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Yinglian Xie Yinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan Osipkov Geoff Hulten, Ivan Osipkov Microsoft Research Silicon Valley Windows Live (Hotmail) mail, Windows Live Safety Platform MSR-SVC

Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

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Page 1: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Yinglian XieYinglian Xie

Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan OsipkovGeoff Hulten, Ivan OsipkovMicrosoft Research Silicon ValleyWindows Live (Hotmail) mail, Windows Live Safety Platform

MSR-SVC

Page 2: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Botnet attacks areBotnet attacks are prevalent◦ DDoS spam click fraudDDoS, spam, click fraud◦ Large-scale, hidden trailCan we detect them by signatures?◦ Filter future spam emails

Detect botnet membership◦ Detect botnet membership◦ Understand botnet

activities and trends

Focus on URLs instead of contents74% of spam contain at least one URL74% of spam contain at least one URL

MSR-SVC

Page 3: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Common or similar URLs from a botnet spamCommon or similar URLs from a botnet spam campaign◦ Direct users to one or a few Websites◦ Direct users to one or a few WebsitesBotnet attacks are distributed yet bursty◦ Distributed: Involve a large number of hostsDistributed: Involve a large number of hosts◦ Bursty: spam sent in a short duration

Identify groups of distributed hosts that sent Identify groups of distributed hosts that sent similar URLs in a burstsimilar URLs in a burstsimilar URLs in a burstsimilar URLs in a burst

MSR-SVC

Page 4: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Mixing spam and legitimate URLs in an emailMixing spam and legitimate URLs in an email◦ Which URLs characterize a Botnet?◦ White list approach does not workWhite list approach does not work

Email 1Email 1 Email 2Email 2 Email 3Email 3

http://www.shopping.com

http://www.w3.org/wai

http://www psc edu/networ

http://www.peacenvironment.net

http://www.w3.org/wai

http://endosmosis.com/

http://www.talkway.com

http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start=4&q=http://isc.sans.org

http://isc.sans.orghttp://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/tcp/

… …

http://www dvdfever co uk/

http://www.bizrate.com

… …

http://www dvdfever co uk/

http://www.bizrate.com

… …

http://www.dvdfever.co.uk/

http://isc.sans.org

http://www.dvdfever.co.uk/co1118.shtml

… …

http://www.dvdfever.co.uk/co1118.shtml

… …

co1118.shtml

… …

MSR-SVC

Page 5: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Crafting polymorphic URLs across emailsCrafting polymorphic URLs across emails◦ Insert random tails◦ Customize based on recipientCustomize based on recipient◦ What are the common URL patterns?

Time URLsSource

ASesURLs 

h // l / /? h b l

2006‐11‐02 66 38

http://www.lympos.com/n/?167&carthagebolets

http://www.lympos.com/n/?167&brokenacclaim

http://www.lympos.com/n/?167&acceptoraudience

2006‐11‐15 72 39

http://shgeep.info/tota/indexx.html?jxvsgfhjb.cvqxjby,hvx

http://shgeep.info/tota/indexx.html?ijkkjija.cvqxjby,hvx

http://shgeep.info/tota/indexx.html?ibdivvx ceh.cvqxjby,hvxttp://s geep. o/tota/ de . t ? bd _ce .c q jby,

MSR-SVC

Page 6: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Automatic Botnet spam signature generationAutomatic Botnet spam signature generationSpam URL signatures

AutoREBotnet host IP addresses

Sampled emails

How we address challenges:◦ Mixing legitimate and spam URLS

Require no labeled data or white list◦ Mixing legitimate and spam URLS

◦ Porlymorphic URLs“distributed” and “bursty” spam activity

Porlymorphic URLs Two types of signatures: 

• complete URLs

FP rate 10x - 30x lower than keywordsFN rate10x lower than complete URLs

p• regular expressions

MSR-SVC

Page 7: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

•Three months of sampled emailsSampled

EmailsSource

•Three months of sampled emails•5,382,460 email messages•Labeled with spam or non spam

Ignore label

AutoRE

Ignore label

Botnets and their IPs

URL signatures

•16% ‐18% of spam not captured by well known blacklists•Identified 7,721 botnet

ig

• 0.2% false positive ratespam campaigns •Span 5,916 ASes•340,050 botnet IP addresses•0 5% false positive rate

Nov-06 Jun-07 Jul-07•0.5% false positive rate

Num. of Botnets 1,748 2,426 3,547

Num. of Spam 145,510 234,685 200,271

Num. of IPs 100,293 131,234 113,294

MSR-SVC

Page 8: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Example Spam URL SignaturesExample Spam URL Signatureshttp://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?QjQRPxbZf.cVQXjbY,hVX

p p gp p g

http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?giAfS.cVQXjbY,hVXhttp://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?QNVRcjgVNSbgfSR.XRW,hVXhttp://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?afRZQ.XRW,hVX

