Patrick Barron Sana Jaffrey Blai r Palmer Ashutosh Varshney
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IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers
Since 1998, Indonesia has been undergoing a momentous political and economic
transition.The fallof theNewOrder, theeconomiccrisis,and radicaldecentralization
havechangedthepolitical,economicandsocialcontext.Withinthisnewcontext,power
relations are in flux, identities are being renegotiated, and institutions are changing.
Changes in incentives, and in the role of formal and informal institutions at various
levels,havealteredtheways inwhich individualsandgroupsrelatetoeachotherand
the state. Understanding this new context, and the ways in which various actors
(nationalandinternational)canpromoteprogressivesocialchangeisimportant.
TheIndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapersseriesaimstofurtherdiscussiononarange
ofissuesrelatingtothecurrentsocialandpoliticalcontextinIndonesia,andtohelpin
thegenerationof ideasonhowdemocraticandpeaceful transitioncanbesupported.
The series will cover a range of issues including conflict, development, corruption,
governance,theroleofthesecuritysector,andsoon.Eachpaperpresentsresearchon
aparticulardimensionof socialdevelopmentandofferspragmaticpolicy suggestions.
Papers also attempt to assess the impact of various interventions—from local and
national actors, as well as international development institutions—on preexisting
contextsandprocessesofchange.
Thepapersintheseriesareworksinprogress.Theemphasisisongeneratingdiscussion
amongstdifferent stakeholders—including government, civil society, and international
institutions—rather than offering absolute conclusions. It is hoped that they will
stimulatefurtherdiscussionsofthequestionstheyseektoanswer,thehypothesesthey
test,andtherecommendationstheyprescribe.
PatrickBarron(serieseditor) [email protected]
UnderstandingViolentConflictin
Indonesia
AMixedMethodsApproach
PatrickBarron
SanaJaffrey
BlairPalmer
AshutoshVarshney
December2009
IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.15
Papers in the Indonesian Social Development series are not formal publications of theWorld
Bank. They are published informally and circulated to encourage discussion and comment
between those interested in Indonesian development issues. The findings, interpretations,
judgments,andconclusionsexpressedinthepaperarethoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbe
attributedto:theWorldBankandaffiliatedorganizations;membersoftheWorldBank’sBoard
ofExecutiveDirectorsorthegovernmentstheyrepresent;oranyofthefundingagencies.
ThefullrangeofpublicationsassociatedwiththebroaderstudyoflocalconflictinIndonesia(of
whichthisreportisaproduct)isavailableonlineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org.
Emailaddressesforcorrespondence:
Copiesofthispaperareavailablefrom:
PNPMSupportFacility
JalanDiponegoroNo.72
Jakarta10310Indonesia
Tel:+62(0)213148175
Fax:+62(0)2131903090
Acknowledgements
ThispaperprovidesanoutlineofthemethodologybeingusedfortheViolentConflictin
Indonesia study. The research is funded througha grant from theWorldBank’s Post‐
ConflictFund.Additional fundshavebeenprovidedbyUSAID, through the IRD‐SERASI
program.ChrisWilsonandAdrianMorelprovidedsubstantive inputs intotheresearch
design.ThankstoBrunoBoccara,SamuelClark,PaulFrancis,MarkusKostner,Stephen
Miller, Dave McRae, William Wallace, Alys Willman, Susan Wong and Matthew
Zurstrassen(WorldBank),YuhkiTajima(UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside),SidneyJones
(International Crisis Group), and Supryoga Hadi (Bappenas) for comments on earlier
draftsofthispaper.Theviews inthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsaloneandnotof
theinstitutionstowhichtheyareaffiliatedorofanyofthefundingbodies.
ThepaperispublishedsimultaneouslyasSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.117.
i
TABLEOFCONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................................................ i
TABLEOFCONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. ii
1.INTRODUCTIONANDBACKGROUND................................................................................................... 1
1.1THEVIOLENTCONFLICTININDONESIASTUDY ................................................................................................. 3
1.2RESEARCHTOPICS ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Patterns,incidentsandimpactsofviolentconflict................................................................................ 4
Routineviolence .................................................................................................................................... 4
Escalationofviolence ............................................................................................................................ 4
De‐escalationofviolence ...................................................................................................................... 5
2.ANOVERVIEWOFTHEMETHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 6
2.1UNDERSTANDINGVARIATION ...................................................................................................................... 6
2.2WHYAREWEUSINGMIXEDMETHODS? ...................................................................................................... 6
2.3HOWAREWEUSINGTHESEMETHODS?....................................................................................................... 7
Trackingtrends:establishingpatternsofvariance ............................................................................... 7
Nestedcasestudies:theorybuilding..................................................................................................... 8
Theorytesting ....................................................................................................................................... 9
2.4QUANTITATIVEDATA:THEVICISNEWSPAPERDATASET................................................................................... 9
Phasesofthenewspaperstudy ........................................................................................................... 11
3.PATTERNS,FORMSANDIMPACTSOFVIOLENTCONFLICT ................................................................. 14
3.1AIMSANDRESEARCHQUESTIONS............................................................................................................... 14
4.ROUTINEVIOLENCE .......................................................................................................................... 16
4.1AIMSANDRESEARCHQUESTIONS............................................................................................................... 16
4.2RESEARCHMETHODS............................................................................................................................... 17
4.3CASESELECTIONANDFIELDWORK .............................................................................................................. 18
Provinces ............................................................................................................................................. 19
Districtsorsub‐districts ....................................................................................................................... 19
Incidents .............................................................................................................................................. 20
4.4COMPARATIVEFRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................................... 20
5.ESCALATIONOFVIOLENCE................................................................................................................ 22
5.1AIMSANDRESEARCHQUESTIONS............................................................................................................... 24
5.2RESEARCHMETHODS,CASESELECTIONANDFIELDWORK................................................................................ 24
Hypothesisgeneration ........................................................................................................................ 24
Caseselectionandcomparativeframework ....................................................................................... 25
6.DE‐ESCALATIONOFVIOLENCE........................................................................................................... 28
6.1AIMSANDQUESTIONS ............................................................................................................................. 30
6.2RESEARCHMETHODS............................................................................................................................... 30
6.3CASESELECTION ..................................................................................................................................... 31
Comparingdifferentde‐escalationpatterns ....................................................................................... 31
Comparinglevelsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings.............................................................. 32
Comparingformsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings ............................................................. 33
Withincasestudyanalysis .................................................................................................................. 34
6.4FIELDWORKANDANALYSIS........................................................................................................................ 35
6.5TESTINGTHETHEORYONDIFFERENTTYPESOFCASES .................................................................................... 36
ii
7.TESTINGOURHYPOTHESES:LINKSTOOTHERQUANTITATIVEDATA ................................................. 37
Social/demographicfactors ................................................................................................................ 37
Economicfactors ................................................................................................................................. 37
Institutionalfactors ............................................................................................................................. 38
8.AUDIENCEANDOUTPUTS ................................................................................................................. 39
8.1AUDIENCES ............................................................................................................................................ 39
8.2OUTPUTS .............................................................................................................................................. 40
Policybriefingnotes ............................................................................................................................ 40
Workingpapers,journalarticlesandbook ......................................................................................... 40
Conflictdataset ................................................................................................................................... 40
Workshopsandcapacitybuilding ....................................................................................................... 41
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 42
ANNEXA:CONCEPTSANDDEFINITIONS ............................................................................................... 46
ANNEXB:PROVINCESANDESTIMATEDDISTRIBUTIONOFMEDIASOURCES......................................... 47
ANNEXC:CODINGTEMPLATE............................................................................................................... 48
ANNEXD:EXPLANATIONOFCODES...................................................................................................... 49
iii
1
1.IntroductionandBackground
ViolentconflictinIndonesiaisinneedofserioustheoreticalandpolicyattention.Anew
belief that conflict has de‐escalated in Indonesia has crept into popular and policy
circles.However,itisnotclearwhetherthemovementtowardsde‐escalationiscyclical
orpermanent.Nor is it clear thatnewer formsof conflictwill not erupt in Indonesia.
Comparative theoryandevidence indicate thatviolenceoften reappears inareas that
previously had acute conflict. Theory also suggests that unless suitable institutions or
policies are imaginatively devised and put in place, a multiethnic or multireligious
societyisvulnerabletothepossibilityoflong‐runviolentconflict.Acarefulexamination
of Indonesia’srecenthistoryofconflict,andformsandpatternspresenttoday, isvital
for ascertaining current risks. As the Indonesian government and society seek to
consolidatethedemocraticgainsofthepastdecade,understandingviolentconflictisof
upmostimportance.
Bynow,theliteratureonconflictinIndonesiaisquitesubstantialandmanyelementsof
thestoryarereasonablyclear.1ThefallofSuhartowasaccompaniedbytheoutbreakof
intense group violence in several parts of the country. As a result, and in dramatic
contrast to studies of Indonesia during the late New Order when the literature
emphasized order, stability and economic dynamism, conflict became an important
concern in scholarly and policy circles. The literature that emerged has especially
advanced our understanding of some large‐scale conflicts – in Aceh, Kalimantan,
SulawesiandtheMalukus.
