GLOBAL JIHAD IN SINAI: AN EXTENSION OF THE GAZA STRIP?
Rob Bongers (Research Assistant, ICT)
March 2014
* The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International
Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).
ABSTRACT
The ongoing Islamist insurgency that has taken root in the Sinai since the January 25
revolution has gone from bad to worse. Deteriorating following the Muslim
Brotherhood’s ouster, the conflict is extraordinarily complex as it conflates the
continued political turmoil in Egypt, the longstanding marginalization of Sinai
Bedouins, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Libya’s lawlessness, internal friction in
Gaza, transnational criminal networks, and the growing presence of global jihad-
inspired fighters. Due to the security vacuum, Sinai has quickly become yet another
fertile breeding ground for militant Islamists, and moreover, a base from which they
can target both Israel and Egypt rather unchallenged. Through the lens of the concept
of terrorist organizations’ ‘‘glocalization,’’ this paper seeks to analyze this relationship
by examining the various interwoven local, regional and global features facilitating
Gazan actors’ incentives to export subversion and terrorism to Sinai, the extent to
which these networks have shaped the insurgency, and the security challenges they
pose. It concludes that, even though some other non-local battle-hardened jihadists
have likely influenced the rise of (sophisticated) attacks too, Gazan Salafi-jihadists
have played a major role in the terrorist activity across the Philadelphi Corridor by
means of exploitation of Sinai’s breakdown of security.
ACRONYMS
ABM Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem)
AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
IAF Israeli Air Force
IDF Israeli Defense Forces
IED Improvised explosive device
ISIS The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant)
JAA Jund Ansar Allah (Soldiers of God‟s Supporters)
JAI Jaish al-Islam (the Army of Islam)
MAITIC The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
MJN The Muhammad Jamal Network
MSC The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem
OPD Operation Pillar of Defense
PIJ The Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PRC The Popular Resistance Committees
RPG Rocket-propelled grenade
SAM Surface-to-air missile
TWH Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus)
TWJ Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1
BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................................... 3
THE SALAFI-JIHADIST MAPS OF SINAI AND GAZA .......................................................................... 7
Overview ................................................................................................................................................... 8
Organization ............................................................................................................................................ 16
KEY SALAFI-JIHADIST GROUPS .......................................................................................................... 19
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis ............................................................................................................................. 19
Jaish al-Islam .......................................................................................................................................... 22
The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem ................................................................ 24
Takfir wal-Hijra ...................................................................................................................................... 26
Tawhid wal-Jihad .................................................................................................................................... 28
„„GLOCALIZATION‟‟ – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................... 30
THE LOCAL AGENDA ............................................................................................................................. 33
THE SINAI-GAZA CONNECTION .......................................................................................................... 36
Strategy ................................................................................................................................................... 36
Supporting evidence ................................................................................................................................ 38
Tactics ..................................................................................................................................................... 43
GLOBAL JIHAD AND AL-QAEDA AFFILIATION ............................................................................... 47
ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS – A GLOCAL ORGANIZATION ............................................................ 54
HAMAS‟S DOUBLE-GAME .................................................................................................................... 61
Increasingly isolated ............................................................................................................................... 61
Hamas and the Salafi-jihadists ................................................................................................................ 66
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 70
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................... 74
1
INTRODUCTION
In spite of a considerable decline in the 2000s, al-Qaeda‟s narrative has paradoxically
been revived throughout the Middle East and North Africa due to the security vacuums
left by the developments of the so-called Arab Spring. Apart from, for example, Syria,
Iraq, Libya and Lebanon, another area this trend has manifested itself in is Egypt‟s Sinai
Peninsula.1
Though Sinai has always been a historically neglected area, insecurity and lawlessness
have risen significantly since the January 25 revolution. Hence, the peninsula has
quickly become another hotbed for jihadists, and moreover, a platform from which they
can target Israel as well as Egypt‟s mainland with relative impunity. Since the Egyptian
army‟s takeover of power on July 3, 2013, however, the army has conducted an extensive
counter-terrorism campaign in accordance with Israel‟s approval of increased military
deployment in the Sinai. Nevertheless, violence deteriorated rapidly, transforming the
area with nearly daily shootings and bombings. 2
To date, at least 315 attacks have been
reported in Sinai since 2013.3
Consequently, Shin Bet, the Israel Security Agency, established a new unit in 2013 that
exclusively focuses on thwarting attacks from Sinai.4 In the same year, an Israeli senior
intelligence official stated that “[w]e thought that Sinai was the source of all evil for
Gaza, but it turned out things were exactly the opposite.”5 Numerous other accounts have
linked the deterioration of violence in Sinai to Salafi-jihadist elements stemming from the 1 Riedel, B., 2014. The continuation evolution of al-Qaeda 3.0. Al-Monitor. January 3, 2014. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/al-qaeda-terror-spread-iraq-lebanon.html# [Accessed January 13, 2014]. 2 Reuters, 2013. Cairo bus blast injures four. Al-Akhbar. December 26, 2013. http://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/18020 [Accessed January 4, 2014]. 3 Barnett, D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem calls on „spies‟ to repent in latest video. The Long War Journal. March 12,
2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/03/ansar_jerusalem_calls_on_spies.php
[Accessed March 13, 2014]. 4 Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 5 Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014].
2
Gaza Strip. Whereas cooperation between militants from Gaza and Sinai is not a new
phenomenon, these relationships have increased in recent years. As it is critical for
counter-terrorism purposes, this paper attempts to analyze these networks by setting a
theoretical framework with respect to the notion of the "glocalization" of terrorist
organizations, and subsequently examining the various interrelated local, regional and
global features facilitating Gazan Salafi-jihadists‟ motives to export rebellion and
terrorism to Sinai, the extent to which these networks have shaped the insurgency, and
the security challenges they pose. It concludes that, whereas some other non-local battle-
hardened jihadists have likely influenced the upsurge of (sophisticated) attacks as well,
Gazan Salafi-jihadists have directly as well as indirectly played a major role in the
terrorist activity in Sinai through exploitation of the area‟s risen lawlessness.
Notwithstanding contradicting sources and the media blackout imposed by the Egyptian
military-led government, the analysis of such a fluid and covert topic is limited because
credible evidence concerning the organizations‟ structures, funding and operations is hard
to come by, reinforced by the rapidly changing nature of the situation on the ground.
Groups operating in Sinai have been mapped on several occasions, albeit limited in
depth, which can entirely be contributed to their elusive character. Heavily reliant on
secrecy, they consciously employ sophisticated strategies as a means to obscure their
connections, coordination and activities.
The first chapter will provide a historical background on Sinai‟s demographic, political
and security environment. Subsequently, the jihadist maps of both Sinai and Gaza will be
discussed, including their organizational structures, followed by an overview of the key
Salafi-jihadist groups. After a theoretical framework regarding the concept of
"glocalization" is laid out, the next three sections will examine the applicability of this
notion, respectively outlining the (overlapping) local, regional and global features of the
main Salafi-jihadist militias in Sinai. The chapter on regional issues will almost
3
exclusively analyze the Sinai-Gaza terror nexus, including strategies, supporting evidence
and tactics, whereas the global aspects predominantly focus on the revival of Salafi-
jihadism and al-Qaeda affiliation. Next, a case-study of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, Sinai‟s
dominant and most lethal group will be provided. Before drawing conclusions, Hamas‟s
controversial yet problematic role will be discussed.
BACKGROUND
Adjoining Israel and the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula has historically been Egypt‟s
least developed area. Estimates of the number of Bedouins range between 80,000 and
300,000 out of a total Sinai population of about half a million, the bulk inhabiting the
north.6 Ever since Egypt regained full control of the peninsula in 1982, the Bedouins have
been subject to systemic socioeconomic marginalization. The Mubarak regime‟s efforts
to develop the area almost exclusively focused on enhancing the lucrative tourism
industry along the coast of the Red Sea, in which the locals were mostly ignored. Due to
the non-existence of the rule of law and social and economic services provided by the
government, the Bedouins‟ resentment towards the regime rapidly grew.7 A critical factor
was Cairo‟s response to the terrorist attacks on tourist sites in Sinai in the mid-2000s.
6 Gold, Z., 2013. Sinai security: Opportunities for unlikely cooperation among Egypt, Israel, and Hamas. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. October 2013. pp. 3-4.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/10/22%20sinai%20egypt%20israel%20hamas%20gol
d/22%20sinai%20hamas%20egypt%20israel%20gold.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]; Balanga, Y., 2012. Sinai:
Territory without master. Al-Monitor. June 23, 2012. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/06/trouble-from-
the-south.html [Accessed January 23, 2014]; Yaari, E., 2012. Sinai: A new front. The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. January 2012, p.2. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf
[Accessed January 27, 2014]. 7 Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, pp. 1-5.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014]; Salama,
V., 2013. What‟s behind the wave of terror in the Sinai. The Atlantic. November 22, 2013.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/11/whats-behind-the-wave-of-terror-in-the-sinai/281751/
[Accessed December 3, 2013]; Balanga, Y., 2012. Sinai: Territory without master. Al-Monitor. June 23, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/06/trouble-from-the-south.html [Accessed January 23, 2014].
4
Bedouin tribes in the north, who, according to the regime, had cooperated with operatives
from Gaza, were blamed. Subsequently, a brutal crackdown was unleashed by the army
in which thousands of Bedouins were arrested and received cruel treatment, including
torture, long-term detention and the arrests of family members. The key causes of
Bedouins‟ increasing frustrations were left unaddressed by the regime.8
Without any opportunities offered by the state, the Bedouins began seeking other sources
of income. In the 1990s, this initiated the creation of a vast smuggling network close to
the borders with Gaza and Israel. This network, which became a key economic source for
the locals, was increasingly used for transferring illicit arms. Israel‟s disengagement of
the Gaza Strip in 2005, Hamas‟s takeover of power in 2007, and Israel‟s economic
blockade of the enclave in 2007, rapidly augmented demand for goods and weapons in
Gaza, reinforcing the criminal networks and resulting in a substantial increase of tunnels
under the Egyptian-Gaza border.9 It was estimated in 2011 this parallel economy
surpassed $300 million per year.10
These events also led to the expansion of Hamas and other Gazan operatives into Sinai.
Heavily reliant on the tunnel economy, Hamas has established close relations with Sinai
Bedouins more and more since 2007. Moreover, because Gaza‟s leadership perceived,
and still perceives, Sinai as a critical operational backyard, illicit weapon trade and
transferring increased in both directions. It is believed Hamas‟s al-Qassam Brigades (its
military wing) started smuggling heavy arms, such as missiles, to storage depots in Sinai
8 Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, pp. 1-5.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014]. 9 Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, pp. 4-5.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014]. 10
Yaari, E., 2012. Sinai: A new front. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2012, p.10.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf [Accessed January 27, 2014].
5
in 2010.11
After the Egyptian army‟s takeover of power, the tunnel infrastructure has
largely been destroyed. Recently, the military said it had demolished 1,370 tunnels.12
According to Amos Gilad, Director of Political-Military Affairs for the Defense Ministry,
approximately 90 to 95 percent of the tunnels have been destroyed by the Egyptian
forces.13
While many Sinai Bedouins had a positive perception of Israel in the early phases after
its withdrawal from Sinai due to good relations during the Israeli occupation, a
considerable part of the Bedouin community has radicalized over time, particularly since
2007.14
Whereas there is little hard data on the radicalization processes, many factors
point to these developments. Most likely, the authorities‟ previous and current counter-
terrorism operations, and historical neglect and discrimination have played, and still play,
a crucial role. In addition, many Bedouins arrested during the crackdowns following the
Sinai tourist sites‟ bombings spent years in prison with Salafists, and escaped during the
turmoil of the January 25 revolution.15
Furthermore, the locals have also come under
increasing influence of Hamas, other Gazan Islamists, and Salafi-jihadists from
11
Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, pp. 8-9.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014]. 12
AFP, 2014. Egypt destroys 1,370 Gaza smuggling tunnels. Saleh, The Times of Israel. March 12, 2014.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-destroys-1370-gaza-smuggling-tunnels/ [Accessed March 12, 2014]; Saleh, Y.,
2014. Exclusive: With Muslim Brotherhood crushed, Egypt sets sights on Hamas. Reuters. January 14, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-egypt-gaza-idUSBREA0D09D20140114 [Accessed February 11,
2014]. 13
Lappin, Y., 2014. Amos Gilad: When Iran goes nuclear, the region will go nuclear. The Jerusalem Post. March
12, 2014. http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Amos-Gilad-The-moment-Iran-goes-nuclear-the-Saudis-will-buy-the-
bomb-from-Pakistan-345102 [Accessed March 13, 2014]. 14
Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, pp. 3-5.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014]; Ravid, B.,
2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]; Balanga, Y.,
2012. Sinai: Territory without master. Al-Monitor. June 23, 2012. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/security/01/06/trouble-from-the-south.html [Accessed January 23, 2014]; Tanoukhi, N., 2012.
Attack in Egypt‟s Sinai reflect spread of jihadists, Islamists. Al-Monitor. August 7, 2012. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/map-of-islamic-groups-in-sinai-s.html [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 15
Pelham, N., 2012. Sinai: The buffer erodes. Chatham House. September 2012, p. 14.
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/pr0912pelham.pdf [Accessed
December 13, 2013].
6
elsewhere. Other possible causes of expanded radicalization are the accumulated amount
of Islamist websites,16
the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood and the subsequent
clamping down on Islamists by the army.
The political turmoil in Egypt since early 2011 has transformed Sinai into an even more
ungoverned space than it was before, which accelerated after the ouster of President
Mohamed Morsi in July 2013. Sinai‟s breakdown of security was instigated during the
January 25 revolution when security forces pulled out, resulting in an enormous demand
for weapons.17
Nowadays, there is a huge amount and variety of arms in the area,
including many advanced missiles and explosives' originating from former Libyan
dictator Muammar Gaddafi‟s regime‟s plundered weapons stockpiles.18
Two other main
sources of arms in Sinai are believed to be Yemen and Sudan.19
Aviv Oreg, former head
of the global jihad desk in Israel‟s Military Intelligence and currently owner of CeifiT, a
risk consultancy company on terrorism, said in February 2014, "[n]ame whatever
weapons you need, and you can find it in the Sinai Peninsula."20
Additionally, a
significant rise of both local and foreign jihadists, including Palestinians, has been
notified in recent years. These developments in combination with the increased
lawlessness, continued Bedouins‟ grievances, and opportunity to operate with relative
16
Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, pp. 3-5.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014]. 17
Whewell, T., 2011. Egypt revolution leaves Sinai increasingly lawless. BBC News. June 1, 2011.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9501505.stm [Accessed March 14, 2014]. 18
Ginsburg, M., 2014. Taba attack sends dual murderous message. The Times of Israel. February 17, 2014.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/taba-terror-attack-sends-dual-murderous-message/ [Accessed March 1, 2014]; Eleiba,
A., 2013. The Sinai of all fears. Al-Ahram. December 19, 2013. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/4980/17/The-
Sinai-of-all-fears.aspx [Accessed March 14, 2014]; Cohen, G., 2012. Sinai peacekeeping force commander warns of
weapons smuggling to Gaza. Haaretz. May 31, 2012. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/sinai-
peacekeeping-force-commander-warns-of-weapons-smuggling-to-gaza-1.433567 [Accessed March 14, 2014]. 19
Salama, V., 2013. What‟s behind the wave of terror in the Sinai. The Atlantic, November 22, 2013.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/11/whats-behind-the-wave-of-terror-in-the-sinai/281751/
[Accessed December 3, 2013]; Eleiba, A., 2013. Sinai: Point of no return. Ahram Online, August 18, 2013.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/79209/Egypt/0/Sinai-Point-of-no-return.aspx [Accessed
December 3, 2013]. 20
Ginsburg, M., 2014. Taba attack sends dual murderous message. The Times of Israel. February 17, 2014.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/taba-terror-attack-sends-dual-murderous-message/ [Accessed March 1, 2014].
7
impunity in the proximity of Israel, have created a safe haven and fertile soil for the rise
of the global jihad movement.21
THE SALAFI-JIHADIST MAPS OF SINAI AND GAZA
While Sinai is an area rife with organized crime and home to a vast array of armed
groups and cells, this paper‟s scope is mainly bound to the Salafi-jihadist factions.
Therefore, it is useful to define this term beforehand. As Yoram Cohen, chief of Shin Bet,
states on movements adhering to this ideology in Gaza, "[l]ike other extreme Sunni
Islamist groups, the ideological objective of these Salafi-jihadist groups is to revive the
golden days of ancient Islam (Salafi) and establish a global Islamic caliphate that
implements Sharia (Islamic law). These Salafi-jihadist organizations sanctify the use of
violence (jihad) as the main way of realizing this vision. As such, it is legitimate to use
force against non-Muslims (infidels), regimes considered insufficiently Islamic, and other
perceived enemies of Islam… The Salafi-jihadist groups espouse an ideology of „pure
resistance,‟ within which there is no room for ceasefires or temporary halts in attacks
against the enemy."22
An important note is that Israel differentiates among the militant groups in Gaza. It
regards the Salafi-jihadists as members of the global jihad movement, in contrast to
members of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Resistance
Committees (PRC) and al-Ahrar, which deem themselves national liberation movements
21
Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, pp. 3-5.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014]; Col. G.,
2013. Al-Qaeda, the regional upheaval and Israel – from someone else‟s problem to a different kind of problem. The
ICT Working Papers Series. December 2013. http://www.ictwps.com/default/assets/File/ICTWPS%20-
%20Col%20G%2026.pdf [Accessed February 25, 2014]. 22
Cohen, Y., 2009. Jihadist groups in Gaza: A developing threat. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
January 5, 2009. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/jihadist-groups-in-gaza-a-developing-
threat [Accessed January 13, 2014].
8
concentrating on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through armed struggle. Salafi-jihadists,
on the other hand, do not recognize states‟ borders and consequently perceive themselves
as affiliates of a transnational front. In addition, they consider all apostates of true Islam
justified targets, including Iran and Shi‟a Muslims.23
Matti Steinberg, former chief
advisor to the director of Shin Bet elaborated on this distinction by saying that „„Hamas
and the Muslim Brotherhood strike a balance between universalism (Islam) and localism
(nationalism/Palestine). Their focus is Daawa [calling people to Islam]. They spring from
the centre of society, which they wish to occupy. In order to achieve this, they must
necessarily be moderate. Al-Qaeda is the opposite. It wishes to distance itself from
society – to create a counter-society – in order to attack it.‟‟24
The following paragraphs
will provide an overview of the Salafi-jihadist maps in Sinai and Gaza, and their fluid
organizational structures. The next chapter will briefly introduce the prominent groups.
Overview
Little is known about the Salafi-jihadist map in Sinai. The exact number of global jihad
organizations as well as fighters in the area is not clear. This is highlighted by, for
instance, the different estimations of Shin Bet and Israel‟s Military Intelligence, which
put the amount of militants at respectively several hundred and a few thousand.
According to the former, at least 15 groups are active in the peninsula.25
Israeli
23
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, p. 6.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 24
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, pp. 6-7.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 25
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014].
9
intelligence further approximated that over 200 small cells are operating in the area.26
The prominent factions that have attacked Israeli targets are considered to be Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis (ABM), Jaish al-Islam (JAI), the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of
Jerusalem (MSC) and Takfir wal-Hijra (TWH).27
In order to achieve their ultimate
ideological goal, Sinai-based terror networks almost exclusively target the Egyptian
security forces and Israel, through which they also seek to derail Egyptian-Israeli
relations. Some groups tend to focus more on attacking the Egyptian military-led
government; others seemingly put more emphasis on aggression against 'the Zionist
enemy'.
Not only do most of the groups share the same global jihadist ideology, they are also
linked to Gaza in some way or another. This is most clear in the cases of JAI and the
MSC, which are both Palestinian organizations, headquartered in the Strip, but have
branches in Sinai as well.28
In the last few years, various reports have mounted regarding
the involvement of Gazan Salafi-jihadist groups in Sinai.29
Despite the ambiguity of such
elusive matters, sources have not only accumulated in frequency over the course of the
past three years, but have also provided more and more evidence on the influence of these
factions. Nevertheless, cooperation between Sinai and Gaza-based groups is anything but
new. For example, apart from the smuggling networks, it is believed particularly JAI has
used Sinai as an operational base even before President Hosni Mubarak was toppled. It
was accused of coordinating terrorist activities in Egypt for al-Qaeda and was allegedly
26
Harel, A., 2014. Israel faces uphill battle with Al-Qaida groups in Sinai, says ex-IDF commander. Haaretz.
September 18, 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/high-holy-days-2013/high-holy-day-news-and-
features/.premium-1.547720 [Accessed March 7, 2014]. 27
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 28
Schweitzer, Y., 2013. Al-Qaeda and global jihad in search of direction. In: Kurz, A. and Brom, S. (eds.), 2013.
Strategic survey for Israel 2012-2013. Institute for National Security Studies. Chapter 12, pp. 220-1.
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2605 [Accessed December 23, 2013]. 29
See, for instance, Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz.
August 20, 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26,
2014]; Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed December 25,
2013].
10
involved in several attacks carried out in Egypt, such as the February 2009 attack in
Cairo‟s El Khalili bazaar, resulting in the death of a tourist, and the suicide bombing of a
Coptic church in Alexandria on New Year‟s Eve 2010/2011, which killed 25 citizens.30
Another Gazan organization that is thought to have expanded its operations in Sinai well
before 2011 is the PRC.31
The Sinai-Gaza terror link will be addressed in more detail
later on.
