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Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline": Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire,Fifteenth to Eighteenth CenturiesAuthor(s): Jonathan GrantSource: Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 179-201Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078753Accessed: 03-03-2015 08:23 UTC
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8/9/2019 Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empir
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Rethinking
the Ottoman
Decline77:
Military
Technology
Diffusion
in
the
Ottoman
Empire,
Fifteenth
to
Eighteenth
Centuries
JONATHAN
GRANT
Florida
State
University
In
the
field
of
Ottoman
history,
scholars
have often
advanced
an
interpretation
of decline.
Traditionally,
the
argument
states
that
the
Ottoman
empire
reached its
peak
in the sixteenth
century
under
Suley
man
the
Magnificent,
and
thereafter
began
an
inexorable
stagnation
and
decline
lasting
until
the twentieth
century.
Historians often
point
to
the
Ottoman
naval
defeat
at
Lepanto
in
1571
or
the failure of the
second
siege
of
Vienna
in
1683
as
events
marking
the
waning
fortunes
of
Ottoman
power
and the
beginning
of
the decline. 1
The
use
of
the
term
decline
as
it
has been
applied
by
Middle
East
scholars
to
the
Ottoman
case
presents
several
problems.
Implicit
in
any
notion
of decline
is
some
kind
of
comparison.
After
all,
an
empire
Journal
of
World
History,
Vol.
io,
No.
i
?1999
by University
of
Hawai'i Press
179
1
Norman
Itzkowitz,
Ottoman
Empire
and
Islamic Tradition
(Chicago:
University
of Chi
cago
Press,
1972),
pp.
67,
73;
Paul
Coles,
The Ottoman
Impact
on
Europe
(London:
Thames
and
Hudson,
1968),
p. 195;
P.
M.
Holt,
Egypt
and the Fertile
Crescent
1516-1922:
A
Political
History
(Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press,
1966),
pp.
61-70;
Halil
Inalcik,
The
Ottoman
Empire:
The
Classical
Age,
1300-1600
(New
Rochelle:
Orpheus Publishing,
1973),
pp.
41
52;
A?ir
Arkayin,
Ikinci
Viyana
Kusatmasi
1683
(Ankara:
Gnkur. Askeri Tarih
ve
Stratejik
Etiit
Ba?kanligi Yayinlari,
1983);
Bernard
Lewis,
The
Emergence
of
Modern
Turkey
(London:
Oxford
University
Press,
1968),
pp.
21-39.
See also Halil Inalcik
and
Donald
Quataert,
eds.,
An
Economic
and Social
History
of
the
Ottoman
Empire,
1300-1014
(Cambridge:
Cam
bridge
University
Press,
1994),
for the
most
recent
discussions
of
the decline
thesis.
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i8o
JOURNAL
OF
WORLD
HISTORY,
SPRING
1999
can
only
be
seen as
declining
in
comparison
to
some
measure,
whether
it
be other
powers
or
its
own
imperial
past.
As
historians have
em
ployed
the
concept,
the
unit
of
measure
(if
mentioned
at
all)
is
often
overly
broad
or
inappropriate
to
the Ottoman
context.
In its
broadest
application,
Ottoman decline
has
served
as a
negative
judgment
on
Islamic
society
as a
whole
and
its
inability
to
match
the
march of
progress
and
rising
power
of
Western
society
since
the seventeenth
century.
In
this
instance
the
unit
of
comparison
is
the civilization.2
Such
a
basis for
comparison
is
ill-chosen
because
the
notion
that the
strength of a civilization can be measured in military success is an
obviously
dubious
proposition,
as
the
examples
of
Renaissance
Italy
or
the
thirteenth-century
Mongols
make clear.
Besides
selecting
a
vague
unit
of
measure,
proponents
of the
decline thesis tend
to
be rather
imprecise
about the
scale
by
which
they
measure
the Ottoman decline.
For
example,
they
may
posit
an eco
nomic
or
cultural/social
decline that contributed
to
a
military
decline,
but
invariably
this so-called decline
was
in
relation
to
an
economically
expanding
West. 3
However,
neither
the
West
nor
Islamic
society
was a
monolithic
entity,
and within each civilization there existed
states
with
varying
degrees
of
military capability.
Most often scholars
have
used the
term
the
West
or
Europe generically,
when
they actually
meant
England,
France,
and Holland.
The
use
of these
western
Euro
pean
states
as
the basis
for
measuring
Ottoman
military
decline
has
obscured the actual Ottoman conditions
by
placing
them
in
the
wrong
context.
The
Ottomans
did
not
operate
in
western
Europe,
but rather
in
eastern
Europe
and the
eastern
Mediterranean.4
In
fact
decline
is
not
a
useful
term at
all,
because
it
reflects
more a
moral
judgment
passed by
Europeans
convinced of their
own
superiority
than
an
accurate
assess
ment
of Ottoman
capabilities
after
1571
or
1683.
To
be
sure,
the
declinists
offer
more
than
a
monocausal
expla
nation.
Halil
Inalcik,
perhaps
the
foremost
advocate of
the
declinist
position,
points
to
population
pressure,
fiscal
crisis,
and
Europe's
new
military
technology
as
contributing
to
Ottoman
decline
by
the
early
2
Reuben
Levy,
An
Introduction
to
the
Sociology
of
Islam
(London:
Harrison and
Sons,
1933).
Marshall
G. S.
Hodgson,
The Venture
of
Islam: Conscience
and
History
in
a
World
Civ
ilization,
vol.
3:
The
Gunpowder
Empires
and Modern Times
(Chicago:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1974),
offers
a more
nuanced
assessment
of the
decline
of
Islamic
civilization after
1700.
See also IraM.
Lapidus,
A
History
of
Islamic Societies
(Cambridge: Cambridge
Univer
sity Press, 1988).
3
The foremost
example
of such studies
isH.
A.
R.
Gibb
and
H.
Bowen,
Islamic
Society
and
the
West,
vol.
1,
pt.
1
(London:
Oxford
University
Press,
1950).
4
A notable
exception
is
Virginia
H.
Aksan,
An Ottoman Statesman
in
War and Peace:
Ahmed Resmi
Efendi,
1700-1783
(Leiden:
E.
].
Brill,
1995).
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Grant:
Military
Technology
Diffusion
in
the Ottoman
Empire
181
seventeenth
century.
In his
view,
the
Ottoman
failure
meant
that
a
traditional Asiatic
culture,
even
when
it
borrowed
war
technology
from the
West,
was
doomed before the
rise
of modern
Europe....
The
Ottoman decline
was
as
much the
outcome
of
Western
Europe's
modern
economic
system
as
of
superior
European military
technology. 5
Although
some
aspects
of Ottoman
economic
decline have
been
seri
ously
called
into
question,
the role of
superior
European military
tech
nology
and
its
production
in
contributing
to
Ottoman decline has
remained
an
operative assumption.6
Instead
of
thinking
in
terms
of
decline,
it
is
more
useful
to recon
ceptualize
the
problem
in
terms
of
locating
Ottoman
capabilities
on
the
scale
of
the
international
production hierarchy,
which
includes
arms
production,
arms
transfers,
and
technological
diffusion.
