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CHINA’S CHANGING MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
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BASIC FEATURES OF CHINA’S MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
• A controlled media environment where government exercises central control over most aspects of the media
BUT
• A rapidly changing media environment where a number of outlets increasingly push the envelope
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HOW MEDIA CONTROL WORKS
• Oversight of media from highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party
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HOW CHINA CONTROLS ITS MEDIA
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HOW CHINA CONTROLS ITS MEDIA
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Potitburo
Central Committee
Organization Department
International Department Propaganda
Department
United Front Work Department
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BASIC PILLARS OF THE CHINESE PROPAGANDA SYSTEM
RENMIN RIBAO—Party daily
XINHUA—Official news agency
CCTV—Official television network
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WHAT CONTROLLED MEDIA LOOK LIKE
Central media carefully crafted to send messages about government policy priorities
Central media tends to be formulaic
When reading this media, you need to learn to read between the lines, decode the signals
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LOOSENING OF SOME CONTROLS FROM 1990s
• Commercialization and cutting of subsidies for many publications, television networks
• Development of new technologies—Internet cell phones and satellite TV-- and greater access to these technologies
• China’s accession to WTO in 2000, requiring China to partially open its market to Western media firms
• Professionalization of journalism
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IMPACT OF COMMERCIALIZATION
• Created need to develop content that would appeal to readers, advertisers
• Creation of a small but increasing number of quasi-commercial publications that occasionally tend to push the envelope in their reporting
Caijing
Caixin
Xinjing Bao
Guandong-based publications
Nanfang Dushi bao
Nanfeng Chuang
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PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: NANFANG DUSHIBAO12 December 2010
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PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: NANFANG DUSHIBAO 1 June 2010
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PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: XINJINGBAO 4 JUNE 2010
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PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: XINJINGBAO, May 2012
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“In the still of the deep night, removing that mask of insincerity, we say to our true selves “I am sorry.””
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IMPACT OF WTO ACCESSION
Reorganization of television networks
• Creation of a number of regional companies that have often pushed the envelope on programming to attract viewers
• Hunan Satellite TV’s “Supergirl” program
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IMPACT OF THE INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA
Chinese Communist Party’s Ambivalent Approach to the Internet
• Tool for economic development, better disseminating party line
But
• Efforts to restrict sensitive content that cross party red lines
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CHINESE INTERNET CONTROLS
• External – Great Firewall
• Internal – Party retains ability to shut down sectors of Internet within the country
• Censorship
• Guiding public discussion – 50 Cent Cadre
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RAPID GROWTH OF CHINESE INTERNET USE
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INTERNET PENETRATION IN CHINA
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CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA LANDSCAPE
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MEET SINA WEIBO
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MEET SINA WEIBO
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FOREIGN MINISTRY’S SINA WEIBO PAGE
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GOVERNMENT MICROBLOGS ON SINA WEIBO
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MEET QQ (TENGXUN) WEIBO
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LOCATION MATTERS
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CENSORSHIP ON SINA WEIBO
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s.weibo.com, 5 Nov 2012
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CENSORSHIP ON QQ (TENGXUN) WEIBO
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t.qq.com, 5 Nov 2012
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CENSORSHIP ON SINA WEIBO
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An image deleted from Sina Weibo. The text reads, “Smashing special provisions [for Party leaders] is better than boycotting Japanese goods,“ 21 September 2012 (http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/09/27/27607/)
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CENSORSHIP
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTJmtfjVerw
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THE LIMITS OF CONTROL?
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But
• The Internet is so large that even with all the party’s resources, some sensitive postings still get through, however briefly
• Increasingly savvy social media users adept at getting around party controls
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ANALYZING CHINA’S CONTROLLED MEDIA: BASIC PRINCIPLES
1. Authoritativeness of media vehicles—helps determine level of leadership involvement
2. Comparison of shifts in media formulas and patterns to help identify policy shifts
3. Examine media aimed at different audiences to decode policy signals aimed at specific audiences
4. Look for signals of policy debate, early signs of policy shifts in lower level, less authoritative media
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AUTHORITATIVENESS
Basic point: All media are NOT created equal
• Authoritativeness: the degree to which a report in controlled media reflects the views of the highest levels of the PRC party and government
• Examination of the levels of authoritativeness through which PRC media sends messages can shed light on the degree of leadership involvement in and concern over an issue
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LEVELS OF AUTHORITATIVENESS IN PRC MEDiA
1. Major party documents, government work reports
2. Statements by PRC leaders—the higher the leader’s rank, the more authoritative the statement is
3. Renmin Ribao Editorials
4. Renmin Ribao Commentator Articles
5. Signed articles in Renmin Ribao—level of authoritativeness depends on who signs them
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LEVELS OF AUTHORITATIVENESS—PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
• Government statements
• Foreign Ministry statements
• Statements by Foreign Ministry spokesman, other government spokespersons
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COMPARISON OF MEDIA FORMULAS AND PATTERS
Basic point: Never take anything at face value
• PRC controlled media tends to be formulaic
• Comparison of changes in formulas over time can provide insight into changing PRC policy priorities and views
• Applies not only to language used in PRC media, but to images, patterns of TV coverage, and placement in a media outlet
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CHINA’S CHANGING DESCRIPTIONS OF ITS TIES WITH NORTH KOREA
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“Closer than lips and teeth ( 1950s-early 1990s)
“Brotherly Countries” ( 2000)
“Friendly neighbors” (July 2006)
“Normal State-to State relations” (April 2009)
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CHANGING MEDIA PATTERNS
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China Daily website, cartoon in Chinese on North Korean missile launch, entitled “Unrealistic Forward Movement, “ 14 April 2012
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DECODING MESSAGES AIMED AT SPECIFIC AUDIENCES
The PRC sometimes uses media outlets aimed at specific audiences to send policy signals to those audiences
• China’s official English-language newspaper China Daily
• Xinhua’s English-language service
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IDENTIFYING SIGNS OF POLICY DEBATE
Lower-level, less authoritative media sometimes provide signs of debate
• These media are not controlled as rigorously as central media
• But because all PRC media are controlled to some extent, views would not appear without some degree of official support, especially in government-affiliated think-tank journals
• CAVEAT: While these articles may reflect thinking in some officials circles, they do not speak for the Chinese Government or represent its official, consensus position
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IDENTIFYING SIGNS OF POLICY DEBATE
Some specialized publications allowed greater scope for debate
• Mainly on economic issues
• Also some foreign policy issues—relations with Japan, DPRK, China’s role in the world
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ROLE OF PRC-OWNED HONG KONG MEDIA
Beijing sometimes uses this media to air issues, send signals it deems too sensitive to discuss in domestic media
Early signs of tougher line toward DPRK
Early signs of opening to the KMT
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ROLE OF PRC-OWNED HONG KONG MEDIA
WARNING: Not everything in PRC-owned Hong Kong media is a policy signal from Beijing or a sign of debate
Articles are more likely to be signals if they:
• Quote or are authored by a well-connected PRC scholar
• Are picked up by other PRC-owned Hong Kong media outlets
• Are picked up or quoted in lower-level mainland media
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SUMMING UP
1. When reading PRC central media, always remember:
• Not all media are created equal—pay attention to authoritativeness• Never take anything at face value
2. Media environments are dynamic and constantly changing
• Never take anything for granted
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Marcella B Northeast Asia Program, Senior Analyst
Jonathan LNortheast Asia Program, Open Source Officer
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