Zachary A. Harringtond.classactionreporternewsletter.com/f/16/flmd16-01696-0003.pdf · Filing # 45706046 E-Filed 08/25/2016 04:43:27 PMCase 6:16-cv-01696-GKS-TBS Document 3 Filed

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CIVIL DIVISION

DOMINIQUE PEREZ, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff, CLASS REPRESENTATION vs. CASE NO.: ___________________ CENTRAL FLORIDA AUTO WHOLESALE INC. d/b/a DEAL TIME CARS & CREDIT, HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY, and GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants.

________________________________________________________________________

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION _________________________________________________________________________

Respectfully submitted by: ROGER D. MASON, II, P.A. /s/ Zachary A. Harrington Roger D. Mason, II, Esq. [email protected] Florida Bar No. 504793 Zachary A. Harrington, Esq. [email protected] Florida Bar No. 044104 Ashley V. Goodman, Esq. [email protected] Florida Bar No. 111995 5135 West Cypress Street Suite 105 Tampa, Florida 33607 Telephone: (813) 304-2131

Facsimile: (813) 304-2136

Filing # 45706046 E-Filed 08/25/2016 04:43:27 PMCase 6:16-cv-01696-GKS-TBS Document 3 Filed 09/27/16 Page 1 of 26 PageID 140

mailto:[email protected]



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................2

A. Facts Applicable to All Putative Class Members ..............................................2

B. Facts Applicable to Plaintiff, Dominique Perez ................................................2

III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFY EACH OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION ............................................................................................3

A. The Numerosity Requirement is Satisfied .........................................................5

B. The Commonality Requirement is Satisfied ......................................................7

C. The Typicality Requirement is Satisfied............................................................8

D. The Adequacy Requirement is Satisfied ............................................................9

E. The Proposed Class Meet the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b) ........................10

i. The Proposed Class Meet the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(1) .......10

ii. The Proposed Class Meet the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(2) .......12

iii. The Proposed Class Meet the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(3) .......12

a) Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate .................13

b) The Class Action Mechanism is Superior ................................14

IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................15

Case 6:16-cv-01696-GKS-TBS Document 3 Filed 09/27/16 Page 2 of 26 PageID 141

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

I. Florida Supreme Court Cases:

A. Johnson v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 641 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1994) ........3

B. Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2011) ................. passim

II. Florida Court of Appeals Cases: A. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Porcher, 898 So. 2d 153

(Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ........................................................................................14

B. City of Tampa v. Addison, 979 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ........................9

C. Davis v. Powertel, Inc., 776 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ...........................5

D. Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss, 981 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ..............5

E. Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Galura, 961 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) .....................5

F. Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So.2d 261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ...........9

G. W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Myers, 696 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ................5

III. United States District Court Cases: A. Klewinowski v. MFP, Inc., 8:13-CV-1204-T-33TBM, 2013 WL 5177865

(M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2013). ................................................................................9

B. Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 663, 678 (M.D. Fla. 2010) .................14

IV. Florida Rules and Statutes A. Rule 1.220, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure .......................................... passim

B. Fla. Stat. §501.211 ...........................................................................................12

C. Fla. Stat. § 501.976 ........................................................................................ 2-3


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Plaintiff, Dominique Pererz by and through her undersigned counsel respectfully moves

the Court for an order certifying this case as a class action pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil

Procedure 1.220 and states:

I. INTRODUCTION

The Complaint states a claim on behalf of the “Undisclosed Predelivery Service Fee

Class” (hereinafter the “Class”) which is defined as:

a. all persons or entities who purchased or leased a vehicle from the

Dealership during the four year period prior to the filing of this action

through class certification;

b. who entered into a finance agreement with the Dealership that included as

a line item in the finance agreement a “Document Processing” fee, or

otherwise denominated predelivery service fee; and

c. the finance agreement containing the line item for the fee did not contain

the statutorily required disclosure that “This charge represents costs and

profit to the dealer for items such as inspecting, cleaning, and adjusting

vehicles, and preparing documents related to the sale.”

