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ICT STAKEHOLDER MAPPING AND POLICY ANALYSIS FOR KENYA
REPORT Prepared by the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT) at Strathmore Law School
Working Draft: February 2015
The ICTs, State-‐building & Peacebulding in Eastern Africa Project:
This working paper is part of a larger project run by the Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) at the University of Pennsylvania, conducted in partnership with the Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy (PCMLP) at the University of Oxford, and funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY). This project seeks to bring greater clarity about the expectations and the realities of the use of communication technologies in developing contexts. In media and development theory, policy, and practice, strong normative statements about the transformative power of ICTs have often clouded the understanding of how people and communities actually make sense of, and engage with, the old and new communication technologies that surround them. Under this framework, this two-‐year project explores the use of ICTs in Eastern Africa.
This report was made possible (in part) by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Objectives .......................................................................... 3 Methodology .......................................................................................................................................................... 4
History of ICT Policymaking in Kenya (1963-2002) ..................................... 5 The Kenyatta Years (1963-‐1978) ................................................................................................................. 5 The Moi Years (1978-‐2002) ........................................................................................................................... 5
Current ICT policy and practice: The route to Kenya’s 2006 ICT policy ... 8 The Kibaki Years (2002-‐2013) ...................................................................................................................... 8 The Current Kenyan Administration ........................................................................................................ 22
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 25 Case studies of ICT Use Post-2006 National ICT Policy of Kenya ........... 26 ICTs and Economic Development in Kenya: M-‐Pesa .......................................................................... 26 ICTs in Kenya’s Financial Economy: M-‐Shwari and M-‐Kesho. ................................................................... 27
ICTs in Kenya’s Humanitarian Aid ............................................................................................................. 29 ICTs and Agribusiness in Kenya .................................................................................................................. 30 M-‐Farm .............................................................................................................................................................................. 30
iCow .................................................................................................................................................................................... 31
KilimoSalama .................................................................................................................................................................. 32
ICTs, Citizen Participation in Governance and Peace Promotion in Kenya ............................. 33 Mzalendo ........................................................................................................................................................................... 33
Ushahidi ............................................................................................................................................................................ 35
Amani @ 108 ................................................................................................................................................................... 36
Bibliography .................................................................................................. 38 Appendix A: List of Interviewees ................................................................ 43
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INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES In just over a decade, Kenyans’ access to and uptake of information and communication technologies
(ICTs), especially mobile phones, has expanded dramatically. At the close of 1999, less than 1 in 1,000
Kenyans had access to a mobile phone (World Bank, 2010, pp. 8-9). By September 2012, penetration
stood at 77.2% (CCK, 2012). The increasing availability of inexpensive smart phones and the spread of
mobile broadband networks across the country have also led to greater internet access (CCK, 2012). This
transformation has been catalyzed in great part by the public-private sector partnerships that have led to
build outs of key information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure.1
The widespread availability of internet-ready mobile devices has had a wide-ranging impact on social,
political, and economic structures in the country. As an economic sector, ICT outperformed all other
sectors of the Kenyan economy over the last decade, growing at an average of about 20% per year (World
Bank, 2010). Indeed, in the same period, Kenya’s economy grew at an average rate of 3.7% of GDP
(World Bank, 2010). The ICT sector also intersected with various other sectors including agriculture and
healthcare.
Kenya is now at a point where ICT policy requires a balance between advancing free speech, maintaining
an appropriate level of control over the media, promoting peaceful coexistence, and encouraging Kenya’s
economic growth. This report places the current state of balance in historical and cultural context by
providing an overview of Kenya’s current ICT policies and identifying the main actors and their influence
on ICT debates and policymaking. This paper also seeks to identify the stakeholders that are using ICTs
in ways that positively affect participatory governance and peace promotion in Kenya. The ultimate aim
and objective of this report is to elucidate the relationship between ICT policy and the use of ICTs in
processes of participatory governance, peace promotion, and service delivery in Kenya in an attempt to
map the future of Kenyan ICT policy and practice.
This report thus seeks to address the following key research questions:
1. What policies currently impact Kenya’s ICT environment?
2. Which Kenyan entities make, influence, or use ICTs in governance, service delivery and peace
promotion? Who are the most influential players in the ICT debate and policymaking process?
3. In what ways does the ICT space affect participatory governance, spur innovation in service
delivery, and affect peaceful co-existence in Kenya? 1The TEAMS cable landed in Mombasa June 12, 2009 and the SEACOM and EASSy cables in July 2009 (African Development Bank Group, 2007).
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As this report will show, the formalization and institutionalization process of ICT policies in Kenya have,
historically, been largely unstable and incomplete. We attempt to demonstrate herein that the winding
road of ICT policymaking in Kenya has closely tracked the democratization of Kenya’s political space,
moving from the efficient clientelism of the Jomo Kenyatta administration, to the autocracy of Daniel
Arap Moi, and finally, the increasingly democratizing governments of Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta.
By reviewing the past, it becomes clear that media policy and government attitudes toward the press are
important forerunners to current ICT policy, and that ICT policy has direct implications for the media and
for freedom of speech. We endeavor to track the influences, actors, and ideologies related to media and
ICT policymaking over time.
METHODOLOGY Qualitative data for this project was gathered through desktop research and in-depth interviews with
experts in ICTs, media policy, or governance in Kenya. These interviews provide an insider’s perspective
into Kenya’s ICT policymaking and emerging trends in Kenya’s ICT policy. Their insights have been
used to corroborate information from desktop research amounting to the conclusions in this report. The
list of interviewees included academics, as well as people in the corporate sector, the media sector, the
government, and civil society.2
These interviews sought to: 1) provide a representative picture of the ICT policy-making process from a
governmental, academic, civil society, and private sector perspective, illuminating key stakeholders, their
influences, and their motivations; 2) provide insight on the historical relationship between the
government, ICTs, and the media in order to shed light on the formative processes surrounding Kenya’s
ICT policies; and 3) in the case of bloggers, share their perspectives on de facto ICT policy in the media –
illuminating the seeming dialectic between the government’s liberal rhetoric around ICT policy and its
practical actions on the ground.
In total, we conducted seventeen interviews, lasting approximately forty minutes each. These were face-
to-face interviews, with the exception of Dennis Itumbi and Moses Kemimbaro who were interviewed
over the telephone, and Chacha Mwita, who shared his views on media freedom at a brief lunchtime
meeting at Strathmore Business School. An interview questionnaire contained the primary questions,
though follow-up questions were also asked as needed.
2A full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix A.
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HISTORY OF ICT POLICYMAKING IN KENYA (1963-‐2002) Policymaking incorporates many actors, influences, and courses of action. These actors include private
sector organizations and groupings that are interested in policy, insofar as it affects their business
outcomes. It also includes civil society organizations that are largely concerned with the capacity of
ICTs to enhance civil liberties. Generally, ICT policy impacts three main areas: telecommunications,
broadcasting (radio and TV), and the internet. A solid understanding of the process of ICT policy
formulation in Kenya requires a keen knowledge of the political contexts in which those processes have
historically been located. In Kenya’s post-colonial history, its successive administrations have engaged
with civil society and the private sector in policy formulation with varying degrees of openness.
THE KENYATTA YEARS (1963-‐1978) Jomo Kenyatta was sworn into Kenya’s presidency at decolonization. At the age of seventy, he was a
revered father of the young Kenyan nation, poised to unite Kenya against foreign domination. Despite a
patrimonial framework, his policies attracted support from Kenya’s then largely foreign-owned media.
By 1968, government control over media was catapulted by the passing of the Official Secrets Act by the
Kenya Parliament, a restrictive piece of legislation that sought to protect state secrets and state security.
The act spurred problems for the Nation Media Group, culminating in the departures of three editors who
refused to temper criticism of the Kenyatta administration (Nyamora, 2007). In several cases, editors were
ordered by the State House to kill stories that could hurt the government in general and Kenyatta in
particular (Nyamora, 2007). Though there were isolated incidents of journalists writing hard-hitting
editorials against the government, especially in the wake of the many political assassinations that took
place during this period, the press was, by and large, subdued (Nyamora, 2007).
Furthermore, the Kenyatta regime oversaw important changes in telecommunications infrastructure and
ownership. The earliest submarine cables connecting Kenya to the external world were laid by the Eastern
and Southern Africa Telegraph Company in 1888 (Aduda & Ohaga, 2004). These primarily connected the
British administrators in the colony and the few settler farmers who had telephone connections (Aduda &
Ohaga, 2004). After independence, the East African Post and Telecommunications Corporation
(EAP&TC), owned by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, served as the main provider of telecommunications
and postal services in the region until 1976, when EAP&TC eventually disintegrated, paving the way for
Kenya to put in place a home-grown ICT provider and policy.
THE MOI YEARS (1978-‐2002) Having ascended to power in 1978 after the death of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moi exerted even
heavier state control in a bid to consolidate his power, legitimize his leadership, and broaden his political
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base. To this effect, the Moi government restricted political freedoms, criminalized dissent, and openly
clamped down on critical press to an even greater degree than the Kenyatta regime. As a result, some
Kenyans began to view the mainstream media as unreliable and sought to express themselves through
non-mass forms of expression. This led to the establishment of various underground press outlets such as
Pambazuka, Pambana, and the Organ of the December 12th Movement. These outlets called for reforms
of government policies concerning, among other things, freedom of the media. The editors of
underground publications were often uncovered and subsequently convicted in sedition trials (Nyamora,
2007). Between 1988 and 1990 a total of twenty publications were banned in Kenya (Nyamora, 2007).
The foreign press did not escape the Moi government’s restrictions. Local media were forced to “stop
publishing new by foreign wire services” as they were “allegedly misinforming the world about events in
Kenya” (Mbeke, 2008, p. 5). The Voice of Kenya (VOK), a public radio broadcast service established in
1928, was renamed Kenya Broadcasting Corporation in 1989 and transformed into a mouthpiece of the
government (Mbeke, 2008).
Moi’s grip on the media tightened due to threats to his political power issued on several fronts. Such
threats came from his political rivals (e.g., Raila Odiga), popular agitation for political and economic
liberalism that undergirded the IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (which the Moi government was
forced to adopt in the face of 1980’s economic recession), and an attempted military coup in 1982. As a
result of pressure from within and outside the country, the government was forced to change its
governance policies, and a multi-party political system was introduced in 1991. This eventually led to
greater political and press freedom, and the proliferation of independent newspapers and magazines such
as Economic Review and Finance. These changes precipitated the liberalization of the media and
communication sectors that would occur under President Kibaki.
Moi’s regime also witnessed the advent of new technologies, in particular the computer and the internet.
Throughout the 1990s, the Moi administration viewed ICTs with great suspicion. Officially, this reaction
was influenced by the anxiety that computers might cause a loss of state secrets or pose a threat to
national security (Bowman, 2010). President Moi was also on record stating that he believed that
computers would take away jobs (Aduda & Ohaga, 2004). Internally however, the anxiety seemed to stem
from the growing ability of the opposition to mobilize and assert itself through these new technologies.
