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Descartes on the Power of "Ideas"Author(s): Stephen I. WagnerSource: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), pp. 287-297Published by: University of Illinois Presson behalf of North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744708.
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History
of
Philosophy
Quarterly
Volume
13,
Number
3,
July
1996
DESCARTES ON
THE
POWER OF IDEAS
Stephen
I.
Wagner
Descartes'discussion
of
ideas
in
Meditation
III
is often
seen as
the
most
problematic
element
in
his
metaphysical
project.
A
previous
paper
in
this journal offers a reading ofMeditation II which attributes toDescartes
a
conception
of the
mind
as
an
active
power.1
That
view
can
provide
a
range
of
clarifications
to
Descartes'Meditation
III
theory
of
ideas.
This
paper
will
spell
out the most
central
of
those clarifications.
Even
though
this discussion of
Descartes'theory
of
ideas
does
derive
from
an
earlier
analysis
ofMeditation
II,
it
need
not
be
seen
as
dependent
on
the
validity
ofthat
analysis.
Our initial claims
about
the nature
of
mind
can
be
considered
along
the
lines
of
Descartes'
own
approach
in Part
VI
of
the Discourse
on
Method,
with
regard
to the
suppositions
he
employs
in
theOptics and theMeteorology. He tells
us
inDiscourse VI that he thinks
he
can
deduce
these
suppositions
from his
primary
truths,
but
that
in
his
presentation
he would
simply
allow the
causes
to
be
proved
by
the
ef
fects ?that
is,
he
would
take the
explanatory
force of
these
suppositions
as
constituting
such
proof.
Our claims about the mind's
nature
can
be
derived
from
the Meditation
II text.
But
the
present
discussion
need
not
presuppose
the
validity
ofthat derivation?the results ofthat
analysis
may
also be taken
as
suppositions.
With these
as
starting points,
we
will
be
led
to
a
range
of
clarifications
to
Descartes'
discussion
of ideas
inMedita
tion III. These
effects
can
serve
to
furnish,
ifnot
proof,
at
least
support
for the
explanatory
causes.
I.
The Meditation II
Discoveries
Our first claim
is
that theMeditation
II
thinker discovers themind
to
be
an
active
power,
whose
cognitive
activity
consists
in
the
generating
of
representations.
All
of
the
mind's
cognitive
acts
are
discovered
to
involve
some
degree
of
generative activity?from
the
most
perfect
exercises ofthat
power
in
generating
clear
and distinct
perceptions,
to
the
less
perfect
exercises
in
our
imaginings
and
sensings.
Our
second claim
is
that
this
discovery
is
achieved
by recognizing
that,
in
each of
our
thoughts,
the
power
affecting
our
will is
a
reflection
of the
mind's
generative
power.
For
example,
the
clear
and
distinct
perception
of
the
piece
of
wax
has
two
components?the
representation
of
the
wax as
287
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288
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY
QUARTERLY
extended,
which
is
a
representation
generated
by
the
intellect,
and
the
power
compelling
our
assent,
which is a
representation
of the mind's
activity.
In
our
perceptions
which
are
not
clear
and
distinct,
this
power
is
experienced
as
a
less
forceful inclination of the will.
In
addition
to
the
recognition
of these individual
thoughts
as
generative
acts,
Meditation
II
provides
the
thinker
with
a
clear and distinct
perception
of the
mind
itself
as
a
thinking thing.
This
perception,
also
self-generated,
is achieved
by
consolidating
the
spectrum
of
representations
of the mind's
activity
into
a
single representation,
which
consists
wholly
of
a
power
affecting
the meditator's
will.
The
generation
of this idea of the mind
explains
Descartes' claim in the
Synopsis
that
Meditation
II
enables
themeditator
to
form
a
concept
of
the
soul
which
is
as
clear
as
possible
and is also
quite
distinct from
every
concept
of
body
(AT
VII,
13;
CSM
II,
9).2
The natures ofmind and
body
are
presented
in
our
clear and
distinct
perceptions
of
each.
