EuropEan InvolvEmEnt In thE arab-IsraElI ConflICt Muriel Asseburg,
Michael Bauer, Agnès Bertrand-Sanz, Esra Bulut Aymat, Jeroen
Gunning, Christian-Peter Hanelt, Rosemary Hollis, Daniel Möckli,
Michelle Pace, Nathalie Tocci Edited by Esra Bulut Aymat
124
Director: Álvaro de Vasconcelos
© EU Institute for Security Studies 2010. All rights reserved. No
part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior
permission of the EU Institute for Security Studies.
ISBN 978-92-9198-176-2 ISSN 1017-7566 QN-AA-10-124-EN-C
doi:10.2815/21669
Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in
Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by
Hanno Ranck in collaboration with CL Design (Paris).
Acknowledgements
The editor would like to thank all participants of two EU-MEPP Task
Force Meetings held at the EUISS, Paris, on 30 March 2009 and 2
July 2010 and an authors’ meeting held in July 2010 for their
feedback on papers and draft chapters that formed the basis of the
volume. Thanks in particular to Constanza Musu, Anne Le More and
Rouzbeh Parsi for detailed comments on draft chapters. Thanks also
to Gearoid Cronin for his editorial work, to Noelle Tomas for the
formatting of the text, and to Suzanne Lavender and Arsim Mulaku
for their work on the annexes. Any errors are the responsibility of
the editor and authors.
Contents
4
3
2
1
Executive summary 11 Chapter summaries 11 Policy recommendations
12
Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict 15 Esra
Bulut Aymat Introduction 15 Does Europe matter? 17 Between
diplomatic dichotomies 19 An ever-involved EU? 22 Summary of
chapters 24 Conclusion 29
the basic stakes and strategy of the Eu and member states 31
Rosemary Hollis Introduction 31 European interests and stakes 31
Formal EU position on the conflict 35 Europe’s evolving role: a
salutary tale 36 Policy constraints and limitations 38 Unpalatable
options 40 Conclusion and policy implications 41
the conflict and the Eu’s assistance to the palestinians 43 Agnès
Bertrand-Sanz Introduction 43 Historical background 44
State-building in an emergency: the Fayyad plan 45 Necessary EU
responses to roadblocks in the way of Palestinian Statehood 46
Building matchstick houses in a storm: EU aid and state-building
efforts during occupation and blockade 47 Conclusion and policy
implications 51
the conflict and Eu-Israeli relations 55 Nathalie Tocci
Introduction 55 The political context: EU goals, interests and
policies regarding Israel 55
Contents
8
7
6
5
EU policies towards Israel and implications for the conflict 57
Conclusion and policy implications 62
the middle East conflict, transatlantic ties and the Quartet 65
Daniel Möckli Introduction 65 From conflict to limited cooperation
66 Obama playing an EU tune 69 The transatlantic agenda: difficult
decisions ahead 70 Conclusion and policy implications 74
Eu crisis management in the arab-Israeli conflict 75 Muriel
Asseburg Introduction 75 EU approaches and interests 75 Fields and
instruments of EU crisis management 76 Conclusion and policy
implications 83
the end of Eu democracy promotion and of the two-state solution? 87
Michelle Pace Introduction 87 Past and present policies 88 Basic
challenges and European interests 92 Lessons learned 93 Conclusion
and implications for current and future policy 95
the conflict and the question of engaging with hamas 97 Jeroen
Gunning Introduction 97 Brief history of (non-)engagement 97 A
critique of the case against engagement 98 The case for engagement
101 A model for engagement? 104 Situating engagement 106 Conclusion
and policy implications 107
Contents
A
9 regional approaches to the arab-Israeli conflict and the role of
the European union 109 Michael Bauer and Christian-Peter Hanelt
Introduction 109 The role of regional actors: dimensions and
developments 110 Ownership and commitment: coordinating regional
and international efforts 113 Prospects and challenges for
diplomacy by a multilateral actor 115 Conclusion and policy
implications 117
annexes 119 List of supporting documents 119 About the authors 123
Abbreviations 127
7
preface Álvaro de Vasconcelos
In the last few weeks we have witnessed, yet again, the failure of
US- mediated negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. This
means that it is necessary, once again, to discuss the course of
action that the European Union should follow, in the present
strained regional and international circumstances, to attain its
long-sought but elusive goal of peace in the Middle East. This
Chaillot Paper suggests a shift in emphasis and priorities from a
determined but not always consistently pursued effort to create a
Palestinian state to deliberate and sustained insistence on Israeli
and Palestinian respect for international and European law.
Helping bring about a Palestinian state living in peace and
security alongside Israel has been the common unifying goal
underpinning European efforts at resolving the Middle East conflict
since 1980. The inescapable conclusion is, however, that those
efforts, however well meaning, have largely failed, and that the
chances for success are at present perhaps slimmer than ever
before. The authors of the chapters that make up this volume are
almost unanimous in pointing out that it is pointless to embark on
fresh attempts without analysing what exactly made previous
attempts abortive in the first place. Why have those most closely
involved in attempting to make good on the promise of helping
create a Palestinian state inherent in the Oslo-Madrid process –
the European Union, the United States and the Arab states –
accumulated nothing but an enormous amount of frustration and the
sense that they have so little to show for years and years of
commitment? And the question must furthermore be asked: for how
many more years will diplomatic engagement along the same lines
continue to be deployed in vain?
The essays in this volume inevitably point to the conclusion that
the goal sought by European diplomacy, for the time being at least,
is not within reach. The situation that has developed over recent
years, as Esra Bulut Aymat writes, ‘increasingly fuel doubts about
the very possibility of a two-state solution.’ This is obviously
not merely a failure of EU policy, but rather one in which all
those who have been involved in the search for a solution share
some responsibility, to say nothing of course of
8
European Involvement in the arab-Israeli Conflict
Israeli and Palestinian politicians. But persisting along paths
that have led straight to dead ends will merely spell increased
frustration, and make the end goal even more elusive.
The lack of meaningful progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
through the two-state solution, which has been a primary goal of
the EU, is a huge challenge to the credibility of the EU’s
international policy. It has an obvious negative security impact in
that there is a constant and impending risk of war in the Middle
East, with a source of acute tensions and radicalisation festering
at the southern rim of the Union. The EU’s Mediterranean policy has
remained, in spite of intense efforts to the contrary, largely
hostage to the conflict, and its objective of creating a
multilateral framework for cooperation in the Mediterranean
including Israel as well as Arab states cannot be met. The 2003
European Security Strategy states categorically that the
‘Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe’.
Furthermore, as long as it remains unresolved, ‘there will be
little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East.
The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit
resources to the problem until it is solved.’ There is indeed no
single topic in the international agenda that has mobilised greater
and more continued European engagement, including an inordinate
amount of shuttle diplomacy on the part of all its main leaders,
and an active presence in the Middle East Quartet since it was set
up in 2002. Neither the commitment to the Quartet nor the
scrupulous support of US initiatives have brought any significant
strides towards the long-sought goal, however, nor prevented the
collapse of President Obama’s efforts to instigate direct talks in
2010.
The question today, inevitably, is what next? Could there be a way
out that has not been tried yet? Is there a policy line out there
waiting to be put to the test that could give a fresh chance to the
two-state solution? In the minds of those who contributed to this
volume, some of the very best European experts on the Middle East
among them, there certainly is, and its first steps involve
fostering Palestinian reconciliation.
Bringing about Palestinian reconciliation cannot be achieved
without engaging with Hamas. This is a matter on which most authors
concur, and a point that Jeroen Gunning emphasises: as he puts it:
‘the international community must find a way of working with Hamas
– or give up on the goal of achieving a two-state solution.’ With
Hamas’s differences with Fatah managed or mediated, a unified,
representative and democratically accountable Palestinian
negotiating partner would be empowered to draw on attractive
bargaining chips, make crucial concessions and credible commitments
to their Israeli counterparts, significantly enhancing peace
prospects. There is no guarantee however against renewed failure if
an insistence on a gradual process systematically sidestepping
the
9
preface
main issues, and thus subject to the kind of indefinite
procrastination that has led all peace initiatives from Oslo to
Obama to fall apart, is maintained.
The second question on which a strong consensus emerges from this
volume is that the EU should place its own norms and rules, as well
as international law, at the heart of its policy as part of a
multilateral strategy. Agnès Bertrand-Sanz writes that the EU
should adopt a comprehensive strategy predicated on international
law and human rights. Nathalie Tocci notes that ‘the application of
the law is not incompatible with cooperation with Israel’ and that
the EU should not view ‘the application of the law as an undue
“punishment”’ and contends that by putting respect for the law at
the heart of its relations with Israel the EU would contribute to
establish the conditions essential to achieve the two-state
solution. The EU should not only identify and denounce those
aspects of both Israeli and Palestinian behaviour that run counter
to international law, but Rosemary Hollis suggests it should go one
step further and ‘impose penalties accordingly’.