As discussed below, the requirements for certification are met and Ms. Perez requests

that the Court (1) certify the Class; (2) appoint Plaintiff as representatives for the Class; and (3)

appoint Roger D. Mason, II and Zachary A. Harrington of the law firm Roger D. Mason, II, P.A.

as counsel for the Class.


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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Facts Applicable to All Putative Class Members

Ms. Perez and the putative Class members each purchased or leased a motor vehicle from

Central Florida Auto Wholesale, Inc. d/b/a Deal Time Cars & Credit (hereinafter, the

“Dealership”).

Ms. Perez and the putative Class members entered into finance agreements with the

Dealership. The finance agreements included a pre-printed predelivery service fee. However, in

order to charge such a predelivery fee under Florida law, a dealership must follow certain

procedures.

Chief among them, when a dealership charges a predelivery service fee, commonly

referred to as a dealer fee, all documents that include a line item for such predelivery service fee

or dealer fee must include the following disclosure: “This charge represents costs and profit to

the dealer for items such as inspecting, cleaning, and adjusting vehicles, and preparing

documents related to the sale.” Fla. Stat. § 501.976(18). The Dealership charged the

predelivery service fee in the contracts, but failed to include the required disclosure. As such, the

predelivery service fee should not have been charged.

B. Facts Applicable to Plaintiff

Ms. Perez purchased a 2007 Cadillac CTS bearing Vehicle Identification Number

1G6DP577270176638 (the “Vehicle”) from the Dealership and entered into a Retail Installment

Sales Contract (the “Finance Agreement”) with the Dealership. A true and correct copy of the

Finance Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Pursuant to the terms of the Finance Agreement, the Dealership charged Ms. Perez a

$599.00 fee for “DOCUMENT PROCESSING.”


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However, the Finance Agreement did not include the disclosure that the document

processing predelivery service fee “represents costs and profit to the dealer for items such as

inspecting, cleaning, and adjusting vehicles, and preparing documents related to the sale.” As

such, the Finance Agreement violates Section 501.976(18), Florida Statutes.

Pursuant to Section 501.976, Florida Statutes, a violation of Section 501.976(18) is a per

se violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”). Fla. Stat. §

501.976 (providing that “[i]t is an unfair or deceptive act or practice, actionable under the Florida

Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, for a dealer to [violate Section 501.976]”).

Since the Finance Agreement violates Section 501.976(18), the Finance Agreement

violates FDUTPA.

Ms. Perez’ circumstances and resulting claims place him squarely within each of the

Class definitions and meet all of the requirements for certification of the Class.

III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFIES EACH OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

“The purpose of the class action is to provide litigants who share common questions of

law and fact with an economically viable means of addressing their needs in court.” Johnson v.

Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 641 So. 2d 58, 60 (Fla. 1994).

Rule 1.220, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the requirements for class

certification. Rule 1.220(a) requires that:

(i) the proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all individual class members is

impracticable (numerosity);

(ii) that there are common questions of law and fact amongst class members

(commonality);


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(iii) that the proposed representative’s claims are typical of those of the class

(typicality); and

(iv) that both the named representative and his counsel have and will continue to

adequately represent the interests of the class (adequacy of representation).

As discussed in further detail below. Ms. Perez meets each of the Rule 1.220(a)

requirements.

In addition to the Rule 1.220(a) requirements, Ms. Perez must also meet one of the three

Rule 1.220(b) requirements. In this case, Ms. Perez meet the requirements under each of Rule

1.220(b)(1), 1.220(b)(2) and 1.220(b)(3).

In order to certify a class under Rule 1.220(b)(1), a plaintiff must show that prosecuting

separate actions by individual members of the class would either (a) create the risk of

inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would

establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant or (b) create the risk of adjudications

with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the

interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications. See Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.220(b)(1).

