CHAPTER SIX
URDU LANGUAGE AND RECONSTITUTION OF MUSLIM IDENTITY IN
INDEPENDENT INDIA
The focus of this chapter is on the process of redefinition and reconciliation of
identity of Muslims in independent India. Since the symbols of identity
claimed by the Muslims to justify their demand for a separate state were
altered by the very process of partition, the status of Muslims who remained
in India had to be redefined.
6.1 Situation of Indian Muslims after Independence
Between 1940-1947, through the vigorous activities of the Muslim League
for the creation of Pakistan based on the ideology of two nation theory, the
symbols of Muslim identity that included Urdu language were fixed. Noorani
(1998: 125) points out that by then, to be sure, the theory had spread far and
wide in the minds of millions and caused damage far more grave than the
Partition of India. The damage occurred because of the image of Muslims
that emerged as a consequence of these events. For their opponents, all
Muslims appeared to be separatists and anti-national. The association of
Muslims with these images would persist as part of their identity long after
the Partition.
After the formation of the new state, Pakistan, Muslims were forced to
reconstitute their identities. Reconstruction meant redefining the status and
role of Aligarh Muslim University, Urdu language and Sharia etc after
independence. The Muslim League leaders mostly from the predominantly
Hindu provinces, like UP in undivided India, who created these identities
and symbols, left for Pakistan.
At the time of partition according to the 1951 census, 64 million Muslims
went to Pakistan while 36 million decided to stay in India. Das Gupta
(1970:27) says that if one were to accept the principle set forth by the leaders
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of Muslim separatism that religion was the basic criterion of a nation, one
could understand the problem of status which the creation of Pakistan
undoubtedly posed for the Muslims in new India.
Mohamed Raza Khan, who was a member of the League Council since 1943,
and of the Madras Legislature from 1946 to 1962, describes the Muslim
mood at Partition as follows;
Having worked for the creation of Pakistan, they found themselves left without an organization and leadership, with nobody to guide them, Mr. Jinnah left for Karachi to lead the new State. Most of the top leaders, who were on the League Working Committee and prominent Leaguers in different States, either left for Karachi to build up their own careers, as they felt they had no political future in India, or went into complete retirement. A fear complex had overtaken the Muslim community throughout the country. They could not think in terms of their political rights or their material welfare. All that they wanted was that there should be no communal trouble in their areas. They practically lost all interest in politics and wanted that they should be left to themselves. This mood of withdrawal lingers till today (Quoted in Noorani, 1998: 129).
Some of the leaders who stayed behind added to the confusion. According to
Noorani (1998:126), one of them, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, offered support
to Jawaharlal Nehru's motion on the national flag and implicitly pledged
loyalty to the new state, which was contrary to the previous Muslim League's
policy and guidance to the Muslim masses. The League leader and former
premier of Bengal, H. S. Suhrawardy, raised an important question, which is
still relevant, in his letter to Khaliquzzaman on 10 September 1947.
What I fear is, will they have respect for you if you have not strength, that is to say if you give up your particular group solidarity? At the same time, any attempt to acquire solidarity and strength will raise suspicion in their minds as regards of bona fides (Noorani, 1998: 126).
This dilemma was experienced even by the League and Jinnah himself,
perhaps in a more embarrassing manner. Jinnah had repeatedly counselled
them to organize themselves and professed that they should chalk out their
own future, which is precisely what he afterwards prevented them from
doing. The League Council met on 14-15 December 1947 in Karachi and
decided that there shall be separate Muslim League organizations for
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Pakistan and the Indian Union (Noorani, 1998: 127). Accordingly he said
that there must be a Muslim League in Hindustan. If they were thinking of
anything else then they were finished. If they wanted to wind up the League
they could do so but he thought it would be a great mistake. He said he knew
there was already an attempt to do that (Noorani, 1998: 127). These remarks
raised a question as to why Indian Muslims had to maintain the League,
which was meant for the creation of Pakistan when there was no need of
another Pakistan under the secular policy of Indian Union.
The Muslim's dilemma was also reflected in the Hindu leaders' comments
against them. In relation to the dispute raised by Pakistan regarding the
status of Kashmir, Vallabhbhai Patel in a public meeting on 6 January 1948,
angrily questioned the Indian Muslims' alleged silence on the issue. He
asked them why they did not open their mouths on the Kashmir issue. He
wondered why they had not condemned the action of Pakistan (Noorani,
1998: 130). Noorani points out that it was obvious that Patel was prescribing
a loyalty test to Muslims- support to the Government of India's stand on the
Kashmir dispute with Pakistan (1998: 130-31). Though the League continues
in India, it is as a regional body with strong base in only Tamil Nadu and
Kerala (ibid.: 132).
All Muslim identities and symbols, which were created during the colonial
period in one way or another, lost their objectives and relevance. Muslim
masses were left behind without leaders. Noorani (1998: 133) comments on
the Indian Muslim condition after the Independence by pointing out that no
grievance was redressed and no reform carried out. The insecurities yet
remain. Muslims continue to perceive their identity to be under threat. The
principal gainer was, of course, the League leadership. Thus they had no
choice but to reconstitute/reconcile their identity.
In the next section the role of Urdu language in the reconstruction of
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identity is examined.
6.2 Decline in the :instrumental power of Urdu
6.21 Internal Factor: State Language Policy
As we have seen already, policy can create hierarchies both at social and
psychological levels. UP State language policy had two negative effects on
the instrumental power of Urdu language. First the language was denied a
legitimate status on account of being a minority language and secondly the
reluctance to provide protection to the minority language meant an
impediment on its development and a decline in its use.
In addition it is important to note that central and state policies toward
linguistic minorities especially in the case of UP are contradictory. While
central government policies are designed to promote national unity by
accepting linguistic and cultural pluralism, State government policies seek
to pursue the same objectives by encouraging homogenization on the basis of
the dominant regional cultures. Brass, (1975: 216-17) argues that in this way
state governments seek to avoid the implications of linguistic and cultural
pluralism and the political demands of linguistic and religious minorities for
privileges which foster separate cultural identities. In other words, as
Kirpalani Committee says in the case of UP, the State Government is one
which is concerned about the interests of 'national integration' by rejecting
the 'national policy'. As far as the second status of Urdu is concerned,
technically the government of Uttar Pradesh, did not deviate from the norm
that was agreed upon by the states in the Indian Union, since the State
Reorganization Commission in its report (1955) had suggested that before a
language could be considered as a second state language, the population
speaking the language should be 30 percent of the total population of the
state and the Union government. Through a memorandum the Ministry of
Home Mfairs agreed with this proposal and advised the state governments
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accordingly (Das Gupta, 1970: 148). On this basis they could legally deny
Urdu a legitimate status as the second official language.
This imposition of majority's language and culture on the minority in UP
had a second dimension. The step they took was to provide poor or no
facilities for Urdu education and discouraging and de-linking it from higher
education and administrative services. In this way the UP state government
succeeded in restricting Urdu to .the poor or inferior sections of society
leading to a decline in the image and status of Urdu.
This neglect and discriminative policy of the state therefore prevented Urdu
speakers from feeling part of or joining the mainstream society and created a
sense of deprivation among the Muslims. In the next section, we see how all
these factors have affected Muslim identity.
6.22 External Factor: Effect of Globalization-
As shown in the discussion above, legitimate power provided through policy
determines both the symbolic and instrumental significance of languages
especially in the context of relations between different linguistic groups.
Without any support of the state however, English remains a powerful
language because of its association with the market institution through
which languages enter the arena of legitimation (Singh, 2000: 149).
Languages of significant value in the market context like English have
increased in importance due to the process of globalization.
While policy creates the internal divisions and hierarchy among languages,
globalization works as an external factor to change 'in' and 'out' group
language categories since 'in' and 'out' relationships are not absolute.
Although Urdu and Hindi fall into separate categories in relation to each
other because of different statuses accorded by the state as well as the
emotional rivalries between the cultural groups associated with them, when
viewed externally in relation to English they fall into the same 'in' group as
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Indian languages. Singh, (2000: 163) therefore observes that the new phase
of economic development not only alters the market situation for languages
externally (outside the country) but also within the society. He notes further
that; The crucial factors which govern the viability of a language for the internal
market are: modernization of teaching in the language and its orientation to services and the integrative capacity within the linguistic community to absorb in its educational system the skills and vocations that the emergent new economies may require. The responses to· these new demands in education influence the market prospect of a language (2000: 163).
