Cloud Computing Security: From Single toMulti-Clouds
Abstract:
The use of cloud computing has increased rapidly in many organizations. Cloud computing
provides many benefits in terms of low cost and accessibility of data. Ensuring the security of
cloud computing is a major factor in the cloud computing environment, as users often store
sensitive information with cloud storage providers but these providers may be untrusted. Dealing
with “single cloud” providers is predicted to become less popular with customers due to risks of
service availability failure and the possibility of malicious insiders in the single cloud. A
movement towards “multi-clouds”, or in other words, “interclouds” or “cloud-ofclouds” has
emerged recently. This paper surveys recent research related to single and multi-cloud security
and addresses possible solutions. It is found that the research into the use of multicloud providers
to maintain security has received less attention from the research community than has the use of
single clouds. This work aims to promote the use of multi-clouds due to its ability to reduce
security risks.
Algorithm Used:
Secret Sharing Algorithms:
Data stored in the cloud can be compromised or lost. So, we have to come up with a way to
secure those files. We can encrypt them before storing them in the cloud, which sorts out the
disclosure aspects. However, what if the data is lost due to some catastrophe befalling the cloud
service provider? We could store it on more than one cloud service and encrypt it before we send
it off. Each of them will have the same file. What if we use an insecure, easily guessable
password to protect the 2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences file, or
the same one to protect all files? I have often thought that secret sharing algorithms could be
employed to good effect in these circumstances instead.
Background
The use of cloud computing has increased rapidly in many organizations. Subashini and Kavitha
argue that small and medium companies use cloud computing services for various reasons,
including because these services provide fast access to their applications and reduce their
infrastructure costs. Cloud providers should address privacy and security issues as a matter of
high and urgent priority. Dealing with “single cloud” providers is becoming less popular with
customers due to potential problems such as service availability failure and the possibility that
there are malicious insiders in the single cloud. In recent years, there has been a move towards
“multiclouds”, “intercloud” or “cloud-of-clouds”. This paper focuses on the issues related to the
data security aspect of cloud computing. As data and information will be shared with a third
party, cloud computing users want to avoid an untrusted cloud provider. Protecting private and
important information, such as credit card details or a patient’s medical records from attackers or
malicious insiders is of critical importance. In addition, the potential for migration from a single
cloud to a multi-cloud environment is examined and research related to security issues in single
and multi-clouds in cloud computing are surveyed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
The System describes the beginning of cloud computing and its components. In addition, it
presents examples of cloud providers and the benefits of using their services. The system
discusses security risks in cloud computing. System analyses the new generation of cloud
computing, that is, multi-clouds and recent solutions to address the security of cloud computing,
as well as examining their limitations. The System presents suggestions for future work.
NIST describes cloud computing as “a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction”.
The three key cloud delivery models are infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service
(PaaS), and software as a service (SaaS). In IaaS, the user can benefit from networking
infrastructure facilities, data storage and computing services. In other words, it is the delivery of
computer infrastructure as a service. An example of IaaS is the Amazon web service. In PaaS,
the user runs custom applications using the service provider’s resources. It is the delivery of a
computing platform and solution as a service. An example of PaaS is Google Apps. Running
software on the provider’s infrastructure and providing licensed applications to users to use
services is known as SaaS. An example of SaaS is the Salesforce.com CRM application. This
model represents the second layer in the cloud environment architecture.
Cloud deployment models include public, private, community, and hybrid clouds. A cloud
environment that is accessible for multi-tenants and is available to the public is called a public
cloud. A private cloud is available for a particular group, while a community cloud is modified
for a specific group of customers. Hybrid cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more
clouds (private, community, or public cloud). This model represents the third layer in the cloud
environment architecture. Kamara and Lauter present two types of cloud infrastructure only,
namely private and public clouds. The infrastructure that is owned and managed by users is in
the private cloud. Data that is accessed and controlled by trusted users is in a safe and secure
private cloud, whereas the infrastructure that is managed and controlled by the cloud service
provider is in a public cloud. In particular, this data is out of the user’s control, and is managed
and shared with unsafe and un trusted servers.