Yet there are limitations to the existing research on Indonesian conflict. Four are
particularlyworthyofnote.First,theIndonesianmaterialshaveremainedbyandlarge
unincorporatedintothelargertheoreticalandmethodologicalliteratureonconflict.The
scholarshiponethnocommunalconflicthasmadeenormousadvancesoverthelastten
years,butIndonesiaplaysvirtuallynopartinthisscholarlyeffervescence.2Verylittleis
known about Indonesia’s conflict dynamics beyond a small circle of Indonesia
specialists. Indonesia needs theory and, equally, conflict theory needs Indonesian
materials. The conflict dynamics in Indonesia, among other things, are likely to have
relevance for those multiethnic and/or multireligious societies that used to have
authoritarian political orders and have of late gone through a democratic transition
accompanied by considerable group violence. Nigeria, post‐Communist Eastern and
CentralEurope,andCentralAmericaeasilycometomind,butthelistcanbeexpanded.
A creative engagement with theory and comparative experience nearly always
illuminates uncharted dimensions of a problem, inaugurating newerways of thinking
and,insomeinstances,suggestingnewpolicyandprojectinterventions.
1Although,forthemostpart,thepolicyimplicationsoftheexistingresearchareunclear.
2Foranoverview,seeVarshney(2007,2008).
2
Second, the emphasis in the literature has been virtually entirely on the colossal
episodesofcollectiveviolence,especially in theMalukus, inCentralSulawesi,and the
May1998 riots in Jakarta, aswell as thewar inAceh. This focus isunderstandable in
lightofhowhorrifictheseviolentepisodeswere.However, itresults inseveralserious
limitations. The literature has more or less ignored routine acts of violence, such as
fights over land or vigilante justice, which appear to be common in some parts of
Indonesia. These have not been systematically studied despite their potential policy
importance. If these forms of violence cumulatively have serious human security
impacts,or if theyareaprecursor to largeroutbreaksofunrest,an importantpartof
thepictureismissing.3
Third, themethodsbywhichthe large‐scalecasesofviolencehavebeenstudiedhave
led to incomplete explanations. One stream has focused on the structural conditions
that lead to, or allow for, violence. Books by Bertrand (2004), Sidel (2006) and van
Klinken(2007a)alltakemultiplecasestudiesandlookforcommonalitiestodetermine
causal factors. These scholars may well be right about the causes of violence, but
without a comparisonwith peaceful cases, they cannot, in principle, be sure that the
causesofviolencetheyhaveidentifiedareindeedtherightones.4Foracausaltheory
to be right, it is not only important to identify what is common across the many
episodes of violence, but it is also critical to demonstrate that the causal factors
associated with violence are absent in peaceful cases.5 Studies based on the
commonalityofoutcome(orunvaryingvaluesofthedependentvariable)cancertainly
allowonetobuildatheory,butasKing,KeohaneandVerba(1994)haveargued,such
studiescannotgiveusanadequatelyverifiedtheory.Forthat,weneedvariationinthe
researchdesign.6
3Therearesomeexceptions.Lynchingisperhapsthebest‐studiedoftheformsofroutineviolence.See
Welsh’s(2008)analysisoflynchinginfourprovinces;Vel’s(2001)onSumba,andHerriman’s(2007)onthe
‘witchdoctor’ killings inEast Java. TheeditedvolumebyColombijnandLindblad (2002) contains some
researchon‘everyday’formsofviolence.TheWorldBank’sConflictandDevelopmentprogramhasalso
analyzed ‘local conflict’ in Lampung (Barron andMadden2004; Tajima2004), and Flores andEast Java
(Clark2005;BarronandSharpe2005,2008).4Oneothertypeofresearch–large‐nininspiration–oughttobenoted.Barronet.al.(2009)andMancini
(2005)usesurveydatatodeterminefactorsassociatedwithconflictpropensity. Thissortofworkdoes
covervariationinthedependentvariable,butasistrueoflarge‐nworkingeneral,itisunabletoidentify
themechanismsthroughwhichtheindependentanddependentvariablesmightbeconnected.5Wesaymoreonthislater.SeealsoVarshney(2007)andAspinall(2008).
6Onthewhole,aresearchdesignbasedoncomparingsimilarepisodesisusefulintheorybuilding,notin
theorytesting. Underonecondition,however,theorytesting isalsopossiblethroughthismethod. Ifa
theoryisdeterministic,notprobabilistic,thenevenonecase,letaloneafew,whereviolencetakesplace
intheabsenceoffactorsidentifiedwithviolence,isenoughtoinvalidatethetheory.KarlPopper’sfamous
example isrelevanthere:anynumberofwhiteswansthatweobservewillnotprovethatallswansare
white, but one black swan can prove that not all swans are white (Popper 2002). The Popperian
observation,itshouldbenoted,doesnotapplytoprobabilistictheories,whichtheoriesofviolence,along
witha lotofother social sciencearguments, tend tobe. Inaprobabilistic schemeof things,oneblack
swancouldsimplybeanoutlier.
3
Finally,thereisalmostnosystematicinformationavailableatallonthepost‐2003years
of conflict – its forms, causes, and trajectories.7 Varshney et. al. (2008) have put
together a database for the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery
(UNSFIR) which records incidents of large‐scale violence for the period 1990‐2003;
BarronandSharpe(2005,2008)havecreatedadatasetonsmall‐scaleviolenceinFlores
andpartsofEastJavafor2001‐2003.Yetrelativelylittleinformationexistsonformsof
conflictsince2003.8Thesedataarecriticalforunderstandingconflictanditsimpactsin
Indonesia.Withthemassivedecentralizationinitiative,awholehostofnewinstitutions
havecomeintoexistence,alteringthesites,groupincentivesanddynamicsofconflict.It
is important, and apriority of the Indonesian government, tobuild anempirical base
thatallowsforconsiderationofconflictpatternsandtrendsinthepost‐decentralization
era.
1.1TheViolentConflictinIndonesiaStudy
The Violent Conflict in Indonesia Study (ViCIS) is a newWorld Bank project aimed at
plugginggaps in the literatureandadding topopularknowledgeonviolent conflict in
Indonesia.ThestudyaimstohelptheGovernmentofIndonesiaandotherstoformulate
programs and policies to promote peaceful development and effective violence
prevention. It seeks to bring a marriage of Indonesian conflict materials with the
comparative theories of ethnic and communal conflict; it focuses attention on the
widespread routine violence in Indonesia; it explores, within a broad comparative
framework, how small clashes are transformed into largeepisodesof violence; and it
investigates the process of de‐escalation, asking whether Indonesian conflict de‐
escalation is likely to represent a permanent decline, or if there is evidence to the
contrary. Finally, it aims to put together a comprehensive database of violence,
updating and deepening the UNSFIR dataset (Varshney et. al. 2008) to include local
conflict,violentcrimeandconflictsince2003,usingaround100newspapersassources.9
Havingstartedinmid‐2008,theprojectwilllastforroughlythreeyears.
7OneexceptionisthePotensiDesa(PODES)surveyconductedbytheGovernment’sBureauofStatistics.
The2005surveycontainedaquestionontheincidenceandimpactsofconflict,forallIndonesianvillages.
Whilethe2002PODESdatahasbeenused(Barronet.al.2009),no‐onehasyetanalyzedthe2005data.
ThoughthescaleofthePODES(itisimplementedineveryvillageinIndonesia)isimpressive,thefactthat
itcollectsdataatasinglepointintimepreventsanalysisofhowconflictevolvesovertime,andtheremay
be reliability issues, given incentives for respondents (primarilyVillageHeads) toover‐ or under‐report
conflict.Nevertheless,whereadvisable,wewillusethemostrecentPODESdatatosupplementourother
datacollectionmethods.8Acehistheoneexception.Here,theWorldBankhasbeenmonitoringconflictincidentsreportedinlocal
media since the tsunami (e.g. World Bank 2008). Some case evidence (e.g. van Klinken 2007b) and
reportsbytheInternationalCrisisGroupalsoprovideinformation.Butthesehavenotcomparedcurrent
conflict incidence and patterns with those in earlier periods, making it difficult to know how serious
violenceistodaycomparedwiththatoftheimmediatepost‐Suhartoperiod.9SeeAnnexAfordefinitionsemployedinthestudy.
4
ViCISbuildsuponandextendsprevious researchconductedby theWorldBank,other
development agencies, and scholars on conflict in Indonesia. Since 2002, the Conflict
and Development program of theWorld Bank has produced a number of studies on
localconflictinIndonesiaanditsinteractionwithdevelopmentprojectsandprocesses.10
ThisresearchledtotheformulationofaprogramofsupporttotheAcehpeaceprocess,
andhasalso influencedthedesignandrefinementoftwolargegovernmentprograms
funded in part through World Bank loans and credits: the KDP/PNPM community
development program, which operates in every village in Indonesia, and the SPADA
programwhichsupportslocalgovernanceanddevelopmentinIndonesia’spoorestand
mostdisadvantagedareas.UNSFIR,withsupportfromtheUnitedNationsDevelopment
Programme, created the conflict dataset discussed above. The new project will draw
uponevidence,theoryandmethodologicaltechniquesdevelopedinthepriorwork,as
wellasinsightsfromtheexistingliteratureonconflictinIndonesia,andwillcomplement
thiswithfreshdatacollectionandcomparativeanalysis.
1.2ResearchTopics
Theprojectwillhavefourmaincomponents:11
Patterns,incidentsandimpactsofviolentconflict
ViCISwillprovidequantitativeevidenceontheformsofviolenceprevalentinIndonesia,
their impacts,andhowthesehavevariedover time.Thiswillalsoallowus to identify
thegeographicdistributionof violent conflict, its formsand impact indifferentareas,
andwillhelpanswerquestionsabouttheextenttowhichitisconcentratedinalimited
numberofareasorisdistributedmorewidely.