In order to certify a class under Rule 1.220(b)(2), the party moving for class certification

must show that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally

applicable to all the members of the class, thereby making final injunctive relief or declaratory

relief concerning the class as a whole appropriate.

In order to certify a class under Rule 1.220(b)(3) questions of law or fact common to the

proposed class members must predominate over any questions affecting only individual


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members, and the class mechanism must be superior to other available methods for fairly and

efficiently adjudicating the controversy. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(3).

As discussed in further detail below, Ms. Perez satisfies each of the requirements of Rule

1.220(a) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 1.220(b).

Further, other Florida Courts have certified Class of claims under FDUTPA. See Sonic

Auto., Inc. v. Galura, 961 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)(affirming certification of FDUTPA

class against motor vehicle dealerships); W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Myers, 696 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1996)(affirming certification of FDUTPA class); Davis v. Powertel, Inc., 776 So. 2d 971

(Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(reversing dismissal of complaint and stating that plaintiffs are entitled to

assert their FDUTPA claims as a class).

Finally, as stated by the Florida Supreme Court “[a] trial court should resolve doubts with

regard to certification in favor of certification.” Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91,

105 (Fla. 2011).

Since Ms. Perez satisfies the Rule 1.220 requirements, the Court should grant

certification of the Class. Each of the Rule 1.220 requirements is discussed in detail below.

A. The Numerosity Requirement is Satisfied.

The first requirement of Rule 1.220(a) is met when “the class is so numerous that joinder

of all members is impractical.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(1).

“Courts have generally held that this rule imposes two distinct, but related requirements

for class certification. First, the class definition must permit the court to reasonably ascertain

whether or not any particular individual is a member of the class.” Olen Properties Corp. v.

Moss, 981 So. 2d 515, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) approved sub nom. Sosa, 73 So. 3d 91 (Fla.

2011).


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In this case, the Class definitions permit the Court to easily ascertain whether or not any

particular person or entity is a member of the Class.

Specifically, the Court need only look at the finance agreements entered into between a

purchaser and the Dealership during the class period and, if the finance agreement includes a line

item for a predelivery service fee, but does not include the required disclosure, then such

purchaser is a member of the Undisclosed Predelivery Service Fee Class. If the finance

agreement does not include a line item for a predelivery service fee, or does include a line item

for a predelivery service fee, but also includes the required disclosure, then such purchaser is not

a member of the Undisclosed Predelivery Service Fee Class. Thus, the first numerosity threshold

is satisfied for the Undisclosed Predelivery Service Fee Class.

“If [the first] threshold is satisfied, the Rule requires that the class be so numerous that

separate joinder of each member is impracticable. ‘Impracticable’ does not mean impossible, and

numerosity is satisfied if it would be difficult to join all the members of the class.” Id. No

specific number and no precise count are needed to sustain the numerosity requirement. Sosa, 73

So. 3d at 114.

Ms. Perez has requested the relevant documents from the Dealership in order to

determine the exact number of putative class members, but it is believed that the number of class

members is in the hundreds or possibly thousands.

The number of class members is more than enough to satisfy the numerosity requirement.

See Estate of Bobinger v. Deltona Corp., 563 So. 2d 739, 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)(“We note that

Class as small as 25 have fulfilled the numerosity requirement”); InPhyNet Contracting Servs.,

Inc. v. Soria, 33 So. 3d 766, 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)(affirming that120 class members was

sufficient to establish numerosity); Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments Condominiums Master


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Ass'n, Inc., 847 So. 2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)(finding that 100 class members was

sufficient to establish numerosity) approved sub nom. Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So.

3d 91 (Fla. 2011).

Accordingly, the numerosity requirement is satisfied in this case.

The Commonality Requirement is Satisfied.

Next, Rule 1.220(a) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the

class.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(2).

“The threshold of the commonality requirement is not high.” Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 107. “A

mere factual difference between class members does not necessarily preclude satisfaction of the

commonality requirement [and] [i]ndividualized damage inquiries will also not preclude class

certification.” Id.

