Landowner Enfranchisement to
Promote Habitat Stewardship and
Access Agreements on Private Land in
British Columbia
Prepared for:
The Stewardship Incentives Steering Committee:
Nancy South (MOE)
Mike Badry (MOE)
Terry Dever (MAL)
Prepared by:
Jeff Morgan
Incentives Economist
Ministry of Environment
Fish and Wildlife Branch
August 22, 2005
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft i
Executive Summary
In British Columbia, acceptable environmental practices and standards are established by
a host of statutes, regulations and bylaws and through the application of common law.
Yet only the Species at Risk Act (SARA) addresses the comprehensive protection of
wildlife habitats on private land. Comprehensive habitat protection on private land is not
legislated for wildlife species that are relatively abundant, even if they are highly valued
by society.
Thankfully, a variety of voluntary programs can be used to provide incentives for
stewardship on private land. Seven general incentive strategies are used in BC, including
stewardship agreements, subsidies, property acquisitions, compensation programs, cost
share programs, certification programs and lease agreement systems. These strategies
offer flexibility and precision (i.e. they can address particular issues or areas of concern),
are voluntary and can achieve environmental outcomes without disadvantaging
landowners.
Enfranchisement programs, not yet in use in BC, engender tripartite partnerships
involving government, landowners and users. Landowners provide stewardship and/or
public access concessions and receive payments (or privileges) in return for these
services. The government maintains policies and programs that enable landowners to
market wildlife-oriented recreation. Finally, recreationists pay landowners for services
rendered through government programs that operate on a ‘user-pay’ basis. All parties
participate in objective setting, implementation and monitoring processes. While
enfranchisement programs generate revenues through the marketing of wildlife viewing
or hunting opportunities, government surrenders no rights, pays no subsidies and
maintains its licensing and enforcement functions. All participants play a role in the
management of wildlife, or their habitats, and are held accountable by contractual
landowner agreements which clearly articulate benefits and responsibilities. Broad
societal interests in enfranchisement programs are protected through the involvement of
government and public advisory bodies.
Enfranchisement programs allow the public and private sectors to organize and
harmonise their objectives (social, economic and ecological), roles and responsibilities.
In essence, society becomes the lessee and its citizens form a broad collective with rules
common to all. For these reasons, landowner enfranchisement can be implemented in a
manner that greatly enhances the North American Model for Wildlife Conservation.
Landowner enfranchisement provides government with an opportunity to develop and
implement wildlife policy that recognises the interests of private landowners and the
wildlife sector. By engendering a cooperative approach to objective setting processes,
government can gain influence in the agricultural setting and garner the support of sector.
This can happen if government is prepared to recognise and tangibly reward landowners
for the stewardship they provide.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft ii
As their uptake is voluntary, enfranchisement programs must provide landowners with
financial alternatives that are more profitable than conventional alternatives. Workloads,
liability insurance and risks to livestock and property must be accounted for and
landowner opportunity costs must be understood.
Three broad enfranchisement programs are recommended:
1. A Depredation Program is recommended to address ungulate crop depredation issues
and to manage public access on private land. Participating landowners would be
obligated to tolerate specified crop loss levels and to provide access to hunters in
exchange for monetary incentives.
2. A Stewardship Program is recommended to promote landscape level ecological
planning and stewardship and establish public access opportunities on private land.
Participating landowners would be obligated to participate in the development and
execution of a habitat plan and to provide access to hunters in exchange for monetary
incentives. This program would be most appropriate in areas where highly desirable big
game species (e.g. bighorn sheep) could be used to generate revenues.
3. An expanded provincial Wildlife Viewing Program is recommended to promote
cooperative landowner, government and NGO commercial wildlife viewing ventures. In
return for cost-sharing infrastructure and marketing, government would gain
environmental concessions from landowners, promote economic development and
showcase BC’s commitment to the environment.
Enfranchisement programs rely on user-pay models that minimise government
expenditures. Beyond positive public access and stewardship outcomes, landowner
enfranchisement has the potential to increase regional economic opportunities and
generate government revenue through the sale of licences, LEH applications and through
royalties.
All potential programs should employ pilot projects as developmental vanguards. They
would provide the learning and consultation opportunities necessary to develop
relationships and efficient programs. Working groups would develop products and test
assumptions in a ‘real world’ environment in order to evaluate the feasibility of various
enfranchisement options.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft iii
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ I
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ III
1. INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND SCOPE ............................................. 1
1.1. Landowner Enfranchisement and the North American Model for Wildlife Conservation ..... 2
2. ENVIRONMENTAL INCENTIVE PROGRAM ECONOMICS ........................ 3
3. THE BRITISH COLUMBIA SETTING ................................................................ 5
3.1. The Environment ............................................................................................................................ 5
3.2. Wildlife Legislation and Property Rights ..................................................................................... 5
3.3. Private Land Stewardship Strategies in BC ................................................................................. 7
4. ENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF VARIOUS SECTORS AND
FIRST NATIONS .............................................................................................................. 7
4.1. The Agriculture Sector ................................................................................................................... 7
4.2. Conservation Organizations .......................................................................................................... 9
4.3. The Hunting Sector ...................................................................................................................... 10
4.4. First Nations .................................................................................................................................. 11
4.5. Government ................................................................................................................................... 11
5. THE UTILITY OF LANDOWNER ENFRANCHISEMENT IN BC ................ 12
5.1. A Need for Healthy Partnerships ................................................................................................ 12
5.2. Recommended Hunting Enfranchisement Programs and Revenue Models for BC ............... 14 5.2.1. A Depredation Program ................................................................................................................... 14 5.2.2. A Stewardship Program ................................................................................................................... 14 5.2.3. Revenue Models .............................................................................................................................. 15
5.3. A Public/Private Wildlife Viewing Partnership for BC ............................................................ 17 5.3.1. The Existing Wildlife Watch Program ............................................................................................. 17 5.3.2. An Expansion of the Wildlife Watch Program to Include Private Land .......................................... 18 5.3.3. Wildlife Viewing in the Context of BC’s Tourism Strategies ......................................................... 20
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft iv
6. NEXT STEPS: PILOT PROCESSES ................................................................... 21
7. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 22
8. REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 23
APPENDIX 1: LEASE ARRANGEMENTS AND PRESERVE HUNTING
EVALUATED AGAINST THE NORTH AMERICAN MODEL FOR WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION .......................................................................................................... 25
APPENDIX 3: A REVIEW PRIVATE LAND STEWARDSHIP PROGRAMS AND
STRATEGIES IN BC ..................................................................................................... 27
APPENDIX 3: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WILDLIFE OUTSIDE OF BC AND A
DESCRIPTION OF SOME ENFRANCHISEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
STATES ........................................................................................................................... 37
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 1
1. Introduction, Background and Scope
Democracies invariably strive to balance the protection of individual property rights with
the protection of “the commons”. When private property coexists with publicly owned
and spatially dynamic natural resources, such as water and wildlife, statutes and common
law are often used to define property rights and establish environmental standards. Not
surprisingly, environmental legislation can create animosity, diminish co-operation and
be expensive to enforce. Further, the standards they establish are minimums and are
usually consistent with broad societal expectations only.
Thankfully, a variety of voluntary programs can be used to provide incentives for
stewardship on private land. Seven general incentive strategies are used in BC, including
stewardship agreements, subsidies, property acquisitions, compensation programs, cost
share programs, certification programs and lease agreement systems. These strategies
offer flexibility and precision (i.e. they can address particular issues or areas of concern),
are voluntary and can achieve environmental outcomes without disadvantaging
landowners.
Enfranchisement programs, not yet in use in BC, engender tripartite partnerships
involving government, landowners and users. Landowners provide stewardship and/or
public access concessions and receive payments (or privileges) in return for these
services. The government maintains policies and programs that enable landowners to
market wildlife-oriented recreation. Finally, recreationists pay landowners for services
rendered through government programs that operate on a ‘user-pay’ basis. All parties
participate in objective setting, implementation and monitoring processes. While
enfranchisement programs generate revenues through the marketing of wildlife viewing
or hunting opportunities, government surrenders no rights, pays no subsidies and
maintains its licensing and enforcement functions. All participants play a role in the
management of wildlife, or their habitats, and are held accountable by contractual
landowner agreements which clearly articulate benefits and responsibilities. Broad
societal interests in enfranchisement programs are protected through the involvement of
government and public advisory bodies.
Enfranchisement programs are an official approach that the public and private sectors can
use to organize their objectives, roles and responsibilities (Benson et al. 1999). They
enable government, user groups, and landowners to create and harmonise social,
economic and ecological objectives for private lands. In essence, society becomes the
lessee and its citizens form a broad collective with rules common to all.
Landowner enfranchisement programs are distinctly different from other types of
incentive programs because they generate self-sustaining revenues based on the quantity
and quality of environmental services rendered. These systems augment traditional
business opportunities and they do not rely on external funding commitments.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 2
This report explores the potential for enfranchisement programs to encourage ecological
stewardship on private land in BC.
This report is intended to:
review and summarize policy, legislation, land use practices, and stakeholder
expectations within BC,
evaluate the applicability of landowner enfranchisement within the BC context , and
recommend the pursuit and development of promising landowner enfranchisement
programs for BC.
The term ‘environmental stewardship’ will be used throughout this report to describe
activities that are intended to maintain or recover naturally functioning ecosystems. For
the purposes of this report, stewardship occurs when; 1) a practice maintains a natural
ecological state, 2) a practice shifts processes or ecosystems toward a natural state, or 3) a
practice allows a natural state to be emulated.
1.1. Landowner Enfranchisement and the North American Model for Wildlife
Conservation
Landowner enfranchisement programs are highly varied however, they can be readily
compatible with the principles of the North American Model for Wildlife Conservation,
as described by Geist (2005 and 1995). This distinctly North American model for the
ownership and governance of wildlife is based on the following principles: 1) public
ownership of wildlife, 2) the elimination of markets for dead wildlife, 3) the allocation of
wildlife by law, 4) the killing of wildlife for legitimate purposes, 5) the recognition of
wildlife as an international resource, 6) scientifically based management decisions and 7)
the democracy of hunting opportunities. Through careful design, enfranchisement
programs can be consistent with all of the above principles and, as discussed below,
greatly bolster five of them.
The first principle, wildlife as a public trust resource, can be bolstered by
enfranchisement programs that acknowledge and affirm that wildlife ownership is
vested in government. Participating landowners are required to provide public
access to wildlife were it would not be assured otherwise. In effect, the wildlife is
repatriated and the public is able to enjoy enhanced recreational opportunities.
The third principle, the allocation of wildlife by law, can be bolstered by
enfranchisement programs if they acknowledge the public ownership of wildlife
and create opportunities for all members of society (in good standing) to legally
harvest wildlife on private lands. Such programs would be clearly articulated,
transparent, enforceable and responsive to a system of public oversight.
The fifth principle, wildlife as an international resource, can be bolstered by
enfranchisement programs that invite society to participate in the development of
economic, ecological and social objectives for private land. This allows
governments and society to manage internationally significant wildlife while
addressing important economic and social issues.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 3
The sixth principle, science is the proper tool for discharge of wildlife policy, may
be bolstered by enfranchisement programs that establish scientifically based
objectives within adaptive and risk management frameworks that are designed to
promote economic and environmental sustainability. These systems rely on the
scientific and technical expertise of many disciplines to inform the objective
setting, field practices and monitoring phases of the habitat management cycle.
The seventh principle, the democracy if hunting, may be bolstered by
enfranchisement programs that bring wildlife and wildlife habitat on private land
under the influence of the governments. Citizens are able use of wildlife on
private land and, perhaps more importantly, they are able to participate in the
establishment of objectives and the execution of plans.
It must be recognised that, in the absence of enfranchisement programs, or other powerful
incentive programs, the BC public cannot freely recreate on private lands or participate in
the development of habitat objectives for private land. Landowner enfranchisement is a
process that creates recreation opportunities for the public on private lands and enables
government, user groups and the public to participate in the development of wildlife and
habitat objectives for private lands in exchange for time-bound landowner privileges. For
these reasons, landowner enfranchisement can be implemented in a manner that greatly
enhances the North American Model for Wildlife Conservation.
Despite their superficial similarities, lease arrangements and enfranchisement programs
are not alike. Lease arrangements are simple agreements between users and landowners
that enable the lessee to enjoy exclusive, or semi-exclusive, recreational opportunities on
private land. While private financial arrangements can motivate stewardship, these
agreements do not usually involve government or society and, as such, they do not allow
government to pursue important social, economic and ecological goals. Accordingly,
lease arrangements are contrary to many of the principles embodied by the North
American Model for Wildlife Conservation. For a more detailed discussion on this issue,
please refer to Appendix 1.
2. Environmental Incentive Program Economics
Environmental incentive programs reconcile landowner and societal interests in private
land management activities and outcomes. The public has interests in ecological services
and commodities that can be influenced by land uses and practices. Thus, incentive
programs address broad consumer-product relationships in the context of existing
property rights and provide inducements that promote specific land use practices.
Land ownership imparts and implies a specific set of property rights within social and
legal systems at various levels of governance. Rights in natural resources, such as water
or wildlife, are not usually tied to land ownership, thus, many resources with a variety of
owners (including the Crown) can coexist in time and space.
