South African Instit
ute of Inte
rnat
iona
l Affa
irs
African perspectives. Global insights.
China in Africa Project
O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 1 6
China’s Growing Involvement in Chad: Escaping Enclosure?
M a y 2 0 1 2
R o m a i n D i t t g e n & D a n i e l L a r g e
A b o u t S A I I A
The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record
as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,
non-government think-tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into
public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs
with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research
excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers
present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in
Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good
governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;
and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the
environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about
SAIIA’s work.
A b o u t t h e C h I N A I N A F R I C A P R o J e C t
SAIIA’s ‘China in Africa’ research project investigates the emerging relationship between
China and Africa; analyses China’s trade and foreign policy towards the continent; and
studies the implications of this strategic co-operation in the political, military, economic and
diplomatic fields.
The project seeks to develop an understanding of the motives, rationale and institutional
structures guiding China’s Africa policy, and to study China’s growing power and influence
so that they will help rather than hinder development in Africa. It further aims to assist African
policymakers to recognise the opportunities presented by the Chinese commitment to the
continent, and presents a platform for broad discussion about how to facilitate closer
co-operation. The key objective is to produce policy-relevant research that will allow Africa
to reap the benefits of interaction with China, so that a collective and integrated African
response to future challenges can be devised that provides for constructive engagement
with Chinese partners.
A ‘China–Africa Toolkit’ has been developed to serve African policymakers as an
information database, a source of capacity building and a guide to policy formulation
SAIIA gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the main funders of the
project: The United Kingdom Department for International Development and the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency.
Project leader and series editor: Dr Chris Alden, [email protected]
© SAIIA May 2012
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Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.
A b S t R A C t
Relations between Chad and China have expanded and deepened since diplomatic
ties were resumed in August 2006. Growing links have been underpinned by Chinese oil
development operations, epitomised by the Rônier refinery project. This symbolises China’s
ascendancy in Chad following N’Djamena’s rejection of its relations with the World Bank-
led Chad–Cameroon pipeline project. Despite recent turbulence, oil investment looks set
to play the key part in China’s continuing engagement in Chad and enhance the potential
for stimulating economic growth, despite severe constraints and ongoing challenges. By
investing in a refinery, and dealing with N’Djamena in a different way from the conditionality
heavy approach of recent Western engagement, China has embarked on an innovative
intervention of increasing importance in Chad. This is seen in the appropriation of China
by the Chadian leadership under President Idriss Déby as a means to promote a range of
social goals related to the domestic political objectives of his regime. However, tensions
remain within the terms of the newly forged partnership. Whether China can follow
through on and sustain its present engagement, and enable Chad to escape its historical
confinement amidst chronic underdevelopment and protracted insecurity, remains to be
seen.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o R S
Romain Dittgen is a PhD candidate and assistant lecturer in human geography at the
University of Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne).1
Daniel Large is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute. His publications include Sudan Looks East:
China, India and the Politics of Asian Alternatives (Oxford: James Currey, 2011), co-edited
with Luke Patey.2
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C H I N A I N A F R I C A P R O J E C T
A b b R e v I A t I o N S A N d A C R o N y m S
CAMC ChinaCAMCEngineeringCoLtd
CAR CentralAfricanRepublic
ChinaEximBank Export–ImportBankofChina
CNPC ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation
CNPCIC ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationInternationalChad
DPP DemocraticProgressiveParty(Taiwan)
FOCAC ForumonChina–AfricaCooperation
GRAMP-TC GroupedeRecherchesalternativesetdeMonitoringduprojet
pétroleTchadCameroun
JEM JusticeandEqualityMovement(Darfur)
MINURCAT UNMissionintheCentralAfricanRepublicandChad
MW megawatt
MOFCOM MinistryofCommerce(China)
OHADA OrganizationfortheHarmonizationofBusinessLawinAfrica
OPIC OverseasPetroleumInvestmentCorporation
PRC People’sRepublicofChina
SHT SociétédesHydrocarburesduTchad(HydrocarbonCompany
ofChad)
SOE state-ownedenterprise
SRN SociétédeRaffinagedeN’Djamena(N’DjamenaRefineryCompany)
C H I N A ’ S G R O W I N G I N V O L V E M E N T I N C H A D : E S C A P I N G E N C L O S U R E ?
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I N t R o d u C t I o N
“Openingupinordertomovecloser”3
(ToumaïAirChad)
TheresumptionofofficialtiesbetweenN’DjamenaandBeijinginAugust2006setthe
stageforanexpansionoftheChineseengagementinChad.Comingasitdidinthe
midstofamilitaryinsurgencyaimedatoverthrowingthelongstandingleader,IdrissDéby,
andhisgovernment’sdecisiontoabandontheWorldBank’sconditionalitiesdesignedto
allocateoilrevenuesforsocialdevelopment,itseemedaninauspiciousfoundationfor
anewrelationship.However,despitethesecontroversialbeginningrelations,Chadand
Chinahavebeguntodevelopstrongeconomicties.TheimpactofChineseinvestment
intheoilsectorinparticularlookssettobecomeanevenmoreimportantpartofChad’s
domesticpoliticsandforeignrelationsinfuture.
AlthoughChina’sattentionisnotdirectedsolelytowardstheextractivesector,the
interestoftheChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation(CNPC)inoildevelopmentis
neverthelessattheheartofthecurrentChineseinvolvementinChad.Thelatteronly
joinedtheclubofoil-producingcountriesin2003.Aconsortium,ledbytheUSmajoroil
companyExxonMobil,hasbeenoperatingoilconcessionsnearDoba,southernChad.In
manyrespects,thisconsortium–inwhichtheMalaysiancompanyPETRONASoperatesa
30%stake,togetherwithExxonMobil(40%)andChevron(30%)–hasestablishedasetof
referencesintermsofmanagementandinstitutionalframeworkandhascreatedastrong
legacy.TheCNPCmayhavebeenanewcomertoChad’soilsectorbutenteredanindustry
withahistoryandprior-establishedsetofactorsperceivedashavinga‘Western’character.
Thefirstproject,supportedbytheWorldBankandimplementedbytheExxonMobil-led
consortium,hasincludedtheconstructionofa1 070-kilometrepipelineconnectingthe
oilfieldsaroundDobawiththeKribiharbourinCameroon.In2004,followingawrangle
withtheChadiangovernmentovertheuseofoilrevenues,theWorldBankpulledout
oftheDobaproject.Comparedwiththis‘Western’experience,theexistingandrelatively
newChineseoildevelopmentproject,knownasRônier,isquitedifferent,notonlyin
termsofscope(dailyproductionbeingsignificantlylower)butaboveallwithregardsto
theobjectivespursued.TheCNPC’sengagementispursuingtheintegrationofChad’s
upstreamanddownstreampetroleumindustry,addingacompletelynewdimensiontothe
industryandtheChadianeconomymoregenerally.
Incontrasttootherinternationalprotagonists,whichsofarhaveshunnedinvesting
inChad,4China is starting tomultiplyvariousprojectson thegroundaspartofan
expandinganddeepeningengagement.Althoughtheoilsectorremainsthefocalpointof
interest,thereareadditionaldynamicsworthmentioning.IncreasingnumbersofChinese
enterprises,aswellas independentmigrants,havestarted toestablish themselves in
Chad,creatingparalleldynamicsontheground.Hence,thisdemonstratesamorediverse
ChineseengagementinChadthatcannotbereducedmerelytoChina’sforeignpolicy.
Infact,Chadhasbeenasalientexperimentineffortstopromoteaprogressiveagenda
formanagingtheoilindustryviatheambitiousChad–Cameroonpipeline.Byincludinga
refinerycomponent,China’soilroleappearstodepartinitsambitionandinitiativesfrom
theDobaexperience.ItalsoseemstoempowerPresidentDéby’srulingregime,which,
since2006,seemstohaveincorporatedBeijingintoitsdomesticagenda,firstlythrough
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C H I N A I N A F R I C A P R O J E C T
theshort-termimperativesrelatedtotheChad–Sudanproxyconflictandmorerecently
through new development ambitions into which China has become more centrally
co-optedoverashortperiodoftime.
OfferingananalysisofChad’sgrowinglinkswithChina,thepaperarguesthatrelations
havedevelopedimportantlyinarelativelyshortspaceoftime,aprocessthathasseen
Chinabecomemore involvedandsignificantwithinChadiandomesticpolitics.The
coreofChina’sengagementistheRônierproject,adomesticoil-productionunit.This
appearstoenableneweconomicopportunitiesforChad,eventothepointofwidening
thecountry’sindustrialpotential,andrepresentsanotabledeparturefromChad’sprevious
experienceofforeignoilinvestment.InspiteofChad’schallengingbusinessenvironment,
relationslooksettodeepenaseffortsaremadetopursueanambitioussetofinfrastructure
andotherventures.
ThepaperfirstoutlinestheChadiancontext,atnationalandregionallevels,inorder
tolocateChina’sengagementappropriately.BecauseChina’seconomicengagementin
Chadisstructuredmostlyaroundoilinterests,thesecondsectionexaminesthedifferent
dimensionsofthe‘Rônier’project,theapparentbasisoffurtherChineseinvolvementin
Chad,andregardedastheenablingfoundationforawidersetofeconomicrelationsbased
uponlong-termengagement.Recentdevelopments,however,haverevealedthefirstsigns
ofdiscordbetweentheChineseandtheChadiangovernments.Thelastsectionreviews
thedifficultyofreconcilingPresidentDéby’ssocialambitionswiththeCNPC’seconomic
constraints, indicating Chinese companies’ increasing concern about the economic
viabilityoftheirprojects.
t h e C o N t e X t
Chadremainsatthebottomofdatasetsofworlddevelopmentandbusinessindicators.5
Overall,andfollowingarecenthistoryofconflict,Chadis far frombeingabusiness
environmentattractivetoforeigninvestment.This is linkedpartlytohighelectricity
pricesandthelackofbasicinfrastructure.Withthisinmind,thegovernmentandthe
ChadianpopulationhavefairlyhighexpectationsthattheChinese-builtoilrefinerycan
beameanstoescapethecountry’sgeographicallylandlockedenclosurebydeveloping
domesticrefiningcapacityandenhancingself-sufficiency.6
AlthoughparallelswithotherexamplesofChinese involvement inAfricacanbe
drawn,notablyconcerningtheentanglementofpoliticalandeconomicconstituentsin
countriesasdiverseastheSudansandZambia,Chadstilloffersanumberofunique
attributes.ConsideringthatChadisnotastrategicpriorityforChineseattention,does
thisinfluencethewayitsengagementunfoldsinacountryof‘intermediate’importance?