The
clear
and
distinct
perception
of
mind
represents
it
as
a
generative
power,
capable
of
operating
on
its
own?as
such,
it
qualifies
as
the idea
of
a
substance.
The
perception
of
body
includes
no
representation
of
power
and
no
compelling
ground
for
concluding
that it exists.
Finally, these discoveries lead the meditator to an understanding of the
meanings
of
thought
and existence.
Thinking
is
seen
to
signify
the
causal
activity
of
generating
ideas.
Existing
is taken
to
signify
an
exer
cise
of
causal
power.
Thus,
the meditator
is
justified
in
concluding
that
whenever
he
thinks,
he
exists.
Given
these
claims,
we can
turn to
Descartes' discussion
of ideas
in
Meditation III.
We
will look
first
at
the clarifications
provided
for
our
understanding
of
objective
reality,
formal
reality
and the causal laws.
We
will then
look
briefly
at
the
impact
of
our
perspective
on
material
falsity
and the idea ofGod.
II.
OBJECTIVE
REALITY
AND
THE
CAUSAL
LAWS
Descartes' discussion of
ideas
inMeditation
III is
primarily
in the
service
of
deciding
whether
he
can
conclude
to
the
existence
of
anything
other
than
himself.
After
rejecting
his
natural
inclinations
as
a
reliable
guide
for
deciding
that
any
of his
ideas
are
not
self-generated,
Descartes
develops
another
way
of
proceeding:
But it
now occurs
to
me
that there
is
another
way
of
investigating
whether
some of the things ofwhich I possess ideas exist outside me. In so far as the
ideas
are
simply
modes of
thought,
there is
no
recognizable
inequality
among
them:
they
all
appear
to
come
from
within
me
in
the
same
fashion.
(AT
VII, 39-40;
CSM
II,
27-28).
Taking
an
idea
as
a
mode
of
the
mind
is
taking
it
materially ?as
an
operation
of
the
intellect,
as
the
Meditations'
Preface
tells
us.
On
our
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8/11/2019 Descartes on the Power of Ideas
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290
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY
QUARTERLY
tion
from within
experience.
And since the
power
representing
the mind
is the
power
to
generate
any
and all ofour
ideas,
itwill effectamore forceful
inclination
of the will than the
power
experienced
in the
idea of
the
wax.
Thus,
the
idea of the
mind
will,
as
Descartes
puts
it,
undoubtedly
be
seen
to
have
more
objective reality.
A
few clarifications
are
in
order here.
First,
this
reading
of
objective
reality
leads the meditator
to
identify
reality
with
power
and,
given
the
Meditation
II
result,
to
equate
both
of
these with
existence. This three
fold identification
is
supported
by
Descartes'
later
characterization of
objective
reality
as
the
mode
of
being
by
which
a
thing
exists
objectively
in the intellect byway of an idea (ATVII, 41; CSM II, 29). We can note
too
that the
suggestion
made
by
many
commentators
that
objective
reality
must
be
identified
with
possible
existence
is
in
fact
appropriate.
But
within the
order
of
reasons,
an
understanding
of
necessary
existence
has
not
yet
been
achieved,
so
the
meditator does
not
yet
have
the
resources
to
make that finer distinction.
The statement
just
quoted
leads
us
to
a
second
point.
Descartes
charac
terizes
objective
reality
as
the
way
inwhich
a
thing
exists
in
the
intellect,
and
this
might
seem
to
suggest
that
it is
a
mistake
to
explicate
it
as a
power
affecting the will. But Descartes' comments
to
Mersenne
in
January
1641
are
helpful
here:
I
claim that
we
have ideas
not
only
of all that
is
in
our
intellect,
but
also of
all
that
is in
the will. For
we
cannot will
anything
without
knowing
that
we
will
it,
nor
could
we
know this
except by
means
of
an
idea.
. .
.
(AT
III,
295;
CSMK
III,
1724).
We
are
reminded
here
that
our
entire discussion
of
ideas
is
conducted
from
a
self-reflective
posture.