Cloud Service Providers Examples
In the commercial world, various computing needs are provided as a service. The service
providers take care of the customer's needs by, for example, maintaining software or purchasing
expensive hardware. For instance, the service EC2, created by Amazon, provides customers with
scalable servers. As another example, under the CLuE program, NSF joined with Google and
IBM to offer academic institutions access to a large-scale distributed infrastructure. There are
many features of cloud computing. First, cloud storages, such as Amazon S3, Microsoft
SkyDrive, or NirvanixCLoudNAS, permit consumers to access online data. Second, it provides
computation resources for users such as Amazon EC2. Third, Google Apps or versioning
repositories for source code are examples of online collaboration tools. Cloud service providers
should ensure the security of their customers’ data and should be responsible if any security risk
affects their customers’ service infrastructure. A cloud provider offers many services that can
benefit its customers, such as fast access to their data from any location, scalability, pay-for-use,
data storage, data recovery, protection against hackers, on-demand security controls, and use of
the network and infrastructure facilities. Reliability and availability are other benefits of the
public cloud, in addition to low cost. However, there are also concerning issues for public cloud
computing, most notably, issues surrounding data integrity and data confidentiality. Any
customer will be worried about the security of sensitive information such as medical records or
financial information.
Security Risks in Cloud Computing
Although cloud service providers can offer benefits to users, security risks play a major role in
the cloud computing environment. Users of online data sharing or network facilities are aware of
the potential loss of privacy. According to a recent IDC survey , the top challenge for 74% of
CIOs in relation to cloud computing is security. Protecting private and important information
such as credit card details or patients’ medical records from attackers or malicious insiders is of
critical importance. Moving databases to a large data centre involves many security challenges
such as virtualization vulnerability, accessibility vulnerability, privacy and control issues related
to data accessed from a third party, integrity, confidentiality, and data loss or theft. Subashini and
Kavitha present some fundamental security challenges, which are data storage security,
application security, data transmission security, and security related to third-party resources.
In different cloud service models, the security responsibility between users and providers is
different. According to Amazon, their EC2 addresses security control in relation to physical,
environmental, and virtualization security, whereas, the users remain responsible for addressing
security control of the IT system including the operating systems, applications and data.
According to Tabakiet al. the way the responsibility for privacy and security in a cloud
computing environment is shared between consumers and cloud service providers differs
between delivery models. In SaaS, cloud providers are more responsible for the security and
privacy of application services than the users. This responsibility is more relevant to the public
than the private cloud environment because the clients need more strict security requirements in
the public cloud. In PaaS, users are responsible for taking care of the applications that they build
and run on the platform, while cloud providers are responsible for protecting one user’s
applications from others. In IaaS, users are responsible for protecting operating systems and
applications, whereas cloud providers must provide protection for the users’ data. Ristenpartet al
claim that the levels of security issues in IaaS are different. The impact of security issues in the
public cloud is greater than the impact in the private cloud. For instance, any damage which
occurs to the security of the physical infrastructure or any failure in relation to the management
of the security of the infrastructure will cause many problems. In the cloud environment, the
physical infrastructure that is responsible for data processing and data storage can be affected by
a security risk.
Data Integrity
One of the most important issues related to cloud security risks is data integrity. The data stored
in the cloud may suffer from damage during transition operations from or to the cloud storage
provider. Cachinet give examples of the risk of attacks from both inside and outside the cloud
provider, such as the recently attacked Red Hat Linux’s distribution servers. Another example of
breached data occurred in 2009 in Google Docs, which triggered the Electronic Privacy
Information Centre for the Federal Trade Commission to open an investigation into Google’s
Cloud Computing Services. Another example of a risk to data integrity recently occurred in
Amazon S3 where users suffered from data corruption. Cachinet system argue that when
multiple clients use cloud storage or when multiple devices are synchronized by one user, it is
difficult to address the data corruption issue. One of the solutions that they propose is to use a
Byzantine fault-tolerant replication protocol within the cloud. Hendricks et al. state that this
solution can avoid data corruption caused by some components in the cloud. However, Cachinet
al. claim that using the Byzantine fault tolerant replication protocol within the cloud is unsuitable
due to the fact that the servers belonging to cloud providers use the same system installations and
are physically located in the same place.