Followingtheambivalentresultsof theDobaexperience,aprojectpredictedtohelp
alleviatepoverty,7towhatextentcanthecurrentChineseventurechangetheoddsin
Chad?BeyondtheirinitialdecisiontoinvestinChad,thequestionthatemergesishow
andinwhatwaysChinesebusinessesmanagetheirinvestmentinahigh-riskenvironment.
Consequently,theobjectiveistoanalysethevariousdynamics,aswellasthedevelopment
opportunities,underlyingtherecentandemergingrelationsbetweenChinaandChad.8
C H I N A ’ S G R O W I N G I N V O L V E M E N T I N C H A D : E S C A P I N G E N C L O S U R E ?
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C h A d R e t u R N S t o C h I N A : t A I W A N A N d A F t e R
Untilitre-establishedrelationswiththePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC)inAugust2006,
Chad’srelationshadbeenrelativelyminorandnon-strategic,owingtoacombinationof
Chad’spost-colonialhistoryandChina’sownlimitedengagementintheregionbeforeits
morerecentexpansionofrelationswithAfricaoverthepastdecadeinparticular.Although
Chad’scolonialhistoryunderFranceformallyendedwithitsindependenceon11August
1960,theimpoverishedcountryenteredaphaseofprotractedcivilwarswithimportant
regional andgeopoliticaldimensions. Itwas in this context thatChadand thePRC
formallyestablisheddiplomaticrelationsin1972.Chinaundertookanumberofassistance
projectsindifferentpartsofthecountry,suchasricecultivationinsouth-westernChad
andtheconstructionofahospital,palaceandstadiuminN’Djamena.
In1997thegovernmentofChadrecognisedTaipei followingaperiodofmoving
betweenChinaandTaiwan.Chadthusbecamecaughtupincross-straitsChina–Taiwan
tensionsasplayedoutinAfrica.Priortoitsswitch,therewerecertainlinksbetween
N’DjamenaandBeijing, includingavisit toChinaby IdrissDéby in1994.The then
Chineseforeignminister,QianQichen,signedaneconomicco-operationagreementin
ChadinJanuary1996,andChad’spresidentvisitedBeijinginJuly1997.Nonetheless,
inAugust1997,ChadrecognisedTaipeiandreceivedaloanof$125 million.Asaresult,
ChinabrokeoffallformalpoliticalandeconomicrelationswithChad.
Chad’sswitchbacktoBeijingon6August2006wasabrupt.Itcame,however,asa
resultofvariousinternalpressuresfacingPresidentDébyinthecontextofaseriesof
interlockingconflictsinthegreaterChad–Darfurregion,includingaproxywarbetween
ChadandSudan.Thoughinitiallyclose(KhartoumhavinghelpedColonelDébycometo
powerinthefirstplaceinDecember1990),relationsbetweenKhartoumandN’Djamena
haddegeneratedandcametobecharacterisedbyapatternofmutualinterventionand
destabilisation,withbothregimessponsoringproxyrebelmovementstoopposeeach
other.The conflict that escalated inDarfur afterApril 2003had important regional
dimensions.PresidentDéby,himselfsupportingsuchgroupsastheJusticeandEquality
Movement(JEM)fightingagainstKhartoum,feltparticularlythreatenedbyrebelsbacked
bythegovernmentofSudan.UnderPresidentOmaral-Bashir,Sudanhadbeensupported
byChinainmultifacetedways,especiallyfollowingtheCNPC’sentryintoSudanin1995.
TheseincludedaprogrammeofmilitaryassistancetoKhartoum,whichinevitablybecame
involvedinthefightinginDarfurand,bynaturalextension,Chad.
InjustifyinghisreturntoChina,PresidentDébyreportedlyexplainedtotheTaiwanese
president, Chen Shui-bian, leader of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
thatbecauseoftheseriousnessofthecivilunrestcausedbytherebels,hehadtomake
compromiseswiththeChinesegovernment‘forthesurvival’ofChad.Thecontinuation
ofhisregime,inotherwords,necessitatedatacticalshift:recognisingBeijingwouldbring
myriadshort-andlonger-termadvantages.9PresidentDébystoodtobeempoweredbythe
certaintyofaid,thelikelihoodofinvestment,andmilitaryassistancefromapermanent
memberoftheUNSecurityCouncilthatcouldserveasaninternationalally.Chinaalso
happenedtobeKhartoum’skey internationaleconomicpartnerandpoliticalpatron,
aswellasimportantmilitaryally.Inthisrespect,Déby’sgambitwasinspired:among
otherthings,itunblockedChina’soppositionattheUNandallowedChadtodiscussits
problemswithSudanwithChina.10
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LosingChadinAugust2006wasamajorsetbackforTaiwaninAfrica.Incontrast
toTaiwan’sother fewremainingAfricanallies,Chadrepresentedstrongpotential in
termsofresources.WinningbackChadwasanimportantachievementfortheChinese
government,especiallyasthiscamenotlongbeforeitsthirdForumonChina–Africa
Cooperation(FOCAC 3)inBeijinginNovember2006andwasanimportantvictory
against DPP-governed Taiwan. However, despite the diplomatic gains, Beijing was
suddenlyfacedwithachangedregionalpoliticalandsecuritycalculus.Ithadtoconfront
theawkwardnewcomplexitiesandpotentiallydamagingcontradictionsofsupporting
twoneighboursseekingtopromoteregimechangevis-à-viseachotherand,byextension,
threateningChina’sestablishedinterestsinSudanandanyeffortstobuildnewonesin
Chad.
Chad’s relations with Beijing subsequently strengthened, and saw N’Djamena
participate in FOCAC 3. The then Chinese foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, visited
N’DjamenainJanuary2007toopentheChineseembassyandannounceanassistance
package. President Déby undertook a state visit to Beijing in September 2007,
accompaniedbyafullministerialdelegation.11HemetPresidentHuJintaoandPremier
WenJiabao,dutifullyexpressinghisoppositiontosecessionistactivitiesbyTaiwanand
support for theone-Chinapolicyaspartof solemnvows tomaintaina longer-term
relationshipwiththemainland.TheChadianpresidentalsometCaoGangchuan,China’s
defenceministerandvicechairmanoftheCentralMilitaryCommission,andthetwo
countriesagreedtoincreasemilitaryco-operationbetweentheirarmedforces.12Escorted
byWangYingwu,China’sambassadortoChad,DébyalsovisitedtheCNPCheadquarters.
Relationshavealsofeaturedhigh-levelexchangesbetweenotherimportantfiguresinthe
Chineseleadership,includingthosecentraltoitsenergysecurityconcerns,notablyZhou
Yongkang,theCentralCommitteeleaderofChina’spowerfulCommunistPartyofChina
andformerCNPCgeneralmanagerwithlongstandingandinfluentialinvolvementin
Sudan.13InFebruary2011theChineseforeignminister,YangJiechi,visitedN’Djamena.
TogetherwithPresidentDéby,heattendedthefoundation-layingceremonyofChad’s
newparliament,whichisbeingbuiltwithChineseassistance(Chad’sNationalAssembly
buildinghavingbeendestroyedin2008bySudan-backedrebels).
China’s elevated importance to Déby from 2006–11 demonstrates an important,
ongoingshiftinthedomesticroleoftheChineseengagementinChad:fromashort-term
tacticalimperative,China’sroleinDéby’sagendahasalreadybecomemorecentralinand
importanttothelonger-termpoliticsofhisregime.Effectivelyresortingtoaresource-
backedstrategyofChineseassistance,DébythuscampaignedintheApril2011elections
asChad’ssocialarchitect-in-chief,inanapparentcaseofChinabeingincorporatedinto
Déby’sdomesticpolitical strategies through thedeliveryof a rangeofdevelopment
projectstoconfirmandenhancethelegitimacyofhisrule.14
G R o W I N G e C o N o m I C t I e S
Sincediplomatictiesresumed,andaccompanyingenhancedpoliticalrelations,economic
linksbetweenChinaandChadhaveincreased,atrendwhichismademanifestinthe
growingnumberofChinesecompaniesandindependentmigrantssettlinginthecountry.
ThemainareasofChineseeconomicactivityinChadcanbedividedintothreecategories:
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assistanceandaid,extractiveprojects,andsecondaryactivitiesdirectlyor indirectly
connectedtooneorseveralcoreinterests.
China’sgrowingeconomic linkswithChadhavecomeduringaperiodof recent
reformsgearedtowards improvingthecountry’sbusinessenvironment.15Asaresult,
economicrelationswithChinahavebecomemoreorganisedandstructured,notablyafter
theChina–ChadJointCommissiononCommerceandTrademetforthefirsttimeon
26April2010inN’Djamena.PresidedoverbyChina’svice-ministerofcommerce,Fu
Ziying,andChad’sforeignminister,MoussaFakiMahamat,thiswaslaudedasa‘milestone’
takingrelations‘intoanewera’.Fourpriorityareaswereidentified:implementingtheeight
newmeasuresoftheNovember2009FOCAC4andenhancingdevelopmentassistance
co-operation;strengtheningupstream–downstreamintegrationinthepetroleumindustry;
promotingcorporateexchangeandcommunicationtoincreasetrade;andensuringthe
safetyofChinesenationalsinChad.16
TheChinesemedicalandagriculturalprojectsare,forthemostpart,directlyconnected
toChina’sofficialprogrammeofbilateral assistance.Although tailored toChad, this
also falls within the general terms of China’s Africa relations, including its FOCAC
commitments.17China,forexample,carriedoutaprogrammeofdebtcancellationworth
some$34 million.In2010theFreedomHospitalrenovationprojectwasalsolaunchedin
N’Djamena,andisduetoreverttoitsformernameastheChad–ChinaFriendshipHospital.
