Shubra Bhattacharyya

IS CYBER WARFARE A RELEVANT PART OF THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

INTRODUCTION• Cyber War – “Actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or

networks for the purpose of causing damage or disruption” - Richard Clarke , former special advisor to the US President

• Cyberspace is different

• Ability to mobilize users/netizens

• Ability to provide large quantity of information

• Ability to shrink distances

IS IT REALLY A PLACE?• “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from

Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.”

–John Perry Barlow, a Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 1996

CYBERLIBERALISM VS CYBERREALISM• Both acknowledge cyberspace as a new type of territory which is anarchic.

• However they differ in :

• Understanding of agent-structure debate

• Likelihood of regulating action within Cyber space

• Whether it represents ungoverned or merely unclaimed territory

THE LIBERAL VIEW• The two strands

• The Utopian and

• The Regulators

• Both are optimistic about:

• cyberspace’s democratizing and liberating potential

• The actor learning in a peaceful and progressive direction

• However, utopians see cyberspace’s development as an organic growth process, while regulators believe its happening due to international cooperation.

UTOPIAN VS. REGULATORS

UTOPIANS REGULATORS

Part of the “World we live in” Alternate Universe

Information as a free good

Information as a collective good.

THE REALIST VIEW• Cyberspace is a technological change in the existing international system—rather than a

new creation.

• Extension of battlefield as well as marketplace

• Not a revolutionary space.

• Cyberspace is capitalist , not socialist.

THE REALIST VIEW (CONTD..)• Advantages of the Cyberspace :

• Force Multiplier

• Enables the quest for strategic paralysis

• Cyberspace’s unique open, anarchic system is a danger rather than an opportunity.

CYBERWARFARE

• Stuxnet

• China – Taiwan, China – US Conflict

• Russian CW against Estonia

• Is CW a strategic weapon?

• Can CW be employed with the intent to achieve a strategic political agenda?

• Did the targeted nations concede a strategic political objective?

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA• Background

• Early 2007 Estonian Government decides to relocate a World War II Soviet War Memorial from the capital city of Tallinn to a military cemetery outside of the city.

• The Russian government as well as many Russia citizens are outraged at the perceived slight.

• It is generally accepted that this was the catalyst for the cyber attacks that occurred soon after the uproar over the war memorial

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions before the attack

• Diplomatic :

• Estonia adopted a look West policy

• Increases diplomatic relations with other Central European States.

• Starting in 2005 Estonia starts to diplomatically distance itself from Russia.

• Estonia wanted to interact with Russia as an equal nation.

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions before the attack

• Information

• Few countries in the world to allow voting to occur over the Internet

• Aggressively embraced the information age

• 90% of people aged between 12 – 24 use internet

• 58% of people aged between 24 – 49

• 95% Banking transactions conducted electronically

• Information security procedures were not capable of preventing the attacks, but once started they were able to respond effectively.

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions before the attack

• Military

• In 2006 – 2007 Estonia increased military spending as it wanted to become a contributing partner in EU and NATO.

• Wanted to distance itself from security reliance on Russia.

• Instead wanted to pursue a “Look West” military policy

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions before the attack

• Economic

• Baltic Economic Powerhouse in 2006

• Information Technology (IT) was among the most significant economic sectors

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Summary of the Attack

• Primary target were government and government related internet sites.

• Civilian sites were also targeted but no military sites were attacked.

• The Internet security professionals were unable to defend their systems from attacks which initially were originating from .ru domain but then the attacks started originating from all across the world.

• A complete shut down of traffic coming into Estonia from the international community had to be enforced.

As per Martin Libicki CW can be used for

Espionage

Disruption Corruption Distraction

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions after the attack:

• Diplomatic

• Diplomatic stance towards Russia deteriorated.

• Ties with Western allies strengthened immediately as Western government went to Estonia’s aid.

• Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Ford said in 2007 the Baltic states, “will never be left alone again, whether threatened by old, new, or virtual threats. . . .”

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions after the attack:

• Information

• Estonia looked to NATO and the EU for increased protection of its information infrastructure

• In response NATO established a “Centre of Excellence” in Tallinn within one year of the attacks to conduct training and research into CW.

• Estonia developed sophisticated policies and strategies to safeguard its information infrastructure, specifically through published information security strategy doctrine (Cyber Security Strategy, Estonian Ministry of Defence 2008).

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions after the attack:

• Military

• Maintained all military and NATO military commitments and did not modify any domestic military programs.

• Published strategy for Cyber Security.

• Rather than avoid the potential dangers of CW as a result of the cyber attack, Estonia moved aggressively to develop measures to prevent CW within a year of the attacks.

RUSSIAN CW AGAINST ESTONIA(CONTD.)• Conditions after the attack:

• Economic

• Despite efforts by Russia to Estonian Economy, Estonia continued to perform well for the rest of 2007.

IS IT RELEVANT?• Is CW a strategic weapon?

• No, but future possibilities are there where it can be used as a strategic weapon. And this might lead to a security dilemma.

• Can CW be employed with the intent to achieve a strategic political agenda?

• Yes. The intent for causing changes in Diplomatic, Information and Economic power was there although Russia failed in its objectives.

• Did the targeted nation concede a strategic political objective?

• No, but the opposite happened. Estonia forged quick alliances and distanced itself from Russia.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CW• Incidents in real world can lead to actions in cyberspace and vice versa.

• Identifying the true enemy could be a problem.

• Low costs of entry with potentially high returns on investment.

• Attractive tool for waging asymmetric war.

• Non Violent means of coercion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY• Ed Pilkington, “Washington moves to classify cyber-attacks as acts of war”, 31.05.2011, The

Guardian, accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/31/washington-moves-to-classify-cyber-attacks

• Nicholas C. Rueter, Department of Political Science Duke University, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, 2011

• Stuart S. Malawer, Cyber Warfare:Law and Policy Proposals for U.S. and Global Governance, VIRGINIA LAWYER, February 2010, Vol. 58

• Mary McEvoy Manjikian, “From Global Village to Virtual Battlespace:The Colonizing of the Internet and the Extension of Realpolitik”, International Studies Quarterly (2010) 54, 381–401

• BRADLEY L. BOYD, CYBER WARFARE: ARMAGEDDON IN A TEACUP?, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Feb – Dec 2009

• Misha Glenny, “Cyber-weaponry, virtual battlefields and the changing face of global warfare”, 16.05.2011, The Guardian, accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/16/cybercrime-warfare-stuxnet-weapons-hacking?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487

• Cyber Security Strategy, Cyber Security Strategy Committee, Ministry of Defence, Estonia, 2008