Zionists & the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 1876-1909

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1/12

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Zionists and the Ottoman Foreign Ministry during the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)Author(s): Bülent Kemal ÖkeSource: Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall 1980), pp. 364-374Published by: Pluto JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857551 .

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2/12

Zionists and the Ottoman Foreign Ministry

during

the

Reign of

Abdulhamid II

(1876-1909)

Bülent

Kemal

Öke

By

the late

1800s,

Palestine

had

become the focus of the

European

Zionists who were

offering

o

deliver their followers

to the

Promised

Land.

Palestine, however,

was

neitherempty

nor

free of an

existing

sovereignty.

t

was

part

of the Asiatic

provinces

of

the Ottoman

Empire,

inhabited

by

the Arab

subjects

of

the

Sultan.

Having

elevated the

Zionist

movement

from a

disunited

collection of

philanthropic

ocieties to an

actor

in

international

elations,

Dr. Theodore Herzl admitted

that the

decision is in

the sole

hands

of His

Majesty

the

Sultan. 1 In order

to

win

Abdulhamid

I to

his

plan

of

establishing

home

for

he Jews

n

Palestine,

he made

five

journeys

to

Constantinople

between

1896

and

1902.

During

his

stay

at

the Ottoman

capital,

he was summoned o

the Porte

as

well as to the

Palace,

negotiated

from

Power to

Power,

as he

described

it,withvarious dignitaries f the State, including he Grand Vezir, and

was

even

granted

an

audience with

Abdulhamid

I.

Herzl was soon to

discover that the Sultan of

Turkey

was

vehemently

against

the

creation of a Jewish State in Palestine.2

At a time when the

Macedonian

uprisings

n

the

West and the

Armenianrevolts n

Anatolia

were

threatening

he territorial

ntegrity

f the

Ottoman

Empire,

the

Turkish

Governmenthad

no

desire

to

nurture

nother

nationality

roblem

within

ts

domains.

Thus,

the Ottomans

took the Zionist movement eri-

ously

from ts

inception

and devised their

policies

to

deal with t

accord-

ingly.

It

was Abdulhamid II himselfwho laid the

cornerstone of the

Ottoman reactiontoward theZionists. He was determined hattheTurk-

ish Government

should

prevent

Jewish

immigration

nd settlement

n

Palestine to

the best of

ts efforts.3 he

Sultan,

in

turn,

sked the Cabinet

to

carefully

discuss

the

entire

question

at

its

meetings

and work

out

detailed

policies

to

cope

with the

Zionist

phenomenon

both at home and

Bülent

emal

Öke

s

Lecturer

n

nternationalolitics

nstitutefPolitical

cience

University

f

stanbul.

1. R. Patai ed.),TheComplete iaries fTheodor erzl London,1960), ii,p.

909.

l.

Diaries

i,

p.

5

is.

3.

A.

Osmanoglu,

abam Abdülhamid

Istanbul,

960),

p.

46.

364

ASQ

Volume

2

Number

4


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/12

Ottoman

Foreign Ministry

365

abroad.

The

final

program,

s

formulated

y

the council

of

ministers nd

approved

by

the

Sultan,

entailedfour ets

of

policies,

forwhose

execution

different

inistries

were

responsible.4

While the Ottoman

Foreign

Minis-

try

was

asked

to

persuade

the

Powers

not

to lend

any

support

to

the

Zionist

movement,

he

Ministry

f the Interiorhad to

find

ways

of

pre-

venting

he Zionists

from

ntering

he

country.5

espite

the efforts f the

ministries

oncerned,

some

Jews

managed

to

infiltrate

he

country;

t was

up

to the Grand Vezirate

to ensure that

they

did not

acquire foreign

protection

nd become entitledto

capitulatory

ights.6

Furthermore,

t

was the task of the Departmentof Land Registration o preventtheir

acquisition

of land in Palestine

and

its environs.7

The

Ottoman

Foreign

Ministry

ame to be

involved at

every

level of

decisionmaking

n Turco-Zionist

relations. Abdulhamid

II and

his ad-

visors'

image

of

Zionism

was

shaped

by

the

way

Turkish

diplomats

abroad

perceived

Zionism

and

by

the

way

they

communicated this

phe-

nomenon

to

Constantinople.

