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.4:ZIONSOLUTIONYzzW
Ani EnargySofuflona Com~pany
10 CFR 50.4(b)(6)10 CFR 50.71(e)10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)
October 1, 2014 ZS-2014-0290
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48NRC Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304
Subject: Submittal of Defueled Safety Analysis Report Update, Revision 810 CFR 50.59 Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments10 CFR 72.48 Report of Changes, Tests and ExperimentsPermanently Defueled Technical Specifications Bases Change Update
Reference: (1) ZionSolutions, LLC letter, "Submittal of Defueled Safety Analysis ReportUpdate," dated October 1, 2012
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71, "Maintenance of records, making ofreports," paragraph (e), ZionSolutions, LLC is submitting Revision 8 of the Defueled SafetyAnalysis Report (DSAR) for the Zion Nuclear Power Station (ZNPS). In accordance with 10CFR 50.71(e)(4), the DSAR update is being submitted within 24 months of the previous ZNPSDSAR revision which was submitted in Reference (1).
The changes to the DSAR reflect administrative changes (i.e., editorial and DSAR text changes)and plant design changes. Revision 8 includes changes made from October 2012 throughSeptember 2014.
Attachment I contains a summary of the DSAR changes. Attachment 2 contains page changeinstructions. Attachment 3 contains the update to the ZNPS DSAR. As required by10 CFR 50.71(e), this attachment consists of replacement pages to be inserted the DSAR.Changes to the DSAR are indicated by revision bars.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, tests, and experiments," paragraph (d)(2), a reportof changes, tests, and experiments, including a summary of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of eachchange is required to be submitted at intervals not to exceed 24 months. In Reference (1), theprevious ZNPS 10 CFR 50.59 report was submitted. Attachment 4 contains a summary of 10CFR 50.59 evaluations performed during the time period from September 2012 through August2014.
101 Shiloh Boulevard, Zion • IL 60099 L4(224) 789-4016 - Fax: (224) 789-4008 • www.zionsolutionscompany.com
ZionSolutions, LLCZS-2014-0290Page 2 of 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 72.48, "Changes, tests, and experiments," paragraph (d)(2), a reportof changes, tests, and experiments, including a summary of the 10 CFR 72.48 evaluation of eachchange is required to be submitted at intervals not to exceed 24 months. Attachment 5 contains asummary of 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations performed during the time period from July 2013 throughAugust 2014.
In accordance with Zion Station Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS), Section5.6.4.d, changes to Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRCon a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e). Attachment 6 contains PDTS Bases changesapproved by the licensee since the previous DSAR update report submitted in Reference 1.
As Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, I certify that the information in this submittalaccurately presents changes made since the previous submittals necessary to reflect informationand analyses submitted to the NRC or prepared in accordance with NRC requirements.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Jim Ashley at (847) 379-2978.
Respectfully,
Gerard van NoordennenVice President Regulatory AffairsZionSolutions, LLC
cc: John Hickman, U.S. NRC Senior Project ManagerService List
Attachments:1. Summary of Changes
2. Page Change Instructions
3. ZNPS DSAR Revision 8
4. 10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report5. 10 CFR 72.48 Summary Report
6. PDTS Bases Changes
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit I and 2 License Transfer Service List
cc:
Alan Parker
President Projects Group
EnergySolutions
1009 Commerce Park Drive, Ste. 100
Oak Ridge, TN 37830
John Sauger
Senior VP & General Manager
ZionSolutions, LLC
101 Shiloh Boulevard
Zion, IL 60099
Gerard van Noordennen
VP Regulatory Affairs
ZionSolutions, LLC
101 Shiloh Boulevard
Zion, IL 60099
Anthony Orawiec
Decommissioning Plant Manager
ZionSolutions, LLC
101 Shiloh Boulevard
Zion, IL 60099
Dan Shrum
Senior VP Regulatory Affairs
EnergySolutions
423 West 300 South, Ste. 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Russ Workman
General Counsel
EnergySolutions
423 West 300 South, Ste. 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Alwyn C. Settles
Section Head, Nuclear Facility Inspection
Bureau of Nuclear Facility Safety
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
1011 North St., PO Box 250
Mazon, IL 60444
Kent McKenzie
Emergency Management Coordinator
Lake County Emergency ManagementAgency
1303 N. Milwaukee Avenue
Libertyville, IL 60048-1308
Regional Administrator
U.S. NRC, Region III
2443 Warrenville Road
Lisle, IL 60532-4352
John E. Matthews
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004
ZionSolutions, LLCZS-2014-0290: Attachment 1
ATTACHMENT 1
Changes Made to the DSAR But Not Previously Submitted
Pages Description of Change
Pages 3-30, 3-33, Fuel Handling Building Overhead Crane design change.
Pages 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-14, Install New Liquid Radioactive Waste processing / release systemTable 4-1, Table 4-3,Figure 4-1
Pages 4-8, 4-9, 4-10 Revise DSAR Solid Waste Management discussion.
Page 3-37, Table 3-9 Install Spent Fuel Pool Underwater Demineralizer Unit
Page 3-29a Revise spent fuel Instrument Tube Tie Rod (ITTR) repair discussion.
Page 3-49 Eliminate Control Room Ventilation charcoal filtration discussion.
Table 3-3 Add MAGNASTOR Transfer Cask seismic restraint discussion.
Table 4-2 Relocate Fuel Handling Building area radiation monitor.
Pages 2-3, 2-27 Revise aircraft crash hazard analysis.
Pages 3-11, 3-54 Revise Important To The Defueled Condition (ITDC) classificationcriteria.
Page 3-iv, 3-vi, 3-vii, 3-9, Revise Fuel Handling Building crane discussion.3-10, 3-25, 3-30, 3-33, 3-39, 3-40, 3-41, 3-42, 3-61, Table 3-5A, Figures3-33, 3-34, 3-35, 3-36,3-37, 3-38
Pages I-iii, 1-1, 1-5, 1-6, Add Dry Cask Storage system discussion.1-9, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-11,3-25, 3-26, 3-61, 6-5,Table 3-3, Figures 1-1, 1-2, 1-18,
Figure 1-1 Revise site boundary drawing.
Pages 3-38,3-46, 3-47, 3- Revise Service Water / Fire Protection system DSAR description.48, 3-52, Figure 3-40
Pages 3-30, 3-38, Eliminate discussion of Secondary Water Storage Tanks.
Pages 4-4, 4-15 Revise site portal monitor discussion
ZionSolutions, LLCZS-2014-0290: Attachment 2
ATTACHMENT 2PAGE CHANGE INSTRUCTIONS
To perform the October 2014 Zion Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) update, pleaseremove the existing pages and insert pages dated October 2014 as follows:
SECTIONList of Effective PagesList of Effective PagesList of Effective PagesList of Effective PagesList of Effective PagesMaster Table of ContentsMaster Table of ContentsMaster Table of ContentsMaster Table of ContentsChapter 1 Table of ContentsChapter 1 Table of ContentsChapter 1Chapter 1Chapter 1Chapter 1Chapter 1Chapter 1Chapter 1Chapter 2Chapter 2Chapter 3 Table of ContentsChapter 3 Table of ContentsChapter 3 Table of ContentsChapter 3 Table of ContentsChapter 3 Table of ContentsChapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3
REMOVELOEP-2LOEP-4LOEP-5LOEP-6LOEP-71-i3-iii3-iv3-v1-i1l-iii1-1
1-51-61-9Figure 1-1Figure 1-2Figure 1-182-32-273-iii3-iv3-v3-vi3-vii3-53-63-83-93-103-113-253-263-29a3-303-333-343-353-373-383-39
INSERTLOEP-2LOEP-4LOEP-5LOEP-6LOEP-71-i3-iii3-iv3-v1-i1 -iii1-1
1-51-61-9Figure 1-1Figure 1-2Figure 1-182-3 and 2-3a2-273-iii3-iv3-v3-vi3-vii3-53-63-83-93-103-113-253-263-29a3-303-333-343-353-373-383-39
ZionSolutions, LLCZS-201 4-0290: Attachunent 2
ATTACHMENT 2
PAGE CHANGE INSTRUCTIONS (continued)
To perform the October 2014 Zion Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) update, pleaseremove the existing pages and insert pages dated October 2014 as follows:
SECTIONChapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 6
REMOVE3-403-413-423-463-473-483-493-52
3-61Table 3-3
Table 3-9 (2 of 3)Figure 3-33Figure 3-34Figure 3-35Figure 3-36Figure 3-37Figure 3-38Figure 3-404-44-54-64-74-84-94-104-134-144-15Table 4-1Table 4-2Table 4-3Figure 4-16-5
INSERT3-403-413-423-463-473-483-493-523-54a3-61Table 3-3Table 3-5aTable 3-9 (2 of 3)Figure 3-33Figure 3-34Figure 3-35Figure 3-36Figure 3-37Figure 3-38Figure 3-404-44-54-64-74-84-94-104-134-144-15Table 4-1Table 4-2Table 4-3Figure 4-16-5
ZionSolutions, LLCZS-2014-0290: Attachment 3
ATTACHMENT 3
ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION
DEFUELED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT REVISION 8
ZION STATION DSAR
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
PAGE DATE PAGE DATE
Controlled Copy CoverSheet
List of Effective Pages TabLOEP-2LOEP-3LOEP-4LOEP-5LOEP-6LOEP-7Master Table of Contents Tal1-i2-i2-ii3-i3-ii3-1il3-iv3-v4-i4-ii5-i6-i7-iChapter I Tab1-i1 -ii1 -iUi1-1
1-21-31-41-51-61-71-81-9Table 1-1(1)Figure 1-1Figure 1-2Figure 1-3Figure 1-4Figure 1-5Figure 1-6Figure 1-7Figure 1-8Figure 1-9
OCTOBER 2002
OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014
bOCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2002OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2004AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2006OCTOBER 2000
OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2002OCTOBER 2010OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2012AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2012AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998
Figure 1-10Figure 1-11Figure 1-12Figure 1-13Figure 1-14Figure 1-15Figure 1-16Figure 1-17Figure 1-18Chapter 2 Tab2-i2-ii2-iii2-iv2-v2-12-22-32-3a2-42-52-62-72-82-92-102-112-122-132-142-152-162-172-182-192-202-212-222-232-242-252-262-27Table 2-1(1)
AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2012AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014
AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2010AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998
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2C-172C-182C-192C-202C-212C-222C-232C-242C-252C-262C-272C-282C-292C-302C-312C-322C-332C-342C-352C-362C-372C-382C-392C-402C-412C-422C-432C-442C-452C-462C-472C-482C-492C-502C-512C-522C-532C-542C-552C-562C-572C-582C-592C-602C-612C-62
DATE PAGE DATE
AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998
2C-632C-642C-652C-662C-672C-682C-692C-702C-712C-722C-732C-742C-752C-762C-772C-782C-792C-802C-812C-822C-832C-842C-85Chapter 3 Tab3-i3-ii3-iii3-iv3-v3-vi3-vii3-viii3-13-23-33-43-53-63-73-83-93-10
AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998
AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2002OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2000AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2010OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014
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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
PAGE
3-113-123-133-143-153-163-173-183-193-203-213-223-233-243-253-263-273-27a3-283-293-29a3-303-313-323-333-343-353-363-373-383-393-403-413-423-433-43a3-43b3-443-453-463-473-483-493-503-513-52
DATE PAGE DATE
OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2002OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2000AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2014
3-52a3-533-543-54a3-553-55a3-563-573-583-593-603-61Table 3-1(1)Table 3-2(1)Table 3-3(1)Table 3-4(1)Table 3-4(2)Table 3-4(3)Table 3-4(4)Table 3-4(5)Table 3-5(1)Table 3-5ATable 3-6(1)Table 3-7(1)Table 3-8(1)Table 3-9(1)Table 3-9(2)Table 3-9(3)Table 3-10(1)Table 3-11(1)Table 3-12(1)Table 3-13(1)Table 3-14(1)Table 3-15(1)Figure 3-1Figure 3-2Figure 3-3Figure 3-4Figure 3-5Figure 3-6Figure 3-7Figure 3-8Figure 3-9Figure 3-10Figure 3-11
OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2004OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2014AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998
I]
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DATE PAGEPAGE DATE
Figure 3-12Figure 3-13Figure 3-14Figure 3-15Figure 3-16Figure 3-17Figure 3-18Figure 3-19Figure 3-20Figure 3-21Figure 3-22Figure 3-23Figure 3-24Figure 3-25Figure 3-26Figure 3-27Figure 3-28Figure 3-29Figure 3-30Figure 3-31Figure 3-32Figure 3-33Figure 3-34Figure 3-35Figure 3-36Figure 3-37Figure 3-38Figure 3-39Figure 3-39AFigure 3-40Figure 3-41Figure 3-42Figure 3-42AFigure 3-43Figure 3-44Figure 3-45Figure 3-45AFigure 3-46Figure 3-47Figure 3-48Chapter 4 Tab4-i4-ii4-iii
AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2010AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2012AUGUST 1998
AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2004AUGUST 1998
4-iv4-14-24-34-44-54-64-74-84-94-104-114-124-134-144-154-164-17Table 4-1 (1)Table 4-2(1)Table 4-3(1)Figure 4-1Chapter 5 Tab5-i5-ii5-iii5-15-25-35-45-55-65-75-8Table 5-1(1)Table 5-2(1)Table 5-3(1)Table 5-4(1)Table 5-5(1)Table 5-6(1)Table 5-7(1)Figure 5-1Figure 5-2Figure 5-3
AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2010OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2010OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2008OCTOBER 2012OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2008OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014OCTOBER 2014
AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000AUGUST 1998OCTOBER 2000AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998AUGUST 1998
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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
PAGE DATE PAGE DATE
Figure 5-4Chapter 6 Tab6-i6-16-26-36-46-5Chapter 7 Tab7-i7-17-2
AUGUST 1998
OCTOBER 2006OCTOBER 2010OCTOBER 2006OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2010OCTOBER 2014
OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000OCTOBER 2000
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ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION TITLE PAGE
1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION 1-1OF PLANT
1.1 INTRODUCTION 1-1
1.2 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION 1-21.2.1 General Design Criteria 1-21.2.1.1 Overall Requirements 1-31.2.1.2 Radiation Controls 1-41.2.1.3 Fuel and Waste Storage Systems 1-51.2.1.4 Dry Cask Storage 1-51.2.1.5 Effluents 1-51.2.2 Structures 1-61.2.3 Waste Disposal System 1-61.2.4 Fuel Handling System 1-71.2.5 Electrical System 1-71.2.6 Site and Environment 1-71.2.7 Facility Safety Conclusions 1-8
1.3 IDENTI FICATION OF AGENTS AND CONTRACTORS 1-8
1.4 DRAWINGS AND OTHER DETAILED INFORMATION 1-9
1.5 REFERENCES, SECTION 1.0 1-9
1-i OCTOBER 2014
ZION STATION OSAR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION
3.93.9.13.9.1.13.9.1.23.9.1.33.9.23.9.2.13.9.2.1.13.9.2.1.23.9.2.1.33.9.2.1.4
3.9.2.1.53.9.2.23.9.2.33.9.33.9.3.13.9.3.23.9.3.2.13.9.3.2.23.9.3.2.33.9.3.2.43.9.3.2.4.13.9.3.2.4.23.9.3.33.9.43.9.4.13.9.4.1.13.9.4.1.23.9.4.23.9.4.33.9.4.3.13.9.4.3.23.9.4.3.33.9.4.3.43.9.4.3.53.9.4.3.63.9.4.3.73.9.4.3.83.9.4.3.9
TITLE
FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLINGNew Fuel Storage
Design BasisNew Fuel Storage Facility DescriptionDesign Features Important to the Defueled Condition
Spent Fuel StorageDesign Basis
Prevention of Fuel Storage CriticalityFuel Storage Decay HeatSpent Fuel Storage Radiation ShieldingProtection Against Radioactivity Releasefrom Spent Fuel StorageMonitoring Fuel Storage
Spent Fuel Facility DescriptionDesign Features Important to the Defueled Condition
Fuel Handling SystemsDesign BasisSystem Description
Failed Fuel CansSpent Fuel Pool BridgeFuel Building CraneFuel Building Crane Interlocks
Travel Limit SwitchesHoist Limit Switches-Operation
Design Features Important to the Defueled ConditionSpent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
Design BasisFuel and Waste Storage Decay HeatCodes and Classifications
System DescriptionComponents
Spent Fuel Pool Heat ExchangersSpent Fuel Pool PumpsSpent Fuel Pool FiltersSpent Fuel Pool StrainersSpent Fuel Pool DemineralizersSpent Fuel Pool SkimmerSpent Fuel Pooling Cool System ValvesSpent Fuel Pool Cooling System PipingSpent Fuel Pool Sump Recessed Area
PAGE
3-263-263-263-263-263-263-263-263-273-273-28
3-283-283-313-313-313-323-323-323-333-343-343-343-353-353-353-353-353-363-363-363-373-373-373-373-373-373-373-37
I
3-iii OCTOBER 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION TITLE PAGE
3.9.4.4 Spent Fuel Pool Make-Up Capability 3-383.9.4.5 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition 3-383.9.5 Control of Heavy Loads 3-393.9.5.1 Introduction/Licensing Background 3-393.9.5.2 Safety Basis 3-393.9.5.3 Scope and Control of Heavy Load Handling Systems 3-393.9.5.4 NUREG 0612 Elements 3-393.9.5.4.1 Safe Load Paths 3-403.9.5.4.2 Load Handling Procedures 3-403.9.5.4.3 Qualifications, Training & Conduct of Crane
Operators 3-403.9.5.4.4 Special Lifting Devises 3-403.9.5.4.5 Lifting Devices Not Specially Designed 3-413.9.5.4.6 Inspection and Testing of Cranes 3-413.9.5.4.7 Crane Design 3-413.9.5.5 Safety Evaluation 3-41