In more than one respect, Palestine is a key test of the EU’s
credibility as a supporter of democratic reform. The refusal to
recognise the victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elections in
spite of the fact they were indisputably declared as ‘free and
fair’ by EU observers, has doubtless eroded that credibility and
contributed to the notion that the EU would rather back
authoritarian regimes than face the risk that free elections return
Islamist parties as those favoured by the people. The fact that new
elections in Palestine have been taken off the agenda altogether
has only contributed to spread this view. Michelle Pace puts it
forcefully: ‘Only a truly political reform agenda in the Middle
East can prevent the further de-democratisation of the region’ and,
with specific regard to Israel and Palestine, ‘the emergence of a
single-state outcome to the conflict accompanied by endemic
violence.’ This is all the more important since, in the very likely
event that there will be no Dayton-like arrangement for the Middle
East, the two-state solution will fade away at least for the time
being and the EU will need ‘to consider the other option on the
table – a one-state solution.’
In his Cairo speech in June 2009, US President Obama extolled the
virtues of peaceful resistance, and its potential to prevail over
violence. ‘Palestinians must abandon violence. Resistance through
violence and killing is wrong and does not succeed. For centuries,
black people in America suffered the lash of the whip as slaves and
the humiliation of segregation. But it was not violence that won
full and equal rights. It was a peaceful and determined insistence
upon the ideals at the centre of America's founding.’ The
centrality of civic movements will become more evident if the
situation moves from one dominated by movements
10
European Involvement in the arab-Israeli Conflict
who fight for a national state to one where the focus shifts to
fundamental rights and their protection under international law.
The emergence of civic movements which reject any form of violent
resistance and various kinds of grass-roots organisations with
mixed Israeli and Palestinian membership seems to be a step in this
direction.
Whether a one- or a two-state solution looms on the horizon, the
question of civil rights will not evaporate, nor will the need for
all parties to the conflict to comply with international law.
Whatever the circumstances, adherence to a law, norms and
fundamental rights approach seems to be the best option for the EU
and one that is vindicated by the arguments put forward in this
Chaillot Paper.
Paris, December 2010
Executive summary
The Chaillot Paper examines European involvement in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. It focuses on European Union involvement in
the conflict, with special, but not exclusive, attention to EU
involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian dimension of the conflict.
Three decades on from the landmark 1980 Venice Declaration of the
then nine Member States of the European Community, 2010 has seen
new setbacks in efforts to resolve the conflict, and negative
trends that increasingly fuel doubts about the very possibility of
a two-state solution. This contrasts sharply against the optimistic
objectives of the latest US peace initiative and Palestinian
Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s plan for a Palestinian
state, both of which envisage 2011 as a key year for moving towards
a two-state solution. These contrasts invite far-reaching, honest
and critical reflection on where European involvement in the
conflict has left the EU and its Member States, and how it has
impacted on peace prospects. Drawing on the expertise and distinct
approaches of researchers from across Europe, the volume combines
discussion of past and present EU policies, basic challenges for
the EU, European interests and lessons learned, with elaboration of
policy implications and recommendations.
Chapter summaries Chapter One (Esra Bulut Aymat) introduces the
overall contributions and findings of the chapters, and provides
chapter summaries. Overall, the findings confirm the EU’s crucial
relevance to the conflict, invite fresh scrutiny of the key
relationships between the EU and other parties involved in the
conflict, and caution against bending to multiple pressures that
result in the EU becoming more embedded in the conflict in a way
that does not serve basic European interests. Chapter Two (Rosemary
Hollis) outlines the basic stakes for the EU and Member States
regarding the conflict, and provides a historical overview of the
EU’s formal position on the matter and its evolving role since the
1990s. The author argues that EU policy has been more about issuing
declarations and
12
European Involvement in the arab-Israeli Conflict
maintaining consensus within the transatlantic alliance than
effective conflict resolution. Chapter Three (Agnès Bertrand-Sanz)
examines the conflict and the EU’s assistance to the Palestinians.
The author argues that without a basic reorientation in EU aid
strategies and a rethink of the failed boycott of the Hamas
administration in Gaza, current EU policy can only further erode
the prospects of a viable Palestinian state-building enterprise.
Chapter Four (Nathalie Tocci) examines the conflict and EU- Israeli
bilateral relations. The author argues that the EU’s prioritisation
of cooperation with Israel has worked against prospects of a
two-state solution, and led the EU to compromise its adherence to
its own norms and laws. Chapter Five (Daniel Möckli) explores the
interplay between transatlantic ties, the Quartet and EU policies
towards the conflict. While transatlantic convergence over the
conflict has reached an all-time high since 2009, this has failed
to translate into substantial progress on the ground, prompting the
need to address a number of issues on the transatlantic agenda
through more strategic and effective means.
Chapter Six (Muriel Asseburg) focuses on EU involvement in crisis
management and mediation in the Arab-Israeli arena. The author
argues that European presence on the ground has at best served to
freeze rather than settle the conflict, and that efforts should
focus on tackling trends that heighten the risk of renewed violence
and destroy prospects of a viable Palestinian state. Chapter Seven
(Michelle Pace) examines the interplay between the stalled state of
democratisation efforts in the region and a feared eclipse of a
two-state solution. The author argues that the EU is left with
limited policy choices in both domains in the absence of a clear
strategy on the linkage between democracy- building in the region
and peaceful resolution of the conflict. Chapter Eight (Jeroen
Gunning) tackles the question of engaging Hamas. The author argues
that the realities of power balances and political trends across
the OPT and within the Hamas movement, coupled with tested
alternatives to the current non-engagement policy, make some form
of EU engagement, potentially with a Palestinian national unity
government, imperative. Chapter Nine (Michael Bauer and
Christian-Peter Hanelt) explores regional approaches to the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of the European Union. The
authors propose that the EU should aim to help link regional
ownership to international support for promising initiatives, most
notably the Arab Peace Initiative.
policy recommendations As a multi-author volume, the Chaillot Paper
does not have one set of recommendations shared by all the authors,
nor does it propose a single route for future EU policy.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of chapters
13
Executive summary
converge in their assessment that the current priority lies in
encouraging and enabling intra-Palestinian reconciliation. The
current EU and US policy towards Hamas is unsustainable and
counter-productive in this respect, and some form of engagement
with Hamas will be required if progress is to be attained. The
chapters offer a variety of concrete proposals on how this might be
achieved. The EU could work with the US and Quartet partners to
foster coordinated and creative thinking on Palestinian
reconciliation. Treating the Quartet principles as crucial goals
rather than preconditions, the EU could lead the way on encouraging
the formation of a Palestinian National Unity government committed
to maintaining a ceasefire, dealing with Israel on the basis of the
1967 borders and respecting previous agreements. The EU could help
dismantle the current incentive structure that makes a National
Unity government unattractive to the Palestinian factions, for
example by spelling out the rewards on offer to a potential new
Palestinian unity government, or by clarifying how it would deal
with such an entity. While one author advises the EU should leave
mediation to others, another suggests the EU could consider the
option of acting as a mediator in Hamas-Fatah unity talks, building
on its long-standing direct and indirect interaction with
Palestinian factions.
Another theme that emerges from a number of chapters is the
recommendation that the EU place respect for international and
European law, and diligence in ensuring appropriate reactions and
remedies to violations of both, at the heart of its relations with
Palestinians and Israelis. This would include adapting current
policy and practice regarding Israeli settlements goods to comply
with EU declarations and legal obligations; and seeking
reimbursement for additional costs to EU-funded humanitarian relief
incurred as a result of illegal practices in the OPT. Other
practical measures to deal with the particularly problematic issue
of settlement growth might include issuing a code of conduct to
discourage European investment in and cooperation with
settlement-based companies. In East Jerusalem, the EU and Member
States could tighten policies and practice to avoid de facto
recognition of the Israeli annexation.
At least twenty further suggestions for improving policy are
presented in the following chapters. These include recommendations
for the EU to:
Prioritise bringing about an end to the Gaza blockade, working • on
durable border arrangements and on ensuring that any further
changes to the current closure policies do not entrench a
collective punishment logic and isolation of the Gaza Strip from
the West Bank.
14
European Involvement in the arab-Israeli Conflict
Renew emphasis on conflict resolution efforts, and on removing •
obstacles to the emergence of a Palestinian state, in order to
improve the effectiveness of EU assistance to the OPT and its CSDP
missions on the ground.
Seek to clarify its role in Middle East diplomacy in coordination •
with the US and other Quartet members, including the scope for
European unilateral measures on certain issues, such as settlements
and relations with Syria.