Furthermore,sinceChinaismostlywillingtoengageinlargeinvestmentdeals,financial
backinghasbecomeincreasinglyimportant.InChad,theExport–ImportBankofChina
(ChinaEximBank)hasbeeninvolvedinmajorinvestmentprojects,togetherwithother
Chinesebanks.18ThemajorChinesetelecommunicationcorporationshavealsobecome
activeinChad,withHuaweiandZhongxinTelecom(ZTE)operatinginthecountry.19
ArelativelysmallbutgrowingnumberofChinesemigrantshavealsomadeatimid
appearance in N’Djamena and have started to become part of the capital’s evolving
landscape, althoughnot in anespeciallyprominentwayasyet. Suchentrepreneurial
businessactivitymostlyinvolvestheservicesectorandhasseentheopeningofrestaurants,
hotelsandmassageparlours.20Eventhoughthesepremisesremainlimitedinnumber,they
havenonethelessgainedincreasingvisibilityinacityofmorethanone millioninhabitants.21
DespitesuchindicationsofmorediverseChinesepresenceandengagementinChad,the
majorityofChineseinterestsremainmoreorlessdirectlylinkedtoextractiveactivities.
C h I N e S e o I L I N v e S t m e N t I N C h A d : t h e F I R S t P I e C e o F A G R o W I N G J I G S A W P u Z Z L e
AlmostimmediatelyaftertherestorationofSino–ChadiandiplomatictiesinAugust2006,
theChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationInternationalChad(CNPCIC)purchasedall
thesharesrelatedtoEncana’soilpermitinChad.22Havinginitiatedtheexpansionofits
operationsinChad,thisChineseoilinvestmentoffersarangeofsingularitiesforthehost
country.
The originality of the Rônier project primarily comes from its composition and
structure.Thismulti-facetedinvestmentisstructuredarounda311-kilometrepipeline
connectingtheoilfields,locatedintheBongorBasinineastern-centralChad,toarefinery
inDjarmaya,some50 kilometresnorthofthecapital.23Inordertoallowandpromote
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Chad’sparticipationinthisventure,ChinaEximBankgrantedaloan.Asaresult,through
itsnationaloilcompany,SociétédesHydrocarburesduTchad(SHT),theChadianstate
becamea40%shareholderoftheSociétédeRaffinagedeN’Djamena(N’DjamenaRefinery
Company),createdspecificallytomanagetherefinery,withtheremaining60%goingto
theCNPCIC.24Thecostoftheentireprojectwassetat$1 billionandhasbeenadvanced
entirelybytheChineseoilcompanyandChinaEximBank;one-halfforconstructing
therefinery,theotherfordevelopingtheoilfieldsandassociatedtransportinfrastructure.
Undertheguidanceandco-ordinationoftheChadProjectCompany,theparticipating
oilsub-contractingcompanies25andCNPCSoluxeInternationalcompletedtheoilfield
surfacefacilitiesandpipelineconstructioninjustfourandahalfyearsandlaunchedthe
projectintoproductionontime.ThevalveswereopenedinMarch2011,followednot
longafterwardsbytheinaugurationoftheconnectedrefineryinlateJune.
At the same time, thisChineseventurehasbeen influencedbyChad’sparticular
circumstances.Chadhasbeenproducingoilsince2003.FollowingtheDobaproject,
implementedbytheExxonMobil-ledconsortiumandinitiallysupervisedbytheWorld
Bank,Chadhasgainedafairamountofexperienceintheoilindustry.26Thisfirstproject,
whichrequiredamajorinvestment,27includedtheconstructionoftheChad–Cameroon
pipeline(Doba–Kribi)toanoffshoreterminal intheGulfofGuineaandiscurrently
producingabout130 000 barrelsperday.28
TheRônierproject,however,isconsideredtobetheoutstandingmarkerofChina’s
differentapproachinChadcomparedwiththeFrenchorUSengagements,whichhad
regardedthisinvestmentasunprofitable.29WhereasWesterninvolvementintheAfrican
oilsectorisusuallylimitedtoexportingrawcrude,ChineseoperatorsinChadofferthe
possibilityofdevelopingthehydrocarbonpotential,aswellasallowingforvalue-added
investment,inlinewithChad’snationalneeds.30TheChineserefineryinChadfollows
thatwhichwasbuiltnearKhartoumandcompletedin1999.Withinonlyafewyears,
ChinahasthusdevelopedintoamajorplayerinChad,undertakingadistinctivedeparture
fromChad’spreviousexperienceofinternationaloilinvestment.31TheCNPChasbecome
central to theChadiangovernment’soildevelopment strategy in away thatdeparts
significantlyfromN’Djamena’sprevioustroubledpartnershipswiththeWorldBankover
theChad–Cameroonpipeline.
TheenergyburdenhasplayedaveryimportantpartinlimitingChad’sdevelopment.
Theideaofacquiringarefinerydatesbacktothelate1970s,32nearlytwodecadesbefore
theoilvalvesinDobawerefirstopened.OwingtoChad’slandlockedposition,recurrent
supplydifficultiesfromNigeriaandproblemswithinthemanagementoftheenergysector,
thepriceofelectricityinChadisamongthehighestintheworld.Furthermore,beyond
N’Djamena,onlyahandfuloftownshavemoreorlessregularaccesstoelectricity.33This
structuralshortagehasbeenpartofthereasonwhy,sofar,thepossibilitiesofdeveloping
anyindustrialbaseinChadhavebeenseverelylimited.
ChinesepublicextractiveinvestmentinAfricahastendedtobestructuredas‘package
deals’.Infact,Chinesefirmshaveoftenusedthisapproach(andstilldo)towincontracts
andbecompetitive.IfthismethodappliesalsotoChad,thescenariohas,however,been
slightlydifferent.Atfirst,theCNPCdidnotnecessarilyseetheusein‘offering’toomuch,
aspotentialcandidatesinterestedinthispermitremainedmostlyabsent.Atthesametime,
sincethecurrentpartnershipwithBeijingisstillfairlyrecent,theChadiangovernment
hadtimetoobserve(fromadistance)howsuchprojectsunfoldinotherAfricancountries.
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ChadappealedtoChina’sgeneralwillingnesstocoverwideraspectsofextractiveprojects.
Asaresult,whentheCNPCboughtEncana’sshares,theChadianauthoritiesexhortedthe
Chinesecompanytoincludetherefinery.
Inorder to address theenergy shortage,ChinaEximBank, inco-operationwith
the Dutch firm Wärtsilä, is financing an electrification scheme to link N’Djamena
withDjarmaya, the siteof the refinery.TheChadiangovernmenthas topay30%of
XAF34 95 billion($185 million),therestwillbecomingfromChinaEximBank.TheChina
NationalMachineryandEquipmentImportandExportCorporationwillconstructthe
distributionnetworkandtransmissionlines,whichwillbelinkedtoanew60-megawatt
(MW)powerplantatFarcha.
Figure 1: Location of main Chinese and related activities in Chad and beyond
Source:DittgenR,2012.
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TheCNPCisengaginginaninnovativeinterventioninChad,butthescopeofthe
Rônierprojectremainsnonethelessquitesmall.AtthebeginningofproductioninMarch
2011,oilfieldcapacityamountedto20 000 barrelsaday,withapossibleincreaseofupto
60 000 barrels.Therefineryhasamaximumformalproductioncapacityof40 000 barrels
aday,althoughitwasonlyprocessinghalfthisamountatthisfirststage.35Onpaper,the
facilityisabletoannuallyproduceapproximately700 000 tonnesofpetrolandkerosene,
20 000 tonnesofdiesel,25 000 tonnesofpolypropylene,60 000 tonnesof liquefied
petroleumgasand40 000 tonnesofgasolinefuel.36Thecrudeissupplyingacentralpower
plant,expectedtoproduce40 MW.37Therefineryuseshalfthisamountofenergy;the
otherhalfgoestotheSociéténationaled’électricité,Chad’snationalelectricitycompany.
PresidentDébypubliclyforecastChad’s– oratleastN’Djamena’s –energyindependence,38
butthe20-MWcapacityofthispowerplantisclearlyfarfrombeingsufficienttosolve
thecountry’sstructuralproblems.Infact,thecapitalalreadyconsumes100 MWalone.
Nevertheless,thisinvestmentwillhelptoalleviateasaturatednetwork,atleastuntil
longer-termsolutionsarefound.39
Inmanyways,therefineryinDjarmayaalsoconstitutesaneuralgiccentreoffering
thepossibilityoffurtherinvestment.FollowingtheCNPC’soilengagement,Chadand
Chinahaveagreedtodevelopanindustrialpark.40Thecostforthisprojectamountsto
$150 milliontobeadvancedbySoluxeInternational,theChinesecompanyinchargeof
theimplementation.Theareawillcover25squarekilometresinalocationadjacenttothe
refinery.Intermsofbusinessandproducts,somefacilitieswillbeconnecteddirectlyto
therefiningprocess,whereasothers,merelybenefitfrompreferentialterms;notablythe
‘freezone’statusthattheparkwillenjoy,aswellastheavailabilityofenergy.Thisfuture
industrialcomplexwill,inotherwords,beinchargeoftransformingseveralby-products
fromtherefinery:includingvariousplasticgoods,polypropylenefibreandnaturalgas
bottlingfactories.Itisalsoprojectedthattherewillbecompaniesprovidingawiderange
ofactivitiessuchassolarenergy,drinkingwaterandelectricbicycles.41Althoughnot
restrictedtoChineseinvestment,todateonlyChinesecompanieshavecommittedto
developingoperationsinthepark.
OtherChineseprojectsarealsobeingdeveloped,someofwhicharemoreadvanced
thanothers.TheBaoréturnkeycementfactory,locatedinMayoKebbiWest,issecondto
theRônierprojectintermsofscaleandimportance.ChinaEximBankhasadvancedthe
fundingforthisprojectintheformofapreferentialloan.Theprojectisbeingimplemented
byChinaCAMCEngineeringCoLtd(CAMC),asubsidiaryofChinaNationalMachinery
IndustryCorporation.Owingtotheexpansionofroadandinfrastructuredevelopmentin
Chadinrecentyears,therehasbeenincreasingdemandforcementandinterestinoptions
tomanufacturethisdomestically.TheBaoréprojectisChad’sfirstcementfactoryandis
expectedtocutcostsforinfrastructureprojectsinthecountrybyreducingrelianceon
importsfromCameroon.42CAMCbrokegroundontheplantatBaoréinNovember2007
andproduction,whichhadaimedtodeliver200 000tonnesperyear,shouldhavestarted
inJuly2011butwasdelayed.43Accordingtosomesources,thereasonforthedelaywas
political.44However,othersclaimittohavebeenofatechnicalnature,45withanumberof
unresolvedproblemsremainingfortheplant.Oneseemstobelinkedtotheseparationof
theproject’smaincomponents;withcementproductionlocatedinthesouth-westofChad
butthestoragecomponentinAbéché(north-easternChad).Successoftheprojectisthus
dependentondevelopingthenecessarytransportinfrastructure.