However, the liberalization of the airwaves progressed slowly. An increase in the number of media
houses, economic demands, and pressure from donors and civil society forced the government to review
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the laws governing the media. The Attorney General set up a Task Force on Press Law in 1993, led by
Hillary Ngweno, to review and make recommendations on a comprehensive legal framework for the
exercise of freedom of the press and the development of a dynamic and responsible print and electronic
media.3 Although the taskforce collaborated closely with the media, their reports, published as The Kenya
Mass Media Commission Bill (1995) and The Press Council Kenya Bill (1995),4 attracted mass criticism
(Mbeke, 2008). The media, civil society, and opposition parties all rejected the bills, who argued that they
were “draconian, failed to protect the right to information, failed to protect journalists, publishers, and
broadcasters, and gave government unfair representation in the proposed regulatory body” (Mbeke, 2008,
p. 8).
In a testament to the developing power of the media and of civil society, the Moi government was
eventually pressured to do away with the two bills. It reconstituted another Task Force under Horrace
Awori in 1996. The report from the new task force, presented to the government in May 1998,
recommended the establishment of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), tasked with the
responsibility of regulating the allocation of frequencies in the broadcasting and telecommunications
sector. However, the government instead established the Communication Commission of Kenya (CCK).
Although the CCK was created as an independent regulatory agency as the Awori Task Force
recommended, it did not remain independent. The CCK epitomizes the nexus between political
interference and ICT control, access, and exclusion.
Unsatisfied by the government led review initiatives, the media instead supported a Kenya Union of
Journalist spearheaded media review. In April 1998, the Kenya Union of Journalists released the Media
Bill of 1998: Framework for Free and Independent Press for the Task Force on Press and Media Law.
The Media Bill of 1998 recommended “the establishment of an independent Mass Media Commission,
the institution of the Media Council of Kenya, and the repeal of section 79 of the 1963 Constitution of
Kenya, with new provisions to guarantee freedom of the media, protection of journalists, publishers, and
broadcasters and right of access to information” (Mbeke, 2008).
At first, the government did not adopt the recommendations, however, Moi eventually succumbed to
surmounting pressure to review media laws. In 1997, the government repealed sections of the State Law
that “hindered freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and which criminalized the free flow of
published or documented information in Kenya” (Mbeke, 2008, p. 6).5 The regime slowly implemented
3Legal Notice No. 6889, December 24, 1993. 4Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 64 (Acts No. 3, of 1998, Nairobi, November 1998). 5 These include Articles 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 66, 67, and 121.
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these new policies until it left power in 2002. As the 1990s drew to a close, the Kenyan private sector also
pushed increasingly for policy changes that would open the sector for domestic companies, but these
efforts failed to reach the Moi’s cabinet (Bowman, 2010).
By the late 1990s, the Moi regime was both politically and economically weak and greatly susceptible to
external donor pressure for democratization and liberalization, including with respect to ICTs. For
instance, “the privatization of Telkom was made a pre-condition of the resumption of talks with the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank” (Bowman, 2010, p. 95). The Moi administration was
increasingly encountering a dynamic and vociferous civil society comprising religious leaders and
opposition politicians.
In response to donor pressure, the government issued two policy statements that liberalized the
telecommunications sector: first the Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996 and then the 1998 Kenya
Communications Act. The 1998 Act (which repealed the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Act) also
unbundled Kenya Post and Telecommunication into five separate entities, including a fixed-line operator
(Telkom), a regulator (the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK)), and an in-house policy-
making organ (the National Communications Secretariat (NCS)) (Bowman, 2010, p. 95).
The ICT policy agenda was again forced on a reluctant government “by multilateral donors through the
Kenyan Poverty Reduction Strategy Process” (Bowman, 2010, p. 96). The Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper – published in June of 2001 and developed with coordination from the United Nations
Development Program, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank –placed ICT as one of eight
sectors needing prioritization to help reduce poverty and spur economic growth (Bowman, 2010, pp. 96-
97).
CURRENT ICT POLICY AND PRACTICE: THE ROUTE TO KENYA’S 2006 ICT POLICY
THE KIBAKI YEARS (2002-‐2013) Mwai Kibaki came to power in 2002, under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), in the context of
increasing democratization and free media. In March 2003, the National Communications Secretariat
(NCS) convened a stakeholders’ forum and publicly released the first draft of the government’s ICT
policy, which was modelled on the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) ICT
Framework (MFP, 2001). Although this was a commendable attempt to formalize Kenya’s first ICT
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policy and a high water mark distinguishing Kibaki’s administration from the Moi regime, the move was
largely criticized for emulating former Kenyan governments whose policies were not on par with wider
private ICT stakeholder involvement or input (COMESA, 2003). Apart from being a forum mainly for
government institutions dealing with ICT, these institutions did not coordinate closely. For instance,
policy formulation for media, computing, and telecommunications was distributed between the Ministry
of Transport & Communication and the Ministry of Information & Tourism. The policy recommendations
of this forum were, as a result, not endorsed by the NCS.
One core challenge for the Kibaki government with respect to developing an ICT policy was the chaotic
dispersal of institutions making ICT policy in government. For example, “the Ministry of Transport &
Communication was responsible for telecommunications and postal matters, whereas the Ministry of
Information & Tourism was in charge of the electronic media and broadcasting” (Bowman, 2010, p. 98).
In June 2004, “President Kibaki eliminated the Ministry of Information & Transportation and merged
broadcasting and telecommunications into the newly created Ministry of Information & Communication,
directed by Minister Raphael Tuju” (Bowman, 2010, p. 99). The resulting structure yielded five
organizations that coordinated the Kenyan government’s actions in the ICT sector: 1) the Ministry of
Information & Communication; 2) the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) (the regulator); 3)
the Government Information Technology Service (GITS) (which provides computer and technology
support for ministries); 4) NCS, which advises the government on Communications policy and 5) the
Directorate of E-government (Bowman, 2010, p. 99).
The newly elected NARC government also convened an Economic Recovery workshop in 2003 “in an
effort to promote economic growth” (Bowman, 2010, p. 98). In the workshop, the government proposed
an inter-ministerial committee to incorporate ICT into government operations; invest in adequate ICT
education and training; implement tax reductions and tax incentives on both computer software and
hardware (allegedly to make them affordable to micro-enterprises and low income earners); and review
the legal framework to remove impediments that had discouraged the adoption and use of e-commerce”
(Bowman, 2010, 98). The government also disclosed its plans to “develop a ‘master plan’ for e-
government by the end of June 2004 “(Bowman, 2010, p. 98).
The 2004 E-Government Strategy was developed under the guidance of ICT Secretary Dr. Juma Okech.
Its stated aims were to, among others, increase the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and
accountability in the delivery of government services through the use of information technologies.
However, a lack of organization within the administration made the strategy difficult to execute. Kenyan
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scholar Tim Waema argues that although the release of the e-government directive was a welcome
initiative, the government’s recidivism into ad hoc approaches to ICT policy and strategy development
worked against it (Waema, 2005). The e-government strategy was developed before an ICT policy could
be formed. It was therefore not clear how the e-government Directorate in the Office of the President
would work with the new Ministry of Information & Communication or with GITS in implementing the
strategy.
Dennis Itumbi, a former journalist and the current Digital, New Media & Diaspora Director in the Office
of The President, opines that the Kibaki government’s approach to ICT policy was progressive but
uncoordinated (Itumbi, personal communication, July 2013). He offers as examples the haphazard
development of websites by government departments, which were rarely updated. As such, it seemed to
be a government consumed with the image of progress in the use of ICTs without sufficiently engaging
with technology as an essential tool for delivering services and information.
INCREASED ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR The government’s challenges in implementing an effective ICT policy underscored the need for increased
engagement with private sector stakeholders. Kibaki had initiated work with the private sector in 2003 to
promote economic growth in Kenya. His administration’s general willingness to work with the private
sector represented a radical shift in Kenya’s approach to ICT policymaking. In addition, there was a
marked insistence on employing qualified technocrats to run ICT policy formulation and operations in
government. Dr. Juma Okech, who had served as Director of the Rwandese Information Technology
Authority, was nominated ICT Secretary in the Office of the President (Bowman, 2010, p. 97). The new
Minister of Information & Communication, Raphael Tuju, held a postgraduate degree in Mass
Communications from the University of Leicester in England, and the first and second permanent
secretaries James Rege and Dr. Bitange Ndemo were accomplished technocrats (Bowman, 2010, p. 97).
These policy entrepreneurs working within government made it possible for civil society and the private
sector to have open conversations about the direction of Kenya’s ICT policy (Waragia, 2010). The “enya
ICT Federation (KIF), a group of private sector ICT organizations, also initiated frequent meetings with
the two permanent secretaries and Juma Oketch. Such meetings continued through the Kibaki
Administration, after Dr. Bitange Ndemo became the sole Permanent Secretary for Information &
Communication (Bowman, 2010, p. 100).
On November 18, 2004, the second draft of the National ICT Policy put together by KIF, the civil society
organization KICTAnet, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and the Ministry of
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Information & Communication was issued in a “National ICT Visioning Workshop” (Bowman, 2010).
The provisions focused mainly on ICT education and training; tax reductions and tax incentives on both
computer hardware and software; and impediments that discouraged the growth of e-commerce
(Bowman, 2010).
The new draft differed from older ICT policies in some key ways. Most importantly, the 2004 draft
included many private stakeholders (Bowman, 2010). The previous draft, in 2003, had failed in its
objective “to collect and collate view of stakeholders drawn from the public and private sectors as a basis
for preparing Kenya’s National ICT policy” (Waema, 2005).
The Ministry of Information & Communication called for public input on the draft National ICT Policy.
An electronic communication forum was developed, and the compilation of public comments was led by
Alice Munyua, director of KICTAnet. A website was also developed by the CCK management, which
issued its own report based on the comments. The reports of Alice Munyua and the CCK addressed
environmental sustainability of ICT, the use of ICT for poverty eradication, universal access, promotion
of local content on ICTs, and protection of the CCK from undue political interference. These reports were
handed over to the Ministry in April 2005 (Bowman, 2010). The Kenya National ICT Policy was finally
adopted by the cabinet in January 2006.
Kenya’s National ICT Policy (2006) has as its mission to “improve the livelihood of Kenyans by ensuring
the availability of accessible, efficient, reliable, and affordable ICT services” (Ministry of Information &
Communications, 2006). Section Two of the policy addresses ICT challenges with a focus on ICT
infrastructure, electronic learning, universal access, public-private partnerships, e-government, e-
commerce, electronic security, and electronic content development. Section Three of the policy deals
with strategies guiding the development and use of ICTs. Section Four focuses on licensing of broadcast
services, signal distribution, equity participation, control of digital broadcasting, cross media ownership,
and social responsibility. Section Five espouses general principles for telecommunications liberation,
specifically dealing with broadband services, regional telecom infrastructure, rights of way, multimedia
services, standardization, and telecom research. Section Six covers postal services and Section Seven
covers guidelines on the radio frequency spectrum in Kenya. Section Eight covers guidelines relating to
financing universal access to ICT and the establishment of an ICT Centre of Excellence. Lastly, Section
Nine creates an institutional framework for policy implementation, addressing the role of government
(through an ICT Policy Advisory Secretariat, an ICT Sector Regulator, and an ICT Appellate Tribunal) as
well as the roles of investors, operators, consumers, development partners, and civil society.