// / /http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?YcGGA.XRW,hVX

http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?*{4,18}.[a‐zA‐Z]{3,7},hvx

http://arfasel.info/hums/jasmine.html? UbSjWcjHC.cVQXjbY,hVXhttp://apowefe.info/hums/jasmine.html? PSeYVNfS.cVQXjbY,hVXhttp://carvalert.info/hums/jasmine.html? SfLWVYgRIBH.XRW,hVX

http://www.mezir.com/n/?167& acetyleneassign

http://[^\/]*/hums/jasmine.html?*{4,18}.[a‐zA‐Z]{3,7},hvx

http://www.mezir.com/n/?167& acetyleneassignhttp://www.aferol.com/n/?167& commonwealcircehttp://www.bedremf.com/n/?167& deprivationalignhttp://www.mokver.www/n/?167& bleachbeneficialp // / /

http://[^\/]*/n/?167&[a‐zA‐Z]{9,27}

MSR-SVC

Page 9: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Reduce the number of signatures by 4 to 19 timeshttp://www.bedremf.com/n/?167&[a‐zA‐Z]{10,19}Reduce the number of signatures by 4 to 19 times◦ Reduce pattern matching complexity◦ Great for capture future spam

p // / / [ ]{ , }http://www.mokver.www/n/?167&[a‐zA‐Z]{11,23}

http://[^\/]*/n/?167&[a‐zA‐Z]{9,27}

45,000

50,000

ed

Before generalizationAft li ti

700

800

sion

s Before generalizationAfter generalization

25 000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

ails

cap

ture After generalization

400

500

600

gula

r exp

res

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

f spa

m e

ma

100

200

300

mbe

r of r

eg

0

5,000

Nov 2006 June 2007 July 2007 June toJuly

# of

0

Nov-06 Jun-07 Jul-07

Nu

y

MSR-SVC

Page 10: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Botnet IP addresses are less than 0 5% of all IPsBotnet IP addresses are less than 0.5% of all IPsTheir spam emails:

4%-6% of all detected spam4% 6% of all detected spam

AS description AS number Number of bot IPs

Korea Telecom 4766 15757

Verizon Internet Service 19262 11426

France Telecom 3215 11303France Telecom 3215 11303

China 169-backbone 4837 9960

Chinanet-backbone 4134 8113

MSR-SVC

Page 11: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Email content similarityEmail content similarity◦ Destination Web pages

Over 90% at least 75% similar◦ Features: # of URLs, # of domains, email length

Over 95% with negligible std◦ Email text◦ Email text

Over 60% less than 50% similar

S di b h i i il itSending behavior similarity◦ Over 90% with sending time std <20 hours◦ Over 50% with sending time std < 1 8 hourOver 50% with sending time std < 1.8 hour◦ Clustering botnet sending patterns

MSR-SVC

Page 12: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

85% of spam campaigns are well clustered85% of spam campaigns are well clustered

191 hosts with 9 outliers162 hosts with 4 outliers

MSR-SVC

Page 13: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Botnet sending activities are clusterableBotnet sending activities are clusterable

-1

MSR-SVC

Page 14: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Higher correlation in Aug than in NovHigher correlation in Aug than in Nov

MSR-SVC

Page 15: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Botnets are more popular for sending spamBotnets are more popular for sending spam◦ Number of spam campaigns doubled◦ Number of botnet IPs increased by 10%Number of botnet IPs increased by 10%Spam campaigns are more stealthy◦ Adoption of polymorphic URLs increased by 50%Adoption of polymorphic URLs increased by 50%Email sending patterns are clusterable when viewed in aggregateviewed in aggregateBotnet activities show correlation with the network telescope datanetwork telescope data

MSR-SVC

Page 16: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Server zombieServer

CaptchaCaptchasolver

RDSXXTD3RDSXXTD3

MSR-SVC

Page 17: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Large volume of input dataLarge volume of input data◦ Efficient algorithm◦ Distributed computing infrastructure◦ Distributed computing infrastructureAttackers are stealthy and evolving◦ Individual detection difficult◦ Individual detection difficult◦ An aggregated view for detection◦ Robust features or attack invariantRobust features or attack invariantRigorous evaluation challenging ◦ Usually no ground truth data◦ Usually no ground truth data◦ Collaborative monitoring

MSR-SVC

Page 18: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Economic underpinnings of botnet attacksEconomic underpinnings of botnet attacksInformation sharing for collaborative researchresearch Attack forensics and deterrence

MSR-SVC

Page 19: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

MSR-SVC

Page 20: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

30

35AURL 1

URL 2

20

25

Signal 1

BURL 3

URL 4 URL 2

URL 4 Extract

10

15Signal 1

Signal 2

Signal 3

CURL 5

URL 6

URL 4URL 9

Signatures

0

5g

DURL 7

URL 8A E

1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28EURL 9

URL 10

MSR-SVC

Page 21: Yinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, …web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/workshop/talks/Xie.pdfYinglian XieYinglian Xie Fang Yu, Kannan Achan, Rina Panigrahy, Geoff Hulten Ivan

Why regular expressions?Why regular expressions? ◦ Need specific signatures

YSignatureExtract Signature  accepted?

Extract frequent keywordsInput URLs URL RegExes

Construct D t ili

signature tree

RegEx generation

Detailing  Generalization

g g

MSR-SVC