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HavingaccesstocheaperfuelthankstotheRônierproject,inApril2011theChadian
government andCAMCsigned an agreementworth$919 million todevelop anew
internationalairportinDjarmaya.Thissite,whichissupposedtoinitiallyaccommodate
aboutone millionpassengersayear,willbeconnectedtoN’Djamenabya40-kilometre
highway,whichisalsoincludedintheproject.AccordingtoDjikoloum,thedeputy-
managingdirectorattheMinistryofPublicWorksandTransport,thereisstrongpotential
forthisinitiativetoestablisharegionaltransithubnexttothoseinAddisAbaba(Ethiopia)
andDouala(Cameroon).46Theairportshouldbeoperativeinfouryears’time,although
theexactlocationhasyettobeidentified.47
AnothertransportprojectaimstoconnectCameroon,ChadandSudanviaarailway
network.On14March2011,Chad’stransportminister,AdoumYounousmi,signeda
$7.3-billiondealwiththeChinaCivilEngineeringConstructionCorporationtobuild
a1 344-kilometrerailwaynetwork.ProjectedtobeChad’ssingle-largestinfrastructure
project, thefirststage is intendedto linkAbéchétoAdréontheborderwithSudan,
andMoundoutoNgaounderéon theborderwithCameroon;with thesecondphase
connectingMoundouwithN’DjamenaaswellasconnectingtheChadiancapitalwiththe
borderregions,notablywithAbéché(thirdphase).Aftercompletion,thefourthphase
aimstolinkAbéchéwithNyalainSudan.ItwillbefinancedbyChina’spolicybanksand
repaidbytheChadiangovernment,withoilofferingthepossibilitytodoso.48
TheseprojectsreflecttherapidandincreasingChineseinvolvementinChad.However,
theyalsobringaboutnumerouschallenges.Comparedwiththerecentnatureofthisform
ofengagement,therearestillanumberofquestionsthatremainunanswered.
S u C C e e d I N G A G A I N S t A L L o d d S ? o N G o I N G C h A L L e N G e S
FollowingthenearremovalbyrebelsofPresidentDébyfrompowerinFebruary2008,the
armedopponentsofhisregimeseemtohavelosttheirimpetusandrelationswithSudan
havebeenrestored.49Inrecenttimes,andincontrasttothemoreusualperceptionofthe
countryasafailedstate,boththelocalandtosomeextenttheinternationalpresshave
startedtoportrayChadasacountryonitswaytomorepeacefulpoliticalstability.Chad
maynotbecharacterisedasademocracy,butthenotionthattheregimeisstrongenough
toremainincontrolandprovidetherequiredconditionsforaviablebusinessenvironment
ismorewidespread.ThisisunderlinedpartlybyDéby’snewfoundambitiontodisplay
himselfasthearchitectofChad’sdevelopment,whiletryingtodistancehimselffromhis
‘warlord’image.ThischangecanbeseeninthewayDébyportrayshimselfonbillboards
andposters,manyofwhicharescatteredthroughoutN’Djamena.Inthepastheworea
uniformandwasoftensurroundedbyarmedsoldiers.Morerecentlyhehasswitchedto
civilianclothingandispicturedalone,withhiswifeoryoungChadians.Thecombined
messagealsoreflectsDéby’sself-proclaimedsocialturnandmessageofunity:‘Ensemble
pourleTchaddedemain’or‘togetherfortheChadoftomorrow’.
Thankstooilrevenues,theChadianregimeseemstohaverediscovereditstastefor
large-scaleprojects.Initiallythegovernmentdirectedthebulkoftheroyaltiestowards
maintainingstatesecurity(through,forexample,purchasingweapons,somethingthat
eventually contributed towards theWorldBank’s exit).Today,however, part of this
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income(theexactamountremainsunknown)isinvestedininfrastructureconstruction,
includingroads.
Fromashort-termstandpoint,thesituationinChadappearstobeimprovinggradually.
Thesocio-politicalcontext,however, ismuchmorecomplicatedandrendersaclear
distinctionbetweenastateofpeaceandwardifficult.Owingtocyclesofapparentchronic
instability,thecircumstancesresemblemoreofan‘interwar’periodand,foralongtime,
armedviolencehasinfactbeenpartoftherealityofthecountry.50
Theviolenceislinkedtobothinternalandexternaltensions.51AccordingtoMarielle
Debos,armedviolenceisoftenawayofexpressingcontestation,makingaliving,achieving
socialmobilityoradefiningmodeofpoliticalsociability.52Onaregionalcross-border
scale,theformationandthepresenceofconsecutivewavesofrebellionshavelargelybeen
possibleowingtoexternalfinancialsupport.Inthepast,theLibyangovernmentunder
ColonelMuammaral-Gaddafi,andtheSudanesegovernmentunderPresidentBashir,
regularlybackedChadianrebelgroupswhoaimedtoremovePresidentDéby(Bashir
havingalsohelpedDébycometopowerinthefirstplace).53Currently,however,both
sourcesoffundinghaveceased:Gaddafi’sregimehasbeenoverthrown,andtheSudan
governmentunderwentaprocessofrapprochementwithChadthateventuallysawa
workingpeacearrangementbetweenthetwo,featuringjointmilitaryborderpatrols.54
JEM,aleadingDarfurrebelgroupformerlyveryclosetoDéby,wasweakenedinDecember
2011bythedeathof its leader,Khalil Ibrahim,aZaghawacousinofPresidentDéby.
CurrentcircumstancesseemtoplayinDéby’sfavour,butdomesticandregionalrealities
canevolveveryquickly.ClaimingthatthepeakofinstabilityinChadbelongstothepast
isthereforeahastyandriskystatement.
C h I N A ’ S R e G I o N A L S e C u R I t y e N t A N G L e m e N t
ThevulnerabilityofChineseinterestsinChadwasfirsthighlightedbytheevacuationof
over200ChinesenationalsfromN’DjamenainearlyFebruary2008,whenarebelattack
cameextremelyclosetotopplingPresidentDéby.55InSeptember2010,andfollowing
otherattacksinSudan,securityriskswerepersonalisedbytheabductionofaChinese
engineerworkingonawaterprojectfortheCGCOCGroupChadneartheborderwith
Sudan,whowassubsequentlyrescuedbyjointSudanese–Chadianforces.Suchincidents
weresurfacemanifestationsofdeeper,morecomplexregionalsecuritydynamicsand
conflictsinvolvingmassiveforcedpopulationmovementsofSudanesefromDarfurinto
easternChad,aswellasChadiansineasternChad,andrefugeesfromtheCentralAfrican
Republic(CAR).
AlthoughBeijinghadwelcomedChad’srejectionofTaiwan,dealingwithN’Djamena
and Khartoum in the context of conflict linking Chad with Darfur (and CAR) was
clearlyadiplomaticchallenge.China’sspecialenvoy,LiuGuijin,hadbeenappointed
withresponsibilityforDarfur,andsoonfoundhimselftravellingbetweenKhartoumand
N’Djamena.China’smilitary-securitycalculusintheregionwaschangedinAugust2006.
OneoftheunintendedconsequencesofChina’smilitarysupportforKhartoum,andthe
linksbetweenChinesearmscompaniesandtheSudangovernment,wasaprevalenceof
Chinese-manufacturedsmallarmsandammunitionintheregion.56Indeed,inApril2006,
ChaddisplayedChinesemunitionscapturedfromrebelssupportedbyKhartoum.Sudan
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backedtheFebruary2008attackthatnearlyoustedDéby.Chad,inturn,supportedDarfur
rebelgroups,includingJEM,whichmountedaspectacularattackonOmdurmaninMay
2008thatcameuncomfortablyclosetoKhartoumitself.
Beijingengagedindiplomatic–politicalinterventionspropelledbyitsownbilateral
interests,byseekingtoeaseChad–Sudantiesandconductingshuttlediplomacybetween
KhartoumandN’Djamena.Thiswascouchedinwidertermsaspromotingpeaceinthe
region,buttheneedforsuchdiplomacywasundoubtedlycatalysedbythreatstoChinese
interests.IntheaftermathoftheFebruary2008attackonN’Djamena,LiuGuijinwas
careful to insist thatChinawouldnotbecome involved inmediatingproxyconflict
betweenKhartoumandN’Djamena,althoughhedidurgebothpartiestopractise‘good
neighbourliness’.HevisitedN’DjamenatomeetDéby,followedbymeetingswithBashir
andNafieAliNafieinKhartoum,‘withthepurposeofpersuadingbothcountries[Chad
andSudan]tofurtherimproverelations.’57LiuGuijincontinuedtoengagewithboth
N’DjamenaandKhartoumaspartofhisDarfurdiplomacy,byextensionfulfillingChina’s
diplomatic–politicalandeconomicinterestsinregionalstability.Forexample,hevisited
N’DjamenainlateMay2009inatripstyledasseekingtoendtheconflictbetweenChad
andSudan.58
SuchdynamicsofChina’sbilateralsecurityinterestsintheregionoccurredwithin
widerinternationaleffortstorespondtoconflictinChadandtheregion.Chadwasthe
siteofamajor internationalpeacekeepingeffortuntil thegovernment inN’Djamena
requestedtheUNSecurityCounciltodisbandtheoperation.Chinadidnotcontributeto
themission.