From
this
posture,
the inclinations
of
the
will,
as
they
are
experienced
in
our
thoughts,
can
be
apprehended
and
can
serve
as
ideas
of
the mind and
its
modes.
A final
clarification
is
provided by
E.J. Ashworth's criticism of
Descartes'
grading
of
the
objective
realities
of his ideas:
.
. .
how
are we
to
grade
the
reality
of ideas?
.
. .
Having
a
high grade
of
reality
must
involve
having
certain sorts of
property
to
a
high
degree, including
causal
efficacy
or
creative
power.
How
can
any
of these be
assigned
to
my
ideas?5
Ashworth's
questions help
focus
our
proposals
in
an
important
way.
Our
ideas
can
be
assigned
causal
efficacy
not
in
the
sense
that
they
them
selves
are
causally
efficacious;
rather
they
contain
objective reality
in
that
they
exhibit
an
exercise
of
causal
power.
The meditator's
understanding
that the
power
exhibited
is
a
reflection
of
the
mind's
creative
activity
of
generating
ideas
captures
the
sense
in
which
objective
reality
is
indeed
a
representative
reality.
Returning
to
the
text,
we can
now
see
how Descartes'introduction of
his
first
causal
principle
is
grounded:
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DESCARTES
ON
THE
POWER
OF
IDEAS
291
Now it is
manifest
by
the natural
light
that
there
must
be
at
least
as
much
in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. For
where,
I
ask,
could the effect
get
its
reality
from,
if
not
from
the cause?
And
how
could the
cause
give
it to
the effect unless
it
possessed
it?
(AT
VII,
40;
CSM
II,
28).
Our
perspective
makes
plausible
this claim of
proportionality
between
the
effect
and its cause.
As
a
result
of the
Meditation
II
discoveries,
the
meditator
in
fact takes
objective reality
to
be
an
effect,
since
the
power
moving
our
will
is
understood
to
be
a
reflection of the
mind's
generative
activity.
Insofar
as
it
is
such
a
reflection,
the
claim
seems
to
follow
easily
that
it
cannot
exceed
the
generative
power
itself.
Thus,
Descartes'
princi
ple seems to be an appropriate candidate for a deliverance of the natural
light.
Furthermore,
we can
explain
how Descartes
can now
go
on
to
say
that
two
more
general principles
follow from
this
result:
It
follows from this both
that
something
cannot
arise
from
nothing,
and
also
that what
is
more
perfect?that
is,
contains
in
itself
more
reality?cannot
arise
from what
is less
perfect.
(AT
VII,
40-41;
CSM
II,
28).
Many analyses
seem
to
reverse
Descartes'
movement
of
thought
here,
suggesting that he derives his first causal principle from these more
general
principles.
But
our
analysis
seems
to fit
the
text
better,
since it
suggests
that both
the
causal
principle
and these
more
general
principles
can
in
fact be
seen
as
generalizations developed
from
and
grounded
in
the
Meditation
II
experiential
discovery
of the
mind's
activity
and
its effects.
This
viewpoint
accords better
with
Descartes'
claim in
Second
Replies
that
It is in the nature of
our
mind
to construct
general
propositions
on
the
basis
of
our
knowledge
of
particular
ones
(AT
VII,
141;
CSM
II,
100).
Invoking
his
second causal
principle,
Descartes
introduces the
notion of
a
formal
reality :
And this
is
transparently
true
not
only
in
the
case
of
effects which
possess
actual
or
formal
reality,
but
also
in
the
case
of
ideas,
where
one
is
considering
only
objective
reality.
.
.[I]n
order for
a
given
idea
to
contain such
and
such
objective
reality,
it
must
surely
derive
it
from
some
cause
which
contains at least
as
much
formal
reality
as
there
is
objective
reality
in
the
idea.
(AT
VII,
41;
CSM
II,
28-29).
Although
Descartes
seems
to be
applying
his
causal
principle
across
categories ?reasoning
from
the
existence
of
a
certain
objective
reality
in
his
ideas
to
a
certain
degree
of
formal
reality
in
their
causes?our
perspective
provides
a
corrective.