Property rights are redefined when governments create laws that regulate land use
practices on private land. Legislation, such as the provincial Water Act and the federal
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 4
Fisheries Act, serves to define the property rights and liabilities of landowners,
governments and citizens. One can ask “why are incentive programs an attractive
alternative to the restructuring of property rights through environmental legislation?” A
variety of factors influence the appeal of incentive programs. Governments may not
favour increased regulation for social, economic and political reasons or because of
administration and enforcement costs. Similar outcomes, with fewer negative
consequences, can sometimes be accomplished with incentive programs. Further,
incentive programs are flexible, discretionary and adaptive to changing circumstances.
Incentive programs can also be used to facilitate an orderly transition toward new
legal/property rights regimes by offsetting imposed costs.
As previously stated, a primary purpose of voluntary incentive programs is to make the
implementation of environmentally favourable practices more appealing to landowners.
This is achieved by reducing costs or increasing the returns associated with
environmentally favourable land-use practices. Costs can be divided into two general
categories; observed costs and opportunity costs.
Observed costs include the start-up capital costs that can impede transitions toward
environmentally favourable practices. Operational costs (often labour) and
administrative costs are other observed costs that can be increased by heightened
environmental expectations. Observed costs also include losses, such as property damage
and crop depredation, and elevated insurance costs.
Opportunity costs exist when the potential returns generated by a foregone financial
alternative are greater than the actual returns generated by the alternative selected.
Landowners bear opportunity costs when, willingly or unwillingly, they forgo
development or engage in less profitable practices. Opportunity costs can be temporary
or permanent. When land use decisions are long term, landowner’s may experience an
opportunity cost known as an ‘options value’ cost. This occurs when the landowner loses
his/her flexibility to exploit future financial opportunities.
Incentive programs can induce landowners to voluntarily elevate environmental standards
or outcomes by providing them with additional revenues, or by reducing costs (e.g.
taxes). Such programs must recognise all costs and ensure that the profit margins
associated with the favoured practice are attractive. In the absence of compelling social
or legal motivators, incentive program profit margins must be greater that those generated
by realistic alternatives. If not, the voluntary uptake of the program will be low.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 5
3. The British Columbia Setting
3.1. The Environment
BC possesses tremendous biological diversity and wildlife values. While residents and
tourists alike cherish the province’s natural beauty, human activities often conflict with
ecological values. Ironically, the same physiographic and climatic factors that bless the
province also contribute to its resource management challenges. While only five percent
of the BC land base is privately owned, the province has not been settled evenly. Human
development is concentrated in hospitable valley bottoms, along coastlines or on arable
plateaus. As a result, rare and biologically rich habitats have been disproportionately
impacted.
Runka and Gale (2004) indicate that grasslands comprise approximately 1% of the
provincial land base. Of this, 40% is privately owned and much of the remainder is
tenured for a variety of land uses. More importantly, over 30% of the province’s
threatened and endangered species are associated with grassland ecosystems (Runka and
Gale 2004). Agriculture and domestic grazing are among the top seven threats to red
listed animals in BC (Anon. 2002).
Private land use also profoundly influences on the habitats of important recreational
wildlife species. It is conservatively estimated that at least 50% of the capable mule deer
winter range habitat in the Okanagan Timber Supply Area falls on private land (pers.
obs). The pattern recurs for elk, mule deer, white-tailed deer, and bighorn sheep habitats
in many parts of the province.
Significant improvements in environmental management may be gained by emphasizing
private land stewardship. While most of BC is Crown land, the private portion contains
habitats that are diverse and highly valuable to recreational species and to the majority of
the province’s species at risk. Programs that promote private land stewardship should
become management cornerstones that compliment existing provincial and federal policy
and legislation.
3.2. Wildlife Legislation and Property Rights
Provincial jurisdiction over wildlife, though not specifically addressed, is understood to
have been vested in the provinces by the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly entitled the
British North America Act) which, with some exceptions, gave the provinces control and
ownership of Crown lands (Donihee 2000). Though ostensibly owned by the sovereign,
wildlife ownership became vested in the provincial government unless transferred in
accordance with legislation.
Today, British Columbia’s Wildlife Act asserts provincial ownership of wildlife in
Section 2 where it states:
2 (1) Ownership in all wildlife in British Columbia is vested in the government.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 6
In 1916, the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United
States of America was entered into. Subsequent legislation, the Migratory Birds
Convention Act 1994, brought migratory birds and their nests under federal authority.
Here again Crown ownership is established but it is vested in the federal government.
Individual rights to hunt wildlife, under provincial or federal authority, are established
through licences which are issued by those governments. Possession and ownership of
wildlife is then established through lawful capture. Most importantly, the right to hunt or
to possess wildlife is not tied to land ownership.
Landowners cannot grant hunting rights per se, however, the Trespass Act and common
law enable landowners to deny public access onto their land holdings. Further, British
Columbia’s Wildlife Act requires hunters to receive permission from landowners or
lessees before hunting over cultivated land or on Crown land that is subject to a grazing
lease while the land is occupied by livestock. Landowners may elect to benefit by leasing
access rights to individuals or groups.
While ownership rests with government, Section 5 of the Wildlife Act also asserts that the
province is not liable for death, personal injury or property damage caused by wildlife.
Thus landowners can find themselves in the position of having to accept losses to wildlife
without an offsetting obligation on the part of the Province to provide compensation.
In BC, acceptable environmental practices are established and enforced by a host of
statutes, regulations and bylaws and through the application of common law. However,
only the Species at Risk Act (SARA) addresses the comprehensive protection of wildlife
habitat on private lands.
The Species at Risk Act (SARA) contains provisions relating to the protection of the
residences or critical habitats of threatened or endangered species. Sections 58 and 61 of
SARA prohibit any person from destroying any part of the critical habitat of a listed
threatened or endangered species-even when this habitat is on private land. Section 61
addresses the protection of critical habitat for species that are not migratory birds or
aquatic or that do not reside on federal lands through an order by the Governor in
Council. Accordingly, this section is referred to as the “safety net” because here, SARA
raises the possibility of federal incursions into provincial jurisdiction. Thus, private land
habitats of species of risk may be protected by an uncertain SARA process.
The provincial Agriculture Land Commissions Act does not relate directly to the
management of wildlife habitat however, it has profound implications for wildlife habitat.
Under this act, the Commission has the authority to designate agricultural land and
establish it as an agricultural land reserve. The commission defines and authorizes
acceptable farm practices within the reserve and it must authorize subdivision of the
parcels or the creation of covenants within the reserve.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 7
British Columbia’s Assessment Act is another provincial statute that can have profound
implications for the environment. This act and its regulations identify various
agricultural activities that allow land to receive ‘farm class’ status. Lands not committed
to “primary agriculture production” are classed as “residential” and higher tax rates are
then applied by local governments. While incentives for primary agriculture are
established, disincentives for ecological entrepreneurialism and preservation of ecological
values may be the corollary. As a practical matter however, it is unlikely that
stewardship actions would cause a change in land classification unless it precluded
primary agriculture activities from significant portions of a parcel.
3.3. Private Land Stewardship Strategies in BC
British Columbia has a compliment of government and ENGO stewardship programs that
is similar to that of other ‘Western’ democracies. These programs employ a variety of
stewardship strategies including stewardship agreements (including conservation
covenants), subsidies, property acquisition or leasing, compensation, cost share,
certification and access leases. Often these strategies meld and coexist within programs
and distinctions blur. For a description of many BC incentive programs please refer to
Appendix 2.
Cost share, subsidy and compensation strategies provide direct financial incentives or
compensation to landowners for stewardship concessions. These strategies rely on
external funding and are distinctly different than enfranchisement programs which
generate self-sustaining revenues. Access leasing can also generate direct and self-
sustaining revenues however, these arrangements are exclusive and do not invite the
public to participate in the establishment of objectives for the private land base.
4. Enfranchisement in the Context of Various Sectors and First Nations
4.1. The Agriculture Sector
Approximately 5% of British Columbian land base falls within the agricultural land
reserve and most of it is privately owned. Agricultural lands are concentrated in valley
bottoms and proximal to major waterways and wildlife movement corridors. This pattern
of development has disproportionately impacted habitats that are naturally scarce and
ecologically valuable. Over the last three decades societies environmental expectations
have increased and conservation has been achieved through legislation and stewardship
initiatives. Federal and provincial governments have signed national (Accord for the
Protection of Species at Risk) and international (Convention on Biological Diversity)
agreements and created new legislation (SARA). While the mechanics of legislation,
such as SARA, remain uncertain, it is clear that society and its governments are placing
increased pressure on landowners to co-operate in conservation.
Economic circumstances for many BC producers have also changed dramatically in
recent years. Bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE) or the ‘mad cow crisis’ prompted
the US to close it border to Canadian beef from 2003 to 2005. Cattle prices dropped and
Statistics Canada and Agriculture and Agrifood Canada report that between 2002 and
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 8
2004 cash receipts within BC’s Cattle and Calf Commodity Group declined by 42%. The
circumstance has highlighted the need for BC cattlemen to diversify and reduce their
reliance on US markets and processing facilities. The industry can be expected to take a
dim view programs that reduce profits further, however, it will look favourably upon
stable stewardship programs that are structured to increase profits and enable
diversification. Paradoxically, the circumstance has created a niche for well thought out
environmental stewardship programs.
Dramatic ecological changes have also occurred in BC over the last decade. A recent
series of mild winters coupled with relatively conservative harvest regulations have
resulted in ungulate population increases. Serious wild ungulate crop depredation issues
now occur in all agricultural areas of the province including Vancouver Island, the Fraser
Valley, the Okanagan Valley, the Boundary Area, the Bulkley Valley and the Cariboo
and Peace regions. Waterfowl impacts have also increased in many areas of the province.
Reductions in agricultural productivity have highlighted a clash in sector and agency
objectives. The current conflict calls for a system that reconciles and harmonises the
objectives various sectors and, to the extent possible, mitigates conflict.
As stated previously, most wildlife species do not enjoy significant legal habitat
protection in BC. Thus, producers can resolve problem wildlife issues by simply
removing habitat or excluding wildlife from it. Producers can elect to seek compensation
from government or they can lobby for aggressive wildlife harvest rates.
The East Kootenay “homesteader” or resident elk dilemma serves to illustrate the
problem. The number of elk that occupy lower elevation habitats on year-round basis has
increased and individual losses to hay crops can exceed 30% (Zbeetnoff and McTavish
2004). In response, the agriculture sector has sought compensation or attempted to
mitigate or prevent depredation through a government cost share program. After
exploring reasonable alternatives, many producers resorted to the installation of game
proof fences. Over 11,000 acres of land, much of it classed as prime elk winter and
spring range, have been fenced off and the figure is projected to double in the next few
years (Zbeetnoff and McTavish 2004). Thus, elk and deer have been excluded from high
value habitats on private land and they face movement barriers. East Kootenay Producers
have also lobbied for aggressive, herd-reducing harvest strategies and government has
responded by increasing the antlerless elk authorizations administered through the
Limited Entry Hunt (LEH) system. Producers would welcome smaller resident elk
populations, however, this is likely to conflict with hunting sector objectives.
In an assessment of 12 ranches in the Caribou in 2003, the estimated value of hay lost to
mule deer was in excess of $388, 000.00 (Peter Fofonoff pers. com.). Average losses
exceeded $32, 000.00 per ranch. Government has responded with antlerless mule deer
LEH hunts but the ranching community maintains that the population is not in decline.
Similar problems with mule deer, white-tailed deer and elk occur in the Peace region
where hay and grain producers report serious depredation problems. In addition to
depredation, grain growers report decreased product value due to fecal contamination.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 9
Producers throughout the province now complain that losses due to wildlife threaten the
viability of their businesses and they identify a policy bind that leaves them without
options. The Agriculture Land Commissions Act and the Assessment Act compel many
landowners to farm. At the same time, wildlife agencies often manage toward large
wildlife populations without commensurate obligations, as affirmed by the Wildlife Act,
to compensate landowners for property damage caused by wildlife. In essence, society
forces landowners within the ALR to farm while pursuing other objectives that reduce
agricultural profits. Where the protection of the commons involves a resource that is
essential, such contradictions may be necessary. However, agriculturalists point out that
1) hunting in BC is primarily a recreational pursuit, 2) it is enjoyed by a relatively small
percentage of the BC population, and 3) the demand for hunting opportunities can be met
on the Crown land base.
If frustrated by depressed markets and an unfavourable policy environment, landowners
are sometimes able to divest themselves of their holdings. The bovine spongiform
encephalitis (BSE) problem began in 2003. Runka and Gale (2004) report that the
number of exclusion applications to the Agriculture Land Reserve (ALR) Commission
increased by 27% between 2003 and 2004. These applications, if successful, free
landowners of ALR constraints and it is reasonable to speculate that some ranchers are
attempting to maintain cash flows through the subdivision and sale of land.
The BC Grasslands Commission has identified the subdivision of larger parcels as a
major threat to grassland ecosystems. Acreage or “ranchette” landscapes represent a
change in land use. They are more densely populated, more roaded and more intensively
used. Continual grazing by “hobby” livestock damages natural grasslands and renders
them vulnerable to the invasion of non-indigenous weeds. In addition, human activities
and disturbance can kill wildlife or cause habitat alienation. Finally, habitat
fragmentation can threaten the population viability of wide ranging species such as the
yellow badger.