China’smountingrole inChad,connectedas it is toDarfurandSudan,hasbeen
predominantlybusinessorientedfollowingBeijing’scross-straitscoupagainstTaiwan
in August 2006. Beijing has enhanced bilateral military relations with N’Djamena,
and security concerns aboutChadhavecontinued tobepresent, albeit in changing
circumstances,asLibyademonstratedmostrecently.LikeChad,Chinahasbenefited
indirectlyfromthesecurityroleledbytheFrenchmilitarywhileseeminglynothaving
madeanysubstantialcontributionofitsowntotheinternationalsecurityresponse.59China
didnot,forexample,contributetotheUNMissioninCARandChad(MINURCAT).60
Simplyput,suchadivisionofsecurityresponsibilitiesallowsChinatoconcentrateon
thebusinessofinvestment,withFranceleadingeffortstorespondtothesecurityofsuch
business(andthemainlypoliticalinterestsofParis).Recently,however,therehavebeen
recurringrumoursaboutapossibleFrenchwithdrawalinthenearfuture.61Inevitably
thisraisesthequestionofhowthesituationcouldalterifthe‘Épervier’operation62comes
toanend;andhowChinamayneedtoreviseitsdevelopment-securitycalculusinthe
regionifitistosustainitsinvestments.ThepossibilityofaswiftchangeofeventsinChad
thatcaninfluenceandhaveanimpactonthelong-termviabilityofChineseinvestments
remains.
o I L P R I C e d I S P u t e : S o C I A L A m b I t I o N S v e R S u S e C o N o m I C v I A b I L I t y
AtpresentChineseandChadianprotagonists,embodiedbytheCNPCICononeside
andChad’sMinistryofOilandEnergyontheother,seemmoreconcernedaboutthe
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waytheRônierprojectshouldbemanagedandoperated.Themainimpedimentliesin
thedifficultyoffindingacompromisebetweensettingupamarketpriceallowingthe
CNPCtopayoffitsinvestment,anda‘social’priceenablingtheChadianauthoritiesto
carryouttheirobjectives.Unexpectedissuesappearedontheverydaythattherefinery
wasinauguratedinJune2011.Débyhastriedtoaccomplishasetofsocialpromises
madeduringhislastpresidentialcampaigninApril2011–oneofwhichwastoprovide
moreaffordablepetroleumpricesforthepopulation.Consequently,theChinesehavebeen
worriedaboutthenegativeeconomicrepercussions.Duringtheopeningceremony,and
withoutanypriorconsultations,63DébyannouncedauniquepriceofXAF200perlitreof
refinedproductsduringatransitionalperiodofthreemonths.Asaresult,thepumpprice
wasfixedatXAF365perlitreforpetrolandXAF330forpremiumliquefiedpetroleum
gas,whereasotherrefinedpetroleumproductsweresoldataboutXAF500perlitreon
averageatpumpsintheregion.64
OrdinaryChadians respondedpositively to thedecline inoilprices;nonetheless
thismeasurewasalsoaccompaniedbyaseriesofdifficulties.Taxidrivers,forexample,
welcomed this measure, although some hoped for further price reductions. Being
compelledtolowerthepriceoftheirservicesandroutes,somearguedthattheirmargin
ofprofithaddeclinedcomparedwiththepre-refinerycontext.65Asaresult,themajority
continuedtofilltheirtanksinKousseri,justacrosstheChadianborderinCameroon,
wheretheycouldgetalitreofgasoilforXAF250.66Furthermore,applyingauniqueprice
forthewholecountrywasnotsustainable.Ensuringnationwidesupplyrequireshaving
recoursetoawideinfrastructurenetwork,whichisnotyetinplaceinChad.Besides
this,transportationcostsneedtobetakenintoconsideration,especiallyforthosewho
purchasefuelinDjarmayaandsellthiselsewhereotherthaninoraroundthecapital.
Clearlythesecalculationswerenottakenintoaccountandshowalackofpreliminary
workpriortothedecision-making.
Oncethetransitionalpricehadbeenset,theChadianauthoritiesneededtonegotiate
withbothurbanandlong-distancetransportassociations.WithinnumerouspartsofChad,
however,ittookawhileforpricestodrop.Furthermore,sincethereleaseofthenewprice
wasalreadyexpectedbytheendofSeptember2011,thepossibilityoftensionscould
notbeexcluded.Overall,theChadianauthoritiesseemnottohavethoughtthroughthe
immediateconsequencesandimplicationsofsuchaproject.Establishingapricerange,
takingintoaccountcostsandobjectives,wouldhavebeenawaytoavoidoratleastreduce
theseproblems.
The transitional price was considered unreasonable, as the refinery had already
undergone heavy losses and had been unable to continue normal operations. The
processingcost–takingintoaccountemployeesalaries,maintenanceandtheredemption
factoroftheequipment,generalexpensesandfinancialcosts–amountstoXAF205per
litreofcrude(foracapacityof500 000 tonnesofcrude).67Consideringthesellingprice
atthetime,therefinerywasnotonlyunabletocoveritsprocessingcostsbutalsoits
employeesalaries.BytheendofAugust2011,theNationalRefiningCompanyhadalready
accumulatedalossofsome$4.7 million.68EventhoughtheChadianstateis(officially)
a40%shareholder,therefineryhasnotyetreceivedanyformofsubsidy.Duetothis
breechoftrust,therehavebeenrumoursthattheinitial60/40partitionofthedownstream
sectionbetweentheChineseandtheChadiansideisnolongervalidandhasalreadybeen
redividedintoa70/30ifnot80/20split.69
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Chadhasalsoexperiencedsignificantchangesintermsofoilsupplyanddistribution
methods. Before June 2011, distributors were more or less restricted to Total and
Oilibya.However,thelaunchingoftherefineryhasattractedincreasinginterest.Asthe
requirementstomountdistributionoperationsonly involveobtainingadministrative
authorisationfromtheMinistryofCommercetoestablishapetrolstation,andproviding
proofofbeingabletoimport10 millionlitresperyear,thenumberofoperatorshasbeen
expandingcontinually.Most–like3SH,Tourra,TchadHydrocarb,SosadepandDounama
–haveonlybeensetuprecentlyandlackexperienceinthisfield,withtheresultthat
theircapacitytoimporttherequiredyearlyminimumcannotbeproven.Nonetheless,an
increasingnumberoftanktruckshavebegunpurchasingfueldirectlyfromtherefinery.
AgrowingshareoftheserefinedproductsaresoldinCameroon,totheextentthatit
iscausinganapparentshortageinChad.Thecombinationofimposedsellingprices,
disorderedproliferationofnewdistributorsaswellasasomewhatunregulatedpurchase
environmenthavepromptedlong-timeoperatorssuchasTotaltoreviewtheirregional
strategy.Asthecurrentpatternappearsdisorganised,withquestionableeconomicreturns,
leavingChadcouldbeapossibilityforTotal.70
Atfirst,theCNPCkeptalowprofileoverDéby’sostentatiousdeclarationofholding
oneofthecheapestpetrolpricesintheregion.Astheduedateapproachedwithoutany
significantprogresstowardstheestablishmentofanewprice,theChinesesidedecided
totakeactionandputtherefiningprocessonhold.BytheendofSeptember2011,both
sides(theCNPCandtheMinistryofOilandEnergy)claimed,however,thatnegotiations
wereprogressing.Thecontentofthesediscussionsremainsconfidential,butsomeof
thebasicissuesareknown.Apartfromcertaindiscrepancieslinkedtotheproject,the
lackanddifficultyofcommunicationareoftenportrayedasthemainstumblingblocks.
Havingadvancedtheentireinvestmentasaloan,mostlythroughChina’sEximBank,the
CNPCobviouslyaimstorecoveritsinvestmentthroughthesaleofpetroleumproducts.
Accordingtovarioussources,theChinesecalculationshaveeithernotbeenveryprecise
orreasonable,especiallysincethelatterplannedtoamortise$1 billionwithinfiveyears.71
Following theseestimates,Chad’sMinistryofOilandEnergyclaimed that theprice
suggestionsmadebytheChinesewouldexceedthecostofimportedrefinedproducts.72
TheChinesestakeholdersdeploredboththelackofpreparatoryworkandtheoutlookof
theirChadianpartners.Intheend,bothpartiesseemedtoblameeachotherforthelack
ofnegotiatingprogress.
Theuncertaintyanddoubtsovertheimplementationofthenewfuelpriceseemedto
havebeenresolvedbymid-October2011.73TheMinistryofCommerceandIndustryissued
adecreefixingthenewratesforpremiumgasolineatXAF490andatXAF495forgasoil.74
PumppricesthroughoutChadwereboundtotheonesinN’Djamena,andthistimethe
transportationcostsinabsolutetermsweretakenintoaccount.75Thepetroleumproducts
experiencedasubstantialpriceincrease;forsomeitalmostdoubled,muchtothesurprise
oftheChadianpopulation.Thereactionbythelatterisallthemorecomprehensible,asthe
Chineseprojecthadbeenpresentedindevelopmenttermsandwassupposedtoalleviate
energyshortages.Inasubsequentpressrelease,GroupedeRecherchesalternativesetde
MonitoringduprojetpétroleTchadCameroun(GRAMP-TC),aChadianNGOandthink
tank,whichgainednotorietythroughtheDobaproject,expresseditsregretthattheCNPC
intendedtoobtainanimmediatereturnonitsinvestmentandrapidlymaximiseitsprofits,
onthegroundsthatChadremainedapoliticallyunstablecountryandrecoveringfunds
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couldbeadifficulttask.76Sinceopacityandalackofinformationcontinuetocharacterise
variousprojectsinChad(notablythemanagementofoilrevenues),itremainsdifficultto
produceadetailedportraitofthetermsofthecontract.AccordingtoseveralChadiancivil
societyorganisations,thisresolutiondiscreditsthevalidityofthebilateralco-operation.
ThedecisionseemstoconfirmtheirallegationsthatChinaismerelyinterestedinitsown
benefits.ItalsoraisesquestionsabouttheChadiangovernmenthavingturneditsbackon
itspledgetoprovideanaffordablesourceofenergy.AsChinaisoneofthefewexternal
partnerswillingtoinvestwidelyinChad,theriskofundulyantagonisingamajorbusiness
associateoverapricedisagreementappearstohavebeentoohigh.
ThebalanceofpowerisplayedoutmainlybetweenChinesepartnersontheoneside
andtheChadiangovernmentontheother,frequentlyreducingthepopulationtotherole
ofmerespectators.Duringtheceremoniallayingofthefirststonefortheconstructionof
theDjarmayaInternationalairportinNovember2011,however,Débyrevealedthatthe
rateswouldberevised.77Thischangeofmindcanberelateddirectlytopriorcivilsociety
reactions.Forinstance,GRAMP-TCheldapresentationquestioningthebenefitsofthe
DjarmayarefineryforChadianconsumers;themeetingwasattendedbymorethan500
participantsandcoveredbythemedia.Asaresult,afewdayslater,theSHTorganised
talkswithChadiancivilsocietygroups,anddiscussionsonanewpricingpolicyare
currentlyunderwaybetweentheCNPCandthegovernment.78
Nonetheless,theDjarmayarefinerywasshutdownonthe19January2012.Laterthat
month,DébyfiredMahamatAliHassa,theministerofplanning,andTabeEugene,the
oilminister.On6February2012,Chadannouncedthattherefinerywouldbereopened.