The Salafi-jihadist movements in Gaza, which have increasingly emerged since 2007,
mainly consist of Palestinians.32
A senior intelligence officer of Shin Bet stated that these
factions‟ members are all defected operatives of Hamas and the PIJ.33
In 2009, it was
estimated between 30 and 50 foreign fighters were present in the enclave, notably
Egyptians and Yemenis. It is believed some of them have gained significant training
and/or combat experience in other jihadist strongholds, such as Afghanistan or Iraq.34
While estimates of the total amount of Salafi-jihadists in Gaza vary widely, Shin Bet
30
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2011. Exporting terrorism and subversion from the
Gaza Strip. February 2, 2011. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/17958 [Accessed January 13, 2014]. 31
Barnett, D., 2014. Israel targets Gaza terror operative linked to Sinai-based Ansar Jerusalem. The Long War
Journal. February 9, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2014/02/israel_targets_gaza_terror_ope.php [Accessed February 20, 2014]. 32
Karmon, E., 2014. Al-Qaida and Palestinians jihadists: the Hamas connection. The International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism. January 29, 2014.
www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1266/currentpage/1/Default.aspx [Accessed
February 10, 2014]; International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, p. 7.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]; Cohen, Y., Levitt, M. and Wasser, B., 2010.
Deterred but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian Arena. The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy. January 2010, pp. 1-3. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf
[Accessed January 14, 2014]; Fighel, J., 2009. Hamas, Al-Qaeda and the Islamisation of the Palestinian cause. The
Elcano Royal Institute. January 30, 2009.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/El
cano_in/Zonas_in/ARI19-2009#.UvptLbQv88N [Accessed February 11, 2014]. 33
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 34
Cohen, Y., Levitt, M. and Wasser, B., 2010. Deterred but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian
Arena. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2010, pp. 2, 4, 6, 9, 12.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed January 14, 2014].
11
approximated the number at 500 in 2010.35
Due to the recent events in Egypt and the
expertise of the al-Qassam Brigades and Salafi-jihadist groups, presumably many more
foreigners, including Sinai Bedouins, have infiltrated Gaza for military training courses
in recent years. Aviv Oreg approximated in 2014 that there are now up to 1,000 Salafi-
jihadists in the enclave.36
A leader of the MSC who spoke on condition of anonymity to
Associated Press, disclosed in March 2014 that their numbers are rising, adding that there
are perhaps 4,000 of global jihad-inspired militants.37
The Salafi-jihadist militias in Gaza
include, but are not limited to, JAI, the MSC and Tawhid wal-Jihad (TWJ). The tense
relations Hamas has with the Salafi-jihadists, which are important for understanding the
Sinai-Gaza terror link, will be analyzed in a following chapter.
The composition of Sinai-based factions‟ operatives, however, appears to be more
complex. Basically, they derive from five, sometimes overlapping, sources. Firstly, local
Bedouins constitute the core element of the insurgency, predominantly young radicalized
members of the Sawarka, Tarabin, Tiyaha38
and Breikat tribes.39
The first two have
heavily been involved in the Gaza tunnel trade and smuggling, especially through
35
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, p. 14.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 36
Daraghmeh, M., 2014. AP interview: Jihadi head says Gaza groups growing. AP. March 9, 2014.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-interview-jihadi-head-says-gaza-groups-growing [Accessed March 10, 2014]. 37
Daraghmeh, M., 2014. AP interview: Jihadi head says Gaza groups growing. Associated Press. March 9, 2014.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-interview-jihadi-head-says-gaza-groups-growing [Accessed March 10, 2014]. 38
Heras, N.A., 2013. Can the Sinai Bedouin become a counter terrorist force? The Jamestown Foundation,
Terrorism Monitor, volume 11, issue 20. October 31, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttne
ws[any_of_the_words]=sinai%20bedouin&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41559&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=763887306d
5e16d9c93d1f9bd89adb83#.UqWhj-IVZOs [Accessed December 9, 2013]; Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new
unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]; Yaari, E.,
2013. Deterioration in the Sinai. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. July 11, 2013.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/deterioration-in-the-sinai [Accessed December 30, 2013]. 39
Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, p. 2.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014]; Kumar
Shahi, S., 2013. The problematic peninsula. The Sunday Indian. November 10, 2013.
http://www.thesundayindian.com/en/story/the-problematic-peninsula/39/48210/ [Accessed December 14, 2013].
12
establishing good relationships with clans in Rafah and local Palestinians.40
In
combination with the radicalization processes that have taken place, many Bedouins
perceive the anarchy as an opportunity to force their traditional demands, such as political
and economic reform, and the release of prisoners.41
However, not all local criminals or
militants are necessarily adherents of radical Islam. Though it is difficult to estimate the
tribal members‟ sympathy towards the insurgents, it is believed many support them –
some because of the destruction of their livelihoods (i.e. the tunnel economy), others
because the army‟s counter-terrorism operations have caused the loss of lives and
massive (collateral) damage.42
The second group comprises Palestinian Salafi-jihadists
from Gaza, many of them former members of Hamas and PIJ.43
Most likely the majority
of them are members of Gazan factions‟ branches in Sinai and move forth and back
between Sinai and Gaza. As this paper will highlight later on, operating in Sinai clearly
offers them an abundance of advantages over operating in the Gaza, irrespective of
whether they have fled from Hamas‟s crackdowns,44
been expelled by Gaza‟s rulers,45
or
40
Pelham, N., 2012. Sinai: The buffer erodes. Chatham House. September 2012, pp. 3-4.
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/pr0912pelham.pdf [Accessed
December 13, 2013]; Pelham, N., 2012. Gaza‟s tunnel phenomenon: The unintended dynamics of Israel‟s siege.
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 14, no. 4, Summer 2012. http://palestine-
studies.org/journals.aspx?id=11424&jid=1&href=fulltext [Accessed December 14, 2013]; Yaari, E., 2012. Sinai: A
new front. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2012, p.10.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]. 41
Yaari, E., 2013. Deterioration in the Sinai. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. July 11, 2013.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/deterioration-in-the-sinai [Accessed December 30, 2013]. 42
Kingsley, P., 2014. Egypt faces new threat in al-Qaida-linked group Ansar Beyt al-Maqdis. The Guardian.
January 31, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/31/egypt-alqaida-terrorist-threat-ansar-beyt-almaqdis
[Accessed February 17, 2014]. 43
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]; Al-Shishani,
M.B., 2013. Gazan jihadists unite to create new operational base in Sinai. The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism
Monitor, volume 11, issue 4. February 22, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40492#.UrihJrQyjWc [Accessed December
23, 2013]; Kovač, N. and Guertin, T., 2013. Armed groups in the Sinai Peninsula. Civil-Military Fusion Centre.
February 2013, p. 3.
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r029%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%
20%2828-FEB-13%29.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]. 44
Sabry, M., 2013. Sinai: Egypt‟s most recent mayhem. GlobalPost. September 16, 2013.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/130915/sinai-egypts-most-recent-mayhem
[Accessed December 25, 2013].
13
left for Sinai for other reasons. Thirdly, numerous Egyptian prisoners, including
Bedouins, escaped during and after the 2011 revolution, some of which that were jailed
for involvement in terrorism. Many of them have reportedly sought refuge in remote
Sinai.46
Fourthly, except for Palestinians, various sources report on the increased
presence of other foreign fighters. These include, but are not limited to, Yemenis,
Libyans, Saudis, Tunisians and Algerians.47
Until recently, this was likely the least
widespread of five main sources of Sinai-based Salafi-jihadists. However, their numbers
have progressively increased. According to a joint report by The Saban Center for Middle
East Policy at Brookings and the Institute for National Security Studies, hundreds of
foreign jihadists have now infiltrated Sinai. They pose a serious threat since many of
them are seasoned fighters that have undergone sophisticated military training and
acquired extensive combat experience abroad.48
The opportunity to attack Israel and
Egypt‟s military-led government relatively unchallenged from Sinai may soon draw more
foreign global jihad adherents. A fifth group that has only recently received increasing
45
Metz, S., 2013. Strategic horizons: Sinai is the next big jihadist battle. World Politics Review. August 11, 2013.
http://chainsoff.wordpress.com/2013/08/11/strategic-horizons-sinai-is-the-next-big-jihadist-battle/ [Accessed
January 28, 2014]. 46
Karmon, E., 2013. Hamas in dire straits. Perspectives on Terrorism, volume 7, issue 5. October 2013, p. 116.
http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=OfvZFQrRMqI%3d&tabid=66 [Accessed January 21, 2014]; Yaari,
E., 2012. Sinai: A new front. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2012, p.5.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf [Accessed January 27, 2014]. 47
Klein, A., 2014. Egypt threatened by mass terrorist invasion. WorldNetDaily. February 28, 2014.
http://www.wnd.com/2014/02/egypt-threatened-by-mass-terrorist-invasion/ [Accessed March 5, 2014]; Kirkpatrick,
D.D. and Schmitt, E., 2014. Jihadist return is said to drive attacks in Egypt. The New York Times. February 5, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/world/middleeast/jihadist-return-is-said-to-drive-attacks-in-egypt.html?_r=0
[Accessed February 7, 2014]; Mourad, H., 2013. Genesis of the Sinai crisis. Ahram Online. September 27, 2013.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/4/0/82529/Opinion/0/Genesis-of-the-Sinai-crisis.aspx [Accessed
January 1, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2013. Rising concerns over foreign militants in the Sinai as more explosives seized.
The Long War Journal. January 19, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2013/01/concern_that_militants_from_al.php [Accessed January 14, 2014]; Fishman, A., 2012.
Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed December 25, 2013]. 48
Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, p. 7.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014].
14
media attention, is the return of Egyptian fighters from jihadist arenas, such as Syria and
Afghanistan.49
The insurgency‟s core area is located in Northeastern Sinai, encompassing the territory
between northern Sinai‟s capital al-Arish and the 14-kilometer long Philadelphi Corridor,
which includes Sheikh Zuwaid. Particularly ABM is believed to be dominant here.50
Worth mentioning is al-Mahdiya, a troublesome village harboring jihadists next to the
border, where the Egyptian army has carried out several raids.51
It is almost exclusively
controlled by the Breikat tribe that, unlike the majority of tribes in Sinai, has previously
cooperated with militant Islamists too.52
According to residents in Northern Sinai, the
militias have taken control of approximately one third of the villages. By hiding among
the local populace, the insurgents not only try to decrease the likeliness of being targeted
but also hope collateral damage through the military‟s operations will increment
49
The Associated Press, 2014. Violence risks turning Egypt to jihadi front. Al Arabiya. February 7, 2014.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/02/07/Violence-risks-turning-Egypt-to-jihadi-front-.html
[Accessed February 8, 2014]; Kirkpatrick, D.D. and Schmitt, E., 2014. Jihadist return is said to drive attacks in
Egypt. The New York Times. February 5, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/world/middleeast/jihadist-
return-is-said-to-drive-attacks-in-egypt.html?_r=0 [Accessed February 7, 2014]; Howeidy, A., 2014. Sinai jihadists
target Delta. Al-Ahram. January 3, 2014. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/5040/17/Sinai-jihadists-target-the-
Delta.aspx [Accessed January 24, 2014]. 50
World Tribune, 2014. Egypt strikes strongholds of Al Qaida „chief terrorists‟ in Sinai. February 24, 2014.
http://www.worldtribune.com/2014/02/24/egypt-strikes-strongholds-of-al-qaida-chief-terrorists-in-sinai/ [Accessed
March 11, 2014]; Spencer, R., 2013. Egyptian soldiers killed in Sinai car bomb attack. The Telegraph. November
20, 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10461668/Egyptian-soldiers-
killed-in-Sinai-car-bomb-attack.html [Accessed December 14, 2013]; Kumar Shahi, S., 2013. The problematic
peninsula. The Sunday Indian. November 10, 2013. http://www.thesundayindian.com/en/story/the-problematic-
peninsula/39/48210/ [Accessed December 14, 2013]; Elshinnawi, M., 2013. Sinai: Egypt‟s growing security threat.
Voice of America. September 11, 2013. http://www.voanews.com/content/egypts-sinai-a-new-threat/1747895.html
[Accessed December 1, 2013]. 51
Issacharoff, A., 2014. Taba bombing shows Sinai terrorists won‟t go quietly. The Times of Israel. February 17,
2014. http://www.timesofisrael.com/taba-bombing-shows-terror-group-not-giving-up-on-sinai/ [Accessed February
18, 2014]; Voice of Russia, 2014. Jihadist leader killed by Egyptian army in Sinai. January 19, 2014.
http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_01_19/Jihadist-leader-killed-by-Egyptian-army-in-Sinai-0294/ [Accessed
February 18, 2014]. 52
Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, p. 2.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014].
15
resentment towards the government,53
which they then can exploit to recruit, spread their
ideology and legitimize their actions. One region of particular concern is Jabal al-Halal, a
territory of approximately 2400 km² located 60 kilometers south of al-Arish, which
serves as a safe haven.54
Only accessible by foot, mountainous and remote, the terrain is
often called the 'Tora Bora of Sinai'.55
Historically, it has always been a hideout for
criminals and hardliners. Even under Israeli occupation, Israeli troops were never able to
control it.56
It was thought around 1,000 militants were hiding in the Jabal al-Halal
mountains in January 2014.57
Due to the parallel economy‟s significance and the locals‟
vast knowledge of Sinai‟s rugged hinterland, which includes smuggling routes, hiding
places, caves and short cuts, cooperation between non-locals and local Bedouin militants
is highly likely.58
Another base is the area of Jabal al-Amru, close to the Israeli border.59
The fact that attacks have increasingly been carried out in Egypt‟s heartland may indicate
the networks have set up cells or divisions in areas outside of Sinai as well.60
According
53
Al-Latifaat, 2014. Special report: Egyptian militants outwit army in Sinai battlefield. Reuters. March 16, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/16/us-egypt-sinai-specialreport-idUSBREA2F05020140316 [Accessed
March 16, 2014]. 54
Abdel Rahman, Y. and al-Arabi, M., 2012. The state of Sinai (III): Refuge for hardliners and outlaws. Al-Akhbar.
August 23, 2012. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/11392 [Accessed December 9, 2013]. 55
Lazareva, I., 2013. Israelis on Sinai border face Islamist threat. Al-Monitor. July 23, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/israel-sinai-border-salafist-threat-violence.html [Accessed January 21, 2014];
Elyan, T., 2012. Insight: Mimicking al Qaeda, militant threat grows in Sinai. Reuters. August 13, 2012.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/13/us-egypt-sinai-militants-idUSBRE87C0P620120813 [Accessed February
14, 2014]. 56
Abdel Rahman, Y. and al-Arabi, M., 2012. The state of Sinai (III): Refuge for hardliners and outlaws. Al-Akhbar.
August 23, 2012. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/11392 [Accessed December 9, 2013]. 57
Yaari, E., 2014. The new triangle of Egypt, Israel, and Hamas. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
January 17, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-triangle-of-egypt-israel-and-
hamas [Accessed January 29, 2014]. 58
Kovač, N. and Guertin, T., 2013. Armed groups in the Sinai Peninsula. Civil-Military Fusion Centre. February
2013, p. 2.
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r029%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%
20%2828-FEB-13%29.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]; Abu Draa, A., 2012. Safe haven: Mount Halal is said to
be the refuge for Sinai militants. Egypt Independent. August 20, 2012. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/safe-
haven-mount-halal-said-be-refuge-sinai-militants [Accessed January 14, 2014]. 59
Yaari, E., 2014. The new triangle of Egypt, Israel, and Hamas. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
January 17, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-triangle-of-egypt-israel-and-
hamas [Accessed January 29, 2014]. 60
Klein, A., 2014. Egypt threatened by mass terrorist invasion. WorldNetDaily. February 28, 2014.
http://www.wnd.com/2014/02/egypt-threatened-by-mass-terrorist-invasion/ [Accessed March 5, 2014].
16
to locals in Northern Sinai, a considerable amount of belligerents have recently moved
towards Egypt‟s Nile Valley region.61
Organization
The Salafi-jihadist factions‟ clandestine nature makes untangling these networks
extraordinarily hard, if not impossible. Posing many challenges to intelligence services,
they are structured very loosely and heavily rely on secrecy in order to consciously
obscure their inner and outer workings.62
An anonymous source close to the Egyptian
intelligence services said, for instance, that ABM resembles a cluster organization
comprising many different cells consisting of 10 militants at the very most. The sources
further argued that cells communicate through coded messages but not all operatives have
connections to other cells.63
A flexible organization including numerous and diverse
informal cells precludes the movements from having an obvious operational signature,
increasing their elusive character. Consequently, it is very likely 'memberships' overlap
due to shared interests64
and individuals possessing unique expertise. An example
61
Al-Latifaat, 2014. Special report: Egyptian militants outwit army in Sinai battlefield. Reuters. March 16, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/16/us-egypt-sinai-specialreport-idUSBREA2F05020140316 [Accessed
March 16, 2014]. 62
Kovač, N. and Guertin, T., 2013. Armed groups in the Sinai Peninsula. Civil-Military Fusion Centre. February
2013, p. 2.
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r029%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%
20%2828-FEB-13%29.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]; Cohen, Y., Levitt, M. and Wasser, B., 2010. Deterred
but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian Arena. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
January 2010, p. 2. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed
January 14, 2014]. 63
Eleiba, A., 2013. Undermining Sinai‟s terrorist cells. Al-Ahram. November 7, 2013.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/4587/17/Undermining-Sinai%E2%80%99s-terrorist-cells.aspx [Accessed March
11, 2014]. 64
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014]; Kovač,
N. and Guertin, T., 2013. Armed groups in the Sinai Peninsula. Civil-Military Fusion Centre. February 2013, p. 2.
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r029%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%
20%2828-FEB-13%29.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]; Cohen, Y., Levitt, M. and Wasser, B., 2010. Deterred
but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian Arena. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
17
demonstrating this was Hisham al-Mashal, a militant highly-skilled in making rockets
who worked for various Gazan extremist groups and, before his death in April 2013, had
supplied rockets to Sinai.65
In August 2013, a northern Sinai tribal leader said that while
there are different Salafi-jihadist militias in the area, they "…coordinate and sometimes
run shared operations."66
Alex Fishman, veteran Ynet News military analyst, argues that
sophisticated high-profile attacks are generally conducted by a set of militants collected
from several bases in Sinai.67
According to WND reporter Aaron Klein, Middle Eastern
security officials have stated that "there is information the militant groups are forming a
de facto chain of command, with alarming coordination between the various jihadist
factions embedded in the country."68
In addition, as the terrorist organizations
deliberately do not have any (apparent) tangible sign or proof of membership, defining
groups‟ members constitutes a major problem, becoming even more difficult in case they
successfully blend in with the local populace. Perhaps some combatants do not even
belong to any faction, but are involved because of political, economic and/or ideological
interests. Gen. Sherif Ismail, former security advisor to the governor of Northern Sinai,
asserted in September 2013 that the distinct militias in Sinai are now "on the same page,
in full cooperation in the face of the same threat."69
Due to close ties among some of the
(members of the) groups, some of them presumably utilize a common infrastructure,
including sources of income and arms supplies, and at the same time, operate under
January 2010, p. 2. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed
January 14, 2014]. 65
Ben David, A., 2013. Hamas enforces quiet border with Israel. Al-Monitor. May 3, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/hamas-enforces-a-quiet-border-with-israel.html [Accessed March 14, 2014]. 66
Sabry, M., 2013. Al-Qaeda emerges amid Egypt‟s turmoil. Al-Monitor. December 4, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/al-qaeda-egypt-sinai-insurgency-growing-influence.html [Accessed February
6, 2014]. 67
Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed December 25,
2013]. 68
Klein, A., 2014. Egypt threatened by mass terrorist invasion. WorldNetDaily. February 28, 2014.
http://www.wnd.com/2014/02/egypt-threatened-by-mass-terrorist-invasion/ [Accessed March 5, 2014]. 69
Fox News, 2013. Fox News. Local, foreign Islamic militants turn Egypt‟s Sinai a new front for jihad. AFP.
September 3, 2013. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/03/local-foreign-islamic-militants-turn-egypt-sinai-
new-front-for-jihad/ [Accessed March 9, 2014].
18
different names.70
The abovementioned is illustrated by an interview of International
Crisis Group with a Salafi-jihadist in Rafah who commented on the existence of Jaljalat,
a name that has caused confusion because some consider it a distinct faction, while
others, including Hamas, regard it as the entire Salafi-jihadist community in Gaza.71
The
interviewee said that "[t]here is no entity called Jaljalat. It is not an organisation. What
you have to understand is that even the other names that you use – Tawhid wa al-Jihad,
Ansar al-Sunna, and the like – are not really separate organisations. All the Salafis will
use these different organisational names at different times and for different operations.
But we are all the same, with the same goals and the same teachings. One day you and
several others launch some mortars and declare that is was Ansar al-Sunna. Another day
you and a few different people fire a rocket and say it was Jaysh al-Umma. These
different names are adopted only because of the pressure we face from the
government."72
Given the substantial influence of Salafi-jihadist Gazans in Sinai, on
which will be elaborated later on, and the extensive counter-terrorism campaigns of the
Egyptian army, it is plausible Sinai-based groups employ the exact same method for the
exact same reason. The loose structures make it difficult to view the groups as separate
entities and consequently, who to blame, which explains why some attacks have been
attributed to different organizations.73
As The Jerusalem Post journalist and military
analyst Yaakov Lappin argues, "[w]ith hundreds of Salafi jihadists based in Gaza, and
70
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014]. 71
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, pp. 16-8.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 72
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, p. 18.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 73
Schweitzer, Y., 2013. Al-Qaeda and global jihad in search of direction. In: Kurz, A. and Brom, S. (eds.), 2013.
Strategic survey for Israel 2012-2013. Institute for National Security Studies. Chapter 12, p. 221.
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2605 [Accessed December 23, 2013]; Barnett, D., 2013.