Like language policy, globalization provokes a sense of identity. Due to
globalization, homogenization of cultures takes place in several aspects of
cultural life of the people but this process also accelerates the growth of
cultural self-consciousness and cultural identities (Singh, 2000: 98).
In a sense, globalization and the influence of English has helped to reduce
the gap in instrumental power between Urdu and Hindi. Due to
comparatively little power of both Hindi and Urdu in the market sphere (in
the instrumental sense), their symbolic power have increased tremendously.
That is why 'angrezi hatao' 1 by Mulayam Singh eased the process of
recognition of Urdu as a second language in UP.
Even if Muslims have strong attachment to Urdu, identity claims can not be
sufficient reason for the language retention. The linguistic identity needs
'legitimation'. Singh (2000: 166-7) says that a major loss to Urdu language in
India during the past fifty years has been due to its displacement as a
language of symbolic domination as well as major changes in policies of
states towards Urdu language which have adversely affected its market
value. One of the reasons why, during the British period, the Muslim elite
tried to defend the continued use of Persianized Urdu in the courts, offices
1 This political slogan expresses sentiments against English and support for Indian languages
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and schools of the northern provinces was that it enabled the Muslim elite to
maintain their dominance and limit others' access to positions of dominance
in the ruling institutions of the provinces (Brass, 1975: 179).
Especially after independence, the apathy of the upper and the middle class
Muslims towards Urdu and the tendency in the Muslim community to
appropriate it merely as a religious-cultural phenomenon has reduced its
utilitarian as well as ideological appeal. It is no longer patronized by the
state, or the market as in the past. The job opportunities for graduates in
Urdu have become negligible except for a limited number of teaching
positions. All this signifies the loss of symbolic domination or instrumental
value of Urdu language (Singh, 2000: 167). This erosion in its symbolic
domination is 'as a result of ascendance of English' and this results from its
precarious linkages with the market, now in the process of economic
globalization (ibid.:168). This effect of globalization applies as well to other
Indian languages including Hindi which otherwise enjoy considerable state
patronage and articulate higher degree of cultural domination in the social
space (ibid.: 167). That is one of the reasons why English still occupies a
dominant position in language hierarchies in India in spite of its lack of
official status in many regions.
The process of globalization produces dual and contradictory trends in the
usage of the languages, which can be applied to Indian situation. Muslim
elite patronize English-medium, private or convent schools while professing
oral commitment to education through Urdu medium (ibid.: 174). This
happens even in Pakistan, where Urdu is the national language of the
country. Rahman, (1999: 98) notes that English remains the language of
power and high social status in Pakistan. At the rhetorical level, however,
the ruling elite appears to support Urdu. Thus this process produces new
hierarchies of power among languages.
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A brief review of the situation in Pakistan could be used to illustrate this
point. Rahman, (1997: 177) writes that Pakistan is no doubt an ideologically
inspired state and Urdu was a part of this ideology. The situation of Urdu is
however not so stable even in Pakistan. Though as a national language, it
enjoys considerably high status like Hindi in India, the effects on Urdu from
the internal regional divisions and external factors are tremendous. Except
for relatively better situation of Urdu in Pakistan than in India, these
external and internal factors undermine the importance of Urdu as a single
dominant national language.
Symbolically Urdu has a strong ideological and official support in Pakistan
because of its centrality in national integration. Though this is the same
with Hindi in India, which is supposed to be a symbol of national integration,
the presentation of this issue takes a secular approach while in Pakistan,
Urdu language is often associated with religion. Thus in Pakistan, the
Perso-Arabic roots are used in order to stress the Muslim aspect of the
Pakistani identity and, in keeping up with the two-nation theory,
differentiate Pakistani Urdu from India Hindi which is becoming more and
more Sanskritized (Rahman, 1999: 266). At the same time, now it is being
used to counter the hegemony of Western culture and Anglicization (Rahman,
1999: 291).
After partition and independence of Pakistan, the Muslim League leaders
who formed the government associated Urdu with Islamic and Pakistani
identity. Moreover, they also felt that only Urdu could be used to integrate
the diverse nationalities of Pakistan. Thus they propounded the uni-national
thesis - that Pakistanis are one people - and chose Urdu as the national
language (Rahman, 1999: 9). This policy has remained almost the same
either at educational level or administrative level and has been followed by
several political parties, though their motives could be different. However
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there have been several regional linguistic movements including the Bengali
movement against Urdu language and Urdu speaking dominant group.
Rahman, (1999: 289) observes that at the same time, however, for all
lucrative and high-powered positions, it is English, which is required as it
was in the days of the British Raj. In that context, Urdu is ghettoizing.
Hence, whereas highly placed state functionaries support Urdu in their
official roles, they privately use English and educate their children in it. In
fact even middle class people who support Urdu for ideological reasons adopt
the pragmatic policy of learning English and teaching it to their children.
This dual and contradictory attitude is a universal feature of elite and
middle classes in almost all marginalized speech communities and is related
to linguistic ideology, which is mobilized at two levels, namely, general
(communicative) and specific (symbolic), with the structure of social
stratification and division of classes in a speech community (Singh, 2000:
143). With the dominance of English as the global language and the
recognition of Hindi as the official language in India, Urdu's position as
legitimate language in the communicative ~ense is weakened further.
6.3 Urdu as a Symbol in Identity Reconstitution
The denial of legitimate status to Urdu especially in UP has not only
affected the instrumental power of Urdu but also created an acute identity
crisis among the Muslims in India. The government policies especially on
language have not only affected Muslims in economic spheres but have also
stirred their human consciousness especially where policy decisions are
unfair and unjust. After independence, the role of Urdu language in the
constitution of Muslim identity has been enhanced in last five decades by the
official neglect and even suppression of the language itself. This political
neglect and denial of legitimate status to Urdu is strongly connected with the
image, which surrounds Urdu language and its identification with Muslims
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and Islam. In the next section the discussion focuses on how this image has
been created and is maintained.
6.32 Social Construction of Image
Human beings understand themselves through interaction with others. In
the process of identifying others, human beings can identify themselves. If
they can not identify others, their own identification is also not clear. Thus
the role of others become a very important factor for the identity formation.
Creation of image or myth is not only an outcome of direct interaction but
also a result of indirect information transmission. In indirect method of
image creation, the power of language and media like journals and the press
plays a crucial role. They can give idea about what people know they are,
what they think they ought to be, and what others think they really are.
They create the image and even contribute to the creation of myths.
Through interaction, people begin to have certain 'images' about others and
vice versa. This 'others' perceptions might or might not be congruent with
the self-image. Normally human beings have their own self-perception about
their own image and seek to present it that way. However it depends on
various factors whether others also interpret it the same way. When it is
incongruent and especially when others are in powerful position, like a
majority, they can enforce their version of image. The projection or
transference of image and status from majority to minority and
appropriation of cultural symbols or values of dominant groups in society
plays a crucial role in the constitution of identity.
Thus as Noorani (1998:121) says, a minority's sense of identity is shaped by
its understanding of its own history. Its self-image is influenced, no less, by
the image the majority groups have of the minority - an image shaped, in
turn, by their understanding of history. Not infrequently, historical
perceptions clash. History does not address itself in the same language to
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different peoples.
Through the nationalistic movement followed by the birth of Pakistan, the
interaction between Hindus and Muslims has led each group to have certain
images of each other. Their behavior towards each other in present times
majorly depends on the image, which was created during that time.
Since colonial period basically Indian Muslims, especially in northern parts,
have always been seen in opposition to Hindus. Thus a number of elements
of their identities are also the creation of this interaction. The emergence
and continuation of an identity is sometimes supported by a counterpart.
Since this majority and minority group relationship has always been marked
by conflict, their identities are also constructed in that context. Thus when
identity has a counterpart in this manner, it increases attachment to one's
in-group.
There are several identities, which are attached to each of these socio
cultural groups. Several of these identities were created during the colonial
period and some of them have persisted in India to this day. For Muslims in
contemporary India, the status of Aligarh Muslim University, the oispute
over Muslim Personal laws, and the Urdu language are major identity issues.
Among them, Urdu has a unique position in the constitution of Muslim
identity especially in relation to Hindus, since it has a counterpart, Hindi. In
order to understand the uniqueness of such identities, a comparison is made
here between the aspects of identity, which have counterparts in other
groups and those that do not have.