Second,

the

Ottoman

Foreign Ministry

proved

to be

highly

nfluential

n the formulation

f

definitive

olicies

toward

the

activities

of

the

Zionists,

both in the

diplomatic

field

and in

Palestine.Third,theForeignMinistry, ompared

withthe other Ottoman

ministries,

ore the heaviest

burden

n

the

mplementation

f

the Turkish

Government's

nti-Zionist

egulations.

I

When

Zionism came

to

the

forefrontf

Jewish

ffairs

with the

congre-

gation

of

the

First

Congress

at

Basle

in

1897,

the Ottoman

representatives

abroad

did not lose

any

time in

feeding

he

capital

detailed

information

concerning

he

development

of the entireZionist movement. While the

detailed

reports

nd

newspaper

cuttings

were

readily

dispatched

to Con-

4.

Tahsin

Pa§a,

Abdiilhamide

Yildiz

Hatiratari

Istanbul,

931),

pp.

7-9.

5.

PublicRecord

Office,

ondon

later

o be

cited s

PRO), Foreign

ffice

iles

(later

o

be

cited

as

FO),

78/5479,

o.

71,

Dickson

to

Bunsen,

Jerusalem,

9

December

900;

no.

34,

O'Conorto

Lansdowne,

onstantinople,

7

January

901.

6.

Foreign

elations

f

the

United

tates

later

o be cited s

FRUS),

(1886),

no.

445,

Cox

to

Bayard, onstantinople,January

886;

FRUS

(1893),

end. to

no. 3, MavroyenioGresham,2 November 893,Therapia.

7.

FRUS

(1898),

no.

78,

Angeli

o

Sherman,

onstantinople,

January

898;

FRUS

(1906),

no.

1370,

Jay

o

the

Secretary

f

State,

Constantinople,

5

April

1906;

RO, FO,

195/1765,

o.

35,

Dickson o

Clare-Ford,

erusalem,

0 December

1892.




4/12

366

Arab Studies

Quarterly

stantinople,8

Turkish

diplomats

tried to interview Zionist

notables and

even

sent

agents

under

disguise

to

their

congresses.9

Turkish

diplomats

did not

perceive

the Zionist

phenomenon

favorably.

In

1898 Ali Ferruh

Bey,

the

Turkish

minister n

Washington,

eported

hat

Zionism

4

vitally

concerns Turkish

sovereignty. 10

The Turkish

ambas-

sador

in

Berlin,

Ali

Tewfik

Pasha,

wrote

to the Porte on

17

August

1900

that

we

must have no illusions about Zionism.

Although

he

speakers

at

the

Congress

dwelled

upon

vague generalities

uch

as the

future f the

Jewish

people,

the

Zionists,

in

effect,

im

at the formation f

a

great

Jewish tate n Palestine whichwould also spreadtowardstheneighboring

countries. 11Two

years

before his

message

reached

Constantinople,

he

Turkish

ambassador

in

London,

Antopulos

Pasha,

had

already

warned

the Porte

that

4

with the increase in the number

f

flourishing

olonies

in

Palestine,

the Zionist

colonizers

would

not be content to live

under

Ottoman

municipal

aw. 12 He

added

that

the

Zionists,

contrary

o

what

they

had

said

at

Basle,

would

press

for nternational

ecognition

nder

he

law

of

nations.

After

analyzing

these

reports,

the

Sultan,

as the

principal

decision

maker of the Ottoman Empire, admitted that he

4

understood their

[Zionists']

evil

projects,

and

as much as he

protected

his

Jewish

ubjects,

he was

still an

enemy

of

those Jews who entertained

ertain

chimeric

ideas

about

Palestine. 13

Abdulhamid I

thought

hat he

mmigration

nd

settlement f the

Jews in

Palestine

were

harmful

o

the

interestsof

the

Ottoman

Empire

insofar s

they

would lead to the

emergence

of a

4

'Jewish

Question,

and were

especially

dangerous

at a time

when the

Turkish

Government

had the

Armeniantroubles on its hands.14

Having

communicated o

the Portethe

emergence

nd

the

development

8. These were all

kept

in a dossierentitled The

Question

of

Zionism,

catalogued

nder

32/17 f the Ottoman

oreign

Ministry

rchives

later

o be

cited s

OFM).