Routineviolence
A major focus of the project will be on ‘routine’ forms of violent conflict, such as
lynchings,landconflicts,andlocalpoliticalviolence.ViCISwillhelpusmapwhichforms
arethemostprominentinIndonesia,whattheircollectiveimpactsare,andwherethey
are concentrated. Qualitative work will focus on establishing why levels and impacts
varybetweenareas,andonunderstandingtheprocessesbywhichsmall‐scaleconflicts
anddisputesacquireviolentforms.
Escalationofviolence
Theprojectwillprovidenewcomparativeevidenceonhowsmall‐scaleviolentconflicts
escalateintolargeroutbreaksofmassviolence,andwhysomeareashavebeenproneto
thiswhileotherhavenot.
10Thisworkhasresultedinalargenumberoflocalcasestudies,includingin“non‐conflictareas”(Barron
andMadden2004),workondevelopingconflicttypologiesandconflictmappingtechniques(Barronand
Sharpe 2005, 2008), and evaluations of the impacts of projects on local conflict (Barron, Diprose, and
Woolcock2006).Theseandotherpapersareavailableatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org11Fullerdiscussionof theresearchquestions,andmethods tobeutilized,undereachof these topics is
giveninSectionsIII‐VI.
5
De‐escalationofviolence
There has been little attention paid to forms and levels of violent conflict in the
‘postconflict’areasof Indonesia.ViCISwillprovide insights intohowformsofviolence
evolve after large‐scale conflicts formally end, andwhy some areas become peaceful
relatively quickly while in others sporadic violence continues. The analysis will help
identify the extent to which these areas remain vulnerable to further outbreaks of
violence, and the formsof intervention that canhelpensure thatpeaceful conditions
consolidate.
6
2.AnOverviewoftheMethodology
2.1UnderstandingVariation
The study will combine quantitative and qualitative approaches. The fundamental
premiseofourmethodologyisthatfiguringoutwhytherearevariationsintheoutcome
of interest – namely, violence – is the one of bestways to understand the causes of
violence.12
Suppose X represents violence and Y represents peace.With some exceptions, most
explanations of violence have so far taken the following form: if transmigration (a),
incomedifferentialsbetweentwoethnicorreligiouscommunities(b),anddemographic
imbalances in the local military or police units (c) are present in X, they have been
treatedas thecausesofviolence.Methodologicaldiscussionsof the last fifteenyears,
inspiredbyKing,KeohaneandVerba (1994),havebynowclearlyestablishedthat this
sortofcausalreasoningisfallacious.Factors(a),(b)and(c)cancauseX,ifonecanshow
that theyarenot present inY,which representspeaceful cases.Conversely, if (a), (b)
and(c)arepresentinbothXandY,butanotherfactor(d)ispresentonlyinY,notinX,
then(d)willbethecauseofwhyXisdifferentfromY.13Wecannothaveconfidencein
our theory of violence ifwe study only the violent cases. Rather, it requires studying
appropriatelychosencasesofpeaceandviolence.14Thatisoneofthekeyimplications
oftheprincipleofvariationforthestudyofconflict(Varshney2007).Weneedtoavoid
‘selectionbias’inqualitativeresearch.
2.2WhyAreWeUsingMixedMethods?
Methodological arguments in the social sciences are increasingly headed towards the
view that both quantitative and qualitative approaches have distinct utilities and
limitations,anexclusiveuseofeitherapproachcanundulyconfinethescopeofanalysis,
andideallythetwoshouldbecombined(Gerring2007).Large‐ndatasets,forexample,
typicallyallowtwokindsofanalyses:(a)identificationofbroadpatternsandtrends,and
(b)establishmentofcorrelationsbetween‘independent’and‘dependent’variables.On
the whole, if not always, large‐n datasets are unable to establish causality, whereas
12Thoughadmittedlyitisnottheonlyway.
13Assumingallelsethatmayberelevantisidentical.
14 However, we ought to note that the causal factors we consider in our study of variation must be
significant inananalytical,notmechanical,sense. Takeanexample. Suppose inastudyofmurder, (a)
standsformen,(b)forhatredbetweenthem,(c)foraknife,and(d)forhandcuffs.Furtherassumethat
(d)ispresentinY(peace)butnotinX(murder).Ifwemechanicallyfollowthelogicoutlinedabove,the
absenceofhandcuffs (factord) couldbeviewedas thecauseof violence. Rather, factor (d) shouldbe
viewed as the “cause” of violence only in the specific contextwhere (a), (b), and (c) are also present.
Thus,interventionstomitigateviolencemightneedtoaddress(a),(b),and(c),aswellas(d).
7
qualitativeresearch,bysystematicallylookingatwhicheventsledtoviolence(‘process
tracing’),allowsustoseparatecausesandeffects.15
Of course, there are conditions under which large‐n datasets can move beyond
correlations.Theycanallowustoassigncausality, ifgood ‘instrumentalvariables’can
be identified.However,evenundersuchconditions,weneedqualitativecasestudies.
Instrumentalvariablescangiveusagoodsenseofcausaleffects(whatistheeffectofX
onY?),butnotofcausalmechanisms(howdidXcause,orleadto,Y?).16
Followingthisreasoning,theobjectiveofthequantitativeapproach inthisprojectwill
be to generate a usable large‐n dataset, building on and supplementing existing
datasets,whichwillallowfor identificationof trends inconflict types, formsandtheir
impacts. Based on the empirical results of the quantitativework, targeted qualitative
studies will be carried out to determine the causes of the most frequent and high‐
impactconflicts,andofdifferingpatternsofconflictescalationandde‐escalation.17
Itshouldbenotedthatthereisanotherwaytoproceed.Sometimes,itissaidthatcase
studies are goodat theorybuilding, not for theory testing, forwhich large‐ndatasets
mayberequired(Gerring2007).Ouruseofcasestudiesaboveisnotconceptualizedin
thisvein.Asofnow,wedonotplantomovefromcasestudiestodatasets:ratherwe
will proceed from datasets to case studies. Our contention above is that our large‐n
dataset will establish patterns and case studies will establish causes underlying such
trends. For example, it is possible that largeepisodesof violence are concentrated in
cities,notvillages.Ifso,ourcasestudieswillbeaimedatsortingoutwhythisisso.18
2.3HowAreWeUsingTheseMethods?
Trackingtrends:establishingpatternsofvariance
Thelarge‐ndatabasewillenableustoobservepatternsofvarianceintheincidenceand
impactsofconflictatmultiplelevels.Identificationofsuchpatternsisnotonlynecessary
toanswertheresearchquestionsposed inthisstudybutalsohasserious implications
for policy‐makers who need to identify areas and issues most vulnerable to violent
conflict.
15Thisisparticularlytrueforresearchonviolence,wherethedirectionofcausalitycanbeimpossibleto
determine(seeBarronet.al.2009).16FordetailsseeGerring(2007,pp.43‐48).SeealsoGeorgeandBennett(2005).
17Aseconduseofourdatasetisalsopossible.Wecantestwhethersomeexistingtheoriesinthelarger
literature–forexample,theethnolinguisticfractionalization(ELF)argument–areapplicabletoIndonesia.
Thisisnotthemainthrustofourproject,butifweareabletotestsomepreexistingtheoriesthisway,we
certainlywill(seeSectionVII).18Wearesureaboutthisuseofourdataset,butweremainopentothealternativemethodologicalroute.
Our casematerialswill inevitably generate some theories of violence. If the elements or factors they
identifyascausescanbemeasuredwell,andifourdatasetalreadyhasrelevantinformation,wemayalso
subjectourtheoriestoalarge‐ntheorytesting.Beforefiguringoutwhattheorieswillemerge,itishard
tobecertainaboutwhetherwewillbeabletouseourlarge‐nknowledgefortheorytesting.
8
First, we will consider spatial variation in the incidence and impacts of conflict. The
designof thedatabasewill allow identification of patterns at the regional, provincial,
district(ruralkabupatenandurbankotamadya)andsub‐district(kecamatan)levels.We
willbeabletoascertainwhichregions,provinces,districtsandsub‐districtshavebeen
themajorsitesofviolence.
Second,temporalvariationintheincidenceofconflictwillbetracedacrosstheeleven‐
year period (1998‐2008). This will allow us to understand which regions, provinces,
districtsandsub‐districtshavemovedfrompeacetoviolence(andtowhatdegree)and
viceversa.
Third,wewillanalyzevariationinconflicttypes(religious,ethnic,resourceconflict,etc.)
andforms(demonstrations,riots,lynching,etc)acrossregionsandacrosstime.Wewill
thus know which forms and types of violence have been prevalent where, and how
formsandtypeshavechangedindifferentpartsofthecountry.
Nestedcasestudies:theorybuilding
While the dataset will be used to identify trends of conflict in Indonesia, causes or
causalmechanismswill be established by conducting targeted case studies based on
patternsdetected in thedata.19 Theprojectwill adopt twocasestudyapproaches to
determinethecausesofviolence.
Thefirst,involvesmatched‐casecomparisons.Casesexhibitingdifferentlevelsofconflict
(high, medium and low) in the dataset, or showing different patterns of conflict
escalationandde‐escalation,willbeselectedaftercontrollingforsomefactorsthatwe
will identify later to detect causes or causal pathways. Comparisons will bemade at
multiple levels (regional, provincial anddistrict level) toallow for the identificationof
causalmechanisms. It is entirely possible that different causes ormechanisms are at
workatdifferentlevelsofthepolity.Thispossibilitycannotbetheoreticallyruledout.