As
we
have
seen,
the
objective reality
of
an
idea?its
power
to
move
our
will?is
taken
by
the
meditator
to
be
a
manifestation,
within the
realm
of
ideas,
of the mind's
power
to
generate representations.
The
formal real
ity
to
which
the
power
affecting
our
will
corresponds
is
our
mind's
genera
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292
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY
QUARTERLY
tive
power.
So
our
reading
shows that Descartes
is not
applying
his causal
principle
across
categories,
since both formal and
objective
realities denote
causal
powers.
He
is
simply
correlating
the manifestation
of
a
causal
power
within
consciousness
with the
power
itself
operating
outside
the
realm
of
his direct
awareness.
Our
analysis
shows
too
that
the
paradigm
forDescartes'
introduction
of
his
term
formal
reality
is
the
mind,
insofar
as
it
is
understood
to
be
a
generative
power.
Thus
we
see
that
the causal
relationship
between
formal
and
objective
realities
comes
first in the order of
discovery, grounded
as
it
is in the
Meditation
II
discovery
of
the
mind's
power
to
generate
ideas.
Our
understanding
of formal realities in
general
and of formal-to-formal
causal
relationships
must be
epistemologically
grounded
in
these
para
digms.
We
should,
then,
agree
with Annette
Baier,
who
has also
traced
the
fundamental
nature of
the
formal-to-objective
causal
paradigm
back
to
Meditation
II
and
says:
If
the
causal
principle
did
not
apply
to
objective reality,
then
it could
not
be
known
to
the meditator
to
hold
good.6
Within
the
order
of
reasons,
the causal
link
between
formal
and
objective
realities
is
not
problematic?it
is basic.
Our
perspective
also
helps
to
clarify
Descartes'
explanation
of
objective
reality
to
Caterus
in First
Replies
as
the
object's being
in
the
intellect
in
the
way
in
which
its
objects
are
normally
there
(AT
VII,
102;
CSM
II,
75).
We must
take the
object ?the
formal
reality?to
be
a
causal
power.
The
way
in
which such
an
object
is
in
the intellect
is
not
in
the form of
a
picture
image.
Rather
it
is
there
through
a
representation
of the
objects's
causal
power,
in
the form
of
the
power
affecting
our
will.
Finally,
our
perspective
can
offer
a
clarification
regarding
Descartes'
infamous
causal
resemblance
principle :
A
stone,
for
example,
which
previously
did
not
exist,
cannot
begin
to
exist
unless
it
is
produced
by
something
which
contains,
either
formally
or
emi
nently
everything
to
be found
in
the
stone;
similarly,
heat
cannot
be
produced
in
an
object
which
was
not
previously
hot,
except by
something
of
at
least
the
same
order
of
perfection
as
heat,
and
so on.
But
it
is also
true
that
the idea
of
heat,
or
of
a
stone,
cannot
exist
in
me
unless it
is
put
there
by
some cause
which
contains at least
as
much
reality
as
I
conceive
to
be
in
the
heat
or
in
the
stone.
(AT
VII,
41;
CSM
II,
28).
Descartes'
principle
has
occasioned
widespread
discussion
and
criticism.
But
our
discussion
shows
that the
meditator has
been
led
to
understand
formal and objective realities as powers. Since the meditator is, at this
point,
cognizant
of
only
one
kind
of
causal
power,
the
only
resemblance
between
cause
and effect
which
can
be
at
issue here
concerns
degrees
of
causal
power.
From the
perspective
which the meditator
has
been
led
to
adopt,
Descartes will be
seen as
saying
simply
that the
cause
must contain
at
least
the
same
degree
of
power
as
is
contained
in
the
effect.
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DESCARTES
ON
THE POWER OF
IDEAS
293
III.
The Formal Reality
of
Ideas?
A
further
clarification
confronts
a
possible
objection
to
our
analysis,
Our
view that
formal
reality
denotes
generative
power
entails that
ideas
n
themselves
have
no
formal
reality.
This
claim, however,
runs
counter
to
the views
of
most
commentators.