Report provides insight on Israeli view of jihadists in Sinai. The Long War Journal. August 20, 2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/report_provides_insi.php [Accessed February 22, 2014]; The Meir
Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2012. The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network Tawhid wal-
Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli civilian was
killed. August 8, 2012. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20381 [Accessed January 27, 2014].
19
many of them moving to and from Sinai, smuggling weapons and plotting attacks, it is no
longer possible to view Gaza and Sinai as fully separate sectors."74
Interestingly,
however, ABM is the only faction that has taken credit for more than one attack in Sinai
since Morsi has been deposed.75
KEY SALAFI-JIHADIST GROUPS
Whereas it is estimated there are at least 15 Salafi-jihadist groups active in Sinai, this
chapter provides a brief overview of the most prominent ones. The following chapters
will explore some of these in more detail.
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, ABM (Supporters of Jerusalem), also known as Ansar Jerusalem,
is the dominant and most lethal movement in Sinai. It is believed it was established in
early 2011,76
and has become the premier terrorist threat to Egypt. In early February
2014, geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor concluded that it "has rapidly become one of
the most active jihadist groups in the world."77
Israeli intelligence considered ABM
responsible for the majority of attacks launched from Sinai territory in 2012, many of
74
Lappin, Y., 2014. Analysis: The Salafi menace in Sinai goes after a soft target. The Jerusalem Post. February 17,
2014. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-The-Salafi-menace-in-Sinai-goes-after-a-soft-target-341608
[Accessed March 6, 2014]. 75
Barnett, D., 2014. Egypt‟s army says 16 militants killed in latest North Sinai airstrikes. The Long War Journal.
February 8, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/egypts_army_says_16.php [Accessed February
24, 2014]. 76
Howeidy, A., 2014. Sinai jihadists target Delta. Al-Ahram. January 3, 2014.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/5040/17/Sinai-jihadists-target-the-Delta.aspx [Accessed January 24, 2014]; 77
The Associated Press, 2014. Violence risks turning Egypt to jihadi front. Al Arabiya. February 7, 2014.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/02/07/Violence-risks-turning-Egypt-to-jihadi-front-.html
[Accessed February 8, 2014].
20
them aimed at the al-Arish-Ashkelon gas pipeline.78
Headquartered in the insurgency‟s
heartland, it mainly comprises Sinai Bedouins,79
complemented with a number of non-
local jihadists (including other Egyptians and Palestinians), some of which that have
extensive combat experience.80
Some reports estimate ABM totals approximately 700 to
1,000 members,81
many of them well-trained, evidenced by the movement‟s substantial
amount of sophisticated attacks.82
ABM has reportedly been established to target Israel,
but clearly shifted its prime focus to the Egyptian security forces after the Muslim
Brotherhood‟s overthrow.83
78
Barnett, D., 2012. Ansar Jerusalem threatens to attack Israel for killing top Salafi leaders in Gaza. The Long War
Journal. October 16, 2012. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2012/10/ansar_jerusalem_threatens_to_a.php [Accessed December 8, 2013]. 79
Hauslohner, A. and Cunningham, E., 2013. In Egypt, jihadist group Bayt al-Maqdis claims responsibility for
bombing. The Washington Post. October 21, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-egypt-jihadist-group-
bayt-al-maqdis-claims-responsibility-for-bombing/2013/10/21/7ddbd77c-3a6a-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html
[Accessed December 7, 2013]; Kovač, N. and Guertin, T., 2013. Armed groups in the Sinai Peninsula. Civil-Military
Fusion Centre. February 2013, p. 2.
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r029%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%
20%2828-FEB-13%29.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]. 80
Al-Anani, K., 2014. The resurgence of militant Islamists in Egypt. Middle East Institute. February 14, 2014.
http://www.mideasti.org/content/resurgence-militant-islamists-egypt [Accessed February 20, 2014]; The Associated
Press, 2014. Violence risks turning Egypt to jihadi front. Al Arabiya. February 7, 2014.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/02/07/Violence-risks-turning-Egypt-to-jihadi-front-.html
[Accessed February 8, 2014]; Kirkpatrick, D.D. and Schmitt, E., 2014. Jihadist return is said to drive attacks in
Egypt. The New York Times. February 5, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/world/middleeast/jihadist-
return-is-said-to-drive-attacks-in-egypt.html?_r=0 [Accessed February 7, 2014]; Howeidy, A., 2014. Sinai jihadists
target Delta. Al-Ahram. January 3, 2014. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/5040/17/Sinai-jihadists-target-the-
Delta.aspx [Accessed January 24, 2014]. 81
Kingsley, P., 2014. Egypt faces new threat in al-Qaida-linked group Ansar Beyt al-Maqdis. The Guardian.
January 31, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/31/egypt-alqaida-terrorist-threat-ansar-beyt-almaqdis
[Accessed February 17, 2014]; Nasralla, S., 2013. Egypt tightens Sinai security, assesses militant threat. Reuters.
September 9, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-egypt-protests-sinai-idUSBRE9880UB20130910
[Accessed November 26, 2013]. 82
Al-Anani, K., 2014. The resurgence of militant Islamists in Egypt. Middle East Institute. February 14, 2014.
http://www.mideasti.org/content/resurgence-militant-islamists-egypt [Accessed February 20, 2014]; Howeidy, A.,
2014. Sinai jihadists target Delta. Al-Ahram. January 3, 2014. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/5040/17/Sinai-
jihadists-target-the-Delta.aspx [Accessed January 24, 2014]. 83
Youssef, N.A. and Ismail, A., 2013. In Egypt‟s Sinai, military harsh campaign earns pledges of retaliation.
McClatchy DC. October 8, 2013. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/10/08/204748/in-egypts-sinai-militarys-
harsh.html [Accessed December 7, 2013]; Hauslohner, A. and Cunningham, E., 2013. In Egypt, jihadist group Bayt
al-Maqdis claims responsibility for bombing. The Washington Post. October 21, 2013.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-egypt-jihadist-group-bayt-al-maqdis-claims-responsibility-for-
bombing/2013/10/21/7ddbd77c-3a6a-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html [Accessed December 7, 2013].
21
Some of the attacks it claimed responsibility for include the suicide bombing of the South
Sinai Security Directorate in el Tor on October 7, 2013 (leading to three deaths and more
than 45 wounded),84
the assassination of Lieutenant Colonel Mabrouk of Egypt‟s
National Security Agency on November 17, 2013,85
and a suicide car bombing of the
Daqahliya Security Directorate in Mansoura on December 24, 2013 (resulting in 16
fatalities and 132 wounded).86
The group unsuccessfully attempted to murder Minister of
Interior Mohammed Ibrahim by means of a suicide bombing.87
Additionally, in the run-
up of the third anniversary of the 2011 revolt, ABM took credit for some of the five
explosions, among others one at the police headquarters, in Cairo in two days in late
January 2014, killing six and wounding approximately 100.88
In late January, an ABM
operative shot down an army helicopter with a sophisticated surface-to-air missile
(SAM). Five soldiers died in the incident.89
Most recently, a member of the group blew
himself up inside a tourist bus at the Taba border crossing on February 16, 2014, leading
to 4 deaths and 14 wounded. It was the first time ABM attacked tourists, indicating an
84
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem claims credit for suicide bombing of South Sinai Security Directorate. The
Long War Journal. October 9, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/ansar_jerusalem_clai_2.php
[Accessed November 26, 2013]. 85
AFP, 2013. Jihadists claim murder of Egyptian investigator. Al Arabiya. November 20, 2013.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/11/20/Jihadists-claim-murder-of-Egypt-investigator-.html
[Accessed December 1, 2013]. 86
Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2013. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis claims responsibility for Mansoura bombing. Egypt
Independent. December 25, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/ansar-bayt-al-maqdis-claims-
responsibility-mansoura-bombing [Accessed January 4, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem claims
responsibility for Mansoura bombing. The Long War Journal. December 25, 2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/12/ansar_jerusalem_clai_4.php [Accessed January 4, 2014]. 87
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem claims credit for assassination attempt on Egypt‟s interior minister. The Long
War Journal. September 9, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/09/ansar_jerusalem_clai_1.php
[Accessed January 4, 2014]. 88
Barnett, D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem claims SAM attack as 3 soldiers killed in Sinai bus ambush. The Long War
Journal. January 26, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/ansar_jerusalem_clai_6.php [Accessed
January 29, 2014]; Reuters, 2014. Bomb hits Cairo, Qaeda-linked group claims attacks. January 25, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/25/us-egypt-bomb-idUSBREA0O04620140125 [Accessed January 25,
2014]; BBC News, 2014. Egypt militants step up campaign with Cairo blasts. January 24, 2014.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25874370 [Accessed January 24, 2014]. 89
Barnett, D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem claims SAM attack as 3 soldiers killed in Sinai ambush. The Long War
Journal. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/ansar_jerusalem_clai_6.php [Accessed January 27,
2014]; Binnie, J., 2014. Egyptian militants downed helo with Igla-type MANPADS. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly.
January 28, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/33165/egyptian-militants-downed-helo-with-igla-type-
manpads#.UukbqdPL_rM.twitter [Accessed February 20, 2014].
22
expansion of its potential strategic targets. In response, it said, among others, that "[w]e
will target [the Egyptian regime‟s] economic interests everywhere to paralyze its hands
from what they do to the Muslims."90
Following the attack, the group declared foreign
tourists had four days to vacate Egypt, "or you don‟t have no one else but yourselves to
blame."91
ABM employs a variety of tactics which include suicide bombings, car bombs, drive-by
shootings, assassinations, rockets, mines, mortars and SAMs.92
The impact of its attacks
since July 2013, and the wide array of weaponry used, show the organization‟s
evolvement and ability to adapt to the fluid situation on the ground. The group has clearly
developed and adjusted its tactics since its attacks have become less exposed and more
high-profile.93
The assassination of Mabrouk and the Mansoura and Cairo bombings
highlight its growing capabilities and efficiency to unleash terror and hit key targets,
including inside Egypt‟s mainland.
Jaish al-Islam
Jaish al-Islam, JAI (the Army of Islam), is one of the strongest Salafi-jihadist factions in
Gaza and was founded in 2006 after its leader Mumtaz Dughmush and his followers split
90
Barnett, D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem claims tourist bus bombing in Egypt‟s Sinai. The Long War Journal. February
17, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/ansar_jerusalem_clai_8.php [Accessed February 20,
2014]. 91
World Bulletin, 2014. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis behind attack on Egypt tourists. February 17, 2014.
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/129062/ansar-beit-al-maqdis-behind-attack-on-egypt-tourists [Accessed
February 20, 2014]. 92
BBC News, 2014. Profile: Egypt‟s militant Ansar Beit al-Maqdis group. January 24, 2014.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25882504 [Accessed January 25, 2014]; Allam, A., 2013. Egyptian
Islamist figure issues warning on Sinai. Al-Monitor. November 25, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/11/egypt-islamist-figure-supports-government.html [Accessed December 7, 2013]. 93
Howeidy, A., 2014. Sinai jihadists target Delta. Al-Ahram. January 3, 2014.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/5040/17/Sinai-jihadists-target-the-Delta.aspx [Accessed January 24, 2014];
Barnett, D., 2013. Egypt‟s growing militant threat? CNN. November 5, 2013.
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/11/05/egypts-growing-militant-threat/ [Accessed January 21, 2014].
23
off from the PRC (though close relations continued to exist). Dughmush is a member of
the Dughmush clan, whose stronghold used to be the Sabra neighborhood in Gaza City
until 2008, when Hamas took over control by force.94
The al-Qaeda-inspired group‟s
operational base is now located in southern Gaza, where it is heavily involved in arms
trafficking, among others to Sinai-based operatives.95
One of the movement‟s most well-
known operations is the kidnapping of IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) soldier Gilad Shalit
in 2006, in cooperation with Hamas and the PRC. Furthermore, it has attacked targets
that they deem Western, such as tourists in Sinai and internet cafes, journalists and
Christians. In 2007, it kidnapped BBC reporter Alan Johnston.96
JAI, designated a
terrorist organization by the United States in 2011,97
has also collaborated with the MSC
in the past by jointly firing rockets at Israel.98
The militia comprises a few hundred
operatives, predominantly based in Gaza.99
According to Shin Bet, Dughmush is
directing the majority of military training camps in Gaza for jihadists from all over the
94
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, pp. 8-11.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 95
Issacharoff, A., 2013. El-Sissi‟s army goes to war in the Sinai. The Times of Israel. September 3, 2013.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/el-sissis-army-goes-to-war-in-the-sinai/ [Accessed March 10, 2014]; Cohen, Y.,
Levitt, M. and Wasser, B., 2010. Deterred but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian Arena. The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2010, p. 16.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed January 14, 2014]. 96
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, pp. 8-11.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center, 2011. Exporting terrorism and subversion from the Gaza Strip. February 2, 2011.
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/17958 [Accessed January 13, 2014]; Cohen, Y., Levitt, M. and Wasser,
B., 2010. Deterred but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian Arena. The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. January 2010, pp. 16-21.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed January 14, 2014]. 97
US Department of State, 2013. Foreign terrorist organizations. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
[Accessed March 19, 2014]. 98
Barnett, D., 2012. Gaza-based Salafi jhadists conduct joint rocket attacks, Sinai jihadists suppressed. The Long
War Journal. November 22, 2012. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/11/salafi-
jihadist_groups_in_gaza.php [Accessed February 22, 2014]. 99
Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed December 25,
2013].
24
Arab world, who subsequently go abroad, including Sinai.100
In addition, a JAI member
was killed in Syria in mid-2012, suggesting some more have possibly gone there.101
The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem
The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, MSC, or Majlis Shura al-
Mujahideen fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis, emerged in June 2012 and is an umbrella
organization consisting of several Palestinian Salafi-jihadist groups,102
among others
TWJ and Ansar al-Sunna.103
The MSC was founded by the two emirs of these factions,
which were both killed by Israeli airstrikes in October 2012.104
Particularly TWJ‟s former
leader, Hisham Ali Saidani, killed by an Israeli airstrike in October 2012,105
was an
experienced jihadist who had fought in Iraq and allegedly had strong connections to al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).106
According to Egyptian officials, Ansar al-Sunna is active in Sinai
100
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 101
Schweitzer, Y., 2013. Al-Qaeda and global jihad in search of direction. In: Kurz, A. and Brom, S. (eds.), 2013.
Strategic survey for Israel 2012-2013. Institute for National Security Studies. Chapter 12, p. 221.
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2605 [Accessed December 23, 2013]; Roggio, B., 2012. Army
of Islam fighter from Gaza killed in Syria. The Long War Journal. July 28, 2012.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/07/army_of_islam_fighte.php [Accessed March 10, 2014]. 102
Al-Shishani, M.B., 2013. Gazan jihadists unite to create new operational base in Sinai. The Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, volume 11, issue 4. February 22, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40492#.UrihJrQyjWc [Accessed December
23, 2013]. 103
Barnett, D., 2013. MSC in Jerusalem claims rocket attack on Eilat. The Long War Journal. August 13, 2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/msc_in_jerusalem_cla_1.php [Accessed January 13, 2014]. 104
Paraszczuk, J., 2012. Al-Qaida group urges jihad after Gaza leaders slain. The Jerusalem Post. October 25, 2012.
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Al-Qaida-group-urges-jihad-after-Gaza-leaders-slain [Accessed January 13,
2014]; Al-Mughrabi, N., 2012. Israeli air strikes kill three Palestinian militants in Gaza. Reuters. October 14, 2012.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/14/uk-palestinians-israel-violence-idUKBRE89C0IY20121014 [Accessed
March 10, 2014].
105 Al-Shishani, M.B., 2013. Gazan jihadists unite to create new operational base in Sinai. The Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, volume 11, issue 4. February 22, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40492#.UrihJrQyjWc [Accessed December
23, 2013]. 106
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2012. The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network
Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli
25
as well.107
Sheikh Anas Abdul Rahman, a leader of the MSC, has argued his organization
aspires to „„fight the Jews for the return of Islam‟s rule, not only in Palestine, but
throughout the world.‟‟108
Though based in Gaza, the MSC is active in Sinai too, where it
maintains ties with indigenous fighters.109
According to analyst Murad Batal al-Shishani,
the MSC serves predominantly as a unifying ideological banner as the Gazan jihadist
movements lack the financial means to support their Egyptian-based counterparts.110
Hence, other factions may very well fight under the MSC‟s framework and/or have
benefited from training courses, and yet operate independently. Perhaps it constitutes a
somewhat more cohesive body in Gaza in order to form a united front against Hamas.
Due to its expertise, it is likely it has provided training and operational coordination for
jihadists in Sinai. In April 2013, the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center (MAITIC) asserted the organization was responsible for the majority of rockets
and mortars launched from the Gaza Strip since the conclusion of Operation Pillar of
Defense (OPD) in November 2012. It has also fired rockets into Israel from Sinai111
and
claimed credit for an Egyptian-Israeli cross-border assault in June 2012, carried out by
civilian was killed. August 8, 2012, pp. 15-7. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20381 [Accessed January
27, 2014]. 107
Ma‟an News Agency, 2013. Egypt Sinai October 3, 2013.
http://maannews.net/ENG/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=635479 [Accessed March 1, 2014]. 108
Barnett, D., 2014. Gaza jihadist group praises Ansar Jerusalem fighters, calls for more attacks. The Long War
Journal. March 18, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2014/03/msc_in_jerusalem_praises_slain.php [Accessed March 18, 2014]. 109
Al-Shishani, M.B., 2013. Gazan jihadists unite to create new operational base in Sinai. The Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, volume 11, issue 4. February 22, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40492#.UrihJrQyjWc [Accessed December
23, 2013]; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2013. The Mujahideen Shura Council: a
global jihad-affiliated organization based in the Gaza Strip, has recently become prominent for firing rockets and
mortar shells into Israeli territory. April 22, 2013. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20504 [Accessed
February 11, 2014]. 110
Al-Shishani, M.B., 2013. Gazan jihadists unite to create new operational base in Sinai. The Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, volume 11, issue 4. February 22, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40492#.UrihJrQyjWc [Accessed December
23, 2013]. 111
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2013. The Mujahideen Shura Council: a global
jihad-affiliated organization based in the Gaza Strip, has recently become prominent for firing rockets and mortar
shells into Israeli territory. April 22, 2013. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20504 [Accessed February 11,
2014].
26
members of TWJ, which killed an Israeli civilian.112
The perpetrating cell included an
Egyptian and a Saudi,113
of which the latter had acquired training in Gaza.114
Possibly the
MSC also has a presence in the West Bank as three of its members were killed by IDF
forces close to Hebron in November 2013.115
Takfir wal-Hijra
Takfir wal-Hijra, TWH (Excommunication and Exodus), is an extremist movement
created in the 1960s by Egyptians as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.116
After the
group abducted and murdered former Minister of Religious Endowments, Husayn al-
Dhahabi, in 1977, the authorities launched a nationwide crackdown, resulting in the
execution of leading figures and imprisonment of hundreds of sympathizers. While the
organization ceased to exist, and many of its members resurfaced in other groups,117
it
"…left an enduring legacy which was taken up by Islamist radicals in subsequent years
and decades", according to Katerina Dalacoura, author of Islamist Terrorism and
Democracy in the Middle East.118
Following from this, TWH should not necessarily be
addressed as a single (umbrella) organization, but rather as a decentralized network of
112
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2012. The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network
Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli
civilian was killed. August 8, 2012. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20381 [Accessed January 27, 2014]. 113
Joscelyn, T., 2012. Al-Qaeda-linked group claims responsibility for attack in Israel. The Long War Journal. June
19, 2012. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/06/al_qaeda-linked_grou.php [Accessed March 10, 2014]. 114
Barnett, D., 2014. Saudi MSC in Jerusalem fighter fought in Libya, sought to join „mujahideen‟ in Somalia. The
Long War Journal. January 27, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/saudi_msc_in_jerusal.php
[Accessed February 18, 20214]. 115
Karmon, E., 2014. Al-Qaida and Palestinians jihadists: the Hamas connection. The International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism. January 29, 2014.
www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1266/currentpage/1/Default.aspx [Accessed
February 10, 2014]. 116
Gleis, J.L., 2005. National security implications of Al-Takfir wal-Hijra. The Fletcher School Online Journal for
issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, Spring 2005, article 3, p. 1.
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/25967/ichaptersection_singledocument/5cab85e6-3db7-4442-acdd-
9baac0d77795/en/gleis_national+security+implications+al-takfir+wal-hijra.pdf [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 117
Esposito, J.L., 1998. Islam and politics (fourth edition). Syracuse University Press, p. 239. 118
Dalacoura, K., 2011. Islamist terrorism and democracy in the Middle East. Cambridge University Press, p. 113.
27
committed Muslim fighters around the world affiliated only through their beliefs.119
The
same applies on a smaller scale to Sinai, where apparently various militias operate under
the name TWH.120
Their strict Salafist ideology, which includes the rejection of tribal law
and local customs121
requires, according to analyst Joshua L. Gleis, "…that its followers
purify the world of infidels. The group is known for perpetrating violence against those it
considers kufar (heretics), including those Arabs and Muslims whom Takfiris do not
consider to be living in accordance with true Islam."122
Its presence in Sinai resurrected
through a considerable influx of detainees who escaped during the 2011 revolt.123
An
article in The Daily Star Lebanon stated that the number of Takfiris in Sinai had risen
from a few hundred before 2011 to about 4,500 in August 2012.124
Most of them live in
Sheikh Zuwaid and Rafah.125
Although not all Takfiris fight jihad, and their ideology
does not completely tally with that of Salafi-jihadists‟, they are likely easily persuaded by
armed groups to conduct or collaborate in terrorist attacks due to their puritanical
119
Gleis, J.L., 2005. National security implications of Al-Takfir wal-Hijra. The Fletcher School Online Journal for
issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, Spring 2005, article 3, p. 1.