9.

OFM,

332/17,

o.

1205/30,

issak Effendi

o

Tewfik

asha,

La

Haye,

17

August1907;

no.

23600/182,

ahmudNedim

o

Tewfik

asha, Vienna,

1

July

1898;

Yildiz Palace

Archives

t

the

Porte,

stanbul

later

o be cited s

YPA),

C

11/67/54/136,

li

Ferruh

ey

to

the

Palace,

Washington,

0

May

1898;

6

11/48-

49/54/136,27

pril

1898.

10.

OFM,

332/17,

o.

9597/81,

li Ferruh

ey

to

Tewfik

asha,

Washington,

3

July

898.

11.

OFM,

332/17,

o.

1683/136,

.

Tewfik

o

Tewfik

asha, Berlin,

7

August

1900.

12.

OFM,

332/17,

o.

23598/216,

ntopulos

o

Tewfik

asha,

London,

8 June

1898.

13.

Abdülhamid,

iyasi

Hatiratim

Istanbul, 975),pp.

76-77.

14.

C.

R.

Atilhan,

ttihat

e

Terakki in

uikastleri

Istanbul,

973),

pp.

200-1.




5/12

Ottoman

Foreign

Ministry

367

of

Zionism as

they

perceived

them,

he

members f the

Turkish

diplomat-

ic

corps

were

also enthusiastic

n

advising

the Turkish Government

n

ways

to

cope

with

this

movement,

which,

according

to

them,

threatened

the territorial

ntegrity

nd

political

sovereignty

f

Turkey.

On

31

No-

vember

1903 the

Turkish

mbassador

in

Berlin

urged

the

Porte to elabo-

rate

the

existing

pecial

regulations

rohibiting

he Zionists from

cquir-

ing

land

in Palestine

and

preventing

he colonization of the

country,

activities

which,

according

to

him,

aimed

at

the establishment of

an

independent

State

within he

domains of the Ottoman

Empire.15

As earlyas 1898,Ali FerruhBeywrotea letter o the Sultan a copyof

which

he also sent

to the

Foreign

Ministry

t the Porte16

suggesting

hat

the time

has

come for

the

Government

f His

Imperial Majesty

to take

certain

measures

to

repair

the faultwhich

their

ncestors had committed

by

allowing

the

non-Moslem

communities

o settle

in Palestine. As the

journey

of the

German

Emperor

to

Jerusalem

learly

showed, Catholics,

Protestants,

Orthodox

and Jews

prepare

the

ground

for the

Powers

to

enhance

their

respective spheres

of

political

and

religious

ambitions

(within

he Ottoman

ands). 17

Ali Ferruh

Bey,

whose father ad been the

governor fJerusalem, urthernformed he Sultan thaton a recent visit

to Palestine

he had

seen the

way

the

Zionistswere

plundering

he riches of

the

country,

o the detriment

f

the

local Muslim

population.

In order to

rectify

hisstate

of

affairs,

e

suggested

hat

he

Government

acilitate

he

immigration

f Muslim

communities

nto Palestine

to

leave fewer

places

for

he Jews

to settle. Abdulhamid

I must

have

shared Ali

Ferruh

Bey's

anxiety,

for he declared:

We must

forget

he idea of

allowing

Jewish

immigration

nto

Palestine.

Otherwise,

s

they

would in due

course mus-

ter all

the

power

in their

hands

wherever

hey

settle,

we would

sign

the

death

warrant

of

our

religious

brothers. 18 On another

occasion,

Ab-

dulhamid I said, we could onlyopen our borders o those whobelongto

the same

nationality

nd

religion

s

we do. We

should

try

o

buttress he

Turkish

lement

n

our

body

politic. 19

When

Muslim Turkish

refugees,

in

the face

of

growing

repression

in the Balkans and

Russia,

fled

to

Turkey,

Abdulhamid

I settled them

n the

valley

of

Hauran,

Palestine.

When

t came

to

implementing

he Turkish

policies,

the

Foreign

Minis-

15.