“[T]he commonality prong only requires that resolution of a class action affect all or a

substantial number of the class members, and that the subject of the class action presents a

question of common or general interest.” Id.

“Furthermore, the commonality requirement is satisfied if the common or general interest

of the class members is in the object of the action, the result sought, or the

general question implicated in the action.” Id. (emphasis in original). “This core of the

commonality requirement is satisfied if the questions linking the class members are substantially

related to the resolution of the litigation, even if the individuals are not identically situated.” Id.

The commonality element is quite simple: Ms. Perez and each of the putative class

members entered into identical or substantially similar finance agreements with the Dealership.

Ms. Perez contends that the Finance Agreement theyshe entered into with the Dealership, and

thus the identical or similar contracts the putative class members entered into with the


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Dealership, violates the FDUTPA by including a predelivery service charge without also

including the required disclosure. The truth or falsity of Ms. Perez’s contention that the Finance

Agreement between the Dealership and her violated FDUTPA will resolve the issue of whether

the Dealership’s contracts violate FDUTPA for Ms. Perez and each of the Class members.

Accordingly, Ms. Perez’s claim and the Class’ claims depend on a common contention.

As a result, the commonality element is satisfied.

B. The Typicality Requirement is Satisfied.

Typicality, the next requirement under Rule 1.220, requires that Ms. Perez’ claims be

typical of those of the other putative class members. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(3).

“The key inquiry for a trial court when it determines whether a proposed class satisfies

the typicality requirement is whether the class representative possesses the same legal interest

and has endured the same legal injury as the class members.” Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 114. “The test

for typicality is not demanding and focuses generally on the similarities between the class

representative and the putative class members.” Id. Mere factual differences between the class

representative's claims and the claims of the class members will not defeat typicality. Id. Rather,

the typicality requirement is satisfied when there is a strong similarity in the legal theories upon

which those claims are based and when the claims of the class representative and class members

are not antagonistic to one another. Id. at 114-115.

In this case, Ms. Perez and the putative class members were each subject to Defendant’s

common course of conduct and, thus, have identical claims based upon identical legal theories.

Ms. Perez and the Class were all subjected to the same or substantially similar vehicle

purchase contract or other transaction document in which the Dealership charged a predelivery

service fee but failed to provide the required disclosure.


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Accordingly, Ms. Perez and the putative class members were each subject to Defendant’s

violation of FDUTPA. The claims or defenses of Ms. Perez and the putative class members arise

from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory. Accordingly,

the typicality element is satisfied.

C. The Adequacy Requirement is Satisfied for Both Class.

Finally, Rule 1.220(a) requires that the representative parties have and will continue to

“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(4). “This inquiry

serves to uncover conflicts of interest between the presumptive class representative and the class

he or she seeks to represent.” Sosa at 115 citing Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So.2d

261, 268 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

“A trial court's inquiry concerning whether the adequacy requirement is satisfied contains

two prongs. The first prong concerns the qualifications, experience, and ability of class counsel

to conduct the litigation. The second prong pertains to whether the class representative's interests

are antagonistic to the interests of the class members.” Id. citing City of Tampa v. Addison, 979

So.2d 246, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Ms. Perez is represented by counsel experienced with the handling of consumer claims,

especially consumer claims involving motor vehicle dealerships, and counsel is experienced with

and capable of handling class actions.

Counsel for Ms. Perez has also been found to be adequate class counsel previously. See

Klewinowski v. MFP, Inc., 8:13-CV-1204-T-33TBM, 2013 WL 5177865 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12,

2013)(stating that “[t]he Court likewise determines that Plaintiff's counsel [Roger D. Mason, II

and Zachary A. Harrington] are adequate representatives for prosecuting this action on a class-

wide basis”).


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Accordingly, Ms. Perez meets the first adequacy of representation prong.