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/25967/ichaptersection_singledocument/5cab85e6-3db7-4442-acdd-
9baac0d77795/en/gleis_national+security+implications+al-takfir+wal-hijra.pdf [Accessed January 26, 2014];
Tanoukhi, N., 2012. Attack in Egypt‟s Sinai reflect spread of jihadists, Islamists. Al-Monitor. August 7, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/map-of-islamic-groups-in-sinai-s.html [Accessed January 26,
2014]. 120
Daymon, C., 2013. The Egyptian Sinai: A new front for jihadist activity. Small Wars Journal. March 26, 2013.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-egyptian-sinai-a-new-front-for-jihadist-activity [Accessed March 10, 2014]. 121
Hauslohner, A., 2011. What scares the Sinai Bedouin: The rise of the radical Islamists. Time. August 10, 2011.
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2087797,00.html#ixzz23caz5gPd [Accessed March 10, 2014]. 122
Gleis, J.L., 2005. National security implications of Al-Takfir wal-Hijra. The Fletcher School Online Journal for
issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, Spring 2005, article 3, p. 1.
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/25967/ichaptersection_singledocument/5cab85e6-3db7-4442-acdd-
9baac0d77795/en/gleis_national+security+implications+al-takfir+wal-hijra.pdf [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 123
Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed December 25,
2013]. 124
Batrawy, A., 2012. Egypt‟s most extreme hardliners in Sinai revival. The Daily Star Lebanon. August 15, 2012.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Aug-15/184760-egypts-most-extreme-hardliners-in-sinai-
revival.ashx#ixzz23cTmZKkj [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 125
Tanoukhi, N., 2012. Attack in Egypt‟s Sinai reflect spread of jihadists, Islamists. Al-Monitor. August 7, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/map-of-islamic-groups-in-sinai-s.html [Accessed January 26,
2014].
28
beliefs.126
Additionally, as they live very isolated in Sinai, their military capabilities are
obscured to a large extent.127
According to Shin Bet, the ultra conservative movement
was responsible for a complex cross-border attack in August 2012, which killed 16
Egyptian security forces.128
Some sources were certain experienced Palestinian militants
were involved in this assault in some way or another.129
Tawhid wal-Jihad
Established in 2008, Tawid wal-Jihad, TWJ (Monotheism and Jihad), is another al-
Qaeda-inspired faction in Gaza.130
It merged into the MSC in 2012, but it is not clear to
what extent the MSC constitutes a coordinating entity. It is very possible these affiliates
continue to operate independently, to a certain extent. Its founder, and also one of the
creators of the MSC, was Hisham Ali Saidani, already mentioned above. TWJ is
reportedly stationed in the refugee camps in central Gaza, particularly Nuseirat,131
but,
like other groups discussed previously, uses Sinai as an operational backyard as well. It
conducted an attack on June 18, 2012 claimed by the MSC, in which three militants
dressed in uniforms very similar to that of the Egyptian army infiltrated Israel from Sinai
126
Batrawy, A., 2012. Egypt‟s most extreme hardliners in Sinai revival. The Daily Star Lebanon. August 15, 2012.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Aug-15/184760-egypts-most-extreme-hardliners-in-sinai-
revival.ashx#ixzz23cTmZKkj [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 127
Batrawy, A., 2012. Egypt‟s most extreme hardliners in Sinai revival. The Daily Star Lebanon. August 15, 2012.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Aug-15/184760-egypts-most-extreme-hardliners-in-sinai-
revival.ashx#ixzz23cTmZKkj [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 128
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 129
Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sAinai-war.html [Accessed December 25,
2013]. 130
Fighel, J., 2008. Tawhid and Jihad legions in Palestine: A new global jihad oriented organization in Gaza. The
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. December 12, 2008.
http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/571/currentpage/12/Default.aspx [Accessed March 10, 2014]. 131
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, p. 16.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013].
29
and killed an Israeli civilian. Other attacks it carried out are, for example, the IED
(improvised explosive device) that killed an IDF soldier in 2009 and the murder of the
kidnapped Italian activist and journalist Vittorio Arrigoni in 2011.132
TWJ in Gaza should
not be confused with the similarly named group that was created by Sinai Bedouins in
2000 and is thought to have carried out the devastating Sinai tourist sites‟ bombings in
the mid-2000s, which resulted in the deaths of 145 and nearly 300 wounded.133
Regardless of the ensuing crackdown by the authorities, in which more than 3,000
tribesmen were arrested, many of the detainees have joined the new Salafi-jihadist groups
in Sinai after escaping from prison in early 2011,134
and thus, possibly the Gazan TWJ.
Considering the 'older' Sinai TWJ originated from al-Arish, it is very likely many of them
have returned there and subsequently joined other jihadist factions or regrouped with
remnants of the Sinai TWJ. This was demonstrated, for example, when a statement of
ABM in response to the death of one of its founders, Tawfiq Mohammed Freij, said he
had previously 'accompanied' leading figures of the Sinai TWJ.135
This is only one of the
many examples that underscore these groups‟ shadowy character and the challenges
intelligence and security services are facing.
132
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2012. The Gazan based Salafist jihadi network
Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli
civilian was killed. August 8, 2012, pp. 1-15. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20381 [Accessed January
27, 2014]; International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, p. 16.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 133
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2012. The Gazan based Salafist jihadi network
Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli
civilian was killed. August 8, 2012, pp. 20-3. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20381 [Accessed January
27, 2014]. 134
Yaari, E., 2012. Sinai: A new front. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2012, p.5.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf [Accessed January 27, 2014]. 135
Barnett, D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem confirms death of 2 members, including founder. The Long War Journal.
March 16, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/sinai-based_ansar_je.php [Accessed March 18,
2014].
30
‘‘GLOCALIZATION’’ – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A relatively new theory regarding militant Islamism is that of 'glocalization'.136
Before
analyzing the applicability of this concept to the Salafi-jihadist groups in Sinai, it is
important to layout this notion‟s theoretical aspects.
According to Virginie Andre, researcher at the Global Terrorism Research Center at
Monash University, glocalization can be defined as "the intertwining of the global and
the local, a process through which universal ideas are locally interpreted and absorbed
according to local cultural and historical particularities. It is a process of cultural mixing
across locations and identities, which gives rise to a global mélange."137
With regard to
some terrorist organizations, this is manifested by a dual nature that mixes local and
transnational/global variables. While strongly being shaped by, and often exploiting,
local political, historical, demographic and socioeconomic factors (such as tribal values
and grievances), 'glocal' militant groups‟ objectives and methodologies are influenced by
international conditions and opportunities as well. For instance, some radical Islamist
movements, such as Hamas, exclusively wage jihad locally as a religious obligation on
behalf of the transnational idea of the Ummah (nation). Other examples of regional/global
factors are ideological/organizational affiliation with other transnational jihadist or
criminal networks, global jihadist aspirations, sources of funding abroad, the employment
of foreign fighters, the use of high-tech technologies, etc. It should be said this
connection usually remains vague to a large extent due to the clandestine organizational
structures, the abstract idea of 'membership' and a lack of evidence. Additionally, often
the boundaries between the local and international conditions are blurred and/or
interrelated. In certain cases, such as the US presence in Afghanistan, (attacks carried out
136
Hegghammer, T., 2009. The ideological hybridization of jihadi groups. Current trends in Islamist Ideology,
volume 9, pp. 26-45. http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1298/hegghammer_vol9.pdf
[Accessed February 3, 2014]. 137
Andre, V., 2012. „Neojihadism‟ and Youtube: Patani militant propaganda dissemination and radicalization. Asian
Security, Vol. 8, no. 1, p. 51.
31
on) US forces could be interpreted as a 'near' (local) as well as an 'far' (global) target.
Moreover, the employment of local, regional and global features is mostly unique to
every organization and heavily dependent on the local environment it is based in.138
Examples of glocal terrorist organizations are al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Whereas both are highly designed by the
unique local conditions in respectively Northern Africa and Yemen, they are also clearly
influenced by international factors in terms of objectives, tactics, ideological propaganda,
technological know-how, funding and transnational (jihadist) connections, including to
al-Qaeda‟s senior leadership.139
Critical for glocal terrorist organizations is balancing their local and global objectives,
their short-term and long-term goals, and hence, their strategies towards the 'near' and
'far' enemy.140
In recent years, these have increasingly blurred as jihadist groups‟ rhetoric
and actions have become more heterogeneous.141
The Islamist insurgency in Sinai,
including its connection to Gaza, constitutes a complex environment where the near and
far enemy, respectively the Egyptian army and (predominantly) Israel, are intertwined to
a great extent, and moreover, can both be targeted from the same operational area. Other
than that, defining local and transnational/global here is problematic as, for instance,
Palestinians coordinating attacks on Israel from Sinai carried out by Egyptians or foreign
fighters can be considered both.
138
Marret, J.L., 2008. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A „„glocal‟‟ organization. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
Vol. 31 , no. 6, pp. 541-552. 139
Marret, J.L., 2008. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A „„glocal‟‟ organization. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
Vol. 31 , no. 6, pp. 541-552; Loidolt, B., 2011. Managing the global and the local: The dual agendas of Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 102-123. 140
Loidolt, B., 2011. Managing the global and the local: The dual agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 102-123; Marret, J.L., 2008. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A
„‟glocal‟‟ organization. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31 , no. 6, pp. 541-552. 141
Hegghammer, T., 2009. The ideological hybridization of jihadi groups. Current trends in Islamist Ideology,
volume 9, pp. 26-45. http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1298/hegghammer_vol9.pdf
[Accessed February 3, 2014].
32
For a glocal organization, remaining devoted to the local cause(s) is key, through which it
can obtain, and maintain, legitimacy and relevance. Longstanding local discontent due to
political and economic marginalization, for instance, could make locals susceptible to
radicalization and join armed groups, and therefore, ideal recruits. However, locals may
also take up arms because of frustrations rather than ideological association to Salafi-
jihadist groups. Addressing local grievances and at the same time responding to, or
making use of, the local social, ethnic and tribal structures, can mobilize support. This
support can manifest itself in various ways, such as volunteers, sanctuary, expert
knowledge of safe havens and harsh terrains, trafficking routes, access to arms, etc.142
Interweaving transnational/global facets brings several advantages. Articulating global
jihadist aspirations, for example by means of using the al-Qaeda 'brand' or proclaiming to
attack Israeli or Western targets, could increase media exposure, earn legitimacy on
another level, exaggerate their power, make them more resilient, and open doors to other
transnational jihadist groups, and therefore, perhaps material, logistical or financial
support. Moreover, it could also widen the potential recruitment base because it provides
incentives for (highly trained) radical Islamists to join the armed struggle.143
By joining
and manipulating local insurgents fighting an oppressive and/or impious government, and
portraying the conflict as a religious battle, Salafi-jihadists can strengthen the global
142
Loidolt, B., 2011. Managing the global and the local: The dual agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 102-123; Marret, J.L., 2008. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A
„„glocal‟‟ organization. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31 , no. 6, pp. 541-552; Loidolt, B., 2011. Managing
the global and the local: The dual agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
Vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 102-123. 143
Marret, J.L., 2008. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A „„glocal‟‟ organization. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
Vol. 31 , no. 6, pp. 541-552; Hegghammer, T., 2009. The ideological hybridization of jihadi groups. Current trends
in Islamist Ideology, volume 9, pp. 26-45.
http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1298/hegghammer_vol9.pdf [Accessed February 3,
2014]; Loidolt, B., 2011. Managing the global and the local: The dual agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 102-123.
33
jihadist movement and possibly become a dominant local force aspiring regional/global
goals.144
On a tactical level, the use of both local and global aims could decrease the predictability
of attacks as well as enable the group to employ a more flexible rhetoric. Needless to say,
transnational channels in terms of operational and technological know-how offer ample
opportunities to enhance methodologies and communication. Nevertheless, focusing too
much on the international and long-term agendas has possible disadvantages. Should the
local cause(s) be overlooked, terrorist groups may not only risk limiting mass
mobilization, they may also become more prone to internal divisions and perhaps
infiltration. Furthermore, internationalization may increase vulnerability to containment
and counter-terrorism policies by both local and foreign security services.145
The
following chapters will examine the main local, regional and global aspects of the
Islamist insurgency in Sinai, with a particular focus on the role of Salafi-jihadists from
Gaza.
THE LOCAL AGENDA
So how does this notion of glocalization relate to the violence in Sinai? While the
interconnection and implementation varies per group, the main factions are clearly glocal
ones, among others because they engage in a local conflict under the banner of the global
jihadist narrative. Starting with the local agenda, ABM evidently espouses a global
jihadist ideology but at the same time appears to be the one most committed to the local
144
Metz, S., 2013. Strategic horizons: Sinai is the next big jihadist battle. World Politics Review. August 11, 2013.
http://chainsoff.wordpress.com/2013/08/11/strategic-horizons-sinai-is-the-next-big-jihadist-battle/ [Accessed
January 28, 2014]. 145
Hegghammer, T., 2009. The ideological hybridization of jihadi groups. Current trends in Islamist Ideology,
volume 9, pp. 26-45. http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1298/hegghammer_vol9.pdf
[Accessed February 3, 2014].
34
cause, which it has seemingly co-opted to garner support, legitimize its actions and
reinforce its ideology. Headquartered among Sinai tribes146
and mainly consisting of local
Bedouin tribesmen, it has primarily targeted the Egyptian security apparatus.147
This
devotion has possibly contributed largely to the movement‟s rapid growth. As a result,
the bulk of its statements refer to the Egyptian army and police. For example, in October
2013, it argued that, for more than six decades, Egyptians Muslims have suffered under
"agencies of oppression" which have aimed "to push aside the Islamic Shariah, fight the
religion, spread disbelief and atheism, and crush these Muslim people without mercy and
make them beg for their freedom, dignity and livelihood… [T]he head of these agencies
that enslaved these people and fought their religion and creed is the criminal police."148
In
a statement on jihadist forums concerning claiming credit for a car bombing in the city of
Ismailia on October 19, 2013, the group asserted that it seeks to "cleanse Egypt of all
dens of criminality and agency" and that the attack was a consequence of the ongoing
"repressive practices carried out by the Egyptian army against our people."149
Additionally, while being aware targeting civilians will decline its number of supporters
and sympathizers, ABM has stressed it does not aim to harm the population. Several
times, it has warned Egyptians to stay away from governmental, police and military sites,
as they are "legitimate targets for the mujahideen."150
It is likely the group draws
146
Elshinnawi, M., 2013. Sinai: Egypt‟s growing security threat. Voice of America. September 11, 2013.
http://www.voanews.com/content/egypts-sinai-a-new-threat/1747895.html [Accessed December 1, 2013]. 147
Farid, S., 2014. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis: Egypt‟s own al-Qaeda? Al Arabiya. February 1, 2014.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2014/02/01/Ansar-Bayt-al-Maqdis-Egypt-s-own-al-Qaeda-.html
[Accessed February 4, 2014]. 148
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem claims credit for suicide bombing of South Sinai Security Directorate. The
Long War Journal. October 9, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/ansar_jerusalem_clai_2.php
[Accessed December 1, 2013]. 149
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem claims responsibility for car bombing in Ismailia. The Long War Journal.
October 21, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/ansar_jerusale_claim.php [Accessed November
26, 2013]. 150
Barnett, D., 2014. The strategy of Egypt‟s Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. The Altlantic Council. February 10, 2014.
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/the-strategy-of-egypt-s-ansar-bayt-al-maqdis [Accessed February
17, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem claims responsibility for car bombing in Ismailia. The Long War
Journal. October 21, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/ansar_jerusale_claim.php [Accessed
November 26, 2013].
35
substantial support among Sinai Bedouins as well as Egyptian Islamists through its
commitment to, and manipulation of, local grievances.
Many other groups active in Sinai have called for attacks on the Egyptian army as well,151
but appear to be focusing less on local issues than ABM. This seems to be the case for
organizations that originate from Gaza, especially the MSC152
and JAI,153
which
predominantly set their sights on waging violent jihad against Israel. The MSC has not
taken credit for any attack on Egyptian targets yet, in spite of calling for attacks on
them.154
However, even though there are little signs with respect to their commitment to,
for instance, the Bedouins‟ alienation, they presumably attempt to gain support among
the locals, and enhance their ranks and networks through exploitation of the situation on
the ground. Having said that, ABM is by no means less committed to the destruction of
Israel than the MSC or JAI. ABM‟s transnational character will be addressed in a
following chapter.
151
Barnett, D., 2013. Jihadist media unit urges fighters to strike Egyptian targets. The Long War Journal. September
23, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/09/jihadist_media_unit.php [Accessed February 4, 2014]. 152
Barnett, D., 2014. Saudi MSC in Jerusalem fighter fought in Libya, sought to join „mujahideen‟ in Somalia. The
Long War Journal. January 27, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/saudi_msc_in_jerusal.php
[Accessed February 18, 20214]; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2013. The
Mujahideen Shura Council: a global jihad-affiliated organization based in the Gaza Strip, has recently become
prominent for firing rockets and mortar shells into Israeli territory. April 22, 2013. http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/en/article/20504 [Accessed February 11, 2014]; Al-Shishani, M.B., 2013. Gazan jihadists unite to create
new operational base in Sinai. The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, volume 11, issue 4. February 22,
2013. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40492#.UrihJrQyjWc [Accessed
December 23, 2013]. 153
Schweitzer, Y., 2013. Al-Qaeda and global jihad in search of direction. In: Kurz, A. and Brom, S. (eds.), 2013.
Strategic survey for Israel 2012-2013. Institute for National Security Studies. Chapter 12, p. 221.
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2605 [Accessed December 23, 2013]; The Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2011. Exporting terrorism and subversion from the Gaza Strip.
February 2, 2011. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/17958 [Accessed January 13, 2014]; Cohen, Y., Levitt,
M. and Wasser, B., 2010. Deterred but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian Arena. The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. January 2010, pp. 16-21.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed January 14, 2014]. 154
Barnett, D., 2014. Saudi MSC in Jerusalem fighter fought in Libya, sought to join „mujahideen‟ in Somalia. The
Long War Journal. January 27, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/saudi_msc_in_jerusal.php
[Accessed February 18, 20214].
36
THE SINAI-GAZA CONNECTION
The amount and variety of weapons used, the presence of experienced, well-trained
(foreign) jihadists, and the sophisticated tactics employed in Sinai explicitly point at the
linkage with transnational jihadist and criminal networks. It is very likely some Sinai-
based Egyptian and foreign operatives that previously waged jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq
or Syria and have connections to other global jihadist groups, have been influential in the
increase of militancy. Nonetheless, according to numerous accounts, a key source of
training and operational coordination stems from Gazan Salafi-jihadists.155
Since
Mubarak‟s fall these relationships have been reinforced and have contributed largely to
the rise of terrorist activity in Egypt. This chapter will examine these ties by outlining
these groups‟ strategies, common interests and modus operandi, supported by various
sources referring to these links.
Strategy
In order to examine the cooperation between Salafi-jihadist groups from Gaza and Sinai,
an analysis of the various interrelated motives to use Sinai as an operational base is
critical. As in other battle zones, the key reason is because of the area‟s increased
lawlessness, which has resulted in a security vacuum. In contrast to the Gaza Strip, where
Hamas has clamped down on the Salafi-jihadists, the ungoverned Sinai simply provides
155
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]; Halevi, J.D.,
2012. The role of Hamas in the formation of global jihadi networks in Sinai. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
August 15, 2012. http://jcpa.org/article/the-role-of-hamas-in-the-formation-of-global-jihadi-networks-in-sinai/
[Accessed February 12, 2014]; Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-
Monitor. August 13, 2012. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html
[Accessed December 25, 2013]; The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2011. Exporting
terrorism and subversion from the Gaza Strip. February 2, 2011. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/17958
[Accessed January 13, 2014].
37
significantly more operational freedom.156
Not only is Sinai nearly three times the size of
Israel,157
the Egyptian-Israeli border is also substantially longer than Gaza‟s border with
Israel, respectively 266 km158
and 51 km.159
Moreover, since Egypt has destroyed most
of the Rafah tunnels, vital channels in terms of financial means, arms and equipment are
easier accessible in the peninsula. Due to the ongoing political turmoil in Egypt, security
in Cairo and other major cities has taken precedence, making the government even less
capable of establishing law and order in Sinai. Besides, the Egyptian army lacks the
capabilities to efficiently combat terrorism and guerilla warfare, among others because of
a doctrinal void.160
Other than that, Israel is officially restricted by the 1979 peace treaty
and thus, cannot violate Egypt‟s sovereignty. Through, for instance, airstrikes in the
peninsula, Israel would not only breech the longstanding treaty, but would also risk
inflaming the Egyptian population.161
Therefore, by moving operations from Gaza to
156
Gold, Z., 2013. Sinai security: Opportunities for unlikely cooperation among Egypt, Israel, and Hamas. The
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. October 2013, pp. 13-4.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/10/22%20sinai%20egypt%20israel%20hamas%20gol
d/22%20sinai%20hamas%20egypt%20israel%20gold.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]; Sabry, M., 2013. Sinai:
Egypt‟s most recent mayhem. GlobalPost, September 16, 2013.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/130915/sinai-egypts-most-recent-mayhem
[Accessed December 25, 2013]; International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011.