OFM,

332/17,

o.

3309/178,

.

Tewfik

o

Tewfik

asha, Berlin,

1 Novem-

ber 1903.

16.

YPA,

C

11/48-49/54/136,

li Ferruh

ey

to the

Palace,

Washington,

7

April1898.

17.

OFM, 332/17,

o.

9550/63,

li Ferruh

ey

to

Tewfik

asha,

Washington,

9

April

1898.

18.

Abdiilhamid,

p.

cit.,

p.

76.

19:

Ibid.,

p.

68.




6/12

368

Arab

Studies

Quarterly

try

was

asked

to

persuade

the Powers

not to lend

any

assistance

toward

Zionism. Since

Germany

was

the

European

Power

most

sympathetic

toward

Turkey,

the Ottoman

Government

hought

hat t

should

first

win

the

support

of the

Kaiser

for ts

anti- ionist

policies.

It is curious

that of

all the

Powers,

Germany

was the

country

most

favorably

isposed

toward

the Zionist

movement. The Kaiser

had

admittedthat the

4

'fundamental

idea of

Zionism has

always

interested

me]

and

even

aroused

[my] sym-

pathy. 20

n

September,

1898 Count

Evlenburg,

he

German

ambassador

in

Vienna,

wrote to

Herzl

that

4

His

Majesty

has

declared himself

eady

to

intervenewith heSultan and preparedto undertake heprotection fthe

Jews

in

the Orient. 21

When the German

Emperor attempted

o

discuss

the matter with the

Sultan and told him

that the Zionists were

4

not

dangerous

to

Turkey,

but

everywhere

he Jews are a nuisance

of

whom

one should

like to be

rid,

Abdulhamid I

was

reported

o have

replied

that he was

quite

satisfied

with his Jewish

subjects.22

Tewfik

Pasha,

the

Turkish

foreign

minister,

old

Wilhelm

I

on

his

tour

of

Jerusalem hat

4

the Sultan would

have

nothing

o do

with

Zionism and

an

independent

Jewish

Kingdom. 23

As

a

result,

Wilhelm

I,

anxious

not to

arouse the

suspicion

of

his host

over

such

a

project,

lost all his enthusiasm for

Zionism.

Biilow

was

extremely

pleased

to

see this

change

in the

Kaiser

and further onvinced him that since

Zionism

was a serious threat to

Turkish

sovereignty,Germany's

support

of

Herzl'

s

plans

was

incompati-

ble

with

the traditional

German

policy

of

maintaining

he

integrity

f

the

Ottoman

Empire.24

Turkish authorities

used

the same

line of

argument

with the Powers which had a vested

interest n the

preservation

f Tur-

key,

namely,

that

they

4

should

renounce the

idea

of

introducing

he

Jewish

people

into

the international

ommunity

s a

state,

because this

project, by

creating

a state within state

at the

center of the Ottoman

Empire,would assure theruinofTurkey. 25Turkishpropaganda in this

connection

was so

powerful

that the

Allegemeine Zeitung

wrote

on

11

August

1900

44Live

nd

let

live;

this s the

policy

of the

Great

Powers

not

only

towards the

Jews,

but

also towards the Turks. 26

It

appears

that

Germany

played

a

pivotal

role in the

shaping

of other

20.

I.

Friedman,

ermany

Turkey

nd Zionism

897-1918

Oxford, 977),

p.

65.

21.

Ibid.,

p.

68.

22.

Diaries

iii,

p.

770.

23. Friedman,p. cit.,p. 79.

24.

Biilow,

Memoirs

London,

1931),

i,

p.

250.

25.

OFM,

332/17,

o.

1683/136,

. Tewfik

o Tewfik

asha,

Berlin,

7

August

1900.

26. Ibid.




7/12

Ottoman

Foreign

Ministry

369

Powers'

attitudes

toward Zionism.

In her withdrawal of

support

from

Herzl,

Russia

followed

Germany'sexample.

Plehve,

the Russian minister

of

the

interior,

had written

o

Herzl

in

August

1903 that

4

so

long

as

Zionism

consisted

of

wanting

o create an

independent

tate

in

Palestine

. . .

