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BATTLE OF HUSSAINIWALA
Introduction
1. 106 Bde was given the task of defending the area of responsibility
from incl Sheikhpur Nao to incl vill Rangewala. To hold the area of
responsibility, coys of 41 Baloch were depl on the FDLs and on
Dipalpur Canal as Bde res. Other supporting units were 3 Punjab, coy
R& S and 95 Fd Engrs (on Inf role).
2. The units after arrival in the conc area carried out extensive recce
and were ordered to gradually prep their def posns. Altn of Def Works
Const Fund and provision of iron scrap under div arrangements from
West Pakistan Rly gave a further impetus to dev of the def, which were
completed by mid Nov 71. However, improvement of def incl laying of
mines cont till the end of Nov 71.
3. Concurrently with the main task of defending its area of
responsibility, 106 Bde was asg the additional task of elimination of
Hussainiwala enclave on the outbreak of hostilities. This msn set in
motion a new round of recce and planning at all levels. Comd 106 Bde
presented the attack plan on 26 Oct 71 to GOC 11 Div, which was
approved. It may be of interest to mention here that Gen A M Yahya
Khan then President of Pakistan and Gen Abdul Hamid Khan then
COAS of Pakistan Army visited 11 Div on 4 Nov 71 and were apprised
of the plan. Gen Abdul Hamid Khan remarked “It is a tough nut to
crack, I wish you best of luck”.
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4. Aim . To study and analyze the Battle of Hussainiwala.
5. Sequence of Presentation . The scheme of my presentation will be:-
a. Area of Ops
b. Orbat
c. Attk Plan
d. Phases
e. Conduct of Battle
f. Lessons Learnt
Area of Ops
Hussainiwala enclave is sit North and NW of the river Sutlej engulfing
Hussainiwala Headworks and portion of Kasur-Ferozepur rd. It has an
area of about 18 sq miles and consists of 16 vills. Terrain in close
vicinity of rd Kaur-Ferozepur consists of numerous bunds, which
provide good obsn and firing posns. The area two creeks, which run
through the middle of this enclave from NE to SW. These creeks
contain water in rainy season but remain dry in winter months.
Hussainiwala Headworks has 29 gates that regulate the flow of River
Sutlej. Two canals, namely Eastern Canal and Bekaner Canal (Gang
Canal) originate from the southern side of the Headworks and irrigate
Ferozepur-Fazailka-Abbhusar areas. The regulator of old Dipalpur
Canal is loc on the Northern side of the Headworks that was closed
under an agreement between two countries. There are two brs (one rd
and one rly) over the Headworks. Rd br acts as a link between
Ferozepur and enclave area and is cl 70. Rly br is at present not op but
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6. can be used as an altn br with some improvement. Other important
tac features are: -
a. Perimeter
b. Guide Bund
c. Rly Bund
d. Banks of disused Dipalpur Canal
e. Qaiser-e-Hind
f. Abutment Bund
g. JCP (Joint Check Post)
h. Hockey spur
j. Indian Ulleke Bund
k. Ulleke Post
l. Rajoki Post and Vill
m. Shameke Post
n. Chandi Wala vill
o. Area watch Tower no 9
Hussainiwala Enclave provided a good springboard to the en for
launching an offensive with a sizeable force towards Kasur and then
either towards Raiwind or Lahore. The en build up in Ferozepur area
particularly the conc of his First Armd Div in area Farid Kot-Kot
Kapura-Muktasar prior to war indicated that there was a possibility of
en taking advantage of this enclave for any offensive. Therefore the
elimination of Hussainiwala Enclave became more important with a
view to improving our def and denying the use of existing br H to the
en.
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Orbat
7. En. Info gathered through various sources indicated that
Hussainiwala Enclave was held by two bns; one being regular bn and
the other a BSF bn. Through Pws captured during the battle of
Hussainiwala it came to lt that 35 Inf Bde which was a part of 14 Indian
Inf Div was responsible for the def of Hussainiwala area. The depl was
as fols: -
i. 15 Punjab
(1) One coy - Area perimeter – Both banks
of old
Dipalpur canal.