,http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 157
Yaari, E., 2012. Sinai: A new front. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2012, p.2.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf [Accessed January 27, 2014]. 158
CIA World Factbook, 2014. Egypt country profile. February 18, 2014.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html [Accessed February 20, 2014]. 159
CIA World Factbook, 2014. The Gaza Strip profile. February 4, 2014.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html [Accessed February 20, 2014]. 160
Al-Latifaat, 2014. Special report: Egyptian militants outwit army in Sinai battlefield. Reuters. March 16, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/16/us-egypt-sinai-specialreport-idUSBREA2F05020140316 [Accessed
March 16, 2014]; Gold, Z., 2013. Sinai security: Opportunities for unlikely cooperation among Egypt, Israel, and
Hamas. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. October 2013, p. 23.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/10/22%20sinai%20egypt%20israel%20hamas%20gol
d/22%20sinai%20hamas%20egypt%20israel%20gold.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]; Metz, S., 2013. Strategic
horizons: Sinai is the next big jihadist battle. World Politics Review. August 11, 2013.
http://chainsoff.wordpress.com/2013/08/11/strategic-horizons-sinai-is-the-next-big-jihadist-battle/ [Accessed
January 28, 2014]; Balanga, Y., 2012. Sinai: Territory without master. Al-Monitor. June 23, 2012. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/security/01/06/trouble-from-the-south.html [Accessed January 23, 2014]. 161
Caspit, B., 2014. Israel waits for Egypt to deal with terrorists in Sinai. Al-Monitor. February 18, 2014.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/terror-sinai-egypt-israel-gen-sisi-eilat-hilton-taba-hamas.html
[Accessed February 20, 2014]; Gold, Z., 2013. Sinai security: Opportunities for unlikely cooperation among Egypt,
Israel, and Hamas. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. October 2013, p. 27.
38
Sinai, the Salafi-jihadists can escape from both Hamas‟s crackdowns and Israeli
retaliation, and decrease the likeliness that the Palestinian population will be affected by
reprisal operations. At the same time, Sinai operatives can move to Gaza in order to flee
from the Egyptian army‟s counter-terrorism campaigns. Operating in Sinai exploits both
the security vacuum and the terms of the peace treaty, and is very likely utilized by the
Gazan Salafi-jihadists too as a means to rebutting involvement or responsibility.
Consequently, the peninsula offers opportunities to serve as a nearby base for all radical
Islamists – and not only for Palestinians or Sinai Bedouins – to stage attacks against
Israel, the 'infidel' Egyptian army, tourists and the Multinational Force & Observers
(MFO), an international peacekeeping force based in Sinai assigned to monitor the
implementation of the peace treaty.162
All of these local and transnational conditions, in
combination with a strategy of hijacking the struggles of the local people, provide a
fertile soil for strengthening the global jihadist movement.
Supporting evidence
Apart from the MSC, JAI and TWJ‟s role in and towards Sinai, which have been
addressed briefly in their respective profiles above, there are plentiful other sources that
link Sinai-based groups with elements from Gaza in varying degrees. In the early stages
after Mubarak‟s resignation, the MAITIC published a report addressing the fear that
Gazan Salafi-jihadists would increase their efforts to export terrorism to Egypt.163
In
contrast to what Israel‟s Military Intelligence and Shin Bet initially assumed, Israel‟s
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/10/22%20sinai%20egypt%20israel%20hamas%20gol
d/22%20sinai%20hamas%20egypt%20israel%20gold.pdf [Accessed December 25, 2013]; Balanga, Y., 2012. Sinai:
Territory without master. Al-Monitor. June 23, 2012. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/06/trouble-from-
the-south.html [Accessed January 23, 2014]. 162
Multinational Force & Observers, 2014. http://mfo.org/ [Accessed March 1, 2014]. 163
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2011. Exporting terrorism and subversion from
the Gaza Strip. February 2, 2011. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/17958 [Accessed January 13, 2014].
39
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and Hamas‟s subsequent rise to power resulted in
the export of terrorism and subversion from Gaza to Sinai rather than the other way
around. A senior intelligence official of Shin Bet argued that "[w]e thought experienced
global jihad operatives from Afghanistan and Syria would come to Sinai, and from there
to Gaza, but in practice, the operatives from Gaza are the ones who taught the operatives
in Sinai everything they know… The Salafi operatives from Gaza are all breakaways
from Hamas and [the Palestinian] Islamic Jihad who know the IDF well and have
accumulated much more combat experience than the operatives from Sinai… The Gaza
operatives are an operational asset, because they know how to plan and supervise
attacks."164
Considering the date of this statement, the increased presence of other non-
local fighters in Sinai (including Egyptians), and the destruction of most of the tunnels, it
is likely experienced jihadists other than Gazans now do constitute another significant
source of coordination, training and logistics.
The official further contended that experienced Gazan militants have travelled to Sinai to
establish relations with local Bedouins and that, over the course of the past two years,
Gaza has become a military training ground for jihadists from all over the region. After
completion of the courses, these belligerents allegedly leave for other jihadist arenas,
including Sinai. JAI‟s leader Mumtaz Dughmush is believed to be running the majority of
training camps.165
This could mean, perhaps, that JAI operatives are not carrying out
assaults in Sinai themselves, but 'subcontracted' operatives trained and supervised by it,
who might have joined other cells or factions, are. The same could explain the attacks in
Egypt that the JAI is accused of having played a key role in. This was discovered for the
first time when three suspected Egyptian members of the "al-Zeitoun cell" were arrested
due to their failed plan to kill the Israeli ambassador in Cairo in 2009. Reportedly, the
164
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 165
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014].
40
militants said they had been trained by JAI in Gaza.166
Sinai combatants have not only
gone to Gaza for training, however, since some of them also purportedly joined the fight
in Gaza against Israel during OPD.167
Other sources support the claim that Sinai-based terror is strongly influenced by Gazans.
Analyst Murad Batal al-Shishani cited a Sinai militant who said in September 2012 that
"[t]he interdependence [between jihadists from Gaza and Sinai] certainly exists
organizationally and ideologically. Salafi-jihadist groups in the Sinai and Gaza do not
recognize borders; they are dealing with the Palestinian issue in terms of religious
understanding. Even before the fall of the Mubarak regime, jihadists in the Sinai
supported Gaza by weapons, supplies and military missions through the tunnels. [We
have] also sheltered some of them who are wanted in Israel… On the other hand, Sinai
jihadis have benefited from the expertise available in the [Gaza] Strip, some were sent
there to receive training or to hide."168
The Sinai-Gaza terror link and the danger it poses became horribly apparent on August
18, 2011, when a string of sophisticated, cross-border attacks killed eight Israelis and
wounded over 30,169
the worst terrorist attack Israel had endured since 2008.170
While
166
Cohen, Y., Levitt, M. and Wasser, B., 2010. Deterred but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian
Arena. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2010, p. 20.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed January 14, 2014]. 167
Zelin, A.Y., 2012. Spoiling the Gaza ceasefire. The Atlantic. November 24, 2012.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/spoiling-the-gaza-ceasefire/265552/ [Accessed February
22, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2012. Sinai jihadists reportedly travel to Gaza fight to join Hamas in fight against Israel. The
Long War Journal. November 19, 2012. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2012/11/sinai_salafists_reportedly_tra.php [Accessed February 22, 2014]. 168
Al-Shishani, M.B., 2013. Gazan jihadists unite to create new operational base in Sinai. The Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, volume 11, issue 4. February 22, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40492#.UrihJrQyjWc [Accessed December
23, 2013]. 169
Pfeffer, A., 2011. Coordinated attacks in south Israel kill 8. Haaretz. August 19, 2011.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/coordinated-attacks-in-south-israel-kill-8-1.379428 [Accessed February
25, 2014]; Haaretz, 2011. Timeline / eight hours of terror in southern Israel. August 18, 2011.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/timeline-eight-hours-of-terror-in-southern-israel-1.379344
[Accessed February 25, 2014]. 170
Bruer, W., 2011. Militants kill 8 in complex assault on Israeli civilians. The Long War Journal. August 18, 2011.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/militants_kill_7_in.php [Accessed February 25, 2014].
41
Israeli intelligence was immediately aware it was orchestrated by the PRC (the Israeli Air
Force retaliated at PRC senior officials in Rafah on the same day),171
investigation found
out later that members of ABM had carried out the PRC‟s plans. According to Brig. Gen.
Nadav Padan, former commander of the IDF territorial division responsible for the
Egyptian-Israeli border and the southern part of the Jordanian border, the PRC had
provided financial, logistical and material support, among others through transferring
suicide vests via the tunnels.172
On February 9, 2014, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) targeted
and seriously injured Abdallah Kharti, a leading PRC operative, who, according to Israeli
intelligence sources, had played a fundamental role in erecting the terrorist infrastructure
in Sinai and provided assistance to ABM.173
In contrast to what Israeli intelligence initially believed, ABM played a much greater role
in the operation in August 2011. In September 2013, Padan argued that the Sinai-based
militias are gaining more independence from their counterparts in Gaza.174
Though it is
difficult to judge to what extent this could be the case, several factors could point to this
development. Firstly, even though tunnels still exist, or are rebuilt,175
the destruction of
the bulk of them, and the Egyptian army‟s recent strategy to establish a buffer zone in
171
Pfeffer, A., 2011. Coordinated attacks in south Israel kill 8. Haaretz. August 19, 2011.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/coordinated-attacks-in-south-israel-kill-8-1.379428 [Accessed February
25, 2014]. 172
Harel, A., 2014. Israel faces uphill battle with Al-Qaida groups in Sinai, says ex-IDF commander. Haaretz.
September 18, 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/high-holy-days-2013/high-holy-day-news-and-
features/.premium-1.547720 [Accessed March 7, 2014]. 173
Lappin, Y., 2014. Analysis: Target of IDF strike is key link in Gaza-Sinai radical Salafi terror network. The
Jerusalem Post. February 9, 2014. http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Analysis-Target-of-IDF-strike-is-key-link-in-
Gaza-Sinai-radical-Salafi-terror-network-340854 [Accessed March 12, 2014]; Levy, E., 2014. IAF strikes Gaza;
Israel says member of global jihad wounded. Ynetnews. February 9, 2014.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4486138,00.html [Accessed March 13, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2014. Israel
targets Gaza terror operative linked to Sinai-based Ansar Jerusalem. The Long War Journal. February 9, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/02/israel_targets_gaza_terror_ope.php [Accessed
February 20, 2014]. 174
Harel, A., 2014. Israel faces uphill battle with Al-Qaida groups in Sinai, says ex-IDF commander. Haaretz.
September 18, 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/high-holy-days-2013/high-holy-day-news-and-
features/.premium-1.547720 [Accessed March 7, 2014]. 175
Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and respond concept. The Saban
Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, pp. 8-9.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014].
42
Rafah up to 500 meters,176
have considerably limited the freedom of movement between
Gaza and Sinai. Secondly, the increased number of foreign jihadists could indicate that
Sinai-based militants have also benefited from other experienced actors‟ expertise.
Various sources state numerous training camps have been set up in Sinai.177
And thirdly,
Sinai-Gaza collaboration already existed before last year‟s deterioration of violence.
Presumably most of the Sinai insurgents that have acquired military training in the
coastal enclave have done so prior to the tunnel infrastructure‟s demolition. Due to the
training, connections and increased number of (high-profile) attacks carried out, some
Sinai-based factions have grown themselves and increasingly developed their tactics over
time, and perhaps started to act more on their own. According to an Israeli television
station Channel 10 report in October 2012, this applies to ABM as its relationship with
the PRC has waned because the former began operating more independently.178
According to Padan, some jihadist networks in Sinai have also started producing their
own arms.179
However, providing coordination, advice or assistance does not necessarily require travel
across the border. Whereas access to Gaza is restrained to a certain extent, Palestinian
Salafi-jihadists still reside in Sinai and could direct training camps and/or operations from
there. In spite of possible increased independence by some organizations or influence of
176
The Jerusalem Post, 2014. Report: Egypt creating buffer zone on Gaza-Sinai border, destroys 10 tunnels.
February 16, 2014. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-Egypt-creating-buffer-zone-on-Gaza-Sinai-border-
destroys-10-tunnels-341533 [Accessed March 9, 2014]. 177
Fox News, 2013. Fox News. Local, foreign Islamic militants turn Egypt‟s Sinai a new front for jihad. AFP.
September 3, 2013. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/03/local-foreign-islamic-militants-turn-egypt-sinai-
new-front-for-jihad/ [Accessed March 9, 2014]; Lappin, Y., 2013. Israel‟s balancing act in Sinai. The Daily Beast.
August 16, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/16/israel-s-balancing-act-in-sinai.html [Accessed
March 9, 2014]; The Sydney Morning Herald, 2012. Sinai becomes latest hotbed for extremist militant training
camps. July 16, 2012. http://www.smh.com.au/world/sinai-becomes-latest-hotbed-for-extremist-militant-training-
camps-20120715-22460.html [Accessed March 9, 2014]. 178
Barnett, D., 2012. Israeli intelligence: Sinai is the „home of an independent jihadist network.‟ The Long War
Journal. October 3, 2012. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/israeli_intelligence.php [Accessed
January 25, 2014]. 179
Harel, A., 2014. Israel faces uphill battle with Al-Qaida groups in Sinai, says ex-IDF commander. Haaretz.
September 18, 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/high-holy-days-2013/high-holy-day-news-and-
features/.premium-1.547720 [Accessed March 7, 2014].
43
seasoned foreign fighters, it is very likely Sinai-based elements still profit from their
Gazan counterparts‟ expertise and that these ties continue to develop one way or another,
given these groups‟ ideological similarities, innovativeness and shown ability to adjust to
changing circumstances.
Tactics
The tactics used by Salafi-jihadists in Sinai vary widely – from more common terrorist
attacks (such as mines, mortars, kidnappings, hit-and-run attacks and IEDs) to
assassinations to sophisticated, near-simultaneous multi-strikes, including suicide
bombings. These groups, and ABM in particular, have clearly learned on a strategic as
well as a tactical level, suggesting the influence of experienced jihadists from Gaza or
elsewhere. Though little is known about the planning of operations, it is obvious that
some of the high-profile attacks must have taken weeks, or even months, to prepare and
required advanced intelligence gathering skills. For instance, the car bomb claimed by
ABM that struck the police headquarters in Cairo in January 2014, was detonated at
exactly the same time police officers changed shifts.180
The threat that the varied and
complex nature of these groups‟ modus operandi constitutes will be emphasized by three
of the many attacks that stood out.
With regard to the cross-border attack on August 18, 2011 mentioned above, it is
believed about 15 to 20 militants had exited Gaza and entered Israel near Eilat via
Sinai,181
wearing Egyptian military uniforms182
and equipped with bombs, assault rifles,
180
Youssef, N.A., 2014. Deadly blast sets Egypt on edge ahead of revolt‟s anniversary. January 24, 2014.
McClatchy DC. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/01/24/215691/deadly-blast-sets-egypt-on-edge.html [Accessed
February 23, 2014]. 181
Pfeffer, A., 2011. Coordinated attacks in south Israel kill 8. Haaretz. August 19, 2011.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/coordinated-attacks-in-south-israel-kill-8-1.379428 [Accessed February
25, 2014].
44
grenades, a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher, and anti-tank missiles. The
perpetrators appeared to be working in multiple units. Initially, three militants set up an
ambush, positioning themselves at intervals of approximately 200 meters along route 12,
a desert border road. Two buses and some cars were attacked by heavy gunfire,183
including an anti-tank missile hitting a car.184
A suicide bomber blew himself up near the
second bus. Not much later, mortars were fired into Israel from Sinai. Explosive devices
had also been planted along the road,185
hitting a military vehicle.186
After Israeli soldiers
arrived, a gun battle erupted, followed by another one later that day. While the majority
of assailants managed to escape, seven were killed, respectively five by Israeli troops and
two by the Egyptian army in Sinai.187
Additionally, three Egyptian security officers lost
their lives.188
On August 5, 2012, another well-coordinated, complex attack was carried out at the
Kerem Shalom border crossing, close to where Gaza, Egypt and Israel‟s borders meet.
While Egyptian soldiers were having their meal after sunset during Ramadan, their base
182
Levy-Stein, R., 2011. Israeli bus driver recounts long minutes of terror attack. Haaretz. August 19, 2011.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israeli-bus-driver-recounts-long-minutes-of-terror-attack-1.379444
[Accessed February 25, 2014]. 183
Pfeffer, A., 2011. Coordinated attacks in south Israel kill 8. Haaretz. August 19, 2011.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/coordinated-attacks-in-south-israel-kill-8-1.379428 [Accessed February
25, 2014].. 184
The Guardian, 2011. Israelis killed in attacks near Egypt border. August 18, 2011.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/18/israeli-bus-attacked-border-egypt [Accessed February 25, 2014];
BBC News, 2011. Deadly attacks reveal Israeli vehicles near Egypt. August 18, 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14573559 [Accessed February 25, 2014]. 185
Pfeffer, A., 2011. Coordinated attacks in south Israel kill 8. Haaretz. August 19, 2011.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/coordinated-attacks-in-south-israel-kill-8-1.379428 [Accessed February
25, 2014]. 186
Bruer, W., 2011. Militants kill 8 in complex assault on Israeli civilians. The Long War Journal. August 18, 2011.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/militants_kill_7_in.php [Accessed February 25, 2014]. 187
Pfeffer, A., 2011. Coordinated attacks in south Israel kill 8. Haaretz. August 19, 2011.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/coordinated-attacks-in-south-israel-kill-8-1.379428 [Accessed February
25, 2014]. 188
Bruer, W., 2011. Militants kill 8 in complex assault on Israeli civilians. The Long War Journal. August 18, 2011.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/militants_kill_7_in.php [Accessed February 25, 2014].
45
was overrun by militants armed with RPGs and assault rifles.189
Sixteen Egyptian soldiers
were killed and seven injured.190
Subsequently, they seized an armored personnel carrier
and drove to the border crossing where they sought to break through the security fence
and head to the Kerem Shalom IDF base. At the same time, the alleged commanders of
the operation and one other cell firing mortars for cover, totaling at least ten militants,
stayed on the Egyptian side. It is thought the idea was to kill as many as forces possible,
and probably abduct an Israeli soldier, through entering the base with a pick-up truck
loaded with half a ton of explosives, followed by the armored personnel carrier, including
some suicide bombers. Luckily, the Israeli border forces were prepared and succeeded in
stopping the attack. While the pick-up truck already exploded at the border crossing, the
armored personnel carrier did infiltrate Israel before being destroyed via, among others,
airstrikes. Some assailants got out of the vehicle and engaged in clashes with the Israeli
forces. Six terrorists were killed.191
Some sources say 35 fighters were involved in the
operation.192
Sources vary about who carried out the attack, demonstrating the fluid
nature of these groups‟ structures yet again. While Shin Bet thought TWH was
responsible,193
others blamed JAI,194
ABM195
or TWJ.196
Nevertheless, both Israel and
189
Batrawy, A. and Teibel, A., 2012. Egypt soldiers killed in Sinai attack. The Huffington Post. August 6, 2012.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/06/egypt-soldiers-killed-sinai_n_1748316.html [Accessed February 24,
2014]. 190
Halevi, J.D., 2012. The role of Hamas in the formation of global jihadi networks in Sinai. Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs. August 15, 2012. http://jcpa.org/article/the-role-of-hamas-in-the-formation-of-global-jihadi-
networks-in-sinai/ [Accessed February 12, 2014]. 191
Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed December 25,
2013]; Israeli Defense Forces, 2012. Chief of Staff: joint operation prevented a large-scale terror attack. August 6,
2012. http://www.idf.il/1283-16775-EN/Dover.aspx [Accessed February 24, 2012]. 192
Halevi, J.D., 2012. The role of Hamas in the formation of global jihadi networks in Sinai. Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs. August 15, 2012. http://jcpa.org/article/the-role-of-hamas-in-the-formation-of-global-jihadi-
networks-in-sinai/ [Accessed February 12, 2014]; Batrawy, A. and Teibel, A., 2012. Egypt soldiers killed in Sinai
attack. The Huffington Post. August 6, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/06/egypt-soldiers-killed-
sinai_n_1748316.html [Accessed February 24, 2014]. 193
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 194
Halevi, J.D., 2012. The role of Hamas in the formation of global jihadi networks in Sinai. Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs. August 15, 2012. http://jcpa.org/article/the-role-of-hamas-in-the-formation-of-global-jihadi-
networks-in-sinai/ [Accessed February 12, 2014].
46
Egypt were certain that Gazan actors had played a major role in orchestrating the
attack.197
According to Alex Fishman, the complex assault had taken at least two months
of preparation, including intelligence gathering along the border, training, logistics, and
funding.198
A noteworthy, yet very worrying, development that has only recently been displayed is
the militants‟ possession of advanced portable SAMs, known as MANPADS, a type of
weapon previously unseen in Sinai.199
These capabilities were evidenced on January 25,
2014, when a member of ABM shot down a military helicopter, which subsequently
crashed and resulted in the death of five soldiers. Considering the helicopters are a key
feature of the counter-terrorism campaign in Sinai, the presence of SAMs may have
major consequences for the air force‟s operations. Additionally, these missiles constitute
grave potential security and economic threats should terrorists decide to target
commercial airlines as well. Allegedly due to fears of antiaircraft missiles, Transavia, a
Dutch airline, cancelled its flights to Sharm el-Sheikh in October last year.200
195
Ben David, A., 2013. Rocket attack could shake Israel-Egypt security ties. Al-Monitor. April 19, 2013.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/securing-israels-souther-border.html [Accessed March 5, 2014]. 196
Omar, H., et al, 2012. Sinai attack unleashes political blame game. Al-Monitor. August 9, 2012. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/sinai-activists-criticize-the-fa.html [Accessed February 24, 2012]. 197
Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed December 25,
2013]. 198
Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed December 25,
2013]. 199
Kingsley, P., 2014. Egypt faces new threat in al-Qaida-linked group Ansar Beyt al-Maqdis. The Guardian.
