Download pdf - Jews, Nazis and communists down under: The Jewish council's controversial campaign against German immigration

This article was downloaded by: [Eindhoven Technical University]On: 21 November 2014, At: 16:27Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Australian Historical StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rahs20

Jews, Nazis and communists down under: The Jewishcouncil's controversial campaign against GermanimmigrationPhilip Mendes aa Monash UniversityPublished online: 30 Sep 2008.

To cite this article: Philip Mendes (2002) Jews, Nazis and communists down under: The Jewish council's controversial campaignagainst German immigration, Australian Historical Studies, 33:119, 73-92, DOI: 10.1080/10314610208596202

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10314610208596202

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in thepublications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representationsor warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses,actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoevercaused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyoneis expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rahs20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/10314610208596202

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10314610208596202

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Jews, Nazis and Communists Down UnderThe Jewish Council's Controversial Campaign Against

German Immigration

PHILIP MENDES*

This article examines the controversial campaign by the Jewish Council to CombatFascism and Anti-Semitism to stop large-scale German immigration to Australia in the

early 1950s. The campaign was historically significant in that this was the first timeAustralian Jewry had initiated politically divisive public protests linked to nationalpolitical and electoral considerations. Attention is also drawn to some of the factorswhich ultimately hindered the efficacy of the campaign, including the strength ofmainstream monocultural policies and attitudes, political divisions in the Jewish

community, and the Federal Coalition government's aggressive and uncompromisingresponse to Jewish concerns.

IN MID-1950, the Menzies Liberal government announced plans to introduceupwards of 100,000 German migrants to Australia. The Jewish community—energised by the controversial left-wing Jewish Council to Combat Fascism andAnti-Semitism—immediately announced a public campaign of opposition. Moti-vated by continuing anguish over the still recent Nazi Holocaust and fears ofallegedly ingrained German anti-Semitism, the campaign sought to convince theLiberal government and the general public that German immigrants wouldintroduce racial prejudice into Australia.

The existing literature on the Anti-German Migration Campaign (AGMC)has suggested that it largely failed to achieve its objectives. This failure has beenattributed primarily to the involvement and strategies of the Jewish Council.In particular, it has been argued that the Council pursued broader left-wingpolitical objectives beyond specific Jewish concerns about Nazi immigration; thatthe Council wilfully rejected government offers to include Jewish communalrepresentatives in the development of more adequate screening procedures; andthat the Council's left-wing links allowed the government to convenientlydismiss the AGMC as communist-inspired.1

* My thanks to Marianne Dacy from the Archive of Australian Judaica, Lois from the State LibraryManuscripts Section, and Bev Davis from the Australian Jewish Historical Society for theirvaluable assistance. Thanks also to Professor Bill Rubinstein for his insightful comments on anearlier draft, and to Norman Rothfield for kindly providing access to his personal archives.

1 Allan Leibler, 'The Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitism: A Study in the Struc-ture and Function of a Communist Front Organisation' (BA Honours Thesis, University ofMelbourne, 1968), 73-82; Hilary Rubinstein, The Jews in Victoria 1835-1985 (Sydney: Allen &Unwin, 1986), 199; W.D. Rubinstein, The Jews in Australia: Volume 11, 1945 to the Present(Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1991), 410-14; Angelika Sauer, 'Model Workers or HardenedNazis? The Australian Debate about Admitting German Migrants, 1950-1952', Australian Journalof Politics and History, 45, no. 3 (1999): 432.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14

74 Australian Historical Studies, 119, 2002

In contrast, this article argues that the AGMC was an effectively directedoperation, and that it did procure some gains for the Jewish community. To besure, the AGMC did not succeed in reversing the Liberal government's policies,nor did it convince key interest groups such as the trade unions and the RSL towithdraw their support for German migration. However, the campaign employeda wide range of potent strategies, attracted support from a number of key organ-isations and individuals including the Deputy Leader of the opposition LaborParty, and placed considerable pressure on the Liberal government to defendor revise its policies. It also arguably provided the first sign of the emergence ofthe Australian Jewish community as a significant and robust lobby group onethnic/immigrant issues and politics. Although the government refused to res-cind its broad commitment to German migration, it does appear in practice tohave introduced a much smaller number of German migrants than originallyintended.

It is also true that the campaign was prematurely halted in mid-1951, andthat this termination was associated with the decline of the Council's influenceand standing in the Jewish community. However, the failure of the campaign tocontinue and to achieve its ultimate objective of stopping all German migrationcannot be narrowly attributed to the Council's specific strategies. Rather, wemust consider the broader local and international political dynamics of theperiod. Given the dominance of monocultural policies and assumptions inAustralia, the campaign was always going to be politically risky for a smallminority group.2 Arguably the campaign could only fully succeed with thesupport of one of the two major political parties. Given the Labor Party's earliersupport for mass immigration, it is questionable how far they would havereversed existing government policies even if they had been returned to govern-ment in the 1951 federal election. And in the end the campaign's emphasis onGerman Nazis, rather than communism, as the continued principal threat toJews conflicted with the direction of international Jewish opinion. Althoughmost Australian Jews greatly feared the prospect of mass German migration,they were also influenced from about the middle of 1951 by increasing evidenceof anti-Semitism in the Soviet Bloc countries, and the moves towards Israeli/West German rapprochement. The campaign against German migration, there-fore, increasingly threatened to leave Australian Jewry out of step with inter-national Jewish views and agendas.

Labor and Liberal immigration policies

Following the Second World War successive Immigration Ministers ArthurCalwell (ALP) and Harold Holt (Liberal) instigated plans for the large-scale

2 On Australian monoculturalism, see Jason Yat-Se Li and James Cockayne, 'Evolutionary Multi-culturalism and Cultural Diversity', in New Voices for Social Democracy, eds Glen Patmore and DennisGlover (Annandale: Pluto Press, 1999), 233-40.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Mendes: The Jewish Council's Controversial Campaign Against German Immigration 75

migration of displaced persons (DPs) from Europe to Australia. The Laborgovernment coined the phrase 'Populate or perish' to capture Australia's desper-ate need for large-scale immigration. Particular factors cited included Australia'sdeclining birth rate, its continued vulnerability to regional aggression, and labourshortages in heavy industry, home building, and public works. The government'sinitial preference was for British migrants followed by settlers from WesternEurope and Scandinavia. However, these plans were frustrated by circumstancesbeyond the control of the government such as the non-availability of shipping.3

The Chifley Labor government initially introduced refugees from the Balticstates such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. They were followed by new arrivalsfrom Southern and Northern Europe. Under the Displaced Persons Schemeintroduced in July 1947, Australia accepted nearly 180,000 people over a four-and-a-half year period. Most of these newcomers were genuine DPs andrefugees, although a small number appear to have played important roles as Nazicollaborators in the mass killings of Jews during the Holocaust.4 The Chifleygovernment seems to have specifically rejected proposals for large-scale Germanmigration.5

