendent nature of the goal to which he is calleBut the form of the paper and the necessity of separating the twfor clear analysis may accentuate the differences. Unfortunate

^ a r i e Dominique Chenu has analyzed the exitus-reditus theme in Thomas; foshort account see his The Scope of the Summa (Washington, 1958) On the geninterpretation of Thomas, Etienne Gilson's works, particularly ^ his The Chri


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412 ST. THOMAS ON PREDESTINATION

the balance that is so characteristic of Thomas is difficult for his

interpreters to grasp, much less emulate. Fourth, and perhapsmost important, I will discuss Thomas from a twentieth-centuryperspective by asking him our questions. In some cases thesequestions are different from those he himself asked, so that hiswritings do not contain direct answers. To answer these questions I will attempt to articulate the basic considerations and perceptions behind his position. Hopefully this is to use Thomas asa resource rather than a period piece. It is also to run the risk ofdoing a disservice to Thomas and of indulging in "glorioussophistry," to use Acton's phrase about Newman.

I

In Thomas' writings one sees two distinct aspects of providence:God acting through form and as end, and God acting as efficientcause. " In providential activity God controls things by theform of their nature toward an end and through efficiency"*

In the first sense of providenceGod acting as end andthrough formprovidence can be defined as "the exemplar ofthe order of things toward an end existing in the divine mind"8;that is, the eternal structural disposition of the world. As allbeings are structured, they must follow their structure or natureto achieve fulfillment or actualization. God controls themthrough end and form: through end, as every agent actstoward some preordained good, and through form, as everyagent is efficaciousable to do what it desires and achieve its

goodonly through its preordained form. Thus the immediate,providential omnipotence of God is that he has established the


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LEE H . YE ARLE Y 41

divine will in one order returns to it in another; as does the sinnwho by sin falls away from the divine will as much as it lies ihim, yet falls back into the order of that will when by its justiche is punished."*

The second aspect of providence is the causal execution of thaexemplar of orderusing causal in the limited sense of agencThis aspect has two distinct sides. The first is God as the un

versal and therefore inescapable cause. Everything is under thcontrol of God in so far as he is the universal agent cause. "is possible for an effect to happen outside the order of a particulacause but not outside the order of the universal cause . . . foanything happening outside of a particular cause happens bcause of some other cause which can be reduced to the universcause."5 The "abstract" quality of this control is shown by onof Thomas' examples: a thing may fail to be a man or a livinbeing, but it cannot fail to be a being and, since the will of God the universal cause of all being, that will always produces ieffect. The second aspect of God as agent cause is his actugovernment. Here God utilizes the realm of secondary causeTherefore, "the effect of divine providence is not only that thing

should happen somehow, but that they should happen eithnecessarily or contingently."6 "God who governs the univerintends to establish some of his effects by way of necessity anothers by way of contingency. . . . Though the divine providencis the per se cause of a particular future event,... it does not folow . . . that this particular effect necessarily will be; f

the divine providence is the per se cause that this event wihappen contingently "7 Thus a major mode of God's govern


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The implications of this are incredibly far reaching, for itmeans that, in general, when acting providentially God specifically ordains events only via form, end, and universal causality.As an operating cause he can be "hindered" by deficiencies insecondary causes or by possible conflicts among different causes.Therefore, God does not directly control all particular happeningsin the world, having ordained most ofthem to occur contingently.

The question immediately arises why God has chosen toexercise his providential control only through secondary causalityand a structure which brings destruction if flaunted. ThoughThomas never raised the question in its peculiar modern formand realized that it is tied to the mystery of Creation, there aretwo implicit answers in his writings. The first is his belief thatthe beauty and order of the whole justify it. "The principal goodin things themselves is the perfection of the universe."9 Thismeans that all grades ofbeing must be found, for only the greatdiversity of the whole could even begin to manifest God's na^ture. Thus the shortcomings of any particular part must be seenin their relation to the whole. God aimed to "make what isbetter in the whole, not what is better in every single part, except

in relation to the whole."10 "A wise craftsman is not obsessedwith the particular advantage of this part or that; he takes themall as subordinate to the whole."11 This principle not onlyjustifies a great variety ofbeings, it also, and more importantly,justifies the conflicts among these various imperfect beings. For"something can operate against a particular system without being

against nature as such . . . [for it will be] in accordance withnature taken in its most universal sense which includes the re


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LEE H . YEARLEY 4 1

lies in the relation ofthe whole to God, though particular justic

lies in the relation ofpart to part. The lattermay be thwarted

the former never can be. "The order of creatures to himselin which justice consists"

13can never be overcome.

