Download pdf - Michaels AI and Legal Change Draft - DePaul University · 2019. 7. 28. · AI, Legal Change, and SOP Michaels DRAFT – July 2019 1 Artificial Intelligence, Legal Change, and Separation

AI,LegalChange,andSOP MichaelsDRAFT–July2019

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ArtificialIntelligence,LegalChange,andSeparationofPowers

AndrewC.Michaels* Somecontemporarylegalacademicliteraturehasbeenarguing,invarious

forms,thatreplacinghumanmadelawwithartificialintelligencewillorshould

happen.Thisessaydisagrees,andexaminesanumberofconcernsthatarenot

adequatelyaddressedintheliterature.Inshort,proposalstoautomatelawboth

underappreciateandundervaluethehumanaspectsoflaw.

First,thisessaywilldiscusstheproperroleofcourtsinlegalchange,thatis,

indevelopingthelawandadaptingittoaconstantlychangingsociety.Inour

currentsystem,courtsdomorethansimplyapplythelaw,theyalsoinarealsense

makelaw,thoughtheydosoinaslowerandmoremeasuredwaythanlegislatures.

Thatis,theymakelawasthoughtheywerefindingit.Theymustbalancerespectfor

precedentandstabilityagainsttheneedforlawtoadaptthroughadjudication.How

wouldthisworkinasystemofautomatedlaw?Canrobotsreallysuccessfully

balancethevaluesofstabilityandchangeinthewaythatjudgesdo?

Second,byclaimingthatmachinedecisionswouldbemoreconsistently

“accurate”theargumentforrobotjudgesseemsinherentlyformalisticandseemsto

overlooktheteachingsoflegalrealism,specificallythepointthatnoteverycasehas

alegallybestorrightanswer.Judgessometimesmustchoosebetween

incommensurablevalues.Consistencymaybeovervalued,asthedifferencesof

opinionthatarisebetweenjudgesmayhelpfleshoutdebatesaboutwhatisthebest

laworpolicy.Onceitisfullyacknowledgedthatatleastpartofjudginginvolves

makingpolicyandvaluejudgments,theargumentforturningsuchdecisionsoverto

machinesbecomesamoredifficultonetomake.

*AssistantProfessorofLaw,UniversityofHoustonLawCenter.Theauthorthanksthosewhohaveprovidedhelpfulcomments,includingthosewhoparticipatedinthe2019SouthEasternAssociationofLawSchoolsNewScholarsWorkshop,aswellastheFall2019IPColloquiumatBYULawSchool.


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Third,theliteraturearguingforartificiallyintelligentlawseems

astonishinglyshortsighted,overlookingcertainpossiblelongtermeffects.Without

humanjudges,wecouldeventuallylosethecommunityoflegalexpertspaying

attentiontothelaw.Thatis,wewillhavereplacedlegalthoughtwithartificiallegal

thought.Thiswilllikelyhinderourabilitytoadjustthelawtochangingsocietal

circumstances.Itwouldalsomakesocietyasawholelessawareofthelaw,simply

obeyingtheauthorityoftheblackboxlawmachines.Withoutacommunityof

peoplepayingattentiontoandthinkingaboutthelaw,thelawcouldbecomemore

susceptibletobeingco-opted.

Fourth,thisessaywilllookattheeffectsofautomatedlawonseparationof

powers.Wouldautomatedcourtsbeabletoprovideasufficientcheckontheother

twobranchesastheyaresupposedtoinoursystemofseparationofpowers?

WouldtheyrunafouloftheArticleIIIcaseorcontroversyrequirement?Although

automationmaybemoreappropriateinagencyadjudicationorinotheraspectsof

theexecutivebranch,Iarguethatitisinappropriateinthejudiciary.

Myargumenthereisprimarilyagainstreplacingtheactualdecision-making

ofthejudicialbranchwithartificialintelligence.IamnotopposingusingAIasatool

toaidinresearchoranAIstaffattorney.1NoramIopposedtoAIintheprivate

sector,say,formedicalpurposes,2orevensomeAIlawyerstotheextenttheyare

effectivewithhumanjudges.3NoramIevenarguinghereagainsttheuseofAIfor

decision-makinginadministrativeagenciesoftheexecutivebranch.4Replacingthe

judicialbranchdecision-makers,i.e.,ArticleIIIjudges,withartificialintelligence

strikesmeasparticularlyproblematic,sothatiswhatIfocusonhere.

1SeeEugeneVolokh,ChiefJusticeRobots,68DUKEL.J.1135,1148(2019).2Cf.JasonChungandAmandaZink,HeyWatson,CanISueYouforMalpractice?ExaminingtheLiabilityofArtificialIntelligenceinMedicine,ASIA-PACIFICJ.HLTHL.,POL’Y&ETHICS(2017)(availableat:https://ssrn.com/abstract=3076576)3ThoughaslongaswehavehumanjudgesasIargueweshould,itseemsclearthattherewillbeaneedforatleastsomehumanlawyers.4SeePartV,infra.


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PartIwillbrieflyintroducetheargumentsthatsomecontemporaryscholars

makeinfavorofreplacinglawwithartificialintelligenceandoffersomepreliminary

responsesandthoughts.PartsII-Vwillthentrackthefourmajorresponsessetforth

above.Thisessaywillthenbreiflyconcludebyconsideringsomeofthepotential

benefitsofartificialjudgesorartificiallaw,andsomealternativewaysinwhichsuch

benefitscouldbeachieved.

I–TheArgumentsforArtificialLaw

Inhisrecentessay,ChiefJusticeRobots,EugeneVolokharguesthatifAI

technologyreachesthepointwhereitcan“createpersuasiveopinions,capableof

regularlywinningopinion-writingcompetitionsagainsthumanjudges,”then“we

shouldinprincipleacceptitasajudge.”5AsVolokhrecognizes,thisisa“thought

experiment,”asAItechnologyiscurrentlyfarfromthispoint.6Nevertheless,sucha

thoughtexperimentcanprovokeimportantdiscussionsabouttheproperroleof

humansversusartificialintelligenceinourlaw.Thus,althoughIdisagreewith

Volokh’smainconclusions,Iamgratefulforhisposingthethoughtexperiment.

Volokh’sargumentthatweshouldreplacejudgeswithrobotsiscontingent

ontherobotspassingwhathecallsthe“ModifiedJohnHenryTest,”anopinion

writingcompetitionwherein“acomputerprogramisarrayedagainst,say,ten

averageperformers”inthegivenfield,andif“thecomputerperformsatleastaswell

astheaverageperformer,”thenitpassesthetestandisan“adequatesubstitutefor

humans.”7Whethertheprogrampassesthetestisdeterminedby“apanelof,say,

tenhumanjudgeswhoareknowntobeexpertsinthesubject,”whomust“evaluate

everyone’sperformancewithoutknowingwhichparticipantisacomputerand

5Volokh,supra,68DUKEL.J.at1135(asidefromcreatingpersuasiveopinions,asecondconditionisthatthesoftwaremust“beadequatelyprotectedagainsthackingandsimilarattacks”).6Id.at1137.7Id.at1138-39.


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whichisahuman.”8Thispanelofexpertswillbehereinreferredtoasthe

“evaluators,”asinVolokh’sessay.Oneobviousquestionishowdowechoosethese

evaluators,andwhyshouldwebemoreconfidentinourchoiceofapanelof

evaluatorsthanweareinourchoiceofjudges?

AccordingtoVolokh,“prospectiveAISupremeCourtJusticesshouldbe

measuredagainstthequalityofaveragecandidatesforthejob–generally

experienced,respectedappellatejudges.”9Volokh’scriterionforevaluationis

“persuasiveness,”thatis,“iftheHenryTestevaluatorpanelistsarepersuadedbythe

argumentfor”theAIjudge’schosenresult.IfanAIcomputerprogramcan

consistentlypassthistest,Volokharguesthatweshouldadoptit,becauseitis

“likelytobemuchcheaper,quicker,andlesssubjecttocertainformsofbias,”thus

makingthelegalsystem“notonlymoreefficientbutalsofairerandmoreaccessible

topoorandmiddle-classlitigants.”10

Othershaverecentlymadesimilararguments.Forexample,AzizHuq,ina

forthcomingarticlecalled“ARighttoaHumanDecision,”arguesthatthereisno

suchright,andthatinsteadallwedoorshouldhaveis“arighttoawell-calibrated

machinedecision.”11Butwhodecideswhetherthemachinedecisioniswell

calibrated?Andifonewantstoarguethatthemachinedecisionisnotwell-

calibrated,whoexactlywouldonemakesuchargumentsto?

Inthesamevein,AnthonyCaseyandAnthonyNibletthavepredictedthatlike

self-drivingcars,“laws,too,willbeself-driving,”12andthatadvancesinartificial

intelligenceandcommunicationstechnologywill“beabletoidentifytherules

applicabletoanactualsituationandinformtheregulatedactorexactlyhowto

8Id.at1139.9Id.at1140.10Id.11AzizZ.Huq,ARighttoaHumanDecision,105VA.L.REV._(forthcoming2020).12AnthonyJ.Casey&AnthonyNiblett,Self-DrivingLaws,66U.TORONTOL.J.429,442(2016).