Engage in more timely and consistent confidence-building, early •
warning, monitoring and crisis mediation, in particular in the most
sensitive areas, including on the Lebanon-Israel border and in
Jerusalem.
Prepare carefully for the different scenarios surrounding the PA •
government’s August 2011 deadline for creating a Palestinian
state.
Assess the sustainability and impact of its current aid policies in
• the OPT.
Develop a more comprehensive policy towards human rights and •
democracy in its approach to the conflict, revising its democracy
support programmes to maximise impact on the ground.
Explore playing a more proactive role • vis-à-vis constructive
regional initiatives towards the conflict, helping link initiatives
with regional ownership to effective international support, most
notably in the case of the Arab Peace Initiative.
Overall, these recommendations address both those searching for
bold conflict resolution steps and those seeking to minimise the
harm done to peace prospects by current trends. This Chaillot Paper
thus invites both sceptics and enthusiasts to further explore the
full array of policy options and policy constraints that the EU
faces with a more grounded and ambitious, and perhaps more
‘European’, vision and purpose.
15
Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict esra
Bulut Aymat
Introduction This Chaillot Paper examines European involvement in
the Arab-Israeli conflict through an array of approaches. It
focuses on European Union (EU) involvement in the conflict, with
special, but not exclusive, attention on EU involvement in the
Israeli-Palestinian dimension of the conflict. The volume aspires
to make a timely contribution to policy thinking by focusing
attention on a number of cross-cutting issues, challenges and
opportunities for the EU.
2010 marks the passing of three decades since the 1980 Venice
Declaration of the then nine Member States of the European
Community, considered a milestone in the history of European
involvement in the conflict. Thirty years on, the perceived
capacity of PLO leaders to represent and deliver Palestinians in
peace-making is undermined by sharp intra-Palestinian political and
physical divisions, while the viability of a potential negotiated
two state-centred solution, the stated preferred outcome of the EU,
is increasingly called into question by its foremost advocates
either in despair, tactical desperation or strategic reassessment.
While there have been more violent phases in the conflict, as well
as more chaotic and more polarised periods, an unprecedented
combination of Israeli and Palestinian political inertia, societal
polarisation and physical fragmentation has prompted serious
discussion in unlikely quarters about a one-state solution, and
other alternatives.1
This stands out in stark contrast to the optimistic objectives of
the latest US peace initiative backed by the Quartet, as well as
Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s plan for a
Palestinian state, both of which envisage 2011 as a key year for
moving towards a two- state solution. Indeed, a wider range of
contrasts have punctured and defined the last two years of the
conflict, from war and dire post-war conditions in the Gaza Strip
to the intensification of PA-Israeli security
1. For further discussion, see the chapter by Michelle Pace in this
volume. On alternatives to both a two-state and one-state solution,
see for example the ‘Parallel States Project’ at Lund
University.
16
1 Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict
cooperation in the West Bank, from diplomacy at the highest levels
over Israeli settlements to international civil society attempts to
break the embargo on the Gaza Strip, and from fears of an imminent
regional conflagration to uncertainty over the shifting,
potentially irreversible and volatile situation in Jerusalem.
These developments invite far-reaching reflection on where EU
policies towards the conflict have met or fallen short of
objectives and expectations, the actual effects of policy paths
taken, and what might be usefully attempted additionally or
alternatively. The current volume stems from the belief that sound
policy thinking for the future must be grounded in detailed, honest
and critical examination of past and present policy outcomes. With
varying emphasis, the chapters combine discussion of past and
present EU policies, basic challenges, European interests, and
lessons learned, with elaboration of policy implications and
recommendations. Between them they address basic stakes, key
relationships, the transatlantic context, cross-cutting questions
and regional approaches. The annexes support these chapters with a
list of useful relevant documents. The volume does not constitute
an exhaustive account of EU policy towards the conflict as a number
of topics have been addressed at the expense of others given length
limitations.2
This Challiot Paper aspires to focus minds on distinct and shared
European interests, concerns and stakes regarding the conflict and
its non-resolution. The contributing authors hail from several
European countries and are drawn from across the realm of research,
spanning universities, think tanks and non-governmental
organisations. Convening European analysts to examine European
policies carries several objectives. It serves to expose
policy-relevant insight and advice from broader research projects
being carried out by the authors’ think tanks, universities and
research networks. It seeks to further intra-European discussion of
EU policies, and draws on papers and draft chapters discussed at
three meetings held at the EU Institute for Security Studies in
Paris in 2009-2010.3 The volume thus speaks first and foremost to
Europeans, but also to the conflicting parties and to other third
parties, including the US. Its primary target audience comprises
policy-makers, as well as the research and civil society
communities that scrutinise, influence and sometimes transcend,
policy. It is also aimed at anyone seeking to learn more about EU
involvement in the conflict and efforts to resolve it. It
constitutes an invitation to further and broaden analysis,
discussion and policy adaptation.
2. For example, while a number of chapters touch on the topic,
there is not a specific chapter specifically devoted to the
conflict and Euro-Mediterranean relations; readers are instead
invited to consult a series of papers published this year on this
topic by the Institute: the Ten Papers for 2010 report series
published jointly by the EUISS, Paris and IEMED, Barcelona.
3. ‘Lessons Learned and Strategic Thinking after the Gaza Crisis’,
EUISS EU-MEPP Task Force Meeting, 30 March 2009, EUISS, Paris;
‘Between Pessimism and Optimism: EU Policy Options across
Scenarios’ EUISS EU-MEPP Task Force Meeting, 2 July 2010, EUISS,
Paris and an authors’ meeting, 1 July 2010, EUISS, Paris.
Esra Bulut Aymat
17
Does Europe matter? Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the policy
debates over European roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict is the
discrepancy that characterises different actors’ and institutions’
assessment of the basic relevance of the EU and its Member States
to the conflict. While many in outside policy circles tend to think
Europeans are largely irrelevant to the contemporary course of the
conflict, many policy-makers point to the unique contributions the
EU has made, while still others allege that European policies are
harming the chances of a sustainable negotiated settlement.
Awareness of the scope and precise nature of EU involvement is
generally vague beyond the doors of EU and Member State
institutions and missions. Navigating between such praise,
criticism, derision and unfamiliarity, we inevitably and frequently
return to two basic questions. Do European policies matter to the
conflict and efforts to end it? And does it matter how European
policies matter?
The first major contribution of this volume is its focus on
European involvement first and foremost in terms of previous and
existing policies, and the various forms of impact (or lack
thereof) these have had to date. The overriding message that
emerges from the chapters that follow is that European involvement
in the conflict does matter, and that more attention to how it
matters is essential. A multifaceted profile of a complex player,
not just payer, emerges from the analysis of various dimensions of
EU involvement. This complexity stems not only from the distinctive
workings and institutions of the EU and its Member States,
particularly baffling for outsiders, but also from the varied and
diffuse effects that European policies and action have had on the
conflict.
Understanding European involvement in the conflict requires
transcending a conceptualisation of it as the sum of EU and Member
State policies. European policymakers have a tendency to evaluate
and defend the EU’s record in terms of a list of achievements
administered by different parts of the EU machinery rather than in
terms of overall impact as a distinct and unified actor. There are
many reasons for this. Yet inventories of EU policy instruments,
projects and council conclusions can only go so far when trying to
better understand the relationship between policies, strategies,
tactics and interests. While numerous policies might be assessed to
have had limited impact in meeting stated objectives, it is in the
far-reaching, sometimes blatant, sometimes more convoluted, and
often unintended, consequences of EU involvement that a serious
assessment of impact must be traced.
Herein lies one possible explanation for the puzzling diversity in
assessments of the EU role: the different objectives and priorities
of those making them. Those more focused on identifying conflict
resolution
18
1 Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict
opportunities tend to see the EU as a relatively inconsequential
actor with nevertheless useful funds and technical expertise. In
contrast, those who are more concerned with whether and how current
trends diminish peace prospects, appear to see a consequential role
for the EU as a prominent fund-provider, Quartet member, and
self-proclaimed partner of the PA and Israel. While policy-makers
and analysts of the former ilk encounter little EU-related material
while sifting through the peace-making debris for
breakthrough-inducing or game-changing material, the latter
regularly encounter the imprint of EU bodies and Member States when
tracing apparent violations of the ‘do no harm’ principle of
intervention.4 This discrepancy may also reflect a progressive
erosion of favourable conditions for a sustainable negotiated
settlement since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the tendency to
downplay European involvement, apart from sometimes being
ascribable to unawareness of the scope and specificities of EU
involvement, may be reinforced by thinking of impact primarily in
terms of quasi-hegemonic capacities.