The newly elected Liberal government extended the existing arrangements,arguing that larger immigration rates would assist Australia's defence, and facil-itate economic growth.6 The new program included a plan to introduce 100,000German (particularly Volksdeutsche) migrants to Australia over four years. TheVolksdeutsche were ethnic German refugees who had fled or been expelled fromtheir homes in Central Europe during or after the war. Germans were to beadmitted both under the existing Displaced Persons Scheme, and also as skilledworkers included in the Special Workers Scheme.7 The government was ableto persuade the politically powerful Returned Soldiers' Sailors' and Airmen'sImperial League of Australia to support this decision. This was a decisive movegiven the RSL's previous opposition to any non-Anglo-Saxon migrants, includingmost notably Jewish migration.8 The RSL was subsequently to play an importantrole in the Immigration Advisory Council which offered support for the Germanmigration program.9

3 Leslie Haylen, Twenty Years' Hard Labor (Melbourne: MacMillan, 1969), 94-103; John Lack andJacqueline Templeton, Bold Experiment: A Documentary History of Australian Immigration Since 1945(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2-21; Jock Collins, Migrant Hands in a Distant Land(Leichhardt: Pluto Press Australia, 1991), 20-3 & 53-5; Andrew Markus, 'Labour and Immigra-tion 1946-9: The Displaced Persons Program', Labour History 47 (November 1984): 73-90.

4 Mark Aarons, Sanctuary: Nazi Fugitives in Australia (Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia,1989), 83-8; Mark Aarons, War Criminals Welcome (Melbourne: Black Inc, 2001), 244-51.

5 Suzanne Rutland and Sophie Caplan, With One Voice: A History of the New South Wales Jewish Boardof Deputies (Sydney: Australian Jewish Historical Society, 1998), 53.

6 Aarons, Sanctuary. 120.7 Rutland and Caplan, 53; Sauer, 425.8 Aarons, Sanctuary, 88; Michael Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees 1933-1948 (Sydney:

Croom Helm Australia, 1985), 296-7; Ann-Mari Jordens, Redefining Australians (Sydney: Hale &Iremonger, 1995), 35-7.

9 Rutland and Caplan, 53-4 & 57.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14

76 Australian Historical Studies, 119,2002

The government's support for German migration reflected the rapidlychanging international political climate. Former German enemies were nowregarded as potential allies in the international struggle against communism.As authors such as Bower have noted, the earlier concern to punish or denazifyGerman war criminals was replaced by an emphasis on utilising the skills andresources of anti-communist Germans in the Cold War.10 German migrants andother anti-communist refugees were also viewed by the Liberal government aspotential allies in the local struggle against communists and radical tradeunions.11

The Jewish Council and the Australian Jewish community

The leading role in the Jewish campaign against Nazi and more specificallyGerman migration was taken by the Jewish Council. Formed in 1942, theCouncil was established to counter the growth in anti-Semitism associated withpre- and post-war Jewish immigration, and the impact of Nazism. Leaders of theCouncil advocated an activist and high-profile approach to fighting anti-Semitism, rather than the traditional low-key, inconspicuous strategy favouredby the established Anglo-Australian Jewish leadership.12 The Council was alwaysinfluenced by the Communist Party and its sympathisers, but in its early yearsenjoyed broad communal support. Its emergence reflected the wartime popular-ity of the Soviet Union, and the united front of all Jews—social democrats,communists, conservatives, Zionists, and leading Rabbis—against Nazism and itslocal apologists.13

By 1948, the Council had become the official public relations representativeof the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies (VJBD). This meant that the Counciltook control of all action pertaining to anti-Semitism, communal relations, andpolitical activity undertaken by the Board. The Council was also responsible forthe public relations activities of the Executive Council of Australian Jewrywhenever that body was based in Victoria.

The Council's emphasis on the joint struggle against the evils of fascism andanti-Semitism reflected the experiences of many Jewish refugees who hadexperienced persecution under anti-communist regimes.14 It also reflected thedisproportionate historical involvement of Jews in socialist and communist

10 Aarons. Sanctuary, 118; Tom Bower, Blind Eye to Murder (London: Andre Deutsch, 1981); TomBower, The Paperclip Conspiracy (London: Michael Joseph, 1987); David Cesarani, Justice Delayed:How Britain became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals (London: Heinemann, 1992), 134-61; Christo-pher Simpson, Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis & Its Effects on the Cold War (London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988).

11 Lack and Templeton, 11; Collins, 70; Aarons, Sanctuary, 111.12 Philip Mendes, 'The Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitism: An Historical Re-

Appraisal', Journal of the Australian Jewish Historical Society, 10, no. 6 (May 1989): 524-5.13 David Rechter, 'Beyond the Pale: Jewish Communism in Melbourne' (Masters Thesis, University

of Melbourne, 1986), 67.14 Ibid., 82.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


groups. This emphasis suggested that potential dangers to Jews came principallyfrom conservatives and the political right. Conversely, the Council believed thatLeft groups and organisations including the Soviet Union were particularlysympathetic to Jews.15

This position quickly came under attack with the beginnings of the Cold Warin 1948. The Jewish political unity of the wartime period began to erode,although in the short term Jews remained disproportionately sympathetic to Leftgroups including the Communist Party. This support was also briefly strength-ened by the Soviet Union's military and political assistance to the State of Israelduring the 1948 war of independence.16

Jewish support for the Soviet Union gradually collapsed in the face ofincreasing evidence of Stalinist anti-Semitism. In addition, Jews locally and inter-nationally were influenced by the growth of anti-communism, and the pressureto endorse new political alignments against the USSR. In contrast, the Councilrejected the Cold War consensus, and attempted to maintain its existing politicallinks and strategies. As a result, the Council became involved in a series ofpublic disputes and controversies which progressively weakened its previouslystrong support within the Jewish community. These controversies have beencovered in significant detail elsewhere,17 and will not be repeated here. Whatwas common in all these controversies was the allegation that the Council wasassociating the Jewish community per se with communist activities, and there-fore creating, rather than combating, anti-Semitism.

I have argued elsewhere that the Council was almost certainly not a straightCommunist Party front group akin to the Australian Peace Council or the Unionof Australian Women. Nevertheless, it was significantly influenced by a numberof prominent Communist Party members and active sympathisers.18 Forexample, CPA members such as Judah Waten, Saul Factor, and Isaac Gust heldsignificant roles in the Council. They were supported by ALP identities such asNorman Rothfield and Sam Goldbloom who shared their hardline support for theSoviet Union.19

On the other hand, ALP activists such as Sam Cohen and Walter Lippmanwere influential both within the Council and within the broader Jewish peakruling bodies. The Council also retained support from a wide cross-section of theJewish community which welcomed its robust and activist approach to fighting

15 Mendes, 'The Jewish Council', 534.16 Philip Mendes, 'From the Shtetl to the Monash Soviet: An Overview of the Historiography of

Jewish Radicalism in Australia', Australian Journal of Jewish Studies 14 (2000): 54-77.17 Allan Leibler, 'The Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitism' (BA Honours Thesis,

Melbourne University, 1968), 6-10; Sarah McNaughton, 'Liberalism and Anti-Communism inthe Melbourne Jewish Community in the 1940s and 1950s' (BA Honours Thesis, Sydney Univer-sity, 1984), 59-75.