OtherdevelopmentssuggestedthatdespitesuchturbulencetheCNPCwasintentona
longer-termengagement.InFebruary2012,andfollowingnegotiationsongoingsince
mid-2010, theCNPCsignedadealwith thegovernmentofCameroontoallowit to
starttransportingcrudeoilfromChadthroughtheChad–Cameroonpipelinebytheend
of2012,thusaddingChinese-producedcrudetothatfromExxonMobil,Chevronand
PETRONASalreadybeingcarriedbythepipeline.
Thisextendedperiodofbargainingbetweenthetwosidesraisesinterestingquestions
abouthowlinkscouldevolveovertime.It isdifficulttoassessexactlywhatrolethe
Chineseauthoritieshavebeenplayinginthisinteraction.79However,theCNCP–Chad
corporate–politicalinterfaceappearstohavepredominantlyentailedtheCNPC’srole,
indicativeoftherelativeautonomyitseemstohavewithinChina’sbroaderengagement
andofhowitpursuesitsowncorporateinterests.Inaddition,theChadiansideseemsto
havedrawnanumberoflessonsfromtheireconomicengagementwiththeRônierproject.
Concedingthatcertainissuescouldhavebeenavoidedhadtheybeenmanagedinadvance,
thegovernmentdecidedtocreateaspecificboard80tosupervisefuturesensitiveprojects.
Theobjectivebehindthisisnotonlytobroadenanddecentralisethemanagementof
Chineseinvestments,butalsotobeabletoforeseeproblems.
Altogether,theRônierprojecthighlightsthedifficultiesoffindingaviablearrangement
for all parties involved, and signals the variation and inconsistency of the Chadian
businessenvironment.Thenagain,italsoreflectsthepossibilityofagrowingdialogue
betweenoilcompany,stateandcivilsociety,andshowsacertainresponsivenessofthe
SHTandtheCNPCtowardsevolvingcircumstances.
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C o N C L u S I o N
ComparedwithotherAfricancountries,China’sinvolvementinChadisfairlyrecentinthe
newcontextofthegrowingChineseengagementacrossthecontinent.Thisis,toagreat
extent,relatedtoanearlyten-yeardiplomaticbreakwiththePRC,whichonlyendedin
late2006,andresultedinverylimitedengagementfromthemainlandduringthatperiod.
Atthesametime,China’spresenceinChadisoftendisplayedasamarginofChina–Africa
dynamicsandhas,sofar,beenovershadowedbyother,moresalientexamples–notably
thoseinneighbouringSudan.Sincediplomaticrelationswereresumed,andledbythe
CNPC’soilinvestment,anewphaseofrelationshasbeenunderway.
Chad’sswitchbacktoBeijingcanbeexplainedbypressingpoliticalconstraintsand
aseriesofinterlockingconflictswithinthegreaterChad–Darfurregion.AsSudanhas
benefitedfromcrucialChinesesupport(andstilldoes),includingmilitaryassistance,
DébyjustifiedtheofficialrecognitionofthePeople’sRepublicaspartofthenecessary
conditionstobringthemoreorlessdirectconflictwithKhartoumtoanend.Chad’s
connectionwith thePRCat first thus restedupon apressing regional andpolitical
dimension,dominatedbythearmedconflictsthreateningDéby’sregimeandfeaturing
China-supportedKhartoum’ssupportforrebelgroupsseekingtomilitarilyoustDéby.In
2006PresidentDébywasinaverytightmilitaryandpoliticalspot.Arenownedmaster
ofsurvival,histurntoChinapaidoffinhisterms.Beyondthis,Chadmightbesaidto
illustratetheroleofN’Djamena’sabilitytomaximiseitsotherwiselimitedleverage,firstly
byplayingthe‘OneChina’gambittoDéby’sadvantageandthenbyfollowingthrough
onandrefiningthisbyseekingandsecuringamoresubstantialCNPCengagementin
Chad.However,economicinterestshaverapidlymatchedorevensurpassedthisaspect
ofrelationsaspartofathickeningpartnershipbetweenN’DjamenaandBeijing.Thecore
ofSino–Chadianco-operationtodayistheRônieroilinvestment.Eventhoughthescale
oftheprojectremainssmall,itincludesarefineryandthereforeoffersthepossibility
ofdomesticproduction.Inthisregard,theChineseoperationdiffersfromChad’sfirst
experienceinDoba,whichislimitedtoexportingthecrude.
Astherecentoilpricedisputeshows,however,whetherthereisnecessarilyabetter
unionofinterestsbetweenChinaandChadthanChad’spreviousfractiousrelationship
withtheWorldBankandtheinternationalcommunityoverthepipelineremainstobe
seen.Divergencesinthispartnershipareboundtobeexpectedfollowingaperiodthathas
hithertohadmuchtodowithestablishingrelations.Nowthatmoreattentionappearstobe
paidtohowtodeepenties,closelylinkedtothesustainabilityofinvestmentsbeyondthe
shortterm,howthesearereconciledislikelytoexertmuchcontinuinginfluenceonties.
ChinahasprogressivelybeenincorporatedintoChad’sdomesticpoliticalstrategies
througharangeofdevelopmentprojects.ThisispartlyareflectionofDéby’spresidential
campaigninApril2011,structuredaroundasetofsocialpromises,andportrayinghimself
asChad’ssocialarchitect-in-chief.Thereappeartobelatentandalreadyexistingtensions
betweenwhatDébywantsforhisowndomesticpurposesandwhattheCNPC,andthe
Chineserolemoregenerally,candeliver.PresidentDébymadearangeof‘social’promises,
likelowerpetroleumprices,duringhislastpresidentialcampaign.However,because
theCNPC’sbasicobjectiveispredicateduponthecommerciallogicofareturnonits
investment,thequestionoftheeconomicprofitabilityandviabilityoftheiroperations
remains,andcontinuestobesubjecttothevagariesofChadianpolitics.
20
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FurtherchallengesontheradarconcernageneralfeatureevidentofChina’srelations
inAfricatodatewithregardstosecurity,thatis,howChina’sforeigneconomicpolicy,
encompassingstateobjectivesaswellaskeyactorsliketheCNPC,hasbeendependingon
prevailingWesternandtoanextentAfricansecuritystructures.Chinahasbenefitedfrom
theleading(andself-interested)roleofFranceinChad’ssecurity,readasthecontinuation
ofDéby’sgovernment,whileconcentratingonenhancingitseconomicactivities.The
questionofwhetherthisisfinanciallyandpoliticallytenablefortheWestloomsasa
subjectunlikelytogoaway,amidstquietinterestincertainChinesequartersaboutthe
securityimplicationsofengaginginplaceslikeChad.Theimplicationsofthishistorically
inheriteddefactodivisionoflabourandassociateddistributionofbenefitshaveyettobe
seen,whilethequestionofsecurityburdensharinginChad,andmoregenerally,islikely
tobecomemorecentral.
e N d N o t e S
1 Theauthor’[email protected].
2 Theauthor’[email protected].
3 Thisslogan– ‘Désenclaverpourmieuxrapprocher’(intheFrenchoriginal)–andChad’s
nationalairlinepublicityindirectlyreflectstheacuityofthisnotionandthechallengesforthe
country.
4 ExxonMobilChad’sgeneralmanagerunderlinedthispoint.WhereasExxonMobil,currently
thesecondmostvaluablecompanyintheworldaccordingtotheForbes list(DeCarloS,
‘Theworld’s25mostvaluablecompanies:Appleisnowontop’,Forbes,8November2011,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottdecarlo/2011/08/11/the-worlds-25-most-valuable-companies-
apple-is-now-on-top),wouldhavebeeneasilycapableofprovidingthenecessaryinvestment
for theDobaprojecton itsown, thecompanyrespondedfavourably to theWorldBank’s
involvementinordertolimittherisksofinvestinginChad(personalinterview,ScottMiller,
generalmanagerofExxon-Chad,N’Djamena,June2010).
5 AccordingtotheUNDP(UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme),Chadranks183outof
191countries(UNDPInternationalHumanDevelopmentIndicators,‘Tchad:Profildepays:
Indicateursdedéveloppementhumain’,http://hdrstats.undp.org/fr/pays/profils/TCD.html,
accessed6November2011).In2011Chadrankedsecondlast(outof183economies)inthe
WorldBank’s‘DoingBusinessReport’(WorldBank–InternationalFinanceCorporation,‘Easeof
doingbusinessinChad’,http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/chad,accessed
6November2011)andfifthfromlastinmattersoftransparency(TransparencyInternational,
‘Perception of corruption index 2011’, http://www.transparence-france.org/e_upload/pdf/
classement_ipc_2011.pdf,accessed7May2012).
6 AsearlyasDecember2008,Chad’snationaloilcompany,theSociétédesHydrocarburesdu
Tchad,entitledtheeditorialofitsmagazine:‘Arefineryofmajorambitions’.
7 TheWorldBank’sengagementintheDobaproject,alongsidetheoilconsortium,wasdriven
bytheobjectiveofpromotingthisinvestmentasadevelopmentmodelwithinChad.
8 Thisstudyisbasedontwofield-researchtrips,conductedfromJune–September2010andin
September2011.ResearchandliteratureaboutChina’srecentinvolvementinChadremains
verylimited(see,forexample,TaboSN,BeassoumCN&TMAsngar,‘Relationséconomiques
entrelaChineetl’Afrique:CasDuTchad’,AERC(AfricaEconomicResearchConsortium
C H I N A ’ S G R O W I N G I N V O L V E M E N T I N C H A D : E S C A P I N G E N C L O S U R E ?