Literature Survey:
1. SPORC: Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources
Cloud-based services are an attractive deployment model for user-facing applications like word
processing and calendaring. Unlike desktop applications, cloud services allow multiple users to
edit shared state concurrently and in real-time, while being scalable, highly available, and
globally accessible. Unfortunately, these benefits come at the cost of fully trusting cloud
providers with potentially sensitive and important data. To overcome this strict tradeoff, we
present SPORC, a generic framework for building a wide variety of collaborative applications
with untrusted servers. In SPORC, a server observes only encrypted data and cannot deviate
from correct execution without being detected. SPORC allows concurrent, low-latency editing of
shared state, permits disconnected operation, and supports dynamic access control even in the
presence of concurrency. We demonstrate SPORC’s flexibility through two prototype
applications: a causally-consistent key-value store and a browser-based collaborative text editor.
Conceptually, SPORC illustrates the complementary benefits of operational transformation (OT)
and fork* consistency. The former allows SPORC clients to execute concurrent operations
without locking and to resolve any resulting conflicts automatically. The latter prevents a
misbehaving server from equivocating about the order of operations unless it is willing to fork
clients into disjoint sets. Notably, unlike previous systems, SPORC can automatically recover
from such malicious forks by leveraging OT’s conflict resolution mechanism.
Disadvantages
1. The data integrity is proving only based on the filename and not on the file blocks or
any other public key.
2. The attackers details are not dynamic instead its maintaining the log files to store the
attacker details and viewing using data mining concepts which is time consuming job and
less security.
2. Authentication and Integrity in Outsourced Databases
In the Outsourced Database (ODB) model, entities outsource their data management needs to
third-party service providers. Such a service provider offers mechanisms for its clients to create,
store, update and access (query) their databases. This work provides mechanisms to ensure data
integrity and authenticity for outsourced databases. Specifically, this work provides mechanisms
that assure the querier that the query results have not been tampered with and are authentic (with
respect to the actual data owner). It investigates both security and efficiency aspects of the
problem and constructs several secure and practical schemes that facilitate integrity and
authenticity of query replies while incurring low computational and communication costs.
Disadvantages
1. There is no feature of automatic blocking the cloud server attackers.
2. Owner data will be stored in un trusted cloud servers.
3. Ensuring Data Storage Security in Cloud Computing
Cloud Computing has been envisioned as the next generation architecture of IT Enterprise. In
contrast to traditional solutions, where the IT services are under proper physical, logical and
personnel controls, Cloud Computing moves the application software and databases to the large
data centers, where the management of the data and services may not be fully trustworthy. This
unique attribute, however, poses many new security challenges which have not been well
understood. In this article, we focus on cloud data storage security, which has always been an
important aspect of quality of service. To ensure the correctness of users’ data in the cloud, we
propose an effective and flexible distributed scheme with two salient features, opposing to its
predecessors. By utilizing the homomorphic token with distributed verification of erasure-coded
data, our scheme achieves the integration of storage correctness insurance and data error
localization, i.e., the identification of misbehaving server(s). Unlike most prior works, the new
scheme further supports secure and efficient dynamic operations on data blocks, including: data
update, delete and append. Extensive security and performance analysis shows that the proposed
scheme is highly efficient and resilient against Byzantine failure, malicious data modification
attack, and even server colluding attacks.
Disadvantages
1. There is no feature of automatic blocking the cloud server attackers.
2. Less Security – No cryptographic technique is used on the cloud data
System Architecture
Existing System:
Cloud providers should address privacy and security issues as a matter of high and urgent
priority. Dealing with “single cloud” providers is becoming less popular with customers due to
potential problems such as service availability failure and the possibility that there are malicious
insiders in the single cloud. In recent years, there has been a move towards “multiclouds”,
“intercloud” or “cloud-of-clouds”.
Disadvantages:
1. Cloud providers should address privacy and security issues as a matter of high and urgent
priority.
2. Dealing with “single cloud” providers is becoming less popular with customers due to
potential problems such as service availability failure and the possibility that there are malicious
insiders in the single cloud.
Proposed System:
This paper focuses on the issues related to the data security aspect of cloud computing. As data
and information will be shared with a third party, cloud computing users want to avoid an un
trusted cloud provider. Protecting private and important information, such as credit card details
or a patient’s medical records from attackers or malicious insiders is of critical importance. In
addition, the potential for migration from a single cloud to a multi-cloud environment is
examined and research related to security issues in single and multi-clouds in cloud computing
are surveyed.