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The 2006 National ICT Policy therefore offers the broadest recommendations on stakeholder involvement
in Kenya’s ICT sector, designating roles to various categories of ICT stakeholders: the government to
enable policies conducive to private sector investment in ICT; development partners to support ICT
capacity building in collaboration with the government of Kenya; consumers to inform the development
of consumer protection standards; civil society to inform ICT policy making, specifically concentrating
on ICT access, ICT for education, poverty reduction, and good governance; regulators to issue licenses,
tariffs, interconnections guidelines, standards, and frequencies, and to manage the ‘.ke’ domain; and
investors, operators, and service providers to develop an efficient ICT sector, commercial integrity, strong
corporate governance, high quality standards, and provision of universal access.
DONOR INFLUENCE AND ICT POLICY It has been observed that the slow speed of ICT policymaking and implementation is linked to the weaker
influence of the international donor community on Kenya. Kenya’s 2006 National ICT Policy came six
years after Rwanda’s, and four years behind the policy enactments from Uganda and Tanzania (Bowman,
2010). This is, in part, because Kenya has a much lower level of donor dependency than its neighbors in
East Africa (Mwega, 2009; Fengler, 2011). Indeed, before lending financial assistance during Kenya’s
economic stagnation in 1990s, the IMF demanded that the Moi regime reform Kenya’s media policy,
freeing the media from restrictive and exclusive government control and promoting a free, liberalized
enterprise. This liberalism laid the foundation for the 2006 National ICT Policy for Kenya.
Today, Kenya’s ICT sector is considered one of the most advanced in the region. The hallmark of the
multiple initiatives toward investment in ICT infrastructure was the public-private partnership that
brought three undersea fiber optic cables to the Kenyan coast in September 2009. The fiber optic cables
catalyzed an ICT revolution marked by cheap access to GSM feature phones through easy access to
broadband internet. By September 2009, Kenyans could finally join other netizens on the World Wide
Web via broadband connections. The Open Data Project, launched on July 8, 2011, aimed to make key
government data freely available to the public through a single online portal. Kenya was lauded as the
first country in sub-Saharan Africa to have an open government data portal. 6
However, by November of the following year, then Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Information
& Communication, Dr. Bitange Ndemo, went to press stating that the process was failing to properly take
6 The Data Portal is available at https://opendata.go.ke/.
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off because various government organizations each claimed to own their information, an indication of the
enduring difficulty of ICT policy coordination within the administration (Wokabi, 2012).
ICTS, MEDIA POLICY, AND POLITICS IN KENYA: LIBERAL RHETORIC, ILLIBERAL PRACTICE Kenya’s socio-economic blueprint, ‘Vision 2030,’ pushes for the realization of a middle-income,
knowledge-driven Kenya by 2030. This vision is modeled on a Euro-American typology of press freedom
characterized by the capacity of the press to be liberal-pluralist, market-oriented, espouse social
responsibility and public interest causes, and run professionally (McQuail, 2010). While Kenya is clearly
moving forward with ICT liberalization and innovation, new technologies and easier access to
information have presented the government with particular challenges regarding its willingness to fully
open itself up to the media. Given restriction on the media sector, media outlets turned increasingly to
ICTs to amplify citizen voice and hold government accountable. The government, in turn, sought
measures to maintain control. The government’s relationship with the media in light of changes in ICT
policy and practice has since proceeded in ebbs and flows, and is the subject of the following section.
Crackdowns under Kibaki Under the Kibaki administration there was an initial commitment to widen the democratic space and
ensure freedom of expression and freedom of media (Ngugi, 2007). Before the 2007 presidential polls,
Ngugi, the Kenyan novelist and playwright, recounts a meeting in 1977 in which the young Kibaki, then
Finance Minister, had personally impressed on him the need for press freedom to safeguard democracy.
Ngugi’s fiction, Petals of Blood, written in 1977, was very critical of conditions in post-colonial Kenya,
the close dependent economic ties between Kenya and the West, and the chauvinism and greed of the
rising African middle class, most of who were colleagues of Kibaki in cabinet. Kibaki attended the book
launch and noted that even though he did not agree with the entirety of the novel’s critique, the
publication was a manifestation of the democratic space afforded in Kenya (Ngugi, 2007).
Much later, at his inauguration in 2002 as the President of Kenya, Kibaki promised to bring “back the
culture of due process, accountability, and transparency in public office” stressing that the era of
‘anything goes politics’ was gone forever (BBC Monitoring, 2002). However, Henry Maina, Director of
ARTICLE 19, East & Horn of Africa, noted in an interview that the euphoric wave that brought the
NARC party and Kibaki to power in the general elections of 2002 meant that citizen demands on the state
were amplified (personal communication, February 2013). A free media, catalyzed by liberalization in the
ICT industry, grew robustly. Kibaki’s first term of office was characterized by unparalleled citizen and
media freedom to dissent openly from government without fear of reprisal (Itumbi, personal
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communication, July 2013). This dynamic shift towards participatory decision making also played out in
the policymaking arena for ICT, as shown in the previous section.
This liberalized media continued more or less unabated until 2005, when Kibaki’s administration lost a
referendum vote on the new constitution to a well-coordinated opposition led by then Cabinet Minister for
Roads, Raila Odinga. This was a devastating loss for the Kibaki government and caused the government
to regress openly on its much-touted respect for the media. The government invoked draconian powers
granted by Section 88 of the Communications Act (1998), which gave the government powers to raid
media houses and seize broadcasting equipment. Among other provisions, Section 88 authorizes the
government to, under certain circumstances, “take temporary possession of any telecommunication
apparatus…” and suspend radio and broadcast communication (Communications Act, 1998).
The first incident occurred in a midnight raid on the offices of the Standard Group on March 2, 2006. In
the incident, about 30 heavily armed and hooded police from the elite Kanga squad7 descended on the
Standard Group’s offices at midnight, beating up employees, breaking doors, stealing employees’ mobile
phones, unplugging CCTV cameras, and confiscating twenty computers. The commando squad also
disabled KTN TV, keeping the channel off air for about thirteen hours (Maina, personal communication,
February 2013). The squad then proceeded to The Standard’s printing press, blasted the gates open,
disabled the plant, and set on fire thousands of copies of the day’s edition that were just rolling off the
press (Adan, 2010).
A report prepared in July 2007 by the parliamentary Committee on Administration, National Security, and
Local Authorities, together with the Committee on Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs, suggested
that President Kibaki had constructive knowledge of the raid (Adan, 2010). The report identified the
leaders of Kanga Squad as Artur Margaryan and Artur Sargasyan, Armenian gun toting thugs-for-hire
who then operated in Nairobi. Then powerful Internal Security Minister John Njoroge Michuki, while
addressing journalists on the morning following the raid, issued his now infamous “rattle a snake”
comment,8 implicitly defending the raid and indicating that the media could not hope to continually attack
government without expecting pushback. Wide-ranging condemnation followed.
7 Kanga Squad is a sub-department of the Kenya Police Criminal Investigation Department, commonly referred to in Kenya as the CID. 8While addressing journalists, he stated that “if you rattle a snake, you must be prepared to be bitten by it” (Adan, 2010).
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In a press conference gathered soon after the raid, more than twenty-seven envoys, including British,
American, and EU ambassadors, expressed concern that the raid was a step backward from all the positive
gains on freedom of expression the government had made since coming to power in 2002. The
parliamentary report indicated that a story that was to be published by the newspaper about a political
strategy meeting between Kibaki and vice president Kalonzo Musyoka in 2006 was the likely trigger of
the raid. Internal Security Minister John Njoroge Michuki further claimed that the raid was a
governmental operation aimed at stopping the planned publishing of articles that could instigate ethnic
animosity. He continued by stating that then Commissioner of Police, Major-General Hussein Ali, knew
about the plans to raid the Standard Group’s offices and printing press (Makokha, personal
communication, June 2013). At the time of the raid, however, the Commissioner of Police was out of the
country and therefore, never responded to the allegations.
The second defining moment of the Kibaki tenure, with regard to control of the media, was the
suspension of live broadcasts during the post-election pogroms of 2007. The Kenyan Presidential Election
of 2007 was hotly contested. The two leading contenders – Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga – were in a
neck and neck tie at the opinion polls up until the eve of the December election. Kibaki won the election,
but Odinga contested the results, claiming they were manipulated. Violence erupted in several parts of
Kenya. The directive to suspend live broadcasts was issued by the Ministry of Internal Security, which
instructed the Ministry of Information and Communication to carry out the shutdown under powers
conferred by Section 88 of the 1998 Kenyan Communications Act which, as described above, allows the
government to shut down media broadcasting during an emergency.9
The government argued at the time that the order to suspend live television and radio broadcasts was not
intended to curtail media freedom but was a necessary measure undertaken to prevent further incitement
of violence. The administration found consonant backing from some sections of the citizenry whose
moral panics about social media hate speech made them amenable to increased government control of
media.
A signed statement by Information and Communication Permanent Secretary Bitange Ndemo appearing
in the December 31st edition of The Standard in 2007 stated that “Pursuant to Section 88 of the Kenya
Communications Act, 1988, I am directed by the Minister of Internal Security, Hon. John Michuki, that in
9Section 88 of the Act gives the Minister of Communication powers to unilaterally, without recourse to parliament or the courts, enter and search broadcasting stations, and seize, dismantle, and dispose of equipment. The minister is also given powers to intercept and disclose communications between persons, and to intercept, disclose, and dispose of postal articles.
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the interest of public safety and tranquility, that I order the immediate suspension of live broadcast until
further notice.” The government further rationalized the delay in live broadcasts by arguing that it was
meant to give editors time to preview content emerging from members of the public and politicians before
airing it, and that the material could be aired as soon as the editors were comfortable with it.
However, the Kriegler Commission,10 an international commission assigned to investigate the post-
election violence, reported that the use of Section 88 of the 1998 Kenya Communications Act during the
2007 post-election violence was unconstitutional, illegal, and improper (“Kriegler and Waki Report,”
2009). As a consequence, it recommended that Section 88 of the Act be repealed. This came to fruition
under the Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act of 2008, which came into force on January 2, 2009.
The Kriegler commission cited the difficult balance required for future attempts to regulate and monitor
media during elections, noting:
…with the full recognition of how close to the edge Kenya came during the 2007 post-
election violence, the Commission would not recommend a free-for-all-monitoring of the
press and other media. This would have the negative potential of taking the country back
to the draconian days of a state controlled media, from which it has so recently just barely
escaped. However, the Commission does believe that speech in the media, including in
vernacular FM radio stations, aiming to foment ethnic hatred and/or incite, organize, or
plan for violence should be investigated thoroughly in a timely fashion when it occurs.
(“Kriegler and Waki Report,” 2009, p. 303)
To date, opinion remains divided on the roles played by print and broadcast media in the 2007 post-
election violence (Abdi & Deane, 2008). Most observers, however, cite the negative contributions of
vernacular used by some FM stations that contributed to the ensuing climate of intolerance, hate, and
negativity.