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comply”suchthat“microdirectiveswillbecomethedominantformoflaw[.]”13They

predictthat“opportunitiesforstatutoryinterpretationandfillingthegapsinvague

standardswilldryupascitizensaresimplyinstructedtoobeysimpledirectives.”14

CaseyandNibletthavearguedmorerecentlythat,inorderforthisautomationand

personalizationoflaw“towork,lawmakersmustknowandpreciselystatethe

objectiveoflawupfrontinawaythathasneverbeforebeenrequired.”15Thisseems

toignoreordevaluetherolethatthejudiciarynecessarilyplaysinshapingthelaw

andadaptingittounforeseensituations.

Theideaofthesescholarsseemstobethatoncewedevelopthemachines,

wecanjustentertheobjectivesthenstopthinkingaboutorpayingattentiontothe

law.Thisseemstometoshowtoomuchfaithinthemachines.Justaswhenoneis

usingGPSnavigationtheydonotlearntheirwayaround,16onceweturnlawoverto

machinesweasasocietymayforgethowtothinkaboutlaw.Evenifthemachines

areworkinginitially,thereisnoguaranteethatsomethingwon’teventuallygo

wrong.Tothecontrary,itseemswecanbefairlycertainthatsomethingeventually

willgowrong.Butifwehavelostourabilityto“dolaw”asasociety,thenwemay

havelostourabilitytoadaptwhenproblemsarise.Therearesomeotherproblems

13AnthonyJ.Casey&AnthonyNiblett,TheDeathofRulesandStandards,92IND.L.J.1401,1404 (2017). CaseyandNiblett strangely frame their argumentaspositiveratherthannormative,eventhoughtheyseemtocelebratethesechangesthattheypredict,andeventhoughthereisnoreasonthatthesechangesmustoccur.Seeid.at1405(“Ouranalysisispositiveratherthannormative.”).Ihavepreviouslycriticizedthisdeterministic aspect of theirworkand sowill not rehash the issuehere. SeeAndrewC.Michaels,AbstractInnovation,VirtualIdeas,andArtificialLegalThought,14MAR.J.BUS.&TECH.L.1,25(2019).14Casey&Niblett,92IND.L.J.at1435(emphasisadded).15AnthonyJ.Casey&AnthonyNiblett,AFrameworkfortheNewPersonalizationofLaw(September2018).16See,e.g.,JosephStromberg,IsGPSruiningourabilitytonavigateforourselves?,VOX(Sept.2,2015,11:31AM),availableathttps://www.vox.com/2015/9/2/9242049/gps-maps-navigation(“wehavegoodreasontobelievethatwhenweblindlyfollowGPSfordirection,we’renotexercisingcrucialnavigationalskills–andmanyofthescientistswhostudyhowthehumanbrainnavigatesareconcerned”).


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withreducingthecitizenrytoamassofunthinkinglemmingssimplyobeying

machines,whichwillbeexploredfurtherbelow.

II–LegalChange

OneproblemwiththeargumentthatVolokhandothersmakeisthatit

inadequatelyaccountsfortheroleofthejudiciaryinlegalchange.Volokhdoes

recognizethat“[l]awdevelopment–whethercommonlawdevelopment,

constitutionallawdevelopment,orinterpretivedevelopmentaboutstatues–often

requiresprediction:Wouldaproposedlegalruledomoregoodorharm?”17Butin

hisview,“wehumansdon’tsetthebarveryhigh,”so“AIsdon’tneedtohaveperfect

clairvoyanceorlegalstatesmanship”tobeatus.18AccordingtoVolokh,“successin

theHenryTestwillbethebestmeasureofjudicialquality,”thatis,“[i]fthe

evaluatorsarepersuadedbytheAIjudge’sprediction-basedargumentsmorethan

bythehumanjudges’arguments,whyshouldwedoubttheAIjudge’sabilitiesmore

thanwedoubtthehumanjudges’abilities?”19

Volokh’sargumentseemstobethatiftheAIjudgecanpersuadeaparticular

panelofevaluatorsataparticularpointintimethatitisbetteratwritingopinions

thanhumans,weshouldturnoverthereignsoflegalchangetoAI.Butwhatis

persuasiveatonepointintimeisnotnecessarilypersuasivelateron,asthefactual

realitiesandmoralvaluesofsocietyshift.Also,nomatterhowmany“testcases”the

evaluatorslookat,theywillneveradequatelyencompassthefullrangeofpossible

factsituationsthatcouldandwillarise.Volokh’sargumentdoesnotadequately

considerthecollaborativeandcontinuousaspects,oflegalchange,andthebenefits

tosocietyoftheprocessitself.Toexplain,amoreindepthdiscussionoftheroleof

judgesinlegalchangeisinorder.

17Volokh,68DUKEL.J.at1183.18Id.at1184.19Id.


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Althoughwrittenalmostacenturyago,BenjaminCardozo’sTheGrowthof

LawhasagooddealofrelevancetoVolokh’sthoughtexperiment.Respondingto

someagitationforamorerigidconceptionofstaredecisis,thenJudge(laterJustice)

Cardozosetforthapersuasiveexplicationanddefenseofthejudicialroleinlegal

development.20AccordingtoJudgeCardozo,legislationaloneisnotasufficient

agencyoflegalgrowth,because“[u]niquesituationscanneverhavetheiranswers

readymadeasinthecompleteletter-writingguidesorthemanualsoftheartof

conversation.”21Thatis,situationsthatthelegislature(orthepriorprecedent

writingcourt)didnotanticipateexantewillinevitablyarise,anditisthejobofthe

courtstograduallyadjustthelawexpostonacase-by-casebasis.22AsJudge

Friendlyhasexplained,it“isimpossibleforthelegislatortoforeseeeverything,”and

“acode,howevercompleteitmayappear,isnosoonerpromulgatedthanathousand

unexpectedquestionsarepresentedtothejudge.”23

Thisispartofwhyprecedentialholdingsarenot(andshouldnotbe)rigidly

setinstone,butrathercan(andshould)begraduallyshapedbysubsequent

decisions,inlightofchangingcircumstancesandnewinformation.24Evenlower

courts“narrowambiguousprecedentsthathavebecomeoutdatedinlightofnew

20SeeBENJAMINN.CARDOZO,THEGROWTHOFTHELAW132-133(1924)(“Staredecisisisnotintheconstitution,butIshouldbehalfreadytoputitthere,andtoaddtheretotherequirementofmechanicalandliteralreproduction,ifonlyitweretruethatlegislationisasufficientagencyofgrowth.Thecenturies,iftheyhaveprovedanything,haveprovedtheneedofsomethingmore.”).21Id.at133.22Id.(“Justiceisnottobetakenbystorm.Sheistobewooedbyslowadvances.”).23HenryJ.Friendly,ReactionsofaLawyer–NewlyBecomeJudge,71YALEL.J.218,220(1961).24SeeAndrewC.Michaels,TheHolding-DictumSpectrum,70ARK.L.REV.661,679(2017)(“generalizationswillnotalwaysbeperfect;thecourtscannotbeexpectedtoforeseeorfullyconsiderallpotentialfactsituationsfallingwithinthegeneralizationsthattheynecessarilymake”);CARDOZO,supra,at138(“Theruleasannouncedmustbedeemedtentative.Forthemanyandvaryingfactstowhichitwillbeappliedcannotbeforeseen.”);ITHIELDESOLAPOOL,TECHNOLOGIESOFFREEDOM161(1983)(“sinceprecedentisthestyleofAnglo-Saxonlaw,thecourtsdefineanewtechnologyasaspecialcaseofafamiliarone”).


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eventsortechnologies.”25AsJudgeCardozoputit:“adaptionofruleorprincipleto

changingcombinationsofeventsdemandsthecreativeactionofthejudge.”26

Thefactthatjudgeshelpshapethelawsupportsthenotionthatweare

governingourselvesthroughruleoflaw,ratherthanbeingcommandedbysome

pureassertionofauthority.27Theprimarypurposeoflegalargumentthrough

briefingandoralpresentationtoahumanjudgeisthatitprovidestheopportunity

topersuadethejudge,andthuspotentiallyindoingsoshapethelaw,totheextent

thattheopinionrenderedisprecedential.Assuch,itisnotonlyjudgesthat

currentlyshapeourlaw,butalsolitigants,acting(usually)throughlawyers.

Volokh’sargumentfocusesontheAIrobotjudge’sabilitytowritea

persuasiveopinion,28topersuadereaders,butitsaysalmostnothingabout,and

thusseemstooverlooktheimportanceof,theabilityofthejudgetobepersuaded.