For
instance,
Nicholas
Jolley
says:
While
laying
the
foundations
for his
proof
of the
existence
of
God,
Descartes
distinguishes
between
the
'formal' and
'objective' reality
of
ideas:
ideas
have
formal
(or
intrinsic)
reality
by
virtue of
being
modes
of
thought,
or
mental
events;
and
they
have
objective reality
by
virtue
of their
object
or
repre
sentational
content.8
Vere
Chappell,
while
placing
his view in the context of his distinction
between
ideasm (ideas
taken
materially)
and
ideas0 (ideas
taken
objec
tively),
agrees:
Descartes
holds that
there
are
different
modes of
being
or
existence,
different
ways
in
which
things
are.
Objective
being
is
the mode
in
which
things
in
the
intellect
characteristically
exist. This
sort of
being
is contrasted with
actual
or
formal
being,
which
is
the mode
in
which
things
outside the intellect
exist.
The
acts
or
operations
of the
intellect?including
all
ideasm?also
have
actual
or
formal
being.9
But
while
this
view
is
widely accepted,
we
must
see
that
the relevant
texts
are
far from clear
in
this
regard.
We should
note, first,
that Gassendi
states
the view
we are
questioning
in his
objections:
You do
in
fact..
.distinguish
between
objective
and formal
reality,
where
'formal
reality,'
as
I
understand
it,
applies
to
the idea
itself
not
as
it
represents
something
but
as an
entity
in
its
own
right.
(AT
VII, 285;
CSM
II,
199).
Descartes,
however,
does
not comment
on
Gassendi's
claim,
passing
up
this
opportunity
to offer
us
explicit
guidance
on
this
point.
InMeditation III itself, one passage seems to deny that ideas are formal
realities:
. .
.although
the
reality
which
I
am
considering
in
my
ideas
is
merely
objective
reality,
I must
not
on
that
account
suppose
that the
same
reality
need
not
exist
formally
in
the
causes
of
my ideas,
but that
it is
enough
for
it
to
be
present
in
them
objectively.
For
just
as
the
objective
mode of
being
belongs
to
ideas
by
their
very
nature,
so
the formal
mode
of
being
belongs
to
the
causes
of
ideas?or
at least the
first and
most
important ones?by
their
very
nature.
(AT
VII,
41-42;
CSM
II,
29).
Descartes denies
here
that the
objective
mode
of
being belongs
to
the
causes
of ideas because their nature is to be formal realities. His claim that the
objective
mode of
being
belongs
to
ideas
by
their
nature
is
presented
in
a
parallel
form?as
captured
in his
just
as
(quemadmodum)?suggesting
that
we
should
deny
them
formal
reality.
It is
surely possible
to
argue,
as
Chappell
does,
that
since Descartes tells
us
that
an
idea
can
be
taken
in
two
senses,
the
formal
mode of
being belongs
to
ideas taken
materially.
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294
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY
QUARTERLY
But this
move
simply
creates
a
problem,
which has
perplexed
many
com
mentators,
of
understanding why
Descartes introduces a different
term? materially ?rather
than
referring
to
this
sense
as
an
idea taken
formally.
On
our
view,
this
problem
never
arises.
Ideas
taken
materially
are
modes of
the
mind,
but,
since
they
do
not
possess
generative
power,
are
not
themselves
formal
realities.
In
one
other
passage
central
to
this
issue,
Descartes
describes the
rela
tion
between ideas
and their
causes:
For
although
this
cause
does
not
transfer
{transfundat)
any
of
its
actual
or
formal
reality
to
my idea,
it
should
not
on
that
account
be
supposed
that
it
must be less real. The nature of an idea is such that of itself it requires {exigat)
no
formal
reality
except
what
it
derives from
my
thought
{praeter
illam
quam
mutuatur
a
cogitatione
mea),
of which
it
is
a
mode.
(AT
VII,
41;
CSM
II,
28).
Descartes'
claim that the
cause
does
not
transfer
any
of
its
formal
reality
to the idea
suggests
that
the
mind,
in
its
causal
activity,
does
not
provide
an
ideam
with
any
formal
reality.