Critique has also been leveled at the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), required by law to provide
equal and balanced coverage to all political parties participating in the elections. The European Union
election observation mission found the KBC to be demonstrating open bias in favor of Kibaki’s Party for
National Unity (PNU), a party formed by Kibaki for which he ran as its presidential candidate in 2007
10The Kriegler Commission, officially known as The Independent Review Commission (IREC), was an international commission of inquiry established by the Kenyan Government in February 2008 to inquire into all aspects of the 2007 general elections with special emphasis on the presidential elections.
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after he had parted ways with his former party coalition, NARC (“Kriegler and Waki report,” 2009). Even
more controversial, however, was its live relay of the contested official results of the presidential election
while live broadcasts on all other stations had been suspended.
CONTROL BY REMOTE: KIBAKI’S “VELVET GLOVE” APPROACH TO THE MEDIA. The 2007 election highlighted the uneasy tension in the Kibaki administration with respect to control of
mass media platforms. Control by the administration led to the prominence of alternative ICT
communication (e.g., blogs), in many ways paralleling the underground oppositional publications created
during Moi’s regime. Increase in broadband access marked a shift in the manner in which news was
produced and disseminated. The ever increasing number of Twitter and Facebook users turned the
Kenyan social media sphere into a vibrant and rapidly growing community.
Although the main source of news had generally been the mainstream printed press in the years preceding
Kibaki’s presidency, the Kenyan citizenry could now share and disseminate news on alternative platforms
because of Kibaki’s institutional permissiveness on ICT growth. The result was that unmediated
conversation on social media began to include Kenyans in the diaspora, who could access news through
the digital editions of the main dailies (Nyambuga & Booker, 2013). Numerous bloggers such as Dennis
Itumbi, Robert Alai, Kenyan Pundit, Bankelele, Boniface Mwangi, and BosireBogonko began to
command considerable followings online, with many Kenyans relying on them for controversial news
that the mainstream media were reluctant to convey.
Increased internet connectivity also led activist platforms to move online. Civil society activists,
politicians, and other actors began to use the internet to canvass. In this regard, platforms such as
Mzalendo,11 a web-based initiative designed to audit and monitor Kenya’s parliamentarians, and Bunge la
Mwananchi, a social movement that mimics parliamentary debates, providing alternative views on social
change and democratic liberation in Kenya,12 furthered online discourse about the efficacy of elected
officials. Such expressions put the Kibaki administration’s apparent commitment to ICT promotion to the
test.
This balancing act saw the Kibaki government fall short by resorting to censorship and authoritarianism
when it was under threat, as had been exemplified earlier in the media raids by the Kanga Squad.
11Mzalendo translates to the Kiswahili for “patriot.” 12Kiswahili expression for “People’s Parliament.”
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However, rather than blatant raids on media outlets, the administration now tried a softer, “velvet glove”
approach (Maina, personal communication, February 2013). The two key elements of this “velvet glove”
approach included 1) alliances between political powers and an increasingly consolidated ownership of
media, and 2) bribery of journalists by commercial or political entities. In chronicling these two strategies
we aim to demonstrate that even the ICT platforms that mainstream media are increasingly adopting, such
as blogs run by the editors of the major outlets and breaking news profiles run on Twitter and Facebook,
are implicated and affected by government practices that favor commercial interests.
1. Consolidated Media Ownership and its Nexus to Politics: Networked Power as a Bar to
Media Independence.
Kenyan media is owned by a very small clique of individuals (Nyanjom, 2013). Royal Media Services
(RMS), for example, is the largest private media conglomerate in Kenya, and owns eleven radio stations,
which broadcast in a variety of indigenous Kenyan languages including Ramogi FM (Dholuo), Chamgie
(Kalenjin), Mulembe (Luhyia), Egesa (Ekegusi), Muuga (Kimeru) and Innoro (Kikuyu). It also owns
Citizen TV network and the print newspaper Citizen. It is widely popular and has the furthest reach of
any privately owned media network.
RMS is owned by S.K. Macharia and his wife. The couple overtly supported the NARC campaign’s
candidate, Mwai Kibaki, in the 2002 general election, and RMS became the official mouthpiece of the
opposition outfit (Nyanjom, 2013). This served as a counterweight to the obvious partiality of the state
broadcaster, KBC, toward the Kenya African Union party (KANU) and its candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta
(Nyanjom, 2013). President Kibaki proceeded to win the election in 2002, and RMS offered increased
media support to Kibaki during his campaign against the referendum in 2005 and to his re-election
campaign in 2007 under the PNU (Nyanjom, 2013). Consequently, over the ten years in which Kibaki
was in power, RMS rocketed to the top as the most popular media house and acquired numerous
electronic media frequencies through government liberalization processes. Such privileges reflected a
weak implementation of Kenya’s National ICT Policy (2006) framework and a deviation from principles
of a fair, free, and professional media as outlined in the 1998 Kenya Information and Communications
Act (Nyanjom, 2013).
In February of 2013, Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka announced to a packed political rally in Nairobi’s
Uhuru Park that Macharia, owner of RMS, would be chair of ‘the Summit:’ a group of well-connected
businessmen and private sector personalities in charge of the campaign effort of former Prime Minister
and Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) coalition presidential candidate Raila Odinga. In an
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about-face of political alignments, Macharia had changed political camps. This was closely followed by
the initiation of CCK’s efforts disable RMS broadcast masts and other equipment for apparent breaches of
licensing requirements (Atemi, 2013). The allegations by CCK were that RMS had allocated itself
transmitters in 2013, even though the transmitters had been in operation since 2008. Additionally, Henry
Maina notes a curious proximity between the announcement of Macharia’s involvement in the CORD
campaign and a migration of twenty senior staff members from RMS to Mediamax,13 possibly on the
promise of better pay (Nyanjom, 2013). Nyanjom (2013) describes this interplay as indicative media
capture by Kenyans in power.
This trend of consolidated media ownership was also seen at the Nation Media Group (NMG), a publicly
listed media company that owns Nation TV, two FM stations, seven newspapers, several magazines, and
NTV. In the past, the NMG was perceived to be against Moi and to favor Kibaki because the Agha Khan,
who funds NMG, had business interests which were aligned with those of Kikuyu business elites
(Nyanjom, 2013). In light of these practices, Kwamchetsi Makokha, former senior editor at both The
Nation and The Standard newspapers, is skeptical of the capacity for editors of media companies in
Kenya to maintain editorial independence. He notes that editors constantly find themselves placed under
the twin pressures of conforming to the commercial interests the media house serves and the political
leanings of the media owner or audience base (Makokha, personal communication, June 2013).
2. Corruption as a Bar to Editorial Independence.
According to Chaacha Mwita, a policy and development expert based in Kenya, corruption in the media is
not constrained to paying bribes for stories to be killed off (personal communication, September 2013).
Corruption includes ethnic and political biases that lead to editorial or managerial choices about what
stories are covered. Chaacha recounted in an interview a time when, as editor of a media house in 2006,
he could not convince any reporters to cover a particular story on corruption at the Kenya Reinsurance
Corporation (Kenya Re). Eventually, Chaacha wrote the story himself, but later learned that the first
reporter he had assigned to the story also worked as the PR person for Kenya Re, and that the second
reporter Chaacha had assigned to the same cause had allegedly been paid off by the Kenya Re
management to drop the story. Moreover, when Kenya Re management became aware of Chaacha’s
interest in the story, one of Chaacha’s colleagues told him that senior managers at Kenya Re, who were
latter charged in court, were making informal inquiries as to the amount Chaacha would “price” to drop
the story.
13 This is a media holding company established in 2009, including K24 TV, Kameme FM, Meru, FM, Mayian FM, and the People Daily newspaper.
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But this not the only way in which principles underlying Kenya’s ICT policy is compromised in media
practice. Henry Maina also notes the power of large corporate organizations to gain favorable coverage in
the Kenyan media. He cites the recent attempt by Kenya Airways to reduce staff, stating “the media was
biased, painting those air hostesses and pilots as just people who were not keen on doing their work for
the benefit of what they as media stand to benefit from Kenya Airways for doing a one-sided report”
(personal communication, February 2013). The reality of Kenyan media practice with regard to press
freedom is therefore significantly, different from the liberal and pluralistic policies envisaged by the
country’s various ICT and media policies.
KENYA’S 2010 CONSTITUTION: A BREAKTHROUGH FOR INCLUSIVE POLICYMAKING AND FREE SPEECH The 2010 Constitution of the Republic of Kenya recognizes public participation as a positive political
right for the people in governmental decision making and institutes a liberal bill of rights that provides
that the privacy of individual communications must not be infringed.14 Crucially, whereas Kenya’s 2006
ICT policy makes no reference to freedom of expression, freedom of expression is an explicit piece of
Kenya’s new constitution (Article 33(1)). The 2010 Constitution requires that citizens are left free to seek,
receive, and impart information. The limitations imposed on this right include expressions that are
designed to propagate war or violence, hate speech, and any advocacy of hatred (Article 33(2)).
Beyond those limitations, the 2010 Constitution expressly guarantees the freedom and independence of
electronic, print, and all other types of media (Article 34(1)). It discourages the state from making any
attempts to exert control over or interfere with any person engaged in broadcasting, the production or
circulation of any publication, or the dissemination of information by any medium.15 Further, no penalties
can be passed on “any person(s) for any opinion or view, or on media outlets for the content of any
broadcast, publication, or dissemination” (Article 34(2)b). The constitution further requires that broadcast
and other electronic media in Kenya enjoy freedom of establishment. This freedom is to be fettered only
by the licensing procedures “necessary to regulate the airwaves and other forms of signal distribution”
(Article 34 (3) a). The constitution envisages a press unhindered by governmental control or political or
commercial interests.
14 Article 10(2)(a) holds that the national values and principles of governance include patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, rule of law, democracy, and participation of the people. 15 Subject only to the limitation of Article 33(2) of the constitution.
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Furthermore, the 2010 Constitution also requires that all state-owned media be left free to determine
editorial content independently. Additionally, such media must be impartial and avail the platform for the
presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions. (Article 34 (4) b and c). These fortifications for
state-run media are informed by recent Kenyan history, when the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation was
largely used as a conduit for government propaganda.
The constitution goes on to mandate that parliament enact legislation establishing a commission that will
set media standards and regulate and monitor compliance with those standards (Article 34(5)).16 This
commission should be free of control by government, political interests, or commercial interests and
reflect the interests of all sectors of society.17
Finally, Article 35(1) declares that every citizen has the right to “access information held by the State and
information held by another person and required for the exercise or protection of any right or fundamental
freedom.”18 The state is also under an obligation to publish and publicize any important information
affecting the nation. Indeed, transparency and the provision to the public of timely, accurate information
are cornerstone values of public service in the new dispensation ushered in by the 2010 Constitution.