Thesecondentailslookingatwithin‐casevariation.Variationofviolencewithinasingle
casewillbestudiedacrosstime.20Forexample,ifadistrictexhibitsanoveralltrendof
high‐violence but is not uniformly violent across time, the case studywill be used to
establish the mechanisms through which violence occurs at specific times in that
particulardistrict.Forexample,weknowthatAmbonandPosousedtobepeacefuluntil
horrific violence rocked the two cities in 1999.Over the last three years, Ambon has
becomequitepeaceful,butPosohaswitnessedarecurringpatternofviolence,though
19FurtherdiscussionofthequalitativecomponentsofthestudyisgiveninSectionsIV‐VI.
20 For the purposes of this study, we define a case as being a geographic area. For different types of
analysis, caseswill be at different levels – provinces, districts, sub‐districts. Our choice for the unit of
analysiswilldependprimarilyon the levelatwhichvariation isobserved.Whenwediscusswithin‐case
analysis,weprimarilymeanlookingattemporalvariationswithinasinglegeographicarea.
9
notatthesamelevelasinthe1999‐2002period.Within‐caseanalysiscanhelpidentify
whyviolencelevelsmayhavechangedwithineachdistrictovertime.
Theorytesting
The main purpose of this study is to build theory in order to ascertain causal
mechanisms. Process tracing based on case studies nested in the dataset will make
possible.However,asdiscussedabove,wewillremainopentotheideathatourdataset
may allow some preexisting hypotheses to be tested on a large‐n template. Such
hypotheses may be based on Indonesia‐specific scholarship, or that emerging from
elsewhere in theworld. Depending on how good our newspaper‐based dataset turns
outtobe,theorytestinginthismannerisconceivable.21
2.4QuantitativeData:theViCISNewspaperDataset
The main quantitative data source will be a comprehensive newspaper dataset that
recordsall incidentsofconflict (violentandnon‐violent)andviolentcrimereported in
localnewspapersfortwenty‐twoprovincesovertheperiod1998‐2008.22 Thedecision
toemploythismethodologyhasbeentakenafterconsideringthelimitationsofseveral
otheroptions.Householdsurveysareweakatmeasuringconflictincidenceandimpacts,
as they tend to record perceptions of conflict and have a tendency to underreport
because (violent) conflict is a generally rare event that does not affect all in a
community. Key informant interviews, as used by the PODES survey, create perverse
incentives tounder‐orover‐reportconflictdependingon theexpectationsabouthow
thesurveyresultswillinfluencepolicydecisionsandresourceallocations(Barronet.al.
2009).Furthermore,surveymethodsrelyonthememoryofrespondentsandarehence
lessreliableforrecordingthedetailsofolderincidentsofviolence,makingitdifficultto
create time series data. A comparison of police, hospital and NGO sources with
newspaperdataalsorevealsthatthereissystematicunder‐reportingofviolentimpacts,
especiallyfatalities,aspoliceandhospitaldataonly includecasesthatarereportedto
thepoliceorvictimswhoareadmittedtohospitals.23Furthermore,theserecordsdonot
21SeethediscussioninSectionVII.
22Fordefinitionsoftheconceptsofconflict,violence,andcrime,seeAnnexA.Foralistofprovinces,see
AnnexB.Weincludeviolentcrimeinthedatabase,inadditiontoconflict(whichisourprimaryfocus),for
threereasons. First,knowingwhetherthere isahigh levelofdeathsfromviolentcrimeis important in
understandingthenethumansecurityimpactsofviolence.Studyingviolentconflictbutneglectingviolent
crimewouldgiveapartialviewofsecurityimpacts.Second,violentcrimessometimesplayanimportant
role in conflict escalation. Collecting data on violent crimeswill thus allow us to study this aspect of
escalation.Finally,thereisamethodologicalreason,inthatnewspaperreportsoftenmakeitdifficultto
determinewhetheraviolentincidentwastheresultofaconflictoracrime.Attemptingtocaptureonly
violentconflictcouldmeanexcludingtheseincidentsfromthedatabase,eventhoughitmayturnoutthat
manysuchunclear incidentswere infactconflict. Asaresult,wewishto includeallviolence(including
whatappearstobecrime).23ApilotconductedinMalukuandNorthMalukucompareddeathsreportedbynewspapers,thepolice
andhealthcareprovidersbetweenJanuaryandJune,2005.Itfoundthatnewspapersreported24deaths,
policerecordedonlytwelve,UNIncidentTrackingfound17deaths,andtheMalukuInterfaithAssociation
10
contain the level of detail that would allow for a distinction to be made between
incidentsofconflictandthoseofformsofviolentcrimesuchasassaultandarson.
Incontrast,thenewspapermonitoringmethodologyhasbeenshowntobeeffectivein
both high and low conflict regions (Barron and Sharpe 2005). UNSFIR showed that
buildinganationaldatasetrecordingconflictsreportedinnewspaperswasbothpossible
and useful. Since August 2005, the local newspaper methodology has been used to
monitortheAcehpeaceprocess.Existingdatasetshaveexpandedourunderstandingof
violenceinIndonesia.Yetgapsremain.ThenewViCISconflictdatasetwillbuildonprior
effortsinanumberofways.
First, the dataset will expand on current spatial and temporal coverage. The UNSFIR
dataset contains data on conflict in fourteen provinces for 1990‐2003. Data collected
sincethenthroughWorldBankstudiesandpilotshavedevelopedmorecomprehensive
methodologiesforrecordingconflictdatabuthavefocusedonasmallersetofregions
for shorter time periods.24 The new ViCIS dataset will expand coverage by collecting
data from 22 provinces, which cover 341 of Indonesia’s 457 districts and 86% of
Indonesia’spopulation,andbycollectingdata from1998to2008 (BPS2007a,2007b).
ThiswillenableustotracetrendssinceUNSFIRacrossandwithinmoreregions.
Second, a larger set of sources of datawill be used. The first iterationof theUNSFIR
dataset collected data from national Indonesian newspapers. UNSFIR‐II utilized
provincial papers when it became clear that smaller conflict incidents were seriously
underreportedinnationalnewspapers(Varshneyet.al.2008).Furtherstudies,primarily
basedonsub‐provinciallevelnewspapersinlowerconflictprovinces(BarronandSharpe
2005; Welsh 2008), demonstrate that provincial papers still miss certain forms of
conflict: incidentsofroutineviolence,suchaslynchingandlanddisputes,arereported
in district level newspapers, but often not in the provincial media. An emerging
conclusion about the Indonesian newspapers as sources of conflict data is that at
differentlevelsofcoverage,newspapersdifferintheirperceptionofwhichconflictsare
newsworthy.Whilelargeepisodesofviolencearereportedbythenationalnewspapers,
lynchingsarebettercoveredinthedistrictlevelnewspapers(Varshney2008).Ourstudy
buildsonthesefindingsbyusinganestimated57district‐levelnewspapers inaddition
to42provincialpapers.Thiswillprovideamoreaccuratecountofconflictincidentsand
theirviolentimpacts.25
recordedonlyfourdeaths.HospitalrecordsrecordedonlyonedeathinAmbon,comparedwiththeseven
reportedinnewspapers(forAmbon).Thelevelofunder‐reportingwasmostpronouncedoutsideofthe
provincialcapital(Sharpe2005).24TheseincludetheKDPandCommunityNegotiationdataset(forFloresandpartsofEastJava;2001‐2003
– see Barron and Sharpe 2008), a newspaper conflict monitoring pilot in Maluku and North Maluku
provinces in 2005 (Sharpe 2005), and the Aceh Conflict Monitoring Updates (2005‐ongoing – see, for
example,WorldBank2008).25Fortheestimateddistributionofnewspapersacrossprovinces,seeAnnexB.
11
Third,thenewdatasetwillimproveonprioreffortsbyexpandingtherangeofincidents
included, and by developing a more detailed coding system that allows for more
extensive disaggregation of data. UNSFIR‐II, the most ambitious project to compile
quantitativedataon conflict in Indonesia todate, focusedalmostexclusivelyon large
incidentsofcommunalviolence.Thenewdatasetwillalsoincludelocalviolentincidents
betweenindividualsandformsofviolentcrime.Thecodingsystem,developedforour
proposeddatabase,expandstheanalyticalcategoriesbyallowingdisaggregationofboth
violentandnon‐violent incidents,byconflict types (resource,administrative, religious,
ethnic andpolitical, etc.) and conflict forms (demonstrations, riots andgroup clashes,
etc.). A broader classification of actors, interventions and impacts will enable us to
capturedetailedinformationaboutconflictdynamicsinIndonesia.26
Phasesofthenewspaperstudy
Whilenewspapersappearbethebestsourceofdataformappingconflictpatternsand
trends in Indonesia, they are not without weaknesses. The study anticipates the
followingproblemsandstrategiesbybreakingthedatacompilationprocess intothree
stages.
1.Addressingbiases:mediaassessments
Before selecting specific newspapers for data collection in each province, exhaustive
media assessments will be carried out to profile existing provincial and district
newspapers.Thestaffofnewspaperswillbeinterviewedtoassessthefollowing:
• Coverage.Evenifweuseprovincialanddistrictlevelnewspapers,itislikelythatthe
reporting coverage will be uneven across districts and sub‐districts. By compiling
informationaboutareaswhereeachnewspaperhaspermanentoffices,permanent
reporting staff and free‐lance reporters,wewill be able to: (a) select newspapers
withthebestregionalcoveragefordatacollection;(b)supplantaweaker‐coverage
paperwithothersinthatregion;and(c)identifythestrongandweakersectionsof
ourdata,evenifanewspaperwithlimitedcoverageisselected.