21
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Paper), 22. Nairobi: AERC, January 2008). The only detailed analysis of the CNPC’s
involvement(eventhoughmostlycentredonenvironmentalregulationandcorporatesocial
responsibility)isVanVlietG&GMagrin(eds),‘Unecompagniepétrolièrechinoisefaceaudéfi
environnementalauTchad’,AFD(FrenchDevelopmentAgency),CollectionFocales,9,Quae,
February 2012, http://www.afd.fr/webdav/site/afd/shared/PUBLICATIONS/RECHERCHE/
Scientifiques/Focales/09-Focales.pdf;VanVlietGetal.,‘ChineseandAmericanoilcompanies
andtheirenvironmentalpracticesinChad:Aquietconfluenceofstreamsorsilencebefore
the battle?’, Rising Powers and Global Standards Working Paper, 2, December 2011,
http://www.risingpowers.net/sites/default/files/RisingPowers_WP2_Van%20Vliet%20et%20al.
pdf.AChadianNGO/researchinstitute(GRAMP-TC,GroupedeRecherchesalternativeset
deMonitoringduprojetpétroleTchadCameroun)producedamonitoringreportaboutthe
CNPC’sactivities.Chad’snationalpressinChadhasmerelyhighlightedthevariousopening
momentsoftheworksites,whiletheinternationalmediahasalmostcompletelyoverlooked
theRônierproject,andotheraspectsoftheChinesepresenceinChad.However,sincethe
productionphasewaslaunched,andthechallengesbecameincreasinglyvisible,theChadian
presshasstartedtofocustoagreaterextentonrelateddevelopmentpossibilitiesandenergy
questions.
9 TaipeiTimes,‘TaiwanforeignministerregretsdiplomaticbreakwithChad’,7August2006.
10 PresidentDébyhasstatedthat:‘Itusedtobethatwhenwehadproblemswithourneighbour
sendingmercenariesto invadeusthatnoneofourcomplaintsbeforetheUnitedNations
wouldpass,becauseChinablockedthem’but,sinceopeningthedoortoChineseinvestment,
‘wehavebeenabletoraiseourconcernswithouttaboo’.FrenchHW&LPolgreen,‘China,
fillingavoid,drillsforrichesinChad’,NewYorkTimes,13August2007;andReuters,‘China
oilcobreaksgroundonChad,Nigerrefineries’,29October2008.
11 Respectively,theministersofForeignAffairs,MinesandEnergy,Petroleum,Economy,Finance,
andInfrastructure.
12 ChineseGovernment,‘China,Chadvowtoboostmilitarycooperation’,Officialwebportal,
21September2007,http://www.gov.cn/misc/2007-09/21/content_758313.htm.
13 Forinstance,ZhouYongkangmetwithadelegationfromChad’srulingparty,thePatriotic
MovementofSalvation,callingformoreco-operationbetweenthetwocountries,headedby
NagoumYamassoum,inBeijing,inJune2010.
14 AfricaAsiaConfidential,‘CampaignsmadeinChina’,4,5,March2011,p.3.
15 In2008,forexample,ChadadoptedanewInvestmentCharterofferingincentivesforforeign
companies(includinga threeyear tax-exemptionstatus).ANational InvestmentAgency
wasestablishedin2010toactasaone-stopgovernmentshopforbusiness.Anumberof
regionalbusiness-orientedinitiativeswerealsopromoted.PresidentDébyhostedthefirst
OHADA(OrganizationfortheHarmonizationofBusinessLawinAfrica)SummitinDecember
2009.ThisaimedtoencouragememberstatestoadoptanenhancedOHADAInvestment
Arrangement that offers benefits beyond those in Chad’s national Investment Charter.
ThesubsequentOHADAarrangementcameintoeffectinChadinJanuary2010.
16 ‘FirstsessionofChina–ChadJointCommissiononCommerceandTradeheldinN’Djamena’,
5May2010,MinistryofCommerceofthePRC(fromhttp://fuziying2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
photonews/201005/20100506898623.html,MOFCOMwebsite,Beijing).
17 In addition to the main Chinese medical presence, a team from the Jiangxi Provincial
Department of Health has been operating in N’Djamena. For agriculture and technical
co-operation,theprojectsareeitherrunbytheChineseAgriculturalTechnologyCooperation
22
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Group,theYichangInternationalEconomicorbytheShandongInternationalEconomicand
TechnicalCooperation(personal interview,ZhengWei,Chineseeconomicadviserof the
PRCinChad,27September2011;datacollectedfromtheofficialwebsiteoftheChinese
EmbassyinChad,http://tchad.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/catalog/zgqy/201105/20110507567258.
html,accessed22October2011).DuringtwoconsecutiveresearchtripstoChad,onlyavery
limitednumberofindependentmedicalfacilitiesprovidingtraditionalChinesemedicinewere
encountered.
18 Namely,theNationalDevelopmentBankWorkingGrouponChad,andShaanxiBranchof
ChinaDevelopmentBank(datacollectedfromtheofficialwebsiteoftheChineseEmbassyin
Chad,op.cit.).
19 Forarelatedbutdifferentcontext,seeMthembu-SalterG,TheEvolvingNatureofChinese
TelecommunicationsInvestmentintheDRC,SAIIA(SouthAfricanInstituteofInternational
Affairs)PolicyBriefing,39.Johannesburg:SAIIA,2011.
20 ComparedwithotherWestAfricancapitals(suchasDakarorBamako),Chineseretailand
wholesaleactivitiesinChadarefairlyrare.Thefewexistingshopsareestablishedineconomic
nicheareas,generallyprovidingbasicelectronicandhouseholdequipmentaswellasvarious
typesofChineseprovisions.
21 ThiscouldberelatedtothefactthatthevarietyofforeignrestaurantsinN’Djamenaisquite
small.MostoftheChineserestaurantsandhotelsinN’Djamenahavebeenestablishedfora
while.Asaresult,theycannotberelateddirectlytothecurrentexpansionofeconomiclinks
betweenChinaandChad,althoughthegrowingnumbersofChinesetechniciansandengineers
inChadhaveclearlybeenimportantinraisingtheirrevenues.Chinesemassageparloursarea
muchmorerecentadditiontothearrayofChinesebusinessventures,oftenactingasacover
forbrothels.
22 EncanaisaCanadianoilcompanyandmostlyactiveintheexplorationphase.TheCNPC
hadbeenassociatedwiththemsince2003andacquired50%oftheconsortium’ssharesin
2006(MaoundonodjiG,Lesenjeuxgéopolitiquesdel’exploitationdupétroleauTchad.Doctoral
thesisinPoliticalandSocialSciences,CatholicUniversityofLeuven,2009,p.417).Although
theofficialChinesepositiongenerallyclaimsthatnoeconomiclinksareofficiallysanctioned
withoutdiplomaticties,therealityonthegroundismorecomplex.TheexampleoftheCNPC
inChad reveals that initial contactcanbemadeperfectlywellbeforeofficialdiplomatic
recognition.ThesameappliestoinvestmentcomingfromthePRC.Since2006theTaiwanese
oil company, theOverseasPetroleumInvestmentCorporation,hasbeen interested inan
oilconcessionnearDoba(despitethebreaking-offofdiplomatictiesthatsameyear)andis
currentlycarryingouttheexplorationphase(personalinterview,IsmaëlMoctar,independent
Chadianoilconsultant,N’Djamena,September2011).
23 Atthisstage,therearejustover100 hundredoilwells.Theplannersexpectthepipelineto
transport1 milliontonnesofcrudeperyear,risingto3 millioninthesecondphase.The
refineryhasanannualcapacityof100 tonnes.
24 MagrinG,‘LesenjeuxduprojetRônier’,inLagestionenvironnementaledelaCNPCauTchad:
enjeuxetmiseenperspectiveendébutdecyclepétrolier.Paris:FrenchDevelopmentAgency,2010,
p.250.
25 SuchastheBureauofGeophysics,GreatWallDrillingCompanyandtheChinaPetroleum
TechnologyDevelopmentCorporation.
26 Foramoredetailedanalysis,seeMagrinG,LeSudduTchadenmutation:deschampsdecoton
auxsirènesdel’ornoir.Paris:Sepia,2001,p.427.
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27 Theprojecthadinitiallybeenestimatedat$3.7billion,butgraduallythecostneededtobe
revisedtoover$8billion.
28 In2010thedailyproductionreachedanaverageof122 500 barrelsperday(EssoExploration
andProductionChadInc.,‘ProjetdeDéveloppementTchad/Cameroun’,MiseajourduProjet
29,RapportAnnuel,2011,http://www.esso.com/Chad-English/PA/Files/29_all_french.pdf).
29 NadingarND&SYang,‘RelationshipbetweenChadandChina’NewYorkScienceJournal,
3,9,2010,pp. 50–54.
30 MagrinG,2010,op.cit.,p.250.
31 Chinaisupheldasamodelof‘InternationalStandard,ChineseSpeed’sinceittookovertheH
blockinJanuary2007.
32 MaoundonodjiG,2009,op.cit.,p.246.
33 MagrinG,2010,op.cit.,p.266.
34 XAFisthethree-lettercurrencycodefortheCentralAfricanFranc.
35 SeriesofpersonalinterviewswithIsmaëlMoctar,op.cit.,July2010,September2011.Michel
Boukar,SecretaryGeneraloftheMinistryofPetroleuminChad,claimedatthetimeofthe
interview(29September2011)that,unlikethepubliclyannouncedfigureof20 000barrelsa
day,therefinerywouldonlyproduceabout10 000barrelsaday.
36 SHTMagazine,‘Carted’identitédelaRaffineriedeN’Djamena’,Chad,001,December2008,p.
7.
37 AlthoughtheproductionstagebeganinlateJune2011,itisstillnotclearhowmuchoilis
beingproducedorbeingrefined.
38 SHTMagazine,‘ExtraitdudiscoursduMinistreduPétrole’,Chad,001,December2008,p.6.
Attheceremony,PresidentDébyassertedthat‘wearewinningavictoryofthebattleforenergy
independence’.
39 MagrinG,2010,op.cit.,p.268.
40 AlthoughthelayingofthecornerstonetookplaceattheendofDecember2010,itisnotclear
whentheconstructionphasewillbefinished.SoluxeInternationalisasubsidiarycompanyof
ChinaHuayouGroupCorporationandisoperatinginvariousservicefields,includinglogistics,
construction,commerceandtradeaswellastechnicalservicesonoilfieldengineeringand
oilfieldchemicalsadditives.InChad,thecompanyisnotonlyactiveintheareaofconstruction
anddecoration,butisalsowidelyinvolvedinlogisticsservicesstructuredaroundtheCNPC’s
oilinvestment(SoluxeInternational,‘SoluxeInternationalChadBranch’,http://soluxeint.com/
en/2010/0623/28.html,accessed21November2011).