In British Columbia, a prosperous, well managed and sustainable agriculture industry is
in the best interest of all natural resource sectors. While the province’s
agriculture/ranching sector continues to make significant stewardship concessions,
increased economic pressures have reduced its ability to absorb wildlife related losses.
Other programs and organizations have moved to support landowners and conserve
habitat, however, many landowners require more financially attractive options.
Landowner enfranchisement could be used to generate economic returns, promote
stewardship and add to BC’s existing array of private land wildlife management options.
The agriculture sector has indicated support for enfranchisement programs provided they
can maintain or enhance business opportunities and relationships with other stakeholder
groups.
4.2. Conservation Organizations
British Columbia has a rich history of environmental non-government organization
(ENGO) involvement. Most conservancy oriented ENGOs are guided by a philosophy of
holistic ecosystem management and they conserve habitats by holding lands in trust or
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 10
though stewardship agreements. Programs that emphasize the management of a single
species at the expense of the ecosystem would conflict with most ENGO programs at
operational and philosophical levels. In order to maximize opportunities for
collaboration with ENGO’s, enfranchisement programs should not encourage practices
that move lands away from natural processes. Ideally, incentive programs should restore
or emulate ecosystems or ecological function.
Most incentive programs readily blend conservation strategies in ways that are mutually
beneficial. Strategies, such as restrictive covenants, other stewardship agreements and
certification programs, commonly interact to create programs and plans that address the
needs of partner organizations. Where objectives align, there are opportunities to for
collaborative enfranchisement/ENGO ventures.
4.3. The Hunting Sector
British Columbia’s hunting sector, represented in part by the BC Wildlife Federation, has
retained core values that have successfully guided the management of hunting in North
America since 1930. The system is referred to as the North American Model for Wildlife
Conservation (Geist 2005) and it is comprised of the following principles; 1) public
ownership of fish and wildlife, 2) the elimination of markets for dead wildlife, 3) the
allocation of wildlife by law, 4) the killing of wildlife for legitimate purposes, 5) the
recognition of wildlife as an international resource, 6) scientifically based management
decisions and 7) the democracy of hunting opportunity (Geist 2005). BCWF
representatives are staunchly in support of the model. The BCWF has also indicated a
reluctance to make financial contributions to programs that do not focus on the
enhancement of hunting or fishing opportunities.
Landowner enfranchisement can maintain or bolster the North American model by using
economic incentives to provide the public with opportunities to influence recreation and
wildlife habitat objectives for private land. Provided the egalitarian principles of the
North American Model for Wildlife Conservation are upheld, the BCWF has indicated a
willingness to consider landowner enfranchisement programs.
Because of their commercial interests in wildlife, hunting guides, represented by the
Guide Outfitter Association of BC (GOABC), must be treated as separate entity within
the hunting fraternity. Not surprisingly, this organization supports the creation of
commercial opportunities associated with wildlife, however, it warns against the creation
of a new licence class that would threaten the integrity of their licences. The GOABC
maintains that the tools required to create commercial opportunities on private land are
already in place; namely guide outfitter licenses and certificates. The GOABC has
acknowledged that hunting opportunities on private land for both residents and non-
residents should be maintained and this would lend support to the concept of landowner
enfranchisement.
Some guide outfitters have suggested that programs reliant on mule deer, and even elk,
would not be able to generate the revenues sufficient to cover program costs. Further,
some are concerned that an increase in the supply of hunts could suppress prices and
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 11
lower profit margins. While the concern warrants further attention, in general, the
GOABC can be expected to favour programs that expand quality guiding opportunities
for its members.
4.4. First Nations
As confirmed by the BC Court of Appeal in its Delgamuukw Decision (1993) aboriginal
fishing and/or hunting rights continue to exist in British Columbia. The Supreme Court
of Canada’s Sparrow decision (1990) established that aboriginal rights to hunt or fish for
sustenance purposes must be given the first priority after conservation needs are met.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s Gladstone Decision confirmed that aboriginal rights to a
commercial use of a fish resource (in this case, herring spawn on kelp) exists when it can
be demonstrated that a commercial usage of the resource existed prior to European
contact and was integral to the distinctive culture of the First Nation in question.
When allocating wildlife harvests, statutory decision makers must recognize aboriginal
rights. Provincial policy (Anon. 1996) holds that “First Nations exercising their
aboriginal rights to hunt and fish for sustenance purposes have the first priority after
conservation needs are met.” This principle must be observed by landowner
enfranchisement pilots and programs.
4.5. Government
Enfranchisement programs can establish and harmonize social, economic, ecological
objectives and provide sound leadership and governance for the following reasons. First,
enfranchisement integrates social, economic and ecological objectives. Second,
enfranchisement links the private, operational objectives with broad strategic direction
provided by government and other organizations.
Third, enfranchisement programs would employ a consultative, scientific, adaptive and
‘results-based’ governance model. After considering options, landowners, user groups
and government (representing society) cooperate in the establishment of a series of
interlocking objectives for individual land holdings or consortia. These objectives, and
their indicators, would be clearly articulated in landowner agreements. Monitoring and
reporting procedures would then provide feedback and allow the agreement to be adapted
as information becomes available.
Fourth, enfranchisement programs would allow government to step away from its role as
regulator and assume a more proactive and positive role in the capacity of ‘partner’.
Synergies could be gained by combining the expertise and assets of other partners. The
‘power of cooperation’ could be harnessed by combining the talents of ecologists,
wildlife biologists, agrologists, economists and landowners. This, in turn, would create
new opportunities and allow public/private partnerships to establish objectives and
intensively mange smaller areas. This could diversify recreational opportunities in BC
and allow the Province to contemplate new economic opportunities. Special seniors,
youth or trophy hunts are examples of market stratification that could increase user
participation rates and generate higher licence fee revenues.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 12
Fifth, landowner enfranchisement can promote environmental stewardship and create
economic opportunities without displacing traditional economies or those who participate
within them. Enfranchisement allows government, landowners and society to
cooperatively participate in wildlife recreation markets that are already established. As
stated by Benson, Ross and Steinbach (1999) “…willing buyers and sellers would be
brought together and assisted in becoming part of the conservation process”.
Accordingly, enfranchisement programs can further the pursuit of governments
environmental goals and objectives without a commensurate increase government
expenditures or a reduction in tax revenues. It may even be possible to increase
government revenues through increased sales of in hunting licences and LEH applications
or through increased royalty payments.
5. The Utility of Landowner Enfranchisement in BC
5.1. A Need for Healthy Partnerships
In BC, partnerships between landowners and society are imposed by the landscapes and
their ecologies, patterns of land ownership and economic and legal systems. Consider the
following:
1) Many populations of fish, game and rare and endangered species satisfy a portion
of their life requisites within valley bottom or coastal habitats that are likely to fall
under private ownership.
2) Private land in BC is not isolated, discrete or geographically concentrated. It
ramifies up and down the valley bottoms or along coast lines and as a result,
ecological and hydrologic interactions between Crown and private lands are
intimate and complex.
3) Landowners are not legally compelled to provide many environmental services or
products. If a landowner wishes to exclude wildlife, very often he/she is legally
entitled to do so. The public’s desire for many ecological services, therefore,
must be pursued through partnerships and contractual arrangements.
4) Private land practices can have profound impacts on public resources and vice
versa.
The optimal management of many provincial natural resources must involve mutually
satisfying private and public sector partnerships that also recognise First Nations
interests. While not a panacea, landowner enfranchisement has the potential to develop
partnerships, create alternate economic alternatives and generate revenues. British
Columbia employs many of the stewardship incentive programs, or strategies, used
elsewhere, however, all programs are limited by their ability to provide attractive
financial options to landowners and almost all rely on external funding commitments.
Further, many programs preclude traditional land uses without creating obvious economic
replacements. Enfranchisement programs can expand and diversify economic
opportunities while delivering important social and ecological objectives. They would
compliment existing stewardship programs, be guided by clear provincial policy and fit
within the bounds of all relevant legislation.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 13
BC’s economic and legal systems often motivate landowners to act in ways that are
contrary to their interests and those of user groups, ENGOs and agencies. This has been
amply demonstrated in the East Kootenay where landowners have asserted their legal
rights and fenced elk and deer out of over 11, 000 hectares of valley bottom habitats so
far (Zbeetnoff and McTavish, 2004). Enfranchisement programs, not yet employed in
BC, have the potential to mitigate conflict by increasing recreation and economic
opportunities and creating drivers for the protection of wildlife and habitats.
Based on various societal values, enfranchisement programs in BC should be broadly
constrained by moral, legal and practical considerations. To meet with widespread
acceptance in BC, enfranchisement programs must:
recognise the contributions of landowners toward the stewardship of publicly
owned natural resources and tangibly reward them,
uphold the principles of publicly owned fish and wildlife. Ownership of all
wildlife is vested in the Province of British Columbia (or Canada) and all
allocations, seasons, restrictions and licenses for provincial species must continue
to be authorised by government,
promote the stewardship of the resources valued by participating user groups,
place a priority on the stewardship of riparian and grassland habitats and the
habitats of species at risk because they are; 1) highly valuable ecologically, 2)
limited in distribution, 3) concentrated on private land, 4) often in need of
restoration, and 5) highly responsive to treatments
maintain or enhance public access to fish and wildlife on private land,
promote ethical wildlife recreation activities. Programs that involve hunting, or
viewing opportunities, will do so with wild animals under natural and free ranging
conditions only. Landowners would not be permitted to influence the movements
of animals on their property other than through habitat enhancement,
maintain or enhance the quality and quantity of ecological values not directly
related to wildlife oriented recreation,
involve activities that fall under the authority of the Government of BC or that can
be authorised through agreements between the Government of BC and other
governments,
be consistent with other government programs and widely held public
expectations, and
recognise the aboriginal interests of First Nations.
The challenge is to create a legal and policy environment that enables the pursuit of
environmental or public access objectives while simultaneously creating attractive
financial opportunities for landowners.
For a description of wildlife property rights outside of BC and a discussion of
enfranchisement programs in the United States, please refer to Appendix 3.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 14
5.2. Recommended Hunting Enfranchisement Programs and Revenue Models
for BC
Two hunting oriented enfranchisement models, ‘Depredation Programs’ and
‘Stewardship Programs’, are recommended for BC. Both programs must provide safe
and ethical hunting situations and government should encourage the formation of
landowner consortiums.
5.2.1. A Depredation Program
A depredation program is recommended to address ungulate crop depredation issues and
to manage public access on private land. Participating landowners would be obligated to
tolerate specified crop losses and to provide access to hunters in exchange for monetary
incentives.
Access program examples include Idaho’s Access Yes Program, Montana’s Block
Management Program and Colorado’s Walk-in Access Program. The Access Yes
Program generates revenues through licence lottery systems and that is available to
resident and non-resident hunters. The hunting opportunities accessed through this
system can occur on private or public land and are not directly linked to the private land
enrolled in the program. They are simply a means of generating the revenues required to
fund the program. The Block Management Program generates revenues through that sale
of licences, particularly the sale of non-resident licenses. Once again, these licenses do
not relate directly the lands enrolled in the program. They are simply a means to generate
revenues. The Walk-in Access Program generates revenues through the sale of
discretionary stamps that grant the purchaser access to private land enrolled in the
program. All systems use the revenues to reward participating landowners. In return,
landowners provide access to appropriately licensed resident and non-resident hunters on
an equal opportunity basis. These programs do not require landowners to change their
land use practices. Instead, they recognise and reward the landowner’s contributions
toward the health of wildlife populations and public recreation opportunities.
These programs uphold principles established for BC and they appear to require a
minimal investment on behalf of all potential partners. Accordingly, they could be
developed and in a relatively short period of time.
5.2.2. A Stewardship Program
A stewardship program is recommended to promote habitat management at the landscape
level and establish public access opportunities. Participating landowners would be
obligated to implement a stewardship plan, tolerate specified crop losses and provide
access to hunters in exchange for monetary incentives. Because stewardship activities
can be costly, a program of this nature would function best where high revenue species
(e.g. bighorn sheep) contribute to the hunting opportunities.
Examples of stewardship programs include Colorado’s Ranching for Wildlife program
and Washington State’s Private Lands Wildlife Management Area Program (PLWMAP).
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 15
Both address public hunting opportunities and habitat stewardship on private lands. Big
game tags are divided between the resident hunters (issued through a state lottery) and the
landowner. The later is free to market his/her transferable tags and the revenues
generated provide the financial incentives for stewardship. At all times wildlife remains
the property of the state and all hunters must obtain the appropriate ‘state issued’ hunting
licences. The state and the landowners develop agreements and plans that establish
hunting seasons and stewardship objectives. Landowners execute their plans in a manner
consistent with the regulations, operating guidelines and the agreement. Compliance is
monitored by a state personnel and non-compliance can lead of the termination of the
landowner agreement.
These programs require higher levels of investment on behalf of all partners.
Landowners are required to develop and execute management plans that could address
disease management, reintroduction/recovery planning, wildlife and habitat inventories,
public information, human disturbance management and enforcement activities.