Therefore,
I
shall
attempt
to
compare
Ottoman
military
and
naval
capabilities
against
the
Ottomans'
own
past
accomplishments
and the achievements
in
war
technology
and
production
made
by
the
Ottomans'
European
rivals
and
neighbors.
When
placed
in
the
proper
context,
it
becomes
appar
ent
that
up
to
the
early
nineteenth
century
the decline
was
certainly
not inexorable.
Keith
Krause
has
recently
put
forth
a
model for the
spread
of
mili
tary
technology
as
a
diffusion
wave
that settles
into
a
hierarchy
of mili
tary
producers. Typically
a wave
begins
as a
period
of
rapid
innovation,
followed
by
the diffusion
of
military
technology
from
the
first-tier
inno
vators to
second-tier
exporters,
and concludes with
attempts
by
third
tier
states to create
their
own
indigenous
arms
industry through
tech
nological
imports.
Accordingly, producers
in
the
first
tier
innovate
at
the
technological
frontier,
those
in
the
second
tier
adapt
weapons
at
the
technological
frontier,
and
third-tier
producers
copy
and
reproduce
existing technologies but do not capture the underlying process of
innovation
or
adaptation.7
The first
wave was
triggered
by
the
gun
powder
revolution
in
the
early
fifteenth
century
and had
largely
run
its
course
by
the
mid-seventeenth
century.
By
that
time
the
centers
of
first-tier
production
were
England,
the
Low
Countries,
and
(ephemer
5
Inalcik
and
Quataert,
eds.,
An
Economic
and
Social
History
of
the Ottoman
Empire,
1300-1914, p.22.
6
Suraiya Faroqhi,
Crisis
and
Change,
1590-1699,
in
An
Economic
and Social
History
of
the
Ottoman
Empire, 1300-1914,
ed.
Inalcik
and
Quataert, p. 468.
For
a
thorough
refuta
tion
of
the
interpretation
of
Ottoman
economic
decline
in
the
period
1500-1800,
see
Roger
Owen,
The Middle East
in
theWorld
Economy,
1800-1914
(London:
Methuen,
1981),
pp.
1-23.
7
Keith
Krause,
Arms
and
the State: Patterns
of
Military
Production
and
Trade
(Cam
bridge:
Cambridge University
Press,
1992),
pp.
30-31.
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l82
JOURNAL
OF
WORLD
HISTORY,
SPRING
I999
ally)
Sweden.8
After
the
initial
revolutionary
wave
came
a
period
of
incremental
innovation
that
began
in
the
late seventeenth
century
and
ended
in
the
early
nineteenth
century.
Among
the
innovations
of
this
secondary
wave
were
the
development
of
boring
cannon
(rather
than
casting
cannon
in
a
mold),
the
conversion
from matchlock
fire
arms
to
flintlocks,
and
the
lightening
of field
guns
and
carriages.9
The
second-tier
producers
were
a more
fluid
group.
The
Italian
states
of
Milan,
Venice, Genoa,
and
Brescia had
been
first-tier
manu
facturers
in
the
first half
of the fifteenth
century,
but
gradually
declined
into the second tier.
By
1500
Milan was
importing
cannon, and
by
1606 half the
Venetian
fleet
was
built
abroad.
Although
Italian
pro
ducers
had
dropped
into
the
second
tier,
they
remained
important
arms
exporters.
Migration
of skilled
workers
served
as
the
main mechanism
for
the
technological
diffusion
into
Sweden,
Russia,
France,
Spain,
and
the
Ottoman
empire
between
1450
and
1650.
Among
these
newcomers,
however,
only
France,
Russia,
and
Spain
successfully
reached
the
second
tier. For the
Ottomans,
Italy
proved
an
important
supply
source,
especially
in
the
early
period
of Ottoman
expansion,
1450-1500.10
By employing
Krause's
model
it
is
possible
to
reformulate
the
ques
tion
of
Ottoman
decline
in
a
more
precise
way:
Did
the
Ottomans
decline
from
their initial
position
in
the
production
hierarchy?
Based
on
Krause's
schema,
it
becomes
clear that
the Ottomans
remained
a
third-tier
producer
throughout
the
period
from
the
fifteenth
century
to
the
early
nineteenth
century.
In
other
words,
the
Ottomans
did
not
drop
a
tier
in
their
military
technological
capabilities,
and
it
is
mislead
ing
to
view them
as
in
decline
by
comparing
them
to
first-tier
producers,
such
as
England
and
Holland.
Furthermore,
their
immediate
rivals
in
Poland,
Hungary,
and
the
Balkans
possessed
comparable
capabilities,
while Egypt and Iran were actually below the third tier and
were
import-dependent.11
Given
this
regional
context,
the Ottomans
were
able
to
maintain themselves
as
a
regionally
dominant
power.
The
comparison
with
Iranian
capabilities
is instructive.
In
their
struggle
with Safavid
Iran,
Ottoman
forces
initially
held
a
distinct
tech
nological
advantage.
At the
battle
of Chaldiran
in
1514
Ottoman
troops
armed
with
firearms
and
artillery
crushed
a
Safavid
force
that
lacked
guns.
In
1528
the
Iranians
were
victorious
over
the
Ozbegs
because
of
their
artillery,
which
they
obtained
from the
Portuguese.
In
8
Krause,
Arms
and
the
State, p.
38.
9
Krause,
Arms
and
the
State,
p.
54.
10
Krause,
Arms and
the
State,
pp.
37~45
11
Krause,
Arms
and the
State, pp.
43,
51-52.
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Grant:
Military Technology
Diffusion
in
the Ottoman
Empire
183
general,
the
Iranians
chose
to
avoid
pitched
battles
with the Ottomans
in
favor
of defensive scorched-earth
tactics.
Under Shah Abbas
(1587
1629)
Persian
forces
included
an
artillery
corps
of about
500
guns,
and
a
series
of
sieges
and
counter-sieges
of
Baghdad
resulted
in
a
reassertion
of
Ottoman control
in
the
region
and
an
effective stalemate of
the
Ottoman-Iranian border
by
1639.
However,
the
Safavid
artillery
force
deteriorated
rapidly
under Abbas
II
(1642-66).
Safavid rule ended
in
1722
when the
Persian
army,
equipped
with
twenty-four
cannon,
under
a
French commander but
lacking
unified
command,
suffered
defeat
at
the hands of
Afghan
forces without
artillery.
Iranian
artillery
and fire
arms
were
imported
throughout
the
period
rather than
manufactured
domestically.