THE CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS Kenya is party to international conventions and regional instruments that acknowledge and guarantee the
right to freedom of expression. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,19 the Banjul Charter,20 the Windhoek Declaration
for the Promotion of an Independent and Pluralistic Press, and the Declaration of Principles of Freedom
of Expression in Africa. Today, these international and regional norm-setting instruments have the same
character as domestic law, since Article 2(6) of the constitution states that any treaty Kenya enters into
forms part of municipal law without the need for formal processes of ratification by parliament.21
16 In Royal Media Services Ltd v Attorney General, the Minister for Broadcasting & the Communications Commission of Kenya [2013] eKLR, the court held that CCK was established by legislation which was currently in force and was empowered to license and regulate postal, information, and communication services as contemplated under Article 34 of the Constitution until the body contemplated under Article 34(5) is established. 17 This provision relieves the CCK (the current converged regulator for broadcasting, ICT, radio communications, and postal services) of all of its regulatory powers over the broadcasting industry. 18 In the recently decided Nairobi Law Monthly Company Limited v. Kenya Electricity Generating Company (Kengen) & 6 others [2013] eKLR, Justice Mumbi Ngugi held that a company was not a 'citizen' capable of enforcing a right to information held by the State within the meaning of Article 35 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 19 See Article 19 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. 20 See Article 9 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. 21 See Article 2(6) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya.
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Moreover, Article 2(5) of the 2010 Constitution provides that the general rules of international law form
part of the law of Kenya. It has been argued that the committee of experts drafting the constitution
conceived the shift to monism as a failsafe to enjoin the Kenyan State to obligations emanating from
progressive human rights instruments without the ceremony of domestication (Ambani, 2010). Prior to
the enactment of the 2010 Constitution, entitlements stemming from international human rights
instruments “remained in abeyance simply because they had not been domesticated” (Ambani, 2010,
p.25).
THE CURRENT KENYAN ADMINISTRATION The 2013 general elections were a watershed moment for Kenya in many respects. The elections were the
first after the violence in 2007, the first under the new constitution, and the first election in which a
leading coalition ticket was held by people facing trial at the International Criminal Court.22 The memory
of the violence that followed the disputed presidential election in 2007 haunted Kenya’s 2013 elections,
with the overarching message on ICT platforms being: “peace at all costs.”
The election period was marked by calls for peace during and after the elections (popularly referred to as
the “Peace Mafia”). This was achieved amidst a difficult balancing act by the media in trying to play its
informative and watchdog roles. Conscious of the accusations leveled against them in the coverage of the
2007 elections, the radio stations that were broadcasting in local Kenyan languages largely focused on
factual blow-by-blow reporting of accounts at the political rallies (Makokha, personal communication,
June 2013).
Although the election was peaceful, the media have been roundly criticized for playing into a
“peaceocracy” narrative, which led to self-censorship. Some observers (including interviewees Makokha
and Maina) feel that the narrative around peace prevented the airing of legitimate grievances, and indeed,
that the narrative to maintain peace at all costs may have been inimical by helping to strengthen the hands
of power-holders. A prime example was the media silence of the failure of the electronic systems of the
newly constituted electoral body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).
The IEBC switched from manual to electronic voting in a bid to effectively and efficiently guarantee
voter identification and transmit results to an electronic system in order to prevent delays in announcing
22 For their alleged role in the 2007-‐2008 post-‐election violence.
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results. Voters were registered through Biometric Voter Registration (BVR).23 On voting day, March 4th
2013, the BVR systems in many polling stations failed.24
During this entire period local media remained silent. Journalists felt their desire to avoid politically
sensitive discourse was justified under the circumstances (Masai, personal communication, June 2013).
Mark Masai holds that the Kenyan public was decided that the central role of the media during the 2013
election should be advocating peace. Indeed, Kenyans online were engaged in pushback against foreign
journalists who dared go against the grain of peace reporting. The Twitter hashtags #someonetellCNN
was an example of pushback directed at a news item by CNN that anticipated an outbreak of violence.
The media willingly conformed to this new norm. There seemed to be an implicit agreement between the
media and the public that peace trumped truth seeking. As Michela Wrong observed:
The local media swiftly fell into the habit of brushing off CORD’s declarations.
Television broadcasts of Odinga’s announcement that he would challenge the outcome of
the election before the Supreme Court cut to Uhuru Kenyatta’s acceptance speech before
the Q. and A. with Odinga had even begun. …Kenya’s largest newspaper devoted more
space to the selection of a new pope than to the lawsuits being prepared by CORD and
civil society groups. (Wrong, 2013)
The emergence of the peace movement has highlighted the competing objectives that the media have to
reconcile. Admittedly, after the violence in 2007, the peace narrative may have been necessary to prevent
a repeat of violence. It has, however, limited the space for a critical assessment and audit of the electoral
process in Kenya.
The newly elected President Uhuru Kenyatta has consistently asserted his government’s commitment to
respecting press freedom and has pushed for the media’s help in pursuing the government’s development
agenda. In his first hundred days in office, he has courted the press in a curiously open rapprochement
that is a radical departure from his predecessor, Kibaki, who shunned the media when it did not favor his
administration. In an unprecedented breakfast meeting hosted at State House Nairobi with members of the
23 This system involved the use of a mobile device that relayed data from each presiding officer to the central tallying station in Nairobi. Presiding officers entered the data from those electoral record forms into a specially developed mobile phone application. This device would securely transmit these provisional results over mobile data network to IEBC headquarters for consolidation and publication. 24 The IEBC’s chair explained this resort to a manual system as occasioned by a glitch in the system that was multiplying rejected votes by eight. Electronic Vote Transmission from the polling stations to the main counting center in Nairobi also collapsed repeatedly. Eventually the IEBC resorted to manual vote tallying.
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Editors’ Guild, President Kenyatta fielded questions on the challenges facing his close to 100-day-old
administration. He addressed national concerns including the then ongoing teachers strike and issues on
foreign policy and insecurity in the country. He called upon the media to consider themselves “partners”
in delivering on the government’s campaign manifesto. To this end, President Kenyatta said: “we are not
interested in government control and propaganda. Our commitment is to better ensure how the media can
more effectively support our democracy. What we want is openness and transparency that offers benefits
to Kenyans” (Aggrey, 2013).
At the State House meeting, the Editors’ Guild expressed concern over the proposed 2013 Media Council
Act. Section 6(E) of the Act still allowed the Communications Commission of Kenya or its proposed
successor (the Communications Authority of Kenya) to administer broadcast content, formulate media
standards, and regulate compliance with such standards. Dr. Haroun Mwangi, Media Council of Kenya
(MCK) CEO, reiterated that these roles remain the purview of the MCK (Mwangi, personal
communication, August 2013). Similarly, Section 5 of the act allowed for censorship of the press during
emergencies, echoing Section 88 of the 1998 Kenya Communications Act utilized by the Kibaki
administration to justify undue censorship from 2005 to 2007. In this context, questions have been raised
whether the President’s warm welcome to the media is not a “charm offensive.”
Veteran journalist Kwamchetsi Makokha views this “charm offensive” from State House as a change of
tack from previous administrations, and one which seeks novel mechanisms to control the press. “Where
Kenyatta and Moi bossed the media, Kibaki was aloof; Uhuru now seems to want to charm the media to
sleep or acquiescence” (Makokha, personal communication, June 2013).
THE END OF THE HONEYMOON: THE MEDIA ACT PASSES On December 5, 2013, Kenya's National Assembly passed the 2013 Media Council Act. President Uhuru
Kenyatta had temporarily held back assent to the legislation amidst great public and media pressure. The
final version, which parliament approved with President Kenyatta’s recommended changes, designed to
appease the public, failed to assuage the substantial concerns of the press. Press reports indicated that
prior to the passage of the act, compromises had been reached between the Parliamentary Committee on
Energy, Communication, and Information and press organizations including the Kenya Editors' Guild and
the Kenya Correspondents Association. These included the elimination of hefty fines against the press
and the continuation of self-regulation through the MCK.
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The enactment of the new media law came amid measures to reinforce government control over the
Kenyan media in the wake of the September 2013 attack by Al-Shabaab militants on the Westgate
shopping mall in Nairobi. Kenyan citizens grew increasingly wary of the media relaying unclear
information, which was obtained mainly from the Cabinet Secretary for Kenya’s Ministry of Interior
Affairs, concerning the number of terrorists, the number of persons who perished in the attack, and much
more. After the attack, the Kenyan media aired footage of Kenyan troops looting and, as such, caused the
government to rethink broadcasting guidelines.
CONCLUSION In Kenya’s history, ICT features as both the target and the means for consolidating regime power as well
as an innovative tool for participatory governance, efficacious public service delivery, and promotion of
peace. The preceding analysis suggests that Kenya’s ICT Policy (2006) is still in a flux and incomplete.
This report puts the current state of balance in historical and cultural context by providing an overview of
Kenya’s current ICT policies and identifying the main actors and their influence on ICT debates and
policymaking. It finds that the winding road of ICT policymaking in Kenya has closely tracked the
democratization of Kenya’s political space, moving from the efficient clientelism of the Jomo Kenyatta
administration, to the autocracy of Daniel Arap Moi, and finally, the increasingly democratizing
governments of Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta.
The report concludes that the 2006 National ICT Policy offers the broadest reach on stakeholder
involvement in Kenya’s ICT sector. The policy creates an appropriate framework for the government’s
non-interference with independent regulators mandated with issuance of ICT licenses, tariffs,
interconnections guidelines, standards, and frequencies, and management of the ‘.ke’ domain. The policy
empowers investors, operators, and service providers to participate in the development of an efficient ICT
sector with values of commercial integrity, strong corporate governance, high quality standards, and
universal access. It is important however, to note that this ICT policy was conceived as very separate
from media policy.
Increasingly, Kenya’s liberal ICT Policy (2006) attracts new stakeholders in ICT use or ICT-based
activities for economic development, humanitarian aid, financial flows, agribusiness, and citizen
participation in governance and peace promotion. However, the formalization and institutionalization
process of ICT policies in Kenya have historically been largely unstable and incomplete. Since ICT policy
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and media policy were not harmonized, the media sector turned increasingly to ICTs to amplify citizen
voice and hold government accountable. The government, in turn, sought measures to maintain control, as
reflected in the 2013 Media Council Act.
CASE STUDIES OF ICT USE AND STAKEHOLDERS POST-‐2006 NATIONAL ICT POLICY OF KENYA
The mission of the National ICT Policy is to improve the livelihood of Kenyans by ensuring the
availability of accessible, efficient, reliable, and affordable ICT services, with a vision of using ICT to
create a prosperous Kenya. The following case studies are indicative of the impact of Kenya’s 2006 ICT
policy and the range of ICT stakeholders, and provide a roadmap to the future of ICT policy in Kenya. In
the context of increasing democratization, Kenya’s National ICT policies increasingly attract new
stakeholders who use ICT for economic development, humanitarian aid, financial flows, agribusiness, and
citizen participation in governance and peace promotion.
ICTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: M-‐PESA The manner in which ICT is influencing the dynamics of statebuilding in Kenya is perhaps most visible
through the effect of Safaricom’s M-Pesa mobile technology product. Launched commercially in March
2007, M-Pesa “is an electronic payment and store of value system that is accessible through mobile
phones” (Mas & Radcliffe, 2010). To access the service, customers register for free at an authorized M-
Pesa retail outlet that assigns them an individual electronic account that is linked to their phone number
and accessible through a SIM card-resident application on the mobile phone. Thereafter, for a fee, the
customer can use M-Pesa to access a wide array of services. Since 2007, M-Pesa has become an
indispensable part of daily Kenyan life. Within its first month, M-Pesa had more than 20,000 registered
users; in 2012, 70% of Kenyans had used M-Pesa and approximately 20% of the country’s GDP had
moved through the platform (Mwangi, 2012). Daily usage is estimated at two million transactions daily,
worth approximately 2 billion KShs.