18 Philip Mendes, 'The Jewish Council, Communism, and the State of Israel', Australian JewishHistorical Society Journal 14, no. 3 (November 1998): 459-67; Philip Mendes, 'The Cold War,McCarthyism, the Melbourne Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitism, andAustralian Jewry 1948-1953', Journal of Australian Studies 64 (2000): 199-200.

19 Rechter, 100.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


anti-Semitism. In the long run, the Coundl's credibility was undermined by theperception that it held dual loyalties, and that the influential pro-Soviet orcommunist faction described above had gained control of the Council's politicalagenda. The Council's later defence of Soviet anti-Semitism in late 1952 and early1953, for example, totally destroyed its legitimacy in the Jewish community.

However, at the time of the AGMC, the Council still enjoyed majoritysupport both within the Victorian and Australian Jewish peak ruling bodies.Moreover, the campaign presented the Council with a perfect opportunity torevive its flagging fortunes given the campaign's emphasis on the old unitedstruggle against Nazism. Although the Council's campaign against German migra-tion was certainly influenced by its broader left-wing political concerns andalliances, this political bias does not appear to have played a significant role inshaping the nature of the campaign. Moreover, although the ImmigrationMinister made some attempt to exploit the Council's alleged communist links,20

these do not appear to have exerted any decisive influence on the outcome of thecampaign. This was because the Jewish community, with only a few minorexceptions, was initially united in its support for a public campaign againstGerman migration.

Initial Jewish concerns about Nazi migration

As early as December 1947, the Jewish Council expressed concerns about thepresence of alleged Nazi collaborators within the Displaced Persons (DP) scheme.Evidence was gathered through overseas and local contacts pointing to the exis-tence of significant anti-Semitic tendencies within migrant groups. For example,Jewish migrants placed alongside Eastern European DPs in migrant centres weresubjected to numerous anti-Semitic attacks. In addition, some migrants werefound to have remnants of SS identification and blood group numbers undertheir armpits.21

The Jewish Council brought these concerns to the attention of the ALPgovernment and the media. Thus President Norman Rothfield expressed concernin the 1949 Council Annual Report that 'among the large numbers of Balticmigrants who have landed here during the past year, there are many who,whether voluntarily or under some pressure, assisted the Nazis to kill EuropeanJews'.22 The government did not take the allegations seriously, and respondedwith a mixture of humour and anger. The humour was typified by Prime MinisterChifley's response to a Jewish Council delegation. On being informed of the

20 Aarons, Sanctuary, 108-9 and 146-8.21 Aarons, Sanctuary, 89-98; JCCFAS Annual Report 1949/50.22 JCCFAS Annual Report 1948/49. See also 'Twelve Alleged Nazi War Collaborators in Security Quiz',

Truth, 24 December 1949; 'Meeting Protests Against Anti-Semitism Among DPs', Jewish Herald,2 December 1949; Norman Rothfield, Many Paths to Peace (Melbourne: Yarraford Publications,1997), 32.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


evidence of substantial sympathy within the Baltic states for Nazi anti-Semitism,he joked, 'When these Baltic women get into bed with Australians they'll forgetall that.'23 The responsible Minister, Arthur Calwell, privately dismissed evidencefrom his own security service regarding the SS origins of some migrants as a'farrago of nonsense', and directed that no further action be taken.24 Publicly hewarned that any cessation of Baltic immigration under the DP scheme would alsothreaten the arrival of Jewish migrants under the same scheme.25 The succeed-ing Liberal Minister, Harold Holt, was to take up this linkage between the twogroups of migrants with greater malevolence.

The Jewish campaign against German migration

The Australian Jewish community—disproportionately comprised of refugeesfrom Nazism including a considerable number of Holocaust survivors—viewedthe proposed German migration plan as a serious threat to its security and well-being.26 With hindsight, it may seem easy to dismiss the Jewish campaign asmotivated by post-Holocaust emotion and hysteria, rather than by a rationalappreciation of the.facts. Most of those Germans who migrated to Australiaappear to have been genuine refugees and victims of war, rather than committedGerman nationalists or Nazis.27 However, as James Jupp notes, Jewish fears were'perfectly justified' given the political and historical context of the period.28

The Jewish community overwhelmingly favoured this campaign for anumber of reasons. The Jewish Council had already exposed the presence ofa number of alleged Nazi war criminals within the earlier batch of Balticmigrants. There was, therefore, understandable concern that large-scale Germanimmigration would also include at least some persons who had participated in themass killings of the Holocaust. A disproportionate number of Holocaust survivorshad already settled in Australia, and as Executive Council of Australian Jewrysubmissions noted at the time, these persons were particularly upset by theprospect of their former persecutors being admitted. It also appeared significantthat prominent anti-Semites were amongst the strongest supporters of Germanmigration. This association provoked fears that German immigrants would beused to promote conservative political agendas, including potentially anti-Semitism.29

The first official Jewish response to the German migration plan came at the1949 Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) conference. The conference

23 Rothfield, Many Paths to Peace, 32; Norman Rothfield, 'Our Long History of Nazi Links', Age,18 August 1999.

24 Mark Aarons, 'A Legacy of War Criminal Protection', Age, 9 January 2000.25 Aarons, Sanctuary, 93-4.26 Leibler, 'The Jewish Council', 74; Rubinstein, The Jews in Australia, 411.27 Rothfield, Many Paths to Peace, 33; Rubinstein, The Jews in Australia, 412.28 James Jupp, Arrivals and Departures (Melbourne: Cheshire-Lansdowne, 1966), 11.29 Ibid., 12.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14

80 Australian Historical Studies. 119,2002

accepted a resolution moved by Jewish Council President Norman Rothfieldexpressing outright opposition to the immigration of Germans, except those witha proven record of anti-Nazi activities. The conference pledged to 'draw publicattention to and arouse public opinion on the dangers to Australia of suchGerman migration'.30

Not surprisingly, the most vigorous concern about German migration wasvoiced by the Jewish Council. The Council linked the migration plan to thealleged failure of denazification in West Germany, and the intended admissionof West Germany into the western alliance. They argued that the influx ofGerman migrants would lead to local anti-Semites being 'reinforced by experi-enced specialists from their Fatherland'.31 The Council appears to have planneda campaign against German migration from the early months of 1950. Theybegan preparing pamphlets, planning public meetings, and seeking alliances withother potentially sympathetic groups.32 However, their main concern was to prodand persuade the official representative Jewish bodies such as the VJBD andECAJ into action on the issue. Once the ECAJ committed itself to public protest,the Council effectively deferred to that organisation's authority.33

In September 1950, Maurice Ashkanasy, the Victorian-based ECAJ Presidentand later a vigorous critic of the Jewish Council, publicly set out Jewish opposi-tion to German migration in a letter to the Immigration Minister. The letterwarned that 'immigration of large numbers of Germans to Australian mustinevitably result in the introduction of streams of bitter race-hatred, doctrines ofarrogant German race superiority and anti-Semitism, which in due course willbecome an immense menace'. Ashkanasy specifically rejected the notion thatscreening would serve to weed out undesirable migrants, arguing that an entiregeneration of Germans had been indoctrinated with Nazi race theory.34 Copies ofthe letter were also circulated among leading Parliamentarians.