Thus,
the
Ottomans'
capacity
to
produce
their
own arma
ments
stood them
in
good
stead
in
relation
to
their Safavid
opponents.12
It
has often
been assumed that the decline
in
the
military
fortunes
of the
empire
after
1683
was
continual and irreversible.
For
example,
Bernard Lewis
wrote,
The Ottomans found
it
more
and
more
difficult
to
keep
up
with the
rapidly advancing
Western
technological
innova
tions,
and
in
the
course
of the
eighteenth
century
the
Ottoman
Empire,
itself far ahead of the
rest
of
the
Islamic
world,
fell
decisively
behind
Europe
in
virtually
all
arts
of
war. 13
Later he
remarks,
And
by
the late
eighteenth
century
the
Ottomans,
for
so
long
self-sufficient
in
armaments,
found themselves
obliged
to
place
orders for
ships
in
for
eign
shipyards. 14
Such
statements
are
less than
accurate accounts
of the
Porte's
war
industries.
It
is
true
that
a
growing
disparity
between
the
products
of
Ottoman
war
industries and those of
their
neighbors
did
occur
over
the
eighteenth
century,
but this
gap
was
caused
by
the
Porte's
neigh
bors
borrowing
the
incremental
innovations,
such
as
galleons,
frigates,
techniques of cannon-boring, light field guns, new-formula gunpowder,
12
Rudi
Matthee,
Unwalled Cities
and Restless
Nomads:
Firearms
and
Artillery
in
Safavid
Iran,
in
Safavid
Persia,
ed.
Charles Melville
(London:
I.
B.
Taurus,
1996),
pp.
391
410;
David
Morgan,
Medieval
Persia,
1040-1797 (London:
Longman,
1994),
pp.
116-17,
125-26,
135, 147,
150-51;
Palmira
Brummett,
Ottoman
Seapower
and
Levantine
Diplomacy
in
the
Age
of Discovery
(Albany:
State
University
of
New York
Press,
1994),
pp.
55,
64-87;
Faroqhi,
Crisis
and
Change,
1590-1699,
pp.
420-22;
Louis
Dupree,
Afghanistan
(Prince
ton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1980),
p.
325.
13
Bernard
Lewis,
The Muslim
Discovery of Europe
(New
York: W.
W.
Norton,
1982),
p.
226.
14
Lewis,
The
Muslim
Discovery
of Europe,
pp.
226-27.
Similar
interpretations
can
be
found
in
Gani
Ozbaran,
War
Industry
Plants of
the
Ottoman
Armed
Forces,
Revue
inter
nationale d'histoire
militaire
67
(1988): 67-76;
Wayne
S.
Vucinich,
The
Ottoman
Empire:
Its
Record and
Legacy
(Princeton:
Van
Nostrand,
1965),
pp.
78-87;
lu. A.
Petrosian,
Osmans
kaia
imperiia
mogushchestvo
i
gibel'
(Moscow: Nauka,
1990),
p. 134.
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185
because he
has
plenty
of
wood,
iron
parts,
skilled
workers,
pitch,
tal
low,
and all the
other
things
needed.
True,
at
present
they
do
not
have
at
hand all
the
armament
they
would need
to
outfit the
as
yet
uncom
pleted
galleys,
much less those
the
Grand
Signor
has ordered
made,
and
they
are
short of
cotton
sailcloth
and other
things.
But
his
re
sources
are so
great
that
if
he wanted
to
he
could
quickly
assemble
what
he
needs;
he has
already
begun
to
attend
to
this.18
Placing
the battle
of
Lepanto
into
the
context
of Ottoman
naval
production,
it
becomes
clear
that this
seemingly
profound
turning point
in
Ottoman
affairs
actually proved
to
be
quite
superficial.
True,
the
battle
itself
was a
decisive defeat
for
the
Ottoman
navy.
Out
of
230
Ottoman
galleys,
80
vessels
were
sunk and
130
captured.19
Yet
Otto
man
naval
production
capabilities
were
left unaffected.
The
huge
naval
arsenal
at
Kasimpa?a
was
still the
largest
in
the
world,
and
together
with the
other Ottoman
dockyards
it
could
make
good
the losses
quite
quickly.
Indeed,
the
French
ambassador
reported
on
8
May
1572
that
the
Turks
had
built
150
galleys
in
five
months.20
In
terms
of naval
con
struction, the Porte seemed
to
possess ample materials for
a
substantial
navy.
Paul
Rycaut,
an
English
observer,
appeared
to
be rather
perplexed
about the
inability
of the Ottomans
to
maintain
a
larger
fleet
in
the
seventeenth
century.
He
wrote,
Their
Ports
are
several
of
them
con
venient
for
building
both
ships
and
Gallies;
the Arsenal
of
Constanti
nople
hath
no
less than
a
hundred
thirty-seven
Voltas,
or
Chambers for
Building,
and
so
many
vessels
may
be
upon
the
stacks
at
the
same
time. 21
He
continued,
At
Sinopolis
[Sinop]
near
Trapesond
[Trebizond]
is
another
Arsenal:
at
Midia
and
Anchiale,
Cities
on
the Black
Sea,
are
the like
...
;
and
yet
the
Turk for several
years,
especially
since
the
War with Cand?a, and their defeat at Sea, have not been able at most
to
Equippe
a
Fleet of above
100
sail of Gallies. 22 From his
description
it
is
obvious that
the Ottomans
had the
facilities
to
produce
a
more
formidable
navy.
The observations
of
Morosini
and
Rycaut
require
some
comment.
The
striking
feature for
these observers
in
the sixteenth and
seven
teenth
centuries
was
the
size
of Ottoman
naval
yards.
We
should
not
18
James
C.
Davis,
ed.,
Pursuit
of
Power:
Venetian Ambassadors'
Reports
(New
York:
Harper
and
Row, 1970), p. 134.19
Coles,
The
Ottoman
Impact
on
Europe,
p.
91.
20
Jack
Beeching,
The
Galleys
at
LePanto
(London: Hutchinson,
1982),
p.
228.
21
Paul
Rycaut,
The Present State
of
the
Ottoman
Empire
(1968;
reprint,
Westmead,
England:
Gregg
International,
1972),
p.
213.
22
Rycaut,
The
Present State
of
the Ottoman
Empire,
p.
213.
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confuse
size
with
efficiency.
Although
the
arsenal
in
Istanbul
was
maintained
as a
permanent
facility,
the
size
of the work
force varied.
The
majority
of workers
were
employed only
for the short
term,
and
the
core
of
permanent
staff
was
relatively
small.
Also,
coerced
labor
figured
prominently
in
meeting
the
labor needs
at
the
arsenal.
Many
of
the workers
languished
without
pay
for
extended
periods
of
time
be
cause
the
treasury
was
insolvent.
Meanwhile,
the official
tax
farmers,
who
were
charged
with
paying
the
arsenal's
bills,
proved
slow
and
un
reliable.23 The
physical
capacity
of
Ottoman
yards rightly
impressed
ob
servers, but the arsenal's fiscal weaknesses remained invisible to them.