By 2012, M-Pesa had over 35,000 agents countrywide, and handled about 70% of the country’s financial
transactions, including “utility bill payment, water purchases, farm equipment purchases, payroll, goods
and services, and international money transfers” (Mwangi, 2012).
The M-Pesa network is now used in a variety of statebuilding activities via mobile phones, smart phones,
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and tablets to enhance both public and private statebuilding initiatives. A number of case studies are
showcased below to illustrate how the M-Pesa mobile money system has been used.
ICTS IN KENYA’S FINANCIAL ECONOMY: M-‐SHWARI AND M-‐KESHO. The designers of M-Pesa asserted that they were specifically targeting the “unbanked” (Hughes & Lonie,
2007). Jack and Suri (2011) explain that though M-Pesa has been wary of regulation by the Central Bank
of Kenya and hence at pains to stress that it is not a bank, “the ubiquity of the cell phone across both
urban and rural parts of the country, and the lack of penetration of regular banking services, led to hopes
that M-‐PESA accounts could substitute for bank accounts, and reach the unbanked population” (pp. 4-
5).25
Morawczynski and Pickens (2009) argued that M-Pesa’s accessibility and safety for those in rural and
informal settlements who had no access to the formal banking system complemented its money transfer
function. However, because M-Pesa was not designed as a savings mechanism, and money stored
garnered no interest, the authors found that this discouraged many bank users from keeping larger
amounts of money in M-Pesa.26 Further, some users were concerned that money would be difficult to
access because of recurring cash float shortages at M-Pesa agents (Morawczynski & Pickens, 2009).27
They concluded that M-Pesa had nevertheless significantly influenced saving behavior amongst its users
and the system had revealed “a latent demand for appropriate savings products” (p. 4). The authors
concluded that “by partnering with financial service providers, mobile operators can play as significant a
role in mobilizing savings as they did in releasing money flows across the country” (Morawczynski &
Pickens, 2009, p. 4).28 Based on such findings, Safaricom has expanded the M-Pesa platform to provide
two banking products, M-Shwari and M-Kesho.
25 According to Jack, W. and Suri, T. (2011): “The low cost, and the widespread unmet demand for financial services, as captured by low rates of bank access, means that mobile banking has the potential to reach remote corners of the socio-‐economic, as well as geographic, spectrum” (p. 19). Mbiti and Weil (2007) state: “The qualitative studies on M-‐Pesa…have suggested that M-‐Pesa serves as a partial substitute for the formal banking system” (p. 14).http://www.nber.org/papers/w17129.pdf?new_window=1 26According to Jack and Suri (2011), “although M-‐PESA does not pay interest on deposits, and does not make loans, it can usefully be thought of as providing financial transaction services and that has operated, until recently, in parallel with the formal banking system” (p. 6). 27 A study conducted by Mbiti and Weil (2007) found that “M-‐Pesa use increases frequency of sending transfers, decreases the use of informal saving mechanisms…and increases the probability of being banked. This suggests that M-‐Pesa is complementary to banks, whereby the adoption of M-‐Pesa has increased the demand for banking products” (pp. 27-‐28). 28In contrast, Mbiti and Weil (2007) found that “although a significant number of survey respondents indicate that they use their M-‐Pesa accounts as a vehicle for saving, our analysis of aggregate data suggests that the overwhelming use of M-‐Pesa is for transferring money from individual to individual, with extremely little storage of value” (p. 28).
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M-‐Kesho In 2010, in partnership with Equity Bank, Safaricom launched M-Kesho, a financial service that linked
M-Pesa to an Equity Bank account. Targeting the one third of M-Pesa accounts which were held by
customers that were otherwise unbanked (FAI, 2010), it allows customers to “transfer money to and from
their M-Pesa accounts via their mobile handsets while enjoying other benefits that come with the bank
account” (TechMtaa, 2013).29 The accounts are issued by Equity Bank but marketed as “M-Pesa Equity”
accounts (FAI, 2010). To open an account, customers with relevant identification documents must either
go to the Equity Bank branch or one of the M-pesa agents at which an Equity Bank representative is
present. While M-Pesa is connected to services offered by other Kenyan banks, Equity Bank has an
exclusive short-term agreement on M-Kesho “relating to product co-branding, use of select M-PESA
agents to promote the bank’s products, and user interface integration” (FAI, 2010).
M-Kesho allows customers to have micro-savings at rates ranging from 0.5 to 3%. There are no minimum
balances, ledger fees, monthly charges, and notice period or penalties on withdrawal. Deposits into the M-
Kesho account are free and can be made through M-Pesa or through the customer’s normal Equity Bank
account. Withdrawals are charged from both the M-Pesa and M-Kesho accounts and there are also
charges for balance enquiries and mini-statement provision. M-Kesho is fully integrated into the M-Pesa
mobile interface and is also accessible through Equity’s Easy 24x7 phone menu.
Deposits into the M-Kesho account are free and can be made through M-Pesa or through the customer’s
normal Equity Bank account, which can be linked to the M-Kesho account. Withdrawals are charged
from both the M-Pesa and M-Kesho accounts and there are also charges for balance enquiries and mini-
statement provision. M-Kesho customers can also apply, at a fee, for credit (TechMtaa, 2013),30 and use
the platform’s micro-insurance product.31
M-‐Shwari M-Shwari is a paperless banking service offered through M-Pesa in partnership with the Commercial
Bank of Africa. With no bank branches to visit and no forms to fill out, M-Shwari allows M-Pesa
customers to save, earn interest on savings, and borrow money through their mobile phone (Safaricom, 29 Equity Bank’s Chief Executive Officer, Dr James Mwangi said “We want to ensure that no Kenyan is locked out of accessing basic banking services…This is in line with our mission to offer inclusive, customer-‐focused financial services that socially and economically empower our clients and other stakeholders.” (TechMtaa, 2013). 30 Credit between 100 and 5,000 KShs is available with overdue interest charged at 3% of the outstanding balance. 31 M-‐Kesho’s micro-‐insurance product offers varying premium fees covering accident, disability, medical, and funeral expenses, which, after a year, can be upgraded to full life insurance.
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n.d). Customers can also move money between the M-Shwari and M-Pesa accounts at no cost, and access
a micro credit loan received directly into the customers M-Pesa account (Safaricom (n.d.). Safaricom
aims to target the twelve million “unbanked” Kenyans with M-Shwari (Gachie, 2013).
M-Shwari allows customers to earn interest rates between 2-5% (Gachie, 2013), which is far higher than
the 0-1.6% interest most banks offer on low-cost deposits (Juma, 2012).
M-Shwari borrowers can qualify for loans ranging between Sh100 and Sh20, 000 payable within thirty
days, and attract an interest rate of 7.5% - a far lower rate than the exorbitant rates changed by informal
money-lenders and bank overdraft fees. As M-Shwari shares users’ credit history with credit reference
bureaus, analysts say that the M-Shwari is competitive amongst individuals and small business owners as
they often have “difficulty accessing credit from banks due to lack of collateral and documents like cash
flow statements and payslips” (Juman 2012,).
In a month after its launch, “M-Shwari had received more than 976 million shillings ($11.3 million) in
deposits, and its customers had borrowed 123 million shillings ($1.4 million)…” with the people between
twenty-five and thirty years of age showing the greatest confidence in the service (Ramah, 2013).
ICTS IN KENYA’S HUMANITARIAN AID In early 2011, the most severe drought in sixty years hit the Horn of Africa, precipitating a wave of
hunger and starvation across Kenya’s arid northern frontier. By May 2011, President Kibaki had declared
the drought and its attendant famine a national disaster, with almost four million Kenyans at risk of
starvation. Images of the unfolding disaster galvanized the nation. On the 23rd of July 2011, a Nairobi-
based media consultant, Ahmed Salim, tweeted urging Kenyans to donate towards the famine relief
efforts by the Kenya Red Cross. As the donations began to increase, Mr.Salim “contacted [the Kenya Red
Cross] asking them to set up a financial platform to absorb the donations…[the Kenya Red Cross] saw the
potential of the campaign and partnered with mobile network provider Safaricom, mobile money transfer
system M-Pesa, and the Kenyan bank KCB, to launch the Kenyans for Kenya initiative” (Kenya Red
Cross, n.d.).
Extensive use of social media resulted in donations of 677 million KShs. (approximately $8 million US)
in three months. Most of the individual donations were made through mobile money transfer platforms
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such as M-Pesa, Zap, Orange Money, and Yu-Cash. By October 2011, donations via M-Pesa totaled KShs
168 million, approximately 25% of the total raised to that point (Deloitte & Touche, 2011).
Because of the initiative, malnutrition rates dropped, life-saving provisions were distributed to schools
and affected communities across the country, drought-resistant seeds were distributed, and school food,
hygiene promotion, and emergency water trucking programs were undertaken. Kenyans for Kenya was
cited by the African Union “as a foundation to build on for a possible Africans for Africa to encourage
African people to take responsibility for the development of their own countries and not look to the West
for aid” (Kenya Red Cross, n.d.).
One key contribution of M-Pesa was that it gave ordinary Kenyans an avenue through which they could
contribute to the welfare of the less fortunate in their society. With donation as little as KShs. 10,
Kenyans could contribute to the cause conveniently and securely (Kenya Red Cross, n.d.2).
ICTS AND AGRIBUSINESS IN KENYA Agriculture is of immense significance to Kenya’s economy; the sector employs nearly 75% of the
country’s population with more than half of the sector’s output in small-scale and subsistence production
(Library of Congress, 2007). Three platforms in particular, M-Farm, iCow, and Kilimo Salama, exemplify
how ICTs, especially mobile applications and SMS messaging, have impacted Kenyan agriculture.
M-‐FARM The primary product of M-Farm Limited, a software solution and agribusiness company, M-Farm seeks
to empower small-scale farmers who had been taken advantage of due to lack of market information as
well as an inability to market their produce. Since 2011, the M-Farm application has allowed farmers to:
access information on the current retail price of different crops from different regions and/or specific
markets; buy seeds, fertilizers and other farm inputs collectively as well as directly from manufacturers at
favorable prices; find buyers for their produce; and sell their produce collectively for better returns
(Solon, 2013; Ekiru, 2011). Information on prices is updated daily and collected “through independent
data collectors using geocoding” (M-Farm, n.d.).
The M-Farm application is accessible through three ways: SMS messaging, a downloadable Android
App, and by going to M-Farm website. To use M-Farm via SMS, a farmer must first subscribe to the
program by sending an SMS to M-Farm containing his or her name and location. Once registered, in
order to get crop prices, the farmer simply sends an SMS to the M-Farm short code in a format beginning
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with the word ‘price’ followed by the name of the crop and the location. To sell, the farmer sends an SMS
to the same short code in a format containing the word ’sell’ followed by the crop name, weight of
produce, and the price the farmer wishes to sell at.