3.10 PLANT SUPPORT SYSTEMS 3-43a3.10.1 Spent Fuel Pool Secondary Loop Cooling System 3-43a3.10.1.1 Design Basis 3-43a3.10.1.2 System Description 3-43a3.10.1.3 Components 3-43b3.10.1.3.1 Cooling Tower 3-43b3.10.1.3.2 Cooling Pumps 3-43b3.10.1.4 Design Feature Important to the Defueled Condition 3-43b3.10.2 Service Water System 3-463.10.2.1 Design Basis 3-463.10.2.2 System Description 3-473.10.2.3, Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition 3-483.10.3 Ventilation Systems 3-493.10.3.1 Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and 3-49
Air Conditioning System3.10.3.1.1 Design Basis 3-493.10.3.1.2 System Description 3-493.10.3.1.3 Normal Operation 3-493.10.3.1.4 Design Features Important to the 3-50
Delueled Condition3.10.3.2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation 3-503.10.3.2.1 Design Basis 3-503.10.3.2.2 Normal Operation 3-503.10.3.2.3 Design Features Important to the 3-51
Defueled Condition3.10.3.3 Containment Purge 3-513.10.3.3.1 Design Basis 3-513.10.3.3.2 Normal Operation 3-51
3-iv October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION
3.10.3.3.3
3.10.3.43.10.43.10.53.10.5.13.10.5.23.10.5.2.13.10.5.2.23.10.5.2.33.10.5.2.43.10.5.2.53.10.5.2.6
3.10.63.10.73.10.8
3.113.11.13.11.23.11.2.13.11.2.23.11.2.2.13.11.2.2.1.13.11.2.2.1.23.11.2.2.1.3
3.11.2.2.1.43.11.2.2.1.53.11.2.2.1.63.11.2.2.23.11.2.2.2.13.11.2.33.11.3
TITLE
Design Features Important to theDefueled Condition
Auxiliary Ventilation SystemsFire Protection SystemOperating Control Stations
General LayoutDesign Basis
Control Room DesignAnnunciator and Audible Alarm SystemRadwaste System Control PanelsMiscellaneous Local Control PanelsPager Alarm SystemDesign Features Important to theDefueled Condition
Lighting SystemsCommunications SystemReactor Waste handling System
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMSDesign BasisSystem Description
Off site Power SystemOnsite Power System
AC Power Systems4160-V System480-V System120-Vac Instrument andControl Power SystemCable DeratingCable Tray LoadingReliability of Power Supplies
DC Power Systems125-Vdc Power System
Design Features Important to the Defueled ConditionFire Protection for Cable Systems
PAGE
3-52
3-523-52a3-533-533-533-533-533-533-543-543-54
3-543-543-54a
3-553-55
.3-553-553-553-553-55a3-563-56
3-563-573-583-593-593-603-60
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3.12 REFERENCES SECTION 3.0 3-61
3-v October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION TITLE PAGE1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION 1-1
OF PLANT
1.1 INTRODUCTION 1-1
1.2 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION 1-21.2.1 General Design Criteria 1-21.2.1.1 Overall Requirements 1-31.2.1.2 Radiation Controls 1-41.2.1.3 Fuel and Waste Storage Systems 1-51.2.1.4 Dry Cask Storage 1-51.2.1.5 Effluents 1-51.2.2 Structures 1-61.2.3 Waste Disposal System 1-61.2.4 Fuel Handling System 1-71.2.5 Electrical System 1-71.2.6 Site and Environment 1-71.2.7 Facility Safety Conclusions 1-8
1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF AGENTS AND CONTRACTORS 1-8
1.4 DRAWINGS AND OTHER DETAILED INFORMATION 1-9
1.5 REFERENCES, SECTION 1.0 1-9
1-i October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE TITLE
1-1 PROPERTY PLAT1-2 PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT PLAT1-3 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - MAIN FLOOR EL. 642'0" (UNIT 1)1-4 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - MEZZ. FLOOR EL. 617'0"1-5 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - GROUND FLOOR EL. 592'0"
(UNIT 1)1-6 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - BASEMENT FLOOR EL. 560'0"1-7 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - MISC. FLOORS1-8 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING1-9 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - SECTIONS A-A AND B-B (UNIT 1)1-10 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - SECTIONS C-C AND D-D (UNIT 1)1-11 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - SECTIONS E-E AND F-F1-12 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - MAIN FLOOR EL. 642'-0" (UNIT 2)1-13 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - MEZZ. FLOOR EL. 617'-0" (UNIT 2)1-14 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - GROUND FLOOR EL.592'-0"
(UNIT 2)1-15 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - BASEMENT FLOOR EL 560'-0
(UNIT 2)1-16 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLAN - CRIB HOUSE1-17 LOCATION OF ZION STATION1-18 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION
I -iii October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the transfer of the facility licenses from ExelonGeneration Company, LLC (EGC) to ZionSolutions, LLC (ZS) on May 4, 2009 (Reference 6).References in the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) to CornEd, CECo, andCommonwealth Edison have been retained, as appropriate, instead o1 being changed to ZS toproperly preserve the historical context.
In February 1998, ComEd certified the permanent cessation of operation of Zion Station Units 1and 2 to the NRC (Reference 3). In March 1998, CornEd certified to the NRC that all fuelassemblies have been permanently removed from both Zion Station reactor vessels and placedin the spent fuel pool (Reference 4). ZS has transitioned Zion Station from the SAFSTORcondition (a period of safe storage of the stabilized and defueled facility) to activedismantlement.
This DSAR is derived from the July, 1996 update of the Zion Station Updated Final SafetyAnalysis Report (UFSAR). The DSAR has been developed as a licensing basis document thatreflects the permanently defueled condition of Zion Station and supercedes the UFSAR. Assuch, the DSAR is intended to serve the same function during SAFSTOR and decommissioningthat the UFSAR served during operation of the facility. An evaluation of the systems, structuresand components (SSCs) described in the UFSAR was performed to determine the function, ifany, these systems would perform in a defueled condition. Each major SSC was evaluated todetermine if it was required to support the safe storage of irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool,or needed to support decommissioning activities. The criteria used to evaluate the major SSCsand the conclusion of the evaluations are provided in Section 3 of the DSAR.
A brief history of major plant operations and licensing related actions for Zion Station Is as
follows:
1. Construction Permit issued, December 1968,
2. Final Safety Analysis Report submitted, December 1970,
3. Operating license issued, April 1973 for Unit 1 and November 1973 for Unit 2,
4. Commercial Operations achieved, December 1973 for Unit 1 and September 1974 forUnit 2.
5. Certification of permanent cessation of plant operation submitted, February 1998,
6. Certification of permanent removal of all fuel from the reactor vessels, March 1998.
Upon docketing of the certification for permanent cessation of operation and permanent removalof fuel from the reactor vessels, the 10 CFR Part 50 license no longer authorizes operation ofthe reactors or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessels. In addition, theoperating licenses scheduled to expire in April 2013 for Unit 1 and November 2013 for Unit 2continue to remain in effect until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission notifies ZS that thelicenses have been terminated.
1-1 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
1.2.1.3 Fuel and Waste Storaae Systems
All fuel storage and waste handling facilities are contained and the facility design is such thataccidental releases of radioactivity directly to the atmosphere will not exceed the limits of10CFR100.
All operations with the spent fuel are conducted underwater (see section 3). This provides visualcontrol of the operation at all times and also maintains low radiation levels. The borated waterassures subcriticality at all times and also provides adequate cooling for the spent fuel. Thespent fuel storage pool is supplied with a cooling system for the removal of the decay heat ofthe spent fuel. Racks are provided to accommodate the storage of 3012 fuel assemblies. Thestorage pool is filled with borated water. The spent fuel is stored in a vertical array withsufficient center-to-center distance between assemblies to assure a K effective of less than0.95, even if unborated water is used to fill the pit, for fuel having a maximum loading of 57.4grams U-235 per axial centimeter of fuel assembly length. The water level maintained In thepool will provide sufficient shielding to permit normal occupancy of the area by operatingpersonnel. The spent fuel pool is also provided with systems to maintain water cleanliness andto indicate pool water level. Gamma radiation in the Auxiliary Building is monitored and a highlevel is annunciated in the Control Room.
Water removed from the pool must be pumped out as there are no gravity drains. Spillage orleakage of any liquids from waste handling facilities go to floor drains which flow to sumps.
Postulated accidents involving the release of radioactivity from the fuel and waste storage andhandling facilities are shown in Chapter 5 to result in exposures well within the limits of10CFR100.
The spent fuel storage pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a corrosion resistant liner.This structure is designed to withstand the anticipated earthquake loadings so that the liner willprevent leakage even in the event the reinforced concrete develops cracks. The transfer tubewhich connects the refueling canal and the spent fuel pool and forms part of the ReactorContainment is provided with a valve and a blind flange which effectively closes off the transfertube.
1.2.1.4 Dry Cask Storaae
The NAC MAGNASTOR dry cask storage system and the independent Spent Fuel Storageinstallation (ISFSI) provide long-term on-site storage of Zion spent nuclear fuel and Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) waste as shown in Figure 1-18. Use of the dry cask storage system isgranted upon issuance of a Certificate of Compliance (Reference 7) from the NRC for Zionspent fuel and GTCC waste. Use of the ISFSI for storage and handling of spent fuel and GTCCwaste is granted upon compliance with the conditions of the General License issued under 10CFR 72, Subpart K and the Zion Nuclear Power Station 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report(Reference 8). Cask handling will be with a single-failure proof Fuel Handling Building overheadcrane.
1.2.1.5 Effluents
Gaseous, liquid, and solid waste disposal facilities are designed so that discharge of effluentsand-offsite shipments shall be in accordance with applicable governmental regulations.
1-5 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
Process and discharge streams are appropriately monitored and safety features areincorporated to preclude releases more than the limits of 1 OCFR20.
The plant restricted area, as it is applied to the definitions in 1OCFR20, is defined in Appendix Fof the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). This area includes sections of shoreline. Thearea is owned by EGC and is leased from them and in the possession and control of ZS; thecontrol being required in IOCFR20.
Neither EGC nor ZS has any riparian ownership extending out into the lake.
Verification of annual exposures to persons in those portions of the lake which constitute therestricted area will be accomplished by station release records and the environmentalmonitoring program. The restricted area does include shoreline frontage. This shoreline will becontrolled. The shoreline is monitored at both the northern and southern boundaries by on-sitestations as shown on Figure 1-1.
Environmental conditions do not place any restrictions on the normal release of operationalradioactive effluents to the atmosphere. Radioactive fluids entering the WD System arecollected in analysis tanks until the course of subsequent treatment is determined.
All solid wastes are placed in suitable containers and stored onsite until shipment offsite fordisposal.
Liquid wastes are processed to remove most of the radioactive material. The spent resins fromthe demineralizers and the filter cartridges are packaged and stored onsite until shipment offsitefor disposal. The processed water, from which most of the radioactive material has beenremoved, is recycled for reuse within the plant or is discharged through a monitored line into thecirculating water discharge.
1.2.2 Structures
The moor structures include a separate and independent Containment for each reactor, acommon Auxiliary Building with holdup tank vault, a common Fuel Handling Building, a commonTurbine Building, a common Cribhouse, and a common Administration and Service Building.General layouts of the Reactor Containment, Auxiliary Building and interior componentsarrangements are shown in figures 1-1 through 1-16. The ISFSI Storage Pad and theMonitoring Building are located south of the switchyard as shown in Figures 1-1, 1-2 and 1-18.
1.2.3 Waste Disrposal System
The shared WD System provides all equipment necessary to collect, process, and prepare fordisposal all radioactive liquid, gaseous, and solid wastes produced as a result of reactoroperation and decommissioning activities.
After collection, liquid wastes are demineralized. The treated water from the demineralizersmay be recycled for use in the plant or may be discharged via the circulating water discharge atconcentrations well within the limits of 10CFR20. The spent demineralizer resins are drummed,dewatered and shipped from the site for ultimate disposal in an authorized location.
Gaseous waste discharge to the environment is controlled to keep the ofisite dose well withinthe limits of 10CFR20.
1-6 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
1.4 DRAWINGS AND OTHER DETAILED INFORMATION
Table 1-1 lists DSAR figures that are controlled drawings.
1.5 REFERENCES, Section 1.0
1. Atomic Energy Commission, Proposed General Design Criteria, Federal Register,
July 11, 1967.
2. Atomic Energy Commission, General Design Criteria, Federal Register, July 1971.
3. Letter from 0. D. Kingsley, ComEd to U.S. NRC, dated February 13, 1998, Certificationof Permanent Cessation of Plant Operation
4. Letter from 0. D. Kingsley, CornEd to U.S. NRC, dated March 9, 1998, Certification ofPermanent Removal of all Fuel from the Reactor Vessels
5. NRC letter "Braidwood, Byron, Dresden, LaSalle, Quad Cities and Zion - OrdersApproving Transfer of Licenses from Commonwealth Edison Company to ExelonGeneration Company, LLC, and Approving Conforming Amendments,"dated August 3, 2000.
6. NRC letter, "Order Approving Transfer of Licenses and Conforming AmendmentsRelating to Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2", dated May 4, 2009.
7. NRC Certificate of Compliance No. 1031, Amendment 3 for the NAC International Inc.(NAC) MAGNASTOR System, July 25, 2013.
8. Zion Nuclear Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ZNPS ISFSI)10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report.
1-9 October 2014 1
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According to the Lake County Regional Planning Commission, commercial fishing is almostnonexistent in this portion of Lake Michigan due to the migration northward of the Lake Trout.Sport fishing has increased in popularity since the introduction of salmon and trout in the lake.
2.2.2.2 Military Facilities
The major military installation in the vicinity of the Zion site is the Great Lakes Naval TrainingStation.
The Great Lakes Naval Training Station has a small arms practice range utilizing a small area ofLake Michigan 10 miles south of the Zion site.
There is no active vessel of the Navy on Lake Michigan. The U.S. Coast Guard operatessurface vessels and aircraft on the lake.
It is concluded that military installations and operations in the vicinity of the Zion site do not poseany threat to safe facility operation.
2.2.2.3 Waterways
Commercial barges and ships do not ordinarily operate within five miles of the Zion site, and themajority of commercial traffic on Lake Michigan does not approach within twenty miles of thesite. All barge traffic north of the Chicago area is limited to the summer months due to waves orice on the lake. Explosives and toxic gases are carried only aboard oceangoing vessels whichdo not closely approach the site.
2.2.2.4 Airrrts
Waukegan Regional Airport is the closest airport to the station and is the only one within 10 miles ofthe plant. It is located 3.14 miles southwest of the site. The station is located 0.76 miles from theextended centerline of the longest runway (5/23). Figure 2-4 shows the general airport layout.
2.2.3 Evaluation of Potential Accidents
A probabilistic risk evaluation has been performed circa 1989 which estimates the potential foran aircraft accident resulting in a post-crash fire within sufficient proximity to Zion Station topresent a hazard (References 6 and 7). The evaluation concluded that the probability ofoccurrence of the event was below 1.0 x 10. 7 per year, and would remain below this value evento the year 2008. The NRC reviewed and accepted this evaluation via Reference 8. The NRC'sconclusion is stated below:
"The overall probabilities of an aircraft crash leading to a fire near the ventilationintakes of the Zion plant meet the acceptance criteria of Section 3.5.1.6 of theStandard Review Plan. Accordingly, the technical specification for aircraft firedetection is not required."