What the
idea does
derive
from
my
thought
seems
to be
something
other
than
formal
reality.
Our
view
provides
an
answer?the
idea
does
not
derive
generative
power,
but
only
representative
power,
in the form of
a
power
affecting
the will.
We can conclude, then, that the text does not provide an obstacle to our
claim that
ideas
have
no
formal
reality.
IV.
MATERIAL
FALSITY
A
full
treatment
of
the
issues
involved
in
Descartes'
concept
of
material
falsity
is
beyond
the
scope
of
our
discussion.
It will suffice
to
show
that
our
perspective
is
helpful
in
a
central
respect.
We
can
focus
first
on
Descartes'
description
of this
concept:
For although. . .falsity in the strict sense, or formal falsity, can occur only in
judgements,
there
is
another kind
of
falsity,
material
falsity,
which
occurs
in
ideas,
when
they
represent non-things
as
things.
For
example,
the
ideas
which
I
have of
heat
and
cold contain
so
little
clarity
and
distinctness that
they
do
not
enable
me
to
tell
whether cold
is
merely
the absence
of
heat
or
vice
versa,
or
whether both of
them
are
real
qualities,
or
neither
is.
And
since
there
can
be
no
ideas
which
are
not
as
it
were
of
things,
if
it
is
true
that cold
is
nothing
but the
absence
of
heat,
the idea which
represents
it
to
me as
something
real
and
positive
deserves
to
be
called
false_(AT
VII,
43-44;
CSM
II,
30).
And
second,
we
need
to
see
Descartes'
explanation
of how these
materially
false
ideas
are
caused:
Such ideas
obviously
do not
require
me to
posit
a source distinct from
myself.
For
on
the
one
hand,
if
they
are
false,
that
is,
represent non-things,
I know
by
the
natural
light
that
they
arise
from
nothing
?
that
is,
they
are
in
me
only
because
of
a
deficiency
and
lack
of
perfection
in
my
nature. If
on
the other
hand
they
are
true,
then
since the
reality
which
they
represent
is
so
extremely
slight
that I
cannot
even
distinguish
it from
a
non-thing,
I
do
not
see
why
they
cannot
originate
from
myself.
(
AT
VII,
44;
CSM
II,
30).
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DESCARTES
ON
THE
POWER OF
IDEAS 295
These
statements
indicate,
as
a
number of commentators
have
shown,
that
we
must
distinguish
the
representative
character of Cartesian
ideas
from
their
objective
reality. 10
This conclusion follows
from the
fact that
those
ideas which arise from
nothing
have
representative
character
(since
all
ideas
are
as it
were
of
things )
but have
no
objective
reality
(since
an
idea
can
have
no
more
objective reality
than
there
is
formal
reality
in its
cause).
While
this result
has often
proven
problematic
for
commentators,
it
can
be
easily
understood
from
our
perspective.
Our
discussion
has shown
that
most
of
our
ideas have two
components.
For
example,
the clear and
distinct
perception
of
the
wax
consists of
the
representation of the
wax
as
extension and the power affecting
our
will.
On
our
view,
the
latter
is the
idea's
objective
reality;
we can
identify
the
former,
for
the
point
at
issue,
as
its
representative
character. The
objective
reality
of
an
idea shows
it
to
be the effect
of
the
operation
of
some
causal
power,
indicating
that
it
truly
represents
a
thing.
But
the
reality
con
tained
in
some
of
our
ideas
is
so
slight?they
exhibit
so
little
power?that
we
cannot
tell
if
they
have
any
objective
reality.
Nevertheless,
all
ideas,
even
those which
seem
to
have
no
objective reality,
are
as
it
were
of
things
in
that
they
have
some
representative
character. For
example,
even
the
idea of cold
presents
an
actual
sensation,
as
Descartes
tells
Arnauld,
and
thereby provides subject matter for error :
.
.
.my
only
reason
for
calling
the idea
'materially
false'
is
that,
owing
to the
fact that it is obscure and
confused,
I
am
unable
to
judge
whether
or
not
what
it
represents
to
me
is
something positive
which
exists
outside of
my
sensation.