Indeed,Volokh’sconceptionofanAIjudgeseemstorenderpersuasiveargumentby

litigantsmoreorlessunnecessary.29LikeVolokh,Huqsimilarlydownplaysthe

possibilityofthelawbeinginfluencedbypersuasiveargument,seemingtoimply

thatithappenssorarelythatitisn’tworthworryingabout.30

25RichardRe,NarrowingSupremeCourtPrecedentfromBelow,104GEO.L.J.921,925(2016).26CARDOZO,supra,at135.27Cf.id.at138(“Thispowerofcreation,ifitistobeexercisedwithvisionandunderstanding,exactsaphilosophyoflaw,atheoryofitsgenesisandgrowthandaim.Onlythusshallwebesavedfromtheempiricismwhichfindsinanopinionnotaprophecytoinspire,butacommandtobeobeyed.”);FrederickSchauer,GivingReasons,47STAN.L.REV.633,636-37(1995)(“Theactofgivingareasonistheantithesisofauthority.Whenthevoiceofauthorityfails,thevoiceofreasonemerges.Orviceversa.”).28SeeVolokh,68DUKEL.J.at1140-41.29Seeid.at1141(“IfwecancreateanAIbrief-writerthatcanpersuade,wecancreateanAIjudgethatcan(1)constructpersuasiveargumentsthatsupportthevariouspossibleresultsinthecase,andthen(2)choosefromallthoseargumentstheonethatismostpersuasive,andthustheresultthatcanbemostpersuasivelysupported.”).30Huq,ARighttoaHumanDecision,105VA.L.REV.at*42(“Anindividual’sopportunitytosupplyreasonstoahumandecision-makerisrelevantonlyifthose


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Volokhrecognizesthepotentiallycontroversialnatureofhisfocuson

“persuasiveness”asthekeyevaluationmetric,31buthedoesn’tfullyaddressthe

concern.Whilepersuasivenessmaybeidealforalawyer,itseemstomenotexactly

whatajudgeshouldbestrivingfor.Alawyerwritingabriefwantstomakethemost

persuasiveargumentforoneside,butthetaskofajudgewritinganopinionis

different.Thejudgemustacknowledgetheargumentsonbothsidesandexplain

whysheischoosingonesideovertheother,(orchoosingsomemiddleground),and

thendecidehowbroadlytowritethedecisionwithaneyetowardsbothitsexante

effectsandconsistencywithpriorprecedent.Moreover,whenthejudgeisfaced

withadifficultdecision,thevalueofcandorcounselsthatthejudgeshould

acknowledgethedifficulty,eventhoughthismayhinderpersuasiveness.32

Persuasivenessisalsoinherentlysubjective,(indeeditisdifficulttothinkof

manythingsthataremorequintessentiallysubjective).Decidingwhetheroneis

persuadedbyanargument(likejudging)oftenrequiresachoicebetween

incommensurablevalues,itisnotamatterofmerenumericalcalculation.33Tothe

reasonshavesomelikelihoodofinfluencingaprocess’soutcome.Butformanyofthedecisionsforwhichalgorithmsmightbeemployedinofficialhands,suchasbenefitseligibilityorparolerevocation,thelawdelimitsaclosedsetofrelevantparameters.”).31Volokh,68DUKEL.J.at1141(“AndiftheHenryTestevaluatorpanelistsarepersuadedbytheargumentforthatresult,thatmeanstheyhaveconcludedtheresultiscorrect.ThisconnectionbetweenAIbrief-writingandAIjudgingislikelythemostcontroversialclaiminthepaper.”).32SeeDavidL.Shapiro,InDefenseofJudicialCandor,100HARV.L.REV.731,737(1987)(callingcandor“thesinequanonofallotherrestraintsonabuseofjudicialpower”);GUIDOCALABRESI,ACOMMONLAWFORTHEAGEOFSTATUTES178-181(1982)(advocatinga“choiceforcandor”andexplainingthatthe“languageofcategoricals”is“particularlypronetomanipulation”).33SeeRebeccaHawAllensworth,TheCommensurabilityMythinAntitrust,69VAND.L.REV.1,68(2016)(“Inherentintheveryideaofjudgingisthenotionofjudgment;courtsarefrequentlydelegatedregulatoryandadjudicativetasksthatmustchoosebetweenvalidandimportantsocialvalues.”);JoshuaP.Davis,LawWithoutMind:AI,Ethics,andJurisprudence1(Univ.ofS.F.LawResearchPaperNo.2018-05,2018),https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3187513(arguingthatthe“ultimatebulwarkagainstcedinglegalinterpretationtocomputers–fromhaving


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extentthatlawyersandjudgesarealltrainedtothinkinacertainway,34someofthe

subjectivityismitigated,butstillmuchofitremains,whichiswhyappellatejudges

oftendisagreeandwritedissents,despitegenerallybeingwelltrainedinlaw.

Volokh’sproposalwouldseemtomerelyshiftthesesubjectivejudgmentsfrom

judges(viewingthelawinthecontextofaconcretecaseorcontroversyexpost)

themselvestothepanelofHenrytest“evaluators,”(evaluatingthepredicted

performanceoftherobotjudgesexante).

Tobesure,theabilityofthejudiciarytomakelawismoderatedand

constrained,itisnotasdrasticandsuddenasexantelegislation,whichisreserved

forthelegislativebranch.35AsJudgeCardozoputsit:“Lawmustbestable,andyetit

cannotstandstill.”36Onewaytoseethisisthroughexaminationofthedoctrineof

retroactivity,whichholdsthatalegaldecisionchangingthelaw(e.g.,overrulinga

precedent)mustbeappliedretroactivelytoothereventstakingplacebeforethe

decisionwasrendered.37

computersusurptheresponsibilityandauthorityofattorneys,citizens,andevenjudges–maybetorecognizetheroleofmoraljudgmentinsayingwhatthelawis.”).34See,e.g.,FREDERICKSCHAUER,THINKINGLIKEALAWYER(2009).35A.BenjaminSpencer,Substance,Procedure,andtheRulesEnablingAct,66UCLAL.REV.654,676(2019)(“Thegovernmentalactofprospectivelyconferringanddefiningthebundleofobligationsandprivilegesthatyieldtheentitlementsdescribedaboveisalegislativefunction(atleastatthefederallevel)becausesuchrightsreflectbasicpolicydecisionsthatshapeoursociety.”)(citingAm.TruckingAss’nsv.Smith,496U.S.167,201(1990)(Scalia,J.,concurring)(“[P]rospectivedecisionmakingisincompatiblewiththejudicialrole,whichistosaywhatthelawis,nottoprescribewhatitshallbe.”).36CARDOZO,supra,at143.SeealsoCharlesE.ClarkandDavidM.Trubek,TheCreativeRoleoftheJudge:RestraintandFreedomintheCommonLawTradition,71YALEL.J.255,275-76(1961)(“judicialcreationisaninevitableandvitalpartofourlaw...theprocessinitshighestreachesisnotdiscoverybutcreation”).37Harperv.Va.Dep’tofTaxation,509U.S.86,97(1993)(“WhenthisCourtappliesaruleoffederallawtothepartiesbeforeit,thatruleisthecontrollinginterpretationoffederallawandmustbegivenfullretroactiveeffectinallcasesstillopenondirectreviewandastoallevents,regardlessofwhethersucheventspredateorpostdateourannouncementoftherule.”).


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Onereasonforthedoctrineofretroactivityisfairness,treatinglikecases

alike.38Iftheruleofthecaseisappliedtothepartiesinthecase,eventhoughthe

eventsleadingtothesuitobviouslytookplacebeforetheexpostjudicialdecision,

thenitshouldalsobeappliedretroactivelytoothereventstakingplacebeforethe

decisionwasrendered.Thereisafairness(ordueprocess)argumentontheother

side:howcanitbefairtoretroactivelyapplyanewruletopartieswhodidnothave

noticeofthatruleatthetimeoftheevents?Onesolutionthathasbeenproposedis

an“actualreliance”exceptiontothedoctrineofretroactivity;thatis,ifoneofthe

partiescandemonstratethattheyactuallyreliedontheold(sayoverruled)law,the

newlawshouldnotbeappliedagainstthemretroactively.39Butthatfactthatthis

solutionremainshypotheticalseemstoshowthatthatthedueprocessorfairness

problemswithretroactivityaremorehypotheticalthanactual.40

Morepertinentlytoourpresentdiscussion,thedoctrineofretroactivity

servesasanimportantcheckonjudiciallawcreation.Ifcourtsareforcedtoapply

changesinthelawretroactively,andforcedtoconfrontthepotentialunfairnessin

that,theymaydecidetoadheretostaredecisisandthepriorruleratherthanrisk

theunfairnessofretroactiveapplication,eveniftheywouldhaveruleddifferently

hadtheybeenwritingonacleanslate.41Assuch,thedoctrineofretroactivity

38Id.at95(“selectiveapplicationofnewrulesviolatestheprincipleoftreatingsimilarlysituatedpartiesthesame”)(quotingGriffithv.Kentucky,479U.S.314,323(1987)).39PaulJ.Mishkin,TheSupremeCourt1964Term-Foreword,79HARV.L.REV.56,66-67n.39(1965)(“thistechniqueofmakingdemonstratedrelianceashieldagainsttheimpactofnewlychangedlawisonewhichseemstometohavegreatpotential”).40SeeCARDOZO,supra,at122(“Thepictureofthebewilderedlitigantluredintoacourseofactionbythefalselightofadecision,onlytomeetruinwhenthelightisextinguishedandthedecisionoverruled,isforthemostpartafigmentofexcitedbrains.”).41See,e.g.,Floodv.Kuhn,407U.S.258,278-79(1972)(“Allthis,combinedwiththefloodoflitigationthatwouldfollowitsrepudication,theharassmentthatwouldensue,andtheretroactiveeffectofsuchadecision,ledtheCourttothepracticalresultthatitshouldsustaintheunequivocallineofauthorityreachingovermanyyears.”).