Further, Ms. Perez understands his obligations as class representative and does not have

any interests antagonistic to the other putative class members.

In this case, Ms. Perez and the Class seek damages and declaratory and injunctive relief

as a result of Defendant’s unlawful actions of charging a predelivery service fee without

including the required disclosure and charging an improper state sales tax, respectively. Given

the identical nature of the claims between Ms. Perez and the Class, there is no potential for

conflicting interests in this action.

Accordingly, Ms. Perez meets the second adequacy prong.

As both prongs are met, the Rule 1.220(a)(4) adequacy of representation requirement has

been satisfied.

D. The Proposed Class Meet the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b).

Once the prerequisites of Rule 1.220(a) are satisfied, one of the three subsections of Rule

1.220(b) must be satisfied. Here, Ms. Perez seeks certification of the proposed Class under Rules

1.220(b)(1), 1.220(b)(2) and 1.220(b)(3).

i. The Proposed Class Meet the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(1).

In order to certify a class under Rule 1.220(b)(1), a plaintiff must show that prosecuting

separate actions by individual members of proposed class would either (1) create the risk of

inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would

establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant or (2) create the risk of adjudications

with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the

interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications. See Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.220(b)(1).


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In this case, Ms. Perez and each of the Class members entered into identical or

substantially similar finance agreements with the Dealership. Ms. Perez contends that the

Finance Agreement she entered into with the Dealership, and thus the identical or similar

contracts or transaction documents the putative class members entered into with the Dealership,

violates FDUTPA by including a predelivery service charge without also including the required

disclosure. Accordingly, the Class’ claims depend on a common contention and the truth or

falsity of Ms. Perez’s contention that the Finance Agreement between Ms. Perez and the

Dealership violated FDUTPA will resolve the issue for Ms. Perez and each of the putative Class

members. If it is determined that Ms. Perez’s Finance Agreement does, in fact, violate FDUTPA,

Ms. Perez and the rest of the putative Class members will all prevail. If it is determined that the

Finance Agreement does not, in fact, violate the FDUTPA, Ms. Perez and the rest of the putative

Class members will all not prevail.

Thus, if this matter is not allowed to proceed as a class, there will be no opportunity to

conclusively determine whether the Dealership’s contract, which charges a dealer fee without the

required disclosure, is a violation of FDUTPA, and the Dealership could face a situation where

the contractual language and disclosure issue is deemed a violation of FDUTPA in some cases,

but in other cases the identical contract language and disclosure is not deemed a violation of the

FDUTPA.

As a result, prosecuting separate actions by Ms. Perez and individual members of the

putative class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to

individual putative class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the

Dealership.

Accordingly, the proposed Class meet the requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(1).


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ii. The Proposed Class Meet the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(2).

In order to certify a class under Rule 1.220(b)(2), the party moving for class certification

must show that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally

applicable to all the members of the class, thereby making final injunctive relief or declaratory

relief concerning the class as a whole appropriate.

The claims of the Class allege violations of FDUTPA. FDUTPA specifically provides

for injunctive and declaratory relief. Fla. Stat. § 501.211(1) (stating that “[w]ithout regard to any

other remedy or relief to which a person is entitled, anyone aggrieved by a violation of this part

may bring an action to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this part and

to enjoin a person who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise likely to violate this part”).

Injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate on a class-wide basis because (1)

injunctive and declaratory relief are available under FDUTPA; (2) the actions and inactions of

the Dealership are alleged to have violated FDUTPA; and (3) the conduct applies to Ms. Perez

and all members of the putative Class they seek to represent.

Accordingly, the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(2).

iii. The Proposed Class Meet the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(3).

Ms. Perez also seeks certification of the Class under Rule 1.220(b)(3), which provides

that a class action may be maintained where the questions of law and fact common to members

of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and the class

action mechanism is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of

the controversy. As discussed below, this case meets both of these requirements.


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(a). Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate.