2-3 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
A new aircraft crash hazard analysis (Reference 52) was performed in April 2013 to determine ifthe 1989 analysis for the Diesel Generator and Switchgear Room Ventilation System air intakes,Auxiliary Building Ventilation air intake, and the Crib House Service Water Pump AreaVentilation intakes remained bounding for the Fuel Handling Building. The new analysisdetermined that the probability of occurrence of an aircraft crash was below 1.0 x 10 per yearfor the Fuel Handling Building which meets the NUREG-0800 criteria of 1.0 x 10,7 per year as towhen aircraft crash is not considered a design basis external event. In Summary, the potentialadverse effects of an airplane crash need not be considered and the 1989 analysis remains thebounding analysis.
The Zion Station can withstand any tire or explosion which could result from an accident in thenormal shipping lanes on Lake Michigan. The release of toxic gases on the lake could affectthe environs of the station, but would not cause the Control Room to become uninhabitable.
2-3a October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
42. Observations On The Earthquakes In the Upper Mississippi Valley, May 26, 1909,Transactions of the Illinois State Academy of Science, pp. 132-143, Udden, J.A.,Dated 1910.
43. "Quarternary Tectonics in Middle North America," by P. B. King in Quarternary of TheU.S. edited by the H.E. Wright, Jr. and D.G. Fry.
44. On the Earthquake ol January 2, 1912, In the Upper Mississippi Valley, Transactions ofThe Illinois State Academy of Science, pp. 111-115, Udden, A.D., Dated 1912.
45. The Missouri Earthquake of April 9, 1917, Monthly Weather Review, pp. 187-188. Finch,R.H., Dated April 1917.
46. United States Earthquakes, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Various Authors,Dated 1928-1964.
47. A Contribution To the Seismic History of Missouri, Bulletin Of The Seismological Societyof America, Volume 31, pp. 187-224, Heinrich, R. R., Dated July, 1941.
48. Observations On The Earthquake Of May 26, 1909, The Popular Science Monthly,pp. 154-162, Udden, J.A., Dated August, 1910.
49. Seismic Zone Map, Seismic Design For Buildings, U.S. Department Of Defense,TM 5-809-10, Navdocks, AFM 88-3, Chapter 13, p. 355, Dated 1966.
50. CONSULTANTS CONTACTED
Dr. T.C. Buschback, Illinois State Geological Survey
Mr. George Hughes, Illinois State Geological Survey
Dr. James E. Hackett, Illinois State Geological Survey
Mr. Warren Parr, U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers. Chicago, Illinois
Mr. A.V. Carozzi, University of Illinois
Dr. Arthur L Howland, Northwestern University
51. Seed, H.B. and Idriss, I. M., "Simplified Procedure for Evaluating Soil LiqueficationPotential", Journal of Solid Mechanics and Foundation Division, ASCE, Vol. 97,No. SM9, September 1971.
52. ZionSolutions (ZS) calculation 22N-D-142X-0008, Aircraft Crash Hazard AssessmentUpdate, Rev. 0, April 16, 2013.
2-27 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION
3.93.9.13.9.1.13.9.1.23.9.1.33.9.23.9.2.13.9.2.1.13.9.2.1.23.9.2.1.33.9.2.1.4
3.9.2.1.53.9.2.23.9.2.33.9.33.9.3.13.9.3.23.9.3.2.13.9.3.2.23.9.3.2.33.9.3.2.43.9.3.2.4.13.9.3.2.4.23.9.3.33.9.43.9.4.13.9.4.1.13.9.4.1.23.9.4.23.9.4.33.9.4.3.13.9.4.3.23.9.4.3.33.9.4.3.43.9.4.3.53.9.4.3.63.9.4.3.73.9.4.3.83.9.4.3.9
TITLE PAGE
FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLINGNew Fuel Storage
Design BasisNew Fuel Storage Facility DescriptionDesign Features Important to the Defueled Condition
Spent Fuel StorageDesign Basis
Prevention of Fuel Storage CriticalityFuel Storage Decay HeatSpent Fuel Storage Radiation ShieldingProtection Against Radioactivity Releasefrom Spent Fuel StorageMonitoring Fuel Storage
Spent Fuel Facility DescriptionDesign Features Important to the Defueled Condition
Fuel Handling SystemsDesign BasisSystem Description
Failed Fuel CansSpent Fuel Pool BridgeFuel Building CraneFuel Building Crane Interlocks
Travel Limit SwitchesHoist Limit Switches
Design Features Important to the Defueled ConditionSpent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
Design BasisFuel and Waste Storage Decay HeatCodes and Classifications
System DescriptionComponents
Spent Fuel Pool Heat ExchangersSpent Fuel Pool PumpsSpent Fuel Pool FiltersSpent Fuel Pool StrainersSpent Fuel Pool DemineralizersSpent Fuel Pool SkimmerSpent Fuel Pooling Cool System ValvesSpent Fuel Pool Cooling System PipingSpent Fuel Pool Sump Recessed Area
3-263-263-263-263-263-263-263-263-273-273-28
3-283-283-313-313-313-323-323-323-333-343-343-343-353-353-353-353-353-363-363-363-373-373-373-373-373-373-373-37
3-iii October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE OF CONTENTSSECTION TITLE PAGE
3.9.4.4 Spent Fuel Pool Make-Up Capability 3-383.9.4.5 Design Features Important to the Delueled Condition 3-383.9.5 Control of Heavy Loads 3-393.9.5.1 Introduction/Licensing Background 3-393.9.5.2 Safety Basis 3-393.9.5.3 Scope and Control of Heavy Load Handling Systems 3-393.9.5.4 NUREG 0612 Elements 3-393.9.5.4.1 Safe Load Paths 3-403,9.5.4.2 Load Handling Procedures 3-403.9.5.4.3 Qualifications, Training & Conduct of Crane
Operators 3-403.9.5.4.4 Special Lifting Devises 3-403.9.5.4.5 Ufting Devices Not Specially Designed 3-413.9.5.4.6 Inspection and Testing of Cranes 3-413.9.5.4.7 Crane Design 3-413.9.5.5 Safety Evaluation 3-41
3.10 PLANT SUPPORT SYSTEMS 3-43a3.10.1 Spent Fuel Pool Secondary Loop Cooling System 3-43a3.10.1.1 Design Basis 3-43a3.10.1.2 System Description 3-43a3.10.1.3 Components 3-43b3.10.1.3.1 Cooling Tower 3-43b3.10.1.3.2 Cooling Pumps 3-43b3.10.1.4 Design Feature Important to the Defueled Condition 3-43b3.10.2 Service Water System 3-463.10.2.1 Design Basis 3-463.10.2.2 System Description 3-473.10.2.3 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition 3-483.10.3 Ventilation Systems 3-493.10.3.1 Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and 3-49
Air Conditioning System3.10.3.1.1 Design Basis 3-493.10.3.1.2 System Description 3-493.10.3.1.3 Normal Operation 3-493.10.3.1.4 Design Features Important to the 3-50
Defueled Condition3.10.3.2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation 3-503.10.3.2.1 Design Basis 3-503.10.3.2.2 Normal Operation 3-503.10.3.2.3 Design Features Important to the 3-51
Defueled Condition3.10.3.3 Containment Purge 3-513.10.3.3.1 Design Basis 3-513.10.3.3.2 Normal Operation 3-51
3-iv October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION
3.10.3.3.3
3.10.3.43.10.43.10.53.10.5.13.10.5.23.10.5.2.13.10.5.2.23.10.5.2.33.10.5.2.43.10.5.2.53.10.5.2.6
3.10.63.10.73.10.8
3.113.11.13.11.23.11.2.13.11.2.23.11.2.2.13.11.2.2.1.13.11.2.2.1.23.11.2.2.1.3
3.11.2.2.1.43.11.2.2.1.53.11.2.2.1.63.11.2.2.23.11.2.2.2.13.11.2.33.11.3
TITLE
Design Features Important to theDefueled Condition
Auxiliary Ventilation SystemsFire Protection SystemOperating Control Stations
General LayoutDesign Basis
Control Room DesignAnnunciator and Audible Alarm SystemRadwaste System Control PanelsMiscellaneous Local Control PanelsPager Alarm SystemDesign Features Important to theDefueled Condition
Lighting SystemsCommunications SystemReactor Waste Handling System
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMSDesign BasisSystem Descdption
Offsite Power SystemOnsite Power System
AC Power Systems4160-V System480-V System120-Vac Instrument andControl Power SystemCable DeratingCable Tray LoadingReliability of Power Supplies
DC Power Systems125-Vdc Power System
Design Features Important to the Detueled ConditionFire Protection for Cable Systems
PAGE
3-52
3-523-52a3-533-533-533-533-533-533-543-543-54
3-543-543-54a
3-553-553-553-553-553-553-55a3-563-56
3-563-573-583-593-593-603-60
I
3.12 REFERENCES SECTION 3.0 3-61
3-v October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE TITLE
3-1 List of Missiles for Which Seismic Class I Structures Have Been Designed3-2 Zion Auxiliary-Turbine Bldg, Time-History vs Response Spectrum Analysis,
Comparison of Accelerations at Various Elevations3-3 Seismic Class I Systems and Components3-4 Summary of Concrete and Reinforcing Steel Stresses3-5 Seismic Class I Load Combinations for the Fuel Handling and Auxiliary
Buildings, the Crib House, and Reactor Building Internal Structures3-5a Fuel Handling Building Load Combinations including Single-Failure-Proof Crane3-6 Maximum Soil Pressures and Actual Factors of Safety3-7 Quality Assurance Records to be Maintained for Containment Vessel3-8 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Code Requirements3-9 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Component Design Data3-10 (Deleted).3-11 (Deleted)3-12 (Deleted)3-13 (Deleted)3-14 (Deleted)3-15 AC and DC Power Data
3-vi October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE
3-13-23-33-43-53-63-73-83-93-103-113-123-133-143-153-163-173-183-193-203-213-223-233-243-253-263-273-283-293-303-313-323-333-343-353-363-373-383-393-39a3-40
TITLE
Removable Slab - Tie Down DetailsRemovable Slab - Tie Down DetailsDesign Basis Earthquake (DBE) Response SpectraResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 642' Auxiliary-Turbine-Diesel Generator BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 630' Auxiliary-Turbine-Diesel Generator BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 617' Auxiliary-Turbine-Diesel Generator BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 592' Auxiliary-Turbine-Diesel Generator BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 580' Auxiliary BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 560' Auxiliary-Turbine BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 542' Auxiliary BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 617' Fuel Handling BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 602' Fuel Handling BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 592' Fuel Handling BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 617' Reactor BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 590' Reactor BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 581'-10" Reactor Biological ShieldResponse Spectra - DBE Elevation 568' Reactor BuildingResponse Spectra - DBE Containment Vessel Elevation 626'-3"Response Spectra - DBE Crib House Elevation 594' Operating Floor SlabResponse Spectra - DBE Crib House Elevation 552' Pump Room FloorResponse Spectra - DBE Outdoor EquipmentComparison - Actual Spectrum and Site Spectrum (DBE)Reactor Building Framing Section B-BCrib House Section A-A West AreaFuel Handling Building Roof Framing Plan West AreaFuel Handling Building Wall Plan EL 617'-0" East AreaAuxiliary Building Sections & Details Sheet 16Auxiliary Building Concrete Beam ScheduleConcrete Block Shield Wall-Tie Down DetailsCombined Interaction Model for Reactor and Auxiliary BuildingsSpent Fuel Storage PoolSpent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup SystemDeletedFuel Handling Building Safe Load Path and Restricted AreaDeletedDeletedDeletedDeletedDeletedSpent Fuel Pool Secondary Loop Cooling SystemService Water System
3-vii October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
Criterion 17 - Monitorinq Radioactivity Releases
Means shall be provided for monitoring the containment atmosphere, the facility effluentdischarge paths, and the facility environs for radioactivity that could be released from normaloperations, from anticipated transients, and from accident conditions.
Answer
The facility contains means for monitoring the containment atmosphere, effluent dischargepaths, and the facility environs for radioactivity which could be released under any conditions.The details of the effluent discharge path and containment monitoring methods are contained inChapter 4 while the environmental radiation monitoring system is described in Chapter 2.
The environmental radiation monitoring system will include the ISFSI.
Criterion 18 - Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storaae
Monitoring and alarm instrumentation shall be provided for fuel and waste storage and handlingareas for conditions that might contribute to loss of continuity in decay heat removal and toradiation exposures.
Answer
Sufficient monitoring and alarm instrumentation is provided in waste and fuel storage areas todetect conditions which might contribute to loss of cooling for decay heat removal or abnormalradiation releases. Details of the monitoring systems are included in Chapter 4.
VIII. Fuel and Waste Storage Systems
Criterion 66 - Prevention of Fuel Storage Criticality
Criticality in new and spent fuel storage shall be prevented by physical systems or processes.Such means as geometrically safe configurations shall be emphasized over proceduralcontrols.
Answer
Criticality in new and spent fuel storage areas is prevented both by physical separation of newand spent fuel elements and the presence of borated water in the spent fuel storage pool.Criticality prevention is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Criticality prevention for the dry cask storage system is described in the NAC MANASTORSystem Final Safety Analysis Report (Reference 16).
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ZION STATION DSAR
Criterion 67 - Fuel and Waste Storage Decay Heat
Reliable decay heat removal systems shall be designed to prevent damage to the fuel instorage facilities that could result in radioactivity release to plant operating areas or the publicenvirons.
Details of the NAC MAGNASTOR decay heat removal system are described in the NACMAGNASTOR System Final Safety Analysis Report (Reference 16).
Answer
The Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System provides decay heat removal for the spent fuel pool. Inaddition, the water in the pool is sufficient to absorb the decay heat produced from 1213 spentcores. Details of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and fuel handling facilities are describedin Chapter 3.
Criterion 68 - Fuel and Waste Storage Radiation Shielding
Shielding for radiation protection shall be provided in the design of spent fuel and waste storagefacilities as required to meet the requirements of 1OCFR20.
Details of the NAC MAGNASTOR system shielding design are described in the NACMAGNASTOR System Final Safety Analysis Report, and plant specific calculations aredescribed in the Zion Nuclear Power Station 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report (Reference 17).
Answer
Shielding is provided for fuel handling and waste storage areas to lower radiation doses tolevels below limits specified in 10CFR20. Shielding for these areas and other plant shieldingrequirements and criteria are Included in Chapter 4.
Criterion 69 - Protection Against Radioactivity Release From Spent Fuel and Waste Storage
Containment of fuel and waste storage shall be provided if accidents could lead to release ofundue amounts of radioactivity to the public environs.
The ISFSI spent fuel and GTCC waste storage facility is described in ZNPS ISFSI 10 CFR72.212 Evaluation Report (Reference 17) and analysis of potential accidents in the dry caskstorage system is included in the NAC MAGNASTOR System Final Safety Analysis Report.
Answer
All fuel storage and waste storage facilities are designed to prevent the release of undue ofradioactivity to the public. Fuel storage facilities are described in Chapter 3, waste storagefacilities are described in Chapter 4 and analysis of potential accidents in these systems isincluded in Chapter 5.
3-6 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
For Seismic Class I equipment, dynamic analyses, static analyses, or tests were used todetermine that components and structures will operate or maintain their integrity, as required.For Seismic Class II equipment, static analysis methods were used. Seismic Class Illequipment meets applicable codes.
Seismic design is discussed in Section 3.7.
3.2.2 Seismic Class I Structures
The Containment Building, Fuel Handling Building, ISFSI, and the Auxiliary Building are SeismicClass I structures. The spent fuel pool, in the Fuel Handling Building, and the Control Room, inthe Auxiliary Building, are therefore Seismic Class I. As for the intake structure, that portion ofthe Crib House enclosing the service water pumps and the related essential piping, are allSeismic Class I.
In the permanently defueled condition, the Containment Building, Auxiliary Building, and CribHouse are not vital to the safe shutdown and isolation of the plant since both reactors havebeen permanently defueled. Although the potential for a LOCA no longer exists, the seismicqualification of these structures continues to ensure that a structural failure will not result in anincrease in the severity of any accident postulated to occur in the defueled condition. Inaddition, the Containment Buildings, Fuel Handling Building, and Auxiliary Building also functionto contain radioactive materials and therefore are regarded as Important to the DefueledCondition (ITDC - see 3.2.4).