Government must administer a resident lottery system, assist in the development of
wildlife management plans and contracts and engage in (or oversee) monitoring
activities. User groups must be prepared to provide higher revenues to support programs
of this nature. In return, the government and user groups can negotiate higher levels of
stewardship.
Stewardship programs are consistent with the principles that of the North American
Model for Wildlife Conservation yet they are not without controversy. The Ranching for
Wildlife program has created a distinct landowner-guide class which has led to criticisms
of privatization. BC could choose to avoid such controversy by creating a stewardship
program that relies, in part, on landowner/guide outfitter cooperation. For example,
government could market the landowner’s portion of the annual allowable harvest and
pay for the services of an existing guide-outfitter. The recreational use revenues could
then be directed to the landowner. Alternatively, while ensuring resident hunter demand
is satisfied, enfranchisement programs could oversee direct financial agreements between
guide-outfitters and landowners.
Because the stewardship model requires an ecosystem-based approach to habitat
planning, most opportunities for implementation will occur in the BC interior and in the
Peace Region where large rural holdings are still somewhat numerous. In addition,
stewardship programs require higher revenues and, as such, they must involve hunting
opportunities for highly desired species such as elk, bighorn sheep, moose, and bison.
5.2.3. Revenue Models
All revenue generation models contemplated for BC must; 1) generate self-sustaining
revenues, 2) be consistent with the principles of the North American Model of Wildlife
Conservation, and 3) provide tangible financial benefits to landowners who participate on
a voluntary basis. While province/landowner agreements would be voluntary, they would
also be based on time-bound contracts that identify payments, stewardship and access
concessions, measures of success, monitoring regimes, penalties and renewal clauses.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 16
Government participation in program administration and revenue generation is assumed,
however, various levels of involvement are possible.
Selected revenue models must create attractive financial options that motivate
landowners to provide hunter access, adhere to stewardship agreements or tolerate crop
depredation. All costs, including capital costs, operational costs, administrative costs,
property damage, crop depredation, and insurance costs must be factored in to the
remuneration package. Periodic renewals would be required to account for market
changes and shifting objectives.
Landowner costs can be considerable. In 2003, twelve ranches in the Chilcotin
experienced crop losses, due to depredation, that averaged over $32, 000.00 per ranch. In
the East Kootenays, compensation payments to individual hay producers in 02/03 and
03/04 often exceeded $10, 000.00. A depredation program would require incentive
revenues that range between $10, 000.00 to $100, 000.00 per ranch. Depending on the
planning and stewardship commitments, the figures could be larger for a stewardship
program.
Revenue models used in other North American jurisdictions include, license fee
surcharges, lotteries, access fees, guiding fees and auctions. They may rely on
governments, or sanctioned organizations, to manage the revenue generation and
landowner payment process. Alternatively, with government oversight, landowners may
receive payments directly from users. Finally, while many BC hunters would prefer to
restrict hunting opportunities to residents this would obligate the resident hunter to bare
all costs. Depending on the model selected, this could force unacceptable user fee or
license fee increases. In order to support the program, it may be desirable to allocate a
portion of allowable harvest on private land to non-resident users.
The creation of revenue generation models will lie at the heart of all programs and all
stakeholders should expect to dedicate considerable consultation efforts toward their
development. Several models are presented below for discussion purposes. They
warrant further scrutiny and direct input from the government, user groups and landowner
representatives will be sought. It is anticipated that the options that are eventually
adopted will be derivations and combinations of those presented in this document. The
revenue models that follow are intended to be generic and potentially applicable to both
the Depredation and Stewardship Programs.
A Surcharge System would generate revenues through the creation and sale of special
licences or licence surcharges. These licences would be purchased by hunters wishing to
participate in private land programs. Access to private land hunting opportunities would
be regulated but open to all individuals with the appropriate license. An Auction System
would generate revenues through a province wide government auction of highly desired
hunting opportunities on private land. Access to private land hunting opportunities would
be limited to the successful bidders. An Access Fee System would generate revenues
through access fees paid by hunters directly to the landowner or, alternatively, through a
government intermediary. Access to private land hunting opportunities would be limited
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 17
to those willing to pay the market price. A Lottery System would generate revenues
through government lotteries for highly desired hunting opportunities on private land.
Multiple entries/hunter for the same hunt could allow the system to generate higher
revenues than the regular LEH process. Access to private land hunting opportunities
would be limited to the lottery winners.
All of the above systems could accommodate a non-resident allocation. The numbers of
non-resident permits/hunts could be minimized and used to satisfy the established
monetary requirements for the program. Further, the revenue model applied to the non-
residents could differ from that used to manage the resident hunters. For example,
resident hunters could be managed through the existing LEH licensing system at existing
prices. The non-resident allocation could be managed through an Access Fee System.
This combination would generate revenues through the non-residents and minimize
resident costs. Depending on the revenue model selected, government revenues may be
generated through the sale of licences, LEH applications and/or royalties.
5.3. A Public/Private Wildlife Viewing Partnership for BC
5.3.1. The Existing Wildlife Watch Program
The Ministry of Environment sustains a wildlife viewing program entitled ‘Wildlife
Watch’. Its goals are to 1) ensure the activities of the program are consistent with the
well being of wildlife and its habitat, 2) promote and enhance opportunities to see and
enjoy wildlife, 3) support tourism and economic benefits associated with wildlife
viewing, and 4) promote increased public understanding and awareness of and support for
wildlife and its habitat needs.
The program’ objectives are:
to develop Wildlife Watch as a province-wide, partnership based program that has
a stable funding base and is largely self-sustaining,
to foster partnerships for the joint development, management and maintenance of
viewing opportunities and sites,
to ensure the planning and implementation of the viewing site system in BC
includes a mix of ecosystems and habitats, wildlife and other natural features,
to work with partners to increase the public’s awareness of viewing opportunities
while ensuring a proper code of wildlife viewing conduct is followed,
to support and participate in the development of appropriate commercial products
and tourism services that meet the needs of wildlife and wildlife viewing
participants,
to promote public awareness and knowledge of wildlife and ecosystems through
informational and educational materials,
to monitor and site use and impacts of use, and
to evaluate program effectiveness and determine the public’s viewing needs,
preferences and opinions.
The program conveys information through its website and through the distribution of
pamphlets and a guidebook. Regional and sub-regional pamphlets identify viewing sites,
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 18
species of interest, seasons, travel routes and directions. Loop routes, offering multiple
viewing destinations along scenic highways, are identified through these media and they
are popular. Most sites feature charismatic species and visits to them usually require little
physical effort. Currently, the vast majority of Wildlife Watch sites (557 are listed on the
wesbsite) occur on Crown lands or on lands leased or owned by ENGOs.
In addition to government programs, BC’s private tourist sector offers ecotourism
experiences that range from dog sled rides to whale watching tours. Approximately
2,250 businesses in BC offer nature-based activities and in 2001, just under 966, 000
tourists spent a total of 908.0 million dollars while at these businesses (Anon. 2004). The
total GDP impacts of commercial nature-based tourism are estimated at $782.9 million
(Anon. 2004).
5.3.2. An Expansion of the Wildlife Watch Program to Include Private Land
BC’s wildlife viewing industry must be considered a success. However, North American
demographics and the affluence of Asian and European tourists indicate that the industry
has potential for further growth still. In addition, several strategies to promote eco-
tourism remain untried or underutilized—especially where private lands are concerned.
In its 2002-2005 Business Plan (Anon. 2001) the Wildlife Watch Program lists support
for appropriate commercial viewing activities and partnerships that develop and maintain
interpretive centers as “ongoing program activities”. Further, program objectives include
the establishment of partnerships and the development of self-sustaining revenue streams.
Accordingly, private/public wildlife viewing partnerships represent an area of untapped
potential.
As discussed previously, private lands are often ecological hot spots and they lend
themselves to viewing. They host the majority of the provinces red and blue species,
contain high value ungulate winter ranges and often interface with lake, river and marine
environments. In addition, most private land is situated in the valley bottoms and along
popular travel routes. Landowners could enhance and market viewing opportunities from
vantage points and walkways on their properties. In addition, wildlife viewing
experiences could attract guests to existing businesses such as bed and breakfasts, cabins,
dude ranches and hotel/motels. Operators could offer an array of experiences ranging
from ‘continental breakfasts with humming birds’ and ‘horse back trips with burrowing
owls’ to ‘sleigh rides amongst the elk’!
Yet relatively few private landowners have developed wildlife viewing businesses.
Incredibly, many dude ranch brochures fail to mention wildlife! There are probably
several reasons for this. Private landowners may not be aware of the opportunities that
exist. In addition, individual private operators could face high start-up (infrastructure),
labour and marketing costs relative to the size of the business they could hope to grow.
The North Island Wildlife Viewing Network (NIWVN) is a pilot program that is
attempting to develop self sustaining revenue streams through commercial wildlife
viewing ventures and to provide economical justifications for conservation. The program
links over 30 government and Nature Trust (TNT) properties on Vancouver Island. This
program does include some leased properties and as such to a small extent, some
economic incentives for private land stewardship do exist.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 19
Existing barriers in BC could be overcome by an expanded provincial viewing program
designed to promote co-operative landowner, government and NGO commercial
ventures. In doing so, government could hope to gain environmental concessions from
landowners, promote economic development and showcase BC’s commitment to the
environment. The recommended features of an expanded public/private wildlife viewing
program are listed below:
Government would communicate the business opportunities associated with
wildlife viewing. Many businesses, such as dude ranches, could increase their
appeal by insinuating existing wildlife viewing opportunities into marketing
strategies.
Landowners and any combination of government, NGO, and private operators
would partner and collectively market “wildlife routes”. These multi-member
wildlife viewing associations would cost share, cross promote and collaborate on
the marketing of ‘their’ multi-stop, multi-facility wildlife viewing loop. Further,
these same associations would develop and/or hire guide services to provide
professional and efficient services. It should be noted that MOE is not the only
potential government partner. Agencies and corporations, such as the Department
of Fisheries and Oceans, the Ministry of Forests and Range, BC Hydro and the
Ministry of Tourism, Sport and the Arts, have interpretive and visitor sites and are
potential partners. Other non-wildlife tourist offerings, such as winery-tours, hot
springs, heritage train rides, First Nation’s facilities, trail networks (hiking and
cycling), golf, skiing, dude ranches, fishing operations, museums and house
boating enterprises, would compliment, diversify and accentuate multi-day, multi-
stop tours.
Government would promote private land viewing sites and facilities on its web-
site and with highway signage at little extra cost. Better links and cross
referencing and wildlife information would also be provided on affiliate web-
sites. At present, BC Government Internet Standards (2001) do not generally
condone advertisements for organizations outside the BC government. For this
reason, the creation of a Wildlife Watch Society or a policy change may be
required.
Consistently formatted on-site information signs would be provided to
participating landowners. The signs would bear a prominent viewing program
logo and the logos of all partners. This ‘branding’ would increase the viewing
program’s profile and its recognition. In addition to providing site specific
information, the signs could identify and promote other viewing opportunities and
activities along the affiliated loop and throughout the province. In return for
signage and website advertising, government would expect stewardship
agreements that would address habitat management provisions and specify
guest services, facility standards and viewing protocols.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 20
Where the cost of infrastructure, such as viewing platforms or boardwalks are
prohibitive, governments, NGOs, private tour operators and landowners would
cost share. In return for the government contribution, landowners would
enter into involved stewardship agreements or environmental covenants. NGO’s or private tour operators could contribute to the partnership by assuming
guide or facility management duties. Facilities and infrastructure would adhere to
government standards to enable certification, ensure safety and environmental
standards, cultivate name brand recognition and raise the government’s profile.
By combining private and public viewing destinations the existing Wildlife Watch
program would increase the densities of viewing sites along existing travel routes
and viewing loops. These “sectoral industry clusters” would allow new entries
into the market to benefit from infrastructure that is already developed (Anon.
2004). Increased densities will expand business/marketing opportunities, attract
tour operators and foster the creation of viewing associations. Further, the
program’s appeal to groups (e.g. school) less inclined to travel long distances
would be enhanced. Finally, increases in the number and diversity of sites along
routes would also increase customer options and allow the creation of customised
tour itineraries.
If government were to expand its Wildlife Watch Program and promote commercial
wildlife viewing on public and private lands, a first step would be the development of an
information package. It would identify: 1) the opportunities associated with the wildlife
viewing business, 2) the structure of the programs private public partnerships, 3) the
process for becoming a certified Wildlife Watch viewing site, and 4) the process for
creating or joining certified Wildlife Watch tour associations. Once established, the
program’s partner building activities would not rest solely on government’s shoulders.
Local ‘wildlife viewing associations’ could seek out additional private partners, provide
information, prepare agreements and monitor facility standards.