• Accuracyofreporting.Accuratereporting,especiallyasitpertainstoassessmentof
impacts(deaths,injuriesandpropertydamage),iscrucialforthevalidityofourdata.
Itislikelythatsomenewspapersdonotemphasizeaccuratecollectionoffactsprior
topublicationofincidentreports.Gatheringinformationaboutnewspapers’sources
ofinformationandtheirpolicyonfact‐checking,willenableustoselectnewspapers
withhighstandardsofreportingandtoestablishhowaccurateourdatais likelyto
be.
26Bertrand(2008)hasarguedthatexpandingtherangeofincidentsincludedwillleadtoalackofanalytic
clarity,becausetheforcesdrivinglarge‐scaleviolencewillprobablydifferfromthoseleadingtosmaller‐
scale unrest. However, the coding categories employed mean that it will be possible to disaggregate
different types of violence (large‐scale communal, localized, violent crime, etc.). This will allow for
consideration of the different causal factors and processes that lead to different outcomes; itwill also
allowforBertrand’shypothesistobetested.
12
• Reporting biases and censorship. There iswidespread consensus that the press in
post‐Suharto Indonesia is relatively free. However, previous research shows that
self‐censorship in editorial policy due to the SARA legacy of theNewOrder or to
prevent conflict escalation,27 and ‘envelope’ journalism, where newspapers are
sponsored by certain local groups or individuals and become advocates of those
parties,stillexist(BarronandSharpe2005).Assessingtheinstitutionalandpersonal
biases in conflict reporting is vital for ascertaining the accuracy of the dataset.
Extensive interviewswithnewspaper staff,eliciting responsesaboutnotonly their
ownreportingstandardsbutaboutthereputationsofotherpapers inanarea,will
help us evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of our data and how it can be
analyzed.28
• Completionofarchives.Asidefromconducting interviewstogaugetheaccuracyof
reporting, themedia assessment processwill also obtain an accurate count of all
existingarchives ineveryprovince.Byaggregating this information from the field,
wewill be able to: (a) select newspaperwith themost complete archives for the
eleven‐yearperiodofthestudy,and(b) identifypotentialgaps inourdatatohelp
strategizehowtoovercomethem.
2.Datacollectionandcoding
Datacollectionandcodingwillbethemostcrucialpartsofthequantitativestudy.Field
teamswillcollectreportsofconflictandviolentcrimeincidentsfromlocalandprovincial
newssourcesandsendthisrawdatatoJakarta.Astandardizedcodingtemplatewillbe
completed for each reported incident and information about location, date, conflict
type,form,actorsinvolved,andviolentimpactswillbecoded.29Thecodeddatawillbe
subsequentlyenteredintoasearchabledatabase.Toensureaccuracyanduniformityof
collectionandcoding,thefollowingmeasureshavebeentaken:
• Training.Ateamofresearchershasgonethroughasix‐daytrainingprogramtolearn
theconceptsofviolentandnon‐violentconflictandviolentcrime,asdefinedinthis
study,andhowtomapandcollectdata.Aseparatetraininghasbeenconductedfor
thecodingstafftoteachthemthenuancesofthecodingsystemdevelopedforthe
ViCISdataset.
• Qualitycontrol.Giventhatthedefinitionsofconflictandcrimeusedinthisstudyare
complex, therearebound tobeerrors in the selectionof articles in the field.We
havedevelopedsystematicqualitycontrolproceduresthatwillenableustomonitor
the number of mistakes being made in the field in real time, so these can be
correctedonanongoingbasisandadditionaltrainingcanbeprovidedifnecessary.
Procedures will also allow us to identify the newspapers and articles that were
27 On ethnocommunal issues, the New Order government had a so‐called SARA policy. SARA was an
acronym for ethnic (suku), religious (agama), racial (ras), and inter‐group (antar‐golongan)differences.
Thesedifferenceswerenottobediscussedinthepublicrealm.28 Forexample, if anewspaperacts asamouthpiece for apolitician, it cannotbeused for anaccurate
countofconflictsrelatedtoelections.However,itbutmaystillbeusefulforreportsonlynching,etc.29Forthecodingtemplateandanexplanationofthecodesused,seeAnnexesCandD.
13
subjected to quality control in the field so that they can be re‐checked for the
reliability of the quality control procedures themselves. Ten percent of coding
templateswillberandomlycheckedforaccuracyanduniformity.
3.Testingtheaccuracyofcompileddata
Afterthecompilationofthedatabase,thefinalaccuracyofourdatawillbetestedby:
• Cross‐checkingthedatawiththePODESsurvey;
• ComparingcollecteddatawiththeUNSFIR‐IIdatabasefortheperiod1998‐2003;
• Checking and augmenting the newspaper data with other sources such as police
reports,courtdocuments,andNGOreports;
• Comparing the quantitative newspaper data with results of the qualitative case
studies;and
• Presentingresultstopeersforregularfeedback.
14
3.Patterns,FormsandImpactsofViolentConflict
Aprimaryfocusofthestudyistodescribetheoverallpatternsandtrendsofviolencein
Indonesia today, and over the past eleven years. Thiswill address several of the key
gaps in our understanding of violence in Indonesia. The newspaper database will
providethemostcomprehensivequantitativedescriptiontodateofpatternsofviolence
acrossregions,andtrendsinviolenceovertime.
3.1AimsandResearchQuestions
Inthiscomponentofthestudywewillseektoansweranumberofquestions:30
1. What have been the cumulative impacts of violent conflict in post‐Suharto
Indonesia?31
• Patternsoftemporalvariationinimpacts;
• Patternsofspatialvariationinimpacts(inparticular,isthereaconcentration
ofviolenceinasmallnumberofregions?)
2. Whichtypesofviolentconflicthavehadthelargestimpacts?
• Patternsoftemporalvariationinthetypesthathavebeenthemostfrequent
orhadthehighestimpacts;
• Patterns of spatial variation in the types that have been most severe (in
particular,whichtypesofviolencearesevereinwhichplaces?)
3. Whichtypesofviolencehavethelargestimpactperincident(i.e.themostfatalities
perincident)?
• Patternsoftemporalvariationinthemostdeadlytypes;
• Patterns of spatial variation in themost deadly types (in particular, which
typesofroutineviolencearedeadlyinwhichplaces?)
4. How doesurban and rural violence differ? Do they have different impacts? Are
theirformsdifferent?Aretheyequallydeadly?
5. Whichactorsaremost likelytobe involved inviolentconflicts,and inparticular in
thedeadliestones?Aretherevariationsovertimeandspace?
6. Which weapons are used most frequently in violent conflicts, and in deadliest
conflicts?Aretherevariationsovertimeandspace?
7. What are the variations innon‐violent conflict types and incidence? How is non‐
violentconflictrelatedtoviolentconflict?Forexample,ifthereismorenon‐violent
conflict,istheregenerallymoreviolentconflictalso,orisittheotherwayaround?
30 The following list is not exhaustive. Thedatabasewill alsoprovide a host of other information (see
templateandcodes,attachedinAnnexesCandD).Besidesbeingofusetothecurrentstudy,thedataset
willbeavailableforusebyotherresearchers.31Asnotedearlier,thedatabaseprovidesinformationonimmediateimpactsofviolence,suchasdeaths,
injuries,andpropertydamage,notonlonger‐termeconomicandpoliticaleffects,whichmaybestudied
throughothermeans.
15
8. What are the gender dimensions of violence? For example, what is the role of
womenasvictims,andasactors,inviolence?Arewomenspecialvictimsofspecific
typesofviolence?32
9. Whoarethevictimsinthemostviolentormostdeadlytypesofviolence?Howdoes
thisvaryovertimeandspace?
10.Which cleavagesmost commonly drive violent incidents – ethnic, religious, tribal,
political,orindigenous/local?
• Whichcleavagesarepresentinthedeadliestincidents?
• DoesIndonesiahavewhatmightbecalleda‘mastercleavage’liketheHindu‐
Muslim cleavage in India, the Malay‐Chinese cleavage in Malaysia, the
Sinhala‐Tamil cleavage in Sri Lanka, or the racial cleavage in the United
States?33
32Newspaperdatabasescannotgenerallyrevealmuchaboutformsofviolencesuchasrapeanddomestic
violence, due to both under‐reporting and editorial priorities. Although we can not thus expect
comprehensive or accurate data on violence against women from this database, it will provide some
informationongenderaspectsofviolence,whichmaybefollowedupthroughqualitativework.33A‘mastercleavage’isonewhich,forawholevarietyofhistoricalreasons,isaprimary,ifnottheonly,
determinantofpoliticsandviolence.
16
4.RoutineViolence
Routine violence is one of the most glaringly neglected aspects of the current
scholarship.34 We define routine violence as: “frequently occurring forms of violence
(suchas thebeatingof suspected thieves, inter‐villagebrawls, or fights over a plot of
land)which are not part of a large orwidespread conflict, andwhere the impacts of
single incidents are typically low (less than five deaths)”. Such incidents involve local
actors struggling over local issues, rather than large‐scale mobilization by identity
characteristics(suchasethnicity,religionorregion).