The government's response was to offer a meeting with the Minister forImmigration, Harold Holt, and the Minister for Development, R.G. Casey.However, the meeting produced no significant concessions from the government.According to the ECAJ, the Ministers showed little understanding of the historyof German anti-Semitism, and the likely implications of mass German migrationfor Australian society and democracy. The government maintained its view thatcareful screening could detect and eliminate migrants influenced by Naziideology. The suggestion was made that some Jewish representation in thescreening process could be permitted.35

30 Leibler, 'The Jewish Council', 74.31 JCCFAS Annual Report 1949/50, Archive of the Australian Jewish Historical Society, Melbourne

(hereafter AJHS).32 See JCCFAS Publicity Committee Minutes, 26 April, 17 May, 8 June, 21 June & 5 July 1950. Also

JCCFAS Executive Committee Minutes, 14 February, 21 February, 14 March, 21 March, 28 March,18 April, 26 April & 20 June 1950, Norman Rothfield Personal Archive, hereafter Rothfield.

33 Suzanne Rutland, Edge of the Diaspora (Sydney: Collins Australia, 1997), 332.34 Letter from Maurice Ashkanasy to Harold Holt, 30 August 1950, AJHS.35 Ben Green, German Migration to Australia, Executive Council of Australian Jewry Annual Confer-

ence, Sydney, June 1951, AJHS.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


Critics of the.Jewish Council have subsequently alleged that the Council wasprincipally responsible for rejecting the government's offer to participate in thescreening process, and that a more effective screening system could haveprevented the entry of most of the alleged Nazi war criminals into Australia.36

However, this viewpoint arguably ignores three things. Firstly, there does notseem to be any evidence that the Council played a decisive role in rejecting thegovernment's offer. The decision not to negotiate further with the governmentwas taken by a special ECAJ conference in November 1950 which included onlya handful of Council representatives.37 Secondly, the Australian screeningprocess appears to have been fundamentally flawed.38 The principal concern ofthe screening process was to admit politically reliable migrants who wereopposed to communism. Both the Immigration Minister and the Chairman of theImmigration Advisory Council stated publicly that former membership of theNazi Party would not necessarily constitute a bar to admission of Germanmigrants to Australia.39 It is, therefore, unlikely that the token presence of oneECAJ representative would have produced any significant improvement in thescreening process. Thirdly, as already noted, it seems that the majority of allegedNazi war criminals entered Australia under the earlier DP scheme. Therefore,even if a more effective screening system had been established, it would probablyhave still been too late to prevent the entry of the worst group of offenders.

The organisational structure of the public campaign

The Executive Council of Australian Jewry elected to initiate a campaign ofpublic education in an attempt to change the government's mind. This was asignificant and courageous decision. As Bill Rubinstein observes, this was the firsttime that the Australian Jewish community had publicly and vigorously opposeda policy of the Australian government.40 The assertive nature of the campaignclashed head on with the monocultural assumption that minority groups shouldassimilate into the Anglo-Australian melting pot, and forget their ethnic andcultural differences.41 This inherent political difficulty did not go unrecognised bythe ECAJ. The Council sought throughout the campaign to present concernsabout German migration as non-sectarian, and extending well beyond the Jewishcommunity.42

3 6 Isi Leibler, 'Cold War Memories', Australian Jewish News, 15 October 1999; Rubinstein, The Jewsin Australia, 413.

3 7 Green, 'Address', AJHS.3 8 Aarons, Sanctuary, 89-91 & 124-5; Matthew Ricketson, 'Selective Amnesia', Eureka Street. 4,

no. 6 (August 1994): 35; Efraim Zuroff, Occupation Nazi-Hunter (Hampshire: Ashford Press, 1988),181.

3 9 Rutland and Caplan, 54.4 0 Rubinstein, The Jews in Australia, 411 . See also Rutland, 330.4 1 Yat-Sen Li and Cockayne, 239.4 2 Sauer, 431 .

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


Overall, the Anti-German Migration Campaign was controlled and directedby the ECAJ and its President Ben Green, a prominent Liberal Party memberand anti-communist.43 Green was a passionate opponent of German migration.According to Green, the proposal to place 10,000 German women as domesticservants in Australian households would lead to thousands of Australian childrenbeing indoctrinated with racist and anti-Semitic views. He also suggestedemotively that 'unless the Jewish communities of Australia fight this thing andstop it, the yellow badge that Jews wore in Europe, will be introduced intoAustralia. It may not be a badge on the arm, or a yellow passport. But it will bea yellow badge in the soul.'44

Despite Green's public leadership, the Jewish Council maintained a key co-ordinating and fundraising role in the campaign. The Chairman of both the ECAJand VJBD Public Relations Committees was Sam Cohen, a representative of theCouncil. In addition, his closest adviser on the ECAJ Public Relations Committeewas the Honorary Secretary Walter Lippmann, another Council representative.The Council was solely responsible for organising and activating the public sideof the campaign. In Victoria a joint Anti-German Migration Committee wasestablished, consisting of two representatives from both the Jewish Council andthe Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies under the chairmanship of Sam Cohen.However in NSW, the campaign was principally organised by the NSW Jewish 'Board of Deputies, and led by key non-Council figures such as the former ECAJPublic Relations Chairman Bill Wolfensohn and Sid Einfeld.45

Critics of the Council have accused the Council of usurping or taking over theAGMC.46 However, the Council was always destined to play a central role in theAGMC for both structural and practical reasons. As noted above, the Council andits representatives coordinated the public relations committees of both theVictorian and Australian Jewish peak ruling bodies. It was only reasonable toexpect that these committees would be principally responsible for organising anyofficial Jewish public protest campaign. In addition, the Council was arguably theonly Jewish organisation possessing the political sophistication and expertise torun a vocal and visible public campaign.47

Campaign activities

The Anti-German Migration Campaign involved a number of complementaryactivities which were designed to attract maximum interest and support from

4 3 See, for example, the letter signed by Green and six other Jewish members of the Liberal Partydenouncing Jewish communists, Jewish Herald, 9 December 1949.