The second aspect of Thomas' answer is his recognition tha

in the actual worldthe world we move in and knowgood

and bads are inextricably intertwined. To ask for a world with

out evil is also to ask for a world ofdiminished good. Genera

tion involves corruption, the glory of the martyrs involves thhorrorof their persecutors, the atoning death of Christ is tied t

the perfidy and blindness of his accusors. It is a situation o

constant tensions in which good must purify itself in evil flames

in which construction and destruction are inextricably intertwined

in which death begets life, and evil, good, on all levels, in al

ways. "Gain to one is loss to another; coming to be spells dyinaway. The lion must eat so the kid is killed; the patience of th

just supposes persecution from the unjust. Take away evil an

much good would go with it. God's care is to bring good out o

the evil which happens, not to abolish them."1* "God permi

evil in order to bring forth a greater good."15

The complexity, cross purposes, and destructive potentialities othe world can be salvatory. They are not to be avoided throug

Stoic withdrawal or "Neo-Platonic" mysticism, but gathered u

and completed. As the Incarnation shows, it is only in the da

by-day living of regenerate and unregenerate, good and ba

existence that one finally attains one's end. One calls tha

Friday "good" because, by passing through it, what did comecould come. God could have chosen other means for redeemin


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4i6 ST. THOMAS ON PREDESTINATION

man, but the complex involvement of the Christ was the mosfitting. Growth, movement, life, and diversity demand conflictthe good as well as the evil. A world that causes suffering is also a world that finally confers salvation. The innocenpiety of the one who uses God's will to explain all catastropheis of a lesser order than the wisdom of the one who recognizethat the ordained governance of contingency is the one whichleads to final holiness.10

II

In moving from providence to predestination all the questionrelating to theodicy, all the problems in understanding the naturand form of God's will are heightened. But before discussingthe differences between these ideas, it is important to note theisimilarities, for there is a continuity between providence and predestination. As providence is the structure of human naturethe natural form, the telic cause that must be followed if theris to be actualization, so predestination is the movement to fulfillment as seen in rational creatures.

In this part of Thomas' analysis, in these verbal formulationspredestination like providence is an exemplar of order in thdivine mind. It does not raise one beyond one's natural possibilities nor involve more certain direction than does providence"For predestination is a part of providence, . . . [and] not althings subject to providence are necessary} for at times somthings happen from contingency according to the disposition oproximate causes."17 Seen from this perspective, predestinationi b i i i d l b l d i i bj 0 l


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LEE H. YEARLEY 4

From this point of view Thomas can speak of reprobation

being a conditional, rather than an absolute, inability to be save

for one is not theoretically disallowed from seeing the good an

acting on it.

However, finally, predestination is of a much different com

plexion than providence. For example, though it is true that t

predestined man sees the structured good (providence), acts up

it, is pleasing to God's eyes, and is thereby saved, one must no

that he is able to do this because God loved him and in so doi

created his ability to see and act. For while we are incited

love by a good which already exists, in God it is the reverse. "F

his will, by which in loving he wishes good to someone, is t

cause of that good.'*1* God elects one before all time rather th

responding to the goodness one develops.

Election from love illustrates the particular characteristic predestination. For although "providence means ordering to

end, in a general sense, . . . predestination is concerned only wi

that end which is possible for a rational creature, namely, etern

glory. Consequently it concerns only men, and only with refe

ence to those things that are related to salvation."20

Moreov

"in ordering two things must be considered, the ordering itsand the outcome or result. [Providence is concerned only w

the ordering] . . . but predestination with the outcome or res

of that ordering."21

So although by providence all men a

ordered to eternal beatitude by predestination, only some rea

it."