Much
has been made
of
the
fact
that the
Ottomans
were
very
slow
in
making
the
transition
from
galleys
to
galleons.
After
all,
it
was
not
until
1682
that the Grand Vezir
Kara
Mustafa
Pa?a accepted
the
prin
ciple
of
a
fleet based
on
sailing galleons
rather
than
galleys.24
But
it
is
important
to
bear
in
mind that
the
sailing galleon
did
not
immedi
ately
demonstrate
superiority
over
the
oar-powered galley
in
the mid
sixteenth
century.
Into
the
seventeenth
century
galleys
in
the
Medi
terranean
could
get
the
better
of
sailing
ships.
In
consequence
Spain
maintained
its
position
as
the
premier galley power
in
the
mid-seven
teenth
century
until
the French under
Louis
XIV revived their
galley
fleet
to
make
it
the
largest
one
in
Europe
at
the end of that
century.
Even
in
the
eighteenth
century
the
galley proved
its
effectiveness for
the Russians
in
their
operations
against
the Swedes
in
the Baltic.25
One
possible
explanation
is
that the Turkish
reluctance
to
adopt
galleons
stemmed from material considerations?that
is,
that the
Otto
man
preference
for
a
galley
fleet
over
sea-going
galleons
was
linked
to
reduced timber
supplies.26
The decline of the sancak of
Kocaeli
as
the
main
source
of Ottoman timber
in
the mid-seventeenth
century,
and
the growing importation of hemp from Italy also at that time, indicate
23
Faroqhi,
Crisis
and
Change,
1590-1699,
pp.
461-63.
24
Uzun?ar?ili,
Bahriyya,
p.
948.
25
Geoffrey
Parker,
The
Military
Revolution:
Military
Innovation
and
the
Rise
of
the
West,
1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,
1988),
pp.
87-88;
John
Francis GuiL
martin
Jr.,
Gunpowder
and
Galleys (Cambridge: Cambridge
University
Press,
1974),
pp.
252-73;
Andrew
C.
Hess,
The
Forgotten
Frontier
(Chicago:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1978),
pp. 15,
90-91;
Paul W
Bamford,
Fighting
Ships
and Prisons: The Mediterranean
Galleys
of
France
in
the
Age of
Louis
XIV
(Minneapolis:
University
of Minnesota
Press,
1973),
pp.
11-24.
26
Rhoads
Murphey,
The Ottoman Attitude towards the
Adoption
of
Western Tech
nology:
The
Role
of the Efrenci
Technicians
in
Civil
and
Military
Applications,
in
Contri
butions ?'l'histoire
?conomique
et
sociale de
l'empire
Ottoman
(Leuven:
Editions
Peeters,
1983),
p.
292.
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some
kind of domestic shortfall.27
Nevertheless,
this
argument
is
not
completely
satisfying.
In
the
1760s
much of
the accessible
coastal
areas
had been
vastly
deforested,
and
as a
result the
price
of
timber had
tripled
from the
1740s
to
the
1760s.28
Yet
the
Ottomans
managed
to
produce galleons
at
that
time.
The
provinces
were
still
delivering
wood
to
the
arsenal
as
part
of their
tax,
and
in
fact
the
archipelago
islands
were
required
to
construct
one or
two
ships
called
fricata
in
proportion
to
their
size
or
revenue.29
Moreover,
Selim
Ill's
whole naval
modernization
program
in
the
1790s
was
implemented
with the
same
timber
supply
conditions in effect. So it is difficult to see how reduced
timber
supplies
could
have been
a
determining
factor
in
the
tardiness
of
Ottoman
galleon
construction.
A
more
compelling
explanation
can
be found
in
the
Porte's
long
naval
rivalry
with the Venetians.
Ottoman naval
developments
had
always
been
closely
intertwined
with
those
of
Venice.
Back
in its
infancy,
in
1416,
the Ottoman
navy
had
fought
its
first
sea
battle
against
the
Venetians.30
Also, many
of the
experts
who
supervised
the
building
of
war
galleys
in
the
sultan's
yards
had
served
as
shipwrights
in
Venice,
and
the
Ottoman methods of construction
were
therefore
largely
copied
from those of the Venetians.31
This
rivalry
had
great
sig
nificance for
Ottoman
naval
development
because the
Venetians
were
also
reluctant
to
adopt
galleons.
Both the
Ottomans
and
Venetians
were
latecomers
to
the idea of
galleon
fleets,
and
for
both
the
impetus
for the
adoption
of
sailing
galleons
came
from
the Atlantic
powers
in
the
seventeenth
century.
In
the late
1640s
and
early
1650s
the
Ottomans
made
considerable
efforts
to
increase
the
number of
their
sailing
vessels
in
response
to
their
defeats
by
Atlantic
sailing
vessels
operating
as
auxiliaries for
the
Vene
tian fleet.32 Somewhat later, the Venetians began to encounter diffi
culties
in
retaining
the
services
of
these
foreign
auxiliaries.
Recogniz
ing
the
vital role of
sailing
warships
by
this
time,
the
Venetians
began
building
their
own
in
1667.33
Throughout
the
first
half of the
eighteenth
27
C. H.
Imber,
The
Navy
of
Suleyman
the
Magnificent,
Archivum
Ottomanicum
6
(1980):
232.
28
Henry
Grenville,
Observations
sur
l'?tat actuel
de
l'empire
Ottoman
(Ann
Arbor: Uni
versity
of
Michigan
Press,
1965),
p.
54.
29
Grenville,
Observations,
pp.
3-4.
30
Uzun?ar?ili,
Bahriyya,
p.
947.
31
Beeching,
The
Galleys
at
LePanto,
p.
152.
32
Katip
?elebi, Tuhfetul
Kibar
Fi
Esfari'
l-Bihar, pp.
185,
190,
225;
R. C.
Anderson,
Naval
Wars
in
the
Levant,
1559-1853
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1952),
p.
142.
33
Anderson,
Naval Wars
in
the
Levant,
p.
194.
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century
the
Ottomans
maintained
a
naval
balance with the
Venetian
forces.
Henry
Grenville still
considered the Ottoman fleet
comparable
to
that of Venice
from what he observed
in
1765.34
Unfortunately, by
merely keeping
pace
with the
Venetians,
the Ottomans fell
behind
the
Atlantic
maritime
powers.
The
inferiority
of
Mediterranean naval
power
to
Atlantic
power
only
became clear when the
main
naval
activ
ity
in
the
western
Mediterranean
passed
to
Britain
and
France
in
the
second
half
of the
1700s.35
Judging
by
the
sporadic
naval
construction
programs
in
the
first
decades of the
eighteenth
century, a lack of resolve seems to have
played
the
major
role
in
limiting
the
size
of the
navy.