The importance of cow to Hindus and Sharia to Muslims constitute symbols
of identity that belong to this category that lacks counterparts in the
opposite group. Both of them are central factors in the identity of each
religious group. Sharia is therefore used as a symbol of Muslim identity in a
manner similar to the use of the cow by Hindus (Brass, 1996: 97). Even
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though each group views its own elements of identity with high regard and
reverence, there is a contradictory perception about the same elements by
the rival community (ibid.: 99). In this sense, these symbols are viewed
different from the way Hindi and Urdu are viewed.
There seems to be a tacit agreement between Hindus and Muslims in
contemporary India that so far as Hindus do not interfere about the cause of
Muslims, the Muslims also do not interfere with Hindus. Brass (1996:99)
notes that; Hindus revere the cow and Muslims are brought up to eat it, but dietary habits are changed more easily than religious beliefs. Consequently, Muslims may change their primordial attachment to eating beef for the sake of the Hindu primordial attachment to the sanctity of the cow, particularly if Hindus agree not to tamper with those attachments that Muslim value more than the Hindus, such as the Sharia. Now, this particular bargain, though not an explicit one, surely exists tacitly in contemporary in India. It is at least certain that the ulema will not rise up in a body to defend cow sacrifice as long as there is no interference with Muslim personal law.
This point should be considered from the character of each symbol. While
eating cow is not mandatory for Muslims, it is mandatory for Hindus to
worship cow. In the same way, to support Sharia does not harm Hindus since
there is no importance for them. In short, protection of the Sharia does not
affect the cause of cow protection and vise versa. On the other hand, the
promotion of Urdu, especially giving the second official status, which gives
the practical opportunity for Muslims to get jobs, definitely threatens the
cause of Hindi, even if the numbers are not so high. Especially in north India,
where Hindi is widely spoken, the more the number of Urdu speakers reduce,
the more the numbers of Hindi speakers increase, which is evident from the
census (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 183).
Thus between the issue of Sharia and cow, there can be tacit agreement,
while that agreement is impossible between Hindi and Urdu. At the same
time, the issue of Sharia is complicated and divisive among the Muslims but
not between them and Hindus. Brass (1996:97) therefore observes that
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unlike the symbol of the cow for the Hindus, however, the Sharia is a divisive
symbol within the Muslim community itself. One would be hard put to find
many Hindus who think it important to slaughter cows but many secular
Muslims consider it essential to modernize the Sharia and to adopt a
uniform civil law administered by the state.
However this division in the community 1s generally overlooked or
neglected by others and even by their own people. Once multiple symbols are
attached to a particular group, those who belong to the group will be
considered to have accepted all the symbols. Hasan, Zoya (1994:63) notes
that; Over the years, the salient features of minority identity found expressions
in maintaining the status quo on personal law, besides defending places of worship, and promoting Urdu. But what is often ignored is that Muslims are by no means a homogeneous community; they do not exist in Indian society as separate and isolated entities, they operate within the social structure as segments of a composite social framework. Equally significant is the tendency towards pluralism in matter pertaining to the Shariat.
Whenever a collective identity is externally assigned by a group outside the
one whose identity is in question, then it is assumed that all members share
those attributes or attach the same value to them. This has been the case
with Urdu. According to statistics, Urdu is not the language of all Indian
Muslims. According to the census of India, 1991, only 42.73% of the total
Muslim population could claim it as their mother tongue, although most
people assume that all Muslims are Urdu speakers.
However because of the tragic experience during the partition, anything
related with Muslims and Islam has always been seen through this
particular perspective by Hindus. Any demand related with Urdu or
otherwise has always been viewed with suspicion and always raises
questions of Muslim loyalty to India. Thus Muslim political leaders who
wished to demand protection for Muslim minority rights were now on the
defensive, forced to defend not only their rights but their loyalties, which
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were called into question by Hindu communalist leaders whenever Muslim
demands became assertive (Brass, 1975: 183). Mayer, (1983: 9) observes that
substantial numbers of Hindus still believe that Indian Muslims owe their
primary loyalty to Pakistan. In turn, Muslims always feel discriminated
against whether it is true or imagined. Mayer (1983:10) citing Imtiaz Ahmad
comments that; ... the important thing is not that there is discrimination against Muslims in the economic structure. What is important is that Muslims have felt so insecure as to believe themselves to be the target of continuos economic discrimination. The fact of their belief has been crucial to their social adjustment in the country.
About Urdu, it was worse than any other symbol of Muslim identity since
it was connected exclusively with Muslims by Muslim themselves, especially
beginning with the Muslim league. It was used to assert differences rather
than commonness and it played a critical role in the ideology of Pakistan
movement, and it was eventually declared. the national language. of Pakistan.
It is also at the center of different interpretations of history between the two
communities. According to Brass (1975:186) in the eyes of the more militant
Hindu supporters of Hindi as the sole official language of India and the north
Indian states, this attachment of Muslims to Urdu and its script is an
attachment to a 'foreign' script and an alien culture by a communal minority
whose loyalties to India are suspect. On the other hand, Urdu supporters
deny this charge and argue that Urdu is an indigenous language just like
Hindi and is spoken by both Hindus and Muslims and is thus a symbol of
unity of the two communities (ibid.). While Urdu speakers' claim is genuine,
there is another aspect, which is not always mentioned. It is that the special
heritage of Indian Muslims and the religious literature as well as the
cultural achievements of Indian Muslims are mostly in Urdu (ibid.: 187).
This is the very reason why it is mostly Muslims who defend this language.
Thus the harder Muslims try to defend Urdu, the more the suspicions of
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Hindus increase and get confirmed that Urdu is a Muslim language.
From this brief observation of the interaction between two communities,
there seems to be a consensus between Hindus and Muslims on the basis of
the image that Urdu is a language of Muslims. liowever complications arise
when both communities want to see the issue from completely opposite
perspectives. While some may want to emphasize the inclusive aspect of the
language, others may want to do the same from an exclusive perspective.
In the next section, the place of Urdu in the interaction between these two
communities is examined on the basis of presentation and interpretation of
community image.
6.33 Muslim Identity: The Self-Image
Attitude of Non-Urdu speaking Muslims to Urdu
As explained in the introduction, only a few states have Muslim population
of more than 1 million according to the 1991 census. Among them, UP, Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan accounted for 43% of the total Muslim
population in India. This indicates that more than 50% of the Muslim
population were spread throughout India.
In the same way, Urdu speakers were also dispersed all over India. Eight
states, each with more than one million Urdu speakers, accounted for more
than 93% of the total Urdu speakers in India. The states were UP, Bihar,
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and
Madhya Pradesh. In each of these states however, Urdu speakers constituted
a minority linguistic group.
These figures indicate the extent of diversity of customs, culture, history, and
languages even among the Muslims. Following the linguistic reorganization
of Indian states in 1956, cultural differences and regional distinctions
especially on the basis of language have become sharper.
Since Urdu language was and is more associated with Northern Muslims
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rather than the south, Muslim attitudes towards Urdu as a factor in identity
is more strongly and emotionally displayed in the north. However there is
evidence that south Indian Muslims are also increasingly adopting Urdu as
part of their Islamic identity.
Table 10. Urdu Speakers and Muslim Population (in Millions) since 1971. 1971 1981 1991 Number Urdu % of Number Urdu % of Number Urdu % of of Speakers Urdu of Speakers Urdu of Speakers Urdu Muslims Speakers Muslims Speakers Muslims Speakers
among among among Muslims Muslims Muslims
India 61.418 28.621 46.60 75.512 34.941 46.27 101.596 43.407 42.73
Uttar 13.677 9.273 67.80 17.658 10.208 57.81 24.110 12.493 51.82 Pradesh Bihar 7.594 4.993 65.75 9.875 7.287 73.80 12.788 8.542 66.80
Andra 3.520 3.300 93.75 4.534 4.208 92.81 5.924 5.560 93.86 Pradesh Karnata 3.113 2.637 84.71 4.105 3.611 87.97 5.234 4.480 85.59 ka Mahar a 4.233 3.662 86.51 5.806 4.583 78.94 7.629 5.734 75.16 shtra Sour~: Censuses oflndia 1971, 1981, and 1991.