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encouragescourtstomakeonlyminorandgradualshiftsinthelaw,42leavingmore

drasticprospectivechangesforthelegislativebranch.43

Thedoctrineofretroactivitythusfurtherstheseparationofpowersand

ensuresthatalthoughthejudiciaryplaysaroleinlegaldevelopment,itisasofter

andmoremeasuredrolethanthelegislature.44AsJusticeScaliaputit,although

judgesdo“inarealsense‘make’law...theymakeitasjudgesmakeit,whichisto

sayasthoughtheywere‘findingit’–discerningwhatthelawis,ratherthan

decreeingwhatitistodaychangedto,orwhatitwilltomorrowbe.”45Thelegal

opinionhas“acentralforward-lookingfunctionwhichreachesfarbeyondthecause

inhand:theopinionhasoneifnotitsmajorofficetoshowhowlikecasesare

properlytobedecidedinthefuture,”suchthattheopinion’spreparation“affords

notonlyabackcheckancross-checkonanycontemplateddecisionbywayof

continuitywiththelawtodatebutprovidesalsoaduemeasureofcautionbywayof

contemplationofeffectsahead.”46

42Mishkin,79HARV.L.REV.at70(“Ineluctableretroactivitywouldseemtooperateasan‘inherentrestraint’onjudiciallawmakingbecauseitcompelstheCourttoconfrontinsharpestformpossibleundesirableconsequencesofadoptinganewrule,asforexample,whenitappearsthatapplicationofthenewlyframeddoctrinemayresultinimposingliabilityorotherburdenonsomeonewhoactedinjustifiedrelianceontheoldlaw.”).43Id.at65-66(“Prospectivelawmakingisgenerallyequatedwithlegislation.Indeed,theconsciousconfrontationofthequestionofaneffectivedate–evenifonlyintheformofprovidingexplicitaffirmativejustificationforretroactiveoperation–smacksofthelegislativeprocess;foritisordinarilytakenforgranted(particularlyundertheBlackstoniansymbolicconception)thatjudicialdecisionsoperatewithinevitableretroactiveeffect.”).44JamesB.BeamDistillingCo.v.Georgia,501U.S.529,549(1991)(Scalia,J.,concurring)(explainingthatdifficultiesposedbyretroactivity“areoneoftheunderstoodchecksuponjudiciallawmaking;toeliminatethemistorendercourtssubstantiallymorefreeto‘makenewlaw,’andthustoalterinafundamentalwaytheassignedbalanceofresponsibilityandpoweramongthethreebranches”).45JamesB.BeamDistillingCo.,501U.S.at549(Scalia,J.,concurring).46KARLLEWELLYN,THECOMMONLAWTRADITION26(1960).


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WoulditbepossibleforanAIrobotjudgetostrikethisdelicatebalance

betweenthepastandthefuture?47Ajudgewritinganopinionisinpartexplaining

herreasoningsothatthelegalcommunityandsocietycanbetterunderstandthe

decisionandthusthelaw.Alegalopinionisthusinpartadiscoursebetween

societyandthelegalsystem,andthefactthatthejudgeis(fornow)alsoamember

ofsocietyandthelegalcommunitywouldseembeneficialtothisdiscourse.

III–FormalismandRealism

Theteachingsoflegalrealismhelptofurtherhighlightthefactthatcourtsin

asignificantfractionofcasesdomakepolicychoicesindevelopingthelaw,working

againstthenotionthatlawcanbereducedtocomputing.48True,theresultinmost

casesisdictatedbyexistinglaw,butasignificantfractionofcasescouldgoeither

way,andwhenfacedwithsuchforksintheroad,judgesmustmakeachoiceabout

inwhichdirectionthelawwillproceed.49JudgeCardozoalsorecognized“thatevery

doubtfuldecisioninvolvesachoicebetweenanicelybalancedalternative,andno

matterhowlongwedebateorhowcarefullyweponder,weshallneverarriveat

certitude.”50Thesedays,itisfairlyuncontroversialtosaythatjudgesatleast

sometimesdomorethansimply“callballsandstrikes.”51

47Cf.RONALDDWORKIN,LAW’SEMPIRE413(1986)(“Law’sattitudeisconstructive;itaims,intheinterpretivespirit,tolayprincipleoverpracticetoshowthebestroutetoabetterfuture,keepingtherightfaithwiththepast.”);OLIVERWENDELLHOLMES,THECOMMONLAW1(1881)(“Thelawembodiesthestoryofanation’sdevelopmentthroughmanycenturies,anditcannotbedealtwithasifitcontainedonlytheaxiomsandcorollariesofabookofmathematics.Inordertoknowwhatitis,wemustknowwhatithasbeen,andwhatittendstobecome.”).48SeeMishkin,79HARV.L.REV.at68(“Theinsightsof‘legalrealism,’developingandspreadingataperhapsacceleratingratesinceatleastthetwenties,providedanecessarycorrectivetoanoverlyrigidifiedconceptionoftheCourtastotallywithoutchoiceorwill,merelycarryingoutthesupposedlypreordaineddictatesoftheConstitution.”).49Seeid.at60(explainingthat“itiscertainlytruethatcourtsingeneralhandlethevastbulkofcasesbyapplicationofpreexistinglaw,”andthat“informedestimatesputthefigureatcloseto90%”)(citingFriendly,71YALEL.J.at222).50CARDOZO,supra,at140.Iamspeakinghereofclassicallegalrealism,ratherthanwhatsomehavecalled“newlegalrealism.”SeeThomasJ.Miles&CassR.Sunstein,


14

Onewaytoseethisisbylookingatthedoctrineofprecedentandnotionsof

holdingversusdictum.Thereisnosingleacceptedtestfordeterminingexactly

whatisholdingornot,andinmanycasesthereisnoeasywaytodecide.52There

willalwaysbesomepossibledistinctionfromaprecedentcase,sooftenwhethera

judgechoosestofollowacaseturnsonwhethertheproffereddistinctionisa

meaningfulone,orwhetheritismerelyadistinctionwithoutadifference,an

inherentlysubjectiveinquiry.53Thedoctrineofprecedentis“two-headed”or

“Janus-faced”inthatthere“isonedoctrineforgettingridofprecedentsdeemed

troublesomeandonedoctrineformakinguseofprecedentsthatseemhelpful.”54

Thepropositionthatatleastsomeportionofcasesbeforethecourtscould

reasonablygoeitherwayis,thesedays,fairlywellaccepted.Indeed,theentire

Chevrondoctrineisbasedontheideathatforsomequestionsofstatutory

interpretation,thereisarangeofreasonableanswers,(thuscourt’sdefertothe

agencyinterpretationifitiswithinthatrange).55Assuch,“Chevronhasbeenseenas

atriumphoflegalrealism.”56

TheNewLegalRealism,75U.CHI.L.REV.831,831(2008)(“Weareinthemidstofafloweringof‘large-scalequantitativestudiesoffactsandoutcome,’withnumerouspublishedresults.TherelevantstudieshaveproducedaNewLegalRealism–anefforttounderstandthesourcesofjudicialdecisionsonthebasisoftestablehypothesesandlargedatasets.”).51SeeWilliamBlake,UmpiresasLegalRealists,45PS:POLITICALSCIENCE&POLITICS271,271(2012)(“Duringhisconfirmation,then-judgeJohnRobertsanologizedtheroleofajudgetotheroleofabaseballumpire....LegalscholarshavecriticizedRobertsfromalegalrealistperspectivebecausetheanalogymisconstruesthenatureofjudgingasformalistic.”).52SeegenerallyAndrewC.Michaels,TheHolding-DictumSpectrum,70ARK.L.REV.661(2017).Thesamecouldbesaidfordeterminingwhetheracasehasbeen“implicitlyoverruled.”SeegenerallyAndrewC.Michaels,ImplicitOverrulingandForeignLostProfits,25B.U.J.SCI.&TECH.L.101(2019).53SeeMichaels,70ARK.L.REV.at685;ArthurL.Goodhart,DeterminingtheRatioDecidendiofaCase,40YALEL.J.161,165(1930).54KARLLLEWELLYN,THEBRAMBLEBUSH69-70(1930).55SeeChevron,U.S.A.,Inc.v.NRDC,Inc.,467U.S.837,843(1984)(“ifthestatuteissilentorambiguouswithrespecttothespecificissue,thequestionforthecourtiswhethertheagency’sanswerisbasedonapermissibleconstructionofthestatute”);


15

Theidealawcanbereducedtocomputerscienceseemsinherentlyformalist,

indeeditseemstoconceiveoflawasalmosta“broodingomnipresenceinthesky.”57

ItisreminiscentofDeanLangdell’s“legalscience,”whichheldthat“lawcanbe

reducedtoasetoffirstprinciples,ontheorderofmathematicalaxioms,andthatby

theuseofdeductivemethod,theseprinciplescanyieldallnecessary

consequences.”58ItisalsocomportswithPierreSchlag’sdescriptionoftheGrid

Aesthetic,wherein“lawispicturedasatwo-dimensionalareadividedinto

contiguous,well-boundedlegalspaces.”59

ButasSchlagnotes,“toevenposetheproblemoflegalchangeisalreadyto

weakenthegrid.”60OpposingthegridaestheticistheEnergyAesthetic,which

“leavesthestasisofthegridbehind,”suchthat“lawandthelegalprofessionareon

themove.”61AsSchlagexplains,theoppositionofthegridaestheticandtheenergy

seealsoUnitedStatesv.MeadCorp.,533U.S.218,229(2001)(explainingthatwhenChevronapplies,areviewingcourt“isobligedtoaccepttheagency’spositionifCongresshasnotpreviouslyspokentothepointatissueandtheagency’sinterpretationisreasonable”).56BrianG.Slocum,TheImportanceofBeingAmbiguous:SubstantiveCanons,StareDecisis,andtheCentralRoleofAmbiguityDeterminationsintheAdministrativeState,69MD.L.REV.791,836(2010).57Cf.GrantGilmore,LegalRealism:ItsCauseandCure,70YALEL.J.1037,1037-38(1961)(“Legalrealismmaybeviewedasanelaboratecommentaryonanattitudetowardlawsymbolizedbythefigureofthatmasterofepigram,JusticeHolmes.Thelifeofthelaw,Holmestoldus,hasnotbeenlogic;ithasbeenexperience.Andagain:thecommonlawisnotabroodingomnipresenceinthesky.”).58SeePeterLee,TheSupremeAssimilationofPatentLaw,114MICH.L.REV.1413,1419(2016)(quotingM.H.Hoeflich,Law&Geometry:LegalSciencefromLeibniztoLangdell,30AM.J.LEGALHIST.95,96(1986));EDWARDSTEVENSROBINSON,LAWANDTHELAWYERS67(1935)(“Thereisnottheslightestdoubtthatthecase-lawtheoryoflegaleducationwasamoveinthedirectionofanaturalscienceofthelaw.”).59PierreSchlag,TheAestheticsofAmericanLaw,115HARV.L.REV.1047,1051(2005).60Id.at1066.Seealso,id.at1065(“Itisanold,andapparentlypersistent,question:ifthecourtsaretofindbutnotcreatelaw,thenhowdoeslawchange?Foralawcastintheimageofthegrid,thisquestionisaesthetictrouble.Thegridisinert.Itdoesnotmove.”).61Id.at1070.