Under
the
ener
getic
leadership
of
Mezamorto
Huseyin Pa?a
toward the end of the
i6oos,
the
Ottomans followed
the
European
naval switch from
oar
powered
to
sail-powered
galleons,
which had occurred
at
the
beginning
of that
century.36
Mezamorto's reforms continued
into
the
reign
of
Ahmet III
(1703-30),
and the
number of
new
ships
with
large-caliber
cannons
increased.37
During
the
war
against
Peter
the
Great
the
Turks
were
superior
in
number
and
size
of
ships
on
the
Azov. In
1711
the
Azov
fleet
comprised
eighteen
men-of-war and fourteen
galleys.38
Evi
dently
the
Ottomans
were
quite
capable
of
significant
naval
construc
tion,
because
the
vigilant
Venetians worried
about
rumors
of
the
Porte
forming
a
fleet of
forty
to
sixty
vessels
in
1720.39
Whether
or
not
the Venetian
intelligence
reports
were
exact
is
less
important
than
the
fact
that such
an
Ottoman
response
was
deemed credible
by
Venetian
authorities.
According
to
Baron
de
Tott,
a
French
aristocrat
who
served
as a
foreign
expert
in
Ottoman
arsenals,
frigates
were
only
introduced
into
the
Ottoman fleet
during
the Russo-Turkish
War
(1768-77),
when
they participated
in
the
Ottoman
defeat
at
Chesme.40
It
is
likely
that
frigates
actually appeared
slightly
earlier.
Henry
Grenville mentioned
34
Grenville,
Observations,
p.
29.
35
Uzun?ar?ili,
Bahriyya,
p.
948.
36
Stanford
Shaw,
Empire
of
the
Gazis:
The
Rise and Decline
of
theOttoman
Empire
1280
1808,
vol.
1
of
History
of
the Ottoman
Empire
and Modern
Turkey (Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1987),
p.
226.
37
Shaw,
Empire
of
the
Gazis,
p.
229.
38
B. H.
Sumner,
Peter
the
Great
and the
Ottoman
Empire
(Hamden,
Conn.:
Archon
Books,
1965),
p.
25.
39
Mary
Lucille
Shay,
The Ottoman
Empire
from 1720 to 1734 as Revealed in Des
patches
of
the
Venetian
Baili,
University
of Illinois Studies
in
the Social Sciences
27,
no.
3
(Urbana:
University
of Illinois
Press,
1944),
pp.
74-76.
40
Baron
Francis
de
Tott,
Memoirs
of
Baron De
Tott,
vol.
2,
pt.
3 (New
York: Arno
Press,
1973),
p.
25.
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frigates
with
forty
to
fifty
cannons
each
in
1765.41
In
any
case,
it
was
not
until
after Selim
Ill's
naval
reforms that the
Ottoman
fleet
again
became
competitive
with Atlantic
Europe,
although
the Turkish defeat
at
Chesme
was
not
due
to
any
technical deficiencies.
The
Turkish
fleet
actually
had
larger
vessels than
the
Russian
fleet,
and
their
artillery
was
comparable.42
The naval reforms of Selim
III
(1789-1807)
demonstrated that the
empire's
domestic
production
was
still
capable
of
rising
to
the
chal
lenge.
In
1784
the
navy
consisted of
twenty-two
ships
of
the line and
fifteen
frigates
(of
which
nine
were
in
poor
condition).43
In
the
period
1784-88
there
were
twenty-five
vessels
carrying
over
sixty
guns
within
the
Ottoman
navy.
One
of
these,
a
seventy-four-gunner,
had
been
built
by
French
engineers.44
Between
1789
and
1798
some
forty-five
modern
fighting ships
were
built and launched
from the
empire's ship
yards.
Among
these
were
three of the
largest
ships
ever
present
in
the Ottoman fleet: the
Selimiye
(122
cannons),
the BadiA Nusret
(82
cannons),
and
the
Tavus-u
Bahri
(82 cannons).
By
1806
the
fleet
con
sisted of
twenty
ships
of the
line and
twenty-five frigates,
with
a
total
of 2,156 cannon.45 Additionally, shipbuilding at the arsenal had been
reorganized
on
European
lines.
The
two
old
wooden
drydocks
were re
placed by
three
permanent
stone
ones,
five
new
ship-building
forms
were
constructed,
and
a new
drydock
was
built,
modeled
on
that
of
Toulon.46
Istanbul
was
clearly
the
dominant
center
for
Ottoman naval
con
struction.
The
Selimiye,
Tavus-u
Bahri,
BadiA
Nusret,
AsarA
Nusret,
Sedd
ul
Bahir,
and the
BahrA
Zafer
were
all
launched
from
the
naval
yards
in
Istanbul.47
These
ships
made
up
over
one-third of the
complement
of
galleons
constructed
during
the
reign
of
Selim
III.
They
also
repre
sented most of the navy's firepower. Besides galleons, the Istanbul
yards
also
produced
two
frigates,
the
MerkenA
Gazi
and the
HumayA
Zafer,
and
six
corvettes.48
While
Istanbul
played
the
most
important
role
in
naval
construe
41
Grenville,
Observations,
p. 3.
42
Petrosian,
Osmanskaia
imperiia
mogushchestvo
i
gibel',
p.
164.
43
Shaw,
Empire
of
the
Gazis,
p.
154.
44
Fernand
Braudel,
Civilization
and
Capitalism: i5th-i8th
Century,
vol.
3:
The
Perspec
tive
of
the
World
(New
York:
Harper
and
Row,
1984),
p.
477.
45
Shaw,
Empire
of
the
Gazis,
p.
158.
46
Shaw,
Empire of
the
Gazis,
p.
158.
47Nejat
G?len,
D?nden
B?gune
Bahriyemiz
(Istanbul:
Kastas A.
S.
Yayinlari,
1988),
p.
118.
48
G?len,
D?nden
B?gune
Bahriyemiz,
pp.
118-19.
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I999
tion,
other
ports
made
significant
contributions.
In
Bodrum
three
galleons
were
built between
1790
and
1796.49
Facilities
at
Sinop
also
made three
galleons
in
the
years
1789-93.
?anakkale,
Gemlik, Midilli,
and
Rhodes
contributed
an
additional
one
galleon
each
to
Selim's
pro
gram.
Rhodes served
as
the
principal
construction site
for
frigates,
and
four
came
out
of there from
1793
to
1797?
Also,
two corvettes
were
launched from
Rhodes,
the
first
in
1796
and the second
in
1799?
Other naval
yards
at
Eregli,
Limni, Kemer,
Kalas,
and
Sinop
were
responsible
for
one
frigate apiece.50
The Ottomans had relied on
foreign
expertise
and had
copied
for
eign
technology
in
their naval
construction
from the
very
beginnings
of their
navy.
As
the
innovations
from the
first-tier Atlantic
producers
diffused
across
the Mediterranean
via
Spain
to
Venice,
the
Ottomans
became
cognizant
of them and
incorporated
these
new
types
of
ships
into
their
own
fleet. First
galleons
and then
frigates joined
the ranks
of Ottoman naval
service
after
neighboring
powers
had
similarly
borrowed
them.