The censuses from 1971-91 show that the proportion of Urdu speakers in
Muslim population in the non-Hindi speaking states is higher than in the
Hindi speaking states. According to Farouqui (1992:101) observes that the
condition of Urdu in UP is worse, while in Maharashtra and southern India
it is comparatively encouraging. This fact can be understood from the fact
that in Andhra Pradesh, the official status to Urdu was granted much earlier
than in both UP and Bihar (Khalidi, 1995: 141).
Apart from that, the number of students who study in Urdu medium and
the facilities for education are far better in other states, especially in the
south than in UP, where the highest number of Urdu speakers live. In a
sense, instrumental power of Urdu is more prominent in the south than in
the north. These trends are borne out by the following data.
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Table 11. The comparison of Urdu Primary and Secondary educational facilities in UP and Maharashtra in 1992-1993
Number of Number of pupils Number of teachers Year: Primary schools studying in Urdu employed for imparting 1992-1993 instruction through
Urdu
UP 1573 268056 10068 Maharashtra 2170 525973 13735 Year: Number of Number of pupils Number of teachers 1992-1993 Secondary schools studying in Urdu employed for imparting
instruction though Urdu
UP 218 75115 7430 Maharashtra 430 174647 6297
Source: 33ro Report of Comnnss10n for Linguistic Minorities in India. Note: Bihar, AP, and Karnataka governments did not furnish the data regarding the minority educational facilities. However from previous reports there was evidence that generally the southern parts of India provide better facilities and enroll more students compared with UP.
Thus it is important to see how Muslims in other states other than UP see
the issue of Urdu. Here some patterns of development of Islamic culture
especially in the south that have influenced attitudes towards Urdu
language are examined.
The advent of Islam in south India can be categorized into three phases.
First, after establishing their power in northern part of India, Muslim rulers
started penetrating deep into the south. Secondly, there were local converts
through missionary activities.
Thirdly, and perhaps primarily, the long-standing trading relations with the
ancient Romans, Greeks and Arabs gave them chance of assimilation. Islam
in southern India actually owes its origin primarily to its direct contact with
the Arab traders, who contracted marriage alliances with indigenous coastal
women.
In the first case, during the penetration of the Muslim rulers into the south,
a large number of soldiers, poets and administrators came and settled in
south India from the Deccan and north India. These settlers and their
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descendants, who were mainly Urdu speaking, made south India their home
but did not sever their historical, cultural and ethnic ties with their northern
Muslim brethren. They were never able to identify themselves fully with the
predominantly non-Urdu-speaking local populations. In the second and the
third cases, they remained as Tamil or its derivative Malayalam speakers
(More, 1995: 336).
There was considerable influence through the Muslim League movement on
Tamil Muslims to awaken and propagate their Islamic identity. More
(1995:338) says:
In 1906, the All India Muslim League was founded in Dacca to protect Muslim interests in India. Its Madras branch was founded in 1908. The very next year, separate electorates were accorded to the Muslims. Until about 1930, Muslim politics in the Presidency was dominated by the Urdu-speaking aristocratic merchant elite, centred in Madras city. The situation of the Tamil Muslims, who had their own powerful merchant elite and who until the launching of the Non-Cooperation and Klclafat Movements in the 1920s were impervious to national and pan-Islamic sentiments and usually kept a low political profile, underwent a sea-change. In fact, Khilafat Movement drew the Tamil Muslims into national and international issues and made them join hands with the Urdu-speaking Muslims. They thus became conscious of their Islamic identity and there was certainly an awakening of their political consciousness, too.
In the same way the Hindustani controversy had also arisen in south even
before the installation of the Congress government in 1937. The Hindi versus
Urdu controversy of the United Provinces was well known. Since the
Congress party assumed office in 1937 in the Madras Presidency, with the
Tamil Brahman, C. Rajagopalachari as Prime Minister, naturally the
Muslims of Madras feared that they were being obliged to learn a
Sanskritised Hindi in the name of Hindustani2 (ibid.: 351).
In Madras Legislative Assembly, there was no unanimity of opinion against
Hindustani among the Muslim League members. It was indeed on this
2 The anti-Hindustani movement in the south brought together the non-Brahman who were against Hindi that was supported by Brahmans and the Tamil speaking Muslims who were against Urdu speaking Muslims' dominance. See More, 1993: p333-61.
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question of Hindustani that real cleavage between the Tamil Muslims and
the Urdu-speaking Muslims became apparent (ibid.: 352).
Some Urdu speaking Muslim League Assembly members could see an
advantage in this controversy. They thought that in the name of Hindustani,
they could promote their own language, Urdu, since Hindustani meant both
Hindi and Urdu as Gandhi had said. Prominent leader Basheer Ahmad
Sayeed even insisted that there was no controversy over this. In his view, the
government wanted to propagate this spoken language (Hindustani) which
was a Muslim language. They could therefore get the facilities for the speedy
learning of this language (More, 1995:352-3). More observes that; The support that Urdu-speaking Muslims extended to Hindustani is
understandable. Though Urdu was the cultural language of the vast majority of Muslims in India, it was not the cultural language of the non-Urduspeaking Muslim majority of the Madras Presidency. The maintenance and the propagation of Urdu as the cultural language of all the Muslims of the Presidency was absolutely essential for the survival of the Urdu speaking Muslims as a political force in the Presidency, for without the predominance of Urdu, the Urdu-speaking Muslims knew that it would be more and more difficult for them to stake their claim for the leadership of the Madras Muslims or to play an important role in Madras Muslim Politics. Many Urduspeaking Muslims saw in the proposal to introduce Hindustani a golden opportunity to propagate their language among the other Muslims and thus maintain their influence (1995: 353).
For the Tamil speaking Muslims, Urdu!Hindustani was the symbol of the
linguistic and cultural dominance of the Urdu speaking Muslims. Learning it
would only prolong their cultural subordination to Urdu-speaking Muslims
in spite of the latter being a minority among Muslims in the Tamil country
(ibid.: 354).
In Mappila Muslims of Kerala, Miller (1992: 173) describes their
relationship with north Indian and other Muslims as follows: The Mappilas3 were cut off from Indian Muslims by the barriers of language
and culture as well as by geography. Aside from Bengal the bulk of Indian
3 The Mappilas are all located in a narrow belt along the southwest coast of India. Not only geographically, but also linguistically and culturally, the Mappila Muslims are for all practical purpose identified with Kerala (Miller, 1992: 1).
221
Muslims was Urdu speaking, and their cultural affinities lay to the north and west. These Muslims had no visible interest in the Mappilas ... Few Mappilas, in turn, knew Urdu, and today only a minority show interest in the language. Mappilas had little knowledge of the leaders of north Indian Muslims, and less of their writings. At practical levels the contacts were marginal, and distance, language and culture remain as blocks to regular communication and larger contacts today.
This means that although the number of Urdu speakers among the Mappila
Muslims is small, they are aware that there is the dominant image that
Urdu is a Muslim language and that Urdu symbolizes unity of Muslims in
India, or at least the language is treated in that way. The question that
arises is why the Mappila Muslims would think of Urdu as a symbol of
Muslim identity in India if their contact with the northern Muslims is
limited.
In order to answer this question it is important to revisit the history of
colonial India. During the colonial period Muslim League's influence was
widespread among the Muslims all over India. As it was in Tamil Nadu's
case, in Kerala also, the Malabar branch of the Muslim League fully
supported League policies as they developed in relation to the partition
proposal (ibid.: 162).
Although the Muslims in Kerala and Tamil Nadu prefer to identify with the
culture and dominant languages of these two regions, they are at the same
time conscious of their larger ideologically constructed 'Indian' rather than
'regional' Muslim identity. A similar pattern can be observed nearer north
in Gujarat. In the case of Gc.jarat, Misra (1964: 168) notes that;
... almost all Muslim in Gujarat speak Gujarati with fluency and Urdu with a varying degree of ease. Among most fluent are the Syeds and other foreign Muslim communities who speak Urdu as the first language and Gujarati as the second. Amongst others like Patani Vohras and Tais, in the Urdu they speak as the first language, the Gujarati imprint is so heavy (except for some words) that it appears almost indistinguishable from Gujarati. Being the language of the Islamized elite and also because it is nearer to the
languages in which the Islamic sacred lore is couched, Urdu has come to be regarded as one of the indices of Islamization. It has also been advocated as a factor of Muslim unity and in actual fact, before and after partition, there was a strong movement urging the Muslims to declare Urdu as their mother
222
tongue in the census questions. The result has been a greater awareness of Urdu as a peculiarly Islamic language and an effort on the part of average Muslims to speak it with reasonable degree of purity and competence. It will be noted that peculiarly enough, this competence is limited to speech
alone.