Advantages:
1. Data Integrity
2. Service Availability.
3. The user runs custom applications using the service provider’s resources
4. Cloud service providers should ensure the security of their customers’ data and should be
responsible if any security risk affects their customers’ service infrastructure.
SYSTEM REQUIREMENT:
This Chapter describes about the requirements. It specifies the hardware and software
requirements that are required in order to run the application properly. The Software
Requirement Specification (SRS) is explained in detail, which includes overview of this
dissertation as well as the functional and non-functional requirement of this dissertation.
SRS for Single To Multi Cloud
Functional Control the file access at cloud server, Data Integrity Proof
at TPA. File Privacy Management
Non- Functional Cloud servers never monitors and controls the TPA
External interface LAN , Routers
Performance Finding File Hacker Information, File Sharing efficiency
fairness
Attributes File Management,tpa,cloud server,owner,Remote Users,
Blocked Users,Multi Cloud
Table: 3.1 Summaries of SRS
Functional Requirements
Functional Requirement defines a function of a software system and how the system must
behave when presented with specific inputs or conditions. These may include calculations, data
manipulation and processing and other specific functionality. In this system following are the
functional requirements:-
The Owner will divide the file into ‘N’ number of blocks and has to upload the each block the
individual cloud servers.
The Cloud server has to authorize the valid remote users. if the Remote user is hacker then he
has to block in the cloud server. The data should be integrated by the cloud server.
The Third party auditor has to maintain the error localization and has to monitor the Cloud
Server Activities.
The Remote user has to user correct Secret key and file name. If anyone is wrong then he is
detected as attacker.
The Attributes are File Management, tpa, cloud server, owner, Remote user and blocked user.
Non – Functional Requirements
Non – Functional requirements, as the name suggests, are those requirements that are not
directly concerned with the specific functions delivered by the system. They may relate to
emergent system properties such as reliability response time and store occupancy. Alternatively,
they may define constraints on the system such as the capability of the Input Output devices and
the data representations used in system interfaces. Many non-functional requirements relate to
the system as whole rather than to individual system features. This means they are often critical
than the individual functional requirements. The following non-functional requirements are
worthy of attention.
The key non-functional requirements are:
Security: The system should allow a secured communication between Cs and
TPA, User and File Owner
Energy Efficiency: The Energy consumed by the Users to receive the File information
from the cloud server
Reliability: The system should be reliable and must not degrade the performance of the
existing system and should not lead to the hanging of the system.
Performance
The network performance can be determined by few terms such as the cloud busy time, File
utilization level, efficiency, fairness and imbalance. The amount of the time the cs allocated for
File transmission and reception is called cs busy time. Similarly channel is sometimes being idle
during communication. The unit of time which makes delay to transmit a packet is called channel
access delay time. The channel or medium utilization level can be defined as average rate of
reliable packets delivered through the channel. The MAC layer utilization level can be
determined by noticing whether the medium is busy or idle. The binary values are used for
indicating MAC layer utilization level. 1,0 are used for indicating channel is now busy or idle
respectively.
The main factor deciding buffer overflow is interface queue length when the queue length is
limited in the network. The main terms that are to be calculated to determine the network
performance are efficiency, fairness and imbalance.
The efficiency of the communication is calculated by number hops the successful packets
travelled to the total number of packets placed (dropped and retransmitted also included) in the
Network.
Problem Definition
The problem of the system incorporates the previous system advantages and extends to find the
unauthorized user, to prevent the unauthorized data access for preserving data integrity. The
proposed system monitors the user requests according the user specified parameters and it checks
the parameters for the new and existing users.
The system accepts existing validated user, and prompts for the new users for the parameter to
match requirement specified during user creation for new users. If the new user prompts
parameter matches with cloud server, it gives privileges to access the Audit protocol author wise
the system automatically blocks the Audit protocol for specific user.
Objective
The Objective of the system is to Block the attackers in cloud servers automatically using
automatic protocol, computing the cloud securely, secret sharing with Byzantine failure and
proving the data integrity and batch auditing by the data owners.