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aestheticiswellknownintermsoftheoppositionoflegalformalismversuslegal

realism.62Legalformalismisassociatedwiththegrid,inthatitdoesnottakeinto

accountlegalchangetotheextentthatlegalrealismdoes.

Interestingly,whilethereareformalistaspectstothesuggestionofrobot

judges,therearealsoaspectsthatechowhatmightbecalleditsopposite:Critical

LegalStudies.Theideathatthelegalsystemissobiased,indeterminate,andinept,

astowarrantautomatingthejudiciary,63seemsanextremelycynicalviewofthe

legalsystem.ThisisconsistentwiththelegacyofCriticalLegalStudies,whichwas

toleavebehindaseriesofcorrosivecritiquesaimedatproducingdisenchantment

withlawasnarrowlyunderstood.64Formalismoffersaverynarrowandtraditional

viewoflaw,whereasCriticalLegalStudiesperhapssuppliestheskepticismneeded

toremovehumansfromthesystem.LegalRealism,bycontrast,supplieswhatmight

becalledamiddlegroundrecognizingthehumanjudgmentnecessaryforthelegal

systemtofunction,butperhapsseeingvalueinhumanaspectsofthesystem.

TheprominentlegalrealistKarlLewellynhasderidedtheformalist“One

SingleRightAnswer”approach,explainingthatitmayhavethe“unhappyeffect”of

“drivingreadjustmentandcreationintotheunderground,whichnotonlydecreases

reckonabilitybutseriouslyhampersreasonedstudyandthoughtabouttherelative

valuesandcostsofanycompetingobjectivesandofthealwaysvariousavailableand

devisablemeasures.”65Disagreementsamongstjudgesasexplicatedviacircuit

splitsanddissentshavetheoppositeandbeneficialeffectofbringingthevarious

plausiblelegalchoicesoutintotheopen.

62Id.at1105.63SeeVolokh,68DUKEL.J.at1184(“wehumansdon’tsetthebarveryhigh”).64SeeTHEOXFORDINTERNATIONALENCYCLOPEDIAOFLEGALHISTORY298(StanleyN.Katzed.)(2009)(“TheLegacyofCLS:CLS[CriticalLegalStudies]leavesbehindaseriesofcorrosivecritiques–allaimedatproducingdisenchantmentanddisbeliefinlawasitisnarrowlyconstrued.”).65LEWELLYN,THECOMMONLAWTRADITION,supra,at25n.17.


17

Whenthosearguingforartificialroboticlawspeakofenhancingconsistency

andaccuracy,66theyseemtobeoverlookingthefactthatnotallcaseshavearight

answer,andtheymayalsobeovervaluingconsistency.67Thelegaldisagreements

thatarisefromcircuitsplitsanddissentsmayactuallybebeneficialforsociety,in

thattheyengagethelegalcommunityinaprotractedthoughtfuldiscussionabout

varioussidesofimportantdebatesaboutlawandpolicy.68Replacingthis

communitywithamachinethatinstantaneouslyspitsoutarightansweruponthe

pressofabuttondoesnotseemwise,foradditionalreasonsthatwillbediscussed

furtherinthenextpart.

IV–LegalCommunity

Inourcurrentsystem,wehavemanyjudgesapplyingthelaw,andalthough

theyoccasionallydisagree,usuallytheyapplythelawinmoreorlessthesameway.

Thisisaredundancy,butredundancycanbeagoodthing.69Inthiscase,the

66SeeHuq,105VA.L.REV.at*40(“Ofcourse,evenwell-designedalgorithmictoolswillmakemistakes.Buttheadditionofahumanbackstoponamachinedecisionwilllikelyincreasetheoverallrateofinaccuratejudgments.”);cf.Casey&Niblett,92IND.L.J.at1419-20(“Aspredictivetechnologymakesiteasiertoautomatesuchregulatoryadvancerulingsandensuretheiraccuracy,theywillbecomeacommonmechanismfortheadoptionofmachinegeneratedmicrodirectives.”).67Cf.AmandaFrost,OvervaluingUniformity,94Va.L.Rev.1567,1574(2008)(“Ifthelowercourtsreachvariedbutreasonableconclusionsaboutthemeaningofafederalstatute,andthedifferencedonotcreatesignificantdisruptionorinequality,thentheCourtshoulddeclinetoresolvetheconflict.”).68SeeJOHNDEWEY,HOWWETHINK12(1933)(explainingthatreflectivethinking“involves(1)astateofdoubt,hesitation,perplexity,mentaldifficulty,inwhichthinkingoriginates,and(2)anactofsearching,hunting,inquiring,tofindmaterialthatwillresolvethedoubt,settleanddisposeoftheperplexity.”);seealsoDonaldJ.Kochan,ThinkingLikeThinkers:IstheArtandDisciplineofan‘AttitudeofSuspendedConclusion’LostonLawyers?,35SEATTLEU.L.REV.1,2-3n.5(2011).69SeeJohnM.Golden,Redundancy:WhenLawRepeatsItself,94TEX.L.REV.629,629(2016)(“Thepervasivenessoflegalredundancyhasatleastonestraightforwardexplanation.Redundancyhasmuchtooffer.”).


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redundancyhasvalueinthatitfostersacommunityofpeoplewithastrong

incentivetopayattentiontothelaw.70

Thebestwaytoseethevalueofthiscommunityistoimaginewhatwould

happenifitdidn’texist.Thatis,imagineaworldwherealljudgeswerereplacedby

robots.Ifallthejudgeswererobots,wewouldn’treallyneedhumanlawyers,forwe

couldalsohaverobotlawyers.Indeed,inVolokh’sargument,robotlawyerscome

beforerobotjudges.71Andifwedidn’thavehumanjudgesorlawyers,weprobably

wouldn’thavehumanlawprofessorsorlawstudentseither,(oratleastwewouldn’t

havenearlyasmany).

Robotlawmightbemoreefficient,butwewouldhavelostthecommunityof

peoplewhosejobitistopayattentiontothelaw,whichcouldbecomeaproblemif

thelawchanges,orifsomeoneinpowerchangesthelaw.72Whatwouldstop

someoneinpowerfromchangingthelawinwaysthatwerenotbeneficialto

society?True,thisalreadyhappenstosomedegree,butitcouldbeworse.Thelegal

communityisatleastpayingattentionandthatprovidessomedegreeofacheckon

thosewiththepowertochangethelaw.

Thelegalcommunityitselfcurrentlyplaysaroleinshapingthelaw,

spreadingpowerandsupportingthenotionthatweasasocietygovernourselves.

Judgesareresponsive(tosomedegree)tolawyers,whoareresponsive(tosome

degree)toclients,suchthatpowerisspreadthroughoutthelegalcommunityand

society.Thelegalcommunitymaythushelppromotethesensethatweasasociety

70SeeAnthonyD’Amato,Can/ShouldComputersReplaceJudges,11Ga.L.Rev.1277,1299(1977)(“Asecondcostwillbetorenderareasoflawuninteresting....Atpresent,manypeopleareimmediatelyinterested,whetherfinanciallyorfromateachingorresearchpointofview,inconflictsoflaws.”).71Volokh,68DUKEL.J.at1148-1151.72Cf.FRANKLINFOER,WORLDWITHOUTMIND:THEEXISTENTIALTHREATOFBIGTECH72(2017)(“Theproblemisthatwhenweoutsourcethinkingtomachines,wearereallyoutsourcingthinkingtotheorganizationsthatrunthemachines.”).