Military
Production
The
question
of when the Ottomans first
employed
cannon
and fire
arms
in
their
military
operations
has
not
been
definitively
answered,
but
Ottoman
cannon
production gradually
became
more
centralized
over
the
course
of
the fifteenth
century.51
In
1440,
during
the
reign
of
Mur?t
II,
a cannon
foundry
was
established
at
Germe
Hisar.52
After the
conquest
of
Constantinople,
a
permanent
cannon
foundry
was
estab
lished
in
the Galata
district.53
Bayezid
II
(1481-1512)
extended this
49
Guien,
D?nden
B?gune Bahriyemiz,
p.
118.
50
Guien,
D?nden
B?gune
Bahriyemiz,
pp.
118-19.
51
There
is
evidence that
cannoneers
were
present
with
Murat
Han
during
the
1422
siege
of
Constantinople,
and
important
fortresses used cannon?for
example,
Antalya
in
1423.
In
the
following
years
the
Ottomans
must
have made the
transition
from
siege
guns
to
field
guns,
because
during
the
time
of Murat II
(1421-51)
the
first clear
usage
of
field
guns
occurred
at
the second battle
of
Kossovo
in
1448.
Sevin?,
Osmanli
Sosyal
ve
Ekonomik
D?zeni,
pp.
141-42;
Paul
Wittek,
The Earliest References
to
the
Use
of
Firearms
by
the
Ottomans,
in
Gunpowder
and
Firearms
in
the
Mamluk
Kingdom,
ed.
David
Ayalon
(London:
Vallentine,
1956),
pp.
142-43;
V.
].
Parry,
Barud,
in
Encyclopaedia
of
Islam:
New
Edition,
1:1061;
Mark C.
Bartusis,
The Late
Byzantine Army:
Arms
and
Society,
1204-1453 (Phila
delphia:
University
of
Pennsylvania
Press,
1992),
pp.
336-41.
521.H.
Uzun?ar?ili,
Osmanli Devleti
tesjdlatindan
Kapukulu
Ocaklari, vol. 2
(Ankara:
Turk
Tarih Kurumu
Basimevi,
1944),
p. 35.
See also
Sevin?,
Osmanli
Sosyal
ve
Ekonomik
D?zeni,
p.
142.
53
Tursun
Bey,
Tarih-i
Eb?'1-Feth,
trans.
A. Mertol Tulum
(Istanbul:
Baha
matbaasi,
i977)>
P-
72.
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production
site,
and
Suleyman
I
(1520-66)
had
it
renovated. In
addi
tion
to
the
central arsenal
at
Istanbul,
the
Ottomans
established
Bel
grade,
Buda,
I?kodra,
Teme?var,
Pravi?te,
and
G?lamber
as
important
provincial
centers
of
cannon
production.54
Besides
these
permanent
establishments,
other
locations served
as
foundries,
depending
on
the
needs of the
moment.
Included
in
this
category
were
Bilecik,
Van,
Kigi,
Kamengrad,
Rudnik,
and
Novobrdo.55
The
size
and
quality
of Ottoman
cannons
in
the
fifteenth
and
six
teenth
centuries
were
quite
impressive.
Chemical
analysis
of
Ottoman
guns cast in 1464 reveals that the bronze was of excellent quality.56
Among
the
monstrously
huge
guns
produced
by
the
Ottomans
was
the
balyemez.
This
term
was
derived
from
the
Italian
word
pallamezza
and
applied
to
Ottoman
guns
that
fired
the
biggest
shot.57
The
use
of
an
Italian
loanword reveals
the
origins
of
the
technology copied
by
the
Ottomans.
During
the
reign
of
Selim
I,
cannon
of
this
type
were
820
cm
in
length
and
weighed
up
to
17
tons.
Also
under
Selim
I,
the
Otto
mans
developed
grooved
cast
cannon
425
cm
long
and
100 cm
wide,
a
feat
not
matched
by
the
Germans until
the
nineteenth
century.58
Unfortunately
for Ottoman
military
fortunes,
the
methods
and
tech
niques
that had served the Ottomans so well in the
sixteenth
century
began
to
be
liabilities
in
the
seventeenth
century.
The
Ottoman
pref
erence
for
the
production
of
siege
guns,
which
were
too
heavy
for
use
in
a
war
of
movement,
continued
through
the
seventeenth
century.59
It
was
precisely
at
this
time
that
European
developments
in
the
manu
facture
of
mobile
field
artillery
moved
ahead.
Raimondo
Montecuc
coli,
the
Habsburg
commander who
defeated
the
Ottomans
at
the
battle
of
St.
Gothard
in
1664,
commented
on
Ottoman
cannon:
This enormous artillery produces great damage when it hits, but it is
awkward
to
move
and
it
requires
too
much
time
to
reload
and
site.
Furthermore,
it consumes
a
great
amount
of
powder,
besides
cracking
and
breaking
the
wheels
and
the
carriages
and
even
the
ramparts
on
which
it is
placed
. . .
our
artillery
is
more
handy
and
more
efficient
and here
resides
our
advantage
over
the
cannon
of
the
Turks.60
54
Parry,
Barud,
p.
1063.
55
Midhat
Sertoglu,
Osmanli
Tarih
Lugati
(Istanbul:
Enderun
Kitabevi,
1986),
p.
341.
56
Parry, Barud, p. 1061.
57
Sertoglu,
Osmanli
Tarih
Lugati,
p. 33.
58
Sevin?,
Osmanli
Sosyal
ve
Ekonomik
D?zeni,
p.
143.
59
Coles,
The Ottoman
Impact
on
Europe,
p.
186.
60
Coles,
The Ottoman
Impact
on
Europe,
p.
186.
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Generally,
though,
Ottoman cannons were
still
regarded highly
in
the seventeenth
century.
Rycaut
wrote,
The Guns
are
the
biggest
and
as
well
cast
and moulded
as
any
in
the
world;
for
the
last
Expedition
in
Hungary
there
were
40
pieces
of
new
Cannon
cast
and
transported by
way
of
the black
Sea,
and thence
by
the Danube
unto
Belgrade
and
Buda. 61
Domestic
cannon
production
remained
strong
throughout
the
eighteenth
century,
but the Ottomans'
penchant
for
big, heavy
guns
placed
them
at
a
disadvantage
in
mobile field battles
against
European
forces armed with
rapid-fire
cannons.
The Ottomans
remained
partial
to
the old
balyemez
and shaki
cannons,
and
consequently
their
artillery
was
no
longer comparable
to
that of
European
powers.62
In
effect,
the
empire
was
manufacturing
the
wrong
type
of
pieces.