And hence I
may
be led
to
judge
that
it
is
something positive
though
in
fact
it
may
merely
be
an
absence.
(AT
VII,
234;
CSM
II,
164).
The
representative
character
of the
idea,
along
with
our
inability
to
discern
whether
the
idea
has
any
objective
reality,
may
lead
us
to
mistakenly
judge
that there
is
some
causal
power?some
formal
reality?which generated
the
idea.
But,
in
fact,
it
may
arise
from
nothing ?that
is,
from
a
lack
in
our
nature.
We
see,
too,
that
this last
suggestion
does not
violate Descartes'
causal
principles,
since
only
the
objective reality
of
the
idea,
not its
repre
sentative
character,
has
been shown
to
require
a
positive
cause.
Our
perspective
shows that
material
falsity
is
indeed
an
intrinsic
feature
of
ideas,
as
Descartes
repeatedly
insisted.
Some
ideas
appear
to
not
exhibit
any
power.
Since
we
are
unable
to
discern whether
they
do,
they
provide
material for
making
false
judgments
in
the
way
we
have
described.
V.
THE
IDEA
OF
GOD
We
can
conclude
by
briefly
offering
some
suggestive
results
of
our
analy
sis
regarding
the
idea
of
God.
A
question
asked,
but
left
unanswered,
by
John
Yolton,
can
serve
as
our
focus.
Referring
to
the
idea
of
God,
he
says:
There
may
be
a
problem
with this
particular
idea.
.
.
.Can
an
idea be
a
mode
of
my
thought
but
not caused
by
me?11
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296 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
QUARTERLY
From
the
outset,
the
Meditation
III thinker has
taken
an
idea,
as a
mode
of the
mind,
to
signify
a
generative
act. But after
concluding
that the idea
of
God
cannot be
caused
by
the
mind,
Yolton's
question
must be
confronted.
The
discovery
of this idea
creates
a
tension
in
the
meditator's
conception
of
the mind's
operations.
We
need
to
see more
clearly
how this tension
is
brought
about,
by
recognizing
the
unique
nature
of this
idea
within the
view we've set out.
Descartes'indications that this idea
has infinite
objective
reality
has the
implication,
from
our
perspective,
that it exhibits infinite
power.
The
import
of
this is
described
by
Descartes
in
First
Replies:
But if.
.
.we
attend
to
the
immense
and
incomprehensible
power
that
is
contained within the idea of
God,
then
we
will
have
recognized
that
this
power
is
so
exceedingly
great
that
it is
plainly
the
cause
of his
continuing
existence.
.
.
.[W]hen
we
perceive
this,
we are
quite
entitled
to
think
that
in
a
sense
he
stands
in
the
same
relation
to
himself
as
an
efficient
cause
does
to
its
effect,
and
hence that he derives
his existence from himself
in
the
positive
sense.
(AT
VII,
110-111;
CSM
II,
79-80).
From
our
perspective,
Descartes'
claim has
two
epistemological
conse
quences.
First,
the
immensity
of the
objective
reality
of the idea
of
God?the
immensity
of the
power
affecting
ourwill?seems to eliminate the need to
posit
an
efficient
cause
outside
of
itself.
It
can
only
do
so
if
the
power
shows
itself
to be self-creative.
This
suggests
that
its
infinitude is
not
to
be
understood
as
a
difference
in
degree
from the
objective
realities
of
our
other
ideas,
but
rather
as
a
difference
in kind. It
is
the
apprehension
of
this
self-creative
power
which
provides
the
meditator
with the
meaning
of
necessary
existence.
Second,
the
collapse
of
the
distinction
between the
power
within
the
idea
and
the
efficient
cause
of that
power
means
that it will
be
impossible
to
distinguish the objective reality of the idea from the formal reality which
is its
cause.
In
other
words,
the
meditator
will not
be able
to
distinguish
the idea from the
thing.