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havesomecontroloverthelawsthatgovernus;thatwearegoverningourselves

ratherthansubmittingto(orsimplyobeying)anoutsideauthority.73

Itmightbedifficulttoimaginethatapersonorgroupofpeoplewhoarenot

completelytrustworthycouldrisetopower,butthepossibilitycannotbe

completelydiscounted.Thelossofredundancyinswitchingfromhumanjudgesto

robotjudgescreatessomerisks,whichmaynotbeworththepotentialefficiency

gains.Althoughanythingbeyondanarroweconomicanalysisissometimesderided

as“deontological,”74theseriskspotentiallycreateveryrealnegativeconsequences,

suchthatcontinuingtoguardagainstthemcouldbeseenasutilitarian,as

utilitarianismcantakeintoaccountfactorsbeyondnarroweconomicefficiency.75

Totheextentthatthereisprivateintellectualpropertycoveringthecode

behindtheseAIjudges,theproblemsarecompounded.76Itisthusimportantthat,if

andtotheextentthatwedostarttoturnthelawintocode,attheveryleastthecode

mustbepublicandnotownedasintellectualproperty.Atleastifthecodeispublic,

thenlawyerstogetherwithcomputerscientistscanexaminethecode.Justasjudges

donotowntheopinionstheywrite,thejudgesthemselves,orthecodebehindthem,73Cf.YoungstownSheet&TubeCo.v.Sawyer,343U.S.579,646(1952)(Jackson,J.,concurring)(“oursisagovernmentoflaws,notofmen,and...wesubmitourselvestorulersonlyifunderrules”).74SeeVolokhat1163n.82(“Thisisaformofutilitarianism:Iaskwhatsortofjudginggivesustheresultswewant,notwhatsortofjudgingismostconsistentwithsomedeontologicaltheoryofhowjudgesshouldoperate.”).75Cf.StephaniePlamondonBair,RationalFaith:TheUtilityofFairnessinCopyright,97B.U.L.REV.1487,1490(2017)(“Ifconsiderationoffairnessisfaithbased,then,itisarationalfaith,becauseempiricalevidenceshowsthatfairnesspromotesutilitarianends.”);PeterLee,TowardaDistributiveAgendaforU.S.PatentLaw,55HOUS.L.REV.321,354(2017)(“Atafoundationallevel,theobjectiveofmaximizingsocialutilitycanrequireredistributionofresources,particularlygiventheprincipleofdiminishingmarginalutility.”).76Cf.SoniaK.Katyal,PrivateAccountabilityintheAgeofArtificialIntelligence,66UCLAL.REV.54,141(2019)(“ThefutureofcivilrightsinanageofAIrequiresustoexplorethelimitationswithinintellectualpropertyand,morespecifically,tradesecrets.”);JOSEPHRAZ,THEAUTHORITYOFLAW:ESSAYSONLAWANDMORALITY213(1979)(“Itisoneoftheimportantprinciplesofthe[ruleoflaw]doctrinethatthemakingofparticularlawsshouldbeguidedbyopenandrelativelystablegeneralrules.”).


20

mustnotbeowned,assincethelawisbindingoncitizens,itmustremainfreeforall

toexamineandattempttounderstand.77

Oneaspectoflawisasharedwayofthinking.78Whenwesaythattheresult

inninetypercentofcasesisdeterminedbylawwhereasmaybetenpercentcouldgo

eitherway,whatwemeanisthatforthoseninetypercent,noreasonablejudgeor

lawyerwoulddecidetheotherway,butthisonlyworkstotheextentthatall

lawyersthinkinasimilarway.Thelegalcommunityprovidesaforumwhere

educatedpeoplecandebateissuesthatmatterinpublicinafairlycalm,formal,non-

emotionalway,(somethingvaluablethatseemstobesorelylackinginmostareasof

ourcurrentsociety).Onecouldthinkoflawthenasaformalizedsystemofdebate

andcommunication.Thisatleastsuggeststhatifwetakethehumansthatdothe

communicatingoutofthepicture,wemaylosesomethingimportanttoruleoflaw.

Weseemtohavesometendencyasasocietytoadoptnewtechnologies

beforetheyareentirelyready.79InVolokh’sargument,apanelofevaluators

77SeeBanksv.Manchester,128U.S.244,253(1888)(“Judges,asiswellunderstood,receivefromthepublictreasuryastatedannualsalary,fixedbylaw,andcanthemselveshavenopecuniaryinterestorproprietorshipasagainstthepublicatlarge,inthefruitsoftheirjudiciallabor....Thequestionisoneofpublicpolicy,andtherehasalwaysbeenajudicialconsensus...thatnocopyrightcouldunderthestatutespassedbyCongress,besecuredintheproductsofthelabordonebyjudicialoffiersinthedischargeoftheirjudicialduties.”).78Cf.PierreSchlag,SpamJurisprudence,AirLaw,andtheRankAnxietyofNothingHappening(AReportontheStateoftheArt),97GEO.L.J.803,828(2009)(“Whenonethinksofwhatlawyersmuststrivetodo–whichismainlyresolvedifficultdisputesandcontrolthefuturethoughdocumentarywritings–certainthingsemergeascrucialtotheirwork.Oneisthattheyspeakandthinkinacommonlanguage....Totheextentthat‘alllawyersthinkalike,’theycanwithsomecertaintypredictwhatotherlawyerswilldo–bothinlitigationandintransactionalcontexts.Thisisarguablysociallyuseful.”);BANJAMINN.CARDOZO,THENATUREOFTHEJUDICIALPROCESS35(1921)(“[T]hejudgmentofthelawyerclass,willspreadtoothers,andtingethecommonconsciousnessandthecommonfaith.”).79Cf.DaisukeWakabayashi,Self-DrivingUberCarKillsPedestrianinArizona,WhereRobotsRoam,THEN.Y.TIMES(Mar.19,2018);ClarkD.Asay,ArtificialStupidity,61WILLIAM&MARYL.REV.at*4(forthcoming2020)(“despitetheincessanthypeaboutandevergrowingusesofAI,manyAIexpertslamentalackofanyrealprogressin


21

initiallyselecttherobotjudgeorjudges.Theevaluatorsaresupposedlyexperts,but

onceweturnthelawovertomachines,ourcommunityoflegalexpertswillshrink

andtheneventuallyvanish.Ourlawmuscles,asasociety,willatrophy.80Inother

words,Volokhandthosemakingsimilarargumentsseemtoignorethecostoftheir

proposalintermsofthelossofhumanexpertise.81Canwebesurethatthelaw

machines,justbecausetheywerechosenascompetentataninitialpointintime,

willremaincompetentwithchangingsociety?Oncewehavelostthecommunityof

experts,whowillkeepaneyeonthelawmachinestomakesure?

V.SeparationofPowers

Theimportanceofjudicialindependenceforruleoflawwasrecognizedin

theDeclarationofDelhi,“promulgatedin1959byaninternationalcongressof

juristsconsistingof185judges,practicinglawyersandteachersoflawfrom53

countries.”82TheDeclarationitselfstates:“AnindependentJudiciaryisan

indispensablerequisiteofafreesocietyundertheRuleofLaw.Suchindependence

impliesfreedomfrominterferencebytheExecutiveorLegislativewiththeexercise

ofthejudicialfunction.”83CanAIjudgesreallybesaidtobeindependent?Cansuch

robotsserveasasignificantcheckontheothertwobranches?Volokh’scondition

foradoption,demonstration(viatheModifiedHenrytest)thattherobotscanwrite

persuasiveopinions,doesnotseemtoprovideanyreasontoanswerthesequestions

theAIspace”);BrianSheppard,IncompleteInnovationandthePrematureDisruptionofLegalServices,2015MICH.ST.L.REV.1797,1802(2015)(“Whenadisruptionoccursbeforeallofthecorefunctionsofanindustryhavebeeninnovated,thereisariskthatthisIncompleteInnovationwillforcetheun-innovatedcorefunctionstobecomescarceordissaprear.”).80Cf.NICHOLASG.CARR,THESHALLOWS:WHATTHEINTERNETISDOINGTOOURBRAINS(2010);BRETTFRISCHMANANDEVANSELINGER,RE-ENGINEERINGHUMANITY(2018)(questioningwhetherartificialintelligenceisincreasinglyencouraginghumanstobehavelikemachines).81Cf.BodumUSA,Inc.v.LaCafetiere,Inc.,621F.3d624,633(2010)(Posner,J.,concurring)(“judgesareexpertsonlaw”).82LukeK.Cooperrider,TheRuleofLawandtheJudicialProcess,59MICH.L.REV.501,502(1960).83SeeCooperrider,59MICH.L.REV.at502.


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intheaffirmative.Justbecauseamachinecanwriteapersuasiveopinion,that

doesn’tmeanitisservingasanindependentcheckontheothertwobranches,asthe

“ThirdBranch”issupposedtodoinourgovernmentofseparationofpowers.84

ArticleIIIoftheU.S.Constitution,ofcourse,vestswiththecourtsthejudicial

power,whichextendsto“cases”and“controversies.”85AstheSupremeCourthas

explainedthisrequirement“isnotjustanemptyformality,”rather,it“preservesthe

vitalityoftheadversarialprocess,”suchthatthelegalquestionspresented“willbe

resolved,notintherarifiedatmosphereofadebatingsociety,butinaconcrete

factualcontextconducivetoarealisticappreciationoftheconsequencesofjudicial

action.”86Thisexplanationseemstoimplicitlyrecognizethatcourtsdoexercisean

importantlawmakingandpolicymakingfunctionwhentheyinterpretthelawsoas

toresolvelegalquestions,focusingontheimportanceofsuchinterpretationtaking

placeinthecontextofconcretefactualdisputes,asrequiredbytheConstitution.

Theevaluators’choiceofAIrobotjudgescouldbeseenasrunningafoulofthis

requirement,asitwouldnottakeplaceinthecontextoftheactualdisputesthatthe

robotswouldlaterbedeciding.

Additionally,itisnotclearthatdecision-makingbyAIitselfwouldcomply

withthiscaseorcontroversyrequirement.WhenexactlyistheAIcodemakingits

decision?Hasitalreadymadeitbeforethecase?Onecouldarguethatthedecision

ismadewhenthemachineisprogrammed,inwhichcase,thedecisionwouldnotbe

madeinthecontextofanactualcaseorcontroversyasrequiredbyArticleIII.