3-2.3 Seismic Class I Systems and Components
Following the cessation of reactor operations at Zion Station, various systems and componentswere assessed to determine their relative importance in the permanently defueled condition.This section of the DSAR has been modified to only address those systems and componentsoriginally designed as Seismic Class I and determined to be important to the defueled conditionof the plant. Systems and components formerly classified as Seismic Class I and not includedin the DSAR will not be used to support the storage, cooling, or integrity of spent fuel, and arenot associated with the handling of radioactive materials or involved with radiological safety. Assuch, these systems and components have no safety significance.
Table 3-3 lists the Seismic Class I systems and components applicable in the defueledcondition.
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3.2.4 Structures, Systems and Components Important to the Defueled Condition (ITDC1
3.2.4.1 General
SSC classification involves a determination that an SSC is. or is, not safety related'. SSCsclassified as safety-related are treated differently by regulation than other SSCs2.
SSC's were originally classified according to the safety function they performed during poweroperation. Clearly, the first two parts of the safety-relaled definition in 10CFR50.2 (ensuringintegrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the capability to achieve and maintainsafe shutdown) are not applicable to a permanently defueled plant. The third part of the safety-related defin[tion (prevent or mitigate consequences of accidents comparable to10CFR50.34(a)(t) or 1OCFR100.11 guidelines) is also not applicable. This is primarily due tothe fact that the present day source terms are significantly reduced.
The accidents and events that remain applicable to Zion Station in its permanently defueledcondition are:
* Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Building* Spent Fuel Pool Events/Operational Occurrences* Radioactive Waste Handling Accident
A new analysis has been performed for the Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Building. Thisanalysis indicates that off-site doses (without mitigation) are much lower than previouslyevaluated and, thus, well within the 10CFR50.34(a)(1) and 10CFR100. 11 exposure guidelines.The dose to Control Room personnel remains within the limits specified in 10CFR50, AppendixA, GDC-1 9. These results are primarily due to the fact that the spent fuel assemblies in theSpent Fuel Pool have undergone in excess of a year of radioactive decay and there is aninsignificant amount of radioactive iodine left In the fuel assemblies. This accident is discussedin Chapter 5.
1. Safety related SSCs are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure: a)the Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; b). the capabtiity to shut down the reactor and maintain It in a sateshutdowu condition, and c). the capability to prevent or millgate the consequences of accidents that could result inpotential off site exlposureS comparable to guidelines of IOCFR100.
2 1OCFRS0, Appendix B moles that 'The pertinent requirements of this appendix apply to al activities affecting the safety-related functions of..." SSCs.
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The Spent Fuel Pool Events are a loss of forced cooling and a loss of water level. Both casesresult in a loss of forced cooling and a loss of inventory such that boiling in the pool eventuallyoccurs. Based on the reduced heat load in the Spent Fuel Pool (due to the elapsed time sinceboth reactors were shutdown), the evaluations of these events demonstrate that, in both cases,the loss of inventory is very slow. For both the loss of Spent Fuel Pool forced cooling and theloss of Spent Fuel Pool inventory, a significant period of time will elapse from the loss of forcedcooling until boiling and bolloff of the pool occurs until the water level drops to approximately3.9 feet above the stored fuel assemblies. At this water level, the resultant radiological dose atthe edge of the Spent Fuel Pool is approximately 3.6 R/hr. In either of the above cases,adequate time is available to initiate corrective measures for restoration of malfunctioningcomponents, or to initiate an alternative method of cooling using onsite or offsite water supplies,without significant radiological consequences to plant workers in the Fuel Handling Building orto members of the general public. These events are discussed in Chapter 5.
An evaluation of an accident associated with a container of radioactive resins generated duringdecontamination activities has been performed. This evaluation indicated that, based upon acurie content of waste significantly higher than would be allowed in a shipping container, anaccident that results in the airborne release of dewatered resin will not result in a dose at theEAB in excess of the USEPA Protective Action Guidelines or 10CFR100 limits. This accident isdescribed in Chapter 5 (Radioactive Waste Handling Accident).
The drop of a spent fuel cask during handling is not considered credible due to the use of asingle failure proof Fuel Building crane, the use of special lifting devices that satisfy ANSI 14.6,slings that conform to ANSI B30.9-2003 and implementation of the controls of NUREG-0612,which reduces the probability of a heavy load handling accident in or near the Spent Fuel Poolsuch that it need not be considered.
Based on the above, it is concluded that no SSC's are required to be classified as safety-related at Zion in its permanently defueled condition. This results in two areas of interest:
1. Zion's 'nuclear grade" processes are based largely upon quality assurance (10CFR50,Appendix B) requirements. Reclassifying all SSCs as non-safety related could lead tothe elimination of most management controls in situations where maintainingmanagement controls is desired.
2. Zion recognizes that certain functions remain important to safety in the defueledcondition.
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It is necessary to reclassify SSCs in order to proceed with decommissioning. Strictly followingregulatory requirements in reclassification will result in elimination of most of the currentmanagement controls, which is contrary to management's intent.
These concerns are addressed by introducing an artificial classification scheme that goesbeyond regulatory requirements:
* SSCs which support a fuel safety or radiation protection safety function are designated asImportant to the Defueled Condition (ITDC).
" Enhanced management controls are maintained on SSCs classified as ITDC." The current license basis for ITDC SSCs Is reviewed and revised if appropriate using the
applicable change mechanism (e.g., 10CFR50.54, 50.90, 50.59, etc.). This includes theirsafety-related or non-safety related designations.
" SSCs which are not ITDC are eliminated from the license basis.
The following criteria are used to determine which SSCs are designated as ITDC:
Criteria 1. Is the SSC associated with storage, control, or maintenance of nuclear fuel in asafe condition; or handling of radioactive waste classified as greater than ClassA waste? This includes direct as well as indirect effects3.
Criteria 2. Is the SSC associated with Radiological Safety?4
Criteria 3. Is the SSC associated with an outstanding commitment to the regulators whichremains applicable to storage, control, or maintenance of nuclear fuel in a safecondition; or handling of radioactive waste classified as greater than Class Awaste?
Criteria 4. Does the SSC satisfy a requirement based in regulations? This includes anySSC which is independently required by Technical Specifications,.
A positive response to any criteria indicates that an SSC is ITDC. A negative response to allcriteria identifies a non-ITDC SSC. When applying these criteria to determine the effect on anSSC, the scope of the criteria below must be carefully applied.
ISFSI structures, systems and components require for storage and handling of spent fuel areclassified as Important-to-Safety as defined in the NAC MAGNASTOR System Final SafetyAnalysis Report (Reference 16).
3, Includes the following:" Those SSCs required to safely store and handle radioactive waste classified as greater than Class A
waste.I" Those SSCs required to protect workers and the public Irom the consequences of the remaining (or new)
DBA's." Those SSCs required to safely store new fuel until it Is shipped off site." Those systems which monitor or control radiologicaf effluent release paths.
4. Preserve SSCs associated with maintaining exposures ALARA prior to planned removal of those SSCs in support ofplant decommissioning activities..
5. This evaluation assures that the appropriate regulatory change mechanism Is used for effecting the change. Thisincludes changes associated with the Security Plan, Ouality Assurance Program, Emergency Planning. OperationsTraining, Permits, License Conditions, rules. etc.
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3.8.1.5.2 Reinforcinq Steel
Reinforcing steel in the base slab, cylinder wall, the domed roof, and around the openings tocontrol shrinkage and tensile cracks is deformed billet steel bars. This steel has a minimumyield strength of 60,000 psi; a minimum tensile strength of 90,000 psi; and a minimumelongation of 7% in an eight-inch specimen. Splicing of reinforcing bar sizes larger than No. 11is by Cadweld mechanical splices.
3.8.1.5.3 Quality Control
Quality of both materials and construction of the containment vessel is assured by a continuousprogram of quality control and inspection. Table 3-7 delineates the records to be maintained.
3.8.2 Other Seismic Category I Structures
3.8.2.1 Description of Structures
General layouts of Class I structures are found in Figures 1-3 through 1-16 of the Zion DSAR.Typical reinforcement steel arrangements for main members are shown in Figures 3-23 through3-28. The design of Seismic Class I structures other than Containment are discussed in thissection. Containment structure design is discussed in Section 3.8.1.
The ISFSI pad design is described in the Zion Nuclear Power Station 10 CFR 72.212
Evaluation Report (Reference 17).
3.8.2.2 Loads and Load Combinations
Tables 3-5 and 3-5a identify the load combinations and the design criteria applied to thesestructures.
In areas of the plant where removable shield blocks are used, the blocks are tied down asshown in Figure 3-29. This precludes the blocks from becoming missiles during seismic events.
3.8.2.3 Design and Analysis Procedures
The Auxiliary-Turbine Building was modeled as a fixed base model. Free field motion wasdirectly input to the base of the building-only model without considering the translationalsoil-structure interaction. In order to determine the effect of soil-structure interaction, anindependent study was made by employing an Interaction model (Figure 3-30). In this model.both the Reactor and the Auxiliary-Turbine Buildings were embedded separately in the soilmass.
3.8.2.4 Foundations
This information is covered in Section 3.8.1.4.1.3.
3.8.2.5 Materials
The compressive strength of the concrete used in the construction of the structures was 3500psi @ 90 days. In selected areas of the structures, where required by design or constructionconvenience, the compressive strength of the concrete used was 5000 psi @ 90 days. Forreinforcing steel information, see section 3.8.1.5.2.
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3.9 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING
3.9.1 New Fuel Storaqe
3.9.1.1 Design Bases
The design basis for the new fuel storage rack is discussed in Section 3.9.2
3.9.1.2 New Fuel Storage Description
The new fuel storage facility consists of a new fuel storage rack that is in a separate area designedto hold 132 new fuel assemblies. The new fuel assemblies are stored in the new fuel storage rack inparallel rows having a center-to-center distance of 21 inches. The new fuel racks are provided withlocking devices which preclude any transfer of new fuel assemblies without proper authorization.
New (unirradiated) fuel may also be stored in NRC approved shipping containers designed andlicensed for transportation of new fuel. Fuel stored in such containers may be staged in variousapproved locations within the protected area in order to facilitate shipment of the fuel.
3.9.1.3 Desiqn Fea tures Important to the Defueled Condition
The new fuel storage facility Is considered ITDC while it is used to ensure the safe storage of theremaining unirradlated fuel assemblies. After all of the unirradiated fuel assemblies have beenremoved, the new fuel storage facility will no longer be considered ITDC.
3.9.2 Spent Fuel Storaqe
Spent fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool or at the Zion Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installalion(ISFSI). The NAC MAGNASTOR dry cask storage system and ISFSI provide a means for long-termon-site storage of Zion spent nuclear fuel and Greater than-Class C (GTCC) waste as shown inFigure 1-18. Use of the dry cask storage system is granted upon issuance of a Certificate ofCompliance (Reference 18) from the NRC for Zion spent fuel and GTCC waste. Use of the ISFSI forstorage and handling of spent fuel and GTCC waste is granted upon compliance with the conditionsof the General License issued under 10 CFR 72, Subpart K and the Zion Nuclear Power Station 10CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report (Reference 17). The NAC MAGNASTOR dry cask storage syslemdesign basis is described in the NAC MAGNASTOR System Final Safety Analysis Report (Reference16).
3.9.2.1 Fuel Handling Building Fuel Storaae Desian Basis
3.9.2.1.1 Prevention of Fuel Storage Criticality
Criterion: Criticality in the new and spent fuel storage pits shall be prevented by physicalsystems or processes. Such means as geometrically safe configurations shall beemphasized over procedural controls.
The new fuel storage rack accommodates two-thirds of a core (132 fuel assemblies). There arethree sections ol racks with each section made up of two rows. The two parallel rows in each sectionhave a nominal center-to-center spacing of 21 inches and each section is separated by a distance of44 inches to assure that kff < 0.95, even il water filled the new fuel storage vault, provided that thestored fuel has a maximum of 57.4 grams U-235 per axial centimeter of fuel assembly length. Thenew fuel storage vault is protected from flooding by its free flood drain.
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The inventory of spent fuel assemblies at Zion includes 1481 Westinghouse 15x15 assembliesthat have been identified as susceptible to inter-granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) inthe bulge joint region of the guide tubes just below the top nozzle plate. An instrument tube tierod (ITTR) was installed into 1478 of these Zion fuel assemblies to resolve the issue of potentialtop nozzle separation when the IGSCC-aftected assembly is lifted or moved in the spent fuelpool. Each ITTR was inserted through a machined hole in the top nozzle into the centralinstrument tube until the tip extended and engaged below the bottom nozzle plate. Guide tubeanchors were used to repair the remaining three assemblies, namely C63P, C64P and C62R.Six sleeved anchors were installed into preselected guide tubes of each assembly andexpanded to grip the potentially defective sections just below the top nozzle. After guide tubeanchor and ITTR installation, normal fuel handling procedures using conventional tools canengage the fuel assembly top nozzle to lift and move the IGSCC-susceptible fuel assemblies.
A new fuel elevator is located in the pool that was used to transfer new fuel assemblies into thepool for subsequent handling with the spent fuel pool handling crane. The elevator is equippedwith alarms to inform the operator of any malfunction of the elevator during movement of newfuel. To prevent the inadvertent lifting of irradiated fuel, the new fuel elevator is key interlockedto prohibit raising when the elevator is loaded with greater than 1400 lbs. Raising of the elevatorwhen loaded with a fuel element activates an audible alarm.
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The Cask Loading Pit is a separate, walled off area provided at the northwest corner of the poolfor loading used fuel into a Transportable Storage Cask (TSC).
In the unlikely event that some leakage from the spent fuel pool were to occur, protectivefeatures have been provided to prevent radioactive material release to the environs from eitherloss of water from the storage pool or mechanical damage to the irradiated fuel.
The below listed features were incorporated in the design of the spent fuel pool to meet thedesign intent of AEC Safety Guide 13:
1 All spent fuel storage facilities are located in a Seismic Class I structure. In addition, thespent fuel racks within the fuel pool are Seismic Class I.
2. Although no longer required to be functional or credited In any accident analysis, theventilation system provided in the Fuel Handling Building is equipped with filtrationdevices to limit the potential release of radioactive materials.
3. All piping connections to or from the spent fuel pool are above the level of the spent fuelracks.
4. Level instrumentation, with alarms, and radiation monitoring devices have been providedfor the spent fuel pool.
5. Makeup water for the pool is available from a tank onsite. Backup sources are availablefrom additional water supplies. As a result of decommissioning, Zion Municipal water isthe current dedicated source of makeup water.
6. Interlocks are provided to prevent the main hoist from carrying heavy loads over thearea of the spent fuel pool where fuel is stored unless specific procedural requirementsare met to bypass the interlocks. These interlocks are described in detail in Section3.9.3.2.4.1. Figure 3-34 shows the general arrangement of the Fuel Handling Buildingand the route for the MTC with a TSC to move from the Spent Fuel Pool to the CaskDecontamination Pit and from there to the truck bay.
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3.9.3.2.3 Fuel Buildinq Crane
The upgraded Fuel Handling Building crane is a overhead top-running traveling bridge craneand is equipped with a 125-ton design load (DRL) main hoist and a 15-ton auxiliary hoist.
The overhead crane is used for lifting and transporting the MAGNASTOR Transfer Cask (MTC)containing a loaded Transportable Storage Container (TSC) from the Spent Fuel Pool caskloading area to the cask decontamination area and to the Fuel Handling Building truck bay.The empty MTC and TSC may be staged on the north side of the pool prior to placement in theloading pit. After the TSC is loaded with used fuel, it is moved from the spent fuel pool to theCask Decontamination Pit for canister processing. The TSC lid is welded and the canister isvacuum dried and back filled with helium in the decontamination pit. When canister processingis complete, the MTC is placed on top of the Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) and the TSC islowered into the cask. The VCC with the loaded TSC is then removed from the FHB on a LowProfile Cask Rail Transporter. The crane is also used to lift and move other equipment locatedor stored in the Fuel Handling Building and items associated with loading and handling spentfuel casks.
The overhead crane meets the single-failure proof criteria of ASME NOG-1-2004, NUREG-0554, and NUREG-0612, Appendix C. The main hoist is classified as a Type I main hoist perASME NOG-1-2004 and has a Maximum Critical Load (MCL) rating of 125 tons.. The auxiliaryhoist is not single-failure proof (Type Ill).
The Fuel Handling Building crane is classified as Important-To-Defueled-Condition (ITDC)equipment and Seismic Class 1 equipment and is seismically analyzed. The crane is designedsuch that it will maintain control of the MCL during a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) event.
The single-failure proof trolley for the overhead crane meets the structural and mechanicalrequirements of ASME NOG-1-2004, with one exception. Tornado wind loads are notconsidered in the new analyses and are instead referred back to the original design basis.Since the design basis does not include tornado wind loads combined with crane live loads,crane operations will be suspended in the event of an actual or forecast tornado, hurricane, ortropical storm.