(2) One coy - Area Rly Bund
(3) One coy - Area Qaiser-e-Hind
(4) One coy - Area Guide Bund
j. 25 BSF Bn
(1) One coy - Area Hockey Spur
(2) One coy - Area Ulleke Post
(3) One coy - Area Rajoke Post
(4) One coy - Area Shameke Post
(5) One coy - Area Watch Tower
k. 13 Punjab . In area Barke across River Sutlej.
l. 15 Dogra . Bde res in Ferozepur
m. Sqn of Tks . Area South of Fakhr-e-Hind
n. Arty
4. DS Regt of 35 Inf Bde.
5. Some regts of Div/Corps Arty in area Ferozepur.
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8. En def works consisted of pillboxes, concrete emplacement and
bunkers. En had laid extensive minefd, and barbed wire obs around
their posns. An A/Pers ditch (10’ deep and 7’ wide) and about 40 yds
long was const by the en parallel to the left bank of old Dialpur Canal to
act as a trap for aslt Inf from that dir. 15 Punjab posn was very compact
and was org as a bn str pt in the most vital areas of Hussainiwala
Enclave i.e area br, Perimeter and Qaiser-e-Hind. 25 BSF was covering
a wider frontage and their def was org on coy strong pt basis. A 100 ft
steel tower in area Fakhr-e-Hind across the river, Qaiser-e-Hind and
Watch Tower No 9 provided good obsn to the en over the entire area.
En def were mostly based on various bunds posts and other built up
areas.
9. En had dumped lot of ammo, rats and other stores in the area,
which indicated that en was planning to fight to the last.
10. Own. 106 Bde had fol grouping for the asg task: -
a. Under Comd
6. 41 Baloch
7. 3 Punjab
8. 9 Punjab
9. B Coy ex 26 Punjab (R&S)
10. 95 Fd Coy Engrs
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11. Hussain Khan Wala Mjd Coy
12. Khudian Mjd Coy
13. Two Coys Rangers
b. In DS . 45 Fd Regt Arty
c. In Sp . Div Arty in Range
12. Attk Plan.Wng O for attk on Hussainiwala was received b y Comd 106
Bde at about 1500 hrs on 3 Dec 71. He immediately issued his Wng O to the
units and then attended GOC’s O gp that was held at Kasur at 1600 hrs on 3
Dec 71. It may be stated here that GOC had received info regarding PAF sir
strikes against Indian air bases from Corps Comd at about 1455 hrs that day,
which indicated that war to start by the evening 3 Dec 71. Gist of GOC’s
orders is as under: -
a. 106 Bde to capture Hussainiwala Enclave as per plan ASP.
b. No change in atts and dets.
c. H hr 1800 hrs. Later on changed to 1830 hrs.
d. B-sqn ex 4 Cav to op under orders comd 106 Bde.
e. Fire SP plan – attk to be silent. Fire SP to be provided on call.
orders comd 106 Bde.
f. Fire SP plan – attk to be silent. Fire SP to be provided on call.
g. Comd 106 Bde held his O gp at Ganda Singh Wala at 1700 hrs
3 Dec 71. Briefs confirmatory notes of the orders for the actual
attk were issued to the units before H hr.
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h. Since, the Div Arty Regts were not depl in their actual
posns to sp 106 Bde attk due to security reasons, it
was not possible for them to be able to come into
action at the given H hr i.e. 1800 hrs. The
readjustment of the gun posns and other essential
coord req some more time. In view of this the H hr
was changed from 18oo hrs to 1830 hrs and it was also
decided to make it a noisy attk and timed programmed
(H-15 to H+35).
13.Phases . CO 41 Baloch plan for capture of asg obj is as under: -
a. A coy to capture right bank of Dipalpur Canal incl
Dipalpur Canal br.
b. B coy to capture area Rly Bund to incl Qaser-e-Hind.
c. C coy to capture area astride rd Kasur-Ferozepur from
JCP upto Dipalpur Canal br.
d. Bn Tac HQ was to mov behind A coy.
14. Conduct of Battle
a. A coy under comd Maj Muhammad Hanif (Shaheed),
started the aslt at the given H hr. Soon afterwards the coy came
under hy en auto fire from both banks of the canal and other
adjoining locs. The coy inspite of hy en firing and shelling kept
up the momentum of the aslt and cleared en bunkers one by one
with hand-to-hand fighting right through the obj. During the aslt,
the comd, Maj Muhammad Hanif got a burst of MG fire and fell
martyred. Sub Muhammad Iqbal, SJCO of the coy immediately
took over the comd of the coy and personally
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led the aslt tps right up to Dipalpur Canal br and captured the asg obj.
b. Capture of Qaser-e-Hind
1. B coy under comd Maj Zahid Yasin started the
attk from the dir of JCP at the given H hr.