This
result
may
well
capture
the
true
sense
in
which
this
idea
most
fully
escapes
a
suspicion
of material
falsity?it
eliminates the
possibility
of
error
in
our
judgments
since
there
is
nothing
to
which
our
causal
principles
need
lead
us.
And
it
may
also
reflect
the full
sense
in
which
we
come
to
know that
God
must
be the
cause
of
this
idea.
These
epistemological
results
demand
that further
work
be
done
to
fully
answer
Yolton's
question. Up
to
now,
the
meditator
has taken the
power
exhibited inhis ideas to represent his own mind's generative power. Rec
ognizing
that
the
power
exhibited
in
this
idea is
not
his
own
forces
a
consideration
of the
relationship
between his
own
power
and God's
power?the
second
stage
of the
Meditation
III
proof
passes
to
that
very
issue.
The
full resolution
of this
issue
will
have
a
range
of
implications
concerning
the
proper
understanding
of the
mind's
operations,
whether the
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DESCARTES
ON
THE POWER OF IDEAS
297
mind is
in
fact
a
substance,
and
more.
Those
concerns
are
beyond
the
scope
of our
present
discussion. It is
enough
fornow ifour
analysis
has
provided
some
helpful
results
regarding
Descartes'
theory
of ideas
and has
moti
vated further
investigation
in the directions
we
have
pointed
out.
St. John's
University
Received
September
29,
1995
NOTES
1.
Stephen
I.
Wagner,
Descartes'Wax:
Discovering
the Nature of
Mind,
History
of
Philosophy
Quarterly,
vol.
12
(1995), pp.
165-83.
2.
Our
view,
in
line
with Descartes'
statement
in
the
Synopsis,
denies
that
Descartes held
a
non-representational
view
of the
mind,
as
some
commentators
have
suggested,
e.g.
Michel
Henry,
The
Soul
According
to Descartes
in
Stephen
Voss,
ed.,
Essays
on
the
Philosophy
and Science
of
Rene
Descartes
(New
York:
Oxford
University
Press, 1993),
pp.
40-51.
3.
For
example,
Calvin
Normore,
Meaning
and
Objective Being:
Descartes
and
His
Sources,
in
Am?lie
Rorty,
ed.,
Essays
on
Descartes' Meditations
(Berkeley:
University
of California
Press,
1986), p.
238.
4. See also Third
Replies,
AT
VII,
181;
CSM
II,
127.
5. E. J. Ashworth, Descartes' Theory of Objective Reality, The New Scholasti
cism,
vol.
49
(1975), p.
338.
6.
Annette
Baier,
The
Idea of
the True
God
in
Descartes,
in
Am?lie
Rorty,
ed.,
op.
cit.,
p.
364.
7.
The closest Descartes
comes
to
attributing
such
power
to
ideas
is
his
statement
that one idea
may
perhaps
originate
from
another
(AT
VII,
42;
CSM
II,
29).
But
he
immediately
goes
on
to
argue
that
we
cannot
explain
this
origination
without
appealing
to
some
formal
reality
as
the
primary
cause.
This conclusion
only
follows
if
he is
assuming
that
ideas do
not
themselves
have
generative
power.
8.
Nicholas
Jolley,
The
Light
of
the
Soul
(New
York: Oxford
University
Press,
1990),
pp.
13-14.
9.
Vere
Chappell,
The
Theory
of
Ideas,
in
Am?lie
Rorty, ed., op. cit., p.
187.
10.
Calvin
Normore,
op.
cit.,
p.
230.
Normore here
credits
Margaret
Wilson
with
establishing
this
point.
11.
John
Yolton,
Perceptual
Acquaintance
From Descartes
to
Reid
(Minneapolis:
University
of Minnesota
Press, 1984),
note
14,
p.
41.
12.
Versions of this
paper
were
presented
at
the fall
1995
meetings
of the
Midwest
Seminar
in
the
History
of
Early
Modern
Philosophy
and
the Minnesota
Philosophi
cal
Society. My
thanks
go
to
the
organizers
and
discussants
of
those
meetings
(especially
Phil
Cummins,
Michelle
Eliot
and
Doug
Lewis)
for
their
help
with
my
work.