January 31, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/31/egypt-alqaida-terrorist-threat-ansar-beyt-almaqdis
[Accessed February 17, 2014]; Binnie, J., 2014. Egyptian militants downed helo with Igla-type MANPADS. IHS
Jane’s Defence Weekly. January 28, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/33165/egyptian-militants-downed-helo-
with-igla-type-manpads#.UukbqdPL_rM.twitter [Accessed February 20, 2014]. 200
Barnett, D., 2014. SAMs in Egypt‟s Sinai. Foundation for Defense of Democracy. January 28, 2014.
http://defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/sams-in-egypts-sinai/ [Accessed January 29, 2014]; Vick, K., 2014. Petraeus:
Terrorists with missiles could down global air traffic. Time. January 28, 2014.
http://world.time.com/2014/01/28/petraeus-egypts-israel-militants-rockets/ [Accessed February 24, 2014]; Barnett,
D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem claims SAM attack as 3 soldiers killed in Sinai bus ambush. The Long War Journal.
January 26, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/ansar_jerusalem_clai_6.php [Accessed January
29, 2014].
47
GLOBAL JIHAD AND AL-QAEDA AFFILIATION
Despite a substantial decline in the 2000s, the developments of the so-called Arab Spring
have paradoxically facilitated the resurgence of al-Qaeda‟s narrative throughout the
Middle East and North Africa, including Sinai. Due to the chaos and various regimes‟
failure to (re-)establish law and order, security vacuums arose which have been exploited
by adherents of global jihad (but also by other sub-state actors, such as gangs and
criminal networks). Other countries in which this pattern has particularly been witnessed
are, for instance, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Lebanon. As a result, even though Salafi-jihadist
groups have seemingly become more decentralized and do not necessarily constitute a
coherent front in terms of objectives and targets, their amount, individuals inspired by it,
and attacks carried out by them have increased in recent years. Additionally, another
possible factor for explaining the revival of the global jihad movement is the
transnational migration of militant Islamists. Through collective training, praying and
eating, training camps provide excellent opportunities for the participants to create close
relationships and strengthen ideology among various nationalities. Hence, these social
processes, which also take place when fighting together, generally result in increased
transnational networks, which may culminate in diverse means of support later on.
Salafi-jihadists nowadays derive from four different strata, namely al-Qaeda‟s core in
Afghanistan-Pakistan, its formal territorial affiliates (AQAP, AQIM, Jabhat al-Nusra and
al-Shabaab), groups associating with al-Qaeda that are not officially recognized by it but
may collaborate with it and/or its branches for certain purposes, and independent
networks and actors.201
Sinai‟s strategic location and the opportunities its lawlessness
201
Jones, S.G., 2014.Back to the future: The resurgence of Salafi-jihadists. RAND. February 2014.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT405/RAND_CT405.pdf [Accessed February 27,
2014]; Riedel, B., 2014. The continuation evolution of al-Qaeda 3.0. Al-Monitor. January 3, 2014. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/al-qaeda-terror-spread-iraq-lebanon.html# [Accessed January 13, 2014]; See
also, for example, Reinares, F., 2014. Making sense of global terrorism now. The International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism. March 5, 2014.
48
offers to operate against both Egypt and 'the Zionist enemy' with relative impunity, may
soon draw more Salafi-jihadists from all over the Islamic world.
In line with the possible factors contributing to the rise of radical Islam, there is a
significant amount of sources that link the violence in Sinai to al-Qaeda. This association,
irrespective of whether it is ideological or organizational, is a key indication of the
terrorist organizations‟ transnational character. Many militant groups in Sinai adhere to
al-Qaeda ideals, evidenced by a plethora of statements, black al-Qaeda flags, tributes to
al-Qaeda leaders, and identical tactics.202
The ideological similarities are evident. First of
all, democracy and secularism are strongly rejected, and implementing Sharia is the
solution to the region‟s problems. Secondly, violence, and not democracy, is perceived
the only path to establish Islamic rule. And thirdly, external actors‟ interference in the
Middle East is considered a major cause of the region‟s problems and instability,
including the Muslim Brotherhood‟s overthrow.203
ABM, for instance, blamed "America
and the Crusader West" of interfering in the Arab Spring "to change the natural directions
of these blessed revolutions, and prevent[ing] the Muslim peoples from achieving their
http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1281/currentpage/1/Default.aspx
[Accessed March 19, 2014]. 202
See for instance: Sabry, M., 2013. Al-Qaeda emerges amid Egypt‟s turmoil. Al-Monitor. December 4, 2013.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/al-qaeda-egypt-sinai-insurgency-growing-influence.html
[Accessed February 6, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem releases video of October attack in South Sinai.
The Long War Journal. November 20, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2013/11/ansar_jerusalem_releases_video.php [Accessed December 2, 2013]; Paraszczuk, J., 2012.
„Al-Qaida ideals entrenched in Sinai jihadi groups.‟ The Jerusalem Post. October 18, 2012.
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Al-Qaida-ideals-entrenched-in-Sinai-jihadi-groups [Accessed February 6, 2014];
Tanoukhi, N., 2012. Attack in Egypt‟s Sinai reflect spread of jihadists, Islamists. Al-Monitor. August 7, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/map-of-islamic-groups-in-sinai-s.html [Accessed January 26,
2014]; Roggio, B., 2011. Israel kills leader of al Qaeda-linked Army of Islam in Gaza airstrike. The Long War
Journal. December 30, 2011. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/israel_kills_al_qaed.php [Accessed
January 13, 2014]; Cohen, Y., Levitt, M. and Wasser, B., 2010. Deterred but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the
Palestinian Arena. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2010, p. 9.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed January 14, 2014]. 203
Richards, R., 2013. The al Qaeda network responds to Egypt. American Enterprise Institute; Critical Threats,
July 23, 2013. http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/richards-al-qaeda-network-responds-to-egypt-july-23-2013
[Accessed December 3, 2013].
49
true freedom and implementing their Islamic Shariah."204
Accordingly, a common trait of
the Salafi-jihadist movements active in the peninsula is that they all seek to destroy
Israel.205
As for Egypt‟s military-led government, senior fellow of the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies Thomas Joscelyn argues, "[a]l-Qaeda has consistently portrayed
the Egyptian military as a servant of an imaginary Zionist-Crusader conspiracy, making
the government a legitimate target for jihad."206
Given the increased presence of al-
Qaeda-inspired fighters and sympathizers, operating from Sinai is a strategic move to
establish a new safe haven for the global jihad movement.207
At the same time, several al-
Qaeda leaders and affiliates have commented on the developments in Egypt. Al-Qaeda‟s
Egyptian emir Ayman al-Zawahiri has praised attacks on Egyptian and Israeli targets, and
expressed his support for "our people in Sinai".208
Similar statements have been released
by, among others, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS; though recently disowned
by al-Qaeda‟s senior leadership),209
AQIM210
and AQAP.211
204
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem slams Obama‟s visit to Israel. The Long War Journal. March 21, 2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/03/ansar_jerusalem_slams_obamas_v.php [Accessed
December 8, 2013]. 205
Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August 13, 2012.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed December 25,
2013]. 206
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014]. 207
Zelin, A.Y., 2012. Terror from Sinai: Global jihadist groups on Israel‟s doorstep. The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy. June 20, 2012. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/terror-from-sinai-global-
jihadist-groups-on-israels-doorstep [Accessed February 9, 2014]. 208
Riedel, B., 2014. Al-Qaeda now frontline threat to Israel. Al-Monitor. January 31, 2014. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/al-qaeda-israel-threat.html [Accessed February 6, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2014.
Zawahiri‟s message to „‟our people in Sinai‟‟. The Long War Journal. January 27, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/01/zawahiris_message_to_our_peopl.php [Accessed
February 6, 2014]. 209
Kirkpatrick, D.D. and Schmitt, E., 2014. Jihadist return is said to drive attacks in Egypt. The New York Times.
February 5, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/world/middleeast/jihadist-return-is-said-to-drive-attacks-in-
egypt.html?_r=0 [Accessed February 7, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2013. ISIS judge to Sinai jihadists: „We and you are
one.‟ The Long War Journal. December 14, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2013/12/isis_judge_to_sinai_jihadists.php [Accessed February 27, 2014]. 210
Richards, R., 2013. The al Qaeda network responds to Egypt. American Enterprise Institute; Critical Threats,
July 23, 2013. http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/richards-al-qaeda-network-responds-to-egypt-july-23-2013
[Accessed December 3, 2013].
50
Consequently, it comes as no surprise many sources affiliate the Salafi-jihadist groups
with al-Qaeda. In spite of the ideological association, however, there is no concrete
evidence with regard to factional ties to al-Qaeda (branches). Aviv Oreg argues, for
example, that ABM possibly has internet contact with al-Qaeda elements and utilizes
similar tactics, but is not subjected to external leadership by al-Qaeda.212
In an interview
with Egyptian newspaper al-Masry al-Youm in 2011, a Gazan militant said that the
Salafi-jihadist networks in Gaza are only inspirationally connected to al-Qaeda.213
Other
sources express a similar point of view that there is no official presence of Zawahiri‟s
organization in Sinai or Gaza.214
No proof, however, does not mean such ties do not exist. Many signs suggest possible
involvement of al-Qaeda (branches). A key rule of Osama bin Laden was the
"centralization of decision and the decentralization of execution", which has been applied
to such a degree that even senior leaders were unaware of who planned and executed
211
Barnett, D., 2013. AQAP official comments on Egypt events, says America retreating. The Long War Journal.
August 25. 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/aqap_official_commen.ph [Accessed February 7,
2014]. 212
Hauslohner, A. and Cunningham, E., 2013. In Egypt, jihadist group Bayt al-Maqdis claims responsibility for
bombing. The Washington Post. October 21, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-egypt-jihadist-group-
bayt-al-maqdis-claims-responsibility-for-bombing/2013/10/21/7ddbd77c-3a6a-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html
[Accessed December 7, 2013]. 213
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2012. The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network
Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli
civilian was killed. August 8, 2012, p. 19. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20381 [Accessed January 27,
2014]. Cohen, Y., Levitt, M. and Wasser, B., 2010. Deterred but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian
Arena. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2010, pp. 6-10.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed January 14, 2014]. 214
Daraghmeh, M., 2014. AP interview: Jihadi head says Gaza groups growing. AP. March 9, 2014.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-interview-jihadi-head-says-gaza-groups-growing [Accessed March 10, 2014]; Farid,
S., 2014. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis: Egypt‟s own al-Qaeda? Al Arabiya. February 1, 2014.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2014/02/01/Ansar-Bayt-al-Maqdis-Egypt-s-own-al-Qaeda-.html
[Accessed February 4, 2014]; Siboni, G. and Ben-Barak, R., 2014. The Sinai Peninsula threat development and
respond concept. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. January 2014, p. 6.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/28-sinai-israel-siboni [Accessed February 13, 2014];
Paraszczuk, J., 2012. „Al-Qaida ideals entrenched in Sinai jihadi groups.‟ The Jerusalem Post. October 18, 2012.
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Al-Qaida-ideals-entrenched-in-Sinai-jihadi-groups [Accessed February 6, 2014];
Cohen, Y., Levitt, M. and Wasser, B., 2010. Deterred but determined: Salafi-jihadi groups in the Palestinian Arena.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2010, pp. 6-10, 31-2.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus%2099.pdf [Accessed January 14, 2014].
51
operations until the attacks were completed.215
It should not be excluded a possible a
similar or slightly configured strategy has been employed towards Sinai. Additionally,
the return of Egyptians from, or presence of foreign jihadists who have been to Syria, for
example, could indicate connections with Jabhat al-Nusra or former affiliate ISIS.
Militants associated with ISIS and its even more extremist practices, could exacerbate
violence even more through expansion of targets, such as churches, Christians, women,
elders and children.216
According to a leader of the MSC, 100 jihadists from Gaza have
gone to Syria to wage jihad against the Assad regime, of which 90 are still alive.217
Military analyst Yaakov Lappin recently argued that "[t]he danger of these [Sinai-Gaza]
networks merging with the extensive jihadist networks in Syria is substantial."218
There are other indications that the Salafi-jihadists may have relations within al-Qaeda.
Some reports claim, for instance, that the considerable presence of Yemenis in Sinai
strongly hints at AQAP‟s involvement.219
According to US officials, some of its members
have regularly communicated with combatants in Sinai.220
Furthermore, it is thought the
former leader of TWJ and founder of the MSC, Hisham Ali Saidani, was closely tied to
AQI. Before going to Iraq in 2003, he reportedly joined Abu Mohammed Assem al-
Maqdisi, considered a main advocate of al-Qaeda‟s ideology and the ideological mentor
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI‟s former representative. Saidani‟s alias, Abu al-Walid al-
215
Sabry, M., 2013. Al-Qaeda emerges amid Egypt‟s turmoil. Al-Monitor. December 4, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/al-qaeda-egypt-sinai-insurgency-growing-influence.html [Accessed February
6, 2014]; See also Zimmerman, K., 2014. A new definition for al-Qaeda. The Washington Post. February 1, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-new-definition-for-al-qaeda/2014/01/31/31283002-83a7-11e3-9dd4-
e7278db80d86_story.html [Accessed February 21, 2014]. 216
Al-Anani, K., 2014. The resurgence of militant Islamists in Egypt. Middle East Institute. February 14, 2014.
http://www.mideasti.org/content/resurgence-militant-islamists-egypt [Accessed February 20, 2014]. 217
Daraghmeh, M., 2014. AP interview: Jihadi head says Gaza groups growing. AP. March 9, 2014.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-interview-jihadi-head-says-gaza-groups-growing [Accessed March 10, 2014]. 218
Lappin, Y., 2014. Analysis: The Salafi menace in Sinai goes after a soft target. The Jerusalem Post. February 17,
2014. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-The-Salafi-menace-in-Sinai-goes-after-a-soft-target-341608
[Accessed March 6, 2014]. 219
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014]. 220
Worth, R.F. and Schmitt, E., 2013. Jihadist groups gain in turmoil across Middle East. The New York Times.
December 3, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/world/middleeast/jihadist-groups-gain-in-turmoil-across-
middle-east.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&hp&pagewanted=all& [Accessed February 9, 2014].
52
Maqdisi, suggests he was clearly influenced by al-Maqdisi.221
Like Zawahiri, Saidani was
a strong ideologue pushing for the unification of Salafi-jihadists, evidenced by the
establishment of the MSC.222
In his eulogy for Saidani, Zawahiri called upon Muslims in
Gaza "to unite under the word Tawhid."223
Other indications of possible al-Qaeda
influence are the return of Egyptians and escaped prisoners who were members of the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Gamaa Islamiyya, two Egyptian militant organizations
previously very closely linked to al-Qaeda, and responsible for many high-profile
terrorist attacks in the 1980s and 1990s.224
These included prominent jihadists such as
Zawahiri‟s brother, Mohamed al-Zawahiri, and Muhammad Jamal, though both have
been arrested again. The latter used to work directly with Ayman al-Zawahiri and
contacted him after his release. In 2011, he created the Muhammad Jamal Network
(MJN), a militant group operating in Libya and Egypt, including Sinai,225
designated by
221
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2012. The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network
Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli
civilian was killed. August 8, 2012, pp. 13-7. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20381 [Accessed January
27, 2014]. 222
Al-Shishani, M.B., 2013. Gazan jihadists unite to create new operational base in Sinai. The Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, volume 11, issue 4. February 22, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40492#.UrihJrQyjWc [Accessed December
23, 2013]. 223
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014]; The Al-
Fajr Media Center, 2012. Eulogy to Sheikh Commander, Hisham al-Saedani, Abu Waleed Al-Maqdisi, May Allah
have mercy on him. The Global Islamic Media Front. http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/dr-ayman-al-
e1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22eulogy-for-the-commander-shaykh-hishc481m-al-sa_c4abdnc4ab-abc5ab-al-walid-al-
maqdisc4ab22-en.pdf [Accessed March 12, 2014]. 224
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014]; Fletcher,
H., 2008. Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Council on Foreign Relations. May 30, 2008. http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egyptian-
islamic-jihad/p16376 [Accessed March 12, 2014]; Fletcher, H., 2008. Jamaat al-Islamiyya. Council on Foreign
Relations. May 30, 2008. http://www.cfr.org/egypt/jamaat-al-islamiyya/p9156 [Accessed March 12, 2014]. 225
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014].
53
the United States as terrorists.226
MJN has allegedly set up training camps in Sinai and
close links to al-Qaeda‟s central command, AQAP and AQIM.227
Another example is provided by JAI, which used to be more than al-Qaeda-inspired. A
document found in Osama bin Laden‟s computer revealed it consulted with al-Qaeda‟s
then-emir in 2006.228
In the following year, JAI kidnapped BBC journalist Alan Johnston
and demanded the release of the fundamentalist preacher Abu Qatada, who allegedly had
close relations with al-Qaeda.229
Additionally, a top commander of the movement
disclosed in 2007 that it had received coordination and funds from al-Qaeda, and that
Arabs who had fought in Afghanistan had joined their forces.230
Taking into account
these events happened years ago, and that little to no data has surfaced ever since, it is not
clear if, and to what extent, these links still exist. While JAI as well as the other Salafi-
jihadist factions in Gaza have never been officially recognized by al-Qaeda,231
not
officially recognizing factions could very well be a calculated strategic decision. In the
near future, it is possible al-Qaeda-inspired groups will not be officially accepted, not
only to enhance its covert character but also in the light of a recent statement made by
Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who asserted that the US
226
US Department of State, 2013. Terrorist designations of the Muhammad Jamal Network and Muhammad Jamal.
October 7, 2013. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215171.htm [Accessed March 12, 2014]. 227
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014]. 228
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2012. The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network
Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli
civilian was killed. August 8, 2012, p. 19. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20381 [Accessed January 27,
2014]. 229
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, pp. 8-9.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 230
Halevi, J.D., 2007. „‟The Army of the Nation‟‟ – Another Al-Qaeda affiliate in the Gaza Strip. Jerusalem Center
for Public Affairs. August 7, 2007. http://jcpa.org/article/%E2%80%9Cthe-army-of-the-nation%E2%80%9D-
another-al-qaeda-affiliate-in-the-gaza-strip/ [Accessed February 19, 2014]. 231
Karmon, E., 2014. Al-Qaida and Palestinians jihadists: the Hamas connection. The International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism. January 29, 2014.
www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1266/currentpage/1/Default.aspx [Accessed
February 10, 2014].
54
army perceives itself legally prohibited from hunting down the militants responsible for
the Benghazi attacks, unless they are affiliated to Zawahiri‟s movement.232
Apart from some concrete examples in the past, such as in the case of JAI, it does not
seem the Salafi-jihadist groups currently operating in Sinai and Gaza are subordinates of
an overriding al-Qaeda faction. For now, although many signs, such as the tactics
employed in Sinai, could point to the possible influence of fighters connected to al-Qaeda
(branches), these ties appear to be of an ideological nature. Nevertheless, ideological
association could have opened up, or could eventually open up, gateways to human and
material resources. It is likely, though, actors in Sinai have occasionally cooperated with
members of al-Qaeda for specific purposes or operations in case of mutual interests.
Considering the fluidity of the developments in Sinai, al-Qaeda‟s potential to transform
the peninsula from a jihadist hotbed into a stronghold, the strategically located safe haven
the area provides in the proximity of Israel, and that al-Qaeda‟s senior leadership
comprises several Egyptians who are highly familiar with the local jihadist community,233
evidence of branches or cells with a more direct link to al-Qaeda may very well emerge
in the near future.
ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS – A GLOCAL ORGANIZATION
Considering ABM‟s tactics and weaponry used, it is inconceivable it has no connections
to other transnational networks for financial, material, logistical and/or training purposes.
While its devotion to the local cause has likely played a major role in its evolution, it
could not have become such a dominant organization without interweaving regional and
232
Zimmerman, K., 2014. A new definition for al-Qaeda. The Washington Post. February 1, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-new-definition-for-al-qaeda/2014/01/31/31283002-83a7-11e3-9dd4-
e7278db80d86_story.html [Accessed February 21, 2014]. 233
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014].