Immediately after crossing the start line the coy
came under hy en auto fire from en bunkers in
area Rly Bund. However, the coy kept on aslt
posn and got engaged in hand-to-hand fight
with the en from bunkers. After tough fighting
the coy captured the Rly Bund in disused
Dipalpur Canal br. The coy comd, Maj Zahid
Yasin, realizing that he had over shot his own
obj and yet had to attk Qaiser-e-Hind about and
mov back in the dir of Qaiser-e-Hind.
2. The gallant soldiers of B Coy were struggling
to enter the mighty fortress under hy en auto
fire from the top and base of Qaiser-e-Hind,
when Maj Muhammad Ashraf, another Coy
Comd arrived with a depleted str of one pl and
joined his comrades of B Coy. The Western
Face of this fortress would defy even the most
determined onslaughts as it had a huge wall
with numerous firing holes spread all over it. A
no of attempts to enter the mighty fortress had
not born fruits as the apch to the fortress was
exposed to en obsn in a clear moonlight ni. The
Indian arty shelling further compounded the sit.
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The B Coy comd Maj Zahid Yasin,SJ had
already requested the Bde HQ toto push fwd the
tks that were to knock out the inf to go through
it. After a lapse of about half an hr or so, when
the tks still had not arrived the two coy comd
decided to make another suicidal attempt
without the tks.
3. The en inside and on the top of Qaiser-e-Hind
was not only stubborn but also desperately and
courageously sticking to the pride of its def, the
“Qaiser-e-Hind”. The tks were still awaited. En
guns after a few mins of silence would again
start roaring. Another similar attempt was again
conceived but this time with a change in
selection of pers who would now make the
attempt. New volunteers were asked for. A
complete silence prevailed. Since no of attempts
to enter “Qaiser-e-Hind” had already failed. No
one was now willing to put himself in the jaws
of death. After a lapse of a few moments, Maj
Muhammad Ashraf who had conceived the plan
decided to exec it himself. He knew that the loss
of his life would not jeopardize the op as his
other comrade Maj Zahid Yasin,SJ , present
with him might still survive to complete the task
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4. At about 2000 hrs in a clear moon lit ni, after
the sec Super Energa had been fired Maj
Muhammad Ashraf dashed fwd with a hand
gren in his right hand and a sten in left for
accomplishing the sacred and onerous task that
he had set upon himself. The dash brought him
immediately close to the southern portion of the
mighty fortress where he suddenly loc stairs
leading up into the base of the fortress.
Instantaneously the first gren was flying in the
air and landing inside. Shrieks and cries of the
en from inside echoed in the air. While running
and climbing the stairs Maj Muhammad Ashraf
lobbed yet another two grenades and then he
were at the entrance of the main hall. Luck that
was still with him now appeared to be leaving
him. When he tried to spray the area inside, his
sten refused to fire. He changed the magazine
but without any success. He really now could
not help but smile at the irony of fate.
5. On immediate recovering from the shock of this
serious set-back, Maj Muhammad Ashraf
lobbed the remaining three grenades, Maj
Muhammad Ashraf now rightly presumed that
the en must have completely been wiped out
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from the base but he was mistaken. With the explosion
of the last grenade four/five en survivors rushed out of
the northern entrance who were instantaneously
ambushed and killed by Maj Zahid Yasin ,SJ from
outside, while Hav Mansab Dar stood guard on the
Southern entrance. After some interval the surviving
en soldiers inside again suddenly became alive and
facing a very dangerous sit. Ironically he after having
succeeded in entering the mighty Qaiser-e-Hind had
no other altn but to retrace his steps. Therefore, He
had to rush out of Qaiser-e-Hind but he became still
more determined to accomplish the msn that he had set
upon himself. He now exchanged his sten with a rifle,
armed himself with more grenades and made yet
another desperate and last attempt. The complete base
was again sprayed with fire. It appeared that the en
was now completely annihilated from the base.
6. En was still holding on to top of Qaiser-e-Hind and
engaged this coy with MG fire from the top floor. Maj
Zahid Yasin with some selected men tried to go on top
Qaiser-e-Hind but en tps from the top started bringing
down hy auto fire and also threw hand grens.