4 4 Ben Green, Address to the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies, 5 February 1951, AJHS.4 5 Rutland and Caplan, 56. Whilst a Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitism also

existed in NSW, it did not enjoy anywhere near the status or influence of the Victorian-basedCouncil.

4 6 Rubinstein, With One Voice, 411; Sauer, 432.4 7 Rubinstein, The Jews in Australia, 415.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


both the Jewish and broader Australian community. In most states of Australialarge protest meetings were organised by the ECAJ in conjunction with non-sectarian Citizens Protest Committees. A packed meeting of 3,000 people washeld in the Melbourne Town Hall in November 1950, chaired by ECAJ President,Ben Green. Similarly, a protest meeting attended by 6,000 people was held at theSydney Town Hall in February 1951, and addressed by Dr Evatt and other leadingLabor MPs. In addition, a meeting attended by 1,800 people was held in Perth inJanuary 1951 with leading Labor MHR Kim Beazley as one of the main speakers.Smaller meetings were also held in Brisbane and Adelaide,48 and speakersappointed by the ECAJ and VJBD addressed trade unions, churches, women'sorganisations. Rotary Clubs, and ALP branches.49

Some controversy surrounded the involvement of prominent left-wingactivists such as journalist Wilfred Burchett and author Alan Marshall in anumber of these forums, particularly the Melbourne Town Hall gathering.50

However, the extent and nature of this controversy has arguably been distortedby some later historians. At the time the Victorian Jewish Association ofEx-Servicemen (VAJEX) was the only group to question the list of speakersfor the Melbourne Town Hall meeting. Burchett and Marshall were almostcertainly invited to participate not because of their left-wing links, but ratherbecause they were known to be sympathetic to Jewish concerns. In addition,Burchett was widely regarded as a leading authority on post-war Germany.51

A reading of Jewish Council minutes suggests that the original panel broached(but not confirmed) for the Town Hall meeting included a much wider and moreconservative range of speakers including rabbis, academics, Liberal Partymembers, and mainstream ALP figures such as Victorian Premier John Cain.52

It appears that a number of proposed speakers pulled out at the last moment, andthat the Jewish Council probably had to accept those speakers who were willingand available on the night. It is possible that some of the invited speakers mayhave declined due to the increasingly politically partisan nature of the debate,and/or due to the government's public identification of the Jewish Council withcommunism. However, messages of support for the forum were still offered by adiverse range of groups and individuals including Rabbi Goldman, council critic

4 8 Green, 'German Migration', 11-12, AJHS. See also 'Scars Betray Hitler Men in Melbourne—sayJews', Argus, 22 November 1950; 'Evatt leads Huge Rally', Argus, 27 February 1951; 'LivelyScene at Meeting: Protest Against German Migrants' & 'Big Meeting Urges Ban on Nazi GermanMigrants', Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February 1951.

4 9 Sam Cohen, Report to the Annual Conference of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry on the Work ofthe Anti-German Migration Committee (Melbourne, 1951), AJHS. See also 'Germans more pro-Nazinow than in 1945', Australian Jewish News, 6 October 1950; 'Query on German Immigration inFederal Parliament', Jewish Herald, 6 October 1950.

5 0 Leibler, 'The Jewish Council', 78-80; Rubinstein, The Jews in Australia, 411.51 Marc Purcell, 'The Making of an Australian Radical: Wilfred Burchett and the German Jews',

Exegesis: Monash Historical Journal, 1, no.1 (Spring 1983): 9-24. On Australian Left philo-Semitismduring this period, see also Philip Mendes, 'Left Attitudes Towards Jews: Anti-Semitism andPhilo-Semitism', Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal, 13, no. 1 (1995): 100-3.

52 JCCFAS Executive Committee Minutes, 14 November 1950. See also Anti-German Migration CommitteeMinutes, 3 November 1950, Rothfield.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


Maurice Ashkanasy, Jewish Liberal Party activist Hector Barkman, the AustralianFederation of Jewish Ex-Servicemen and Women, and Holocaust survivorgroups.53

A second strategy involved the publication of pamphlets explaining thedangers of German (allegedly Nazi) migration. These pamphlets claimed thatGerman migrants would undermine Australian democracy, preach race hatredand constitute a potential fifth column, and that effective screening of formerNazis was impossible.54 Over 100,000 of these pamphlets were distributed inVictoria alone. Numerous trade unions, ALP branches, churches, university clubs,and Jewish youth groups assisted with their distribution. In addition, statementsissued by the ECAJ President received considerable coverage in national, stateand country newspapers, and the broadcast media.55 Support was sought andattained from prominent ALP figures including the federal Deputy OppositionLeader Dr Evatt, Kim Beazley, Val Doube, Clyde Cameron, Leslie Haylen, SenatorHendrickson, and Senator Justin O'Byrne.56 Leading representatives of tradeunions and churches also offered support as did several state branches of theLegion of Ex-Servicemen, the War Widows Guild, the Thirty-Niners Association,the Association of New Citizens, many individual members of the RSL, and anumber of Liberal Party MPs and activists.57

The public campaign was temporarily halted during the April 1951 federalelection. The ECAJ was concerned to retain its long-time policy of non-partisanship in party politics, and believed that any public activity during theelection period could be construed as aligning the Jewish community withthe Labor Party.58 For a variety of reasons outlined below, the campaign wasnot resumed.

A united or divided campaign?

The Executive Council of Australian Jewry's AGMC appears to have operatedeffectively and harmoniously. In December 1950, for example, Sam Cohen wasable to report that the VJBD and the Jewish Council were working together

53 Executive Council of Australian Jewry, Messages received for the Town Hall Meeting held on Tuesday21st November, AJHS.

54 See, for example, JCCFAS, Dare We Gamble?; German Migration Concerns You; New Australians orNazi Germans?; Keep Australia Free From Nazis; German and Volks Migration Will Flood Australia WithNazis; Nazi Germans for Australia (Melbourne, 1950).

55 Cohen, Report of the Standing Committee on Public Relations to the ECAJ Annual Conference(Melbourne, 1951), 6; Cohen, Report to the ECAJ Annual Conference on the Work of the Anti-GermanMigration Committee (Melbourne, 1951), 2, AJHS.

56 JCCFAS Newsletter, no. 15 (February 1951), Rothfield; Val Doube, 'Reply to League on Germanmigrants', Argus, 6 March 1951; Leslie Haylen, 'Adjournment', Commonwealth House of Represen-tatives Hansard (16 March 1951): 687.

57 Sam Cohen, 'Report of the Standing Committee', 6; Messages received for the Town Hall Meeting,21 November 1950, AJHS; Julius Stone, 'Mass German Immigration in Australia's Future',Australian Quarterly (June 1951): 20 -1 .