Obviously this election before time, this concern with resu19S T 15234


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4i8 ST. THOMAS ON PREDESTINATION

will involve some sort of direct control on God's part. His par

icularelective decree could never be fully thwarted by contingent

econdary causality as could his providential one. This does

not mean that the proximate cause of salvation, one's free choice,

s not contingent and cannot fail in some sense. It can, but the

first cause, God's decree, cannot. Nor does God just arbitrarily

save one despite one's choices. God works so as to fulfill both

his decree and preserve one's free will.

In an early work Thomas describes this as happening by "Godprepar ing] so many other helps for one who is predestined that

he either does not fail at all or if he does, he rises again. The

help that God gives a man to enable him to gain salvation is

exhortations, the support of prayer, the gift of grace and similar

things."23

In later works he generally describes it as occurring by

God causing the human will to pass from potency to act by aphysical premotion which by its own inner nature produces a free

choice. God by decreeing the premotion knows by the agent's

intrinsic nature what will be freely done.

At this point the modern mind tends to balk, feeling free

will is imperiled. Admittedly, Thomas' "solution" to the free

will dilemma is imperfect at best. There is some cogency in theidea that the will remains free when moved according to its

nature by a higher cause and more in the idea that the will re

mains free in choosing its ordained good when that good becomes

obvious as the goal one has been seeking. But other questions

generate less satisfying answers: Exactly how can God generate

both the act and the act's quality of freedom? In what manner

does the goal become obvious so as not to destroy free choice?


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LEE H . YE ARLE Y 4 1

problem here. But in passing it is important to note that Thoma

seemed to feel that it was absurd to deny free will or for tha

matter contingent causality 5 they are "empiric" givens. Th

theologian's problem is to attempt to give some idea of how the

relate to divine causality. One can only make preliminar

sketches, for the question is tied to two of the central mysterie

of life: the character of God's knowledge and the relation of in

finite and finite being.

Thomas is always clear both that the predestined never know

they are predestined and that this ignorance is ordained by God.

This points up the fact that the question of predestination is on

of man's most heroic and potentially most prideful attempts t

probe into the character of God. Any attempt to solve it com

pletely is doomed either to fail or to create an idol. In a sense

the idea of predestination is an idea that should not concern

man, since he is willed by God to an ignorance of his own and an

other's state.20

But it is a theological question, and the knowledge we d

have arises almost as a "deduction" from two sources. First i

the idea that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and good and tha

he must exercise a particular care to bring men from sin and t

lead them to a supernatural end. And second is the fact that "in

the common course and tendency many fall short."2

It has been argued that the fact of some seeming to fall shor

does not imply they are damned, for, first, we can never know

the actual spiritual state of a man and, second, God's mercy may

be such that he will restore his whole creation (afccatastasis)


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For Thomas the first assertion clearly flies in the face of factseven given our ignorance about the exact nature of predestination

Men do sin; they do die unreconciled to God. To say otherwiseis not to see clearly the tragic state of things. The second ideafor Thomas, does not recognize the seriousness of the choiceone makes on earth, the freedom that man has to make himselfThe integrity of the created world, the importance of actions uponit is such that there can be neither a complete conversion afte

death"When their life is over, . . . human beings remainfast. . . . Unalterableness and immobility mark the end of process"27nor a just forgiving of the worst, unrepented sins.

Four key ideas underlie and inform Thomas' deduction abouthe predestinaran activity of God. Presenting them mamediate somewhat the strangeness of the idea and the inhumanit

we sense in the reprobation of the damned.First is Thomas' belief that the Bible clearly stated that Go

predestined. Without attempting to discuss Thomas ' attitudtoward, and exegesis of, the Bibleso perceptive at times, sbewildering at othersone can note there is much evidence tsubstantiate this view. That evidence must remain a major con

sideration in any discussion.Second is the "fact" seen in both traditional sources anpersonal experience that somehow one is both made and saveby forces beyond one's control. There is a superhuman matriworking for one's salvation. The fact of the Incarnation, thexistence of the Church and its sacramental system can be trulseen only if they are realized to be blessed gifts. And in onepersonal life, the half-understood congruences of events, th


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LE E H . YE ARLE Y 4 2 I

blood of any piety, particularly of one as profound and sensitive

as that of a man who is not only a doctor but also a saint of theCatholic Church.