Although the gr floor had been taken but it was not
possible to climb up as the en had blocked the stair
case eff. Firefight between own tps down below
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and en on the top cont throughout the ni. To destroy en
occupying the top floor of Qaiser-e-Hind with main
gun as a result of which the en posn was destroyed and
tps of B coy rushed upstairs and captured the top floor
by about 0700 hrs 4 Dec 71.
7. C Coy less pl under comd Sub Safdar Ali Shah
started the aslt from the JCP astride rd Kasur-
Ferozepur. The task given to this coy was to bring
flanking fire onto A and B Coys tps and also to clear
the rd with a view to enabling the tks to rush fwd
and secure the mouth of the br. As soon as they
crossed the SL they came under hy auto fire and
encountered opposn from area bks adjacent to the rd.
the Coy under the dynamic ldrship of Sub Safdar Ali
Shah went round the built up area and eliminated the
en with hand to hand fighting. After clearing the bks
area, they cont their aslt on either side of the rd and
successfully reached Dipalpur Canal br and lined up
with A coy which had by then captured the rt bank
of Dipalpur Canal upto the br.
8. 41 Baloch had created an adhoc coy of two pls under
comd Maj Muhammad Ashraf which was to stay
behind as res to be aval to the bn comd for reinforcing
any attacking coy or dealing with unforeseen. Coys had
suffered lot of cas this coy was employed to boost up
the fighting str of attacking tps. This coy successfully
assisted B coy in capturing Qaiser-e-Hind and
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During the later part of the ni secured
foothold in area Canal br and assisted A and C
coys of 41 Baloch and D coy of 3 Punjab in the
reorg phase. The coy comd Maj Ashraf was
wounded due to en air strafing on 4th morning
and was evac.
9. Throughout the attk of 41 Baloch the CO
displayed extra ordinary courage and moved
with the assaulting tps while they were fighting
through the obj. during the attk 41 Baloch wrls
comm. Between CO and Coy comds
completely broken down which created
problems of comd and con. Inspite of hy en
shelling and firing he kept on moving from one
posn to another exhorted his men thoughout the
aslt stage.
15. Honor And Awards. 14 Baloch and affiliated sp arms
were given fol gallantry awards in recognition of their courage, valour
and bravery: -
a. SJs 7
b. TJs 8
c. Imtiazi Sanad 1
16. CAS. 41 Baloch suffered fol cas in this op: -
a. Shaheed. 1xoffr and 66 OR.
b. Wounded. 120 all ranks.
c. En suffered hy cas.
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17.Captured Eqpt . Fol eqpt was captured: -
Wpns
Ammo
Vehs
106 MM RR
3
Carts 106 MM RR
15 Cwt Dodge
1
3” Mor
3
Bombs 3” Mor
¼ Ton Jeep
4
2” Mor
8
Bombs 2” Mor
1 Ton Dodge
2
7.62 MM MMG
5
Rkts 3.5”/83 MM
1½ Ton Truck
1
7.62 MM LMGs
8
Carts .303 (10 Trucks)
.303 LMGs
11
.303 MGs
5
3.5’ RLs
7
7.62 MM Rifles
77
.303 Rifles
75
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18. Lessons Learnt
a. Multi Directional attk. En def was mostly based
on Phil boxes, concrete emplacements and bunkers that
were interlinked. Qiaser-e-Hind with other few posns was
well fortified with fairly deep minefds. To overcome such
def, multi directional attk is the answers because en could
not eff engage the tps aslt from flank and rear. In addition
bunkers/wpns loc at beat back any aslt. Capture of Qaiser-
e-Hind is a good example to quote.
b. Recce. Thorough recce and briefing down to sec
level was carried out. The op was discussed in detail in
conf, on models and on the gr. Even they have gone to the
extent of rehearsing the attk plan. It was through
extensive recce that revealed most of en auto wpns with
numerous holes designed to provide firing slits in Qaiser-
e-Hind. Most of ptls were led by offrs incl coy comds.
Even during broad day light while wearing Rangers
Uniform offrs did the ptl in order to have a good look on
en def.
c. Motivation. Tps were fully motivated. All comds down
to sec comds and tps knew as to what was req of them
and what they were expected to achieve. Sub Manzoor
Hussain who was profusely bleeding on receiving a tk
burst on chest was forcibly evac from scene of battle to
Bn HQ. On seeing his CO, he managed to utter few
words with difficulty,” Sir, I have fulfilled my promise
given to you that I would bear the en bullet on my chest”
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d. Surprise. Since the attk was launched at 1830 hrs (an
unexpected time) complete surprise was achieved. En got
confused from multi directional attk and fight by small
aslt gps. Thus was unable to judge wt and dir of attk.