The structural design of the existing bridge and support structure conforms to the applicablerequirements of the Electrical Overhead Crane Institute, Inc. (EOCi) Specification andapplicable portions of the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Specification for alldesign provisions not covered by the EOCI Specification. The crane has been designed towithstand seismic conditions. The main hook is a Osister hook" type with pin hole and is fittedwith safety latches. The hook is forged steel and has been ultrasonic and magnetic particleinspected. The load on the wire rope does not exceed 10% of the published breaking strength.The load does not exceed 40% of the published breaking strength in a seismic event or brokenrope scenario.
The crane is provided with three brakes, an eddy current brake and two shoe-type holdingbrakes. Each mechanical brake is-capable of holding 150% of full load drive torque. Loss ofpower results in setting the mechanical holding brakes. Load control is provided by electricallycontrolled dynamic braking. The eddy current brake is used for emergency lowering of the loadand does not require external power.
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3.9.3.2.4 Fuel Building Crane Interlocks
The fuel bui!ding crane has been designed with safety interlocks and limit switches, which,together with end stops, guard against any over-travel of both the bridge and trolley. Additionallimit switches limit both the upper and lower travel of the hoists. These switches are activatedwhenever the crane apparatus goes beyond these limits and whenever a high radioactivitysignal is transmitted by the radiation monitor. Interlocks are also provided to prevent main hoisttravel over the Spent Fuel Pool exclusive of the cask loading pit. Other interlocks are alsoprovided as safety features for the main hoist.
3.9.3.2.4.1 Travel Limit Switches
The bridge and trolley are provided with limit switches of the automatic-reset type to slow downthe bridge or trolley prior to contact with the end stops. Limit switches are also provided for thebridge and trolley that define a restricted zone around the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The zone isbased on main hook location such that a spent fuel transfer cask could not be brought over theSFP exclusive of the cask loading pit. In the event that the crane must be brought over thespent fuel pool, where spent fuel is stored, administrative controls to bypass these limitswitches will comply with controls specified in an approved site procedure..
3.9.3.2.4.2 Hoist Limit Switches
The main and auxiliary hoists are provided with two limit switches in both the raise and lowerdirections. Both hoists have a geared limit switch for the first limit in each direction. Thegeared limits remove control power in the direction of motion, but will allow the reverse motionafter being actuated. Both hoists also have a weighted limit switch for the second upper limit.The upper weighted limit switches de-energize the respective safety stop circuits, removingpower from the hoist motion contactor and setting the brakes. Both hoists utilize the loadweighing system to provide a second lower limit. When an underweight (slack rope) conditionis detected, the respective safety stop circuits are de-energized, removing power from the hoistmotion contaclor and setting the brakes.
Except for the drive faults, the above limits can be bypassed allowing operation of the reversedirection to correct the condition.
The following conditions also stop main and/or aux hoist motion by de-energizing the main hoistmotion contactor:
• Mis-reeving detected by a bar over the drum (main hoist only).* Overweight condition detected by the load weighing system.* Unbalanced load detected by the load weighing system (main hoist only).* Overspeed switch (main hoist only).• Hoist Drive fault.
The following condition interrupts the up motion control for the main and aux hoists:
* High radioactivity signal transmitted by Fuel Building overhead crane radiation monitor
Either hoist will be able to lower the load following a high radiation signal.
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3.9.3.3 Desian Features Important to the Defueled Condition
The Fuel Handling System, as described in section 3.9.3, is considered ITDC since it isassociated with the safe storage and handling of nuclear fuel.
3.9.4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
3.9.4.1 Desion Basis
The Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System is designed to remove heat from the spent fuel poolgenerated by the stored spent fuel elements. The system serves the spent fuel pool, which isshared between the two units.
System piping is arranged so that failure of any pipeline does not drain the spent fuel poolbelow the top of the stored fuel elements (Reference 3).
3.9.4.1.1 Fuel and Waste Storage Decay Heat
Criterion: Reliable decay heat removal systems shall be designed to prevent damage tothe fuel in storage facilities, and to waste storage tanks that could result inradioactivity release, which results in undue risk to the health and safety of thepublic.
The Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System has two cooling trains. Either of these trains is capable ofhandling the heat load residing in the spent fuel pool. During normal conditions, the pump andspent fuel pool heat exchanger handle the decay heat load and maintain the temperaturebetween 40OF and 1200F, with one train operating.
3.9.4.1.2 Codes and Classifications
All piping and components of the system are designed to the applicable codes and standardslisted in Table 3-8.
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3.9.4.3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Pumps
The two spent fuel pool pumps circulate water in the spent fuel pool cooling loops. All wettedsurfaces of the pump are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion resistant material.The pumps are operated manually from a local station.
3.9.4.3.3 Spent Fuel Pool Filters
The spent fuel pool filters remove particulate matter from the spent fuel pool water. The filtercartridge is of synthetic fiber, and the vessel shell is austenitic stainless steel. Different filtercartridges can be installed, if needed, to improve water clarity.
3.9.4.3.4 Spent Fuel Pool Strainers
A stainless steel strainer is located at the inlet of each spent fuel pool cooling suction line forremoval of relatively large particles which might otherwise clog the spent fuel pooldemineralizer.
3.9.4.3.5 Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizers
Each of the inline demineralizers are sized to pass about 100 gpm of the loop circulation flow toprovide adequate purification of the spent fuel pool water for unrestricted access to the workingarea and to maintain water clarity. Additionally, an underwater, inpool demineralizer isavailable. It Is sized to pass about 200 gpm of the pool volume to provide adequate purificationof the spent fuel pool water for unrestricted access to the working area and maintain waterclarity.
3.9.4.3.6 Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer
A spent fuel pool skimmer pump, strainer, and filter are provided for surface skimming of thespent fuel pool water. This subsystem maintains the needed clarity for visual observations ofthe spent fuel pool water.
3.9.4.3.7 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Valves
Manual stop valves are used to isolate equipment, and manual throttle valves provide flowcontrol. Valves in contact with spent fuel pool water are austenitic stainless steel or equivalentcorrosion-resistant material.
3.9.4.3.8 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Pipinl
All piping in contact with spent fuel pool water is austenitic stainless steel. The piping is weldedexcept where flanged connections are used at the pump, heat exchanger, and filter to facilitatemaintenance.
3.9.4.3.9 SDent Fuel Pool Sump Recessed Area
A sump recessed area in the spent fuel pool allows for complete draining of the sump with asubmersible pump for cleaning, inspection, and maintenance of the spent fuel pool.
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3.9.4.4 Spent Fuel Pool Make-up Capability
Various equipment and components are available to provide make-up water to the spent fuelpool. Make-up to the spent fuel pool would normally be required to account for naturalevaporation. Makeup sources include water from Zion Municipal Water system and the Service IWater header via hoses. A boron mixing tank located near the Spent Fuel Pool is available toprovide borated water makeup.
The Zion Municipal water supply is hard piped directly to the edge of the SFP and is passedthrough a water purification unit prior to discharge into the pool.
The spent fuel pool has been analyzed for loss of cooling (see Chapter 5). Sufficient time existsfrom the time cooling is lost and boiling occurs that compensatory measures can be taken,including supplying make-up water, to prevent fuel damage and off-site releases that exceedUSEPA Protective Action Guidelines or 10CFR100 limits.
3.9.4.5 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition
This system is associated with the storage of nuclear fuel and helps ensure adequate decayheat removal (cooling function) while maintaining exposures to plant personnel ALARA (cleanupfunction). Those portions of the Spent Fuel Cooling and Cleanup System which provide coolingand cleanup capability to the spent fuel pool are considered ITDC. These are as follows:
" Spent fuel pool pumps (as required)" Spent Fuel Pool heat exchangers (as required)* Spent Fuel Pool demineralizers (as required)" Associated piping, valves, filters, skimmers, and strainers, Spent Fuel Pool weir gate, including seal and nitrogen pressurization bottles if transfer canal
is drained and weir gate is installed (this is being listed here rather than in section 3.9.2since its failure, which is discussed in chapter 5, could lead to a loss of Spent Fuel Poolcooling).
" Municipal water supply makeup to the SFP" Boron mixing tank for borated water makeup.
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3.9.5 Control of Heavy Loads
3.9.5.1 Introduction/ Licensing Background
In response to NRC Bulletin 96-02 (Ref. 12), Exelon provided confirmation (Ref. 13) that allheavy load handling activities that were planned at that time were within existing regulatoryguidelines. Furthermore, the response indicated that if any subsequent activities identified anunreviewed safety question per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, a license amendment requestwould be submitted.
In order to move the spent fuel from the spent fuel pool to the Independent Spent Fuel StorageInstallation (ISFSI), Zion has upgraded the Fuel Handling Building overhead crane to a single-failure-proof capability. The change in methodology for analyzing a cask drop, from a non-single-failure-proof crane and load drop analysis to a single-failure-proof crane with noassumed load drop, required a license amendment request per 10 CFR 50.90 (Ref.14). Thelicense amendment (Ref. 15) allows the transfer of spent fuel to a transportable storagecanister located in the cask loading area of the spent fuel pool without having to assume a caskdrop accident.
Operations, maintenance, testing and administrative station procedures provide the necessarycontrols for the handling of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool such that the requirements ofNUREG-0612 are met.
3.9.5.2 Safety Basis
The risk associated with handling of heavy loads at the Zion Nuclear Power Station isacceptably low based on compliance with the NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.1, 5.1 2 and 5.1.6requirements. For movement of the of the transportable storage canisters in the Fuel HandlingBuilding using the overhead crane, the safety evaluation report concluded that a cask dropaccident is unlikely based on the use of the single-failure-proof crane, handling equipmentcertification and administrative controls.
3.9.5.3 Scope and Control of Heavy Load Handling Systems
The Fuel Handling Building overhead and load handling equipment has been determined to bewithin the scope of NUREG 0612. The sections that follow provide details of the aspects of theZion Nuclear Power Station Heavy Loads Program.
3.9.5.4 NUREG 0612 Elements
The Fuel Handling Building overhead crane is within the scope of NUREG 0612. Sevenelements must be met as described in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1 commonly known as PhaseI. ["Accordingly, all plants should satisfy each of the following for handling heavy loads thatcould be brought in proximity to or over safe shutdown equipment or irradiated fuel in the spentfuel pool area or containment (PWRs), in the reactor building (BWRs), and in other plantareas."] Due to the present state of decommissioning the Zion Nuclear Power Station, the onlyarea still applicable to NUREG-0612 is the spent fuel pool area.
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These seven elements of Phase I have been implemented at the Zion Nuclear Power Station asfollows:
3.9.5.4.1 Safe Load Paths
Safe load paths have been defined at the Zion Nuclear Power Station for the handling of heavyloads utilizing load handling equipment, which, if dropped could impact irradiated fuel.Deviations from defined load paths will require alternative approved procedures. Load paths arenot defined for loads less than 1,800 lbs., however, they typically follow the safest and shortestroute with the load as close to the floor as practical. A heavy load is defined as a load greaterthan or equal to 1,800 lbs.
Existing Fuel Handling Building overhead crane procedures and the fuel transfer proceduresdescribe the job responsibility of the person directing the heavy load movement.
3.9.5.4.2 Load Handling Procedures
Procedures have been developed to cover load handling operations for the heavy loadsidentified in Table 3.1-1 of NUREG 0612 at the Zion Nuclear Power Station. These proceduresidentify the required equipment, the inspections and acceptance criteria prior to initiating loadmovement, the steps and sequence in handling the load and define the safe load path andother special precautions. Because the maximum credible tornado and the fully loaded cranehave not been analyzed together, heavy load movements using the Fuel Building overheadbridge crane are not permitted If a tornado, hurricane or tropical storm watch or warning hasbeen declared for the site.
3.9.5.4.3 Qualifications, Training, and Conduct of Crane Operators
The Zion Nuclear Power Station complies with ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operatortraining, qualification and conduct.
3.9.5.4.4 Special Lifting Devices
The special lifting devices employed at the Zion Nuclear Power Station have been designed inaccordance with industrial standards using good engineering practices. The special liftingdevices for the MAGNASTOR transfer cask have been provided by NAC. The fabrication ofthese lifting devices used standard quality control procedures. The lift yoke special liftingdevices have been designed and tested in accordance with ANSI N14.6-1993 requirements.
Prior to use of specially designed lifting devices, visual inspection is performed, in some cases,certain critical and accessible parts or members, such as hooks and pins, are non-destructivelyexamined at appropriate time intervals.
Should an incident occur in which a special lifting device is overloaded, damaged or distorted,an engineering assessment is performed. This assessment addresses ANSI N14.6 and includesconsideration of the load test up to the original procurement load test value or 150%, whicheveris less.
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3.9.5.4.5 Lifting Devices Not Specially Designed
For heavy road handling where the load, if dropped, could fall into the SFP or impact a loadedspent fuel cask, Zion Nuclear Power Station procures and inspects slings to ANSI B30.9-2003.Inspections are conducted annually and examined visually prior to use. Slings are installed andused in accordance with ANSI B30.9-2003. All lifting devices were designed according toindustrial standards using good engineering practices. The dynamic loads generated by theFuel Handling Building crane at the Zion Nuclear Power Station are added to the static loadwhen selecting slings.
3.9.5.4.6 Inspection and Testing of Cranes
The Fuel Handling Building crane at the Zion Nuclear Power Station is inspected, tested, andmaintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, with the exception that testingand inspections are performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies ofANSI B30.2.
3.9.5.4.7 Crane Design
The Fuel Handling Building crane bridge was originally designed in accordance with the EOCI-61 specification for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes and runways in accordance with theAISC specifications for the design, fabrication and erection of structural steel for buildings.Welding was performed in accordance with AWS specifications. The trolley and 125-ton mainhoist meet the single-failure proof requirements of NUREG-0554 and ASME NOG-1 -2004 withone exception described in Section 3.9.3.2.3.. The bridge has been evaluated against ASMENOG-1 criteria for use as part of the single failure proof crane.
3.9.5.5 Safety Evaluation
The overhead handling of heavy loads at the Zion Nuclear Power Station is conducted in a safemanner through the use of safe load paths, qualified operators and adequately designed andmaintained load handling equipment.
These controls as implemented to comply with NUREG 0612 "Control of Heavy Loads atNuclear Power Plants," Section 5.1.1 (Phase I) and single failure-proof features per Section5.1.6. ensure that the risk of a load drop accident is low.
Restrictions for load height and weight are procedurally controlled to ensure the design basisand seismic analysis remain valid. Requirements to ensure that the handling of heavy loads isperformed in a safe manner and that the risk associated with these activities is adequatelyevaluated are provided in station procedures that control these activities.
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PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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3.10.2 Service Water System
3.10.2.1 Design Basis
The Service Water System provides the required dilution flow for making liquid waste releasesto Lake Michigan, and provides an alternate source of makeup water to the SFP. Thearrangement of the equipment and the flow path of the water is shown on Figure 3-40.
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3.10.2.2 System Description
The service water pump is rated at 3,000 gpm at 82 feet TBH. The pump is located outdoorsand takes its suction from the Crib House forebay which receives water from the lake throughthree, 13-foot steel intake lines. Two of the intake lines have 24-foot diameter bell-shapedinlets and are covered by a flat protective canopy. The third intake line receives water throughan annular structure with 55 openings separated by as much as 96 feet. It is extremelyimprobable that any single barge or ship on Lake Michigan could block all of the circulatingwater intake structure. Any two of the openings in the annular Intake structure which suppliesone 13-foot intake line, or a small fraction of one of the two 24-foot diameter bell-shaped inlets,each of which supply one 13-foot intake line, would be adequate to provide full service waterflow for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. In the event that all three intake lines are blocked, water can beadmitted to the forebay through one discharge line and its recirculation connection to theforebay.
The discharge of the service water pump is routed directly to the U2 discharge tunnel.
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The minimum service water flow is maintained at 2500 gpm for dilution flow of site effluent Ireleases. This is verified by pump discharge pressure and a flow gauge during batch releases. I
3.10.2.3 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition
* The Service Water System is not associated with the maintenance of stored nuclear fuel ina safe condition. As such, this system is not considered ITDC.
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3.10.3 Ventilation Systems
3.10.3.1 Control Room Heating., Ventilating, and Air Conditioninq System
3.10.3.1.1 Design Bases
The design of the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning for the Control Room is based on asystem with the capability to provide air filtration, heating, and/or cooling, with humidificationand/or dehumidification to support routine occupancy of the control room necessary to remotelymonitor and operate spent fuel cooling and its associated support systems.