According to M-Farm, reports show that farmers who sold collectively more than doubled their receipts
for a variety of produce (Macharia, 2013; Ekiru, 2011). M-Farm intends to extend their network by
disseminating information about international regulations as well as focusing on the external market by
dealing with large foreign retailers. In relation to foreign retailers, M-Farm aims to speak to their
corporate social responsibility targets (Solon, 2013). To generate profit, M-Farm takes a transaction fee
for every deal brokered through the program and sells the data it possesses and gathers to research
organizations looking at consumer behavior and food scarcity (Solon, 2013).
ICOW iCow is an agricultural platform developed for small scale farmers, accessible through both mobile
phones and web. Developed by Green Dreams Tech Limited in 2010, it “allows herders to register each
individual cow, and to receive individualized text messages on their mobile phones, including advice for
veterinary care and feeding schedules, a database of experts, and updated market rates on cattle prices”
(Baldauf, 2011). Like the M-Farm, iCow was established in response to a lack of information amongst
small-scale dairy farmers in Kenya, particularly in the rural areas. The app sought to fill the information
gap that farmers faced that left most farmers resorting to trial and error rather than structured and
scientific farming methods (iCow, n.d.; Mfonobong, 2011). iCow seeks to target 1.6 million small scale
dairy farmers with the application. Use of the application by farmers has grown from 300 in 2011 to
45,000 in 2013 (Mbuvi, 2013).
iCow’s initial objective was to provide small-farmers with a mobile-based platform through which they
could access and monitor a gestation calendar for each of their cows as well as obtain expert advice in
order to improve productivity and profits. The calendar solution would enable farmers to track a cow
from insemination, through development of the calf to delivery (Mbuvi, 2013). The application has
expanded to, in addition, provide advice, other information provided include contacts for veterinary
officers and insemination officers in the farmers locality (Mbuvi, 2013).
Registering on iCow also provides farmers with access to agricultural extension service experts. iCow
“utilizes voice-based software application in mobile phones to enable the farmers make automated calls.
For example, they can ask the app when their cow is due to give birth, or how to identify the symptoms of
mastitis” (Kyama, 2010). iCow services can also be accessed through SMS and the internet. It has an
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online crowd map resource through which farmers can locate agro dealers and iCow agri-service
providers. iCow’s iCow Soko feature even enables farmers to trade livestock on the platform (Macharia,
2013).
After formally partnering with Safaricom in 2013, it was announced that iCow would be available as a
USSD based application, and that the cost of the application would reduce from KSh 5 to KSh 3 per SMS.
Additionally iCow would become available in both Kiswahili and English with plans to extend it to other
ethnic languages (Mbuvi, 2013).
An iCow impact study survey found that all registered iCow users claimed to have benefitted from being
on the platform. 42% farmers reported an increase in income with 56% of those with increased incomes
due to increased milk yield ranging from 1.5 to 3 liters per lactating animal. Additional benefits
mentioned included reduced spending on commercial feed; increased markets and income for livestock
and livestock by-products; increased customers reported by artificial insemination providers; reduced
animal illness and mortality; and increased storage of feed in preparation for drought and dry conditions
(iCow, n.d.; Ostrowski, 2013).
KILIMOSALAMA KilimoSalama is an agricultural insurance initiative set up in December 2008 that seeks to promote “safe
farming” by providing weather index insurance for small-scale farmers in Kenya. It is the largest
agricultural insurance program in Africa and the first program worldwide to reach small-farmers using
mobile phone technology (UAP, 2012). KilimoSalama partners include UAP Insurance, Syngenta
Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture, MEA Limited (a fertilizer distributor), Syngenta EA Limited (a
pesticide distributor) and Safaricom Limited.
The aim of the insurance program is to help small-scale farmers deal with weather risks exacerbated by
the effects of climate change such as extreme or erratic rains, floods and drought that threaten their
livelihoods. The KilimoSalama initiative believes that “the use of technology is the key to the micro
insurance product’s affordability and the model’s scalability” (UAP, 2012).
Currently insuring over 70,000 farmers scattered throughout rural Kenya, the initiative works as follows:
a farmer can by insurance at a 5% premium at an input shop when purchasing farm supplies. The
insurance covers adverse weather, which is monitored through solar powered weather stations. Owners of
farm supply stores are “given a camera phone to record the purchase, which instantly sends a
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confirmation text message to the buyer” (Rosenburg, 2011). Farmers registering with KilimoSalama
select their nearest weather station, the produce or product to be insured, the purchase summary, and the
premium paid. The insurance policy is automatically created on the KilimoSalama server and an SMS
confirming the coverage and farmer’s policy number is sent.
With no farm visits, payouts are made based on index triggers from weather data recorded at the weather
stations. The automated weather stations collect and automatically transmit measurements to the
KilimoSalama server every fifteen minutes. Weather at the end of each growing season is compared to
historical weather data. “If the season's rainfall is 15% above or below the average, the insurance payout
owed to client farmers is calculated and sent via automated mobile payment. There is no ‘claims’
process” (Syngenta Foundation, 2014).
Payouts are then transferred through the M-Pesa mobile phone payment system, which notifies the farmer
that a payout has been made to their M-Pesa account. Crop advisory services are also available to the
farmers through a toll free helpline, a partnership between KilimoSalama and mobile operator Safaricom
(UAP, 2012).
Conventional insurance cover for farmers is expensive, which limits insurance access to small-scale
holders. Furthermore, conventional insurance operates on a claims basis, which necessitates costly farm
visits to verify each individual policyholder’s claims. The KilimoSalama initiative overcomes such
challenges “dramatically reducing] administrative costs, [and] enabling a premium price that millions of
farmers can finally afford” (UAP, 2012). The initiative also provides a service called KilimoSalama Plus
through which farmers can further insure their total anticipated harvest value by paying the full premium
amount (Macharia, 2013).
ICTS, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE AND PEACE PROMOTION IN KENYA
ICT platforms have also been developed to impact democratic and peacebuilding processes in Kenya. In
addition to Kenya’s most prominent peacebuilding platform Ushahidi, Mzalendo and Amani @ 108 also
seek to change how citizens and communities influence democracy and peacebuilding in Kenya.
MZALENDO Mzalendo is a web-based initiative founded in 2003 to audit and monitor Kenya’s parliamentarians. Re-
launched in 2012, the project seeks to “to promote a stronger public voice and to enhance public
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participation in politics by providing relevant information about the National Assembly’s activities, MPs
and aspirants ahead of the 2012 elections” (Mzalendo, n.d.). The initiative emerged from a lack of
transparency and accountability concerning the character and activities of Kenyan parliamentarians, and
has expanded to provide an avenue for dialectic engagement between citizens and their elected
representatives. Mzalendo seeks to provide a platform through which citizens can demand information
and accountability, and develop an obligation amongst Members of Parliament and other public officers
to the citizens of Kenya. The website offers Kenyans a wide host of information on current members of
parliament and was useful in informing Kenyans about candidates’ backgrounds in the run up to the 2013
general election.
The site also includes ‘Democracy Resources” which provides information about the how democracy
operates in Kenya. Resources include materials on: the role citizens should play and their legal rights; ‘the
structure of Kenyan democracy under the Constitution of Kenya 2010; the roles of members of
government; qualifications and disqualifications for elected officials; and information about the Kenyan
Constitution and electoral legislation. The site also provides an overview of Parliament containing
overviews of ministries, the committee and bills processes in Parliament, the Hansard,32 and background
information on Kenya’s main political parties.
Mzalendo has developed a scorecard system that aims to provide a mechanism through which citizens can
assess the performance of members of parliament. The primary metrics used to measure candidates on the
scorecard are the contactability of members,33 the number of times their names appear in the Hansard,34
and members’ Constituency Development Fund (CDF) spending performances.35 These measures were
selected as they contain data that is “clear and unambiguous and can be applied across all MPs in a fair
manner” (Mzalendo, n.d.).
32 The Hansard is the official record of the Kenyan National Assembly. 33 “Contactability is based upon the different contact and communication means we have on the site for MP…[MP’s] can at any time provide [Mzalendo] with more information to update our records and improve their rating” (Sasaki, 2010). Mzalendo views this as an important metric as MPs must be available to the citizens who they serve. 34 Hansard appearance track every time a MP speaks in Parliament, which is important as it shows how much time an MP actually spends in Parliament actively representing his or her constituents. 35 The CDF is developed fund established to ensure that national funds are more evenly spent in a targeted locally relevant manner. “CDF spending performance is based upon the social audit reports carried out by the National Taxpayers Association. The NTA has not carried out audits for every constituency yet. As more constituencies are completed new data will be added to the site” (Sasaki, 2010). This metric seeks to show how effectively each member of Parliament spends CDF funds.
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The initiative faces a number of significant challenges including accessing funds; recruiting volunteers;
accessing information; verifying and editing content that is contributed; and maintaining contributions
from parliamentarians and the wider public. Securing the site to make sure information is legitimate and
that MPs cannot be impersonated is a key obstacle tin making sure the initiative is attractive for MPs’
participation. Access to information is a significant challenge as a culture of secrecy still pervades
Kenya’s public institutions. For example, Parliament’s attendance records are secret and no one can
officially tell how many times an MP has been to Parliament, how long they attended, and in what
capacity. The initiative’s future plans include integrating its database with Ushahidi “to allow people to
receive mobile updates about their particular member of parliament” (Sasaki, 2010).
USHAHIDI During the Kenya’s 2007 General Election cycle, an unprecedented amount of violence was witnessed
with more than 1,500 people killed and 250,000 displaced. At the height of the violence, the government
banned live media broadcasts, self-censorship within mainstream media was rampant, and there was a
general lack of information on what was occurring across the country. Within this environment, Ory
Okolloh, a Kenyan blogger and Ushahidi founder, asked people to send her information on what was
occurring across the country – information that she would then post on the internet. From this initiative
the Ushahidi platform was born (Okolloh, 2009).
The volume of reports necessitated the creation of a dedicated website where people could anonymously
report incidents of violence online or via mobile phone text messages (SMS). The information gathered
then mapped in order to enable the public to visualize and understand what was occurring (Okolloh,
2009). Despite the risks of misreporting and misinformation, Okolloh felt that “having a vehicle where
some information could be shared was better none – and that relying on local resources was a good way
to do this…The Ushahidi website was not intended to be wholly accurate…the main focus was the
immediate need to get information out” (Okolloh, 2009, p. 65). Ushahidi’s objective was to harness the
power of crowd sourcing information to facilitate the sharing of information in an environment where
rumors and uncertainty were dominant
A group of interested volunteers came together to build the Ushahidi website, utilizing open source
software, voluntarily donating server space, writing the code, donating the short code for SMS calls, and
helping gather the initial data. Information was gathered both from direct inputs on the website and
through SMS messages that were manually entered into the system. Inputs created a timeline of events
and mapped out riots; deaths; property loss; the activities of security agencies; movements of civilians;
cases of looting, rape, and arson; internally displaced people settlements; as well as the location of various
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peace efforts. As usage and reporting increased, the platform became an important source of information
in a time of crisis and communication challenges. It also formed a platform around which peace
interventions could be strategized and implemented.