Routine conflict doesnothave tobe violent; it can takebothnon‐violent and violent
forms.Examplesincludedemonstrations,protests,petitionsandgroupmobilization.On
the whole, such expressions of grievance are quite healthy for a polity. Freedom of
expressioninapluralisticsocietyisinevitablyaccompaniedbysuchlegitimatemodesof
politics. These non‐violent forms should be separated from incidents of routine
violence.Bothnon‐violentandviolentroutineconflictsareimportantforunderstanding
thedynamicsofviolenceinIndonesia.
Thereareseveral important justificationsforthestudyofroutineviolence.First,small
butfrequentviolencecanexactabigtoll.Althoughfatalitiestendtobelimitedineach
incident,thetotalnumberofthosekilledthroughroutineviolencecanbelarge,ifsuch
episodes are common or frequent (Barron and Madden 2004; Barron et. al. 2009;
Barron and Sharpe 2008;Welsh 2008; Tadjoeddin andMurshed 2007). Second, such
small‐scale violence has serious systemic consequences. If some regions of a country
developatraditionoflynching–amobkillingasuspectedculpritinsteadofhandinghim
over to the police or administration – it impedes the growth of the rule of law.
Moreover,ifthefrequencyofsuchactsishigh,itdeadenspopularsensibilities,arguably
creating greater acceptance of large‐scale violence as well. Finally, sometimes small
incidents initiateaprocess that leads tohugeconflagrations.Often, ifnotalways, the
starting point of a big episode of violence is a small clash between two groups or
individuals. Ifwedevelopabetterunderstandingofwhy small actsof violenceoccur,
especially if suchviolence is frequentandwidespread,andofwhichpeopleorgroups
are in conflict in these forms of violence, we can perhaps generate a policy‐relevant
theory that can identify the institutions and strategies relevant to minimizing the
occurrenceorlimitingtheeffectsofsuchviolence.
4.1AimsandResearchQuestions
Thiscomponentofthestudywillseektoansweranumberofquestions:
1. WhataretheoverallimpactsofroutineviolenceinIndonesia?
34Forexample,routineviolenceisnotafocusofattentioninthethreemostrecentbook‐lengthworkson
groupconflictinIndonesia(Bertrand2004;Sidel2006;vanKlinken2007a).
17
2. Whichtypesofroutineviolencehavethegreatestimpactsacrossthecountry?
3. Which types of routine conflictmost often become violent, andwhich types very
rarelybecomeviolent?
4. HowdoesroutineviolencevaryacrossIndonesia?
• Are there some provinces or districts which suffer much higher impacts than
others?35
• Are these the same regions which also suffer from large‐scale violence, or are
theseregionstypicallythoughtofas“low‐conflictregions”?
5. Howdoesviolencevarybetweenurbanandruralcontexts?36
6. Howhasroutineviolencevariedovertime?
• Aresomeformsincreasinglyprevalentnow?
• Areothersonthedecrease?
7. Whydosomeareasexperiencehighlevelsofroutineviolencewhileothersdonot?
8. Whydosomeareasexperienceparticularformsofviolencewhileothersexperience
differentforms?
9. Whydocasesofroutineconflictescalateintoviolenceinsomeplaces(andatsome
times)andwhynotinotherplacesandatothertimes?
4.2ResearchMethods
All but the last three of these questions can be answered through the newspaper
dataset. The previous section described how the ViCIS databasewill provide detailed
informationonthetypesand impactsofviolence in Indonesia,and itsgeographicand
temporal variations. However, the database cannot tell us why these patterns vary
across regions and across time periods, andwhy some types of routine conflict very
often become violent while other types rarely do.37 No understanding of routine
violenceinIndonesiawouldbecompletewithoutattemptingtounderstandvariationin
time and space, and the transition fromnon‐violent conflict to violence. Insights into
these questions will likely have significant policy implications, as Indonesia seeks to
strengthen its peaceful democratic system in ways most appropriate to each local
context.
A series of qualitative case studieswill be used to understand these ‘why’ questions.
Case studies will each focus on a particular type of routine violence, and will be
35Regionalcomparisonsofviolentimpactswillbeconductedinbothabsoluteandpercapitaterms.Each
hasitsownmeritsforanalyzingviolence.36Understandingdifferencesbetweenurbanandruralpatternsofviolence is important for theory,and
for policy – especially as Indonesia becomes more urban, and given the ease of mobilization and
escalation in urban environments, where heterogeneous communities compete over limited resources
andoftenrelyheavilyonethnicnetworks.37 Although comprehensive comparisons have not yet been carried out, several studies have indicated
thatpatternsofroutineviolencedovarybetweenregions.Forinstance,lynchingsappeartobefarmore
commonontheislandofJavathanelsewhereinIndonesia(Varshneyet.al.2008;Welsh2008).Similarly,
BarronandSharpe(2008)showhowviolentlandconflictismuchmoreprominentinEastNusaTenggara
provincethaninEastJava.
18
designedtounderstandvariation in its impactsacrossregions (and, later in thestudy,
overtimewithineachconflictcase).Casestudiesareneededforthereasonsdescribed
above:large‐nworkcaneasilyidentifycorrelationsbutnotcausalmechanisms.Process‐
tracingwithincasestudieswillthusbeusedtoidentifycausalmechanisms.Comparinga
certain type of routine violence across locations will require obtaining information
about local structural conditions (demographics, institutions, politics, and so on) that
will not be provided by our newspaper database. Finally,wewant to understand the
transitionfromnon‐violencetoviolence,butnon‐violentepisodesarenotconsistently
reported by newspapers. Qualitative work is thus needed to explore why routine
conflicttakesdifferentformsandhasdifferentimpactsindifferentplaces.
4.3CaseSelectionandFieldwork
Thefirststepistoselectwhichtypesofroutineviolencewillbestudied.Ourattention
will focus on the three types of routine violence with the highest aggregate impacts
across Indonesia. Based on the previous literature, we expect that types of routine
violencesuchaslynchings,landconflicts,andgangfightsmaybeamongthosechosen.
However,adecisiononwhichtypestostudywillbemadeafterthedatabaseproducesa
clearerpictureofviolenceimpactsandforms.
The next step is to selectwherewewill conduct case studies. For each of the three
types to be studied, nested case study comparison will be used, selecting provinces,
districts,sub‐districts,and individual incidents.Figure1 laysouttheplan.Thestrategy
allowsforcomparativeanalysisatanumberoflevelstohelpidentifycausalprocessesat
each.
Figure1:CaseSelectionPrinciplesforStudyingRoutineViolence
NOTE:VrepresentsviolentandNVnon‐violent.
DISTRICTS /
SUB-DISTRICTS
High
violence
Low
violence
High
violence
Low
violence
Low
violence
V V
V V
NV
NV
V
V
NV
High
violence
V
V
NV
PROVINCES
CASES
DISTRICTS /
SUB-DISTRICTS
High
violence
Low
violence
High
violence
Low
violence
Low
violence
V V
V V
NV
NV
V
V
NV
High
violence
V
V
NV
PROVINCES
CASES
High
violence
Low
violence
High
violence
Low
violence
Low
violence
V V
V V
NV
NV
V
V
NV
High
violence
V
V
NV
PROVINCES
CASES
19
Provinces
First, twoprovinceswill be chosen foreach typeof routineviolenceweare studying,
onewith a high level of impacts and onewith a low level.38 Effortswill bemade to
controlforotherfactorsasfollows:
• Levels of non‐violent conflict. Provinces will be chosen that have similar levels of
non‐violent conflict of the type being studied. In the case of land conflicts, for
example, thismeans thatwewould select two provinceswith similar numbers of
landconflicts,butwherethenumberofviolentlandconflictsismuchhigherinone.
Inthecaseoflynching,suchidentificationwillnotbepossiblebecauselynchingsare
by definition violent. Becauseof this,wewill use proxy indicators for factors that
tendtoleadtolynchings,suchasthepresenceoftheft,asabasisforselectingthe
control areas. (We are aware that thismay be particularly challenging, given that
newspaperstendnottoreporttheftifitdoesnothaveaviolentimpactorwhenitis
small inscale.Assuch,wewillattemptto incorporateotherdatasources,suchas
policecrimedata,andlocalknowledge,todrivecaseselection).
• Structuralfactors.Provincesselectedshouldnotdiffersubstantiallyacrossstructural
factors (economic levels,education levels,etc.).Which factorsaremost important
will be determined later,with consideration to the type of routine violence being
studiedandthelikelihoodofstructuralfactorsbeingpertinenttoit.
• Reportinglevels.Afterconductingthoroughassessmentsofmediacoverageineach
province,wewillbeable toratethecoveragewhichourdatabaseprovidesof the
news in each province (see discussion above). Itwould bemisleading to compare
rates of violence in a province with minimal coverage to rates of violence in a
province with excellent coverage. Thus in order to be confident of selecting
provinceswithdifferentlevelsoflynchingviolence,theyshouldhavesimilarlevelsof
reporting.39
Districtsorsub‐districts
Fourdistrictsorsub‐districts40willbechosenforeachtypeofroutineviolence:twoin
the ‘high violence’ province and two in the ‘low violence’ province. As with the
provincialselection,thedistricts/sub‐districtswillbechoseninsuchawaythatcontrols
for exogenous factors that might affect the (reported) incidence of routine violence.