3.10.3.1.2 System Description
The Control Room HVAC System arrangement consists of high efficiency filters, a cooling andheating coil package, and a direct-driven vane axial fan. Air is supplied through a louverallceiling. Return air passes through the control boards into a return duct system which isconnected to outlets on top of the boards. The return air is mixed with outside air as required tomeet minimum ventilation requirements and/or room cooling requirements. The Control RoomHVAC System Equipment Room and outside air intake is located at El 617'.
In the event of smoke in the control boards, smoke detectors will annunciate in the ControlRoom.
Mechanical cooling for the Control Room HVAC System is provided by means of two 100%capacity water-cooled refrigeration units. Each refrigeration unit is connected to its respectiveair handling unit.
3.10.3.1.3 Normal Operation
Each Control Room HVAC System is controlled to provide ventilation, healing, and/or coolingon a year-round basis. Two full-capacity air handling units are provided, one of which isstandby.
Each air handling unit is connected to a full-capacity refrigeration unit. During normaloperation, a minimum amount of outdoor air is introduced to the system for the purpose of odordilution. Return air from the conditioned spaces is ducted back through a return fan and isrecirculated through the air handling unit. A standby return air fan is provided. Each system isprovided with separate controls.
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See figures 3-43 and 3-44.
3.10.3.3.3 Desiqn Features Imortant to the Defueled Condition
The Containment Purge system is associated with effluent monitoring in conjunction with theassociated vent stack Air Monitor, and with personnel comfort and habitability. The featuresdeemed Important to the Defueled Condition for these functions during operation are:
* Containment Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves 1(2)AOV-RV0002 & RV0004* Vacuum and Pressure Relief line isolation valve 1(2)AOV-RV0006* Debris screens* Purge exhaust HEPA filter bank
3.10.3.4 Auxiliary Ventilation Systems
The auxiliary ventilation systems are those ventilation systems that are operated to facilitate thegeneral maintenance of the facility and whose function is deemed not to be ITDC. Theseventilation systems circulate air for personnel comfort in the summer months, and inconjunction with the heating system, provide freeze protection in the winter months. Withoutthe auxiliary ventilation systems in service, these same functions could be performed usingportable fans and heaters. The auxiliary ventilation systems are comprised of the following:
* Main Turbine Building Ventilation System,* Portions of the Containment Ventilation System (not described as ITDC in section 3.10.3.3)," Portions of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (not described as ITDC in section
3.10.3.2)," Computer and Miscellaneous Equipment Room Ventilation System, and" Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Systems.
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3.10.8 Reactor Waste Handling System
The reactor vessels and their internal components must be segmented and removed from theirrespective Containment Buildings during plant decommissioning. The segmentation activitiesresult in the generation of radioactive waste material. The segmented material Is loaded intoapproved waste transport containers using the Polar Cranes. The Polar Cranes also lift theloaded waste transport container onto a vendor-supplied Heavy Lift Rail System for transfer outof the Containment Building.
As permanently installed plant components handling radioactive waste classified as greaterthan Class A waste, the Polar Cranes are classified as being Important To the DefueledCondition.
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3.12 References, Section 3.0
1. Spent Fuel Pool Modification for Increased Storage Capacity, Revision 0, datedNovember 15, 1991
2. Zion Station Calculation No. 22S-0-11 OS-0060, "Evaluation of the Zion Spent Fuel Poolfor an Accident Temperature of 212 Degrees F."
3. November 18, 1996 CornEd Response to NRC Final Report on Spent Fuel Storage Pool
Safety Issues.
4. Gould Co. Calculation SO 7-0432124-EQ dated 1-8-71
5. Power Conversion Inc. letter dated 5-25-71 and Gaynes Testing Lab report on Job#7115, dated 3-11-71.
6. General Electric Co. letter dated 2-26-71.
7. General Electric Co. Report #701CS101, dated 2-18-71.
8. Gould Co. Calculation SO 7-043123-EQS, dated 1-8-71.
9. Gould Co. letter dated June 14, 1971 summarizing results of test performed by TIITesting Lab, Inc., College Point, NY.
10. Gaynes Testing Lab Report #71448A dated November 9, 1971.
11. AIEE/IPCEA Power Cable Ampacities, Volume I - Copper Conductors, (AIEEPublication No. S-135-1, IPCEA Publication No. P-46-426) - 1962.
12. NRC Bulletin 96-02, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel In TheReactor Core Or Over Safety-Related Equipment."
13. John B. Hosmer (CoinEd) letter to U.S. NRC, CornEd Response to NRC Bulletin 96-02,"Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or OverSafety-Related Equipment," dated May 13, 1996.
14. ZionSolutions, LLC license amendment requests dated October 25, 2012 and May 16,2013.
15. NRC License Amendments 186 and 173, dated September 19, 2013
16. MAGNASTOR System Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 5, August 2013.
17. Zion Nuclear Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage installation (ZNPS ISFSI)10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report.
18. NRC Certificate of Compliance No. 1031, Amendment 3 for the NAC International Inc.(NAC) MAGNASTOR System, July 25, 2013
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TABLE 3-3
SEISMIC CLASS I SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS
PIPING SYSTEMS
" Service Water (partial)* Liquid Radwaste (partial)" Fire Water (partial)
COMPONENTS
" Spent fuel pool cooling loop pump, strainers, valves, andpiping which are in Seismic Class I structures or concrete
* Spent fuel storage pool, including spent fuel storageracks
" Spent fuel pit bridge and hoist" Auxiliary & Fuel Building Crane" Hangers, Supports & Snubbers for Seismic Class I piping
systems* Valves in Seismic Class I piping systems" Radiation Monitoring (partial)* Fuel Handling Building Seismic Restraint System
consisting of an upper lateral restraint for the MagnastorTransfer Cask and a lower lateral restraint for theVertical Concrete Cask.
* ISFSI Pad" NAC MAGNASTOR Dry Cask Storage System
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TABLE 3-5A
Fuel Handling Building Seismic Load Combinations including Single-Failure-Proof Crane
Original design of the Fuel Handling Building was in accordance with Table 3-5. The supportstructure for the Fuel Handling Building overhead crane was reevaluated as part of the single failureproof handling system upgrade described in Section 3.9.2.3. All applicable combinations providedin Table 3-5 were modified to include the rated capacity of the crane, including impact, and live loadoccurring simultaneously with earthquake and conform to ACI 349-97 for reinforced concrete designand AISC N690-1994 for steel design.
The effect of W' (maximum credible tornado) combined with the full rated capacity of the crane shallnot be considered applicable since provisions shall be made to prevent or secure load handling withthe FHB Overhead Crane during a tornado, hurricane or tropical storm watch.
For this evaluation, the load combinations of Table 3-5 have been determined to be as follows, whichinclude crane impact loads per AISC N690-1994, Table Q1.5.7.1 and ACI 349-97, Section 9.2.1:
Load CombinationD + L + S+ C +Iv* IHI• *± Eo (Severe) AISC N690-1994D + C + IV * H IL * E (Severe - no live load condition) AISC N690-1994D + L + S + C + Iv * IN ±
IL. Ess (Extreme) AISC N690-1994,ACI 349-97
D + C + Iv ± IN * IL ± Ess (Extreme - no live load condition) AISC N690-1994,ACI 349-97
Member stress limits are in accordance with Table 3-5.
The following additional ultimate strength combinations are applicable to reinforced concretecomponents, such as anchor bolts, which are evaluated in accordance with AC1349-97 (Ref. 3-1.9):
1.413 + 1.7(L + S + C + Iv I±L ± Eo) (Severe) ACI 349-970.91 + 1.7(C + IV * IH ± IL ± Eo) (Severe - no live load condition) ACI 349-97D + L + S + C + IV± IN * L ± Ess (Extreme) ACI 349-970.9D + C + IV ± IN * IL ± Ess (Extreme - no live load condition) ACI 349-97
Member resistance factors are in accordance with AC1349-97, (Ref. 3.1.9).
Where:D = Dead Load including Crane Bridge and TrolleyL = Live LoadS = Snow LoadC = Crane Rated Load including Load Block and Rigging
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TABLE 3-5A (Continued)
iv = Vertical impact load per AISC 6th Edition1H = Transverse Crane Impact Load per AISC 6th Edition (perpendicular to building runway girder)IL = Longitudinal Crane Impact Load per AISC 6th Edition (parallel to building runway girder)Eo = ORE EarthquakeEss = SSE Earthquake
Load combinations for evaluation of the crane are from ASME NOG-1-2004, Section 4140 for aType I crane with one exception. Tornado wind loads are not considered in the new analyses and areinstead referred back to the original design basis. The only credible load combinations to considerwhich will have an impact on the building evaluation are consolidated into the following loadcombination. This combination may vary from the previous combinations since it applies impactloads that may, or may not be, different than those required for the building evaluation.
P = D + C + PK ± Phi ±Pht
Where:D = Dead Load including Crane Bridge, Trolley and Load BlockC = Crane Rated Load including riggingP= Vertical Impact Load per ASME NOG- 1-2004 (Ref. 3. 1. 10)Ph, = Transverse Horizontal Load per ASME NOG- 1-2004 (Ref. 3.1.10)(parallel to building runway girder, perpendicular to crane bridge)Phi = Longitudinal Horizontal Load per ASME NOG- 1-2004 (Ref. 3. 1. 10)(perpendicular to building runway girder, parallel to crane bridge)
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TABLE 3-9 (2 of 3)
SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENT DESIGN DATA
SPENT FUEL POOL DEMINERALIZERNumber (shared)TypeVessel design pressure,
Internal, psigExternal, psig
Vessel design temperature, OFDesign flow rate, gpm MaximumMinimum D/FNormal flow, gpmNormal operating temperature, OFNormal operating pressure, psigResin type
SPENT FUEL POOL FILTERNumber (shared)Type
Internal design pressure, psigDesign temperature, 'FRated flow, gpmFihlration requirement
SPENT FUEL POOL SKIMMER FILTERNumber (shared)Type
Internal design pressure, psigDesign temperature, OFRated flow, gpmFiltration requirement
UNDERWATER (IN-POOLI SPENT FUEL POOLDEMINERALIZER
NumberVessel Design Pressure, psigDesign Flow Rate, gpmVessel MaterialResin Capacity, cu ft
2Flushable
2001525010010100120Approximately 50Anion and/or cation
2Replaceable (CageAssembly or single element)200250Nom. 100, Max. 15098% retention of particlesabove 25 micron
1Replaceable (CageAssembly or single element)20025010098% retention of particlesabove 25 micron
150200Stainless steel5o
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Figure 3-33
SPENT FUEL CASK MOVEMENT PATH INFUEL HANDLING BUILDING
October 2014
FIGURE 3-34
FUEL HANDLING BUILDINGSAFE LOAD PATH AND RESTRICTED AREA
-SAFE LOAD PATHFOR LOADEDTRANSFER CASK
-FUEL HANDL INGBUILDINGRESTRICTED AREA
FUEL HANDL)NG BO|LDONSAFE LOAD PATH AND RESTRICTED AREA
NOTE: LOAD PATHS FOR OTHER CRITICAL LOADS W(LL BE DEVELOPEDIN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEAVY LOAD PROGRAM.
REFERENCE: 1. FHi-222. B-109, 8-113. B-114 & B-115
KEY PLAN EM FUEL HANDLING BUILDING RESTRICTED AREA
0 SAFE LOAD PATH FOR LOADED TRANSFER CASK
ZION STATION OSARFIGURE 3-34
FUEL HANDLING BUILDING
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Figure 3-35
CASK OVER STORAGE AREA -LOOKING SOUTH
October 2014
i
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Figure 3-36
ELEVATION OF FUEL HANDLINGBUILDING - LOOKING SOUTH
October 2014
i
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Figure 3-37
YEILD LINE PATTERN FOR FLEXURALFAILURE IN GUARD WALL
Octobei 2014
U
DELETED
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Figure 3-38LOAD VS. DEFLECTION CURVE FORGUARD WALL (FOR MOST CRITICAL
POSITION)Oclobef 2014
EMERGENCYMAKEUP TO SFP
FLOW ELEMENT
TO DISCHARGETUNNELDILUTION
WATER PUMP
CRIB HOUSEFOREBAY
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GURE 3-40
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM(SIMPL IF [ED)
ZION STATION DSAR
4.4.1.2 Protective Clothinq
The nature of the work to be done and the radiological conditions are the governing factors inthe selection of protective clothing to be worn. Examples of the protective apparel available areshoe covers, rubber overshoes, head covers, beanies, gloves (cotton liners and rubber gloves),and coveralls or lab coats. Additional items of specialized apparel such as plastic or rubbersuits, face shields, and respirators are available for operations Involving high levelcontamination and airborne radioactivity areas. In all cases, radiation protection personnel shallevaluate the radiological conditions and specify the required items of protective clothing.
Controlled areas are posted as radiation areas, high radiation areas, radioactive materialsareas, airborne radioactivity areas, or combinations thereof. Access to controlled areas for allwork is authorized in accordance with the Radiation Protection Program and Procedures. Anuncontrolled area is that area within the Station security fencing that is not part of a controlledarea.
4.4.1.3 Physical Barriers for Access to High Radiation Areas
Areas in which the radiation levels could result in a whole body radiation exposure of greaterthan 1000 mrem in one hour at 30 cm from the source are equipped with locked doors orappropriate barriers to prohibit unauthorized entry. A key control procedure is implemented toensure positive control of each entry to locked high radiation areas.
4.4.1.4 Monitoring and Change Room Facilities
The general arrangement of the plant is designed to provide adequate personneldecontamination and change areas. Local change areas are provided for control of radioactivecontamination at the job site. Clothing racks, hampers, and step-off pads, are provided in theseareas. A radiation monitor (frisker) is provided as practicable at the exit from contaminatedareas. Personnel are instructed to check themselves for contamination before leaving. Use ofpersonnel monitoring devices, such as portal monitors, friskers, etc., are required before leavingthe Auxiliary Building.
4.4.1.5 Records
Logs are kept in the Control Room or other appropriate locations to record the various unitoperations and conditions. Each shift records sequentially in these logs such items as status ofunit equipment, malfunctions, trips (including the reasons therefore), changes in operatingconditions, tests and measurements performed by the operators, and other information of asignificant nature. In addition to the logs, separate log sheets are also maintained for significantroutine data and special tests or measurements.
Records of personnel radiation exposure histories and radioactivity discharged to theenvironment (at or prior to the point of such discharge) are maintained by the RadiationProtection Department.
Records of principal maintenance operations involving substitution or replacement of equipmentor components and the reasons therefore are maintained in the Records, Retention, andRetrieval System.
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4.4.2 Procedures
The Radiation Protection Program and Procedures are designed to provide protection of personnelagainst exposure to radiation and radioactive materials in a manner consistent with applicableregulations. The policy of ZS is to maintain personnel radiation exposure As Low as is ReasonablyAchievable (ALARA). Therefore, each individual is trained to minimize his exposure consistent withdischarging his duties. Each individual is responsible for observing rules adopted for his safety andthat of others.
Radiation protection personnel evaluate radiological conditions of operations and establish theprocedures to be followed by all personnel. They ensure that all applicable regulations are compliedwith and that the required radiation protection records are adequately maintained.
Training of operators, maintenance, and technical personnel in radiation protection principles andprocedures took place before initial unit operation. New employees, contractors, and othersupporting personnel are given initial training at the beginning of their work assignments and annualretraining thereafter.
Procedures are in place which require performance of ALARA reviews, as necessary, of proposedplant design changes and modifications.
4.5 Radioactive Waste Management
4.5.1 General
Radioactive waste management is maintained through the use of the Liquid and Solid WasteSystems. These systems collect, process, monitor, and regulate the discharge of all potentiallyradioactive wastes from both units. Storage of radioactive gaseous waste for decay is notanticipated in the defueled condition. The six gas decay tanks have been removed as part of theongoing decommissioning. As such, the Gaseous Waste System is no longer in operation and is notdiscussed as part of Radioactive Waste Management.
Normally, the solid waste systems are operated remotely so as to minimize the radiation exposure ofplant personnel. Waste processing is a batch-type operation which allows a determination of theactivity to be discharged before any action is undertaken to make the actual release. Monitoringequipment is provided to maintain surveillance over the release operations and to halt theseoperations on indication of radioactivity concentrations above established limits.