55
global features. For instance, according to Mohannad Sabry, a journalist from al-Arish, a
substantial amount of ABM‟s weaponry derives from Libya‟s looted arms stockpiles.234
These smuggling operations covering relatively long distances indicate cooperation with
other transnational jihadist and/or criminal networks. Even though there is barely any
concrete information regarding ABM‟s sources of funding, it supposedly finances its
operations through a vast arms smuggling network and human trafficking.235
In combination with its dedication to, and co-optation of, the local struggles, it clearly
pursues a global jihadist agenda as it aspires to "to liberate our Ummah and Muslim
people from the slavery of the oppressive, apostate regimes, and establish justice, dignity
and freedom for them, and that is only through servitude to Allah alone and
implementing His proper Shariah."236
Not only does its name reveal its ultimate
objective, some sources say it was originally founded to target Israel. After the Muslim
Brotherhood‟s overthrow, it shifted its prime focus on targeting the Egyptian security
apparatus. Prior to July 2013, ABM claimed responsibility for several attacks on Israel,
including bombings on the al-Arish-Ashkelon gas pipeline and rockets fired on Eilat.237
Recently, however, it has attacked the pipeline again as well as fired two rockets at
Eilat.238
Following one of the rocket attacks, the group released a statement in which it
234
Sabry, M., 2013. Sinai: Egypt‟s most recent mayhem. Global Post. September 16, 2013.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/130915/sinai-egypts-most-recent-mayhem
[Accessed January 7, 2014]; Salama, V., 2013. What‟s behind the wave of terror in the Sinai. The Atlantic,
November 22, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/11/whats-behind-the-wave-of-terror-in-
the-sinai/281751/ [Accessed December 3, 2013]. 235
Al-Anani, K., 2014. The resurgence of militant Islamists in Egypt. Middle East Institute. February 14, 2014.
http://www.mideasti.org/content/resurgence-militant-islamists-egypt [Accessed February 20, 2014]. 236
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem claims credit for suicide bombing of South Sinai Security Directorate. The
Long War Journal. October 9, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/ansar_jerusalem_clai_2.php
[Accessed November 26, 2013]. 237
Barnett, D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem claims credit for latest Eilat rocket attack. The Long War Journal. February 1,
2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/02/ansar_jerusalem_takes_credit_f.php [Accessed
February 6, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem: „The light of victory has begun to shine‟. The Long War
Journal. January 15, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/ansar_jerusalem_the.php [Accessed
November 26, 2013]. 238
Barnett, D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem claims credit for latest Eilat rocket attack. The Long War Journal. February 1,
2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/02/ansar_jerusalem_takes_credit_f.php [Accessed
February 6, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem claims Cairo assassination and Sinai pipeline attack. The
56
asserted that "Jews must understand that our war with the enemy inside will not make us
forget the prime enemy of the (Muslim) nation, who occupies the land and defiles the
sacred places."239
In January 2013, it also stated that "[t]he mujahideen don‟t see a
solution to confront Israel but with preparation and jihad."240
Furthermore, it described
US President Barack Obama‟s stay in Israel in March 2013 as a "cancerous tumor",
which will have "important implications".241
Though little is known with regard to ABM, it is obviously al-Qaeda-inspired. Often its
members carry an al-Qaeda flags,242
and moreover, it exclusively communicates publicly
through al-Qaeda‟s main propaganda distribution network, the al-Fajr Media Center.243
In
some of its videos, clips were shown of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, Abu
Omar al-Baghdadi (former leader of AQI), and the spokesman of ISIS, Abu Muhammad
al-Adnani al-Shami.244
On the other hand, Zawahiri has frequently praised attacks
conducted by the group,245
and in response to the death of four ABM fighters in early
Long War Journal. January 28, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/ansar_jerusalem_clai_7.php
[Accessed February 6, 2014]. 239
Reuters, 2014. Egyptian militants claim rocket attack on Israel‟s Eilat. January 21, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/21/us-israel-egypt-rockets-idUSBREA0K0ZX20140121 [Accessed
February 6, 2014]. 240
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem: „The light of victory has begun to shine‟. The Long War Journal, January 15,
2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/ansar_jerusalem_the.php [Accessed November 26, 2013]. 241
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem slams Obama‟s visit to Israel. The Long War Journal. March 21, 2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/03/ansar_jerusalem_slams_obamas_v.php [Accessed
December 8, 2013]. 242
Barnett, D., 2014. Ansar Jerusalem claims responsibility for recent Sinai gas pipeline attack. The Long War
Journal. January 19, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2014/01/ansar_jerusalem_claims_respons.php [Accessed March 12, 2014]. 243
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem does not have a Twitter account. The Long War Journal. December 27, 2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/12/ansar_jerusalem_does_not_have.php [Accessed
January 25, 2014]. 244
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem releases video of October attack in South Sinai. The Long War Journal.
November 20, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2013/11/ansar_jerusalem_releases_video.php [Accessed December 2, 2013]; Barnett, D., 2013.
October 26, 2013. Ansar Jerusalem releases video of assassination attempt on Egypt‟s interior minister. The Long
War Journal. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/ansar_jerusalem_rele.php [Accessed February 19,
2014]. 245
Joscelyn, T., 2014. Al Qaeda‟s expansion into Egypt. The Long War Journal. February 11, 2014.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_expansion.php [Accessed February 19, 2014].
57
August 2013, an official of AQAP referred to them as "our mujahideen brothers".246
Even
though there is no evidence of organizational links between ABM and al-Qaeda
(branches) thus far, there are many indications al-Qaeda may have a presence in Sinai,
and therefore, the possibility of collusion in case of converging interests is probable.
Proof may surface in the near future, however, particularly given the grown number of
operatives in Sinai that have fought in al-Qaeda strongholds.
Various sources report on ABM‟s alleged link to Gaza, although much remains murky
due to varying claims and a lack of supporting evidence. While some reports argue, for
instance, that the group was founded by Egyptians,247
others say it originates from
Gaza248
and/or comprises both an Egyptian and a Gazan branch.249
Interestingly, a report
published in March 2011 by International Crisis Group about radical Islam in Gaza,
already mentioned the short-lived existence of a small Salafi-jihadist group named Ansar
Bayt al-Maqdis.250
It is uncertain if this faction made up the initial stages of ABM as it is
known today. Most sources, however, agree ABM is created by Egyptians, also declared
246
Barnett, D., 2013. AQAP official comments on Egypt events, says America retreating. The Long War Journal.
August 25. 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/aqap_official_commen.ph [Accessed February 7,
2014]. 247
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem claims responsibility for attack on Egyptian security official in Cairo. The
Long War Journal. November 20, 2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11/ansar_jerusalem_clai_3.php [Accessed February 9, 2014]. 248
Sabry, M., 2013. Sinai: Egypt‟s most recent mayhem. Global Post. September 16, 2013.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/130915/sinai-egypts-most-recent-mayhem
[Accessed January 7, 2014]; Eleiba, A., 2013. Sinai: Point of no return. Ahram Online, August 18, 2013.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/79209/Egypt/0/Sinai-Point-of-no-return.aspx [Accessed
December 3, 2013]; Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2013. Islamic Jihad founder: Brotherhood has been funding Ansar Bayt al-
Maqdis. Egypt Independent. September 9, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/islamic-jihad-founder-
brotherhood-has-been-funding-ansar-bayt-al-maqdis [Accessed December 3, 2013]. 249
McGregor, A., 2013. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis intensifies assassination campaign in the Sinai. The Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume XI, issue 22. December 3, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_011_Issue22.pdf [Accessed January 4, 2014]; Allam, A., 2013.
Egyptian Islamist figure issues warning on Sinai. Al-Monitor, November 25, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/11/egypt-islamist-figure-supports-government.html [Accessed December 7, 2013];
Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2013. Islamic Jihad founder: Brotherhood has been funding Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. Egypt
Independent. September 9, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/islamic-jihad-founder-brotherhood-has-
been-funding-ansar-bayt-al-maqdis [Accessed December 3, 2013]. 250
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, pp. 7, 9.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013].
58
by the movement itself.251
Aviv Oreg, for example, stated it is a 'homegrown'
organization, referring to Northern Sinai, but added it has apparently organized attacks in
cooperation with Gaza-based groups on a strategic as well as a tactical level.252
According to journalist Ismail Alexandrani, who has carried out research on-the-ground
in Sinai, Palestinians are among ABM‟s ranks.253
Additionally, Egyptian security sources
claimed several of the group‟s leading figures had fled to the Strip in December 2013 in
order to escape from the army‟s crackdowns.254
Whereas the Egyptian army accuses the
Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas for orchestrating terrorism in Egypt, the army has to
date not provided any concrete proof that they have sponsored or coordinated attacks
conducted by ABM.255
It is known that supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood have
joined Sinai‟s militant networks, but, similar to Hamas‟s relationship with the Salafi-
jihadists in the enclave, they have broken ties with the Brotherhood because they
perceived the organization not dedicated enough to violent jihad.256
What is clear, though, is that ABM is tied to the PRC, which has already been discussed
above. For the purpose of this paper, it needs to be stressed that the PRC is a highly-
251
Barnett, D., 2013. Ansar Jerusalem: „The light of victory has begun to shine‟. The Long War Journal. January 15,
2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/ansar_jerusalem_the.php [Accessed November 26, 2013]. 252
Hauslohner, A. and Cunningham, E., 2013. In Egypt, jihadist group Bayt al-Maqdis claims responsibility for
bombing. The Washington Post. October 21, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-egypt-jihadist-group-
bayt-al-maqdis-claims-responsibility-for-bombing/2013/10/21/7ddbd77c-3a6a-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html
[Accessed December 4, 2013]. 253
Anani, K., 2014. The resurgence of militant Islamists in Egypt. Middle East Institute. February 14, 2014.
http://www.mideasti.org/content/resurgence-militant-islamists-egypt [Accessed February 20, 2014]; Howeidy, A.,
2014. Sinai jihadists target Delta. Al-Ahram. January 3, 2014. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/5040/17/Sinai-
jihadists-target-the-Delta.aspx [Accessed January 24, 2014]. Other sources also claim Palestinians have joined
ABM, see, for example: Eleiba, A., 2013. Sinai: Point of no return. Ahram Online, August 18, 2013.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/79209/Egypt/0/Sinai-Point-of-no-return.aspx [Accessed
December 3, 2013]. 254
Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2013. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis members escape to Gaza, Marsa Matrouh. Egypt Independent.
December 9, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/ansar-bayt-al-maqdis-members-escape-gaza-marsa-
matrouh [Accessed January 7, 2014]. 255
Farid, S., 2014. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis: Egypt‟s own al-Qaeda? Al Arabiya. February 1, 2014.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2014/02/01/Ansar-Bayt-al-Maqdis-Egypt-s-own-al-Qaeda-.html
[Accessed February 4, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2014. Can Egypt handle Ansar Bayt al Maqdis? The National Interest.
January 26, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-egypt-handle-ansar-bayt-al-maqdis-9765 [Accessed
February 9, 2014]. 256
Barnett, D., 2014. Can Egypt handle Ansar Bayt al Maqdis? The National Interest. January 26, 2014.
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-egypt-handle-ansar-bayt-al-maqdis-9765 [Accessed February 9, 2014].
59
skilled militant organization which has managed to amass an advanced arsenal.257
It was
created during the outburst of the Second Intifada in 2000 and has over time transformed
into an umbrella organization, becoming Gaza‟s third-strongest armed group after Hamas
and the PIJ. Its members include ex-operatives of Fatah‟s military wing (the al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades), the al-Qassam Brigades and the PIJ.258
Others that have reportedly
joined the PRC used to work for the Palestinian Authority‟s security agencies.259
Taking
into account these militants‟ extensive expertise, PRC fighters have presumably been
highly influential in the advancement of ABM‟s operational capabilities. Even though
ABM may have acquired more independence, it does by no means imply these
connections have ceased to exist.
Some reports suggest ABM is also linked to the MSC.260
In addition, in response to
Israel‟s targeted killings of two leaders of the latter in October 2012, ABM threatened to
retaliate at Israel.261
The MSC, on the other hand, has occasionally expressed its
admiration for killed ABM militants.262
It is unclear, however, if, and to what extent,
these ties have materialized in human and/or material resources. Nonetheless, considering
the know-how and experience of Gazan Salafi-jihadists, the increased capabilities of
257
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2011. The Popular Resistance Committees:
Portrait of the terrorist organization responsible for the series of combined terrorist attacks north of Eilat, Israel‟s
Southernmost city. August 22, 2011. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/17863 [Accessed March 12, 2014]. 258
Ynetnews, 2012. Popular Resistance Committees. January 27, 2012. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
4181628,00.html [Accessed March 12, 2014]; Reuters, 2011. Who is the Palestinian group blamed for the attacks?
Haaretz. August 19, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/who-is-the-palestinian-group-blamed-
for-the-attacks-1.379509 [Accessed March 12, 2014]. 259
Reuters, 2011. Who is the Palestinian group blamed for the attacks? Haaretz. August 19, 2014.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/who-is-the-palestinian-group-blamed-for-the-attacks-1.379509
[Accessed March 12, 2014].
260 Al-Shishani, M.B., 2013. Gazan jihadists unite to create new operational base in Sinai. The Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, volume 11, issue 4. February 22, 2013.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40492#.UrihJrQyjWc [Accessed December
23, 2013]; Michael Maloof, F., 2012. New threat from Sinai‟s united jihadists. WorldNetDaily. March 2, 2013.
http://www.wnd.com/2013/03/new-threat-from-sinais-united-jihadists/ [Accessed January 13, 2014]. 261
Barnett, D., 2012. Ansar Jerusalem threatens to attack Israel for killing top Salafi leaders in Gaza. The Long War
Journal. October 16, 2012. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2012/10/ansar_jerusalem_threatens_to_a.php [Accessed December 8, 2013]. 262
Barnett, D., 2014. Gaza jihadist group praises Ansar Jerusalem fighters, calls for more attacks. The Long War
Journal. March 18, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2014/03/msc_in_jerusalem_praises_slain.php [Accessed March 18, 2014].
60
ABM, and the ideological similarities displayed, it is very possible members of ABM
have in the past participated in military courses in Gaza and collaborated with Gazan
counterparts other than the PRC on matters related to logistics and intelligence, in spite of
a lack of credible information.
Except for its global jihadist agenda and the links to Gaza, there are other strong
indicators of ABM being a glocal organization. Despite comprising mainly Sinai
Bedouins, the movement counts battle-hardened Egyptian and foreign jihadists with
experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq and Syria among its members as well.263
Not
only do they likely have connections to other terrorist organizations, the expertise and
experience they bring are a main asset. The risen number of these fighters, and the
limitation of movement between Sinai and Gaza because of the tunnel infrastructure‟s
demolition, could indicate on the one hand, that the influence of these jihadists has
increased, whereas the role of Gazan Salafi-jihadists, on the other hand, has decreased.
Regardless the reality of this balance, the mix of these similarly-minded actors has been
fundamental to the rise of the global jihad movement in Sinai, and is undoubtedly
applicable to ABM. Hence, The New York Times journalists David D. Kirkpatrick and
Eric Schmitt argue that "Ansar Beit al-Maqdis has shown it can build and remotely
detonate large bombs in strategic locations, gather intelligence about the precise timing of
movements by their targets, record their own attacks and manage the complicated
maintenance of an advanced portable surface-to-air missile – all suggesting combat
263
Al-Anani, K., 2014. The resurgence of militant Islamists in Egypt. Middle East Institute. February 14, 2014.
http://www.mideasti.org/content/resurgence-militant-islamists-egypt [Accessed February 20, 2014]; The Associated
Press, 2014. Violence risks turning Egypt to jihadi front. Al Arabiya. February 7, 2014.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/02/07/Violence-risks-turning-Egypt-to-jihadi-front-.html
[Accessed February 8, 2014]; Kirkpatrick, D.D. and Schmitt, E., 2014. Jihadist return is said to drive attacks in
Egypt. The New York Times. February 5, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/world/middleeast/jihadist-
return-is-said-to-drive-attacks-in-egypt.html?_r=0 [Accessed February 7, 2014]; Howeidy, A., 2014. Sinai jihadists
target Delta. Al-Ahram. January 3, 2014. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/5040/17/Sinai-jihadists-target-the-
Delta.aspx [Accessed January 24, 2014].
61
experience."264
What sets ABM apart from the other factions in Sinai, and possibly
explains why it has become the dominant organization and foremost terrorist threat, is its
strong commitment to both the 'near' and 'far' enemy by devotedly responding to the local
causes in combination with the implementation of regional and global conditions and
opportunities, in which the PRC and Gazan Salafi-jihadists‟ expertise has played a key
role.
HAMAS’S DOUBLE-GAME
The Sinai-Gaza terror link cannot be examined without assessing Hamas‟s role. Even
though it has regularly cracked down on Salafi-jihadists, it currently finds itself in a
problematic position and is playing a controversial double-game, to which it probably
deems itself forced to.
Increasingly isolated
For Hamas, 2013 turned out to be a disastrous year. It found itself increasingly isolated
because its patron the Muslim Brotherhood was overthrown and subsequently crushed,
and it lost support of Tehran and Damascus due to disagreements on what is happening in
Syria265
(albeit Hamas and Iran have recently discussed improving relations again).266
264
Kirkpatrick, D.D. and Schmitt, E., 2014. Jihadist return is said to drive attacks in Egypt. The New York Times.
February 5, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/world/middleeast/jihadist-return-is-said-to-drive-attacks-in-
egypt.html?_r=0 [Accessed February 7, 2014]. 265
Caspit, B., 2013. Israel benefits from Hamas‟ decline. Al-Monitor. December 17, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/hamas-haniyeh-gaza-strip-egypt-iran-syria-isolation.html [Accessed February
11, 2014]; Karmon, E., 2013. Hamas in disarray. The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. November 26,
2013. http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1246/currentpage/1/Default.aspx
[Accessed February 11, 2014]. 266
Miller, E., 2014. Hamas and Iran admit increased cooperation. The Times of Israel. March 12, 2014.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-and-iran-admit-increased-cooperation/ [Accessed March 12, 2014].
62
Additionally, Qatar appears to have scaled back its sponsoring since its change of
leadership.267
In March 2014, Cairo lawfully banned all activities of Hamas inside
Egypt.268
The Egyptian army has also demolished arms storage depots in Northern Sinai
reportedly belonging to Gaza‟s leading organization.269
Moreover, Hamas‟s most vital
source of income (and arms), the tunnel infrastructure, has largely been destroyed by
Egyptian forces. It is believed the tunnel economy constituted 40 percent of the
movement‟s budget, being the main factor contributing to its 2014 budget‟s deficit of 75
percent, and why it has been unable to pay full wages to its 47,000-member staff for
several months.270
Furthermore, the local populace‟s opposition to Gaza‟s leadership
seems to be growing, mainly due to the deteriorated economic and humanitarian
situation.271
Now the daily goods supplied by Israel are important for Hamas in order to
prevent more local unrest and opposition – a main incentive why it needs to do
267
Caspit, B., 2013. Israel benefits from Hamas‟ decline. Al-Monitor. December 17, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/hamas-haniyeh-gaza-strip-egypt-iran-syria-isolation.html [Accessed February
11, 2014]; Karmon, E., 2013. Hamas in disarray. The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. November 26,
2013. http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1246/currentpage/1/Default.aspx
[Accessed February 11, 2014]. 268
BBC News, 2014. Court in Egypt bans Palestinian group Hamas. March 4, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26432122 [Accessed March 13, 2014]. 269
Issacharoff, A., 2013. Egypt destroys Hamas arm depots in Sinai. The Times of Israel. December 11, 2013.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-destroys-hamas-arms-depots-in-sinai/ [Accessed March 14, 2014]. 270
AP, 2014. Gaza public workers demand full salary. The Times of Israel. March 3, 2014.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-public-workers-demand-full-salary/ [Accessed March 13, 2014]; Cheslow, D.,
2014. „2014 is going to be a very bad year for Hamas‟. Deutsche Welle. January 31, 2014. http://www.dw.de/2014-
is-going-to-be-a-very-bad-year-for-hamas/a-17393355 [Accessed February 11, 2014]; Akram, F., 2013. Gaza:
Hamas lawmakers approve large budget deficit. The New York Times. December 31, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/world/middleeast/gaza-hamas-lawmakers-approve-large-budget-
deficit.html?ref=middleeast [Accessed February 11, 2014]. 271
AP, 2014. Hamas in worst economic crisis since seizing Gaza. The Washington Post. March 15, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/hamas-in-worst-cash-crisis-since-seizing-
gaza/2014/03/13/64dc7b5a-aadb-11e3-b8ca-197ef3568958_story.html [Accessed March 16, 2014]; Cheslow, D.,
2014. „2014 is going to be a very bad year for Hamas‟. Deutsche Welle. January 31, 2014. http://www.dw.de/2014-
is-going-to-be-a-very-bad-year-for-hamas/a-17393355 [Accessed February 11, 2014]; Saleh, Y., 2014. Exclusive:
With Muslim Brotherhood crushed, Egypt sets sights on Hamas. Reuters. January 14, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-egypt-gaza-idUSBREA0D09D20140114 [Accessed February 11,
2014]; Issacharoff, A., 2013. When support for Hamas wanes, the cannons roar. The Times of Israel. December 24,
2013. http://www.timesofisrael.com/when-support-for-hamas-drops-the-cannons-roar/ [Accessed March 13, 2014].
63
everything in its power in exchange to abide by the ceasefire after OPD and make sure no
attacks from Gaza are staged at Israel.272
Hamas also faces severe ideological and security challenges. In combination with the
increasingly tense relations with the PRC and especially the PIJ, both with whom it
collaborated in the past,273
these also encompass the notable rise of Salafi-jihadist groups
in Gaza since 2007. The global jihad-inspired militants reject Hamas because of its
political pragmatism, failure to implement Sharia, relinquishment of jihad against Israel,
compliance to ceasefires and crackdowns on them.274
Whereas their relatively small
presence does not pose a direct serious military challenge to Hamas, it certainly does
indirectly. Since Israel holds Hamas accountable for all attacks launched from the
Strip,275
Hamas fears extensive retaliation from Israel, which could deal a final or at least
major blow. At its weakest point since in power, Hamas therefore considers preserving
the fragile lull with Israel after OPD critical for its own survival.276
Being well aware of
272
Eldar, S., 2013. Hamas, Israel develop unwritten understanding for coexistence. Al-Monitor. December 18, 2013.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/israel-gaza-netanyahu-hamas-security-civil-cooperation.html
[Accessed March 14, 2014]. 273
Issacharoff, A., 2014. With Gaza flaring up, the trail leads to Iran. The Times of Israel. March 13, 2014.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-ceasefire-is-in-sight-but-iran-awakens/ [Accessed March 14, 2014]; Issacharoff,
A., 2014. Islamic Jihad tries to drag Hamas, and Israel, into escalation. The Times of Israel. March 13, 2014.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/islamic-jihad-tries-to-drag-hamas-and-israel-into-escalation/ [Accessed March 13,
2014]; Nisman, D., 2014. War looms in Gaza. The Wall Street Journal. January 23, 2014.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303802904579334900615653472 [Accessed March 13,
2014]; Eldar, S., 2013. Haniye torn between honor and Gaza‟s survival. Al-Monitor. October 22, 2013. [Accessed
March 13, 2014]; Barnett, D., 2013. Popular Resistance Committees calls on Hamas to stop arrests of „mujahideen‟.