5.3.3. Wildlife Viewing in the Context of BC’s Tourism Strategies
The timing and philosophy of the proposed Wildlife Watch Program expansion is
consistent with the program’s original goals, broad government signals and the visions of
other agencies in the Pre-Olympic era. The Spirit of 2010 Tourism Strategy, developed
by the former Ministry of Small Business and Economic Development (MSBED),
envisions BC as a “…world-class, all-season destination of choice”. Its goal is to help
the province “…become globally competitive by growing investment in the tourism
sector and attracting more visitors”. The strategy identifies the Olympics as a catalyst for
tourism investments and growth in the entire province before and after 2010. It offers the
following recommendations:
Tourism BC and other provincial agencies, other governments, aboriginal and
non-aboriginal communities, industry and stakeholders need to work together to
further develop untapped or potentially lucrative emerging tourism markets, and
Efforts to increase industry investment will need to be co-ordinated with
government (federal, provincial, local) investment in tourism infrastructure and
the creation of an “open for business” investment climate.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 21
The proposed expansion of the Wildlife Watch Program will also ‘dovetail’ neatly with
the MOE’s Parks and Protected Lands System – 2011 Business Plan (October 2004
Draft) which is also timed to take advantage of the marketing opportunities associated
with the 2010 The Olympic Games.
The document lists a number of objectives including:
the development of new and improved markets by ensuring the full range of front
and back country services are provided,
the provision of new and improved services through such future additions as
interpretation and education programs, and
an increase in user information through integrated marketing approaches
including linkages to the Tourism BC website, Tourism Information Centers,
Chambers of Commerce and schools.
The business plan also identifies the need to provide benefits “beyond the system’s
boundaries”. It recommends the development of partnerships with local communities,
Firsts Nations, [agency] partners and commercial recreation permittees. The report
further identifies that vital partnerships and shared stewardship are an effective way of
doing business with communities. The Parks and Protected Areas Branch (BC Parks)
could partner with the Wildlife Watch Program to increase ecologically sustainable
visitations to their Provincial Parks, Protected Areas, Ecological Reserves and
Conservation Lands. In return, BC Parks could provide leadership in facility, nature
interpretation and signage standards and branding initiatives.
Finally, an expanded Wildlife Watch program is consistent with the provincial
government’s focus for this session. In delivering the 2005 Speech From The Throne,
BC’s Lieutenant Governor, Iona Campagnolo, identified that BC’s "SuperNatural"
branding would be enhanced by government actions. She also stated that “Our parks and
resorts are a huge and growing draw for visitors the world over. Eco-tourism, marine
tourism and agri-tourism are all thriving, using nature as a showcase.”
Tourism was identified as a “cornerstone” of government's Asia-Pacific Gateway strategy
to create new jobs, investment and opportunity in every region. Canada's approved
destination status with China and the 2010 Olympics were identified as major
opportunities for the province’s tourism industry. A timely expansion of the Wildlife
Watch Program would allow BC to protect the environment, stimulate economic
development and, while building on its “Super Natural” branding, showcase its
environmental commitment on national and international stages.
6. Next Steps: Pilot Processes
All potential enfranchisement programs should employ pilot projects as developmental
vanguards. They will provide the learning and consultation opportunities necessary to
develop productive systems and address all relevant values and concerns. Through pilots,
participating landowners, agencies and stakeholders would develop products, such as
landowner agreements, habitat management plans, monitoring plans etc. and processes in
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 22
a ‘real world’ environment. In addition, revenue model assumptions must be tested with
real revenues and costs and administrative procedures must be developed. Pilots will also
test the existing legislation and possibly inform changes to the Wildlife Act. With all of
the above taken into consideration, the feasibility of various enfranchisement options
must be evaluated before government should commit to program development.
Pilot projects will also provide greater opportunities for consultation, communications
and relationship building with stakeholders. While consultation has its own costs,
program acceptance and uptake will not occur without it. Further, by providing a forum
for stakeholders to spell out their expectations, consultation will add efficiency by
quickly ruling out untenable options.
All pilots should involve the voluntary participation of landowners and should be
designed to compliment and interact with existing incentive programs in BC. Existing
BCAC council programs (Environmental Farm Plan and Agriculture Environment
Initiative Funds), government and ENGO programs provide excellent opportunities for
collaboration. As these programs become operational, government should strive to create
consistent standards that would lend themselves to a sanctioned certification program.
The heightened profile of species at risk creates opportunities to partner with the federal
government in the creation of an “endangered species recovery partner” label.
7. Conclusions
Over that last decade the Ministry of Environment has become a victim of it own success.
A series of mild winters coupled with relatively conservative harvest regulations have
resulted in increased numbers of wild ungulates, especially in agricultural areas. While
some may find the circumstance laudable, the Province has a diverse set of competing
obligations. Legislation, such as the Agriculture Land Commissions Act and the
Assessment Act compel landowners to farm, yet wildlife policy can dramatically impact
farm profits and threaten the viability of some agricultural sectors.
Producers in BC have faced challenging times recently and, generally, they have become
less tolerant of wildlife impacts. When left with few alternatives, producers are
sometimes forced to make choices that are contrary to the interests of other sectors and
even themselves! Sometimes they must simply choose between unattractive options and
make the best of a bad situation. Many outcomes, such as wildlife fencing, should be
viewed as the classic ‘lose-lose’ scenario. Fencing is costly and time consuming from the
perspective of the landowner. From the perspective of those in the wildlife sector, scarce
and highly valuable valley bottom habitats are alienated and fragmented. The scenario
repeats itself when landowners are forced to sell off land parcels to maintain cash flows
or to convert their operations from low to high intensity agriculture when they would
prefer to do otherwise. Finally, when satisfactory alternatives fail to materialize and
when widely accepted solutions are not developed, sectors often seek political solutions.
This pits sectors and agencies against one another and rarely results in stable, long-term
solutions that resolve conflict.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 23
Landowner enfranchisement provides government with an opportunity to develop and
implement wildlife policy that recognises the interests of private landowners and the
wildlife sector. By engendering a cooperative approach to objective setting processes,
government can gain influence in the agricultural setting and enlist the support of the
sector. This can happen if government is prepared to develop programs that recognise
and tangibly reward landowners for the stewardship they provide.
Enfranchisement programs rely on a user-pay revenue models that minimise government
expenditures. Beyond improved habitat and wildlife population management, landowner
enfranchisement can increase regional recreation and economic opportunities and
generate government revenues through the sale of licences, LEH applications and
royalties.
8. References
Anonymous. 2002. Environmental Trends in British Columbia 2002. Water Land and Air
Protection, Victoria BC.
Anonymous. 2001. British Columbia Wildlife Watch: Provincial Viewing Program.
Ministry of Water Land and Air Protection and Federation of BC Naturalists.
Victoria, BC.
Anonymous. 2004. Economic Value of the Commercial Nature-Based Tourism Industry
in British Columbia. Tourism BC. Victoria BC.
Benson, Delwin L., Ross Shelton and Don W. Steinbach. 1999. Wildlife Stewardship and
Recreation on Private Lands. Texas A&M University Press, College Station.
Butcher, A. Allen, 1992. Democracy and Capitalism: Are they Critical Elements of a
Climax Human Culture? Website Essay at the “Progressive Living” Website
(www.progressiveliving.org)
Campbell, R. Wayne, Neil K. Dawe, Ian McTaggart-Cowan, John M. Cooper, Gary W.
Kaiser, Michael C.E. McNall. 1990. The Birds of British Columbia: Volume 1.
Royal British Columbia Museum, Victoria BC.
Demarchi, R.A., C.L. Hartwig and Donald A. Demarchi. 2000. Status of the Rocky
Mountain Sheep in British Columbia. BC Ministry of Environment, Lands and
Parks, Wildlife Branch. Victoria, BC. Wildlife Bulletin No. B-99.
Donihee, John. 2000. The Evolution of Wildlife Law in Canada. University of Calgary,
Candain Institute of Resources Law. Calgary Alberta.
Geist, Valerius. 1995. North American Policies of Wildlife Conservation in Geist and
McTaggart-Cowan, Wildlife Conservation Policy, Detselig Enterprises Ltd..
Calgary, Alberta. 77-129.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 24
Geist, Valerius. 2005. The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation as a Means of
Creating Wealth, Protecting Public Health while Generating Biodiversity. In
Preparation.
Jenner, Matt. 2002. North Island Wildlife Viewing Network: Business Plan. Unpublished
Manuscript Prepared for the North Island Wildlife Viewing Network Steering
Committee.
McCay, Bonnie J. 1996. ‘Common and Private Concerns’ in Hanna, Susan, Folke, Carl
and Mäler , Karl-Göran (eds), Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural
and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment. Island Press,
Washington DC. 111-126.
Meidinger, Del and Jim Pojar, 1991. Ecosystems of British Columbia. British Columbia
Ministry of Forests, Victoria BC.
Runka, G.G. and Stuart Gale. 2004. Establishing Strategic Directions: Mitigating the
Fragmentation and Development of BC’s Grasslands. Unpublished Manuscript
submitted to the Grasslands Conservation Council of British Columbia.
Zbeetnoff, Darrell M. and R. Bruce McTavish. 2004. BC Wildlife Damage
Compensation Pilot Project: Evaluation Report. Unpublished Manuscript
ubmitted to the BC Agriculture Council.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 25
Appendix 1: Lease Arrangements and Preserve Hunting
Evaluated Against the North American Model for Wildlife
Conservation
Access lease arrangements for hunting do not usually involve government, or society, and
do not involve a sharing of rights and privileges. They are simple agreements between
users and landowners that take the form of access lease or access fee arrangements
(hereafter referred to collectively as ‘lease agreements’). The access that is acquired
enables the lessee to enjoy exclusive, or semi-exclusive, hunting opportunities on private
land. Such agreements do not usually address social objectives and they do not require
the public to scrutinise or participate in the development of economic or ecological
objectives. These systems can frustrate the attempts of government and society to
achieve important social, economic and ecological goals and they do satisfy several
important principles of the ‘North American Model for Wildlife Conservation’
established by Geist (2005). At least five of the seven principles can be compromised, or
threatened, by lease agreements.
The first principle, wildlife as a public trust resource, is threatened by lease
agreements and trespass laws because landowners can deny the public access to
their land and, by proxy, to wildlife. While the state may claim legal ownership
and continue to regulate harvests, seasons, etc., it could be argued that a de facto
private ownership is the result. Further, and based on this shift in control, the
public’s objectives for wildlife may well differ form those of the landowner.
Lessors may prefer high density populations and/or high proportions of trophy
animals while the public may prefer modest population densities and a natural
range of genetic diversity. Private interests are pitted against those of the public
and, owing to the mobility of wildlife, negative ecological consequences could
ramify well beyond the private land.
The third principle, the allocation of wildlife by law is an egalitarian concept that
acknowledges public ownership of wildlife and encourages public participation in
wildlife oriented activities. This allows all citizens to develop a vested interest in
wildlife and assume responsibility for the well being of habitats and ecosystems.
Lease agreements threaten this principle because they can pander to the elite and
exclude those of lesser means.
The fifth principle, wildlife as an international resource, may be compromised by
lease agreements because, as stated previously, lessors will have interests that
differ from those of society. Society’s interest in maintaining internationally
significant species and their habitats could readily conflict with those of the
landowner and this could impede the progress of wildlife management agencies,
at all levels.
The sixth principle, science is the proper tool for discharge of wildlife policy, can
be threatened by lease agreements because the lessor may not acknowledge public
policy and may pursue short term financial objectives in defiance or ignorance of
sound scientific and technical information. Disease transmission, overcrowding,
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 26
genetic contamination, and negative interspecies interactions or habitat impacts
are potential outcomes.
The seventh principle, democracy if hunting, is can be threatened because private
control of wildlife, especially on those lands most proximal to human population
centers, can inhibit the public from becoming a stakeholder and effectively
participating in the development of conservation and wildlife management policy
applicable to the private land base.
Despite the potential downsides of lease agreements, in the absence of alternatives, it is
likely many producers will enter into them as a means to increase revenues. Most
jurisdictions in North America report increases in the use of such arrangements and,
based on anecdotal evidence, BC does not appear to be an exception.
Preserve hunting violates the remaining two principles of the North American model.
First, these systems rely on captive, if not privately owned, trophy animals that can be
supplied by game farms. As such, canned hunts promote markets for dead wildlife parts
and products. This detracts from the second principle which is the elimination of such
markets. Second, enclosure hunts threaten the forth principle which is that wildlife must
be killed for legitimate purposes. As Geist (2005) notes, a consequence of this principle
is “enforced inefficiency” which increases the contributions of wildlife recreation to
economies and provides the impetus for conservation. While “fair chase” hunts are
advertised, the same advertisements often posts 100% success rates. This contradiction
highlights the efficiency of the canned, or reserve, big game hunts and suggests that profit
would be concentrated in the hands of a relative few within society.
Lease agreements in BC are not extremely different from the hunting preserves or
“canned hunts” popularized in Texas. In that state, as in BC, indigenous game on private
land continues to be public property. Thus, the major difference between lease
agreements in BC and fee hunting in Texas is the widespread use of enclosures. It should
also be noted that the erection of such enclosures is not illegal in BC. Other provinces
allow enclosure hunting and in Saskatchewan the ungulates behind the fence are privately
owned. The game farming of indigenous big game species is legal in Alberta and lobby
groups there continue to push for the legalization of cervid harvest preserves or CHPs.
The wisdom and morality of game farming and enclosure hunts has been persistently
debated in BC. Regardless of the eventual outcome, in the absence of attractive, if not
pre-emptive, alternatives, this lobby will continue to threaten the North American
Wildlife Conservation Model.