Module Description:
1. Data Integrity
2. Data Intrusion
3. Service Availability
4. Dep SKy System Model
Data Integrity:
One of the most important issues related to cloud security risks is data integrity. The data stored
in the cloud may suffer from damage during transition operations from or to the cloud storage
provider. Cachinet al. give examples of the risk of attacks from both inside and outside the cloud
provider, such as the recently attacked Red Hat Linux’s distribution servers. One of the solutions
that they propose is to use a Byzantine fault-tolerant replication protocol within the cloud.
Hendricks et al. State that this solution can avoid data corruption caused by some components in
the cloud. However, Cachinet al.Claim that using the Byzantine faulttolerant replication protocol
within the cloud is unsuitable due to the fact that the servers belonging to cloud providers use the
same system installations and are physically located in the same place.
Data Intrusion:
According to Garfinkel, another security risk that may occur with a cloud provider, such as the
Amazon cloud service, is a hacked password or data intrusion. If someone gains access to an
Amazon account password, they will be able to access all of the account’s instances and
resources. Thus the stolen password allows the hacker to erase all the information inside any
virtual machine instance for the stolen user account, modify it, or even disable its services.
Furthermore, there is a possibility for the user’s email(Amazon user name) to be hacked (see for
a discussion of the potential risks of email), and since Amazon allows a lost password to be reset
by email, the hacker may still be able to log in to the account after receiving the new reset
password.
Service Availability:
Another major concern in cloud services is service availability. Amazon mentions in its licensing
agreement that it is possible that the service might be unavailable from time to time. The user’s
web service may terminate for any reason at any time if any user’s files break the cloud storage
policy. In addition, if any damage occurs to any Amazon web service and the service fails, in this
case there will be no charge to the Amazon Company for this failure. Companies seeking to
protect services from such failure need measures such as backups or use of multiple providers.
DepSKy System Model:
The DepSky system model contains three parts: readers, writers, and four cloud storage
providers, where readers and writers are the client’s tasks. Bessani et al. explain the difference
between readers and writers for cloud storage. Readers can fail arbitrarily (for example, they can
fail by crashing, they can fail from time to time and then display any behavior) whereas, writers
only fail by crashing.
Cryptography Techniques
Implementing Elliptic curve cryptography for encrypting and decrypting the owner data.
System Configuration:-
H/W System Configuration:-
Processor - Pentium –III
Speed - 1.1 Ghz
RAM - 256 MB(min)
Hard Disk - 20 GB
Floppy Drive - 1.44 MB
Key Board - Standard Windows Keyboard
Mouse - Two or Three Button Mouse
Monitor – SVGA
S/W System Configuration:-
Operating System : Windows95/98/2000/XP
Application Server : Tomcat5.0/6.X
Front End : Java (AWT,Swing,RMI,Networking)
Scripts : JavaScript.
Database Connectivity : Mysql.
Future Enhancement #1 Generating Alerts On Mobile Devices
Using MaxAccu Cloak Algorithm
In location-based services, users with location-aware mobile devices are able to
make queries about their surroundings anywhere and at any time. While this ubiquitous
computing paradigm brings great convenience for information access, it also raises concerns
over potential intrusion into user location privacy. To protect location privacy, one typical
approach is to cloak user locations into spatial regions based on user-specified privacy
requirements, and to transform location-based queries into region-based queries. In this paper,
we identify and address three new issues concerning this location cloaking approach. First, we
study the representation of cloaking regions and show that a circular region generally leads to a
small result size for region based queries.
Second, we develop a mobility-aware location cloaking technique to resist trace
analysis attacks. Two cloaking algorithms, namely MaxAccu Cloak and MinComm Cloak , are
designed based on different performance objectives. Finally, we develop an efficient polynomial
algorithm for evaluating circularregion- based kNN queries. Two query processing modes,
namely bulk and progressive, are presented to return query results either all at once or in an
incremental manner. Experimental results show that our proposed mobility-aware cloaking
algorithms significantly improve the quality of location cloaking in terms of an entropy measure
without compromising much on query latency or communication cost. Moreover, the progressive
query processing mode achieves a shorter response time than the bulk mode by parallelizing the
query evaluation and result transmission.
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