,

the Russian

Government

ould

be

completely

favourable to it. 27 t

seems

that

he Russians

gave

their

upport

o

the Zionists

to take

the

wind

from

German

sails.

Suspicious

as it was

of

Wilhelmstrasse'

ambitions

n

the

Near

East,

St.

Petersburg

must

have

thought

hat

f the establishment

of

a Jewish

State

were

unavoidable,

it would be

better to have

it under

Russianrather han Germanprotection.Once theGermansbacked down

from

fostering

he Zionist cause

in

Palestine,

the

Russian

Government

must

have

realized

that there was

no

need

to

complicate

international

relations

with another

nationality uestion.

Thus,

it

placed

the

Jewish

Question

in

cold

storage.

With

respect

to

the

French,

it must be said

that

Paris

was

always

against

Herzl's

project.

It was

clear,

Bodenheimer,

who

accompanied

Herzl

in his

Middle

Eastern

tour,

wrote,

that

Paris

watched

suspiciously

over

events

n Palestine.

Any

ncautiousdeclarationof a

protectorate

r a

Jewish

State

would

have led to

dangerous complications.

Should

the

French

fleet,

alerted at

Toulon,

have anchored off the

Syrian

coast,

trouble

would

certainly

have ensued. 28

Having recognized

the

potential

danger

o

world

peace,

Britain

was

content o

offer

Herzl

and his follow-

ers

less

sensitive

pots,

ike

Uganda

and

Cyprus,

to

fulfill

heir rredentist

aspirations.

II

Having done its homework n the diplomaticfieldby convincingthe

Powers

to

withdraw heir

upport

from he

Zionist

movement,

he Otto-

man

Foreign

Ministry

urned ts attention

o

anotherfacet of the Turkish

Government's

nti-Zionist

olicies.

The Ottomans wished to make

world

Jewry

elieve

that,

from he

point

of view of the

Jewish

people,

Herzl's

plans

were neither

feasible

nor

desirable.

They

hoped

that f

they

were

successful,

here

would be a

drop

n the number f Jewish onvertsto the

Zionist

ranks.

This would

indeed

deprive

he Zionists of theirmain source

of

strength.

typical

method

used

by

the

Turkish

Foreign Ministry

was to

27.

OFM,

332/17,

o.

3309/179,

.

Tewfik

o

Tewfik

asha,

Berlin,

1

Novem-

ber

1903.

28.

H. H.

Bodenheimer

ed.),

The Memoirs

f

Max Bodenheimer: relude

o

Israel

(New

York,

1963),

pp.

124-5.




8/12


9/12

Ottoman

Foreign

Ministry

371

halt the

development

f

Zionism. Certain sections of

the

Jewish

commu-

nity,

such as the

4

Orthodox and the

reformists,

did

indeed

prove

helpful.

Orthodox

Jews believed that

only

a

Messiah could deliver the

Jews

nto

Palestine;

thus

Dr.

Herzl,

who

appointed

himself o

this

divine

task,

was a charlatan.

He

was not

only

interfering

ith the will of

God,

but also

promising

he Jews a

mission

which

he,

with his mere human

powers,

could

not

fulfil.34

eformists lso

did

not

think

highly

f

Zionism.

Reformist

ews

of

Western

Europe

thought

hat

Jews did

not

constitute

nation,

but

a

religion.

nstead

of

migrating

o and

settling

n Palestine

with

thehopeofestablishingheir wn State,they houldabsorb the cultureof

the

nations

among

which

they

ived.

They

were worried

hat

f Dr.

Herzl

could

convince

the

Turks,

then their

position

would be threatened

by

a

sudden

upsurge

of

anti-Semitism,

s

their

hosts could

insist that

they

leave

their

ountries nd

migrate

o Palestine.35

Assimilated

Jews

had

no

desire

to leave Western

Europe,

where,

apart

from ccasional

tragedies

like

the

Dreyfus

Affair,

hey

lived

in

peace

and

prosperity.

Thus Ali

Ferruh

Bey

foundthe reformist ews in

the

United States

very

coopera-

tive.