Yet something with more far-reaching implications for our
understanding of the conflict may be at stake. If, as Rosemary
Hollis suggests in her chapter, ‘European investment in containing
the conflict and funding the basic needs of the Palestinians is
vital to the continuance of the status quo’, then downplaying the
EU role helps us overlook the immense amount of economic,
political, diplomatic and societal work and resources that underpin
the current configuration of the conflict, provided, deliberately
or not, by almost all actors involved. Most EU policies are firmly
at the heart, often median, of these dynamics, be it in terms of EU
direct aid to the PA in the West Bank, assistance to the population
of Gaza, vital support to the UNRWA serving 4.7 million registered
Palestinian refugees in the region, membership of the International
Quartet, associational relationships with the Palestinians and
Israelis, support to the Palestinian Civil Police, measured and
mixed positions in the UN, or extensive but cautious monitoring of
the situation in Jerusalem. Europeans may not define the current
conflict landscape and architecture, but for better or worse they
constitute a key feature and cornerstone.
And yet discussion of the impact of EU policies on Israeli,
Palestinian, US and regional actors’ behaviour appears to be
muffled and abbreviated by the assessment that this role does not
empower, but simply corners, the EU, and that ultimately the
decisions that count are made elsewhere. In particular, existing
internal discussion on whether current policies are contributing to
diminishing prospects of a negotiated two-state solution seems
undercut by ambivalence, or as Rosemary Hollis puts it in her
chapter, ‘a sense of powerlessness and fatalism’, regarding
European agency and impact. Some Israelis and Palestinians suggest
that the EU and/or Europeans could play a substantially altered
role if they wanted to. While some element of wishful thinking
might be at
4. See for example Michael Keating, Anne Le More and Robert Lowe
(eds.), Aid, Diplomacy and ‘Facts’ on the Ground: The Case of
Palestine (London: Chatham House, 2005); Anne Le More,
International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo: Political
Guilt, Wasted Money (London: Routledge, 2008).
Esra Bulut Aymat
19
play, as well as some underestimation of intra-European
constraints, this pattern suggests that the conflicting parties are
more aware of the specific policy choices Europeans have made in
the recent history of the conflict than many Europeans are. Viewing
the history of European involvement as involving specific choices,
decisions, calculations and adjustments – both willing and
unwilling; well-thought out and muddled – rather than simply a
gradual, almost natural, evolution, constitutes an important first
step towards rediscovering EU agency. Indeed while EU council
conclusions and declarations largely tell a story of steady
refinement, the story of how the EU has attempted to implement its
shared positions reveals more U-turns, inconsistencies, and
internal tension and disagreement.
Avoiding permanent or systemic policy drift requires greater
awareness of what position, both complex and contingent, the EU
currently finds itself in. The following chapters devote
substantial space to the historical decisions and dynamics that
have resulted in the EU’s current positions. Chapter two includes a
broad historical overview of European involvement in the conflict
and the changing stakes for the EU and Member States. Chapter three
provides an introduction to the evolution of EU assistance to the
OPT, while chapter four situates its arguments and recommendations
in the context of the historical and legal record of EU-Israeli
relations. Chapter five outlines the historical development of the
transatlantic dimensions of EU involvement in the conflict, while
chapter six contextualises more recent EU crisis management
initiatives within a longer history of mediation efforts and
support for Palestinian institution building. Chapter seven places
recent dilemmas in the EU’s policies regarding democracy and the
conflict in the wider context of EU democracy promotion efforts.
Chapter eight, beyond a brief history of EU non-engagement with
Hamas, unpacks the various ways in which past and present policies
have influenced the movement. Finally, chapter nine includes a
summary of both recent and more long-standing regional initiatives,
and their mixed results, towards the conflict.
between diplomatic dichotomies The second broad contribution of the
volume is its scrutiny of the key relationships that the EU has
with the conflicting parties and other third parties to the
conflict. Overall, the EU’s ability to use its policy instruments
to help the conflicting parties move closer to peace has been
hindered by an increasingly dichotomous view of the landscape as
comprising only partners and foes. While the objective should
remain to nurture cooperative approaches to peace, an over-reliance
on the metaphor of partnership has had at least two distorting
and
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1 Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict
counter-productive sets of results. The chapters point to policy
paths that transcend this dichotomy.
The first set of counter-productive results relate to the EU’s
relationships with its declared partners. Nathalie Tocci argues in
her chapter that the EU’s prioritisation of cooperation with Israel
has not only trumped, but also worked against, EU pursuit of a
two-state solution. She outlines how the EU has foregone using the
potentially most effective means of influence on Israel in its
contractual and political relations. The EU has risked distorting
its own law and practice to accommodate illegal Israeli policies
because it has considered the pursuit of measures to ensure respect
for law as ‘punishments’ harmful to EU-Israeli cooperation.
Furthermore, the predominant framing of the EU’s transatlantic
partnership role as a supporting actor to the US is strained by
limitations in the US position and approach. The recent call for
reflection on the fact that ‘three of the most significant
Arab-Israeli breakthroughs occurred with the US nowhere in sight’,
and on why the US has been ‘so unfailingly inept at launching
successful initiatives’ has important implications for European
policy thinking.5 In his chapter, Daniel Möckli explores the mixed
record of EU efforts to influence US policy as an indirect way of
bringing European thinking into the management and resolution of
the conflict. He recommends shared strategising on urgent matters,
further thinking on the roles of the EU and Quartet in Middle East
diplomacy and renewed attention to the scope for certain unilateral
EU measures.
This is not to say that we should abandon efforts to build
meaningful partnerships with the conflicting parties and third
parties, nor that Europeans should not devote more attention and
resources to direct and effective public diplomacy outlining the
existing forms and foundations of, and further potential for,
partnership in a number of areas. In fact more bold proposals
regarding how the states of a two-state solution might be
integrated into the European Union as close partners require
further reflection. Ongoing thinking over potential European
‘deposits’ in areas such as security, refugees, Jerusalem and
natural resources in support of implementation of a negotiated
two-state solution, might be usefully supplemented by a more
ambitious vision of how the two states would be connected to the
EU. The recent suggestion of a model of ‘Euro-Israeli Partnership’
should be explored,6 as should suggestions that the most meaningful
‘guarantee’ within the context of implementation of a peace deal
would be the option of full EU membership for one or both states.
Yet the objective of meaningful partnerships should not obscure the
full array of choices the EU faces in interacting with all the
relevant actors in the conflict.
This brings us to a second set of drawbacks, related to EU
non-engagement of parties to the conflict. By integrating the
heavily charged notion of
5. Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, ‘How Not to Make Peace in the
Middle East’, The New York Review of Books, 15 January 2009.
6. Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, Uneasy Neighbours: Israel and the
European Union (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 93-109.
Esra Bulut Aymat
21
partnership into our basic interaction with the parties, the stakes
have been raised too high. Almost all the authors converge in
stressing that the current EU and US policy towards Hamas is
unsustainable and counter-productive. The chapter by Jeroen Gunning
lays out six reasons why engagement with Hamas has become
imperative, and points to the Swiss experience as demonstrating the
overall benefits of lessening the stakes of engagement by engaging
with all. Other authors point to the far-reaching consequences of
the current deadlocked policy. Agnès Bertrand-Sanz points to the
implications for the EU’s strategy of supporting Palestinian
state-building, while Muriel Asseburg points to the impossibility
of building an independent Palestinian judiciary and a non-partisan
security apparatus with democratic oversight amidst the current
divisions in the OPT. Michelle Pace reminds us of the far- reaching
consequences for the EU’s democracy-building agenda in the region
and beyond, while Daniel Möckli points to the limiting impact on
Quartet peace-making aspirations. Most of the chapters recommend
urgent prioritisation of encouraging and enabling policies towards
intra-Palestinian reconciliation, and in this context urge
engagement with the movement.
This would almost certainly require coordinating a more nuanced and
proactive approach with other third parties, most notably the US
and governments in the region. The final chapter in the volume
draws our attention to the largely untapped potential of greater
linkage with regional approaches in trying to resolve different
aspects of the conflict. Michael Bauer and Christian Hanelt
elaborate on the importance of regional ownership and international
support for peace initiatives, and the still largely unfulfilled
potential of the Arab Peace Initiative.
The bottom line is that the EU does not share identical objectives
with any of the chief conflicting parties, but nor as a third party
should it expect or strive to. While there may be considerable
overlap – most notably within the context of the current Fayyad
plan – between some objectives of some Palestinians and Israelis
and the EU, ultimately the parties have conflicting objectives that
require reconciliation, partly through outside mediation, pressure
and guarantees. The idea of propping up at any expense a
Palestinian partner with Euro-Atlantic objectives is as problematic
in itself as the idea of excluding Palestinians not sharing these
objectives from the peace dividend. Similarly, the EU is right to
engage with settler ministers in the current Israeli government.