84SeeCityofArlingtonv.FCC,569U.S.290,327(2013)(Roberts,J.,dissenting)(discussingthe“obligationoftheJudiciarynotonlytoconfineitselftoitsproperrole,buttoensurethattheotherbranchesdosoaswell”);YoungstownSheet&TubeCo.v.Sawyer,343U.S.579,597(1952)(Frankfurter,J.,concurring)(“Thejudiciarymay,asthiscaseproves,havetointerveneindeterminingwhereauthorityliesasbetweenthedemocraticforcesinourschemeofgovernment.Butindoingsoweshouldbewaryandhumble.SuchistheteachingofthisCourt’sroleinthehistoryofthiscountry.”).85SeeU.S.CONST.ART.IIISec.1,2.86Massachusettsv.EPA,549U.S.497,517(2007)(quotingLujanv.DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.555,581(1992)(Kennedy,J.,concurring)).


23

Indeed,thecomputercodeprogrammingtheAIjudgescouldbeseenasan

incrediblydetailedstatute(or“code”),87onethatpre-answersallpossiblequestions,

(albeit–orevenworse–inablackboxwaythatnoonereallyunderstands).88This

mightseemappealingincertainways,butitisimportanttorecognizethatitdoesin

asignificantsenseeliminatetheroleofthejudiciaryasanindependentbranch.

AlthoughseparationofpowersisnotexplicitlyintheConstitution,itis

consideredtobeimplicitinanumberofprovisions,includingthevestingclauses

vestingeachofthethreebrancheswithcertainresponsibilities.89InGregoryv.

Ashcroft,theSupremeCourtdiscussedtheimportanceofthe“constitutionally

mandatedbalanceofpower,”tochecking“abusesofgovernmentpower,”by

preventing“theaccumulationofexcessivepowerinanyonebranch,”soasto

“reducetheriskoftyrannyandabuse.”90

Indeed,accordingtoJusticeGorsuch,“[o]neoftheabusesofroyalpowerthat

ledtotheAmericanRevolutionwasKingGeorge’sattempttogaininfluenceover87Cf.Gilmore,70YALEL.J.at1043(“A‘code,’letussay,isalegislativeenactmentwhichentirelypre-emptsthefieldandwhichisassumedtocarrywithinittheanswerstoallpossiblequestions:thuswhenacourtcomestoagaporanunforeseensituation,itsdutyistofind,byextrapolationandanalogy,asolutionconsistentwiththepolicyofthecodifyinglaw.”).88Asay,61WILLIAM&MARYL.REV.at*29(“becauseofthelackoftransparencysurroundingAIsystemsinanumberofimportantindustries,somescholarshavecomplainedthatsuchAIsystemsarea‘blackbox’”)(citingFRANKPASQUALE,THEBLACKBOXSOCIETY(2015)).89See,e.g.,SapnaKumar,PatentCourtSpecialization,104IOWAL.REV.101,118(2019)(“Theterm‘separationofpowers’doesnotappearintheConstitution,butisinsteadinferredfromthedividingoflegislative,executive,andjudicialpowerintoseparateArticles.”)(citingBuckleyv.Valeo,424U.S.1,124(1976);MichaelC.Dorf&CharlesF.Sabel,AConstitutionofDemocraticExperimentalism,98COLUM.L.REV.267,439-40(1998)).90Gregoryv.Ashcroft,501U.S.452,458-59(1991)(alsodiscussingtheimportanceoffederalismandhowthedividingofpowerbetweentheFederalGovernmentandtheStatessimilarlypreventsabusebyproviding“doublesecurity”)(quotingJamesMadison,FederalistNo.51at323(“InthecompoundrepublicofAmerica,thepowersurrenderedbythepeopleisfirstdividedbetweentwodistinctgovernments,andthentheportionallottedtoeachsubdividedamongdistinctandseparatedepartments.Henceadoublesecurityarisestotherightsofthepeople.”)).


24

colonialjudges.”91JusticeGorsuchhasrecentlyexplainedthat“whenpoliticalactors

areleftfreenotonlytoadoptandenforcewrittenlaws,butalsotocontrolthe

interpretationofthoselaws,”thereisarisktoruleoflaw.92Thefounderssoughtto

guardagainstthisriskbyprovidingprotectionstothejudiciary’sindependence

suchaslifetenureforjudgesandaprohibitiononreducingjudges’compensation,so

thatthejudiciarycould“interpretthelaws‘freefrompotentialdominationbyother

branchesofgovernment.’”93Onecouldtrytoarguethatrobotjudgeswouldbe

independentlyapplyingthelaw,butwhensuchrobotscanbereprogrammedbythe

otherbranches,theirindependencedoesnotseemparticularlyrobust.Andsuch

reprogrammingwouldhavetobepossibletoallowforchangeswhenCongress

passesanewlaworchangesthelaw.

InGregory,theCourtalsocandidlyrecognizedtheimportantpolicymaking

rolethatjudgesplay,particularlyinthecommonlawcontext,quotingJustice

Holmes’statement:

Theveryconsiderationswhichjudgesmostrarelymention,andalwayswithanapology,arethesecretrootfromwhichthelawdrawsallthejuicesoflife.Imean,ofcourse,considerationsofwhatisexpedientforthecommunityconcerned.Everyimportantprinciplewhichisdevelopedbylitigationisinfactandatbottomtheresultofmoreorlessdefinitelyunderstoodviewsaboutpublicpolicy;mostgenerally,tobesure,underourpracticeandtraditions,theunconsciousresultofinstinctivepreferencesandinarticulateconvictions,butnonethelesstraceabletoviewsofpublicpolicyinthelastanalysis.94

91Kisorv.Wilkie,588U.S._,slipop.at*22-23(2019)(Gorsuch,J.,dissenting)(citingDeclarationofIndependence¶11).92Id.at*23(quotingPalmorev.UnitedStates,411U.S.389,412(1973)(Douglas,J.,dissenting));seealsoOilStatesEnergyServices,LLCv.Greene’sEnergyGroup,LLC,138S.Ct.1365(2018)(Gorsuch,J.,dissenting).93Kisor,588U.S._,slipop.at*24(Gorsuch,J.,dissenting)(quotingUnitedStatesv.Will,449U.S.200,218(1980));seealsoTheFederalistNo.81,at482(A.Hamilton).94Gregory,501U.S.at466(quotingOLIVERWENDELLHOLMES,THECOMMONLAW35-36(1881)).


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Inconcurrence,JusticeWhite(joinedbyJusticeStevens),agreedthatthe

“quotationfromJusticeHolmes”was“aneloquentdescriptionofthepolicymaking

natureofthejudicialfunction,”andalsoquotedJusticeCardozo’sstatement:

Each[common-lawjudge]indeedislegislatingwithinthelimitsofhiscompetence.Nodoubtthelimitsforthejudgearenarrower.Helegislatesonlybetweengaps.Hefillstheopenspacesinthelaw...Withintheconfinesoftheseopenspacesandthoseofprecedentandtradition,choicemoveswithafreedomwhichstampsitsactionascreative.Thelawwhichistheresultingproductisnotfound,butmade.95

Althoughthepolicymakingchoicesmadebyjudgesare,inJusticeHolmes’

ownadmission,tosomeextent“instinctive”and“inarticulate,”theydoatleastarise

throughtheconsideredlegaladversarialprocessasrequiredbyArticleIII,andare

importantpreventingtyrannythroughseparationofpowers.Noonepolicymaker

canbeexpectedtobeperfect,andoursystemofspreadingpoweramongstmultiple

actorswithdistinctrolesisanimportantaspectofruleoflaw,96whichseemstobe

overlookedbythosearguingforamovetowardsrobotjudges.97

Theseseparationofpowersconcernsmakemachinedecision-making

particularlyproblematicinthejudicialbranch.Althoughsomemachinedecision-

makingisalreadybeingdoneintheexecutivebranchortheadministrative

agencies,98thisdoesnotseemasproblematic.Onewayofthinkingaboutthe

95Gregory,501U.S.at482(White,J.,concurring)(quotingBENJAMINCARDOZO,THENATUREOFTHEJUDICIALPROCESS113-115(1921)).96Cf.MASSACHUSETTSCONSTITUTION,ArticleXXX(“Inthegovernmentofthiscommonwealth,thelegislativedepartmentshallneverexercisetheexecutiveandjudicialpowers,oreitherofthem:theexecutiveshallneverexercisethelegislativeandjudicialpowers,oreitherofthem:judicialshallneverexercisethelegislativeandexecutivepowers,oreitherofthem:totheenditmaybeagovernmentoflawsandnotofmen.”)(emphasisadded).97Cf.FrankPasquale,ARuleofPersons,NotMachines:TheLimitsofLegalAutomationat*48(2018)(“Thelegalfuturists’partialvisionofeconomicprogressreflectsasimilarlyincompletenormativeaccountoftheruleoflaw–onethatasksbothtoomuch,andtoolittle,oflegalinstitutions.”).98SeeEmilyBerman,AGovernmentofLawsandNotofMachines,98B.U.L.REV.1277,1280(2018)(“Givenitsutility,itisnotsurprisingthatgovernmentdecision-makers


26

executivebranchisthatitisentirelyaccountabletothepresidentanyway,99soifthe

presidentchoosestodelegatetomachinesratherthanhumans,thatisseeminglyhis

orherprerogative,oratleast,itdoesn’traiseseparationofpowersconcerns.