Reverend

Stoden,

the

grand

rabbi of

Washington,

old him

that

a

large

section of the

Jewish

community elonged

to the reformist chool

and

had

no

sympathy

whatsoever

with

Zionism.36

As

a

last

measure

to

prevent

he

Zionists

from

olonizing

Palestine,

the

Ottoman

Foreign

Ministry

rdered the

Turkish

diplomatic

corps

not to

give

visas

to those Jews

who

belonged

to the

Zionist

movement.37

Jews

who

had

hoped

to evade

the Turkish

restrictions nd had

embarked on

their

ourney

without

visas

were

surprised

o see

that

the Ottoman cus-

toms'

authorities

were

already

alerted about their arrival. The

Turkish

police

more often han

not

knew the

homeland,

the

date of

embarkation,

as well

as the number

f Zionists

aboard a

ship

even before t reached

the

shores of Haifa or Jaffa.The Turkish representatives broad had no

inhibitions

bout

spying

n the Zionists.

Once

they

earned that

party

f

Zionists

was

on its

way

to

Palestine,

they

immediately

nformed

the

Turkish

authorities

t home with

a

cipher

telegram.38

t was indeed

34.

OFM, 332/17,

o.

60,

Ali Ferruh

ey

to

Tewfik

asha,

Washington,

3

April

1898.

35.

OFM, 332/17,

o.

23598/216,

ntopulos

o

Tewfik

asha, London,

8 June

1898.

36.

YPA,

C

11/35-37/54/136,

li

Ferruh

ey

to

the

Palace,

Washington,

2

April

898;

YPA,

C

11/48-49/54/136,

li Ferruh

ey

to

Tewfik

asha,

Washing-

ton,27April 898.

37.

YPA,

C

11/275-276/54/136,

li

Ferruh

ey

to

the

Palace,

Washington,

4

January

899.

38.

YPA,

C

11/226-229/54/136,

li

Ferruh

ey

to the

Palace,

Washington,

October

898;

C

11/218/54/136,

li

Ferruh

ey

to

the

Palace,

15

September

898.




10/12

372

Arab

Studies

Quarterly

remarkable that the Turkish

Foreign Ministry

nd

the

Ministry

f

the

Interior

chieved such a state of

coordination

and

cooperation.

Ill

Despite

Ottoman

ntransigence,

he

Zionists

managed

to

penetrate

he

borders

nd to

settlethousands

of their

ollowers n Palestine.

By

1909the

Jewish

population

of

Palestine had

risen

to

eighty

housand,

three

times

the number n 1882,when the first ntryrestrictionswere imposed; the

Zionists had

acquired

some

156

square

miles of and and set

up

twenty-six

colonies.39

The

wide

gap

between the

theory

and

practice

of

the Otto-

man

policies

and its results was attributable

o the intervention f

the

Powers on behalf of the Jewish colonizers.

Thanks to

the efforts

f

the

Foreign

Ministry,

he Ottomans

were

by

and

large

successful

in

persuading

he Powers

not

to

lend

any

support

o

the

Zionist

cause. The Powers

did not mediate between the Turks and the

Zionists. If the Zionists

lost on the

diplomatic

front nd failed to obtain a

charter or

home n

Palestine,

they

won

in another

way.

On their

rrival n

Palestine,

the Jewishsettlerswere not naturalizedas Ottoman

subjects,

but

preferred

o

acquire foreign ationality

n

order

to

enjoy

the

privileges

accorded to the Powers under the

Capitulations.

As

the

immigrants

b-

tained

certificates

f

protection

by very

doubtful

means),

the

European

consuls in

Jerusalem

were

compelled

to

recognize

them

as their sub-

jects.40

The Powers

made

it

clear to the

Porte that the

right

of

their

subjects

to

travel

nd to settlewithin he Ottoman

dominionswas

secured

by

the

Capitulations;

therefore,

nti-Zionist

egulations

were

considered

to be

ipso facto

null and

void

as

far as

they

concerned

persons

enjoying

theirprotection.41Thus, the delegations of European (and American)

Powers did not

hesitate

to

intervene

with he

Turkish

fficials

n

behalfof

the Zionists. As a

result,

each

regulation

f anti- ionist

egislation

of

the

Ottoman Governmentwas evaded.