“To meet the requirements of rule 1.220(b)(3), the party moving for class certification

must establish that the class members' common questions of law and fact predominate over

individual class member claims.” Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 111. “Florida courts have held that common

questions of fact predominate when the defendant acts toward the class members in a similar or

common way.” Id.

“More specifically, a class representative establishes predominance if he or she

demonstrates a reasonable methodology for generalized proof of class-wide impact. A class

representative accomplishes this if he or she, by proving his or her own individual case,

necessarily proves the cases of the other class members.” Id. (emphasis in original).

In this case, if Ms. Perez is able to prove that the Finance Agreement, which included a

predelivery service fee but not the statutorily required disclosure, is a violation of FDUTPA, then

Ms. Perez necessarily proves the cases of the other Class members that their identical or similar

contracts violated FDUTPA.

Because of the standardized nature of the Dealership’s conduct, common questions

predominate. The only individual issue is the identification of persons against whom the

Dealership engaged in the activity that violates FDUTPA (i.e., the identity of the Class

members). Since the identity of each class member can be determined from the Dealership’s

records, this issue is easily resolved and determined.

Accordingly, because Ms. Perez necessarily proves the cases of the other class members

by proving their own individual case, the predominance element is satisfied.


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(b). The Class Action Mechanism is Superior to Other Available Methods for the Litigation of this Matter.

Superiority is based on a determination of whether a class action is the most manageable

and efficient way to resolve the individual claims of each class member. Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 116.

“[I]f a district court finds that issues common to all class members predominate over

individual issues, then a class action will likely be more manageable than and superior to

individual actions.” Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 663, 678 (M.D. Fla. 2010)(internal

citations and quotation marks omitted); see Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Porcher, 898

So. 2d 153, 156-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)(stating that [b]ecause Florida's class action rule is based

on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Florida courts may generally look to federal cases as

persuasive authority in their interpretation of rule 1.220).

As discussed above, issues common to all class members predominate over individual

issues in this case and, as a result, prosecuting this action as a class is more manageable than and

superior to individual actions.

Further, when small individual damages form the basis for the class claim, an aggrieved

individual does not have enough economic incentive to bring the claims and, in such instance,

class actions are appropriate, warranted and superior for adjudicating the claims. Sosa, 73 So. 3d

at 116.

In this case, each of the Class members’ claims is monetarily small and, as a result, the

members do not have enough economic incentive to bring the claims on an individual basis.

Accordingly, class treatment of the claims is appropriate, warranted and superior.

In this case, there is no better method available for the adjudication of the claims which

might be brought by each individual subjected to the Dealership’s improper failure to disclose


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the predelivery service fee. Class certification of this action will provide an efficient and

appropriate resolution of the controversy.

Accordingly, the proposed Class meet the requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(3).

IV. CONCLUSION

Ms. Perez meets the requirements necessary for certification Class. Accordingly, Ms.

Perez respectfully requests that the Court (1) certify the Class; (2) appoint Plaintiff, Ms. Perez, as

class representative of the Class, (3) appoint Roger D. Mason, II, Zachary Harrington of Roger

D. Mason, II, P.A. as class counsel, and (4) for such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and proper. As an alternative to immediate certification of the Class, Ms. Perez requests that

the Court delay ruling on certification until class discovery has been completed and this Motion

can be supplemented.

ROGER D. MASON, II, P.A. /s/Zachary A. Harrington Roger D. Mason, II, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0504793 Zachary A. Harrington, Esq. Florida Bar No. 044104 Ashley V. Goodman, Esq. Florida Bar No. 11195 5135 West Cypress Street, Suite 105 Tampa, Florida 33607 Telephone: (813) 304-2131 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]





Exhibit A









Documents

Zachary A. Harringtond.classactionreporternewsletter.com/f/16/flmd16-01696-0003.pdf · Filing # 45706046 E-Filed 08/25/2016 04:43:27 PMCase 6:16-cv-01696-GKS-TBS Document 3 Filed