Where possible, we plan to choose neighboring districts to control for higher level
38By impactshere,aswehavealready stated,weprimarilymeandeaths. For certain typesof routine
violence, other kinds of direct impacts (injuries or property destruction)may bemore prominent, and
hence become a basis for selection. Other indirect impacts—such as effects on the economy,
psychologicalimpacts,andsoon—willbeanalyzedinthecasestudies.However,thesecannotbeusedas
abasisforcaseselectionbecausewedonothavequantitativedataonthem.39
Mediaassessmentsconductedpriortonewspaperselectionwillenableustoidentifylevelsofdistrict
reporting.40Whetherwechoosetocomparedistrictsorsub‐districtswilldependonwhereintra‐provincialvariation
ismostmarked. Thisdecisionwillbe taken laterafterwehaveanalyzedthebasicpatternsofviolence
fromthenewspaperdataset.
20
factorsthatmaydrivevariation.Comparativeanalysisofthefourdistricts/sub‐districts
will help us tease outwhich of the factors leading to variation exist at the provincial
level,andwhichatlowerlevelsofgeographicspecification.
Incidents
Particularincidentsofviolentandnon‐violentconflict(VandNVinthefigureabove)will
be chosen in each of the districts/sub‐districts concerned.Wewill likely over‐sample
violentcases.41 Thenumberof incidents tobestudiedwillbedecided laterbasedon
resource issuesand the insightscoming fromearlycasestudies.Casehistorieswillbe
developedby theresearchteams.Within‐caseprocess tracingwillhelpusunderstand
why some became violent and others did not, and how these factors relate to the
structuralconditionspresentineachplace.
Inanalyzingeachincident,thefollowingresearchquestionswillbeuseful:
• Whydidtheconflictbecomeviolent?
• Whydidthepoliceorotheractorsnotpreventthisviolence?
• Didthepolicearresttheperpetrators?
• Howdolocalsperceivethiscaseandthewayitwashandled?
• Whatstructuralfactorsareconnectedtothiscase?
• Whoweretheactors,whowerethevictims?
4.4ComparativeFramework
The comparative framework outlined in Figure 1 above will allow for a number of
controlledcomparisonsincludingthefollowing:
• Comparison between cases with similar outcomes (high levels of violence) but
differentdistricts/sub‐districtsconditions;
• Comparison between cases with similar outcomes (high levels of violence) but
differentprovincialconditions;
• Comparisonsbetweenviolentandnon‐violentcaseswithinhighviolenceareas;
• Comparison of two districts/sub‐districts (one high violence, one lower violence)
withinhighorlowviolenceprovinces.
Selection of provinces and districts/sub‐districts will be guided by one additional
consideration. If thedatabasehas shown that anumberofprovincesordistricts/sub‐
districts contain a particular concentration of violence, then efforts will be made to
focusseveralofthecasesstudiesonthoseareas.That is, locationsformorethanone
casestudy–perhaps, lynchingsaswellas landconflicts–willbe selected fromthose
41Withinthelowviolencedistrict/sub‐districtinthelowviolenceprovince,wewillnotdoanycasestudies
ofspecificincidents(violentornon‐violent).However,fieldworkwillbeconductedtoseewhatstructural
factorsmightbedrivingthelackofviolenceinthisarea.
21
regions.Thiswillenableustofocusextraattentiononthesehigh‐violenceplaces,across
thevarioustypesofroutineviolence.
Later in thedata collectionprocess (whenearlier yearsof data are available), further
case studies may examine temporal variation in routine violence within a particular
geographicarea.
22
5.EscalationofViolence
Anextensive literaturehasemergedon large‐scaleviolence inpost‐Suharto Indonesia.
However, we still do not have a good theory for why the small sparks of localized
violence and tensions erupt into the large fires of inter‐group collective violence.
Developingsuchatheoryisimportantforunderstandingnotonlythedeadlyoutbreaks
ofcommunalviolenceinthepast,butalso(a)thepotentialforsmall‐scaleconflictand
routine violence elsewhere in the archipelago to escalate, and (b) the scope for
intervention–bythegovernmentand/orcivilsociety.If,withtheaidoftheory,wecan
understandhowtopreventsparksfrombecomingfires,perhapsonecanalsohopefor
fewerandlessdeadlyviolentconflictsinthefuture.
Intercommunal ethnic or religious violence in West and Central Kalimantan, the
MalukusandCentralSulawesi, separatist conflicts inAcehandPapua,and the Jakarta
riotsofMay1998havereceivedthegreatestattentionofIndonesiaexperts.42Initially
most analyses focused on individual cases with few attempts at cross‐case analysis.
More recently, three scholars (Bertrand 2004; Sidel 2006; van Klinken 2007a) have
written books on the broader issue of violence in Indonesia, examining multiple
conflicts.Cross‐caseanalysishasbeenusedtodevelopframeworkstounderstandwhy
different forms of conflict arose in different places at different times, concentrating
largelyonsimilaritiesinstructuralconditionsthatpredatedtheoutbreakofwidespread
violence.
This newwork has undoubtedly enhanced our understanding of the specific conflicts
andhaspointed to general systemic factors, all largely a product of Indonesia’s post‐
Suharto transition. Yet thebooks also have a numberofweaknesses that need to be
remedied.
Thegreatestproblem ismethodological.Noneof theseworks isbasedon the ideaof
variationinresearchdesign.Allhaveconcentratedonlyonepisodesofviolence,mostly
on large‐scale episodes, and none systematically compares why violence occurred in
someplaces, not others. Bertrand (2004) studies violence in East Timor, theMalukus
andKalimantan;Sidel(2006)focusesontheburningofChurchesinJavaintheearlyto
mid‐1990s, the violence in Jakarta, and intercommunal conflict in the Malukus and
Sulawesi;andvanKlinken(2007a)concentratesonriotsinKalimantan,theMalukusand
42See,forexample:vanKlinken(2001)andWilson(2008)onMalukuandNorthMaluku;Acciaioli(2001),
Aragon (2001) andMcRae (2008)onCentral Sulawesi;McGibbon (2004)onPapua; vanKlinken (2000),
Davidson(2008)andSmith(2005)onWestorCentralKalimantan;Aspinall (2006, forthcoming),Schulze
(2004), Sukma (2004), Barron, Clark and Daud (2005), Reid (2006) on Aceh; and Siegel (1998), Purdey
(2006) and Mietzner (2008) on the Jakarta riots. The reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG),
availableatwww.crisisweb.org,havealsoilluminatedmanyoftheconflicts.Anumberofeditedvolumes
havebrought togetherpiecesof conflicts,oftendrawingparallelswithhistoricalpatternsofviolence in
Indonesia:see,Tornquist(2000),Anderson(2001);WesselandWimhofer(2001);ColombijnandLindblad
(2002);HuskenandJonge(2002);Anwar,Bouvier,SmithandTol(2005)andCoppell(2006).
23
Sulawesi. Methodologically, the choice of areas in all three books are examples of
‘selectionbias’.Agoodtheoryrequiresshowingthatthefactors identifiedascausal in
makingviolencepossibleweremissinginplacesthatdidnotexperienceviolence.43As
discussed earlier, if we do not study peace and violence together, we cannot
conclusivelyshowwhichfactorswerereallycausalinproducingeither.44
Threemoreshortfallsareworthnoting.TheseproblemsmarkBertrand(2004)andSidel
(2006), but not van Klinken (2007a).45 First, the comparative work has not fully
considered the processes of escalation, which turned existent social tensions into
smaller‐scale acts of conflict to large‐scale episodes of violence. Second, the
explanations have largely been structural, and hence often rather deterministic,
focusing on demographic shifts, economic balance, and changing access to political
power, andhaveunderplayed the importanceof theprocesses ofmobilization. Third,
there has been an overriding emphasis on macro explanations for the outbreak of
violenceincertainlocalities.Bertrand(2004),forexample,concentratesondifferential
groupaccesstopowerinJakarta,andtheirroleintheIndonesiannationandpolity,to
explainwhy theDayaks,ChristiansandMuslims roseupatcertainpoints.This sortof
approach can explain why violence gets clustered around certain periods (temporal
variation), but it cannot help us understand why violence has geographically specific
locations(spatialvariation).46
For understanding the latter, we need to pay attention to micro or local factors in
explainingviolence (Aspinall2008;Varshney2002,2008).Toooften in the Indonesian
literature,local‐levelconclusionshavebeendrawnfromnational‐levelcrises.Unlessthe
local‐national linksareclearlyestablished,suchcausal reasoning is flawed.Anational‐
level crisis is, by definition, a constant for all localities, both violent and peaceful. It
cannotexplainbothpeaceandviolence.Logically,aconstantcannotexplainvariation.
43 Van Klinken (2007a) does develop a ‘vulnerability index’ in order to compare the provinces of high
violencetootherprovinceswherelarge‐scaleviolencedidnotbreakout.Heidentifiesfactorsofrapidde‐
agrarianization and high dependence of the local economyon the state as important in differentiating
high‐violence and low‐violence provinces. However, the focus of the book is not on establishing how
these factors led to violence through a comparison of dynamics in high‐violence and low‐violence
provinces,butrathertracingtheevolutionofviolenceinthehighviolenceprovinces.44Foramoredetaileddiscussion,seeVarshney(2008).