Without a sufficiently inclusive approach to conflict resolution,
the path of negotiations and the end objective of a fair negotiated
sustainable settlement lose legitimacy and local ownership.
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1 Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict
an ever-involved Eu? The third broad contribution of the volume is
that it challenges the temptation to think that the key to success,
or the most acceptable fall- back option, lies in simply doing and
saying more. Several pressures push policy thinking towards falling
back on the dictum that more, if not better, is at least a
reasonable compromise – from EU assistance to ministerial visits to
the region. On the one hand, the current focus on the establishment
of the European External Action Service reminds us of the ongoing
construction work around the EU’s international role and
representation. As the EU attempts to establish itself as a ‘global
player’, concerns about respecting ‘do no harm principles’ of
international intervention interact with countervailing logics of
budget maximisation, inter-institutional competition, national
rivalries and an eagerness to project or represent ‘Europe’ on the
international stage. On the other hand, as laid out in Rosemary
Hollis’ discussion of internal constraints upon EU effectiveness,
important differences (as well as noteworthy convergence) persist
among Member States and institutions regarding the conflict. As
another recent study details, while EU Middle East policy shows
‘clear signs of convergence’, as a result of a certain degree of
compatibility between Member State preferences, the consolidation
of this convergence into a ‘truly collective policy’ has been
hampered by persistent differences.7
The twin logics of global power building and preservation of
national prerogatives, however defined, provide the fuel for policy
but also lead to many voices, multiple initiatives, parallel
policies and at times incoherent and contradictory responses to key
developments. The chapter by Muriel Asseburg, for example, charts
the mixed impact on EU crisis mediation efforts, which have been
hampered by the rather incoherent picture presented by the
contradictory statements of EU Member States, and on EU aspirations
to play an active third-party role in crisis management and
security matters. This also bears out in what is not covered in the
chapters below. For example, while the volume does not aspire to
present an exhaustive account of EU involvement, it is still
striking that in the eight following chapters there is scarce
mention of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace
Process. Wider feedback on the role and record of the Special
Representative suggests that the EU is unready for a unified
high-profile messenger on the conflict.8
Further pressures emanating from the dynamics of the conflict
present a further basic and recurrent dilemma for the EU in its
approach to, and priorities regarding, the conflict. Israeli
Defence Forces testing of EU equipment donated to the Palestinian
Civil Police serves as a pointed reminder that almost everything
the EU provides to the parties and
7. Constanza Musu, European Union Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli
Peace Process: The Quicksands of Politics (Palgrave Macmillan:
Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 101;173.
8. Interviews with European, Palestinian and Israeli officials,
Jerusalem, Ramallah, November 2008 and May 2010.
Esra Bulut Aymat
23
peace efforts, from technical assistance to diplomatic
interventions, has potential dual use. While on the one hand, and
at least in theory, EU involvement helps prepare the path to peace,
on the other hand it helps contain the conflict at ‘tolerable’
levels. The EU’s existing role and further potential in conflict
containment has not been lost on the parties who have invited or
acquiesced to increasing European involvement in specific
dimensions of the conflict, most notably in the areas of aid and
security. The chapter by Agnès Bertrand-Sanz details the distorting
effects on EU aid policy, while Rosemary Hollis suggests that ‘it
would seem appropriate that the EU begin asking how long European
taxpayers will be prepared to shoulder the costs of continued
occupation and “containment” of violence in the absence of conflict
resolution.’
But does current conflict containment come at the expense of
conflict resolution? In practice the EU’s interaction with the
conflicting parties may have had this effect. The desire, largely
unmatched in capacity, to influence the conflicting parties’
behaviour by initially complying with and then (unsuccessfully)
challenging their conflict strategies has lead the EU into
strategic impasse – from dealing with Hamas’s pre-election and
post-election strategies to coping with former Israeli PM Ariel
Sharon’s 2005 unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip. The
admirable objective of pulling the parties towards crucial
concessions by going along with their plans in good faith, when not
met with the capacity to unleash pulling power, has left the EU in
a position of participating in polarising processes that appear to
weaken prospects of a negotiated settlement. Overall, focus on
conflict resolution opportunities at the expense of attention to
the actual conflict dynamics and the role the EU plays, appears to
have increased disconnect between EU policy outcomes and European
interests. In the 1990s we learnt elsewhere of the dangers of
deploying peacekeepers in war zones where there was no peace to
keep; might the last decade have revealed the dangers of investing
post-peace deal levels of financial and technical assistance into a
conflict zone in the absence of a peace deal?
The area where the EU is most embedded is perhaps where the stakes
are the highest. Many of the chapters point to Palestinian
reconciliation as an urgent priority. The current situation in
which the very involvement of the EU in propping up the Palestinian
Authority may greatly complicate the pressing need for Palestinian
reconciliation should encourage us to think more openly about the
assumed correlation between greater European involvement and
greater positive impact. At present it appears that the kind of
power-sharing or transitional arrangement that Palestinians require
in order to constitute a credible interlocutor for peace overall
requires a further rethink of how the EU supports the PA. It is
worth clarifying whether the choice is between generous European
funding of a Palestinian leadership that is unable to represent its
people technically, electorally or symbolically, or restructured,
perhaps restricted, funding
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1 Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict
to a Palestinian Authority which offers better hope of constituting
a credible and legitimate partner to the Israeli government in
conflict resolution. If so, more serious policy thinking should go
in to exploring the pros and cons of turning to the latter. Such a
step would also require renewed thinking regarding the potential
role of other third parties in this respect.
summary of chapters The chapter by Rosemary Hollis addresses the
basic stakes and strategy of the EU and Member States regarding the
conflict. The EU has as much to gain from conflict resolution as to
fear if hostilities persist or escalate. The author outlines the
conflicting pressures, priorities and difficulties Europeans face
concerning the conflict, including a commitment to good relations
with both Israel and Arab states, the investment of substantial
European tax-derived funds in the OPT, membership of the Quartet,
involvement in security arrangements, contractual relations with
all the official parties to the conflict, concerns over wider
European standing and credibility, energy security considerations,
and mounting divisions among European citizens over the conflict.
Pointing to the December 2009 Council Conclusions on the Middle
East Peace Process as a culmination of a series of European
statements over three decades, the chapter outlines the EU’s formal
position on the conflict before turning to the EU’s evolving role
since the 1990s. While leading on declaratory policy, the EU has
essentially deferred to the US when it comes to policy
implementation and been reduced to keeping the PA afloat in case a
peace process might be resumed, a strategy dealt a major blow by
Hamas’s electoral victory of 2006. The EU has been constrained by a
lack of leverage, the role of the US, and by divisions between
Member States, each influenced by various economic, transatlantic
and history-related calculations. The EU is left with an enduring
set of convictions regarding what a two-state solution would
require without ‘a strategy for making it happen’, particularly
problematic as a solution would likely have to be imposed. The
chapter concludes that Europeans cannot walk away from
responsibilities, abandon international law or impose a solution
alone. The chapter suggests three paths out of paralysis.
Individual Member States could build on the joint EU position on
the conflict by taking the lead on certain issues. Member States
could adopt policies which better identify, and adhere to, EU rules
that penalise both Israeli and Palestinian violations of
international law. Finally, in a bid to encourage Palestinian
unity, Member States could spell out the rewards that would be
forthcoming to a new Palestinian unity government.
The chapter by Agnès Bertrand-Sanz examines the conflict and the
EU’s assistance to the Palestinians. The author outlines European
lead donor
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25
status vis-à-vis the OPT, and how this aid intervention has
migrated over the last decade towards direct budgetary support for
the PA and further relief and humanitarian assistance. The author
reminds us that ground-level involvement and contractual relations
with Israelis and Palestinians place the EU in a position of full
shareholder, and charts the implications from the perspective of
international law. The chapter examines EU support for PA Prime
Minister Fayyad’s two-year de facto state-building plan, the
results of which are so far varied, not least given the persistent
division of the OPT between Fatah and Hamas de facto governments.
The divergence of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, difficult economic
trends, and differing Israeli control across the OPT have
implications for donors. The EU has adapted its assistance to the
population of Gaza to the constraints of the blockade and its
policy of non-contact with Hamas. While this might have stabilised
the situation, it has downgraded EU capacity to promote Palestinian
development and self-determination, and pushed it towards a
position of accommodating collective punishment. The author argues
that without a reorientation of EU strategies and a rethink of the
failed boycott of the Hamas administration in Gaza, the EU’s
current policy can only further erode the prospects for any viable
and contiguous state-building enterprise. The chapter offers four
sets of policy recommendations. Any initiative towards Gaza and
Hamas should be carefully calibrated to avoid entrenching the
current collectively punitive approach, ensure proper economic
recovery and advance Palestinian reconciliation. The EU should
prepare for different scenarios surrounding Fayyad’s August 2011
deadline for creating a Palestinian state, prioritising
intra-Palestinian reconciliation. With mounting concerns over
sustainability, the EU should reassess its aid, directing it to
conflict-ending purposes, conditioning it on the removal of
obstacles to a viable Palestinian state, and addressing the needs
of a fragmented trans-territorial young population. Finally, the EU
should exercise diligence in implementation of its policies and
react appropriately when violations of international law interfere
with or disrupt its own policy implementation.