References:
Geist, Valerius. 2005. The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation as a Means of
Creating Wealth, Protecting Public Health while Generating Biodiversity. In
Preparation.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 27
Appendix 3: A Review Private Land Stewardship Programs
and Strategies in BC
British Columbia has a compliment of government and ENGO stewardship programs that
is similar that of other ‘Western’ democracies. These programs employ one or more of
the following stewardship strategies: stewardship agreements (including conservation
covenants), subsidy, property acquisition or leasing, compensation, cost share,
certification and user based programs. Often these strategies meld and coexist within
programs and distinctions blur.
Stewardship Agreements
Stewardship agreements encompass a wide array of formal and informal agreements
between landowners and other parties. Short-term agreements are time bound and do not
affect land title. They include verbal agreements, management agreements, leases and
licences. These agreements assign rights and responsibilities and direct practices for
specified parcels of land.
Long-term stewardship agreements are permanent agreements that are attached to the title
of the land and bind all future owners to the conditions of the agreement. This includes
covenants, easements, and ‘profits à prendre.’ Easements are written access agreements.
Common law easements are legally attached to the land which benefits from the
easement. Profits à prendre are formal agreements between the landowner and another
person that allow that person to harvest specified resources from the land. These
agreements can only apply to resources that may be privately owned and attached to land
title.
Conservation covenants are voluntary, permanent agreements between landowners and
second parties that limit the property rights of the owner in favour of environmental
objectives. These agreements are attached to title and remain in place even when the land
is sold. Covenants, which can apply to all or a portion of a property, provide protection
for environmental values without an outright change in ownership. As such, covenants
are a relatively non-disruptive and low cost legal tool for the protection of environmental
values. Most often they specify what cannot happen in proximity to certain resource
values, hence the term ‘restrictive covenant’. The covenant is registered against title to
the property in the BC Land Title Office (Section 219 of the Land Title Act) and it is held
by the covenant holder. The holders of covenants can be government and non-
government organizations. Non-government covenant holders are often local
conservancies or land trusts or large conservancy groups. These groups monitor to
ensure compliance and, should there be a contravention, they are able to enforce the
covenant through provisions in the Act.
Landowners often have personal reasons for wanting to preserve ecological features on
their lands. Beyond these, there are some financial incentives for entering into
conservation covenants. Conservation organizations that are registered charities issue
income tax receipts for the value of the covenant. However, where property values have
risen, covenants are transactions that can trigger a capital gains tax which can potentially
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 28
exceed the tax reduction value of the receipt. In effect, the landowner is asked to pay
higher income tax in order to donate a covenant! If a property’s assessed value is
reduced by a covenant, lower municipal or regional property taxes could result. However,
here again, problems arise. As discussed previously, the discontinuance of agricultural
activities could bring about negative tax implications if the property is bumped out of the
“farm” class and into “residential” class.
Depending on the circumstances, tax incentives may not motivate landowners to enter
into covenants. Further, covenants limit the landowner options and decrease property
values. NGOs may elect to secure ecological protection through the purchase of
covenants. Economically, this compares favourably to the fee simple purchases,
especially when the ecological values are discrete or a minor component of the overall
property. Covenant purchases can also allow landowners to benefit more directly and
substantially. NGOs can elect to purchase entire properties and then resell them with
covenants attached. Where property values do not suffer from the imposition of a
covenant, it is possible to gain covenants at a minimal cost or at a profit!
From the perspective of the covenant holder, these agreements can be costly. By their
nature, these arrangement require the co-operation of the landowner and the holder must
accept the cost of monitoring to ensure that the agreement is upheld.
Covenants are commonly used in BC to protect and manage environmental values on
private land in BC. This management option is successful in protecting environmentally
sensitive or valuable habitats on properties where landowners are altruistically motivated
or where the covenant does not significantly reduce future options values or land values.
Because they can be precisely applied to certain activities in relation to highly valuable
habitats, environmental covenants can help to accomplish ecological objectives without
undue disruptions to land ownership or historical land use practices.
Subsidies
Environmental subsidies provide incentives to producers that incur opportunity costs
while managing toward environmental objectives. Very often landowners are asked to
forgo traditional practices in favour of others that provide higher levels of ecological
servicing. In many cases landowners are rewarded for passively allowing fields to lie
fallow or for allowing alternative cover to establish itself. Similarly, subsidy programs
reward landowners for switching to less profitable crops or management techniques. In
both cases the subsidy is intended to be an incentive that will counter opportunity costs.
A good example of subsidy program is the Agriculture and Agri-food Canada’s
Greencover Canada Program which is intended to help producers improve grassland-
management practices, protect water quality, reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, and
enhance biodiversity and wildlife habitat. This national program focuses on:
converting environmentally sensitive land to perennial cover;
critical areas – managing agricultural land near water;
technical assistance – helping producers adopt beneficial management practices, and
shelterbelts – planting trees on agricultural land.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 29
The land-conversion component provides technical advice and financial incentives to
registered landowners who convert environmentally sensitive land to perennial cover.
The landowners must agree to seed their land with approved perennial plants; and commit
to maintain the land under perennial cover for 10 years after the stand is declared
established.
The program is intended to convert marginally valuable agricultural lands that
traditionally have been producing annual crops or summer fallow. Greencover Canada
reviews proposals by assessing the proposed lands against a farmland-specific
environmental sensitivity index (ESI) that considers soil quality, air quality, landscape
drainage patterns, proximity to water, and contributions to wildlife habitat and
biodiversity. If the land has a high ESI, the proposal will garner a higher priority for
funding.
The program promotes conversions to long-lived perennial species, such as forage, shrubs
or trees and information on priority species is provided in the Greencover Canada Forage
Selection Guide. Successful applicants receive two one-time payments:
$20 per acre for the seeding or planting of tame species and signing a Contribution
and Land-Use Agreement, or $75 per acre for seeding native species and signing a
Contribution and Land-Use Agreement; and
$25 per acre after the perennial cover is established, and after Greencover Canada
inspects it and issues a Certificate of Stand Establishment.
The Contribution and Land-Use Agreement (a stewardship agreement) outlines the
landowner’s commitment to establish and maintain perennial cover on the land during the
term of the agreement.
Property Acquisition and Leasing
Conservation groups and governments often acquire properties or long term leases in
order to protect, enhance, manage or procure the environmental values found therein.
Land may be donated or ‘gifted’ to an agency or conservation group, with the donor
experiencing favourable tax implications. In other circumstances conservation groups
may elect to purchase lands or pay for long term leases. When considering purchases,
organizations usually weigh affordability against ecological values. Proximity to other
resources, infrastructure and ecological threats can also be serious considerations. Land
costs can often exceed the ability of any one organization to pay and when this happens
groups sometimes band together to purchase ecologically valuable lands.
Activities and practices on acquired properties are usually guided by management plans
which reflect the philosophy of the organization(s) involved. These plans strive to
balance environmental and human use objectives. While the use of such land is often
oriented toward education or nature appreciation, consumptive uses such as hunting and
fishing can also fit within management plans. Management plans may also allow for
industrial activities such as cattle grazing, farming or logging, providing they are
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 30
consistent with the objectives set for the property. Revenues generated by such activities
provide returns to the conservation group and are used to offset the cost of future work.
Property acquisition provides conservation groups with the maximum amount of
management certainty and it continues to be a popular vehicle for the protection of
environmental values. While this approach to conservation provides security and long
term assurances, it comes at a high cost. Beyond the gifting of properties, the market
value of private land in BC will continue to be a barrier to conservation acquisitions.
Compensation Programs
Compensation programs address observed costs that can be attributed to wildlife
depredation or predation. These programs have also been designed to address observed
and opportunity costs caused by environmental legislation or policy. Where landowner
and societal objectives conflict, these programs allow the landowners to recover their
costs or losses. In return, explicitly or implicitly, the landowner is expected to tolerate
the presence of ‘problem’ wildlife populations or comply with new legislation.
The British Columbia Agriculture Council (BCAC) administers funding for the BC Wild
Predator Loss Compensation Program. This BC wide pilot program has mitigation,
prevention and compensation components. The latter component provides compensation
to producers for verified predation losses. The funding for the compensation is
administered by MAFF’s business Risk Management Branch. The Prevention and
Mitigation Components involve the proactive management of predator populations and
the reactive management of problem predators respectively. These components are
funded by Agriculture Environment Initiative Program Funds which are discussed in
the Cost Share section that follows.
The BCAC is also delivering the Delta Forage Compensation, Mitigation, and Monitoring
Project. This project mitigates losses to waterfowl in the Lower Fraser River Delta
through the use of less palatable forage, lure crop and through habitat alterations
(levelling). Unavoidable losses to waterfowl are compensated. As with the predator
program, compensation is administered by MAFF’s business Risk Management Branch.
Mitigation activities are funded by Agriculture Environment Initiative Program Funds.
As previously discussed, high ungulate populations in conflict with East Kootenay
producers have prompted the BC government to create special Limited Entry Hunts
(LEHs). These hunts are intended to reduce elk numbers or dissuade them from
frequenting agricultural lands. To the extent that the program is intended to reduce the
producer’s costs (e.g. crop loss, labour and infrastructure costs) it could be considered a
‘compensation like’ incentive program. In theory, by limiting depredation and property
(fence) damage, the government and user groups could expect landowners to tolerate high
numbers of elk. However, few in the agriculture sector would accept this argument as
LEH hunts have been only moderately successful in displacing ungulates and reducing
their numbers. Depredation is most problematic in the Spring and Summer months
therefore, the displacement effect of the Fall hunt is limited. Further, despite the lure of
nutritious crops, elk quickly learn to avoid hunting pressure by becoming nocturnal or by
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 31
seeking alternate short term forage areas. Anything short of full compensation is not
likely to be considered an “incentive” within the agriculture community. In addition,
landowners must accept considerable inconvenience. They allow and coordinate hunter
access, address liability and accept some level of risk (associated with unethical hunter
behaviour).
Cost Share Programs
Cost share arrangements identify activities and works that serve multiple objectives (or
interests) and create financial partnerships that involve contributions from two or more
parties. Very often NGO’s or agencies work co-operatively with landowners to install
infrastructure that will enhance environmental values or reduce risks. Cooperating
landowners usually benefit through the installation of infrastructure that also serves
operational needs (such as a water control structure) and reduces legal liabilities. In
many cases the partner organization will purchase the necessary material, finance
installation activities and provide technical expertise. In return, landowners make
financial or ‘in-kind’ contributions that involve labour and/or the use of equipment.
Landowners can also bear opportunity and options value costs if the projects preclude
future uses. Cost share arrangements are often linked to stewardship agreements that can
specify management objectives, maintenance schedules and other landowner
responsibilities. There are many examples of cost share programs in BC.
Ducks Unlimited Canada (DU) has pioneered win/win cost share solutions to
environmental and operational challenges. Very often DU applies engineering and
biological expertise to hydrologic challenges. The water control infrastructures that often
result are designed to meet the landowner’s operational needs while simultaneously
producing ecological benefits.
The Habitat Stewardship Program is a federal government cost share program that is
centred on the protection and recovery of species at risk and is implemented by
Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and the Parks Canada Agency. This
program funds "stewards" for implementing activities that protect or conserve habitats for
species designated as nationally "at risk". These activities must take place on private
lands, provincial Crown lands, Aboriginal lands, or in aquatic and marine areas across
Canada. The program also fosters partnerships among organizations interested in the
recovery of species at risk. It supports organizations and individuals in their efforts to
meet the requirements of the National Recovery Program and the new Species at Risk
Act. This cost share program aims to achieve 2:1 leveraging on funds that it invests, so
that for every $1 provided by the HSP, $2 is raised by project recipients. As stated, this
leveraging can take the form of either financial or in-kind resources (volunteered labour,
products, or services).
The British Columbia Environmental Farm Plan Program is a major government
funded, environmental cost share and compensation program that operates in the
agricultural setting. The program is delivered by the BC Agriculture Council (BCAC)
and is a partnership involving the federal government’s Agriculture and Agri-food
Canada (AAFC), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Environment Canada, the BC
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 32
ministries of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) and Water, Land and Air
Protection. The program’s stated vision is a sustainable agriculture industry in British
Columbia and its values are:
protection of the land;
enhancement of the effectiveness and competitiveness of farms and ranches; and
open and transparent communication, except where protection of confidentiality
is needed, and building partnerships.
The program’s aims and objectives are to:
Encourage farmers and ranchers to be better stewards of the land;
Ensure the future of the BC agricultural industry through the further
implementation of Beneficial Management Practices;
Foster partnerships with agencies;
Be a proactive process to help farmers and ranchers identify environmental
opportunities and risks on their own land;
Be confidential and voluntary;
Raise awareness of progress being made on the land;
Improve farm profitability;
Improve the public perception of agriculture;
Reduce conflicts between agriculture and environmental interest; and
Reduce wildlife impacts to agricultural lands.
These goals are achieved through a planning process that identifies environmental values
and liabilities on the farm (or farm consortium). The information is then used to develop
a priority ranking system that guides activities and works undertaken to manage
environmental values and risks. Further guidance is provided in a series of best
management practice (BMP) guidebooks. Funding is provided on a cost share basis and
spending caps limit the program’s spending on any given activity for each applicant.