It is this whole complex of factors that can lead Paul to thatamazing statement Thomas quotes so often: " In everythingGod works for good with those who love him, who are calledaccording to his purpose" (Romans 8:28). Or as Thomas him

self writes: "Nothing will happen to them that is not for theirown good and everything that happens will be to their advantage."28

Third is the condition of man: it demands a direct intervention of God if salvation is to be accomplished. Man must besaved both "from" and " to" 5 he must be saved from sin and to

a state beyond his "pure" nature. Both movements require thedirect aid of God. Man's sin is such that God could justly condemn him. If man declares God's reprobation of some unjustand demands that God deal justly with all, he would find thatjustice would require the reprobation of all.29

As God must act to save man from sin, he must also act to

lead man to his ultimate end, personal bodily immortality andan enjoyment of the beatific vision. If man is to become a"partaker of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4), if he is to fulfillhis fotentia obedientialis, he must go beyond his natural state.Even the perfection of "pure" nature, the natural beatific vision,does not attain to the entitive elevation necessary for union with

God.The fourth idea which underlies the third and almost the


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destination is nothing other than God's goodness.30 Like all tha

man has, even his very act of existing, it comes directly fromGod as a free gift. Since salvation is given out of liberality, idoes not belong to the realm of justice, the rendering of duthrough the repaying of a debt.81 "Mercy lays the foundationofall divine works 5 nothing is owing to creatures except what Gogives them without title on their part."83 There can be no really

just relation with God, for man can never render him his duethe debt is too immense. "God is not unfair if he renders unequally to men not unequal. It would be against justice were theffect of predestination a debt and not a gift. But without pre

judice to justice you can give presents just as you please, hermore, here less, so long as no one is deprived of what is owingto him."33

I l l

At many points in Thomas' writings the relation of God tothe world seems almost that of a deistic or "philosopher's" Godthough the preservative action is always emphasized. The integrity of the natural world with its web of interacting secondarycauses and its fundamental structure is upheld. In fact, it is maintained to the degree that God seems only able to work throughthem, and thus be thwarted by them. God seems to have ordainedthe world and then stood aside, exercising his sovereignty only insofar as punishment comes from misuse of his ordained naturastructures.

But when Thomas is specifically considering the complex nature of man and the revelation of God other relations other idea


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to be more involved and concerned, as well as more sovereig

and free than the general nature of the world would lead one suppose. From these considerations arise the idea of predestintion. And from predestination arise both the philosophic difculties and the essence of the Christian message.

In considering these two areas, in working at the problems providence and predestination, Thomas has neither exhaustiveanalyzed either sphere nor solved all the problems of their worings and relations. He has, however, taken account of the twbasic realms a theologian must deal withconsistency of rationdiscourse coupled with regard for our basic natural experiencand honesty to the traditional and personal sense of ChristianitOne cannot deny the demands of rational coherence or the empirgivens of contingent causality, natural structure, real particulari

and free will. Nor can one deny the Bible's witness, the tradtion's ideas, the human fotentia obedientialis, or one's own rligious intuitions.

Thomas' account is coherent, understandable, and fairdemonstrable at the level of providence as a structure of realiztion allowing for better and worse use. In the realm of pr

destination the coherence and understandability become strainand the general demonstrability almost disappears. For at tpoint of predestination Thomas is attempting to articulate somhighly particular experiences and facts, to probe the characof God, and to understand the nature of his relation to maThey fit imperfectly into the general construction of nature a

are unamenable to easy understanding because they arise froand represent a different mode of existing and acting a differe


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Yearley Aquinas on Providence Anglican Theololgical Review 1967.pdf