In her chapter on the conflict and EU-Israeli relations, Nathalie
Tocci argues that the deepening of bilateral cooperation between
the EU and Israel, and the two-state solution, instead of being
mutually reinforcing, have seen the former working against the
prospects of the latter. European history-related, political and
economic interests shape a goal of deepening ties, but have seen
the latter compartmentalised away from a solution to the conflict,
also held to be an integral element of security interests. The
chapter examines bilateral contractual relations, progressively
upgraded since the 1960s, as the most important source of potential
EU influence on Israel, in terms of political dialogue,
conditionality and the law. In practice, there has been an ‘inverse
correlation’ between the political effectiveness of, and EU
reliance on, each method. Political dialogue, the EU’s preferred
means of influence, has been rather ineffective. The EU
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1 Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict
has been reluctant to use positive ex ante conditionality by
withholding promised benefits in the context of the European
Neighbourhood Policy. While there has been temporary and
understated engagement in such conditionality since the formal
suspension of the EU-Israeli ‘upgrade’ process since 2009, the
overall ‘business as usual’ nature of relations has lessened its
impact. While application of EU and international law could see
withdrawal of bilateral benefits due to Israeli violations, in
practice the EU has preferred constructive engagement with Israel,
as with other southern Mediterranean countries. In fact EU legal
obligations and the duty of non-recognition of violations of
international law may be undermined by certain aspects of current
EU policy and practice, the most well-known being treatment of
settlement products. The chapter recommends a basic rethink. The EU
has tended to see application of EU and international law as
incompatible with its pursuit of cooperation with Israel, leading
to legal problems and a culture of impunity. Instead the EU needs
to recognise that rules and laws are what make cooperation possible
and that they should be seen as such rather than as ‘punishment’,
and as necessary, although not sufficient, conditions for a
two-state solution.
The chapter by Daniel Möckli examines the Middle East conflict,
transatlantic ties and the Quartet. The author explores how EU
policy towards the conflict has been affected by the fact that for
many Member States sound ties with Washington DC have been just as
important, or much more so, than Middle East peace. Charting three
stages in Euro-US relations regarding the conflict – divergent,
complementary and coordinated – the chapter examines the impact of
the founding of the Middle East Quartet, comprising the US, EU, UN
and Russia, in 2002. While the Bush years saw the US subscribe to
both a two-state solution and institutionalised consultations with
the EU and other external actors, they were mostly lost years in
terms of advancing peace. Since the Obama administration took
office in 2009, transatlantic convergence over the conflict has
reached an all-time high, but this has failed to translate into
substantial progress in concrete terms, not least because of
unfavourable trends on the ground. Furthermore, Möckli points out,
‘if Obama has in many ways played a European tune in his approach
to the Arab-Israel conflict, he has largely done so without or
regardless of the EU orchestra.’ The author identifies six urgent
issues for the transatlantic agenda. More robust international
meditation is required today, although it is unclear what the US
administration is capable of, and what role the EU should seek in
this respect given the need for EU-wide approval of measures to
punish non-compliance if the EU is to play a robust monitoring
role. If the context is not right for peace talks, the focus should
instead lie at this stage on intra-Palestinian reconciliation,
which requires a more pragmatic approach towards Hamas. The EU and
US should also clarify a strategy on Palestinian statehood, a more
credible stance on settlements in the West Bank
Esra Bulut Aymat
27
and East Jerusalem, and explore options for engaging Syria. All
these issues require further clarification of the role of the EU
and Quartet in Middle East diplomacy: while the time does not seem
ripe for a major unilateral EU diplomatic initiative it may be ripe
for unilateral measures on certain issues.
The chapter by Muriel Asseburg examines EU involvement in crisis
management and mediation in the Arab-Israeli arena. The chapter
first contextualises crisis management and mediation in the broad
approach of the EU to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the wider
diplomatic context, charting the increased profile of the EU in
these domains after the failure of the US-mediated talks and the
start of the second Intifada in 2000. The chapter examines four
dimensions of European involvement. First, European mediation
efforts at the height of the second Intifada achieved success
(albeit to a limited degree) as did EU efforts to present a
political path out of the conflict that culminated in the 2003
Quartet Roadmap. The EU proved to be more incoherent and
ineffective during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war and the December
2008-January 2009 Gaza War. Second, the launch of the EU Police
Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) in January
2006 marked a new form of EU involvement, although as a consequence
of Hamas’s electoral victory the same month substantial work only
began in mid-2007, and then only in the West Bank. The chapter
overviews both the mission’s contributions and the dangers inherent
in its current approach. Third, the EU Border Assistance Mission
for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) has been on standby,
with operations suspended, since Hamas’s Gaza takeover in 2007. Its
deployment and short-lived activities contain lessons for EU
aspirations to play an effective third party role. Finally,
European participation in a reinforced UN peacekeeping mission,
UNIFIL II, in Southern Lebanon has seen the mission become an
‘important stabilising factor in a fragile environment’. The
chapter dwells on the innovations of the mission, its record so
far, and inherent limitations to its role in maintaining stability
and achieving peace. The chapter concludes with six sets of policy
recommendations concerning the effectiveness of CSDP deployments,
confidence-building, early warning, mediation and crisis
prevention. To avoid the renewed outbreak of violence and
consolidation of impediments to peace, particular attention should
be devoted to helping bring an end to the Gaza blockade, the need
for Palestinian unity, Israeli settlements and settlement
infrastructure, and the situation in East Jerusalem.
Michelle Pace examines the interplay between the stalled state of
democratisation efforts in the region and a feared eclipse of a
two- state solution. The author provides an overview of how
democratic principles and human rights feature in the EU’s
relationships and strategic outlook towards its Mediterranean
neighbourhood. These are situated within wider EU democracy
promotion objectives that
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1 Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict
are based on an overall optimism towards liberal peace that is not
sufficiently flexible in the face of conflict, state-building and
frustrated national identities. They thus sit uneasily with the
EU’s Middle East conflict resolution objectives. The author
illustrates the dilemmas and resulting perceived double standards
of this approach through focus on Palestinian democratisation, in
particular the EU’s behaviour before and after the January 2006
legislative elections. The author argues that the EU is caught up
in the ‘politics of empty gestures’ where positions are not backed
up with real resistance to rollback of its objectives and legal
obligations. The EU’s relations with governments in the region have
complicated democratisation and peace-making efforts, as has an
approach that excludes key stakeholders. Last but not least, the EU
lacks an overall strategy towards the Middle East that
satisfactorily incorporates democracy. EU decision-makers
themselves appear to have extracted a number of lessons from their
experience so far, from reflection on the handling of the 2006
elections, to current policies towards Hamas, to support for
Palestinian and Israeli civil society. The chapter concludes that
in the absence of a clear strategy on the linkage between
democracy-building in the region and peaceful resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the EU is left with very few policy choices
in both domains. The author recommends that the EU pursue a policy
of convincing Israelis of the importance of a unified Palestinian
interlocutor, act as a reliable mediator in Hamas-Fatah talks, and
revise its democratic assistance and aid programmes.
The chapter by Jeroen Gunning examines the question of engaging
Hamas. After presenting a brief history of EU non-engagement since
Hamas’ 2006 electoral victory, the author outlines and critiques
the main arguments – legal, military, diplomatic and strategic –
against engagement of Hamas. He highlights problems with these
arguments and erroneous assumptions underpinning the current ‘West
Bank- First’ policy. There are at least six reasons why engagement
has become imperative. Hamas is here to stay and is unlikely to
fade away given what it has so far survived. Well beyond a core
constituency, it represents the concerns of a substantial number of
Palestinians. Current trends in power balances suggest
non-engagement is likely to further entrench Hamas and empower its
hardliners. The current situation looks likely to deepen
institutional divisions and autocratic trends across the OPT,
further damaging two-state solution prospects. Finally, the current
situation risks violent radicalisation within the Gaza Strip.
Gunning turns to the Swiss policy of maintaining contact with
Hamas, and explores the implications of such a stance for the EU.