Simultaneous attk on Dipalpur Canal br, Rly Bund and
Qaiser-e-Hind added to shock.
e. Aggressive. Repeated attempts to enter mighty
fortress under hy en auto fire from top and base of
Qaiser-e-Hind had failed. The Indian Arty shelling
further compounded the sit but tempo of attk was never
allowed to die down. Yet another suicidal attempt by Maj
Muhammad Ashraf and his team was made to enter
Qaiser-e-Hind forcibly which they managed. In this msn
prince was enormous but the prize was equally tempting.
f. Comds Well Fwd. All comds were well fwd. In
fact in most of cases were leading the aslt on en. Extra
ordinary courage and valour displayed by the Bn/Coy/Pl
Comds was one of the maj contributing factor in success
of this attk. One of the 41 Baloch obj was in close
vicinity of disused Dipalpur Canal and which was being
attk by A Coy. This could not have met success when
coy comd Maj Muhammad Hanif,SJ (Shaheed) received
the burst and was breathing his last. It was CO, Lt Col
Habib Ahmed,SJ who was fol close behind, decided to
lead the attk and fill up the vacuum created on Shahadat
of coy comd. Because name and pride of 41 Baloch and
country was at stake.
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g. Use of Tks . Tks was boldly used in this attk. En
Soldiers who had refused to surrender, barricaded
themselves in one of the tower, were eventually shot
down with tk fire personally dir by Bde Comd 106
Bde, Brig (Now Maj Gen) Muhammad Mumtaz
Khan,HJ.
h. Ldrship. When coy comds fell in battle, their JCO’s
and even CO was not found wanting and in total
disregard to their life went charging to complete the
unfinished task. Zahid Yasin,SJ to enter first in
Qaiser-e-Hind. Finally Maj Muhammad Ashraf
prevailed.
j. Fire Sp. Although detailed fire sp had been worked
out incorporating all wpns well before start of war but
due to late dumping of ammo at the gun ends and late
provision of tgt data to the GPO’s only 5 fire units
opened initially to sp the attk. 3 more joined later.
Despite all this en tps did not even remember where to
seek refuge.
k. Security. Through out the pd of 3 months, preceeding
the battle tps arriving in battle loc, dusk and dawn
recces and obsns were screened in such an appreciable
manner that en was totally un prep for this attk. So
much so that tps mov to respective FUP’s went
unnoticed.
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l. Fire and Mov. Tps conducted the CQB extremely
well but team craft i.e. fire and mov was missing.
Success came through surprise that had paralyzed en
tps. The aspect of fire and mov is still wanting in the
Army.
m. Re-Org. After the capture of obj reorg should be
rapid to face any C attk. Tps must be ready to repulse
such attempts by en. It was not done in remaining
phases of bn attk thus suffered hy cas.
n. A Tk Wpns. Long-range A Tk wpns that were depl in
FUP/fire base did not fire to sp the attk. Further upon
when, during battle thwarted by en built up defs and
tps in Qaiser-e-Hind these wpns were not brought fwd
to blast such opposn and create entrance.
o. Wpn Serviceability. Before leaving for battle loc,
one must test all wpns. Sten carried by Maj
Muhammad Ashraf did not fire when he had forced
his entry to Qaiser-e-Hind. Even on changing mags
sten still would not fire. Ironically he had to retrace his
steps. After exchanging his sten with a rifle, entered
again in Qaiser-e-Hind and completely annihilated en
from the base.
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19. Conclusions. On 3 Dec 71 at 1830 hrs 41st Baloch that had not
yet even completed its eight months of life was ordered to attk and
captures the “Exit of Hussainiwala Headworks” and “Qaiser-e-
Hind”. The bn suffered considerable cas but the en that was
equally stubborn could not deter the grim determination of the CO
Lt Col Habib Ahmed,SJ, the offrs, JCO’s and men of this young
but brave bn. The bn objs, “ The invincible Qaiser-e-Hind” and
the Exit of Hussainiwala Headworks were all successfully captured
by the bn but after having fought one of the fiercest and bloodiest
battles in the annals of history.