During
the Otto
man
campaign
against
Ada Kale
in
1738,
the
Austrians
captured
fifty
cannons
at
Orsovo,
but
they
could
only
take
forty
of them due
to
the
weight
of
the
pieces.63
It
was
not
until
1774
that
a
train
of
light
field
artillery
was
cast
for Ottoman
service.64
While
Rycaut
had
praised
Ottoman
cannon
production
in
the
seventeenth
century,
barely
over a
century
later Baron de Tott had
no
similar inclination.
In Tott's
assessment,
the Founderies
which
they
already had were useless; . . . and the metal. . .was not hot enough
when
it
reached the
Moulds;
the
improper
make of which added
yet
another
defect
to
the
Pieces
they produced. 65
Accordingly,
the
baron
suggested improved
furnaces
and the
use
of
machines
to
bore the
cannon.66 After
successfully
casting
twenty
cannons
with
the
new
method,
he
was
ordered
to
prepare
fifty
four-pounders.
He
recorded
that,
The first
work of the
New
Foundery
was
to
be
a
Train
of Field
Artillery,
with which the Turks
were
entirely
unprovided. 67
Much
to
Tott's
chagrin,
the
impact
of his
modern
foundry
was
not
as
great
as
he
had
hoped.
After
the
completion
of the
pieces
for the
field
train,
some new cannons were cast for the new forts on the
Dardanelles.68
Still,
the
new
foundry
remained
underutilized.
Soon after
the
baron's
departure,
it
ceased
to
manufacture
cannons
at
all.
The
failure of the
facility
was
due
primarily
to
financial difficulties. As
the
61
Rycaut,
The Present
State
of
the
Ottoman
Empire,
p.
200.
62
Shaw,
Empire of
the
Gazis,
p.
121.
63
A. Z.
Hertz,
The
Ottoman
Conquest
of Ada Kale
1738,
in
Archivum Ottomanicum
6
(1980):
169.
64
Tott,
Memoirs,
p.
155.
65
Tott,
Memoirs,
p.
114.
66
Tott, Memoirs,
p.
97.
67
Tott,
Memoirs,
p. 155.
68
Tott,
Memoirs,
p.
197.
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baron himself
remarked,
We
have
already
seen
that the
Establish
ment
of the
new
Foundery
had
not
abolished
the old.
The Funds
intended for the
Artillery
were
spent
upon
that;
and
it
was
with
diffi
culty
that the
necessary
supplies
were
obtained
for
what
was
acknowl
edged
to
be much
more
useful. 69
Baron
de
Tott's
enterprise
did
yield
some
results.
In
the
1780s
each
artillery
regiment
received
ten
cannons:
four of the
new
rapid-fire
sweat,
two
smaller
abus,
and four older
balye
mez
and shahi
cannons,
for
a
total of
250
pieces.70
However,
this
proved
to
be
inadequate.
As
reported
to
the French
Foreign
Ministry
in
1793,
until
today,
the Turks have founded
only
bronze cannon and their
army
and
navy
have
no
other. Their
foundries and their
forges
are
pitiful. 71
Selim
III
must
have
agreed
with
this
opinion,
because
in
March
1793
the sultan initiated
a
modernization
program
for
artillery
produc
tion.
Selim's
program
relied
on
an
infusion
of
foreign
machinery
and
expertise.
New
machinery
for the
Imperial
Cannon
Foundry
(Tophane)
was
imported
from
Britain
and
France.
At the
same
time
a
group
of
cannon
founders
sent
by
the
French Directorate
occupied
the
old
foundry buildings
in
Hask?y.72
These
buildings
had
originally
been
erected
by
Baron
de
Tott
to
manufacture the
rapid-fire
cannon,
but
had been converted for the
assembly
of
old-style
muskets and
bullets,
which
were
reintroduced after Tott's
departure.
In
addition
to
modern
izing
existing
works,
the
sultan
sought
to create
new
foundries.
With
this
goal
in
mind, seventy
master
workers
were
to
establish
a
cannon
foundry.73
With the introduction of
cannon-boring
techniques
and the
cast
ing
of
light artillery by
Baron
de
Tott
in
the
early
1770s,
the Ottomans
became
the
recipients
of
two
important
technological
innovations,
which constituted part of the second wave of Krause's model. To ap
preciate
the
context
one
should
note
that
Russia
had
adopted
these
techniques only
a
decade before
the
Ottomans,
and
that
the
Russians
also
had made
use
of
a
foreign
expert
to
acquire
the
knowledge
for
cannon-boring.74
When
viewed from
an
eastern
European
perspective,
69
Tott, Memoirs, p.
178.
70
Shaw,
Empire
of
the
Gazis,
p.
121.
71
Shaw,
Empire
of
the
Gazis,
p.
139.
72
Shaw,
Empire
of
the
Gazis,
p.
140
73
Shaw,
Empire
of
the
Gazis,
p.
140.
74
In the
Russian
case
the
expert
was
a
Dutch
prisoner
of
war
captured
in
Berlin
in
1760.
William
H.
McNeill,
The
Pursuit
of
Power:
Technology,
Armed
Force,
and
Society
since
A.D.
1000
(Chicago:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1982),
p.
167;
Krause,
Arms and
the
State,
p.
56.
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the Ottomans
were not
significantly
behind,
and
the
Russian
com
parison
should
mitigate
some
of
Tott's
negative
characterizations
of
Ottoman
capabilities.
Similarly,
before
faulting
the
Turks and the
backwardness
of
Islamic
society
for
their need
to
import
technical
assistance
in
artillery
production,
one
needs
to
remember
that Russia
under
Catherine
the Great
(1762-96)
was
not
self-sufficient
in
pro
ducing
military technology
either.75
Why
did
it
seemingly
take
so
long
for the
Ottomans
to
accept
lighter
field
artillery?
The
Ottoman
timing
was
directly
connected
to
Russian tactical developments in the eighteenth century. Sieges were
the backbone of
military
operations
in
eastern
Europe,
and
therefore
siege
and
fortress
artillery
were
necessarily
vital
components.
The Turk
ish
fortresses
guarding
the northern
approaches provided
formidable
defense and
set
the
conditions for the Russo-Turkish
struggles.
The
Turks
eschewed
field battles
and withdrew
into
their
fortresses,
thereby
forcing
the Russians
to
engage
in
siege
operations.
In
1769
the Rus
sians'
lack of
large
guns
prevented
them from
sustaining
the
siege
against
the
Turkish
fort
at
Hotin,
and
as
a
result
the
Ottomans scored
a
victory
as
the
Russians
were
forced
to
retreat.
The
Russian tactical
innovations of
aimed
infantry
fire,
mobile field
artillery,
the use
of
infantry
squares,
and the
overall
stress
on
speed
and
shock
grew
out
of
challenges posed by
the
Turkish
campaigns
in
the
eighteenth
century.
In
effect,
Russian commanders had
changed
the rules
of
engagement
by
the
1770s,
and
the Turks had
to
compensate.76
The
heavy
Ottoman
guns
were
still viable
in
defending
their
strongholds,
but the
greater
Russian
potency
in
the field
now
required
the
adoption
of
lighter
field
guns.