Should applicants be able to attract further external funding, opportunities to ‘stack’
funding exist within specified limits. The program addresses a variety of environmental
issues and identifies 26 different activities or ‘codes’ that are eligible for funding. All
activities have direct or indirect fish and wildlife habitat implications. It should be noted
that the program will fund fencing projects to prevent wildlife related damage to stored
and standing crops.
The BCAC is the delivery agent, through its Environment Programs Committee, EFP
Coordinators, producer organizations and producers. Agriculture Environment
Stewardship Initiative funds delivered through the Investment Agriculture Foundation of
BC from AAFC were used to initiate the program. The BCMAFF supplies additional
resources, such as personnel and facilities.
The Agriculture Environment Partnership Initiative (AEPI) and Agriculture
Environment Stewardship Initiative (AESI) Funds are cost share initiatives that are
collectively referred to as Agriculture Environment Initiative Funds. These funds
were established to assist the agriculture industry in resolving key environmental issues
and wildlife agriculture conflicts while promoting ecological sustainability and
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 33
enhancing the viability of the industry. Projects that rely on these funding sources
typically address specific conflicts within defined geographic areas. The AEPI, was
developed provincially by Agriculture and Agri-food Canada and the BC Ministry of
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries and is funded through the Agri-food Futures Fund.
The AESI is a similar program that began as a national AAFC program. In the BC
context, it supplements the AEPI by funding on-farm capital expenditures or wildlife
damage compensation or mitigation projects.
These joint industry government agriculture environment initiatives are intended to assist
in the resolution of issues faced by government and industry such as:
Increased pressure on governments to enact new environmental regulations;
Greater public expectations regarding environmental stewardship on farms;
Greater economic impact from non-compliance;
Ongoing programs and research have identified actions that need to be taken;
Increased cost to farmers to achieve public benefits/expectations;
Limited ability of farmer to pass on increased costs for public good;
Long standing wildlife conflicts aggravated by wildlife adapting to agricultural crops;
Public expectation to have more wildlife for viewing or hunting; and
Fewer tools available to farmers to effectively control wildlife impacts
There are benefits to both farmers and the general public from resolution of the main
issues or constraints, such as:
Technological innovation;
Integrated pest management that can ensure continued and new access to markets;
Advances in sustainable production;
Cooperative enhancement of environmental values on farms;
Innovative ways to manage impacts of wildlife on agriculture;
Public awareness of agriculture’s positive contribution to the environment;
providing habitat,
new environmentally friendly farm practises,
potential for enhanced riparian areas, and
Farmers awareness of environmental goals and how they can contribute.
The above benefits cannot be achieved by the industry without the support and
involvement of industry organizations, private and public funds, and regulatory agencies.
Applications are generally submitted and/or supported by farm organizations or groups.
As with the EFP Program, the Agriculture Environment Funds are administered by the
BCAC which assists in the development project plans, monitors participant progress
and metes out costs share cash payments.
These programs fund several projects that are designed to address ungulate depredation
issues through compensation, mitigation or prevention (fencing). In general,
compensation is not deemed to be a cost effective solution in the long term because
underlying problems are not resolved. Understandably, attention has shifted to
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 34
mitigation and prevention activities. Mitigation activities could include lure cropping
on crown land and/or multi-stakeholder/agency ventures designed to manage wildlife
populations and their habitat use patterns. Prevention, by in large, involves the fencing
(game proof) of lands where depredation problems occur. Mitigation activities have
not been adopted on a widespread basis and have not resolved many of the ongoing
ungulate/crop loss issues within the province. As a result the producers have turned to
prevention, or the fencing-off of fields, to protect their crops and resolve the issue.
Ungulate fencing pilot projects have been undertaken in the East Kootenay, the
Okanagan Valley, the Creston Valley, the Christian Valley and on Southern Vancouver
Island. These pilots are in the process of winding down and in the future, preventative
fencing initiatives will be supported under the Environmental Farm Plan.
Another widespread project type that draws upon AEI cost share funding involves the
fencing of [hay] stack yards to exclude ungulates.
Certification Programs
Certification programs identify products (often with labels) and associate them with a
set of practices and standards that ensure product quality and/or external outcomes (e.g.
environmental standards). In an era of heightened consumer awareness and concerns,
participants can gain a marketing advantage by linking their products with ecologically
favorable practices or increased product quality.
Through the Agri-Food Choice and Quality Act and its regulations, the provincial
government can establish voluntary programs that allow producers to have their
practices or products certified. Indeed, it has done so by establishing the British
Columbia Certified Organic Program (COABC). The Certified Organic Association of
BC is designated as the provincial program administrator, and it works closely with
ministry staff in monitoring and promoting the program's credibility and acceptance in
the market place. The program’s administration activities are focused on auditing
member associations for compliance and administering the use of the program's official
mark. The COABC also carries out initiatives that support the growth of the organic
sector in the province.
Other certification programs can provide marketing advantages by appealing to
discerning consumers and niche markets. For example, The Land Conservancy (an
environmental NGO), has established a Conservation Partners Program that promotes
the protection of important habitats on privately owned agricultural lands by providing
market recognition and technical assistance to growers who participate in conservation on
their farm.
In return for their active involvement in habitat conservation, participants are rewarded
with a “conservation partners” label to place on their produce boxes and products. The
label is supplemented with information about the program that is provided to all levels of
the market.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 35
Participating producers become involved in conservation in one of several ways,
depending on the characteristics of their property and their interests. The program
promotes the protection, restoration and enhancement of important habitats. Landowner
commitments are defined in Partnership Agreements and they can consist of stewardship
agreements or longer-term agreements such as conservation covenants or transfer of title.
Where applicable, longer-term plans are prepared and they outline the stewardship
commitments for the property. Annual monitoring ensures the terms of the partnership
agreement are upheld, and helps all parties to evaluate their progress.
All private land conservation programs could potentially benefit through affiliations with
certification programs. They create low cost opportunities for existing programs to
provide financial incentives to landowners by enhancing their marketing power.
Access Lease Agreements
Several forms of access agreements are in use in BC. None are delivered by government.
They involve the provision of access and sporting opportunities to anglers, hunters and
other outdoors enthusiasts in return for fees. They can be lease agreements, access fee
agreements and commercial game clubs. Lease arrangements provide individuals or
groups with exclusive access rights to a defined area over a specified time frame. Access
fee arrangements provide individuals with nonexclusive access rights to a defined area
for specified time frames. Commercial game clubs can take the form of a lease or access
fee arrangements and involve the release of reared, non-indigenous upland birds for
hunting purposes. These landowner/user arrangements may be formally established
through written contracts and involve an exchange of money or they may be entirely
informal and involve a bartering of services. The use of access fee and leasing systems
by private landowners appears to be on the rise BC.
The leasing of waterfowl hunting sites in the Lower Mainland has long been practiced.
Such arrangements occur commonly where demand is high and where the supply of
quality hunting opportunities is low. However, within the Thompson/Nicola Region,
many of the larger ranches now charge an access fee to hunters and fishers (Mike Rose,
Doug Jury and Joe Gardner, pers. com. 2004). Reports from other regions such as the
Cariboo and the Peace suggest that the practice is growing there also. In the latter two
regions, guide outfitters have been known to secure exclusive access for their clients
through lease arrangements and this has frustrated resident hunters who are then “shut
out”. The move toward all three systems appears to be following US trends. Petersen
(1992) reported dramatic increases in leased access to hunters in Montana starting in the
early 80s. He attributed the phenomenon to several factors including increased game
numbers, decreased land values (e.g. depressed agricultural economy), increased
affluence and mobility of hunters and increased out-of-state awareness of hunting
opportunities. As many of these factors are applicable, a similar trend should is expected
in BC. Producers can hope to gain several advantages through financial arrangements
with user groups. In addition to augmenting their revenue streams in financially
challenging times, landowners can control access, develop relationships and limit the
risks that can be associated with irresponsible recreation.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 36
The simple access lease systems currently employed in BC can provide some incentives
for habitat conservation and stewardship activities. However, the arrangements are
exclusive, potentially elitist and the lessors and lessees are not required to consult with
government or society when establishing and managing towards objectives. Accordingly,
lease arrangements are generally inconsistent with the North American Model for
Wildlife Conservation.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 37
Appendix 3: Property Rights in Wildlife Outside of BC and a
Description of Some Enfranchisement Programs in the United
States
Europe
The general belief that European game animals are privately owned is not accurate. In
reality the property rights in wildlife and the system used to regulate hunting are highly
varied. Scottish wild game, such as red deer, is a common resource and owned by no
one until rendered into possession (rule of capture). However, landowners possess
hunting rights, and determine and regulate the harvest of animals on their lands.
Estates generate revenues through the provision of sport hunting, (“stalking” or
shooting”) opportunities. If deer populations exceed what is desired, animals are culled
and the meat becomes a commercial commodity. While the land owner, or consortia
(deer management groups), manages wildlife as a de facto private resource, a statutory
government agency known as the Deer Commission does have the right to cull animals
on private land if the population exceeds established targets.
The German hunting and game management model is renowned, though it has both
advocates and detractors. It is revered by some as an economically efficient model that
maximizes the value of wildlife and promotes stewardship. Most North American
hunters view it as elitist and economically inefficient because it caters only to a limited
subset of the overall population. As with other European countries, hunting rights
belong to the landowner or landowner co-operative and these rights can in turn be
leased out to third parties. Once harvested, wildlife is owned by the landowner and
may be sold at market. Hunting seasons, however, are set by the Federal government
and regulated under the Hunting Act.
In Norway, as with Scotland, the landowners own the hunting rights for their land and are
free to let the rights to others. However, wildlife is a national resource and the quotas and
hunting restrictions are set by the government. Landowners are given harvest quotas and
they benefit through the sale of hunting rights. Because Norway does not have a guide-
outfitter industry, the sale price of individual hunting rights does not normally exceed the
market value of the meat.
In Italy, wildlife is owned by the state which manages and regulates hunting
opportunities. Special hunting rights are not extended to landowners and private lands
may be used by ‘wandering hunters’ unless under cultivation or adequately fenced
(Cirelli 2002). Trade in wild animals (and by products) is forbidden.
Slovenia’s Law on Wildlife and Hunting identifies wildlife as a state owned resource, and
the state grants the right to hunt. Citizens wishing to hunt must be the members of a local
Hunting Clubs (Hunter Families). These clubs then lease hunting rights from the state.
Landowners are not able to sell hunting or even access rights to hunters.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 38
European wildlife management and ownership systems are highly variable and complex.
Governments often control hunting regulations and licensing, however, the landowners in
many Western European countries enjoy de facto private property rights in wildlife.
While they may not own the wildlife (until captured) they are able to exclude access,
charge for hunting rights and make and execute population and habitat management
decisions.
User-based incentive systems are well established in the Europe where landowners are
able to sell hunting rights. This is especially true if landowners are also able to control
(or partner in) population and habitat management decisions. This, in conjunction with
the sale of game meat, can be lucrative and sufficient to motivate habitat management
concessions on private land. However, this system amounts to a private (or near private)
wildlife management system and is not consistent with traditional North American
wildlife conservation policy or the current thinking of most BC anglers and hunters.
Further, while the incentive to manage for game animals is evident, the system does not
necessarily encourage a holistic approach to the management of ecosystems.
Pakistan
Pakistan hosts several incentive based conservation initiatives that are based on tourism
(i.e. trophy) hunting. Like BC, this Asian country is topographically complex with
coastal and continental climates and these factors lead to a diversity of ecosystems. Male
markhor and urial (both bovids) bear magnificent horns and are highly valued trophy
species. Foreign hunters are willing to pay tens of thousand of dollars (US) for guide
services and the opportunity to shoot trophy males. Despite the value of these animals,
the herds suffered declines in the 20th
Century. Traditional domestic goat herding
practices reduced forage availability and increased disease transmission. In addition,
wildlife populations were hunted for trophies and meat in a largely unregulated (open
access) system which did not create conservation incentives. Individuals engaged in a
‘race to the bottom’ and populations persisted remote areas only.
The economic potential of tourist (trophy) hunting prompted NGOs, such as the World
Conservation Union (IUCN), to work with tribal chieftains, communities and Pakistani
governments to restructure local economies (Woodford 2004, Ahamad 2004, Awan
2004). They have created and managed a tourist hunting industry that distributes
revenues within communities and thereby creates conservation incentives. Rangers
police for poachers and monitor the herds and the levels of domestic grazing are starting
to be managed. These actions have resulted in greater levels of gainful employment and
wealth in local communities and increased wildlife populations.
While the Pakistani examples may not be directly applicable to BC, they provide
evidence that programs must secure resident and community co-operation in order to
affect conservation on communal or state lands
Africa
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 39
Wildlife property rights in Africa are highly varied. Very often wildlife has remained the
property of the state. In other countries, including Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa
and Namibia, wildlife on private land becomes de facto privately owned when the land is
enclosed by game proof fencing. In this circumstance, landowners are free to sell hunting
rights, trade in wildlife (as breeding stock or as meat) and set their own habitat and
population management objectives. Further, they are able to hunt on their lands without
purchasing a government licence. In unfenced areas wildlife belongs to, and is managed
by, the State (Cirelli 2002). In Burkino Faso, wildlife is the property of the state
however, (as with western Europe) hunting rights belong to the landowner. In Tanzania
wildlife (outside of parks) is property of the state which authorises and regulates all
harvesting (Singleton 2004).