From examples of these three states, we can see the different patterns of
attitudes among Muslims towards Urdu language. The conclusion one may
draw here is that among Muslims the attitude to Urdu can be assessed at
two levels; the inter-community and intra-community levels. For non-Urdu
speaking Muslims they recognize Urdu as part of their identity when it
comes to inter-community relations but do not necessarily accept the same
identities when it comes intra-community relations. In Tamil Nadu for
example, the Urdu speaking Muslims were the ones who were dominant and
their imposition of identity on non-Urdu speaking Muslims would be more
strongly presented than the non-Urdu speaking Muslims' refusal to accept
the identity. We can see here how political power can transfnrm the symbols
of a handful of people into an entire community's symbols.
This process of adoption of symbols of part of a community by the entire
community gives an insight into how Urdu has played a crucial role in the
constitution of Muslim identity across India especially after independence.
The significance of the language is particularly evident in the higher
percentage of Urdu speakers or better Urdu education systems among
Muslims in the southern parts than tne northern part. In this sense
Farouqui (1995:93) notes that without doubt, today the Muslims of south
India and west Bengal are recognizing Urdu as their language and a symbol
of their religious identity in the changed political milieu, even if Urdu was
never their language and in the past they were greatly distanced from the
Muslims of north India. Siddiqui (1979:27) explains this phenomenon by
stating that;
This common identity as a result of a common religion as practiced, subject to sectarian variations, and a sort of psychological unity and a growing sense of
223
common destiny within the socio-political life of the country is partly expressed in the process of Urduisation to a considerable extent among the non-Hindustani speaking Muslims, drawn not only from the Indo-Aryan speaking areas of north and north-west India but also the Dravidian speaking south, as well as from the delta region of which Calcutta is a natural part. Even those who have retained their mother tongue such as Bengali, Rajasthani, Malayali and Tamil tend to become bilingual and adopt Hindustani as a second language for conversation outside their homes or with people other than their own linguistic group.
According to some scholars, the views discussed above about the Muslims'
perception of Urdu is only partial and should not be construed to apply in all
situations. Hasan, M. (1998: 17) points out that in reality, the commitment of
some Muslim groups to specifically Islamic ideas and symbols does not
indicate a unified structure of consciousness or a community acting in unison.
What should not be assumed is a monolithic conception of Islamic ideology
and practice or a teleology dictating the actions of the Muslims or a general
acquiescence in the actions of few.
It is an undeniable fact however, that the Muslims are generally seen and
judged by others as a collective group through these Islamic ideas and
symbols that are created by 'some Muslim groups'. These ideas and symbols
are the ones, which dominate other people's understanding and perceptions
of Muslim identity and often come to be accepted even by Muslims
themselves. The Muslim identity is created on the basis of an image that is
assumed to apply universally to all Muslims across India. Since the people
who create or hold such images are usually powerful or in the majority,
people come to believe in these images and treat Muslims accordingly.
Urdu movement in UP
Farouqui (1995:93) observes that Muslim politics in contemporary India is
not particularly different from what it was in the past. The hold of north
India Muslims on Muslim political campaigns even after independence has
been strong. This view could apply to Urdu movement as well.
After independence, as discussed in the previous chapters, Urdu lost the
224
dominant power in the field of administration, education and employment as
it was during the colonial period. This loss of legitimation was an outcome of
policies that were implemented by the state governments especially in UP.
All these reactions were connected with the history of nationalistic
movement and the birth of Pakistan.
However the loss was not just concerning the legitimate status of the
language. Since Urdu was a key component in the ideology of the Pakistan
movement it lost its place in independent India as a consequence. Now
Muslims in India had to struggle for reconstitution of identity and especially
to redefine the place of Urdu.
There was a consensus at least in UP and Bihar on the dangers
overshadowing the future of Urdu. This was taken seriously by the some of
the Muslims who saw it as neglect and attack on their identity and further
spurred Urdu movement in the northern part of India especially in UP in
1950s and 1960s.
Brass (1996:90) observes that in the post-independence period, as Urdu lost
some of its hold in the government schools in the north, the Ulama rushed to
the defence of Urdu, which came to be seen as part and parcel of Muslim
social and cultural identity and their spiritual inheritance. The Jamiyat al
ulama jumped into the fray as its foremost defender. At a conference in
Lucknow, Maulana Hifzur Rahman and Syed Mahmud made fiery speeches
on this subject (Hasan, 1997: 191).
The Majlis-i Mushawarat (the federation of various Muslim organizations)
released a nine-point manifesto in July 1966. It records that Urdu was being
ignored in schools as a medium of instruction. The manifesto constructs
Muslim identity in terms of endangered yet chosen emblems such ::1s Aligarh
Muslim University, Urdu and Muslim Personal Law. Constituted as social
and cultural simulacrum, this ensemble of objectified emblems denotes the
225
Muslim community (Talib, 1998, 307-8).
Some considered it as an opportunity for reviving the League (Hasan,
1997:191). Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan announced that they had
recently demanded religious training and Urdu as the medium of expression
in primary schools for those whose mother tongue was Urdu, but the
majority community was against them. He wondered how their demands
could reach the Government through the majority community organizations.
It was therefore necessary that the League revive its political activities
(ibid.).
The most famous movement, however, was the signature camprugn of
Anjuman-i- Talaqqui-i- Urdu led by Zakir Husain. Das Gupta (1970: 142)
writes that the sense of neglect as felt by the Urdu speech community led the
working committee of the Anjuman Taraqqui-i-Urdu (Hind) to lead a
campaign on behalf of the Urdu-speaking people of Uttar Pradesh for the
acceptance of Urdu as a regional language in the state. Ten thousand parents
and guardians, worried over diminishing employment prospects for their
wards, petitioned the state education minister (Hasan, 1997: 191). On 15th
February 1954, a deputation of the Anjuman led by Zakir Husain and others
met President Rajendra Prasad and presented a memorandum signed by
over 2, 700,000 persons (Noorani, 2003: 19). The memorandum submitted by
the Anjuman requested the president to issue a directive under Article 34 7 of
the Constitution of India that Urdu be recognized as one of the regional
languages of UP (ibid.: 299). However the crucial difference between this
movement and the one led by the Ulama and potential League revival
campaigners was that the Anjuman did not approach this issue through a
separate identity factor, while former tried to associate the issue of Urdu
with Muslims for different motives. The memorandum read as follows;
We submit that Urdu, which through centuries has developed a style and a
226
literature which any people can justly be proud of, is today the spoken language of a large number of men and women of all faiths and creeds in Uttar Pradesh, who rightly claim it as their mother tongue or their literary language. All these people while anxious to learn and write Urdu in its own script and for, very good reasons, wish to preserve this national heritage (ibid.: 300).
This approach of the Urdu speaking Muslims, which seeks to present the
issue of Urdu from the perspective of a composite culture, has been observed
in several fields. The stated purpose of the reorganized Anjuman in
independent India is also to adopt all possible measures for promoting Urdu
and to popularize its simpler form, the Hindustani (Das Gupta, 1970: 209).
As Singh (2000:195) notes, most scholars continue to view Urdu language
and literature as a part of composite Indian culture shared both by the
Muslims and non-Muslims and they do not associate Urdu either exclusively
with Islam or with Muslim community. This includes even some of the
eminent Hindu leaders like Inder Kumar Gujral.
By emphasizing that Urdu is an Indian language (and therefore not only for
Muslims), they try to present a perspective which would be acceptable to the
other Indians. This signifies a reconstitution of Identity - from Muslim
identity to a composite Indian cultural identity. As a part of Indian identity,
they try to increase the instrumental power of the language also.
These efforts could however not be sustained for long nor could they secure
the support from Muslims in other states. This could be explained first by
the dispersal of the population of Muslims and Urdu speakers in several
states. Oommen (1997b:158) explains it in terms of the disjuncture between
Urdu and Islam that has further muted the possibility of Urdu nationalism
emerging as an authentic force in independent India. In this case while
Islam remains a unifying factor for Muslims throughout India, they cannot
be similarly united on the basis of a common language, Urdu. Apart from
this fact, there is no ideological consensus among the Muslims on how to
present the issue of Urdu and there is no strong leadership or organization to
227
do that. The 'secular' Muslims and the Ulama's presentation of the issue of
Urdu are completely at variance. While the Ulama still prefer to promote
Urdu exclusively as a Muslim identity, 'secular' Muslims seek to emphasize
the composite culture of India, though their approaches are similarly
motivated by the desire to uphold the Muslim cultural distinctiveness.