41 Personalinterview,ZhengWei,op.cit.
42 Ontheotherhand,thenewcementfactorymayhaveanegativeimpactontheviabilityoflocal
brickmanufacturers.
43 PresidentDébyfinally inaugurated thecement factoryon16February2012(AfricaAsia
Confidential,‘Cementingambitions’,5, 5,March2012.
44 Thediscussionsrevolvearoundthemanagementandthefunctioningmodes,morespecifically
thedebateofretainingthestoragesectionintheproductionareawithtransferringtheend
producttoN’Djamena.
45 Personalinterviews,MaximeNelgarNadjirambaye,sociologistatGRAMP-TC,andZhengWei,
Chineseeconomicadviser,N’Djamena,23and27September2011.
46 Personalinterview,MiaoudouDjikonoum,deputy-managingdirectorattheMinistryofPublic
WorksandTransport,N’Djamena,28September2011.Chad’sinfrastructureminister,Adoum
Younousmitoldjournalists:‘Theprojectwhichwouldbefundedbyaloantothegovernment
24
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ofChadfrom[the]ChinesegovernmentwillhelpChad,becauseofitsgeographicposition,
tobecomeanAfricanhubforflightstotheMiddleEastandAsia’(Reuters,‘Chadinksairport
accordwithChinesefirm’,22April2011).
47 Among other reasons, the current airport, ‘Hassan Djamous’, located near the centre of
N’Djamena,hastodealwiththecontinualextensionofthecityandrisinglandpressure.
48 InearlyAugust2011,ChadianandSudaneseofficialssigneda$2billiondealwithChinaExim
BanktofinancearailconnectionbetweenDoreandNyala,thecapitalofSouthDarfur.During
theOrganisationoftheIslamicConference’s(OIC)SummitinSenegalon14March2008,
acommitteewasestablishedtoimplementthePortSudan–DakarRailwayLine,toconnect
Sudan,Chad,Niger,Nigeria,Mali,BurkinaFaso,SenegalandpossiblyDjibouti.
49 TubianaJ,RenouncingtheRebels:LocalandRegionalDimensionsofChad–SudanRapprochement.
Geneva:SmallArmsSurvey,March2011,p.23.
50 Althoughovertconflictisrarelywitnessed,violencematerialisesinsteadintheexperiences
ofwar(DebosM, ‘LivingbytheguninChad:Armedviolenceasapracticaloccupation’,
JournalofModernAfricanStudies,49,3,2011,p. 412).
51 Magrin G, ‘Tchad 2008: Géographie d’une guerre ordinaire’, EchoGéo, Sur le vif 2008,
http://echogeo.revues.org/2249.
52 DebosM,op.cit.,pp.409–428.
53 MarchalR,‘TherootsoftheDarfurconflictandtheChadiancivilwar’,PublicCulture,20,3.
Durham:DukeUniversityPress,2008,pp.429–436.
54 TheRiyadhagreementof3May2007signedbyDébyandBashir,forexample,observed‘the
principalsofgoodneighbourliness;andnoninterferenceininternalaffairsofotherstates’and
agreed‘topreventtheuseoftheirterritorytoharbour,train,fundorbeusedaspassageby
armedmovementsopposedtotheother,andwillnotofferanyfinancialormoralsupportto
thesemovementsandwillejectthemfromthesoilofthetwocountries’(at3,b).Thiswasone
ofanumberofattemptedaccords,anothercominginJanuary2010whenSudanandChad
signedadealtonormaliserelationsinN’Djamena,featuringyetanothercommitmenttoend
supportforrebelgroupsonbothsides.
55 Itwasreportedthat‘alargeamountofequipmentandmaterials’ownedbyChinesecompanies
waslootedinthisattackbutcompensationwasprovidedbythegovernmentofChad.Yuanhui
S,‘Turmoilwon’tstopChineseenterprises’,AfricaMagazine,13May2011.
56 SeeReportofthePanelofExpertsestablishedpursuanttoparagraph3ofresolution1591
(2005)concerningtheSudan’(30January2006);ReportofthePanelofExpertsontheSudan
establishedpursuanttoresolution1591(2005)(S/2011/111,8March2011);andGramizzi
C,LewisM&JTubiana,‘LetterfromformerMembersofthePanelofExpertsontheSudan
establishedpursuanttoresolution1591(2005)andrenewedpursuanttoresolution1945
(2010)addressedtotheChairmanoftheSecurityCouncilCommitteeestablishedpursuantto
resolution1591(2005)concerningtheSudan’,24January2012.
57 PermanentmissionofthePeople’sRepublicofChinatotheUN,‘China’sSRonDarfurholds
a briefing in Beijing’, Beijing, 7 March 2008, http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/
securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/darfur/t468259.htm,accessed10March2012.
58 SudanTribune,‘ChinapledgestoendSudan–Chadconflict’,1June2009.
59 TheformerFrenchambassador,BrunoFoucher,statedthatParishadaskedtheChad-stationed
FrenchtroopstoevacuatethepersonneloftheChinese,AlgerianandRussianembassies,as
wellasallforeigncitizenswhohadsoughtassistanceatthecrisiscentre(TCHADONLINE,
‘Audition de MM. Bruno Foucher, ambassadeur de France au Tchad’, 23 March 2010,
C H I N A ’ S G R O W I N G I N V O L V E M E N T I N C H A D : E S C A P I N G E N C L O S U R E ?
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http://tchadonline.com/audition-de-mm-bruno-foucher-ambassadeur-de-france-au-tchad/,
accessed11March2012).
60 MINURCAT (the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad), and a European
Unionmilitaryforce(EUFOR),wasestablishedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolution1778
(25December2007)mandatedtoprotectcivilians,humanrightsandtheruleoflaw,and
regionalpeace.UNSecurityCouncil resolution1861 (14 January2009) reiterateddeep
concernaboutarmedactivitiesandbanditryineasternChad,north-easternCAR(Central
AfricanRepublic)andwesternSudan,deemedtobethreateningthesecurityofthecivilian
population,humanitarianoperationsandthestabilityofthosecountries,aswellasproducing
seriousviolationsofhumanrightsand internationalhumanitarian law. Itauthorised the
deploymentofamilitarycomponentofMINURCATtofollowupEUFORinbothChadand
CARattheendofEUFOR’smandateinMarch2009.ThetransferofauthoritybetweenEUFOR
andthemilitarycomponentofMINURCATtookplaceon15March2009.MINURCATfeatured
militarypersonnelfrom48countries,andpolicepersonnelfrom21countries,buttherewasno
Chinesecontribution.FollowingarequestbythegovernmentofChad,themissionfinishedon
31December2010inlinewithUNSCresolution1923(2010).
61 TherecentFrenchinterventioninLibyaseemedtohavetemporarilysupportedarguments
infavourofthecontinuityofthemilitarypresenceinChad.However,itisdifficulttojustify
operatingcostsofabout$118 millionperyear,especiallyinthecontextofdrasticbudget
cutsinFrance(personalinterview,JulienCats,secondadviser(politicalaffairs)attheFrench
EmbassyinChad,N’Djamena,26September2011).
62 ‘OpérationÉpervier’referstotheongoingFrenchmilitarypresenceinChad.Launchedin1986
toforcebacktheLibyaninvasion,ithasremainedoperationaltorestrainrecurrentepisodesof
regionalinstabilityandhelpovercomeseveralconflictsintheregion.
63 AccordingtocommentsmadebytheChineseeconomicadviser,aswellasbyIsmaëlMoctar,
theindependentconsultantwhoconductedtheEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentforthe
CNPC,theChineseweretakenbysurprisewithregardstothisdecision.
64 Priortothatdate,thepumppriceforgasoilwasXAF750perlitrewhereasdieselwassoldfor
XAF650perlitre(withXAF499,85equalling$1).
65 SeriesofinterviewsconductedwithcabdriversinN’Djamena,September2011.
66 LowerpricesinCamerooncanbeexplainedbythefactthatafairamountofinferiorquality
gasoilcomesfromNigeriaviafraudulentwaysandiscommonlysoldinJerricans(personal
interview,MichelBoukar,SecretaryGeneralattheMinistryofOilandEnergy,N’Djamena,
29September2011).
67 N’DjamenaBi-Hebdo, ‘Actualitéd’exploitationde laSociétédeRaffinagedeN’Djaména’,
N’Djamena,26September–2October2011,pp.4–5.
68 NakoJ, ‘ChadrefineryventurewithChinasuspendsoutput’,Reuters,30September2011,
http://af.reuters.com/article/chadNews/idAFL5E7KU2V620110930.
69 Initiallytheideawasthatthe40%participationoftheChadianstate,advancedbytheChinese
side,wouldbereimbursedthroughsalesandtaxes.
70 Personalinterview,MahamatAssouyouti,projectmanagerattheFrenchDevelopmentAgency
inChad,N’Djamena,24September2011.
71 Personalinterview,PhilippeLecluze,economicandfinancialadviserattheFrenchEmbassyin
Chad,N’Djamena,23September2011.
72 Personalinterview,MichelBoukar,op.cit.
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73 However,asisdiscussedlaterinthepaper,thecircumstancesaroundthisprojectareevolving
rapidlyandmakeitdifficulttoassessforhowlongthecurrentpriceswillbeeffective.
74 On16October2011JetA1wassetatXAF529.36a litreandatXAF375pera litre for
kerosene.Duringthetemporaryperiod,thepricewassetatXAF350andXAF230respectively.
75 Chad,MinistryofCommerce and Industry, ‘Arrêtéfixant lesprixde ventedesproduits
pétroliers en République du Tchad’, Decree number 046/PR/PM/MCI/SG/DCCP/2011,
16October2011.
76 GRAMP-TC,‘CommuniquédePresse’,N’Djamena,19October2011.
77 DespitePresidentDéby’sannouncementabouttheratesrevision,asofDecember2011,Decree
number46wasstillfunctional.
78 OnlinediscussionsandemailexchangeonNetworkforAppliedResearchonOil,Gasand
MiningActivities(NARMA),December2011.
79 China’s economic adviser claimed that theChinese embassywouldnot takepart in the
negotiations.
80 The‘GeneralManagementoflargePresidentialprojects’(Directiongénéraledesgrandsprojets
présidentiels)isconnecteddirectlytothepresidency.
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