The Swiss experience illustrates the option of lessening the stakes
of engagement by engaging with all, indicates Hamas’s willingness
to explore compromise, suggests routes to strengthening pragmatists
within Hamas, and draws our attention to the importance of
ownership and internal power balances. The ‘model’ also suggests
the limits and long-term nature of such a policy.
Esra Bulut Aymat
29
Hamas is determined not to follow the perceived tactical errors of
Fatah regarding compromise, and its pragmatists are wary of risks.
The author concludes that while engagement will raise many
difficulties, it is clearly a risk worth taking. Treating the
Quartet principles as goals rather than preconditions, the EU
should encourage the formation of a national unity government
committed to maintaining a ceasefire, a prisoner exchange including
Gilad Shalit, dealing with Israel on the basis on the 1967 borders
and respecting previous agreements, and engage Hamas members qua
government officials. The EU should focus on Hamas’ behaviour
rather than its rhetoric in the light of the internal power
balances within the movement.
The chapter by Michael Bauer and Christian-Peter Hanelt explores
regional approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of
the European Union. They argue that mutual responsiveness between
regional and US diplomacy should be a core objective of European
policy. The chapter examines the role of regional actors in the
‘conglomerate of conflicts’ of the Middle East. To this end, it
elaborates on the importance of ownership and commitment
considerations when coordinating international and regional peace
efforts, and explores implications in terms of opportunities and
challenges for EU diplomacy. The chapter lays out various
initiatives from the region, both those that have shaped existing
peace agreements between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, and more recent
initiatives with a mixed balance sheet in terms of sustainability
and success. Regional ownership and international support appear
key. The Arab Peace Initiative (API) stands out in both respects
and in terms of its scope. The chapter outlines its emergence,
evolution and continued relevance, its links to EU objectives and
the mostly indirect role the EU has played to date on the matter.
We are reminded that the API was reaffirmed by the Arab League in
2007 and sustained even after the 2008-9 Gaza War, demonstrating a
prevailing general consensus that the concept of land for peace and
a two-state solution is still valid. The chapter recommends setting
a primary objective of raising mutual awareness among both the US
and regional actors of their diplomatic initiatives, with the API
constituting a major point of reference in this respect. It also
suggests ways in which the EU would need to think regionally about
its potential role in facilitating implementation of any
comprehensive agreement and its different tracks.
Conclusion The greatest challenge European policy-makers face when
approaching the conflict is the sheer quantity of unknowns. We do
not know the precise thinking that lies behind the current
behaviour and rhetoric of key individuals. We do not know when and
where the next outbreak
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1 Examining European involvement in the arab-Israeli conflict
of violence will be, nor its potential scope or scale. We do not
know whether current US efforts will produce an unexpected
breakthrough any time soon. We do not know how differing
expectations and objectives regarding the Fayyad plan will play out
in 2011. It is unclear whether and how a ‘West Bank First’ Strategy
will be further consolidated, unravel or be abandoned in the coming
years. Uncertainty surrounds the question of Palestinian
power-sharing, elections and reconciliation, and the life-span of
the current Israeli government.
We do however have information on how the EU’s past and present
policies have fared. Greater attention to what has worked and what
has not worked may provide the EU with firmer foundations for
renewed thinking and action with regard to the conflict. This
volume does not specify a single route for future EU policy.
Instead it examines the foundations and debris, constructive
contributions and false starts that mark European involvement in
the conflict, developing a diverse set of recommendations. These
recommendations are addressed to both those searching for bold
conflict resolution steps and those seeking to minimise the harm
done to peace prospects by current trends. In doing so, the
Chaillot Paper invites both sceptics and enthusiasts to further
explore the full array of policy options and constraints that the
EU faces with a more grounded and ambitious, and perhaps more
‘European’, vision and purpose.
31
Chapter 2
the basic stakes and strategy of the Eu and member states rosemary
Hollis
Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to examine what is at
stake for Europe in the Arab-Israeli conflict, analyse the
strategies so far adopted by the European Union, draw lessons and
review the options for future action. A brief summary of European
economic and security interests in the Middle East will demonstrate
that Europe has much to gain from conflict resolution and much to
fear if hostilities persist or escalate. As discussed below, the EU
became directly involved, in parallel with the United States, in
the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) during the 1990s. However,
that process collapsed in 2000 and subsequently the attacks of 11
September 2001 (9/11) gave rise to the so-called ‘war on terror’
that overtook other policy priorities. Since then, and with the
added complication of the Iraq crisis and invasion of 2003, the
conflict has become more intractable. In this context EU policy has
been more about issuing declarations and maintaining consensus
within the transatlantic alliance than effective conflict
resolution. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the
unpalatable choices now facing the Europeans in the face of a
deteriorating situation on the ground for which EU policies to date
must bear some responsibility, but which appears beyond the
capacity of the EU to redress, with or without a lead from
Washington.
European interests and stakes Israel and the Arab states are close
neighbours of Europe, with whom mutual recognition and cooperative
relations have been established and developed over decades.
Latterly successive initiatives for closer cooperation around the
Mediterranean – the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the
Mediterranean (UfM) – have signalled EU commitment to an inclusive
approach to regional relations that is not biased in favour of
either Israel or the Arabs.
32
2 the basic stakes and strategy of the Eu and member states
However, if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists and Israel
continues and further consolidates its occupation of the
Palestinian territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), Arab
governments will likely face increased domestic pressure to make a
stronger stand against Israel and, by extension, its defenders and
supporters in the West. For Europe, such developments could mean
facing conflicting demands to choose sides.1 Arab strategies to
resist ‘normalisation’ with Israel, pending Israeli withdrawal from
the Occupied Territories, have already spilled over onto the agenda
of the UfM and caused the postponement of the summit scheduled for
June this year.
The EU has also invested considerable sums of taxpayers’ money in
Palestinian institution-building and economic development in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to European Commission figures,
between 2000-09 the EU disbursed over €3.3 billion in aid to the
Palestinians.2 However, whereas in the 1990s most of that aid took
the form of development assistance, latterly the bulk of the funds
has gone to paying salaries and the running costs of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank.3
Since the mid-1990s European engagement in pursuit of a negotiated
solution to the conflict has grown to the extent that the EU could
not now walk away without significant costs to the fate of the
Palestinians and European relations with Israel.
As a full member of the Quartet (that links the US, UN, EU and
Russia) the EU is bound into the most high-profile body
coordinating international efforts to achieve peace. Under the
Quartet umbrella, the EU played a leading role in developing the
so-called Roadmap, launched in 2003 and largely accepted by Israel
and the Palestinians, but which has remained unimplemented.
Consequently, the EU is a player, not a bystander, in the quest for
peace.
Perhaps more crucially, the EU is the single largest donor (and
lifeline) to the PA, providing the funds required to pay salaries
and run the education, health and other services in the West Bank.
Donations from the EU and Member States to the UN Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA) are essential to ensure that Palestinian refugees do
not starve, have shelter and get an education. UNRWA services
between 1.6 and 2 million refugees living in Lebanon, Syria and
Jordan; and at least half a million in the West Bank. In the Gaza
Strip, since the imposition of the Israeli blockade (2007), UNRWA
has been providing essential humanitarian aid to 1 million
Palestinians living there.
Europe, in conjunction with the United States, is also directly
engaged in transforming Palestinian security arrangements in the
West Bank. The EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
(EUPOL COPPS)4 helps train,
1. See for example, House of Lords, European Union Committee, ‘The
EU and the Middle East Peace Process’, 26th Report of Session
2006-07, HL Paper 132-I, paragraph 86.
2. See: http://eeas. europa.eu/occupied_ palestinian_territory/
ec_assistance/eu_support_ pa_2000_2009_en.pdf.
3. See chapter by Agnès Bertrand-Sanz in this volume, pp.
43-53
4. Muriel Asseburg, ‘The ESDP Missions in the Palestinian
Territories (EUPOL COPPS, EU BAM Rafah): Peace through Security?’,
in The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and
Defence, SWP Berlin, December 2009.
Rosemary Hollis
33
equip and advise Palestinian police to keep law and order in
Palestinian population centres, and prevent breaches of the peace
that might threaten the PA or its policies toward Israel. The
security situation has improved as a result, but the sustainability
of contemporary arrangements will depend on whether these can
deliver a more fundamental transformation in Palestinian prospects.
Meanwhile, even though the EU provides the monitoring mission
(EUBAM Rafah) to facilitate access and egress on the Gaza-Egypt
border crossing at Rafah, its operations have been suspended since
June 2007.