The privatization of wildlife has led to some positive outcomes for conservation in
Africa. Landowners have shifted from traditional practices (grazing) to wildlife
recreation industries when they could hope to capture greater benefits (Muir-Leresche
and Nelson 2000). In many instances blended wildlife/cattle operations are the most
profitable. This has improved game and habitat management, motivated reintroductions
and reduced competition with domestic livestock. Further the system has engendered
ecosystem based approaches to habitat management by encouraging landowners to form
co-operatively managed conservancies as large as 840, 000 acres (Seasholes 2002). The
economic tradeoffs between wildlife versus traditional livestock operations are complex
and dependant on social, ecological, economic and political considerations. As with
Canada, much of Africa is marginally capable of supporting agriculture—even ranching
(Muir-Leresche and Nelson 2000). These lands can often support rich wildlife
populations that can form the basis of lucrative and sustainable economies.
While a privatized wildlife management system may offer significant environmental
advantages, the systems are in direct conflict with North American principles of public
ownership. African examples would appear to lack lessons applicable to BC, however,
they demonstrate that where landowners are provided with financial incentives to change
their land use practices and actively manage wildlife habitats, they are willing to do so.
The model has led to reintroductions, species recovery, increased game populations and
an ecosystem based approach toward the management of habitats – along with improved
economic opportunities for residents.
Australia
Australia has experienced undesired environmental outcomes, such as salinisation, that
result from agricultural practices not suited to the land. In response, innovative trials to
investigate the commercial value of wildlife as an incentive to change land use practices
and restore habitats have been initiated by the Australian Government’s Rural Industries
Research and Development Corporation. The trials encourage conservation through
commercial uses (recreational and consumptive) of indigenous flora and fauna. The
premise being, if ecosystem services and products are valued as assets by landowners,
economic reasons to conserve and manage threatened ecosystems will emerge. If so,
more environmentally favourable and profitable land use practices may result.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 40
The program is surprisingly similar to some of the African models discussed previously.
Landowners do not necessarily reject past practices. Instead they are provided with
opportunities to benefit financially through an integrated approach to the management of
natural resources and livestock or crops. Marketable products such as kangaroo hides
and meat could prove lucrative and justify reductions in grazing pressure (by cattle) or
reductions in the proportion of the land base under cultivation. Ecotourism and the
commercial use of a variety of other products such a “bush tucker”, plant products and
medicines is also promoted. Further, by restructuring businesses and economies around
natural ecosystems where possible, Australians stand to gain ecological services and
preserve biodiversity (Wilson 2004).
Some programs encourage Australian landowners to form wildlife management
conservancies that involve large scales foster ecosystem based management approaches.
Grazing rotations over larger areas allow plant communities to recover and maintain their
productivity and habitat values. Conservancies allow the resources to be pooled and
create economies of scale. These advantages can, in turn, stimulate new and more
sustainable economies.
Canadian Provinces
Other Canadian Provinces offer an array of private land incentive programs similar to that
of BC. However, many provinces provide opportunities for game farming that are far
more flexible. Alberta allows landowners to farm wild boar, bison, elk, white-tailed deer,
mule deer and moose. In addition to selling meat, these operators are allowed to sell live
animals and have found a market in Cervid Harvesting Preserves (CHPs). These
preserves are legal in Saskatchewan and Quebec and allow the release of game farmed,
indigenous animals into enclosures for the purposes of hunting. Currently harvest
preserves for wild boar and bison are legal in Alberta and the Alberta White-tail and
Mule Deer Association continues to lobby the provincial government to allow CHPs in
Alberta. The Association advocates for the private ownership of deer on large tracts of
fenced land that would be available to paying clients. The Association’s 2004 proposal
was rejected by the Alberta Government in however, it illustrates that many landowners
believe CHPs are legitimate and will exert pressure for its legalisation.
This pressure is not limited to provinces west of the Rockies. Requests for the expansion
of game farming opportunities in BC have been made to WLAP and MAFF (Mike Badry
pers. com.). Interest has declined over the last several years likely due to reports of
chronic wasting disease (CWD) found in elk and deer in Alberta, Saskatchewan and in
several USA states.
The United States of America
In the United States, authority for most big game species has been devolved to the
individual states and, as such, a variety of private land incentive programs have evolved.
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 41
This section focuses on the many state coordinated, landowner enfranchisement programs
that have evolved.
The mention of US style user-based incentive programs evokes images of fee hunting in
Texas where landowners can enclose their holdings with game proof fences and charge
for access. Furthermore, landowners can legally introduce exotic ungulate species and,
provided they are contained within fenced enclosures, they remain the property of the
land owner. Landowners invest in habitat management, watering and feeding
infrastructure and in client facilities. The suspiciously high success rates and enclosures
have given rise to the derisive term “canned hunts”.
Contrary to popular belief, indigenous wildlife in Texas is not privately owned. Hunters
must be licensed and abide by the harvest regulations of the state. However, this
distinction may be somewhat academic because game fencing gives landowners almost
complete control over wildlife. As with all systems, there are offsetting pros and cons to
the Texas example. The intensive management of exotic and indigenous ungulates may
be to the detriment of natural ecosystems. Fenced in hunts diminish the image of the
hunter and are not consistent with the philosophy of most BC hunters. While the system
does have significant shortcomings, it does encourage landowners to invest in habitat
management. The government has developed a Private Lands and Habitat Program that
provides technical assistance and encourages landowners to participate in wildlife
management associations and apply of ecosystem based approaches to the management
of wildlife populations and habitats. In addition, a Landowner Incentive Program is
offered by the state and it funds the enhancement of rare species habitat in return for
management agreements.
Nevada’s Elk Incentive Tag Program provides participating landowners with
transferable tags that may be marketed. The number of tags issued is based on the private
land’s area-based contribution to elk habitat within management units that are often
comprised of a combination of private land parcels and public land. As such, incentives
to manage habitats exist but they are muted by an averaging effect. Landowners are not
required to allow public hunting, improve habitats or prepare a management plan. When
enrolled in this program, landowners are not eligible for the state compensation program
that addresses crop depredation.
Oregon’s Landowner Preference Program allocates big game tags (one third of which
are transferable) to landowners who are then free to hunt on their lands or issue the
transferable hunting tags to paying clients. Public access concessions are not required.
Allocations are based on property size and they are relatively small. For example, a
parcel of 80, 000 acres would generate a landowner allocation of only 9 big game tags.
The program accommodates holdings as small as 40 acres and appears to be oriented
toward resolving landowner/wildlife conflicts rather than the promotion of stewardship.
A small stewardship incentive is provided by two additional tags that may be awarded to
the landowner if he/she commits to habitat improvements. In addition to this program,
the state funds projects that manage public access and create habitat improvements on
private lands through the appropriately named, Access and Habitat Program. It places a
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 42
priority on programs that address habitat improvements on a cost share basis or that
alleviate wildlife damage. The maintenance of public access on private land is viewed
favourably but not a requisite. Finally, the Wildlife and Habitat Conservation
Management Program provides landowners with property tax incentives to protect
habitats on their lands through wildlife habitat conservation and management plans.
Public use is not a requisite and there is no minimum property size.
California has developed a Private Land Management Program that allocates the entire
harvestable surplus that is generated on private land to the participating landowner. In
return, landowners must conduct inventories and submit and receive approval for a
management plan. Landowners receive state issued, ranch specific transferable hunting
permits, harvest limits and seasons. Wildlife is not privately owned and continues to be
the property of the state. As with Texas, the system does not provide free hunting
opportunities to residents. The system’s proponents argue that affordable hunts are
available to residents (Leal and Grewell 1999). Habitat stewardship assurances are
provided in the management plan, participating landowners are licensed for five year
periods and their properties are monitored annually to ensure the management plans are
executed.
Utah’s Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit Program places no direct expectations
on landowners for habitat stewardship. Participating landowners are allocated specific
transferable tags, special seasons and flexible bag limits. The resident allocation is
administered through a lottery system. Allocations are specified in management plans
which are approved by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources. Properties must be at
least 10,000 acres to be eligible for the program. While the system does not require a
specific schedule of habitat improvements, the harvestable surplus (and therefore the
amount of tags issued) is a function of habitat quality and therefore, indirect incentives
exist for sound habitat management practices. In addition, while most CWMU
agreements are renewed annually, longer contracts are being considered for participants
who commit to habitat improvements.
New Mexico’s Landowner Sign Up System provides participating landowners with
transferable tags that may be sold. The number of landowner tags is based on the private
land’s contribution to occupied elk habitat within management regions that can be
comprised of both private public land. As such, incentives to manage habitats exist but
are muted by an averaging effect. Landowners are not required to improve habitats or
prepare a management plan however they are required to provide access to a limited
number of hunters (selected by lottery) who hunt for free.
Colorado’s Ranching for Wildlife Program simultaneously addresses public access
opportunities and habitat stewardship on private lands. Annual allowable harvest rates
are determined for the enrolled ranches and previous/anticipated hunter success is then
used to calculate the number of tags. Tags are allocated to the landowner and the state,
the former being free to use his/her transferable tags, share them with friends, or market
them. The marketing opportunity generates revenues for the participating landowners
and is the program’s financial inducement. The state issues its tags to resident hunters
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 43
through a lottery system and the landowner is obligated to provide access to the lottery
winners. At all times wildlife remains the property of the state and all hunters must
obtain the appropriate state issued licences before hunting. The state and the landowners
co-operate in the establishment of hunting seasons that often segregate the public and
private hunters in time. Habitat stewardship is achieved through a co-operative
landowner and Division of Wildlife process that results in wildlife management plans.
These plans establish objectives and specify ways in which habitat values can be
improved. Landowners then execute their plans in a manner consistent with regulations,
and operating guidelines. In general, properties must be at least 12,000 acres to be
eligible for the program. The seasons and the allocation of public and private licences are
specified in co-operative, multi-year agreements (contracts). Participating ranches are
monitored by a state evaluation team to ensure compliance.
Colorado has also established a Walk-in Access Program that provides hunters with
access to private land in order to hunt small game, migratory birds and furbearers. The
state generates revenues through the sale of annual access permits. Once purchased, the
discretionary stamp is affixed to the hunter’s regular small game licence. The revenues
are then used to lease access rights for small game hunting from landowners. With
permission from landowners, hunters may pursue big game. Very often the private lands
enrolled are also enrolled in other programs that are esigned to promote stewardship such
as the Federal Conservation Reserve Program.
Washington State’s Private Lands Wildlife Management Area Program is very
consistent with Colorado’s Ranching for Wildlife Program. In the Washington program
properties must be a minimum of 5000 acres. The Department of Fish and Wildlife has
initiated several other incentive programs that provide incentives for stewardship or
public access. The Hunter Access Management Program in state run and it coordinates
and manages hunter access onto private lands. This program manages hunter use in high
value bird hunting areas but does not provide financial incentives. The Waterfowl Cover
Crop and the Partnership for Pheasants programs do provide financial incentives to
landowners through the leasing of cover crops or pheasant habitats in return for public
access. In general, Washington State provides and array of programs that can be tailored
to suit a variety of circumstances.
Idaho’s Access Yes! Program and Montana’s Block Management Program have
developed hunter access programs that reward participating landowners with revenues
generated by the state licence lottery systems through hunting licence sales. In return,
landowners provide access to hunters through several systems. Some are unregulated
while others employ a hunter sign in/permission system. These programs do not require
landowners to change their land management practices and do not require lengthy
enrolment periods. The Idaho program issues annual and multi-year contracts depending
on landowner preference and the land’s habitat values. While these programs lack direct
habitat stewardship planning components, the lands must be of value to wildlife and
hunters in order to be eligible and thus, subtle stewardship incentives are at play. Further,
other private land habitat enhancement programs exist and can be combined to create
systems that address access and stewardship. For example, the Habitat Montana
Jeff Morgan, July 8/2005 Draft 44
Program uses hunting licence fee monies to lease valuable habitats or to acquire
easements (covenants) and to undertake enhancement works. Montana’s Upland Game
Bird Habitat Enhancement program provides cost share funding for habitat
enhancement on private lands that remain open for “reasonable” levels of public hunting.
References:
Benson, Delwin L., Ross Shelton and Don W. Steinbach. 1999. Wildlife Stewardship and
Recreation on Private Lands. Texas A&M University Press, College Station.
Cirelli, M.T. 2002. Legal Tends in Wildlife Management. Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations. Rome.
Muir_Leresche, Kay and Robert H. Nelson. 2000. Private Property Rights to Wildlife:
The Southern African Experiment. Website Essay at the Competitive Enterprise
nstitute Website (www.cei.org)
Seasholes, Brian. 2002, Private Conservation of Wildlife in Africa. Sixth Annual New
York State Conference on Private Property Rights. Albany, New York.
Wilson, George. 2004. Sustainable Wildlife Enterprises: Trials of the Commercial Value
of Wildlife as an Incentive to Restore On-Farm Habitat. Rural Industries esearch
and Development Corporation. Canberra, Australia.