The original design of the waste systems was based on 1% of the fuel rods releasing fissionproducts into the coolant by diffusion out of the pellets through defects in the cladding. In thedefueled condition and during decommissioning, the remaining sources of radioactive wastes areactivated corrosion products and fission products that were generated during power operations.Since neither of the Zion Station reactor cores operated with 1 % failed fuel, the amounts ofradioactive waste are less than the original design amounts for the systems. In general, theremaining waste to be released from the site results from fixed and loose contamination, in the formof: liquid wastes generated while maintaining spent fuel pool water chemistry, liquid wastesgenerated during decommissioning activities, ground water in-leakage through contaminated areasin the auxiliary building, and solid wastes in the form of spent demineralizer resins, filters and sludge.The liquid waste system has been designed to accommodate decommissioning. The installation,design and operation of the liquid waste system results in no change in the ability to meet theexisting DSAR design functions, and provides an acceptable method of compliance with applicableNRC regulations.
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4.5.2 Licuid Waste Manaaement System
4.5.2.1 Desiqn Basis
The Liquid Waste Systems are designed to collect, store, process, monitor, and dispose ofliquid radioactive waste from the station. The principle design criteria for the Liquid WasteSystems are as follows:
1. Ensure that the quantities of radioactive waste discharged from the plant duringdecommissioning are as low as practicable and, in any event, well within the allowableconcentration limits; and
2. Limit the inadvertent release of radioactive material from the plant so that the resultingradiation exposure to the public is as low as practicable and, in any event, well within theallowable concentration limits.
The allowable concentration limits described above are defined as 10 times 1 OCFR20 limits forbatch releases from the Lake Release Tanks (Boric Acid Tanks)..
4.5.2.2 System Description
All potentially radioactive liquid waste that is generated in the Containments, Auxiliary Building(AB) and Fuel Building (FB) Is collected and stored in tanks inside the AB. Liquid wastegenerated in the Turbine Building is sent to the Wastewater Treatment Facility (WWTF) via theTB Fire Sump and discharged to the intake fore-bay. Refer to section 4.5.2.4 for WWTF systemdescription.
Uquid waste from the Containments, AB and FB is routed to the Holdups Tanks (HUTS) forstorage. Prior to release, the liquid is processed on a batch basis using filtration and/ordemineralization. The method of processing that is utilized Is dependent on the type of waste.
Processed waste to be released from the AB is discharged from one of the Lake Release Tanksinto the discharge canal- Service water is continuously discharged through the discharge canalfor dilution before entering the lake. Turbine building wastes and other low level secondarywaste, is sent to the Wastewater Treatment Facility (WWTF) via the fire sump and is dischargedto the intake fore-bay. The intake fore-bay is continuously diluted by operation of the SW pump.SW that is routed through the plant discharges to both Unit 1 and Unit 2 discharge canals. Thetwo release paths to the lake, the Unit I discharge canal and the Unit 2 discharge canal, andrelease to the intake fore-bay from the WWTF, are controlled by plant personnel.
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Surveillance requirements for radioactive liquid releases are stipulated in the Offsite DoseCalculation Manual, Section 12.3. Liquid waste, low enough in activity level to be released, isdischarged on a batch basis from one of the Lake Release Tanks. The tank containing thebatch to be discharged is isolated so that no additional waste can be added to it. The batch ofliquid waste is mixed by recirculation to assure uniformity and is then sampled. The sampledrawn from the Lake Release Tank is analyzed for gross alpha. gross beta, radio-isotopicprofile, and tritium activity. Based upon this analysis, a discharge rate is determined so thatwhen the batch is released and diluted by the plant service water, the individual radio-isotopicconcentrations in the effluent is less than the allowable concentration limits. Normally, the wastedischarge is a small percentage of allowable concentration limits. At no time during wastedischarge is the water leaving the plant and entering the lake above the allowable concentrationlimits.
Before liquid waste can be released from a Lake Release Tank, the take is isolated so that noadditional liquid can be made to the tank and the locked closed discharge valve must beopened. The key for this valve is retained by the operations department personnel, and theanalysis of the sample must be approved by the shift supervisor or his designated alternate. Asa further backup, a radiation detector monitors the radioactive effluent discharge line that feedsinto the discharge canal. Upon detecting an abnormal level, a valve closes and an alarm signalis actuated. Detailed records are maintained of all radioactive waste discharged to the environs.A simplified sketch of the Liquid Waste System is provided as Figure 4-1. Specific tank detailsare in Table 4-1.
4.5.2.3 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition
The Liquid Waste Management System, as described in section 4.5.2.2, is considered Importantto the Defueled Condition.
4.5.2.4 Wastewater Treatment Facility
The Wastewater Treatment Facility (WWTF) is designed to treat nonradioactive and low levelradioactive liquid from many facility sources including building roof runoff and the turbinebuilding fire sump, which receives input from the turbine building equipment and floor drains,and the fuel pool cooling tower blowdown. The Steam Generators may also be drained to theturbine building fire sump in the future. To prevent excessive contamination of the WWTF, thefire sump discharge is monitored for radioactivity and sampled and analyzed per the ODCM.Should high radioactivity be detected, piping connections are in place to divert sump fluids forradwaste processing. The critical treatment units in the WWTF are provided in duplicate toprovide operational reliability and maintenance capability.
The WWTF is designed to remove suspended solids and oil to the level acceptable to the IllinoisEnvironmental Protection Agency and to ensure compliance with the facility National PollutantDischarge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Since the wastewater discharge rates arevariable, an equalization tank is provided to maintain a more nearly uniform flow to thetreatment facilities. The WWTF also includes other equipment such as: mixing tanks, mixers,oil skimmers, flocculators, oil coalescers, clarifiers, sludge drying beds, filters, etc.
Effluent from the WWTF is discharged to the Intake forebay where it is diluted via operation ofthe SW pump(s) prior to release to the discharge canals.
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4.5.2.5 Oil Separator System
The Oil Separator System is designed to treat turbine building equipment and floor drains forrelease. The oil separator consists of an oil separator tank, which provides for oil coalescing, oilskimming, and oil baffling. Discharge from the oil separator tank is pumped by feed pumps tothe fire sump and eventually to the WWTF.
4.5.2.6 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition
The Wastewater Treatment Facility, as described in section 4.5.2.4 above, is consideredImportant to the Defueled Condition in order to meet Illinois Environmental Protection Agencyrequirements and compliance with the NPDES permit.
4.5.3 Solid Waste Manauement System
4.5.3.1 Desion Basis
The principal design criteria for the Solid Waste System are as follows:
1. Package radioactive solid wastes for offsite shipment and burial in accordance withapplicable regulations; and
2. Minimize the release of radioactive materials to the environs so as to keep the overallexposure to the public as low as practicable and, in any event, within the limits of10CFR20.
The following waste types are associated with the active decommissioning of the site:
Solid waste is divided into three categories - wet waste, dry active waste (DAW) and irradiatedmetal.
Wet waste consists of spent demineralizer resins, miscellaneous tank and sump solids, andcontaminated oil.
DAW is the descriptive term applied to radioactively contaminated dry industrial trash generatedat nuclear power facilities. DAW may further be distinguished between compactible andnoncompactible components. Compactible DAW can be composed of protective clothing,plastic, paper, rubber, and similar materials. Non-compactible DAW can be composed ofcartridge filter elements, wood, glass, concrete, and metals. Compactible DAW is generallycompressed to reduce its volume by various volume reduction techniques such as pre-compaction, super-compaction, and, potentially, incineration.
Irradiated metal is the metal associated with irradiated pieces and components of the reactorplant. Irradiated metal can be broken down in 2 categories: (1) waste that can be shippedoffsite for disposal (i.e., A, B, and C waste) and (2) waste that will be stored on-site at the ISFSIunder 10 CFR 30 requirements (i.e., Greater than Class C )GTCC waste.
4-8 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
4.5.3.2 System Description
4.5.3.2.1 Processing of Spent Demineralizer Resins
Spent demineralizer resins are transferred either into the spent resin storage tank or directly intoa shipping container in the Radwaste Annex Building.
Specifications for the spent resin storage tank are as follows:
Number 1Location Auxiliary Building. El 617'Capacity 5000 gallonsMaterials Type 304 Stainless SteelDesign Pressure 100 psigDesign Temperature 1500FCode ASME Section III, Class C
The water level in the spent resin storage tank is always maintained above the actual level ofthe spent resins. The volume of resin in the tank is determined prior to processing of resin toensure available capacity. A level indicator allows the operator to establish a liquid level in thetank at a volume greater than that occupied by the resin. Primary makeup water is added ifnecessary. After the level is established, the tank is isolated by closing all valves. The tank isequipped with piping and a pump for recirculation. Piping is installed between the spent resinstorage tank and the Radwaste Annex Building for transfer of spent resins.
Packaging of spent resins involves transfer to containers located in the Radwaste AnnexBuilding. The resins are then dewatered in accordance with approved vendor Process ControlPrograms under 10CFR61.
4.5.3.2.1.1 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition
The Resin Removal System, as described above, is considered Important to the DefueledCondition.
4.5.3.2.2 Processing of Miscellaneous Tank and Sump Solids
Miscellaneous tank and sump solids are simply dewatered in accordance with approvedProcess Control Programs.
4.5.3.2.3 Processing of Contaminated Oil
Contaminated oil is collected for batch processing. Methods that may be used for processingcontaminated oil are:
1. perform a separation process that separates contaminated from uncontaminated oil (on-site or off-site). The separation process produces: A) uncontaminated oil which can befree released, B) solid waste, and C) contaminated oil which is then packaged forshipment to a facility that can process radioactive oil..
2. Off-site incineration.
4-9 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
4.5.3.2.4 Processing of Dry Active Waste
All DAW is segregated for waste type.
Compressible and Non-compressible wastes are packaged in shipping containers. Containersare visually inspected for structural integrity prior to packaging for shipment. Because of the lowactivity, DAW can be stored until enough is accumulated to permit: 1) economical transportationto an offsite burial ground for final disposal, or 2) transportation to an offsite facility for furthervolume reduction.
4.5.3.2.5 Waste Storage
Storage of all containers of waste in final form is: Inside the plant, south and north parking lotslocated within restricted area boundary, or areas as authorized by Radiation Protection.
4.6 Radiation Monitorina Systems
4.6.1 Design Bases
The Radiation Monitoring System is designed to detect, compute, indicate, annunciate andrecord the radiation levels at selected locations in the plant. The system is divided into thefollowing subsystems:
1. The process radiation monitoring system, which includes the effluent monitors, isdesigned to provide early warning of increasing radiation activity due to a malfunction ofplant equipment, and to monitor radioactive discharges to the environment to ensureconcentrations do not exceed specified limits.
2. The area radiation monitoring system is designed to alert personnel of increasingradiation activity in the fuel building that might result in a radiation health hazard orIndicate a degradation of fuel rod integrity.
4-10 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
4.6.2.1.1.2 Auxiliary Building Vent Stack SPING Air Monitor
The Unit 1 AB Vent Stack has been permanently isolated from the AB Ventilation System.When the Unit 1 Containment Purge system is in operation, effluent is continuously monitoredfor beta particulate by the Unit 1 Vent Stack air monitor. The monitor outputs alarm conditionsand abnormal instrument status to the Guard-It system.
The Unit 2 AB Vent Stack SPING continuously monitors the Unit 2 vent stack effluent for betaparticulate and noble gas. The monitor outputs data and alarms to the SPING central controlconsole.
This monitor also outputs low flow and flow irregularity alarms to the control console.
This Air Monitors have no self-contained pump to induce a sample flow through the monitors.The sample is fed to the monitors by the Isokinetic Sampling System at a flow rate of up toapproximately 2 cim. The purpose of this system is to regulate the sample flow to accuratelyduplicate stack gas velocity and pressure to the vent stack Air Monitors. This allows a validindication of the particulate content of the vent stack effluent.
4.6.2.1.1.3 Fuel Building Exhaust Air Monitor
The Fuel Building Ventilation exhaust is monitored via the Auxiliary Building ventilation stackeffluent monitors.
4.6.2.1.2 Liquid Radiation Monitors
The liquid radiation monitors are a set of self-contained monitors used to measure radioactivitylevels in liquid process and effluent streams. Table 4-3 provides a list of these monitors andidentifies their tag numbers and sensitivities.
High radioactivity-alarm indications notify operators via the Guard-It alarm system.
4-13 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
4.6.2.1.2.1 Waste Disposal System Liquid Effluent Monitor
This channel continuously monitors all Uquid Waste System batch releases from the LakeRelease Tanks. A scintillation detector in a shielded assembly monitors all AB effluentdischarges. Automatic valve closure action is initiated by the waste disposal system liquideffluent monitor to prevent further release after a high radioactivity condition is indicated oralarmed.
The accuracy of this monitor will be maintained to provide a highly reliable backup to themultiple sample analyses prior to discharge. A single monitor is provided on the discharge lineand is considered adequate since the tank sample analyses are the primary method fordetermination of allowable discharge volume and flow. The release of liquid waste is performedunder administrative control and this channel provides continuous monitoring during the release.
4.6.2-1.2.2 Fire Sump Discharge Liquid Monitor
The fire sump discharge liquid monitor is installed on the discharge of the fire sump pumps. Aliquid proportional composite sampler is also installed on this discharge line. Upon actuation ofthe high radiation alarm from the fire sump discharge liquid monitor, the permanently installedfire sump pumps are automatically tripped to terminate release of radioactivity to the WWTF andultimately the lake.
4.6.2.2 Calibration and Testing
Each channel employs an isotopic check source for channel testing. For many of thesechannels, the check source test is initiated at the Radiation Monitoring System cabinets. Checksource testing of selected monitors requires local operation. Westinghouse supplied monitorscan be tested online, without actuating interlocks, by increasing the interlock setpoint above thecheck source activity level.
All radiation monitors are calibrated by exposing the detectors to an isotope(s) of known activity.By changing the distance or placing filters between detector and the standard isotope, the fieldintensity is varied thereby allowing for a multi-point calibration. Channels employing count ratemeters may be electronically calibrated via a pulse generator input.
The waste disposal system liquid effluent monitors are calibrated by the use of two (2) isotopicstandards of different intermediate activity levels. The standards are monitored duringcalibration in a configuration similar to that of Ihe monitored sample during normal operation.This method allows for an accurate isotopic calibration without contamination of the system.
The method of calibration of laboratory radiation counting instrumentation is in accordance withthe vendor's manual. Complete documentation of calibration checks is maintained.
4-14 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
4.6.2.3 Effluent Monitoring and Sampling
The methods used in quantifying routine effluent releases to the environment consist ofcontinuous Radiation Monitoring Systems and/or laboratory analyses. Laboratory analyses areconducted on either grab samples or composite samples.
All liquid and gaseous effluents are recorded/saved in some form of data acquisition/storagesystem thereby providing a complete history of abnormal occurrences for evaluation; highradiation levels alarm in the Control Room.
The high radiation alarm setpoints are based upon a value of activity which is sufficiently low tobe in conformance with the concentration limit requirements.
Laboratory Instrumentation used for radiation analysis of effluent grab samples are as describedin the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Calibration of counting equipment will bemaintained by the use of sources certified against the National Institute of Standards andTechnology (NIST) traceable sources and/or with mathematical efficiency calibrations.
Effluent monitors will be calibrated at frequencies established in the ODCM. The multi-channelgamma analyzer will be performance checked daily when in use. Sources are used to verifyagainst known energy lines and activity. Geometry configurations will be checked yearly.Energy Calibrations will be performed on a annual basis. The liquid scintillation counter will bechecked weekly.
Complete documentation of all calibration checks will be maintained.
Effluent discharge line waste monitors will be checked against laboratory analyzed orestablished known portable sources.
4.6.2.4 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition
The Process Radiation Monitoring System Components, as described in section 4.6.2.1, and asshown in Table 4-3, are considered Important to the Defueled Condition.
4-15 October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE 4-1LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM TANKS
DesignCapacity Design Temperature
Tank Room Number Location (gallons) Material Pressure (degrees F)Euxlir 542 i120000eac Type 304
Holdup Tanks 3 Auxiliary Building, Stanlseach Se Atmospheric 150El 542' Stainless Steel
(Boric Acid Tanks) Auxiliary Building, 35,000 each TypeAtmospheric 150
Lake Release Tanks El 592' Stainless Steel
I
October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE 4-2AREA RADIATION MONITORS
Type of ReadoutLocation Monitor Type Range Control Room Local
Fuel Handling ORT-AR22 Proportional 10 pR/hr - High Alarm DigitalBuilding, Pool Counter 10 R/hr Ind / DAS MeterArea ComputerFuel Handling 0RT-AR21 Proportional 10 pR/hr - High Alarm DigitalBuilding, Pool Counter 10 R/hr Ind / DAS MeterArea ComputerFuel Building ORT-AR13 Gamma 0.1 mR/hr - None LogOverhead Crane Scintillation 1 R/hr MeterFuel Building ORT-AR24 Proportional 10 p.R/hr - High Alarm DigitalOverhead Crane Counter 10 R/hr Ind/ORIA- Meter
AR25
(1) ORT-AR22 and ORT-AR21 are credited with satisfying the radiation monitor requirementsas defined in 10 CFR 50.68(b)(6).