At the regional level, the EU has Partnership Agreements with all
the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict: namely Israel, the PA,
Lebanon and Syria, as well as Egypt and Jordan. Under the rubric of
the ENP, so- called Action Plans have been agreed and implemented
with Israel, the PA, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon and while these are
designed to help harmonise the economies of the partner states with
the EU internal market, progress is slow and rewards are limited,
except in the case of Israel, which is sufficiently technically
advanced to benefit more substantially from harmonisation. In terms
of diplomacy, the EU and Member States have long-standing and in
many respects close relations with Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon
and Syria, although tensions are not uncommon and European
political leverage is relatively limited. Meanwhile, because
European service personnel participate in key peacekeeping
operations in the Middle East, including UNIFIL (South Lebanon) and
UNDOF (Golan Heights), they have a stake in the success of these
missions.
In sum, European investment in containing the conflict and funding
the basic needs of the Palestinians is vital to the continuance of
the status quo. If the EU and Member States withdrew their
personnel and economic support there would most likely be a
humanitarian crisis, increased instability, lawlessness,
disillusionment and generalised conflict. Yet, while the status quo
prevails, the occupation has also continued along with settlement
expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, notwithstanding a
temporary and partial freeze in 2009-10, and Israel’s willingness
to pursue negotiations is based on conditions that the Palestinians
are reluctant to meet.
It would therefore seem appropriate that the EU begin asking how
long European taxpayers will be prepared to shoulder the costs of
continued occupation and ‘containment’ of violence in the absence
of conflict resolution.
Europe’s standing and credibility depend upon adherence to the
principles of international law and defence of human rights. Yet
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and annexation
of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are contrary to
international law. Notwithstanding
34
2 the basic stakes and strategy of the Eu and member states
successive pronouncements by the EU on the legal position, EU
actions do not make clear distinctions between dealings with Israel
per se and with Israeli enterprises and settlers in the Occupied
Territories.5
At the broader regional level, Europeans depend on the Arabs, Iran
and Russia for the vast majority of their energy security. The Arab
world represents a lucrative market for European consumer goods,
services, produce and arms. By extension, European economic
interests require peace and stability in the Mediterranean, the
Persian Gulf region and Central Asia. Yet that peace and stability
is undermined by the continuance of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
Europe’s interests in and ties to the Middle East are so extensive
and significant that it does not have the option of turning a blind
eye to what happens there. In particular, the Arab-Israeli conflict
is a source of personal and passionate concern for many EU citizens
and it is becoming an increasingly divisive and disruptive cause
célèbre within European society.
European Jews cannot forget the lessons of the Holocaust and still
fear the potential for anti-Semitism to grow in Europe, especially
in the face of economic crisis and large-scale unemployment, when
ethnocentrism and xenophobia gain ground.6 The danger is that fear
and prejudice in Europe complicate European relations with the
Middle East,7 where Israel is still battling with Arabs and Muslims
generally to achieve acceptance as a Jewish state in the region. In
the twenty-first century the EU has become a mosaic of large and
small Member States with contrasting traditions and cultures. New
migrants from all over the world have enriched the cultural,
religious and ethnic diversity of the whole union. Yet many are
struggling to adjust and find their place in the mix. Religion as a
source of conflict as well as solace is a factor. Thus conflict in
‘the Holy Land’ can have repercussions in Europe and vice
versa.8
The Palestinians are the solution as well as the problem. They
represent the frontline of Arab and Muslim opposition to Israel.
Their cause has also generated anti-Israeli boycott campaigns among
trade unions, student groups and others keen to champion the rights
of a people under occupation.9 The outcry and consternation that
followed the Israeli raid on the flotilla seeking to break the
blockade of the Gaza Strip in May 2010 demonstrated the potential
for the conflict to divide and inflame opinion in Europe. Yet there
is no easy way to satisfy Palestinian demands without exacerbating
the fears of Israeli Jews and their friends and supporters
elsewhere.
5. See Natalie Tocci, ‘The Conflict and EU-Israeli Relations’, pp.
55-63 in this volume. See also Shadi Hamid and Amanda Kadlec,
‘Strategies for Engaging Political Islam’, FES- Middle East
Democracy Project, January 2010.
6. As US State Department official Dennis Ross noted in 2002: ‘The
Israeli perception of a re-emergence of anti-Semitism in Europe is
playing very very negatively.’ BBC Current Affairs, BBC Radio 4
Documentary, ‘Analysis: The Expired Mandate’, broadcast 1 August
2002.
7. As Olivier Roy discusses in his book Globalized Islam: The
Search for a New Umma (London: Hurst, 2002): see for example p.
45.
8. Omar Barghouti, ‘Besieging Israel’s Siege’, The Guardian, 12
August 2010.
9. See: http://www.zionism- israel.com/Israel_boycott. htm; and
http://desertpeace. wordpress.com/2010/06/12/
extending-the-boycott- against-israel/
Rosemary Hollis
35
formal Eu position on the conflict The clearest statement of EU
thinking on the requirements for a comprehensive resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict were laid out in the ‘Conclusions of the
Council of Ministers on the MEPP’ released on 8 December 2009.10
The core element in this statement (as in others before it) is the
call for ‘a two-state solution’ to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, with ‘the State of Israel and an independent, democratic,
contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in
peace and security’.
Beyond articulating these goals, the Council stated that the EU
‘will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders including
with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties’
and that, in the interests of ‘genuine peace, a way must be found
through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the
future capital of two states’. More broadly, the Council noted
that: ‘A comprehensive peace must include a settlement between
Israel and Syria and Lebanon.’
The Council document represents the culmination of a series of
European statements over several decades, commencing with the 1980
Venice Declaration, in which the European Community broke new
ground by calling for the involvement of the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO) in peace negotiations and recognised the right
of Palestinians to self-determination. When it was issued in 1980,
the Venice Declaration was dismissed by Israel and essentially
ignored by the United States, yet its core principles would later
be adopted in the Oslo Accords signed in Washington by the Israeli
Government and the PLO in 1993.
Seventeen years on, in March 2010 a Joint Statement by the
Quartet11 incorporated much of the essence of the EU Council’s
December 2009 Conclusions. Thus the Europeans have effectively
blazed a trail for all the major international stakeholders in the
MEPP. Yet herein lies the rub, because while leading on declaratory
policy, the EU has essentially deferred to the United States when
it comes to policy implementation. The reasons for this date back
several decades. It was the United States which brokered the
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in the 1970s. Washington also took the
lead in convening the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 that, for the
first time, brought all the conflicting parties to the table and
initiated multilateral as well as bilateral peace talks.
In the 1990s, the Americans took the principal role in mediating
between the Israelis and Palestinians for the duration of the
so-called Oslo Process, at the behest of the Norwegians who
brokered the original deal. Europe was expected to inject funds and
technical support into Palestinian state-building, while high
diplomacy was managed by Washington.
10. Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the
Middle East Peace Process’, 2985th Foreing Affairs Council meeting,
Brussels, 8 December 2009. See: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cms_Data/docs/pressdata/
EN/foraff/111829.pdf.
11. Middle East Quarter Statement, Moscow, 14 March 2010. See:
http://www.consilium. europa.eu/uedocs/ cmsUpload/113436.pdf.
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2 the basic stakes and strategy of the Eu and member states
After the Oslo Process collapsed in the second Intifada, the EU did
act to help realise US President George Bush’s ‘vision’ of a
two-state solution through formulation of the Roadmap. However,
when that languished the EU lapsed into inertia, waiting for
Washington to find a new formula. This it eventually did, with the
Annapolis initiative, with limited results. Thus, when Obama came
to power in 2009 promising to make the peace process a priority,
the Europeans were enthusiastic, but preferred a supporting role to
an independent one.
Europe’s evolving role: a salutary tale In the 1990s the EU was
able to pursue economic development of the Palestinian entity in
the West Bank and Gaza, under the Oslo process, in tandem with US
leadership on negotiations. However, not only did the process
collapse, but Palestinian suicide bombings profoundly undermined
Israeli belief in the viability of a negotiated solution. When the
shock of 9/11 then transformed US policy priorities and the ‘war on
terror’ took centre stage, attention turned first to Afghanistan
and then Iraq. Europe split over the legality and wisdom of the
Iraq invasion, losing internal cohesion and traction in Washington
as a result. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon argued
that the Palestinian leadership was part of the terrorist threat to
the region and beyond, and adopted a strategy to re-impose control
on the Occupied Territories that Washington proved unwilling or
unable to alter.
Meanwhile, from 2002 to 2006 Iraq took centre stage and tensions
blighted relations between Washington and those Europeans who
opposed the Iraq invasion. In retrospect, the European quest for a
common foreign and security policy was fundamentally undermined by
differences over Iraq. On the Arab-Israeli front all the EU felt
able to do was try to keep the PA from total collapse, through
injections of cash, so that there would still be a Palestinian
negotiating partner once some sort of peace process could be
resumed.
However, bomb plots and attacks inside Europe, attributable to
al-Qaeda sympathisers purporting to support the