The Long War Journal. July 22, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2013/07/popular_resistance_committees.php [Accessed March 13, 2014]. 274
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, p. i.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]; Fighel, J., 2009. Hamas, Al-Qaeda and the
Islamisation of the Palestinian cause. The Elcano Royal Institute. January 30, 2009.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/El
cano_in/Zonas_in/ARI19-2009#.UvptLbQv88N [Accessed February 11, 2014]. 275
Al Jazeera, 2013. Israel blames Hamas for all attacks from Gaza. December 27, 2013.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/israel-blames-hamas-all-attacks-from-gaza-
201312270847706182.html [Accessed March 14, 2014]. 276
Eldar, S., 2013. Hamas spends downtime digging tunnels. Al-Monitor. October 15, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/hamas-gaza-tunnels-israel-jihad.html [Accessed February 11, 2014]; The Meir
Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2013. The Mujahideen Shura Council: a global jihad-affiliated
64
the regime‟s weakness, the Salafi-jihadists, the PRC and PIJ try to exploit the situation
and drag Hamas into a full-scale war with Israel, possibly even preferring an IDF ground
invasion. Consequently, Gaza‟s leadership is to a large extent committed to making sure
individuals or groups refrain from attacking Israel from the strip.277
Yet, a senior Israeli
military official said in January 2014 that "Hamas is trying to do its best to prevent the
launches, but it can and must do more."278
Until the volley of dozens of rockets and
mortars launched from Gaza on March 12, 2014, the worst string of attacks on a single
day since OPD (most claimed by the PIJ), aggression from Gaza had declined
substantially since the truce. However, attacks did continue during the overlapping
period279
and it is believed a considerable amount of them were carried out by the Salafi-
jihadists.280
Because of Hamas‟s problematic position, the more extremist actors, and
particularly the PIJ, have the ability to manipulate the lull and command the outbreak of
war. Following the barrage of rockets on March 12, Uzi Rabi, Professor at Tel Aviv
organization based in the Gaza Strip, has recently become prominent for firing rockets and mortar shells into Israeli
territory. April 22, 2013. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20504 [Accessed February 11, 2014]. 277
Levy, E., 2014. Hamas deploys forces to prevent rocket fire on Israel. Ynetnews. January 21, 2014.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4479113,00.html [Accessed February 11, 2014]; Caspit, B., 2013. Israel
benefits from Hamas‟ decline. Al-Monitor. December 17, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/hamas-haniyeh-gaza-strip-egypt-iran-syria-isolation.html [Accessed February
11, 2014]; Eldar, S., 2013. Hamas spends downtime digging tunnels. Al-Monitor. October 15, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/hamas-gaza-tunnels-israel-jihad.html [Accessed February 11, 2014]. 278
Balmer, R., 2014. Israel warns Hamas over upsurge in rocket fire from Gaza. Reuters. January 16, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/us-israel-palestinians-gaza-idUSBREA0F18820140116 [Accessed
February 12, 2014]. 279
Barnett, D., 2014. Palestinian terror groups launch dozens of rockets and mortars at Israel. The Long War
Journal. March 13, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/palestinian_terror_g.php [Accessed
March 13, 2014]; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014. Rocket fire from Gaza and Palestinian ceasefire
violations after Operation Cast Lead (Jan 2009). February 19, 2014.
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/Palestinian_ceasefire_violations_since_end_Operation_Cast_
Lead.aspx [Accessed March 13, 2014]; Israel Security Agency, 2014. 2013 Annual Summary.
http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reports/Pages/2013AnnualSummary.aspx [Accessed February 11,
2014]. 280
Berti, B., and Gold, Z., 2014. Why is the Israel-Hamas ceasefire eroding? The Cairo Review of Global Affairs.
February 4, 2014. http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=505 [Accessed March
13, 2014]; Zanoun, A., 2014. Clash looms between Israel and Gaza militants. AFP. January 25, 2014.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5igSgXfKUZyOZ_Hp-eccK6SKzelGg?docId=048b83df-
627f-414a-87ae-af3f69c4e2d5&hl=en [Accessed March 13, 2014];Barnett, D., 2013. Hamas and Salafi jihadists at
odds over rocker fire from Gaza into Israel. The Long War Journal. May 11, 2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/05/hamas_and_salafi_jihadists_at.php [Accessed
February 11, 2014].
65
University, stated that "[t]he Gaza Strip has been taken captive by [the Palestinian]
Islamic Jihad… A sub-state actor has stolen the keys to escalation and de-escalation."281
At the time of writing, it is too premature to assess what the consequences for Hamas will
be after the latest campaign of rocket fire (though the IAF has retaliated on some Hamas
targets).282
Surely, the events have increased Israel‟s decision-makers‟ dilemma regarding
alternatives for Gaza‟s leadership. At least for now, a fragile Hamas regime is perhaps the
'best' option for Israel as the other short-term scenarios – lawlessness and/or a more
aggressive faction such as the PIJ becoming dominant – are worse.
The movement has also encountered increased internal friction, predominantly regarding
the issue of maintaining the ceasefire or continuing its original objective, fighting Israel.
This became apparent, for example, in a document obtained by Ynetnews in early 2014
when Hamas‟s border security forces had suddenly withdrawn from the coastal enclave‟s
borders, and were redeployed again after a few days.283
Gaza‟s leadership is struggling to
balance its image of leader of jihad and armed resistance against Israel while abiding by
the lull at the same time, not only with respect to the threat the Salafi-jihadists, PIJ and
PRC pose, but also to its internal cohesion, fearing more operatives might desert and join
the more extremist factions.
Due to its weakness and isolation, Hamas appears to be mainly employing a monitoring
strategy, waiting for the right time to respond to local and regional developments while
using the time of relative calm for building up its forces as well as developing and
upgrading its arsenals, such as the M-75 rockets, capable of reaching Tel Aviv.284
281
Ginsberg, M., 2014. In Gaza, a host of bad options for Israel. The Times of Israel. March 13, 2014.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/in-gaza-a-host-of-bad-options-for-israel/ [Accessed March 13, 2014]. 282
Issacharoff, A., 2014. Islamic Jihad tries to drag Hamas, and Israel, into escalation. The Times of Israel. March
13, 2014. http://www.timesofisrael.com/islamic-jihad-tries-to-drag-hamas-and-israel-into-escalation/ [Accessed
March 13, 2014]. 283
Levy, E., 2014. Hamas in flux: Document exposes disagreements and divisions in Gaza. Ynetnews. February 2,
2014. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4484788,00.html [Accessed February 11, 2014]. 284
Israel Security Agency, 2014. 2013 Annual Summary.
http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reports/Pages/2013AnnualSummary.aspx [Accessed February 11,
66
Additionally, while the al-Qassam Brigades have not conducted any attacks on Israel
since the ceasefire, they continue digging tunnels into Israel covertly. Not only does it
keep them busy in times of restraint, Hamas also hopes it eventually may lead to, for
instance, the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier or civilian, which it can subsequently use as
a bargaining chip it desperately wishes to obtain in these times of isolation.285
Hamas and the Salafi-jihadists
So how has Hamas responded to the ideological and security challenges the global
jihadist fighters pose? It has, for instance, regularly clamped down on the Salafi-jihadist
movements, most notably on Jund Ansar Allah (JAA) in 2009.286
However, while it had,
and still has, the capabilities to crush these small factions entirely, it has not done so.
Here is where its double-game comes into play.
Both internal and external criticism regarding Hamas‟s image of leader of jihad and
armed resistance and the importance of upholding the truce have pressured Hamas to
continue jihad one way or the other. As Al-Monitor columnist Shlomi Eldar strikingly
states „„[t]he last thing that the Hamas leadership wants is to be portrayed as collaborating
with Israel or as a group motivated by fear from it, taking action against Palestinian
2014]; Caspit, B., 2013. Israel benefits from Hamas‟ decline. Al-Monitor. December 17, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/hamas-haniyeh-gaza-strip-egypt-iran-syria-isolation.html [Accessed February
11, 2014]. 285
Caspit, B., 2013. Israel benefits from Hamas‟ decline. Al-Monitor. December 17, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/hamas-haniyeh-gaza-strip-egypt-iran-syria-isolation.html [Accessed February
11, 2014]; Eldar, S., 2013. Hamas spends downtime digging tunnels. Al-Monitor. October 15, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/hamas-gaza-tunnels-israel-jihad.html [Accessed February 11, 2014]. 286
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, pp. i, 8-13.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]; See also, for instance, Barnett, D., 2013.
Salafi jihadists slam Hamas over arrest of Salafist preacher. The Long War Journal. June 16, 2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/06/salafi_jihadists_slam_hamas_ov.php [Accessed
March 14, 2014]; Cohen, Y., 2009. Jihadist groups in Gaza: A developing threat. The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. January 5, 2009. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/jihadist-groups-in-gaza-a-
developing-threat [Accessed January 13, 2014].
67
groups to appease Israel.‟‟287
Consequently, for a number of interconnected reasons it
has, to a certain degree, granted leniency towards the Salafi-jihadists, likely including
allowing sporadic rocket fire. Firstly, by exercising more tolerance, it hopes this will
prevent, or significantly curb, attacks on Israel. Secondly, brutally cracking down on the
Salafi-jihadists may increase sympathy for them, foment more internal divisions, and/or
lead to the defection of more al-Qassam Brigades operatives. Therefore, by permitting
their activities to some extent, Hamas tries to demonstrate its willingness to continue
jihad against Israel in order to decrease criticism, not only from the Salafi-jihadists but
also within its own ranks. And thirdly, Gaza‟s regime also hopes the global jihad-inspired
fighters might fight side by side with it in case a war with Israel erupts.288
Various events demonstrate Hamas‟s restraint to the Salafi-jihadists. For instance,
detained JAA members, who challenged its rule fiercely, were all released from prison
within a few months after the crackdown.289
Similarly, former TWJ‟s leader Hisham Ali
Saidani was released in August 2012 for no apparent reason.290
Another example is
Hamas‟s relationship with JAI. While having cooperated in the Gilad Shalit kidnapping,
relations deteriorated after Hamas seized power in 2007 due to JAI‟s ongoing attacks,
kidnappings, apparent affiliation to al-Qaeda, and increased criticism of Gaza‟s
287
Eldar, S., 2013. Israel, Hamas caught in „the Gaza trap.‟ Al-Monitor. December 27, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/israel-idf-gaza-strip-hamas-violence-escalation.html [Accessed March 13,
2014]. 288
Abu Amer, A., 2013. Hamas reconciles with Gaza Salafists. Al-Monitor. November 5, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/hamas-salafist-gaza-reconciliation.html [Accessed March 13, 2014]. 289
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, pp. 11-3, 20-3.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 290
Karmon, E., 2014. Al-Qaida and Palestinians jihadists: the Hamas connection. The International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism. January 29, 2014.
www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1266/currentpage/1/Default.aspx [Accessed
February 10, 2014]; Fishman, A., 2012. Tracking sources of Sinai terror, all roads lead to Gaza. Al-Monitor. August
13, 2012. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/contents/articles/security/01/08/the-sinai-war.html [Accessed
December 25, 2013].
68
leadership. As a result, Hamas clamped down on JAI militants in 2007 and 2008,291
though not as decisively as it did on JAA. It seems Hamas only resorted to such measures
in case its authority was severely undermined. Despite previous tensions and violent
clashes, Hamas nowadays grants JAI more freedom and, according to the MAITIC, even
preferential treatment.292
In August 2013, a Shin Bet official addressed Hamas‟s leniency
towards JAI‟s training camps, in exchange for Dughmush‟s guarantee that neither his
movement nor his trainees will conduct attacks from Gaza.293
This pattern became more evident in October 2013, when Hamas struck a deal with the
Salafi-jihadists, brokered by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Kuwaiti clerics. In exchange
for the Salafi-jihadist groups‟ abidance to the truce, and as long as they refrain from
undermining Hamas‟s rule, they are allowed "freedom to operate in politics, the military,
religious advocacy, and civil and social organizations."294
So far, this has led to a decline
in Hamas‟s actions against jihadist dissidents and the release of numerous prisoners.295
According to Ehud Yaari, Lafer International Fellow at The Washington Institute, part of
the deal is that Gaza‟s rulers will not stop the militants from cooperating with their Sinai-
based counterparts.296
291
International Crisis Group, 2011. Radical Islam in Gaza. March 29, 2011, pp. 8-11.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/104---
Radical%20Islam%20in%20Gaza.pdf [Accessed December 11, 2013]. 292
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2011. Exporting terrorism and subversion from
the Gaza Strip. February 2, 2011. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/17958 [Accessed January 13, 2014]. 293
Ravid, B., 2013. Shin Bet forms new unit to thwart attacks on Israel by Sinai jihadists. Haaretz. August 20, 2013.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.542417# [Accessed January 26, 2014]. 294
Karmon, E., 2014. Al-Qaida and Palestinians jihadists: the Hamas connection. The International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism. January 29, 2014.
www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1266/currentpage/1/Default.aspx [Accessed
February 10, 2014]. 295
Karmon, E., 2014. Al-Qaida and Palestinians jihadists: the Hamas connection. The International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism. January 29, 2014.
www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/1266/currentpage/1/Default.aspx [Accessed
February 10, 2014]. 296
Yaari, E., 2014. The new triangle of Egypt, Israel, and Hamas. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
January 17, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-triangle-of-egypt-israel-and-
hamas [Accessed January 29, 2014].
69
Taking into account these developments and the many advantages of operating from
Sinai, it comes as no surprise several attacks on Israel launched from Sinai bear a heavy
Gaza footprint. Through turning a blind eye to the activities of Salafi-jihadists and
consciously not taking strong enough action against them travelling to Sinai, Hamas
passively supports terrorism from Sinai. But what about its active support? As mentioned
above, the tunnel industry has been Hamas‟s backbone since Israel‟s disengagement of
Gaza in 2005, not only for financial reasons but also in terms of arms proliferation (in
both directions) and passage for Hamas leaders, operatives, military trainers and
instructors.297
Whereas the al-Qassam Brigades have been active in Sinai for many years,
it is unclear to what extent this has been the case after OPD, during which it was dealt a
severe blow. Possibly it has covertly provided support and training to militants for the
sole purpose to target Israel from Sinai prior to the military‟s takeover in Egypt, but that
these same fighters have over time joined the Salafi-jihadist groups and have since then
staged attacks on Egypt‟s security forces and Israel without its involvement.
Cairo has not permitted Hamas members to cross into the Sinai ever since, although that
does not mean operatives have not been able to cross the border regardless. Gaza‟s rulers
have consistently denied any interference in Egypt‟s internal affairs. Albeit Cairo blames
Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood for the domestic bloodshed298
and their involvement
cannot be ruled out, any credible proof of Hamas orchestrating or supporting terror in
Sinai since the deterioration of violence in 2013 has not yet been presented publicly.299
Other than that, given Hamas‟s stressed relationship with the Salafi-jihadists and that the
latter‟s ideology rejects Shi‟a and Iran, close cooperation between Hamas and Sinai-
297
Israeli Security Agency, 2012. Hamas: Striving for military buildup and promoting terrorism behind the scenes.
June 2012. http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reviews/Pages/HamasStrivingforMilitary.aspx
[Accessed February 12, 2014]. 298
Saleh, Y., 2014. Exclusive: With Muslim Brotherhood crushed, Egypt sets sights on Hamas. Reuters. January 14,
2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-egypt-gaza-idUSBREA0D09D20140114 [Accessed February
11, 2014]. 299
Huwaidi, F., 2013. What Egypt‟s military spokesman missed out. Middle East Monitor. September 20, 2013.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/7450-what-egypts-military-spokesman-missed-out- [Accessed
March 15, 2014].
70
based global jihad-affiliated fighters in Sinai is unlikely. A boosted number of (well-
trained) al-Qaeda-affiliated militants on its doorstep is probably the last thing it wants at
the moment. It should, however, not be excluded rogue elements within the al-Qassam
Brigades have provided guidance, weapons and/or assistance to factions in Sinai without
the movement‟s upper echelons‟ consent.
More importantly, considering the many critical challenges Hamas faces in Gaza, it is
more likely it has (almost) exclusively committed itself to consolidating power and
building up strength. Through actively supporting or conducting terrorist activities in
Sinai towards Cairo and particularly Israel, the beleaguered regime would run the risk of
a devastating backlash (for instance by Israeli reprisal airstrikes or Jerusalem putting a
halt to supplies), something it cannot afford and should avoid at all costs. Nevertheless,
because Hamas still has the capacities to arrest or eliminate all of the Gazan Salafi-
jihadists but has not done so thus far, and the latter have played a key role in the upsurge
of attacks in and from Sinai, Gaza‟s leadership‟s policies of restraint have, irrespective of
its intentions, highly influenced Sinai‟s conflict. Hence, despite the absence of an active
role, through Hamas‟s leniency towards the Salafi-jihadists, to which it perceives itself
forced to in order to preserve power, it indirectly yet consciously supports the latter‟s
belligerent activities in the peninsula.
CONCLUSION
Many heavily interconnected local, regional and global developments have shaped,
increased, and provided opportunities for the Sinai-Gaza terror networks. These include,
but are not limited to, the radicalization processes witnessed in both territories, the
historical Bedouins‟ grievances, internal conflict in Gaza, the lucrative illicit tunnel
industry and its destruction, the limitations of the 1979 peace treaty, the strategic and
71
operational advantages of operating in Sinai over Gaza, the security vacuums following
the Arab Spring, the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood and subsequent crackdowns
by the army, the revival of al-Qaeda‟s narrative, Hamas‟s isolation and dubious policies
towards the Salafi-jihadists, the increased transnational spread of global jihad-inspired
fighters, and the proliferation of Libya‟s plundered arsenals.
Albeit global jihadist ideology declined in the 2000s, it has paradoxically been revived
throughout the Middle East, including Sinai, because of the security vacuums left by the
developments of the Arab Spring. The breakdown of security in Sinai has provided a
fertile ground for the rise of the global jihad movement and has resulted in a safe haven
from which both Egypt and Israel can be targeted with relative impunity. The increased
lawlessness has been exploited by various actors, most significantly by al-Qaeda-inspired
militants which have hijacked the Bedouins‟ longstanding alienation in order to fight the
military-led government and Israel, and at the same time strengthen global jihadist
ideology. Particularly after the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood, attacks in Sinai
have accumulated rapidly, expanded to Egypt‟s heartland, and become less exposed and
more sophisticated, indicating combat experience.
Whereas jihadists with extensive experience in battle zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq and
Syria have likely shaped the upsurge of (advanced) attacks as well, seasoned Gazan
Salafi-jihadists have been highly influential in the establishment and growth of the Sinai-
based terrorist infrastructure through providing training, planning, supervision and,
sometimes, weapons. The extent to which coordination by Gazans still exists is unclear
because of the limited passage as a result of the destruction of the majority of the tunnels
on the one hand, and the grown independence and capabilities of some networks in Sinai,
predominantly ABM, on the other. Nonetheless, providing coordination, advice or
assistance does not necessarily involve travel across the border. Even though access to
(training camps in) Gaza is restricted to a certain degree; Palestinian fighters still reside
72
in Sinai and could run training camps or direct operations there. While some
organizations in the peninsula may have started to act more on their own, and/or the
influence of the increased number of other battle-hardened jihadists might have risen, it is
very likely the Sinai-Gaza terror link will continue to develop one way or another given
the networks‟ ideological similarities, innovativeness and adaptability. The role of
severely weakened Hamas is complex yet significant as it basically allows the Gazan
Salafi-jihadists to operate to a certain degree and travel to Sinai in exchange for their
guarantee they will abstain from attacking Israel from the enclave. By doing so, Gaza‟s
leadership hopes to maintain the truce, consolidate power, preserve its image of leader of
jihad and armed resistance against Israel, and lessen both internal and external criticism.
Irrespective of its intentions, Hamas indirectly supports terrorism in Sinai through its
leniency towards the Salafi-jihadists, even though it probably regards itself forced to
making these arrangements.
For the time being, it does not seem probable the violence in Sinai will decline anytime
soon. While the Egyptian army lacks the capabilities for an effective counter-insurgency
strategy and Israel is officially restrained from combating the terrorist threat inside the
peninsula, the terrorist networks probably keep on developing, among others because
other Salafi-jihadists will likely continue to seek infiltrating Sinai or other parts of Egypt.
This trend is unlikely to change in the near future due to ongoing regional political chaos
and the opportunities Sinai‟s non-existent governance offers. At the moment, there is no
concrete evidence there is an official presence of al-Qaeda (branches), though many signs
indicate this may be the case nevertheless. Potentially, al-Qaeda could transform Sinai
from a jihadist breeding ground into yet another stronghold.
73
Because of these developments, Egyptian-Israeli bilateral cooperation on thwarting the
terrorist threat emanating from Sinai has significantly increased.300
Furthermore, in recent
years, Israel has reinforced its border security, including a barrier, high-tech cameras and
radars, and the deployment of specially trained elite units.301
While these measures
substantially decrease the likeliness of complex cross-border attacks, it is important to
keep innovative since the Salafi-jihadist Sinai-Gaza networks have demonstrated their
ability to adjust to changing circumstances more than once and will continue to seek for
other security gaps to exploit.
300
Yaari, E., 2014. The new triangle of Egypt, Israel, and Hamas. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
January 17, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-triangle-of-egypt-israel-and-
hamas [Accessed January 29, 2014]. 301
Lappin, Y., 2014. Security and defense: Thwarting the Sinai terrorism threat. The Jerusalem Post. February 22,
2014. http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Security-and-defense-Thwarting-the-Sinai-terrorism-threat-342108 [Accessed
February 25, 2014].
74
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