58 Green, 'Address', 13, AJHS.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


'on terms of mutual trust and close co-operation' in the campaign againstGerman migration.59 The minutes of the Joint Anti-German MigrationCommittee appear to confirm this. Sam Cohen chaired the Committee whichincluded Sam Goldbloom and Alick Mushin as representatives of the Council,and Ben Green, Les Cohen, and Alwyn Samuel as representatives of the VJBD.Approval was given by the Committee to various campaign activities such aspublic meetings, smaller forums, media initiatives, publication of pamphlets,and general lobbying. The minutes do not suggest any association of the AGMCwith broader left-wing political objectives or motivations. In fact on thecontrary, they document a concern to attract the widest possible support for thecampaign including that of Liberal Party branches. Nor is there any suggestionof conflict or division within the Committee.60 The ECAJ President Ben Greensubsequently commended the 'cooperation and energetic work of the JewishCouncil' in the campaign.61 In NSW, a range of prominent Jewish organisationsand individuals including former ECAJ Public Relations Chairman Bill Wolfen-sohn, the NSW Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen, Professor Julius Stoneand others played significant roles in the campaign. The NSW campaign wasconducted in a coordinated and cooperative manner with the broader ECAJcampaign.

The only public Jewish opposition came from the President of the VictorianAssociation of Jewish Ex-Servicemen (VAJEX), Newman Rosenthal. Known forhis extreme anti-communist views,62 Rosenthal initially moved a motion at theVictorian Jewish Board of Deputies opposing the speakers scheduled for thepublic protest meeting at the Melbourne Town Hall, and seeking a new panel ofspeakers. The motion was defeated by 39 votes to 2.63 Rosenthal then circulateda letter to both the RSL and the Immigration Minister dissociating VAJEX fromthe public protest meeting. The letter specifically condemned 'some of themethods' being used in the protest campaign, and 'several of the speakers'utilised in the Town Hall meeting.64 The RSL published the letter in their journal.Mufti, and used the material to suggest that opposition to German migration wasinspired by a combination of communists and 'a section of the Jewish commu-nity noted for its penchant for stirring up trouble between Jew and Gentile'.65

The Minister also used the document to imply that the Jewish community wasdivided on the issue.66 The document was vigorously condemned by both the

59 Sam Cohen, Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies Public Relations Committee Chairman's Report(Melbourne, 1950), 2, AJHS.

60 Minutes of Joint Anti-German Migration Committee, dated 11 October, 22 October, 3 November,24 November, and 27 November 1950; 23 February 1951. See also JCCFAS Executive CommitteeMeeting Minutes, 18 October 1950, Rothfield.

61 Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies Meeting Minutes, 16 April 1951, AJHS.62 Rechter, 46-51 .63 Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies Meeting Minutes, 1 November 1950, AJHS.64 Leibler, 'The Jewish Council', Appendix One.65 Mufti, December 1950, 23.66 Leibler, 'The Jewish Council', 11.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


VJBD and the ECAJ.67 Rosenthal's views were also repudiated by his ownorganisation, and he was forced to resign as president of VAJEX.68 Subsequently,the Australian Federation of Jewish Ex-Servicemen unanimously condemnedplans for German migration.

Some reference has also been made to the criticism of Maurice Ashkanasy,the former President of the ECAJ. It is true that Ashkanasy attacked the JewishCouncil in December 1950, claiming that the AGMC had fallen under the controlof Judah Waten and the communists.69 Ashkanasy demanded that the Anti-German Migration Committee be dissolved, and replaced by a new committeeunder direct Board control.70 However, it would appear that Ashkanasy wasopposed not to the public protest campaign per se, but rather to the dominantrole played by the Council. For example, he later seconded a motion proposedby Ben Green offering full support for the ECAJ campaign against Germanmigration.71

The government's reaction

Throughout the debate, the government's reaction to Jewish pressure wasaggressive and uncompromising. The Minister demonstrated little sensitivity to,and made no concessions to Jewish concerns. Instead, he insisted that thenational benefit must override emotive fears and prejudices.72 According toHarold Holt, large-scale German migration was necessary for economic anddefence purposes. Moreover, German migrants had a long history of successfulsettlement in Australia, and were well regarded by other western countries suchas the United States and Canada. In addition, Australia's acceptance of Europeanrefugees would contribute to international peace and goodwill, and the struggleagainst communism.73

The Immigration Minister employed several strategies in his attempt todiscredit the Jewish campaign. He argued that opponents of German migrationwere motivated by emotional and sectional concerns.74 He also emphasised that'only one organisation, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, had objectedin principle to German migration to Australia'.75 The Council responded stronglythat opposition to German migration came 'from a very wide section of the

6 7 Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies Resolution, 12 December 1950. See also Executive Council ofAustralian Jewry Press Release, 6 December 1950, AJHS.

6 8 Leibler, ' T h e Jewish Council', 81 .6 9 Mendes, 'The Cold War', 201. Waten was the paid secretary of the Council, and known for his

communist sympathies.7 0 'Ashkanasy Launches Public Relations Attack', Australian Jewish News, 22 December 1950.7 1 Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies Meeting Minutes, 7 February 1951, AJHS.7 2 Aarons, Sanctuary, 124.7 3 Harold Holt, 'letter to Maurice Ashkanasy', 17 October 1950, AJHS.7 4 Letter from Harold Holt to Maurice Ashkanasy, 17 October 1950, AJHS.7 5 Argus, 3 November 1950. See also Sauer, 430-1 .

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


Australian people'. Reference was made to the many ALP, church, university,New Australian, and trade union leaders who supported the protest campaign.76

The Minister also implied ominously that a campaign against German migrantsmight provoke a racist backlash against the Jewish population of Australia,77 athreat which was viewed with some concern given the existing attacks by theRSL and some Liberal MPs on post-war Jewish immigrants.78 Holt also tried tosuggest that the Jewish community was divided on the issue, and that left-wingor communist-influenced elements were spearheading the campaign. He calledon 'the more responsible members of the Jewish community' to condemn 'thetactics and language employed by some of those who claim to be representing theJewish viewpoint'.79 The ECAJ replied by affirming the unanimous support of allrepresentative Jewish bodies for the protest campaign, and the marginal status ofthose individuals who were opposed.80

How can we understand the government's hostile reaction to Jewishconcerns? One factor may have been resentment at the ALP's seemingly oppor-tunist abandonment of bipartisan support for mass immigration, particularlygiven Arthur Calwell's central role in the establishment of the immigrationprogram.81 Prime Minister Menzies commented ruefully during the 1951election campaign that the Labor Party had supported large-scale immigration'until Wednesday last'.82

The government was already having problems selling the immigrationprogram, and they may well have feared that Jewish opposition to Germanmigration would undermine public support for the whole program. This was notan unreasonable concern given that large-scale immigration was also plannedfrom Italy—another recent war enemy.