Another reason why Urdu movement cannot be sustained is the lack of goal
orientation as was the case during the colonial period. Instrumentally they
can ask at most for the second (official) status in the states or better
educational facilities where Urdu speakers are in substantial numbers.
Symbolically they can ask for the protection of Urdu so long as Urdu is not
identified as the language of Muslims only (Brass, 1975: 430). Thus this
movement led by Zakir Husain could not continue because Urdu was seldom
the main plank of any organized or sustained agitation by UP Muslims
(Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 183). According to Noorani (2003:20) what followed is
recorded in documents - speeches full of anguish at the plight of Urdu; a
succession of delegations and memoranda; and steady banishment of Urdu
as a medium of instruction at the school level in Uttar Pradesh.
In the early 70s, again Urdu speakers mounted renewed pressure on the
government through seminars, public meetings and petitions to the state
government. These demands received some attention from the central
government, which appointed the Gujral Committee to explore the problems
faced by Urdu speakers (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 183-4). The report made
recommendations in several fields including education and administration.
However the result as found by the Jafri Committee was that most of the
recommendation were not implemented even more than 15 years later ( Jafri
Committee Report).
Muslim legislators lobbied the government to push through the legi$lation,
but there was no sustained movement (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 184). The UP
228
Anjuman failed to exert any autonomous pressure on the ground to accord
Urdu its due, while in neighbouring Bihar the Anjuman conducted a
successful democratic movement for the recognition of Urdu and functioned
as an intermediary group in mobilizing voters and pressurizing the new
Bihar Government to act on its electoral promise (ibid.: 184-5).
Although the Urdu movement may have weakened, it does not necessarily
mean that the efforts were fruitless. The percentage increase between 1951
to 1961 in the number of Urdu speakers was 71.3 in India. Considering that
the percentage for all the languages in the same duration was 21.6 %,
possibly Urdu consciousness increased among the Urdu speakers (Pandey,
1997:85). Eventually Urdu acquired the second official language status in
UP in 1990, as we have seen above. There is no doubt that because of these
movements, Urdu started regaining some instrumental power, though in de
secularized form. The impact of this new power has however been slow and
not so obvious.
Although secular nationalists from among the Muslims insist that Urdu is
part of India's composite culture, they in fact are conscious of its unique
association with their identity. While it is true that Urdu is spoken by non
Muslims and is a symbol of composite Hindu and Muslim culture, it is a
special heritage of the Indian Muslims and that religious literature as well
as the cultural achievements of Indian Muslims are mostly in Urdu. Thus it
is not Hindu-Muslim unity which is threatened by the decline of Urdu, but
the cultural vitality and sense of identity of the Muslim community, which
the Muslim elite of north India wish to preserve and strengthen (Brass,
1975: 186-7).
There is almost a consensus among Muslims on this account. While
logically they are aware Urdu is not exclusively for Muslims, they have
greater emotional attachment to it than non-Muslim speakers of the
229
language do. Khalidi (1995:131-2) elaborates this view by stating that;
Few topics among Muslims invite such emotional outpouring as does Urdu. This is one of the few subjects over which there is near unanimity among "progressive", "moderate", "modernists" and "orthodox" Muslims. Among the progressive academics, Muhammad Mujib asserts that "stability and progress, national dignity and individual character all require that we should appreciate the true value oflndian Muslim culture and the Urdu language as the most precious heritage of our past and our greatest support in the future." A moderate and a modernist" like Sayyid Abid Husain opined "the learning of Urdu for Indian Muslims is not only a vital cultural but also a religious necessity ... It would be nothing less than intellectual and spiritual suicide to give up Urdu." Abid Husain's views do not seem greatly diferent from an "orthodox" Maulana Muhammad Ali Jawhar who "confessed in the end that Urdu is the irreducible minimum to which the most compromising Muslim would consent" The declining fortunes of Urdu were neatly summed up by a leading authority on Islam, Prof Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "the community is in danger of being deprived of its language, than which only religious faith is a deeper possession.
Since the association of Urdu with Muslims has never been in question,
anything that adversely impacts on Urdu is considered as an attack on the
Muslim community itself. It spurs the Muslims to seek to protect Urdu more
strongly. Thus it is assumed that to protect Urdu is equivalent to protecting
Muslim identity.
The efforts to safeguard Muslim identity through the establishment of Urdu
medium schools, the demand for grant of official status for Urdu, signature
campaigns or memoranda and seminars, all constitute a modified post
independence Urdu movement. It is different from the pre-independence
movement that aimed to separate Muslims from non-Muslims and led to the
creation of Pakistan.
In addition the Urdu movement or Urduisation of non-Urdu speaking
Muslims can be understood as a part of Islamization or Islamic revivalism.
Singh (1994:76-7) elaborates that; Islamization, in the form of religious revivalism, distantiated Muslims from the cultural ties existing with Hinduism, and the increased identity conscious and political mobilization of the community was the normal sociological process for this minority group under type of political and sociRl situations to which it was exposed after the partition. Some of the studies which are available on this problem suggest that Islamization, in the form of a solidaristic movement reinforcing communal, cultural and political
230
consciousness, is going on among the Muslims in India.
This increased tendency towards horizontal consolidation of ranks is
triggered by the threat to the group. Culturocide, Oommen (1990:59) says,
can be one of the major reasons for t:PJs consolidation. Culturocide according
to Oommen describes a situation of cultural annihilation. Singh (2000: 145)
notes that during the first decade following independence Muslim identity in
India could be characterized as being involuted and repressed. It was during
this period that Muslim leadership was co-opted in the system to help
formulate language policy. Institutional apparatuses were created to
promote Urdu both as a literary heritage and as an element in the
edu<'..ational and administrative processes in India. Probably because of the
peculiar identity crisis from which Muslims and their leadership were going
through, they became acutely self-conscious in their responses to formulate
and follow-up a vigorous policy for promotion of Urdu. Thus the feeling of
general relative deprivation reinforces the issue of language as an element in
Muslim identity. Identity being a complex and composite phenomenon, the
perceptions of Muslims about the present neglect and decline of Urdu is
bound to constitute an organic element in the formation of their collective
identity (Singh, 2000: 153). This sense of neglect or discrimination can be
explained in factors like low representation of Muslims in various sections of
the administration, education, and employment. Other real or perceived
threats to Mus~s take the form of communal riots, 'minoritization' through
policies, 'culturocide' and so on. All these feelings of deprivation can be
understood by the Muslims as a threat to the group and may provoke strong
consciousness among them.
However this ideological commitment is not necessarily followed by the
practical commitment. Singh (2000: 142-3) explains that it is common
knowledge that members of elite and middle classes, while professing strong
231
verbal commitment or loyalty to a language of their community to derive
political or ideological support in behaviour, deviate markedly from such
norms when they send their own children to educational institutions where
the medium is a language of symbolic domination, e.g., Hindi or English for a
Urdu speech community. Such behavioural duplicity is a universal feature of
elite and middle classes in almost all marginalized speech communities.
After independence, especially in the northern parts of India, the upper and
middle class Muslims made verbal and ideological commitments to the
promotion of Urdu language without any practical commitment. The lower
class Muslims on the other hand made practical commitments with or
without ideological motivations by sending their children to Urdu medium
schools or madrasas, either because of religious reasons or financial reasons.
In an extensive survey of Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and
Maharashtra Farouqui (1994:784-5) discovered that there was not even a
single non-Muslim student enrolled for studying Urdu even as an optional
subject at the primary or secondary level, or opting for Urdu as the medium
of education. Furthermore he observed that most of the c:Pildren enrolled in
Urdu medium schools came from lower middle classes except in
Maharashtra where even middle class Muslims preferred Urdu education
unlike other states. This could be attributed to the business background of
middle class Muslims in Maharashtra that made Urdu medium education
more or less sufficient for their purposes apart from the relatively high
standards of Urdu medium education in the state.
In this way, it becomes clear that both instrumental (communicative and
not legitimacy) and symbolic power of Urdu have been maintained but at
different levels by the different classes. The upper and middle class Muslims
contribute ideologically while the lower classes contribute practically by
sending their children to Urdu medium schools. These complementary roles
232
give the impression of complete commitment of Muslims to Urdu as part of
their identity.