Seeing

that ts efforts

o

check the

establishment

f a

Zionist

stronghold

within he

Ottoman

Empire

were

wasted,

the

ForeignMinistry

made a last

desperate

demarche.

It tried to

explain

to the Powers that the

Jewish

migrants

were

fraudulently cquiring

certificates

f

protection

nd that

39. N. Sokolow,History fZionism London,1919), i,pp. 326-31.

40.

PRO, FO,

78/1692,

o.

218,

Finn

to

Russell,Jerusalem,

y June

1862;

195/2028,

o.

408,

Dickson

to

O'Conor,

Jerusalem,

1 November

898.

41.

PRO,

FO, 195/1575,

hite o

Moore,

Therapia,

9 October

1887;

FRUS

(1888),

no.

1083,

Straus

o

Bayard,Constantinople,

9

May

1888.




11/12

Ottoman

Foreign

Ministry

373

they

were

using

them

to

evade

the

anti-Zionist

egulations

f

the

Porte.

Believing

thatthe

protégé

system

constituted

source of

inexhaustible

abuses,

Said

Pasha,

the

foreign

minister f

Turkey,

n a

note dated

April

1887,

asked the

Powers

to withdraw heir

protection

rom he

Zionists.42

Although

Britain

agreed

in

principle,

London

still

thought

hat

4

'owing

to the actual

persecution

f

the Jews

n

Russia,

it

might

e

injudicious

as

a

matter f

policy

to

deprive

the Jews in

Syria

and

Palestine

suddenly

of

British

protection. 43

The

Porte

did

not find

Germany

and

Russia

very

cooperative

either.

Both countrieshad

genuine

nterests

n

the

promulga-

tionof Zionistpolicies. As Herzl told the Kaiser and Plehve, the exodus

of

theJews

from hese

countries

meant hat he

Socialist movement

would

be

deprived

of its leaders

and

supporters

on

the one

hand,

and

anti-

Semitismwould

be

sapped

of

its

impetus

on

the other.44

With

respect

to

external

considerations,

both

the Germans and

Russians must have

thought

hat these Jewish

lements,

once

placed

under their

protection,

would

prove

themselves

gents

for heir

ncreased

nfluence n that

part

of

the Ottoman

Empire.

As

a last

effort,

he

Foreign

Ministry

urned o

the

United States. The

U.S.

stand vis-à-vis

the Zionists was left to

the discretion of

the U.S.

minister

n

Constantinople,

Oscar

Straus,

who

was

favorably

disposed

toward

Zionist

aspirations.45

As

a

result

of

Straus'

continuous at-

tempts

o

champion

Jewish

rights,

Ali

Ferruh

Bey

wired the

Sultan that

Straus was

blocking

America's

acquiescence

to

the

Turkish

policy

of

restricting

he

stay

of American Jews in

Palestine.46

Abdulhamid I had

him removed fromhis

post

in

Constantinople.

On

28

August

1893 the

Turkishministern

Washington

ppealed

to the

State

Department

hat he

question

of Zionism was an internal ffair f

the Ottoman

Empire,

and

Americans should

abide

by

the

principles

of

the

Monroe

Doctrine,

namelyno one should mix himself itherdirectly r indirectlywith the

affairs f others. 47 These

protests,

however,

fell

short

of

changing

the

American attitude

oward the Zionists in

Palestine.

In

1911,

seeing

that all his

Government's efforts

had

been

in

vain,

Abdulhamid

II,

deposed

and

exiled

by

then,

admitted to

his

private

42.

PRO, FO, 83/1723,

nei, to

no.

394,

White o

Salisbury,

herapia,

10

September

891.

43.

PRO, FO, 195/1510,

o.

14,

Elridge

o

Granville,

eirut,

5

May

1882.

44.

Diaries

ii,

pp.

669-671.

45. FRUS (1888),no. 1101,Adee to Straus,Washington,November 888.

46.

YPA,

C

11/275-276/54/136,

li

Ferruh

ey

to

the

Palace,

Washington,

4

January

899.

47.

FRUS

(1893),

Mavroyeni

o

Gresham,

Washington,

orrespondence

ith

the

Legation

f

Turkey,

8

August

893.




12/12

Documents

Zionists & the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 1876-1909