Holt was willing on at least one occasion to acknowledge that 'many of thevolksdeutsche are ultra-nationalist in their tendencies and their history showsthat they would be undesirable migrants'.83 However, he believed that thegovernment's screening system would ensure that 'only people whom we regardas suitable selections for Australia' would be permitted entry.84 Significantly,he argued that 'it is dangerous, and perhaps mischievous, to generalize onthose matters'.85 The Minister seemed genuinely surprised and angry that

7 6 Executive Council of Australian Jewry Press Release, 28 February 1951, AJHS.7 7 Ibid. See also letter from Harold Holt to Ben Green, 28 March 1951, AJHS; Aarons, Sanctuary,

126.7 8 Rodney Benjamin, A Serious Influx of Jews: A History of Jewish Welfare in Victoria (Sydney: Allen &

Unwin, 1998), 194-8; Blakeney, 300-4; Bernard Freedman, 'Voyage from hell to hope',Australian Jewish News, 19 November 1999.

7 9 Letter from Harold Holt to Ben Green, 18 January 1951, AJHS.8 0 Executive Council of Australian Jewry Press Release, 5 December 1950, AJHS.8 1 Leibler, 'The Jewish Council', 73; Aarons, Sanctuary, 126-7; Sauer, 436.8 2 '1951 RG Menzies', in Party Strategy and Change, eds Ian McAllister and Rhonda Moore (Melbourne:

Longman Cheshire, 1991), 176.8 3 Harold Holt, 'Immigration', Commonwealth House of Representatives Hansard (24 October 1950):

1235.8 4 Ibid., 1236.8 5 Ibid., 1235.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14

88 Australian Historical Studies. 119,2002

representatives of one ethnic minority bolstered by significant recent imm-igration—the Jews—would attack another potential immigrant group, and thatdespite their own experience of persecution, they would be sufficiently intolerantto oppose all Germans on supposedly racial grounds.86 It was probably notcoincidental that Prime Minister Menzies bracketed Jewish and Germanimmigrants together when he called on Australians to display tolerance to newsettlers.87 Menzies' striking insensitivity to the tragic context of recent Jewish-German relations reflects a general Australian rejection of the relevance ofmigrants' historical experience to life in their new home.

Why the public campaign was stopped

Following the Liberal Party's federal election victory of April 1951, the ECAJdecided after considerable discussion not to resume the public protest campaign.It was believed that the campaign had largely achieved its objectives of placingGerman migration on the political agenda, and influencing public opinion.88

Whilst the government refused to rescind the overall German migration program,it had in practice reduced the numbers from the original proposal of 25,000 peryear to approximately 5,000. Whilst other variables such as the increased rate ofunemployment may have influenced this decision, the ECAJ campaign doesappear to have played an important part.89 Eventually, over 50,000 Germanswould arrive over a seven year period from 1952-1959.90

The Jewish community faced a number of serious obstacles in demandingfurther concessions from the government. The German migration plan wassupported by a number of powerful organisations including the RSL and much ofthe mainstream media.91 The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) wasalso at best neutral, given its participation in the Immigration Advisory Councilwhich had endorsed government policy. In addition, there was no certainty thata future federal ALP government would pursue a fundamentally differentpolicy.92 To be sure, the ALP entered the 1951 federal election campaign with anexplicit criticism of government immigration policies pertaining to both numbersand countries of origin.93

However, a number of events during and following the campaign served todamage the Jewish community's relationship with the ALP in Victoria.

8 6 Rutland and Caplan, 57; Sauer, 430.8 7 Lack and Templeton, 43.8 8 Ben Green, President's Report to Executive Council of Australian Jewry Annual Conference (June 1952),

14, AJHS.8 9 Ibid.9 0 Aarons, Sanctuary, 122.9 1 Rutland and Caplan, 57. See, for example, Sydney Morning Herald Editorial, 12 February 1951;

West Australian Editorial, 28 February 1951.9 2 Green, 'President's Report', 11, AJHS.9 3 See Ben Chifley's March 1951 policy speech, 'JB Chifley 1951' in McAllister and Moore, 42.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


Firstly, the Jewish Council Vice-President Sam Goldbloom stood as anIndependent Labour candidate against the endorsed ALP candidate in the FederalSeat of Isaacs. Goldbloom's platform was one of opposition to German migrationand war hysteria. According to the ECAJ President Ben Green, Goldbloom'sunexpected candidature caused considerable embarrassment in that the Jewishcommunity was perceived to be taking sides during an election campaign.94

The Jewish Council was shortly afterwards subjected to a ban by theVictorian ALP, which at that time was strongly influenced by hardline anti-communists such as Frank McManus. The ban related specifically to the JewishCouncil's petition against German migration. The directive from the ALP stated:'That in view of the fact that the Jewish Council used the names of Labor leaderson a petition without the authority of the individuals or the Labor Party, and thatsuch petition had been circularized to members of Parliament and ALP brancheswithout the authority of the Central Executive, branches are informed thatbefore representatives of the Jewish Council can address ALP Branches per-mission must be received from the Central Executive'.95 It has been suggestedthat Maurice Ashkanasy, who was on friendly terms with the right-wingVictorian ALP Central Executive, engineered the ban as part of his campaign toreduce the.Council's influence in the Jewish community.96 Regardless of theprecipitating cause, the ban suggests that the Victorian ALP was unlikely tocooperate further with a public campaign against German migration.

Political divisions within Victorian Jewry almost certainly diminished thepossibility of any further successful campaign. The AGMC coincided with aserious 'narrowing of the definitions of acceptable Jewish political behaviour'.97

Increasingly, Jewish communal leaders influenced by the McCarthyism of theperiod were concerned to avoid any popular identification of Jews with commu-nism.98 Jewish anti-communism was particularly fuelled by the detailed reportsof Stalinist anti-Semitism which began to emerge in the middle of 1951." Anti-communists charged that the Jewish Council was committed to broader left-wingpolitical objectives beyond specific Jewish concerns. They accused the Council ofusing the AGMC to promote communist or Soviet views of West Germany andthe Cold War. 10° Although the Council's leadership of the AGMC led to a temp-orary increase in its popularity, these attacks gradually took their toll. TheCouncil's refusal to recognise the increasing evidence of anti-Semitism in theSoviet Bloc also undermined its credibility, and eroded its support within

9 4 Ben Green, 'President's Report' in Executive Council of Australian Jewry Annual Report 1951, 13-14.9 5 Australian Jewish Herald, 23 November 1951; The Observer, 9 July 1960.9 6 Rechter, 147; Rothfield, Many Paths to Peace, 39.9 7 Rechter, 116.9 8 Mendes, 'The Cold War', 200-3.9 9 Philip Mendes, 'The Melbourne Jewish Left, Communism and the Cold War: A Comparison of

Responses to Stalinist Anti-Semitism and the Rosenberg Spy Trial', Unpublished Paper, MonashUniversity, 2001.