Theunitaryexecutivetheoryisofcoursedisputed,100butthisisnottheplace

togetintothatdispute.Mypointhereisthatevenassumingarguendothatitisok

forexecutivedecision-makingtobecentralizedinartificialintelligence,itisnot

appropriateforthejudicialbranch,asitwouldoverlookthepolicymakingroleof

thatbranchanditsimportanceinmaintainingseparationofpowersbyservingasan

independentcheckonaccumulationoftoomuchpowerintoofewhands.101

seektoharnessmachinelearning’spredictivepowerforpublic-sectoruse.Thesetoolsalreadyhavemadesignificantinroadsinthecontextsofnationalsecurityandlawenforcement.”).99See,e.g.,Myersv.UnitedStates,272U.S.52,135(1923)(“TheordinarydutiesofofficersprescribedbystatutecomeunderthegeneraladministrativecontrolofthePresidentbyvirtueofthegeneralgranttohimofexecutivepower,andhemayproperlysuperviseandguidetheirconstructionofthestatutesunderwhichtheyactinordertosecurethatunitaryanduniformexecutionofthelawswhichArticleIIoftheConstitutionevidentlycontemplatedinvestinggeneralexecutivepowerinthePresidentalone.”).100See,e.g.,Humphrey’sExecutorv.UnitedStates,295U.S.602(1935)(“ButinthecaseofanofficesuchastheFederalTradeCommission,thenatureofwhichisnotpolitical,thefunctionofwhichisquasi-judicialandquasi-legislative,inordertosafeguarditsindependenceofpoliticaldominationitisnecessaryandpropertoenactlegislativestandardswhichthePresidentmustfollow.”);Morrisonv.Olson,487U.S.654,687(1988)(“ContrarytotheimplicationofsomedictainMyers,thePresident’spowertoremoveGovernmentofficialssimplywasnotall-inclusiveinrespectofcivilofficers”).101SeealsoAndrewC.Michaels,AbstractInnovation,VirtualIdeas,andArtificialLegalThought,14MAR.J.BUS.&TECH.L.1,32(2019)(“itcouldbecomeaveryseriousproblemifsomeuntrustworthygroupofpeopleweretogaincontrolofthelawmachine,andstartchangingitscommandsfortheirownbenefit”).AsIhavenotedbefore,distributedledgerorblockchaintechnologymayhavesomepotentialformitigatingsomeofthecentralizationofpowerconcerns.Seeid.atn.134(citingMichaelAbramowicz,Cryptocurrency-BasedLaw,58ARIZ.L.REV.359(2016)).


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Conclusion

Replacingjudgeswithrobotswouldentaildrasticchangestolawasweknow

it,anditisnotatallclearthatthechangeswouldbeforthebetter.Whythen,

shouldwedoit?Volokhandothersofferthreeprimarybenefits.Thefirstisthatit

wouldbecheaper.102Butcomparedtotheamountofmoneythatwespendonthe

military,ortaxbreaksforthesuperrich,thejudiciaryreallyisn’tthatexpensive,103

anditseemslikemoneywellspentinpreservingtheruleoflaw.Efficiency

argumentsdonotadequatelynotaccountfortheincreasedriskduetothelossof

redundancy,nordotheyanswertherelatedseparationofpowersconcerns.104

Indeed,efficiencyisnotalwaysparamountinruleoflaw,forasJusticeBrandeishas

explained,the“doctrineofseparationofpowerswasadoptedbytheConventionof

1787nottopromoteefficiencybuttoprecludetheexerciseofarbitrarypower.”105

102SeeVolokh,68DUKEL.J.at1139n.10(“Insomecontexts,ofcourse,automationmaybebetterevenifit’snotaseffective–forinstance,itmaybecheaperandthusmorecost-effective.Butifit’scheaperandatleastaseffective,thenitwouldbeprettyclearlysuperior.”);Huqat*37(“Rightnow,thedemandforhumanreviewintheteethofitslikelycostsandavailablealternativeresponses,mightseemlittlemorethananaestheticpreferenceaboutthemannerinwhichoneinteractswithstateactors.Iamnotsurethatisenoughtogetarighttohumandecisionofftheground.”);Casey&Niblett,92IND.L.J.at1403(“Anewformoflaw,themicrodirective,willemergetoprovideallofthebenefitsofbothrulesandstandardswithoutthecostsofeither.Thesemicrodirectiveswillprovideexantebehavioralprescriptionsfinelytailoredtoeverypossiblescenario.”).103CompareADMINISTRATIVEOFFICEOFTHEU.S.COURTS,THEJUDICIARYFISCALYEAR2019CONGRESSIONALBUDGETSUMMARYat5(2018)(“Thejudiciary’sappropriationrequestforfiscalyear2019totals[$7.863Billion]”);withOFFICEOFTHEUNDERSECRETARYOFDEFENSE(COMPTROLLER),NATIONALDEFENSEBUDGETESTIMATESFORFY2020at1(2019)(showing$685BillionDODDiscretionaryBudgetAuthorityfor2019);andJOINTCOMMITTEEONTAXATION,MACROECONOMICANALYSISOFTHE“TAXCUTANDJOBSACT”ASORDEREDREPORTEDBYTHESENATECOMMITTEEONFINANCEONNOVEMBER16,2017at7(2017)(estimatinganetlossofover$1trillionoverfiscalyears2018-2027).104SeePartIV,supra;cf.OilStatesEnergyServs.,LLCv.Greene’sEnergyGrp.,LLC,138S.Ct.1365,1380(2018)(Gorsuch,J.,dissenting)(“Ajudicialhearingbeforeapropertyinterestisstrippedaway...canslowthingsdown.Buteconomysuppliesnolicenseforignoringthese–oftenvitallyinefficient–protections”).105Myers,272U.S.at293(Brandeis,J.,dissenting).


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ThesecondreasonproponentsofAIofferisabitmorecompelling;itis

basicallythatAIwouldbemoreconsistentandmightthusbelessbiased.106Of

course,therecouldalsobebiasbuiltintotheAI,butevenassumingthattheAI

wouldbebetterthanhumansonthisscore,itstilldoesn’tdoanythingtoaddressall

oftheconcernsabove.Thebetterwaytodealwithbiaswouldbeforhumanjudges

toworkonbecomingmoreawareofitandcompensatingforit,orbetteryet,to

diversifythejudiciary.Diversifyingthejudiciarywouldalsohavesupplementary

powerspreadingbenefits,spreadingpowertoamorediversecohortofjudges.

Anotherwaytodealwithbiasmightbetoreducejudicialdiscretioninsituations

(suchasperhapscriminalsentencing)wheretheeffectsofbiastendtobe

particularlyacute.107Biasinthejudiciaryisaproblem,butautomatingthejudiciary

isanoverbroadandinappropriatesolutiontothatparticularproblem.

Thethirdreasonisthatthelowercostoflegalserviceswillimproveaccessto

justice.108Totheextentthatrobotsareabletosuccessfullyreplacesomelawyers

(withoutreplacingjudges),thisismoreacceptableasitwouldlowerthecostoflegal106SeeVolokh,68DUKEL.J.at1140(“Andbecausesuchaprogramisalsolikelytobemuchcheaper,quicker,andlesssubjecttocertainformsofbias,itpromisestomakethelegalsystemnotonlymoreefficientbutalsofairerandmoreaccessibletopoorandmiddle-classlitigants.”);Huqat*6(“machinedecisionsareoftencapableofclassificationwithasmallernumberoffalsepositivesandfalsenegativesthanhumans,andhavethepotentialtoactwithfewerdistortingbiases”);Casey&Niblett,92IND.L.J.at1410(“Andthelawswillbehighlycalibratedtopolicyobjectiveswithnochanceofjudgesintroducingbiasorincompetence.”);seealsoBenjaminAlarie,AnthonyNiblett,&AlbertH.Yoon,RegulationbyMachineat4(2016)(availableat:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2878950)(“Inaworldwheretaxpayersreceiveinstantaneousrulingsfromregulators,thealgorithmisthelaw.Thisnewformoflawischaracterizedbygreaterconsistencythanregulatorsandcourtscouldpreviouslyoffer.Thebiasesofregulators,adjudicators,andjudgesarewashedaway,furtherreducinglegaluncertainty.”).107Cf.Berman,98B.U.L.REV.at1283(arguingthat“governmentactorsshouldexploitthebenefitsofmachinelearningwhentheyenjoybroaddiscretioninmakingdecisions,whileeschewingthetoolfordecision-makingwhengovernmentdiscretionishighlyconstrained”).108SeeVolokh,68DUKEL.J.at1147(“Realistically,theonlywaywearelikelytosharplyincreaseaccesstoexpensiveservices,suchaslawyering,isthroughtechnology.”);cf.Alaireet.al.,supra,at*1(“machinelearningcanpredicthowcourtswoulddecidelegaldisputesmorecheaplyandaccuratelythanhumanregulators”).


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services.Thuswecouldreceivetheaccesstojusticebenefitswithoutreplacing

judges.Andaslongaswestillhavehumanjudges,therewillstillbeaneedforat

leastsomehumanlawyers,sothehumanlegalcommunitywillstillexist.

Thustotheextentthereareadvantagestorobotjudges,theadvantagesare

limitedandareoutweighedbythemajordisadvantages,suchthattheadvantages

canbebetterachievedinotherways.Why,then,shouldwereplaceourArticleIII

judgeswithAIrobots?Theanswerissimple:weshouldn’t.