This partial commitment by different classes cannot however contribute to
the healthy promotion of Urdu and relations among Muslims. This is
because both the classes are only compelled by different circumstances to
seek the promotion of Urdu. The dual attitude of the Muslim elite and
middle class can be explained by two major factors.
Firstly once one belongs to a particular group, one is expected to accept the
identity of the group. In case the group has multiple identities, all aspects of
identity of the group are supposed to be accepted by members. Even if some
people may not accept some particular aspects of the group identity other
people outside the group are still likely to associate them with such
attributes. Thus people are compelled to behave or act according to
particular 'images' and expectations about their identities that are
structured by the social context or implied by the behaviours of others
(Weigert et al., 1986: 40). In this way the Muslim elite aim to maintain a
bridge i<?the Muslim community for their safety net, since they still feel
insecure being a minority in India, while at the same time they want to
retain access to certain standards of life through English education. Thus so
far as they are supporting Urdu even if it is just a verbal commitment, they
are a part of the group -and they can secure their places in the in-group.
At the same time, if they can promote Urdu, since Urdu is considered a
symbol of Muslim identity, it can be interpreted as an achievement for the
Muslim community itself. Thus demanding the second official language
status has more symbolic meaning for these people than the commitment to
use them in their daily life. Consequently even if second official status is
gained, it does not necessarily mean that they would send their children to
Urdu medium schools.
233
These educated Muslims' dual attitude influences non-Muslims and non
Urdu speakers' attitudes towards their cause. Since their outward/symbolic
commitment to Urdu language gives the impression of real or total
commitment, members of other communities continue to associate Urdu
exclusively with Muslim identity. This impression exists even within the
Muslim community in spite of the knowledge that inward or practical
commitment is not total. Within the community, this duplicity is often
challenged and leads to changes in in-group and out-group perceptions.
Since colonial period, Ashraf groups in north India have been considered as
superior among the Muslims. Farouqui (1995:93) observes that culturally,
north Indian Muslims always considered themselves different from Muslims
in the rest of the country. They also had a pronounced sense of superiority.
This cultural distance and the strong sense of superiority on the part of
north Indian Muslim$ became a great hurdle in linking them with south
Indian Muslims. Urdu has been one of the symbols appropriated to express
this notion of superiority.
There are studies that show that Urdu is treated as a status symbol among
Muslims. One of the famous cases is that of the Tyabji clan of Bombay. Along
with 'Ashrafzation' -the attempt to rise in the Muslim social status scale
through emulation of the life style of a higher classes, went 'Urduization', the '
replacement of the clan's original Gujarati tongue by the north Indian, and
largely Muslim, lingua franca of Urdu. This shift was already accomplished
through a Tyabji by family fiat in 1959. This decision stemmed from family
aspirations for all-India Muslim leadership (Wright, 1976: 227).
A field study among Calcutta's educated Bengali Muslim Middle class in
early 1970s indicates that the adoption of Urdu as their mother-tongue by
some Bengali Muslims and the familiarity of other Bengali-speaking
Muslims with the Urdu language reflected the importance of Urdu as a
234
means of communication within Calcutta's diverse Muslim population, as
well as the desire of respectable Bengali Muslims to identify with a language
and a literary culture which they considered to be the expression of Indian
Muslim culture and the Muslim community (Eade, 1983: 78). They could
claim prestige among fellow Bengali Muslims by speaking more
sophisticated Urdu and becoming acquainted with the rich heritage of Urdu
literature (ibid.: 66). This partly arose because the North Indian settlers
poured scorn on the 'unsophisticated' Urdu spoken by Bengali Muslims, even
those who were highly educated (ibid.: 69).
A study in the 1980s among the Dakkhini Urdu speakers in Mysore also
shows that the highly favourable attitude towards standard Urdu is in
consonance with its symbolic functions of identity and social status. As an
identity token standard Urdu is considered as an unequivocal symbol of
identity with Muslims in other parts of the country. 8imilarly, its acquisition
and use is considered as a mark of social status by all sectors of population,
though some groups emphasize its symbolic functions more than others (Dua,
1986: 75).
All these studies indicate that acquiring Urdu is the first step towards
Ashrafzation, followed by the ability to master 'sophisticated' or 'standard'
Urdu that determines people's positions in the Muslim social hierarchy.
Interestingly, the Ulama never sought to exclude non-Urdu speakers from
the Muslim community (Brass, 1996: 90), though Muslims themselves
started using Urdu to assess fellow Muslims whether they were Muslim
enough or not. Thus sharing the same identity does not mean equality and
homogeneity in society.
6.34 Muslim Identity: Interpretations by Others
Although there are internal differences among the Muslims including their
commitments to Urdu, there is only one common manner of interpretation of
235
their identity especially by people outside their community. This
interpretation is that Urdu is an exclusive symbol of Muslim identity in
India.
In this case even the Muslim demand for just and due recognition of Urdu
within the Indian Union is always interpreted as a challenge against Hindi
and Hindus. Khalidi (1995: 142-3) provides an explanation of how others,
especially Hindus, would interpret Muslims' attitudes and movements thus;
... the leadership of the Anjuman-i Tarraqi-yi Urdu, the main organization promoting the cause of Urdu, made the strategic error of demanding second official language status for Urdu in many states, instead of making the minimal demand- given the anti-Urdu climate -for the provision of teaching of Urdu as a required subject from primary through secondary school. The Anjuman officials argue that the demand for Urdu's recognition as the second oflicial language was made only to secure arrangement for the teaching of Urdu in school and for no other reason. The Anjuman did not realize that any demand for Urdu's official recognition would be seen as demand for a new Pakistan and would not be conceded. The leadership of the Anjuman failed to understand that demands such as the inclusion of Urdu in official signboards, use of Urdu in courts and administration were all demands of secondary importance.
This clearly shows the differences in perceptions between these two
communities. While, logically speaking, the Anjuman's demand is not
certainly unreasonable, it is take as an extraordinary favour, even as a
threat, by the strong Hindi supporters and from a 'Hindu' perspective. Thus
the second status is interpreted as of immense importance, even if there is a
huge margin between Hindi and Urdu speakers and thus no damage could be
done to the Hindi speakers. During the controversies arising out of the states
reorganization of 1956, writing to the chief ministers Nehru pointed out that;
The position of Hindi is absolutely assumed all over India. No language can rival it as an all India language, though no doubt the great provincial languages will play their full part in their respective regions. Urdu cannot possibly come in the way of the advance of Hindi. Why do some people in their misguided enthusiasm try to suppress Urdu. Millions of people in India speak Urdu or the variation of Hindi, which is called Urdu, and use the Urdu and Persian script. All these will necessarily have to learn Hindi and the Devanagari script. But they treasure Urdu as they are fully entitled to do. Memories are short and perhaps f~w people remember the great stress that Gandhiji laid on the question of Hindi and Urdu. It is true that conditions have changed since then, but basic principles do not change. We encourage
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the smallest tribal language in its own area, but many of us resent even the mention of Urdu, and yet Urdu is very much a child oflndia and is a vital and graceful aspect of our many sided culture (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 180).
This gives an insight into how the state governments through their policies
suppressed Urdu. The negative action which was taken against Urdu
especially in UP was therefore an outcome of 'their' interpretations and
perceptions of history. Government policy encouraged the identification of
Urdu with Muslims by refusing to support Urdu and thus forcing its
advocacy on the minorities (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 187). At the same time,
regarding Muslims as a single constituency on the same issue (negative use
of Urdu) repeai;edly makes Muslims feel more and more insecure and aware
that they are a religious minority and confirms that Urdu is an exclusively
Muslim issue. Due to this affirmation ofUrdu-Muslim connection, giving any
status or safeguard to Urdu (positive use of Urdu) provokes anti-Urdu and
Muslim sentiments among some Hindi supporters. Negative reactions from
Hindus in this way become a further confirmation of the identification of
Urdu with Muslims. In other words, the issues related to Urdu, like
protection, status etc. are considered to be of significant symbolic importance
for the relations between Muslims and Hindus. There are many people from
both communities that seek to emphasize the secular side of this issue but
because of lack of an effective method to present it, their voices are not heard.