1 0 0 Leibler, The Jewish Council', 77-8; Rechter, 'Beyond the Pale', 139-41.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


the mainstream Jewish community. In June 1951 a new VJBD Public RelationsCommittee was elected devoid of Jewish Council representatives, and terminatedthe existing Joint Committee on anti-German Migration. As a result, SamCohen—the coordinator of the AGMC—resigned as PRC Chairman.101 Althoughthe new PRC committed itself to a continuing campaign against Germanmigration, in practice little was done.

It should also be noted that the Minister does appear to have directly threat-ened the Jewish community with political reprisals. According to a number ofsources, notably Mark Aarons, Harold Holt privately threatened both to block thetransfer of Jewish donations to Israel, and to prevent further Jewish migrationunless the protest campaign was called off.102 However, Aarons is almostcertainly wrong to argue that Holt blackmailed the Jewish community to endtheir campaign in 1953, as the ECAJ had already suspended the public lobbyingactivities in April 1951. It is far more likely that these threats occurred in late1950 or early 1951 when Holt was severely embarrassed by the campaign.103

Continued Jewish opposition to German migration

The ECAJ did not cease entirely the campaign against German migration, butelected to continue it in a less public and confrontational form. A decision wastaken by the 1951 ECAJ Conference to implement a range of educational activi-ties, and to continue to lobby the Minister and other members of Parliament.104

Following discussions with leading Jewish figures overseas, the ECAJ Presi-dent Ben Green subsequently concluded that some form of German immigrationappeared inevitable. He argued that the Jewish community should, therefore,concentrate its efforts on 'restricting the number and policing the type ofGermans entering, rather than continuing an uncompromising public oppositionwhich might have dangerous repercussions on the welfare of our community,without any compensating gain'.105 Green's statement suggests an increasingJewish accommodation to Cold War realities, including particularly the rearma-ment of Western Germany as a vital component of the Western alliance.106 Hisstatement also suggests continuing pressure from the Liberal government to ceasepublic criticism.

In addition, Australian Jewish attitudes were increasingly influenced byIsraeli negotiations with West Germany over a reparations agreement. As early

101 'Mr Sam Cohen criticises Board Executive', Australian Jewish News, 20 July 1951.102 Aarons, Sanctuary, 150; Aarons, War Criminals Welcome, 285; Rothfield, Many Paths to Peace, 38.103 See review of War Criminals Welcome by Philip Mendes in Australian Jewish News, 13 July 2001,

and reply by Mark Aarons, 20 July 2001.104 Executive Council of Australian Jewry Annual Conference Resolution, June 1951. See also Executive

Council of Australian Jewry Half-Year Conference Minutes, 9 February 1952, AJHS.105 Green, 'President's Half-Yearly Report to Executive Council of Australian Jewry' (February

1952), 5, AJHS.106 The presence of numerous displaced ethnic Germans in Europe was viewed as a potential

barrier to that objective. Ibid., 3, AJHS. See also Aarons, Sanctuary, 115-18.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14


as April 1951, Israeli officials met with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to discusspossible German compensation for victims of the Holocaust. In December 1951,Adenauer formally announced German willingness to negotiate an agreement,and a final settlement was reached in September 1952.107 Once Israel movedtowards reconciliation with West Germany, it was almost inevitable thatAustralian Jewry would follow suit.

The Jewish Council did not accept this pragmatic approach, and continued topublicly campaign against German migration. In August 1951 it launched apublic petition against the mass migration of Germans which was signed by over3,200 people including a number of leading ALP members of parliament.108

However, the Council's activities on this issue became entangled within a broaderleft-wing campaign against German and Japanese rearmament.109 This clashedwith the political direction of the mainstream Jewish community, increasinglyconcerned at the heightof the Cold War to distance itself from communist andSoviet sympathies. The Council finally was expelled from the Victorian JewishBoard of Deputies in July 1952 as a result of its refusal to halt a public protestagainst the new West German Ambassador.110

Sam Cohen remained as Public Relations Chairman until the middle of1952, although his authority was gradually eroded by the Council's increasing'marginalisation. Nevertheless, Cohen remained a popular figure in the Jewishcommunity, and probably would have retained a key position in the Jewishpeak ruling bodies if not for his continued association with the Council. Cohenlater became President of the Jewish Council, and used that body's close linkswith the Left-dominated Victorian ALP to win preselection for the FederalSenate. 1 H

Conclusion

With hindsight, the anti-German Migration Campaign may seem to have beenmuch ado about nothing. The Liberal government's German migration programdid not lead to the entry of large numbers of committed Nazis or racists, and doesnot seem to have produced any significant increase in anti-Semitism.

However, this analysis ignores the political and historical context of theperiod. Only five years after the Holocaust, Australian Jews understandably

107 Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Hill & Wang, 1993),189-252.

108 'Petition Against Mass German Migration', Australian Jewish News, 17 August 1951; JCCFASExecutive Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 August & 19 August 1952, Rothfield.

109 See 'Professor Ball warns on Germany, Japan', Australian Jewish News, 16 March 1951; 'TheMenace of German Re-Armament, Immigration', Australian Jewish News, 27 July 1951; 'Anti-Nazi Rally Denounces Intimidation', Australian Jewish News, 4 July 1952. See also Leibler, 'TheJewish Council', 77-8; Mendes, 'The Jewish Council', 538; The Clarion, March 1952.

110 JCCFAS Annual Report, 1952-53, AJHS.111 Philip Mendes, 'The Senator Sam Cohen Affair: Soviet Anti-Semitism, the ALP and the 1961

Federal Election', Labour History, no. 78 (May 2000): 179-97.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14

9 2 Australian Historical Studies, 119,2002

feared that German migrants would continue to be influenced by Nazi ideologyand racism, and could potentially contaminate other Australians with theirprejudices. Moreover, the Australian government made little or no attempt torespond to these concerns. Some form of Jewish opposition to the migration planwas inevitable. The campaign that developed was significant in that this was thefirst time Australian Jewry had engaged in a politically divisive public protestcampaign. The AGMC can in fact be viewed as the forerunner of the later andequally controversial 1962 Jewish campaign against Soviet anti-Semitism.112

Both campaigns involved Australian Jewry in politically partisan campaignsvigorously opposed by one of the major political parties. Both also provokedsome division within the Jewish community. However, the later Soviet Jewrycampaign arguably enjoyed greater success because it was running with ratherthan against the dominant anti-communist political agenda of the day, andenjoyed the support of the government.113

Monash University

112 Mendes, 'The Senator Sam Cohen Affair'.113 Ibid., 192.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ein

dhov

en T

echn

ical

Uni

vers

ity]

at 1

6:27

21

Nov

embe

r 20

14