(2) ORT-AR24 is the backup monitor to ORT-AR13 and will be operable only upon failure ofORT-AR 13.
October 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
TABLE 4-3PROCESS RADIATION MONITC
,TRUMENT DETECTCNHANNEL TYPE
IN•C ISOTOPE (1)LSERVICE MONITOR NO. SENSITIVITY
Unit 1 Vent Stack
I-
I RIA-PR49
2RIA-PR49
Particulate Beta Proportional
Beta Scintillation
3.99 E 5 cpm/pCi Sr-90
Unit 2 AuxiliaryBuilding Vent Stack
Particulate
Low Range Noble Gas
1.09 E 5 cpm/aCl Sr-90/Y-90
Beta Scintillation 5.0 E-7 to 1.0 E-2 jiCi/cc Kr-85
-- -- -- -- - - - 1-
Fire Sump Discharge
Waste DisposalSystem LakeDischarge Effluent
0RT-PR25 Scintillation 9.0 E-7 to 8.0 E-2 ýLCi/ml
-f-
Cs-1 37
CO-60
f
ORT-PRO4 Scintillation 10", to 10-2 gCi/ml
(1) Sensitivity Ranges are based on these isotope
October 2014 I
AB RELEASE TANKS
LAKE MICHIGAN
-Sw
ZION STATION DSAR
FIGURE 4-1
ZION STATION LIOUIDPROCESSING FLOWCHART
OTOBR 2014
ZION STATION DSAR
6.5.6 Process Control Program
The Process Control Program (PCP) contains the current formulas, sampling analyses, tests,and determinations to be made to ensure that processing and packaging of solid radioactivewastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will beaccomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with lOCFRParts 20, 61, and 71; stateregulations; burial ground requirements; and other requirements governing the disposal of solidradioactive waste. Dry active waste (DAW) such as compacted trash and contaminatedcomponents are not included in the scope of the PCP. Written procedures are established,implemented, and maintained covering the key activities of the Process Control Program.
Changes to the PCP shall be documented and records of reviews performed shall be retainedas required by Technical Specifications.
6.5.7 Maintenance Rule Program
A Maintenance Rule Program has been established, in accordance with 10CFR50.65, formonitoring the performance of structures, systems, and components associated with thestorage, control, and maintenance of spent fuel in a safe condition. The Maintenance RuleProgram has established performance criteria for these SSCs such that attainment of thecnteria provides reasonable assurance that the SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intendedfunctions.
The Maintenance Rule Program does not apply to the ISFSI.
6.5.8 Quality Assurance Program
The Quality Assurance Program is implemented in accordance with the Quality AssuranceProject Plan (QAPP), ZS-QA-1 0. The QAPP defines the ZionSolutions LLC Quality AssuranceProgram to be implemented during the Zion Station Restoration and Dry Cask Storage (DCS)Project at the Zion Nuclear Power Station (ZNPS) site. The QAPP is designed to meet therequirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 Appendix B, "QualityAssurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," ANSI/ASMENQA-1-1994, Part 71, Subpart H, uQuality Assurance Requirements for Packaging andTransportation of Radioactive Waste" and Part 72, Subpart G, "Quality AssuranceRequirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High Level RadioactiveWaste, and Reactor-Related Greater than Class C Waste."
The QAPP incorporates the applicable portions of the current EnergySolutions QualityAssurance Program (QAP) Revision 0, effective date May 31, 2007, and the existing ExelonQuality Assurance Topical Report (QATR) Revision 84, Appendix A, Section 2.6, AugmentedQuality requirements for Zion Station. Augmented Quality requirements are addressed in theappropriate subsections of Section 4.0 of the QAPP, and are implemented in a graded approachvia station administrative procedures.
6.6 REVIEW AND INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION
The review and investigative functions are conducted in accordance with the plant TechnicalSpecifications.
6-5 October 2014
ZionSolutions, LLCZS-2014-0290: Attachment 4
ATTACHMENT 4
ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION10 CFR 50.59 SUMMARY REPORT
Change Number and Title: 2012-93; Movement of Radioactive Waste Liners fromContainment to a Storage Area
Description: In support of decommissioning, the reactor vessel internals are being segmentedinto smaller, disposable pieces. The waste from the segmentation that is classified as Class B orC low level radioactive waste will be packaged in liners while underwater in the reactor cavityThe liners and associated overpacks will be moved from the containment to storage vaultslocated in a temporary facility south of the Unit 1 containment building, and ultimately placed intransportation casks for shipment offsite.
Summary: The movement of the Class B and C material does not substantially increase thenumber of waste handling operations, so the frequency of a possible drop is not significantlyaffected. A non-mechanistic drop of the liner was assumed at each lift location and in transit andit was shown that, even if dropped, the releases were well within the Part 100 limits and the EPAProtective Action Guidelines (PAGs) and as enveloped by the existing Radioactive WasteHandling Accident in DSAR Section 5.3. Handling of the liner for transfer to the transportationcask is also enveloped by these evaluations. Storage of waste in an area south of Unit 1 isallowed by the DSAR. The 40 yard open top containers filled with earth were shown to provideadequate supplemental shielding to assure the offsite limits of 40 CFR Part 190 contained in theODCM were met thus ensuring that the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20.1301 were also met.Accordingly, the activity may be performed as described without a change to the DSAR orTechnical Specifications.
Change Number and Title: 2013-46; Segmentation of Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Internals
Description: This activity involves the sectioning and disposal of activated waste generatedduring the segmentation of the Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Internals. The majority of the waste isexpected to be Class A waste. Portions of the waste are projected to be categorized as Class B/Cwaste. Select waste from the activity is projected to be Greater Than Class C (GTCC) waste. The50.59 evaluation will be limited to the safe handling and processing of the GTCC waste to ensurethe health and safety of the public and plant personnel is maintained. This evaluation will boundany activities associated with the lower level waste generated.
Summary: Calculation TSD- 11-005 concluded that with a complete loss of water in the reactorcavity and evaluating the limited shielding capability of the construction opening in theContainment building, the resultant dose to a member of the public would be well within thebounding DSAR analyses of Section 5.3, Radioactive Waste Handling Accident, during vesselinternal segmentation activities. In addition, abnormal Operating Procedure AOP 5.1 is in placeto close the Containment construction doors during high radiation conditions and administrativecontrols have been implemented to maintain water in the reactor cavity within set bounds inorder to provide shielding. The evaluation concluded that the activity could be performedwithout a change to the DSAR or Technical Specifications.
ZionSolutions, LLCZS-2014-0290: Attachment 4
Change Number and Title: 2013-54; Greater Than Class C (GTCC) Waste Transfer
Description: This activity lifts the MAGNASTOR Transfer Cask (MTC) containing aTransportable Storage Container (TSC) filled with Greater Than Class C (GTCC) waste from thereactor cavity of either containment. The MTC will then be moved outside containment to allowfor a stack up of the MTC with the Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC). Once in the stack upconfiguration, the TSC will be lowered into the VCC and then transported along the heavy haulpath to the ISFSI Pad for storage with the spent nuclear fuel or other suitable on-site storage.
Summary: An evaluation was performed that concluded that the off-site dose consequences ofcatastrophic failures of the GTCC containers are bounded by the accidents identified in the ZionDefueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR). The catastrophic failure was postulated since thehandling of the waste is performed with non-safety related cranes and the drop could not beexcluded. Transport of the waste to the ISFSI is performed with equipment that has beenanalyzed for potential drops of the VCC with no resultant failure of the TSC that would cause aradiation release.
Change Number and Title: 2013-222 (Revision 0 and 1); Modify Liquid Waste Systems
Description: This activity installs a new liquid waste system and revises the DSAR discussionfor processing liquid waste. The new liquid radioactive waste system will consist of a newprocessing system for processing the liquid to meet the applicable release limits and a newrelease system that will release the processed water to Lake Michigan.
Summary: The evaluation concluded that the new liquid waste system does not result inadverse affects on the capability to perform the design functions described in the DSAR. Theeffluent release concentrations of the release tanks are administratively limited to less than theTechnical Specification release limits. All other administrative and automatic controls associatedwith batch releases are not changed by this modification. The new system design is an acceptablealternative method to the design criteria of Reg Guide 1.143-1979.
Change Number and Title: 2014-18; Greater Than Class C (GTCC) Vertical Concrete Cask(VCC) Loading Operations
Description: This activity provides procedural guidance for moving a MAGNASTOR TransferCask (MTC) containing Greater Than Class C (GTCC) waste from either unit's reactor cavity tothe stack-up location outside the reactor buildings via the Heavy Lift Rail System (HLRS) toallow for stack-up operations. These stack-up operations include MTC installation on the top ofthe VCC, transfer of the GTCC TSC into the VCC, and installation of the VCC closure lidassembly.
Summary: An evaluation was performed that concluded that the off-site dose consequences ofthis activity are bounded by the Radioactive Waste Handling Accident identified in the ZionDefueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR). Therefore, this activity has no adverse impact on anyDSAR described design functions or safety analyses and can be implemented without obtaining alicense amendment.
ZionSolutions, LLCZS-2014-0290: Attachment 5
ATTACHMENT 5
ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION10 CFR 72.48 SUMMARY REPORT
Change Number and Title: 2013-32; Evaluation of Tornado Missiles Impact with the VerticalConcrete Cask (VCC) and Evaluation of 255 mph Automobile Impact with the VCC
Description: The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the resistance to tip over and degreeof deformation of the MAGNASTOR VCC on the Zion ISFSI Pad when subjected to the ZionDefueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) described tornado missiles. The evaluation is neededto determine if the consequences of the Zion DSAR missiles impacting the VCCS are boundedby the analysis for tornado missiles described in the MAGNASTOR FSAR.
Summary: Two calculations were performed to determine the stability and degree ofdeformation of the MAGNASTOR Concrete Casks on the Zion ISFSI Pad when subjected to theZion DSAR described tornado missiles. The calculations conclude that that the Zion DSARtornado generated missiles impacting a VCC will not cause a loaded VCC to overturn and do notresult in any compromise of the integrity of the confinement boundary of the MAGNASTORSystem. While the calculations do show that there will be some localized damage from thetornado missile strike, the damage will remain within the allowed amounts as defined in theMAGNASTOR FSAR and will not adversely impact the cooling capability of theMAGNASTOR System VCC.
Change Number and Title: 2013-34; Evaluation of Zion Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) TipOver at the ISFSI and Heavy Haul Path
Description: The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the acceptability of the ISFSIconcrete pads and heavy haul path hardness with respect to the limiting impact force that theVCC loaded with a TSC are designed to withstand. The tip over accident is assumed to occur bynon-mechanistic means. The evaluation is needed to determine if the consequences of the tipover accident remain bounded by the MAGNASTOR FSAR analysis using the actual hardnesscharacteristics of the Zion ISFSI concrete pads and heavy haul path from the Fuel HandlingBuilding to the ISFSI.
Summary: Evaluations were performed to determine the stability and degree of deformation ofthe MAGNASTOR Concrete Casks on the Zion ISFSI Pad when subjected to a tip over accidenton the Zion ISFSI pads or the Zion heavy haul path. The tip over analysis used the site specificsoil properties and the ZS ISFSI pad geometry. The analysis confirmed that the maximumaccelerations and resulting stress in the most critical parts of the TSC are within acceptable limitsduring a hypothetical VCC tip over. The analysis confirmed that the baskets will maintain theposition of the spent fuel and the canister will maintain the integrity of the TSC confinementboundary for the tip over accident for the Zion site-specific evaluation The analysis alsoconfirmed that the stiffness of the heavy haul path is less than or equal to the ISFSI pad stiffness.
ZionSolutions, LLCZS-2014-0290: Attachment 6
ATTACHMENT 6
ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATIONPERMANENTLY DEFUELED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES CHANGES
Spent Fuel Pool Water LevelB 3.1.1
B 3.1 DEFUELED PLANT SYSTEMS
B 3.1 .1 Spent Fuel Pool Water Level
BASES
BACKGROUND When the plant was operational, this specification providedassurance that the assumptions regarding the iodinedecontamination factor would be met following a fuelhandling accident. Following the permanent defueling of thereactors, the fuel handling accident was re-analyzed basedon the extended time since shutdown and correspondingreductions in iodine activity that are consistent with theplant's permanently defueled condition. As described in Ref.1 and 2, these new analyses determined that 10 CFR 100and 1.0 CFR 50 App. A, Criterion 19 limits would still be meteven with no decontamination by the spent fuel pool water.
Although the specification for spent fuel pool water levelduring fuel handling operations is no longer needed toensure an adequate iodine decontamination factor, thespecification continues to provide assurance of adequatecooling for the irradiated fuel being handled by ensuring thatit remains covered by water and provides significantshielding for personnel safety. Therefore the specificationwas retained essentially unchanged from the operationalTechnical Specifications.
Neither this specification nor the related bases are intendedto be applicable to spent fuel being removed from the poolfor transfer to dry fuel storage.
The assumptions in the fuel handling accident analyses aregiven in Ref. I and 2.
APPLICABLE In the operational Technical Specifications, the specificationSAFETY ANALYSES for minimum water level in the spent fuel pool during fuel
handling activities provided assurance of substantial iodineremoval if a fuel handling accident were to occur. However,as indicated in Ref. 1 and 2, the limits of 10 CFR 100 and 10CFR 50 App. A, Criterion 19 would not be exceeded if a
(continued)
Zion Station B 3.1-ý1 .Rev. 1
Spent Fuel Pool Water LevelB 3.1.1
BASESBASES
APPLICABLESAFETY ANALYSES(continued)
fuel handling accident occurred even with no removal ofiodine activity by spent fuel pool water. This is the result ofthe decay of radioactive iodine during the lengthy periodsince the last reactor operation at the station.
However the specification for water level in the in the SFPalso ensures that irradiated fuel which is not in the storageracks will be adequately cooled by ensuring that it remainscovered with water during normal fuel handling operations,and provides significant shielding for personnel safety.
LCO The spent fuel pool water level is required to be 23 ft overthe top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storageracks. The 23 ft level was formerly based on preserving theassumptions of the previous fuel handling accident analysis.Although this level is no longer needed for iodinedecontamination following a fuel handling accident, pastpractice indicates that this level provides assurance that theirradiated fuel being handled will be covered by water andconsequently will be adequately cooled and providessignificant shielding for personnel safety. The 23 ft level hastherefore been retained as the minimum required formovement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the spent fuelpool.
APPLICABILITY This LCO applies during movement of irradiated fuelassemblies in the spent fuel pool since it is during suchactivities that irradiated fuel may be higher than the top ofthe fuel in the storage racks. An irradiated fuel assemblythat is higher than that stored in the racks may not beprotected against uncovery by design features which ensurethat fuel in the racks remains covered with water. Thisdesign feature consists of the lowest pipe opening in thespent fuel pool being at approximately 598' which is abovethe top of the fuel stored in the racks (approximately 590').
Neither this specification nor the related bases are intendedto be applicable to spent fuel being removed from the poolfor transfer to dry fuel storage.
(continued)
Zion Station B 3.1-2 Rev. I
Spent Fuel Pool Water LevelB 3.1.1
BASES
ACTIONS A.1
When the initial conditions for an accident cannot be met,steps should be taken to preclude the accident fromoccuring. When the spent fuel pool water level is lowerthan the required level, the movement of irradiated fuelassemblies in the spent fuel pool is immediately suspended.This action effectively precludes the possibility ofwithdrawing an irradiated fuel assembly above the waterlevel which would result in a loss of cooling and shielding.This does not preclude movement of a fuel assembly to asafe position.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.1.1REQUIREMENTS
This SR verifies that the spent fuel pool water level issufficiently high to ensure adequate cooling and shielding forthe fuel being handled. The water level in the spent fuelpool must be checked periodically. The 24 hour Frequencyis appropriate because the volume in the pool is normallystable and is acceptable based on operating experience. Inaddition, water level changes are controlled by plantprocedures.
REFERENCES 1. Zion Station Calculation 22S-0-11 OX-0057, FuelHandling Accident Offsite Dose Calculation withExtended Radioactive Decay and no AB Filtration
2. Zion Station Calculation 22S-0-11 OX-0059, FuelHandling Accident Control Room Dose Calculation withExtended Radioactive Decay
Zion Station B 3.1-3 Rev. I
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