The extreme and de-secularized perspectives on these issues are always
connected with the history of independence struggle in India. A typical
example of this 'image' is portrayed in the comment of Home minister
Charan Singh in the Illustrated Weekly of India, 29 January 1978. He says
that;
You have referred to my remarks about Urdu being one of the principal causes of partition. The relative emphasis on the various causes that contributed to the partition of the country can be a matter of opinion. But it is a fact of history that one of the main reasons why the Muslim League and the late Jinnah Sahib insisted on Pakistan was their preference to have Urdu not only as their medium of instruction but as their official language. Indeed, Urdu
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was identified by the Muslim League and the late Jinnah Sahib as one of the factors, which made the Hindus and the Muslims two separate nations. The familiar argument of identifying the separate entity of a people as a separate nation relies heavily on the differences in their languages (Noorani, 2003: 336).
As we have seen in the previous chapters, though Urdu was incorporated
into the ideology of Pakistan and used as a symbol of Pakistan movement, it
was not the primary cause of two-nation theory. By emphasizing that Urdu
led to the partition of India because the separate entities, Muslims and
Hindus, relied on their languages to express their identities as separate
nations, Charan Singh affirms that Urdu is still a distinguishing factor
between them. He goes further to say that; ... as a language, Urdu should have no religious overtones because it is a medium of communication of Hindus and Muslims alike. Unfortunately, however, Muslims of the Hindi region do continue to identify Urdu with their religion. And it is this attitude which creates problems (ibid.).
Charan Singh refers to the script in which Urdu is written to emphasize
its differences with Hindi. He insists that this script is Persian in origin and
is, therefore, essentially alien to India. An unfortunate corollary according to
him was that the Muslims somehow came to identify themselves with the
script rather than with the content of the language (ibid.).
This argument is to a largely extent valid. Most Muslims seek to retain the
Persian script because it is supposed to give an authentic Islamic character
to Urdu language.
6.35 Differentiation and Exclusion
Devaluing Others' Cultures
While the stress of authenticity and glorification is given to Hindi as
'standard' Indian language, Urdu is devalued. Some examples can be cited to
illustrate this phenomenon.
Firstly Hindi and Urdu are always through the differences between them
rather than their similarities. After independence, the differences have been
emphasized more by the Hindus than by the Muslims while the reverse was
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the case before independence. Hasan, Zoya (1998: 181) notes that the choice
between Urdu and Hindi was presented as a choice between Hindustani and
Islam, nationalism and foreignness. From this point of view, P. D. Tan don
declared on 15th June 1948 in Sultanpux that the Muslims must stop talking
about a culture and civilization foreign to Indian culture and genius. They
should accept Indian culture. One culture and one language would pave the
way for real unity. To him, Urdu symbolized a foreign culture. Hindi alone
could be the unifying factor for all the diverse forces in the country (Khalidi,
1995: 138).
Secondly, Pant regarded Urdu as a language of poetry and literature, which
was not suitable for the conduct of official business (Hasan, 1998: 181).
Thirdly, Sampurnanand considered Urdu 'unnational if not anti-national'
and regarded it as the 'language of bazaar' (ibid.). Later he wrote in his
memoirs; My views have remained constant all through. I do not consider Urdu a separate language but merely a-style of Hindi in which words of Arabic and Persian derivation form a high percentage. I do not consider this style suitable for adoption as the official form of the national language. But I am not an enemy of it. In no country can the language of the bazaar serve as the nation's national language. Th give Urdu such a status would be a 'great insult' to the common people. By calling the language Hindustani the injustice could not be removed, but a fraud would be perpetrated on the people* (Hasan, 1998: 181-2).
This is how they disqualified Urdu in both instrumental and symbolic terms.
This ethnocentric attitude of the strong Hindi supporters was noteworthy
especially in UP. While devaluing Urdu, they simultaneously confirmed that
Urdu was part of Muslim identity.
Sankritization
While some non-Muslims were devaluing Muslims they at the same time
tried to separate and differentiate themselves from Muslims. The issue of
script, strengthened by the heavily Sanskritized form of Hindi was a clear
indication of separation, though this happened to even Urdu during pre-
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colonial period. The heavily Persianized form of Urdu was used as a means of
differentiation by the elite Muslim during that time. The language of the elite, then, was 'correct' while country dialects were 'wrong'. Such prescriptivism was obviously a boundary marker, an elitist symbol, a means of distinguishing the elite from the non-elite but it was taken as being intrinsically elegant, desirable, and superior. Norms of correctness were, indeed, used to suppress the common peoples' voice and even petitions written in the 'vulgar tongue' were rejected by the parliament in England (Rahman, 1999: 7).
The manipulation of language in this way has remained a common practice
even today. Thus an interest group is the one that creates the 'standard'.
Such standards do not however remain fixed forever. Language keeps
changing its structure, in terms of the vocabulary, meaning or grammar.
Since language by itself does not change, again interest groups are the ones
that create changes. Singh (2000: 132) also observes that it is the interest
groups that play a significant role in constructing myths and such myths
become the standards.
According to Cooper, changing the vocabulary of already existing standard
language is 'purification' and the process of purification is not a
standardization but re-standardization (Cooper, 1989: 154). Cooper
continues to say that;
The renovated language fulfills no new communicative functions. But if the new forms carry out old communicative functions, they also contribute to the nonlinguistic goals which motivated the linguistic renovation, whether the legitimation of new elite, the discrediting of old ones, the mobilization of political support, or the raising of consciousness. Whereas modernization permits language codes to serve new communicative functions, renovation permits language codes to serve old function in new ways (ibid.).
The interest elite group gains something from this re~ovation, whether in
the name of efficiency, aesthetics, or national or political ideology (ibid.).
Brass (1996:99) notes that when symbols (here the renovated language) are
brought especially into the political arena, it is likely that a particular elite
stands to gain from their use.
Thus symbol manipulation includes the manipulation of the structure of the
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language itself apart from the myth-making of language as a symbol. For
example this attempt at renovation for the non-linguistic goals, although it
may look as a purely linguistic phenomenon by the renovators and their
supporters, also happened to Urdu language during the colonial period.
Rahman (1999:9) explains that; The purpose Persianized Urdu served was that it became a maker of elitist identity for upper class (sharilj Muslims who felt politically impotent and threatened by the overwhelming majority of Hindus around them ... , from which the Muslims sought to be different and considered themselves superior. The new Urdu was, therefore, an identity maker, a badge of distinction, for the im.porverished sh!zrafa (gentlemen) of northern India who had little more than culture to fall back upon.
The concept of correctness was clearly based on the speech of the Muslim
elite. Thus it was applied as a strategy to discriminate against Hindus.
Among Muslims too one had to belong to Dellii or Lucknow. Even in these
.:!ities one had to belong to certain - generally Muslim - Sharif localities
(ibid.: 9-10).
This attempt at separation from others by making standard or pure
language can be seen even today, now among the Hindi supporters rather
than Urdu supporters. In this context Das Gupta (1970: 139) observes that
the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, after the consitution became effective, began a
systematic campaign to identify the official Ifindi with Sanskritized Hindi.
Rahman (1999:225) also notes that such actions help interest groups to
legitimize their rule through the symbol of the 'standard naticnal' language
because the legitimacy of the state itself gets transformed to that of language.
'Standard' therefore serves to confer authority and legitimacy on elitist
power, elitist institutions, and elite culture. They are seen as being
intrinsically superior rather than being powerful (ibid.: 164).
However in this case, the Sanskritization of Hindi was not just a matter of
legitimation because this interest group had another motive. Hasan, Zoya,
(1998: 188) argues that;
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The expansion of Hindi has occurred mainly through Sanskritization and a sharp disassociation of the written from spoken form which is closer to Hindustani, separating it increasingly from written Urdu whichc has developed through Persianization. Government poliey thus made Hindi a Hindu affair and Urdu a Muslim affair. Both developments reinforced the process of linguistic growth and conflict intersecting and overlapping with Hindus and Muslim religious revivalism.
Thus in this process, because of the connection of Persian with Urdu and
Sanskrit with Hindi, the issue of script was automatically incorporated and
connected with the language issue itself.
Summary
This chapter has examined the pattern of reconstitution of Muslim identity
on the basis of a common language, Urdu. It has been observed that the idea
behind this shift in ideology from the erstwhile Pakistan movement has been
to try and fit into the new socio-political circumstances. Unlike the pre
independence identity claims, this is mainly influenced by the challenge
from the rival community namely Hindus to the Muslims to demonstrate
their loyalty to India and show their commitment to the policy of secular
nationalism.
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