As with any crowd sourcing social media tool, Ushahidi’s primary challenge was verifying the
information received on the platform. When possible, Ushahidi called or emailed reporters to try to verify
reports where people reported anonymously. Stories were counter-checked through comparisons with
other available sources. Information that appeared credible but could not be verified was posted on
Ushahidi with a note stating that it had not been verified (Okolloh, 2009). In addition to preventing the
dissemination of inaccurate information, reports were also monitored to avoid publishing inflammatory
and propaganda-like materials (Okolloh, 2009).
In addition to providing crowd-sourced information in a time of chaos, Ushahidi also “was intended to be
a ‘memorial’ or archive…of the events that happened…a reminder of just how bad things got – so that
Kenyans would hopefully avoid repeating history at future elections” (Okolloh, 2009, p. 65). The
Ushahidi platform has since been further developed as a crisis-mapping tool. It has been utilized in other
humanitarian crisis situations around the world in countries such as ithe DRC, Haiti, Chile, New Zealand,
India, Japn, Armenia, and the Middle East.
AMANI @ 108 In 2012, with the aid of the United Nations Development Programme-Kenya the National Steering
Committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (NSC)36 established the Amani Kenya @108
initiative. In line with the 2006 National ICT Policy provisions on e-government, Amani @108 is a
government-led public platform that seeks to engage Kenyans in peacebuilding efforts in the country. The
platform integrates the use of SMS, incident reports, and media reports to help strengthen peace and
conflict prevention efforts in Kenya. Amani @ 108 promotes the use of ICTs to map crisis and promote
peace.
The platform was launched as the crowd-sourcing component of the National Early Warning and Early
Response System, and used the Uwiano platform to gather information related to conflict during the 2013
electoral cycle (Amani, n.d.). Messages were largely received from the public through the SMS short
code, however, information could also be provided on the platform website, by email, and via the social
media sites such as Twitter and Facebook.
36 The NSC is a department within the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security.
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Once supplied, information would be verified and then inputted into the Amani 108 system based at the
NSC. The website also monitored reports relating to conflict and threats of conflict published in the
mainstream media and entered these into the website tool. A mapping tool similar to that used by
Ushahidi was utilized to visualize the reports that had been received, creating a picture of conflict
hotspots across the country. Information was categorized under various headings including abductions,
killings, riots, property loss, theft, sexual assault, demonstrations, hate messages, insecurity, evictions,
and gender-based violence. Various security agencies, government departments, and non-state actors
dealing with conflict in Kenya utilized the data to frame their responses during the electoral period.
Innovative social media tools and user-generated information can thus be utilized for and translated into
localized and participatory preventive multistakeholder action in potential conflict situations. Indeed
peacebuilding and conflict prevention interventions will be improved by supporting mechanisms that
empower citizens to play a central role in proactively responding to conflict (Khal, 2012). The
Amani@108 platform contributed to peacebuilding efforts by providing a path for inclusive and
participatory stakeholder engagement, the rapid flow of information, a platform for collaborative
prevention of violence, and a new avenue for data that enhances information triangulation, which plays a
central role in ensuring that responses are organized on the basis of credible and accountable information.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Abdi, J., & Deane, J. (2008). The Kenyan 2007 elections and their aftermath: The role of media and communication. BBC, World Service Trust, Policy Briefing No 1, Available on: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/kenya_policy_briefing_08.pdf. Accessed on: June 15, 2013.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
1. Kwamchestsi Makokha
Kwamchetsi Makokha is a former senior editor of The Nation and The Standard newspapers. He
trains journalists and communication officers on effective communication skills.
2. Henry Maina
Henry Maina worked in the human rights sector for ten years before moving to Article 19 in
2008. At Article 19, he specializes in criminal justice and human rights education at the Legal
Resources Foundation. He also has expertise in advocacy and governance. Maina is skilled in
program management and fundraising, and holds a Master’s Degree in international development,
law, and human rights from Warwick University in the UK.
3. Dennis Itumbi
Dennis Itumbi is an accomplished radio, television, online, and print journalist. He has worked
with various organizations including Voice of America (VOA), Royal Media Services, The
People Daily, The Standard, The Kenyan Spectator, and various online news media sources.
Itumbi also owns Title County News, a network of newspapers that aims to address unique issues
in the grassroots locations of Kenya. He has also won various international and national awards,
including the Governance Journalist of the Year Prize, and is also a pioneer member of the
Journalist Association of Kenya (JAK). Itumbi has also taken on various PR, communication, and
media consultancies with the Anglican Church, National Rainbow Coalition and UNESCO.
Itumbi also runs key websites including www.dennisitumbi.com and www.wikileakskenya.co.ke.
He currently works as the Digital, New Media & Diaspora Director in the Office of The
President.
4. Dickson Bogonko Bosire
Dickson Bogonko Bosire is the founder of Jackal News, Kenya’s foremost online tabloid. He is
credited with having broken the story of the Kiambaa church fire in Eldoret, a key flashpoint of
the post-election violence in 2007.
5. Dr. Joe Sevilla
Dr. Joseph Sevilla is the founder and Director of @iLabAfrica, a research center at Strathmore
University (Nairobi, Kenya). He is also a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Information
Technology. Dr. Sevilla is a member of the British Computer Society, the Safaricom Innovation
Board, Chairman of the Document Description and Processing Languages Technical Committee
of the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KBS), and a member of the Council of the Free Software and
Open Source Foundation for Africa (FOSSFA). While at Strathmore, he has held the office of
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Deputy Vice Chancellor, Dean of the Faculty of Information Technology and member of the
University’s Management Board. In 1991, he founded the Information Technology Centre (ICT)
at Strathmore and served as its first Director. Dr. Sevilla has participated in a number of
committees established by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Research, Technical
Training and Technology, and the Ministry of Information and Communications; he has advised
the Kenyan Government and the ICT Board on the drafting of national policies in ICT education,
the national syllabus for Computer Studies in schools, and the adoption of a national ICT
strategy. He has also acted as an advisor to the Kenyan Directorate of Industrial Training in issues
related to computer training. Dr. Sevilla’s interests cover: ITC in education and development, IT
security, mobile computing, e-learning, managerial decision modelling, bioinformatics, and FOSS
applications.
6. Juliana Rotich
Juliana Rotich is a co-founder of Ushahidi (Swahili for testimony). Ushahidi is a web-based
reporting system that utilizes crowdsourced data to formulate visual map information of a crisis
on a real-time basis. As a Program Director for Ushahidi, Rotich manages projects and aids in the
development and testing of the Ushahidi platform. She also blogs at 'Afromusing,' typically with
a focus on African tech and renewable energy. She is a budding African Futurist and a TED
Senior Fellow. She often speaks at international conferences about tech and Africa.
7. Joseph Kihanya
Joseph holds a postgraduate degree in Communications and Information Technology Law,
UNSW, Sydney, Australia. He has worked in private law practice, as in-house counsel for Celtel
Kenya Ltd., and as an adjunct faculty member in Media Law at United States International
University. He is a consultant with the Communications Law Centre and lecturer with the
Council of Legal Education. He has also worked with KICTANET, ICJ (Kenya), and the Media
Owners’ Association on best media and telecommunications regulatory frameworks and practices
for the proposed Kenya Information and Communications Bill 2006, the Media Council of Kenya
Bill 2006, and all regulations and codes anticipated thereunder.
8. Alex Gakuru
Alex Gakuru is the Founder and Chair of ICT Consumers Association of Kenya, an ICT
consumer rights advocacy group. He is the Executive Director of Content Development and
Intellectual Property (CODE-IP) Trust, a non-profit organization focusing on creating an enabling
environment for local content development and its intellectual property protection. Gakuru is an
assertive advocate of consumer rights, representing consumer interests through various platforms
both locally and internationally. He is an Elected Council Member at the Free and Open Source
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Software Foundation for Africa and takes part in global Internet Policy formulation as the elected
African representative at ICANN’s Non-Commercial Users Constituency Executive Committee.
He is also the Regional Coordinator for Africa, Creative Commons. Gakuru appreciates the
transformative power of media and therefore continually contributes to various media on
technology and consumer-related matters. He is an honorary member of the “Government
Relations” department at the Kenya ICT Reporters Association. Prior to his appointment to the
BCAC, he served on several government task forces, including the Creative Content Task Force,
the ICT Standards Task Force, the IPv6 Task Force, and Kenya Bureau of Standards (SC34)
Documents Standards Committee. He holds a B.Sc. in Computer Science, Mathematics, and
Physics from the University of Nairobi and has taken several short-courses on communication,
ICT and media regulation.
9. Mugo Kibati
Mugo Kibati is the former Director General at the Vision Delivery Secretariat spearheading
Vision 2030. Kibati has a wealth of experience in both the private and public economic sectors.
He served as the Chairman of Apollo Investments Limited and Apollo Life Assurance Limited.
He has been Director of Apollo Investments Limited since July 24, 2009. Mr. Kibati holds a
Master of Science, Technology Policy from Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
10. Moses Kemimbaro
Moses is Director of Sales at InMobi for Africa. He is responsible for the functional management
and leadership of sales activities for InMobi throughout Africa. He has previously worked at
Dealfish, a Pan-African network of online marketplaces owned by MIH Internet Africa and the
digital business arm of Naspers.
11. Mark Masai
Mark Masai is a journalist with Nation Television Network. He has previously worked with
China Television Africa.
12. Balla Galma
Balla Galma an experienced human rights and humanitarian law defender currently working as a
legal assistant at Madan- Handa and Company Advocates, a law firm based in Nairobi. She also
volunteers with various humanitarian organizations. She has won accolades locally and
internationally for her advocacy in human rights issues.
13. Al Kags
Al Kags is a writer and poet based in Kenya. He is the founder of the Al Kags Trust that
publishes The Quarterly Colour poetry series, a series of free poetry ebooks that are distributed
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over email, blogs, and other media. Al Kags is a public servant who works with the Kenya ICT
Board, the state corporation that markets and develops ICT.
14. Brian Mwita
Brian Mwita is a Nairobi-based software developer with five years’ experience in the industry
and has been a volunteer with Ushahidi since 2008, when he set up the FrontlineSMS to relay
SMS reports for the November 2008 Ushahidi DRC instance setup to track eastern Congo
conflict. Prior to joining Ushahidi, Mwita was responsible for the development, maintenance, and
support of the postpaid billing system at a local telecommunications company. He previously
worked in the development of systems for managing higher education institutions and in the
provision of open-source-managed services to clients around Nairobi.
15. Phares Kariuki
Phares Kariuki has a background in startup incubation and was a Business Manager and Solution
Architect for VMware at Westcon. He has worked for DataposIT, which was a startup at the time.
In addition to this he has a background in mentorship, having setup and run the mentorship
program for the iHub in Nairobi as well as done the same for the Garage 48 brand.
16. Chaacha Mwita
Chaacha Mwita has extensive international work experience in management, policy engagement,
journalism and communications, research, and administration, all gained within the public and
private sectors for multi-national organizations and institutions. He served as the head of policy
engagement and communications for the African Population and Health Research Center
(APHRC), Nairobi, Kenya; Group Managing Editor, Standard Newspapers Ltd; and is currently a
board member of the Ewaso Nyiro South Development Authority (ENSDA), geographically
Kenya's largest development authority.
17. Dr. Haroun Mwangi
He is the Chief Executive Officer and Secretary to the Media Council of Kenya (MCK).