The
Ottoman
system
for the
production
of
gunpowder
followed
the
pattern
of
that used
for
cannon.
The
state
created factories backed
by
state
resources
and directed
by government-appointed
commis
sioners.
One such
factory
was
the
gunpowder plant
(baruthane)
at
Kagi
than? ,
which
produced
seventeen tons
of
powder
per
month
in
1571.77
Additionally
there
were
large
baruthanes
at
Belgrade,
Konya,
Birecik,
Aleppo,
Hama,
Van,
Baghdad,
Rhodes,
Gallipoli,
Izmir,
Selanik,
and
75
For
a
broad
overview
of
Russia's
technical
backwardness,
see
Hans-Heinrich
Nolte,
Tradition
des
R?ckstands: Ein
halbes
Jahrtausend
'Russland
und
der
Westen',
Vierteiljahr
schrift f?r Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 78 (1991): 344-64; Krause, Arms and the State,
P-55
76
Aksan,
An
Ottoman
Statesman, pp. 145,
151;
William
C.
Fuller,
Strategy
and Power
in
Russia,
1600-1914
(New
York: Free
Press,
1992),
pp.
147-66.
77
Inalcik,
The
Ottoman
Empire:
The Classical
Age,
p.
160.
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Teme?var.78
According
to some
sources,
the first baruthane
was
estab
lished
at
Kagithane
during
the
time
of
Bayezid
II.79
Production of
gun
powder
was
subject
to
centralized
direction,
and the
whole
process
of
manufacturing,
transporting,
collecting,
and
using
gunpowder
was
con
stantly
monitored
by
the central
government.
The
center
was
continu
ally
urging improvements
in
both
quality
and
quantity
of
gunpowder,
and
surplus
powder
was
sent
back
to
Istanbul for
storage
and
redistri
bution
to
other
munitions
locales. Provincial
powder
works
provided
a
significant portion
of the
empire's
production.
Besides
Egypt,
there
were
fourteen
powder
factories in
Baghdad,
and ten in Buda. The Buda works
were
supposed
to
provide
200-300
kantars
(1
kantar
=120
lb)
to
three
other
fortresses
in
Hungary
and
another
500
kantars
to
Belgrade
annu
ally.
Meanwhile,
Baghdad
factories
endeavored
to
supply
1,000
kantars
annually
to
Istanbul
via
the
Aleppo
road.80
It
is
difficult
to
gauge
to
what
extent
the
Ottomans
relied
on
for
eign
sources
for
their
supplies
of
gunpowder.
Paul
Rycaut
noted
already
in
the latter half of the
seventeenth
century
that
their
Gunpowder
is
made but
in
small
quantities
about
Constantinople,
but
comes
from
divers
places
of
Europe
but
that
from
Damascus
is
most
esteemed. 81
In
1678
a
baruthane
was
built
near
Istanbul. This
new
powder
works,
along
with
an
older
works
at
Kagithane, produced
3,000
kantars of
black
powder
each
year.
From
Egypt,
some
1,200
kantars
of
saltpeter
were
received
for
use
in
these
baruthanes.82 After
the
one
baruthane
was
destroyed by
a
fire
in
1697,
a new
powder
works
was
established
on
the
outskirts
of
Istanbul
in
1698.
In
addition,
the
Ottomans
maintained
provincial powder
works
in
Salonika,
Gallipoli,
Baghdad,
Cairo,
Bel
grade,
and
Izmir.83
During
the second half
of the
eighteenth
century
a
powder factory
was
built
in
Damascus
to
meet
the
needs
of
the
janis
saries.84 Evidently, these production centers did not provide sufficient
quantities
of
powder,
because
by
the
second half of
the
eighteenth
cen
78
Sertoglu,
Osmanli
Tarih
Lugati,
p.
34;
Sevin?,
Osmanli
Sosyal
ve
Ekonomik
D?zeni,
p. 144.
79
Sertoglu,
Osmanli
Tarih
Lugati,
p.34.
80Turgut
I?iksal,
Gunpowder
in
Ottoman
Documents
of
the Last
Half
of
the
16th
Century,
International
Journal
of
Turkish
Studies
2
(winter
1981-82): 81-91.
81
Rycaut,
The
Present State
of
theOttoman
Empire,
p.
200.
82
Ismail Hakki
Uzun?ar?ili,
Osmanli
Tarihi TV.
Cilt.
2.Kisim
XVIIII
Y?zyil
(Ankara:
Turk
Tarih Kurumu
Basimevi,
1959),
p.
579.
83Stanford
J.
Shaw,
Between
Old and
New:
The
Ottoman
Empire
under Sultan
Selim
III,
ij8g-i8oj
(Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,
1971),
p.
142.
84
Abdul
Karim
Rafeq,
The
Local
Forces
in
Syria
in
the
Seventeenth and
Eighteenth
Centuries,
in
War,
Technology
and
Society
in
the
Middle
East
(London:
Oxford
University
Press,
1975),
p.
301.
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196
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
SPRING
1999
tury
the
Porte
was
buying powder
from Sweden and
Spain.85
Henry
Grenville found
Ottoman
powder
to
be
of
poor
quality,
and he ob
served
rifle
and
pistol powder
being imported
from Holland and
Venice
in
1765.86
The Ottomans continued
to
produce
powder
using
the
six
teenth-century
formula,
while
Europe
had been
using
a more
stable,
higher quality powder
since
the
early
1700s.87
Finally,
in
the last decade
of
the
eighteenth
century
the
Ottomans
initiated
measures
to
improve
their
powder production
in
both
quan
tity
and
quality.
In
the
summer
of
1794,
under the
leadership
of Tevki'i
'Al
Ratik
Efendi,
modernization
of
the
existing
powder
works
was
attempted.
The
Porte
ordered
European equipment
for
the baruthanes
at
Bakirk?y, Gallipoli,
and Salonika. The
goal
was a
production
level
of
5,000
kantars
of
European-type
powder
per year.
Although
this first
attempt
was
unsuccessful,
efforts the
next
year
were more
rewarding.
In
April
1795
Mehmed
?erif
Efendi and
some
British
gunpowder
experts
remodeled
twenty
old wheels
at
Bakirk?y
and added five
new
wheels.
Within
a
year
production
doubled from
1,500
kantars of old
powder
to
3,000
kantars of
European
powder.
While
similar modifications
were
carried out at Gallipoli and Salonika, an entirely new powder factory
was
constructed
at
Azadli
on
the Sea of
Marmara. This
factory
em
ployed
water
power
instead of animal
power.
Azadli
was so
successful
that after
1797
Bakirk?y
served
only
as a
storage
house
and
the
works
at
Gallipoli,
Salonika,
and
Izmir
were
closed
entirely.
After
1795
the
Ottomans could
domestically
produce
suffic