45VanKlinken(2007a)doesconcentrateonescalation,processesandlocaldynamics,thethreepointswe
makebelow.However,hisprimaryfocuswasnottoisolatecausalfactorsinordertodeveloppoliciesfor
conflict mitigation, whereas this project does aim to do so. Van Klinken discussed one aspect of
escalationforeachoffivebigconflicts:WesternKalimantan,CentralKalimantan,Maluku,NorthMaluku
andCentral Sulawesi. As a result,we learnhow Indonesian violence supports Tilly andhis colleagues’
conceptual categorization of the dynamics of contentious politics (McAdam et. al. 2001), and how
elementsofthattheorycanshedlightonunderstandingviolenceindifferentprovinces.Butthelackofa
comparative framework (even within high violence locations) mitigates against generating a broader
understandingofwhyescalationoccursinsomeplacesandnotinothers.46Bertrand(2008)agreeswiththispoint.
24
5.1AimsandResearchQuestions
The second component of the study aims to develop and empirically test causal
explanations as to why small‐scale conflicts and tensions escalate into large‐scale
violence in some cases and not in others. This can be used to increase our
understandingof (a)why the largeoutbreaksof violence inKalimantan, Sulawesi and
theMalukusoccurred47;(b)howtheyescalated;(c)whatexplainstheirtiming,location,
and the form they took; (d) thepotential risk for escalationof local conflicts inother
parts of Indonesia; and (e) potential areas for fruitful intervention by government,
developmentagencies,civilsocietyandtheprivatesectortopreventfutureescalation
of conflicts. Answers to these questions may also have applicability in conflict‐prone
areasinothercountries.
Theresearchquestionsareasfollows:
1. Givenlarge,systemicandsuddenshocks(suchasthefalloftheNewOrderandthe
financialcrisis),howandwhydolocalconflictsescalateintolargeconflictsinsome
places,andnotinothers?48
2. In the absenceof large shocks, howandwhydo local conflicts escalate into large
conflicts?49
3. How,andbywhom,aregroupsmobilized?
4. Inbothcontexts,whatexplainsvariationinincidence,timingandform?
5. What potential exists for the escalation of routine violence across Indonesia into
largeconflicts,andwhichareasareparticularlyvulnerable?
6. Whatpoliciesandprojectscanhelppreventfutureescalation?
5.2ResearchMethods,CaseSelectionandFieldwork
Hypothesisgeneration
Given thatmore has been written on large‐scale violence in Indonesia than on local
conflicts, a first stepwill be to commission a literature reviewof theexisting studies.
The studies of particular conflicts and someof the cross‐case treatments cited above
provide in‐depth chronologies, including of the actors involved, violence triggers and
47 Van Klinken (2007a) has studied all three of these conflicts. However, as discussed above, he has
focusedoncommonalityofoutcomes(large‐scaleviolence),notoutcomevariation(violenceandpeace),
asawaytobuildhisargument.Asaconsequence,wecannottesthisargumentwithhismaterialsalone,
eveniftheargumentisright.48Weareinterestedinfourdifferenttypesofescalationhere:(a)escalationfromindividualtogroup
contention;(b)escalationfromnon‐violenttoviolentconflict;(c)escalationinimpacts;and(d)escalation
ofconflictformsandtypes,wherelessseriouskindsofconflictchangeintomoredeadlyones(e.g.landto
religiousconflict).49ThisisparticularlyimportanttounderstandgivenwhereIndonesiaisnow.Economically,Indonesiahas
nowfully recovered fromthe financialcrisis (asmeasured inGDPpercapita terms)andenjoyspolitical
stabilitynotseensincetheSuhartoera.Therecentglobalfinancialcrisiscouldbeanewshock,although
currentpredictionsarethatIndonesiawillcontinuetogrowandpovertylevelswillcontinuetofall.
25
hypothesizescauses.Fromthese,alongwithotherstudiesof large‐scaleviolence,and
especially riots, fromaround theworld,wewill distill hypothesesonpotential factors
andcausalmechanismsthatmaybeassociatedwithconflictescalation.
Caseselectionandcomparativeframework
Qualitative fieldwork will then be employed. The hypotheses will be developed and
testedinanumberofways.
First,weplan toconduct structured, controlledand in‐depthcasecomparisonsof the
sitesof large‐scalerioting(suchasAmbon,Poso,Ternate,Sampit)withthosethathad
very little violence (such asManado, Palu and Yogyakarta). Controls will be specified
later.Comparingthetwowillhelpelicitinformationonwhyviolenceescalatedinsome
areasandnotinothers.
Second, structured, controlled and in‐depth comparisonswill bemade of the sites of
high violence (e.g. Ambon, Poso)with those that hadmedium levels of violence (i.e.,
locationswhereviolencerosebutdidnotescalatebeyondapoint,suchasMedan,Solo,
Kupang,Lombok).Again,controlswillbespecifiedlater.
Figure2showsthetypesofcomparisonsthatwillbemade.Therearethreehypothetical
cases,consistingoflarge‐scalerioting(suchasinAmbon),medium‐scalerioting(suchas
in Solo), and low violence (such as inManado). The first kind of comparison involves
comparing cases of large‐scale rioting (the top line) with cases of low violence (the
bottom line) for the first threemonths on the graph. The second kindof comparison
involves the next twomonths of the graph (frommonth 3 to 5), where the top line
keepsrising,whilethemiddlelinebeginsdeclining.
Figure2:Threedifferenttrajectoriesofviolence:
large‐scaleriotingvs.medium‐scaleriotingvs.lowviolence
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26
The analyses above will help identify the structural differences between areas that
experience large‐level conflict escalation and those that do not (or those experience
escalation,butofalesserextent).However,suchanalyseswillnotinandoffthemselves
identifythetriggersthatledtoconflicttoescalateatagivenpointintime.Athirdform
of analysis will thus examine varying conflict patterns within a case. This can help
identifytheturningpointsinconflicttrajectories.Forthis,thenewspaperdatasetwillbe
used tomappatternsof conflictover timewithina givengeographicarea. From this,
pointsofheightenedescalationcanbeidentified(seethearrowsinFigure3).Fieldwork
willfocusonthesepointstoseewhatwashappening.
Figure3:Within‐caseanalysisofconflicttrajectories
Cross‐areacomparisonofsuch‘turningpoints’canthenhelpustoascertaintheextent
towhichtherearecommonalitiesinthefactorsleadingtoheightenedescalation.
Finally, some of some hypotheses derived from the literature and fieldwork can be
testedstatistically.Theconflictdatasetweconstructwillcontaininformationonconflict
outcomes (over time). It can also be used to understand how different incidents oi
conflictrelatetoeachother–forexample,ifconflictsofacertaintype(e.g.alynching)
atagivenpointoftimetendtobeassociatedwithconflictsofadifferenttype(e.g.an
inter‐groupbrawl)ata laterpoint intime–50andwillcontain informationonprocess
variables (how escalation began, how it did, or did not, rise beyond a point; which
institutionsororganizationsintervenedtostopescalation,etc.).
Other causal explanations may be more structural in nature, focusing on the
social/demographic,economicor institutionalconditionsthattendtopredictdifferent
50 Doing such ‘process analysis’ is exceptionally difficult within quantitative datasets, even where
informationiscollectedcontinuouslyratherthanatseparatedpointsintime.However,wethinkwewill
beabletodosomesuchanalysis.Separateconflictincidentswithinthedatabasewillbe‘linked’toother
conflict incidents through the generationof a ‘Conflict ID’. This should allow for someprocess tracing
analysis.
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patternsofconflictescalation.Thisdatawillnotbecapturedfromnewspapersbutwill
be taken fromsurveysconductedby the IndonesianBureauofStatistics (BPS) suchas
PODES,SUSENAS,andvariouscensuses.SectionVIIprovidesmoreinformationonhow
suchstatisticaltestingcanbeconducted.
28
6.De‐EscalationofViolence
In Indonesia and beyond, there has been little consideration of processes of de‐
escalationafterepisodesof large‐scaleviolencehavetakenplace,oroftheconditions
underwhichremainingtensionscanre‐escalateintonewoutbreaksofsevereviolence.
Thefourthcomponentofthestudywillseektodeveloptheoryexplainingvariationsin
thesuccessofpeacestabilizationinareasthatexperiencedmassiveunrest,thefactors
thatexplainthere‐emergenceofviolentconflict insomeareasandnot inothers,and
why ‘postconflict’ violence takes different forms in different areas. This will have
implications for thedesignof postconflict programs and approaches in Indonesia and
beyond.
Areas that have experienced large‐scale outbreaks of violence are prone to the
resurgenceofviolence.Collieretal.(2003)havedemonstratedthatthereisasignificant
chance of violent conflict re‐emerging in areaswhere civilwars have formally ended,
withinfiveyearsofwartermination.Thereareanumberofreasonsforthis:signinga
peace settlementdoesnot necessarymean that conflicting parties,whomay still see
advantages in a future re‐escalation of conflict, have fully ‘bought in’ to peace;
expectationsoverthebenefitsofpeacemaynotbemet;poorprogramsandpoliciesin
postconflictsettingscancreateincentivesforpreviouslywarringpartiestopickuparms
again.51 Conflicts also play a role in hardening identities and group cleavages,
reconfiguringnormsregardingtheacceptabilityofviolenceinwaysthattakedecadesto
overcome.Suchfactors,andothers,canleadtotheresumptionofwarinareaswhere
peaceagreementshavebeensigned(Stedman,RothchildandCousens2002).
‘Postconflict’ areas can also experience new forms of violence (e.g. Rogers 2007;
ChauderyandSuhrke2008;Fortna2008).Insomecases,thehumansecurityimpactsof
such violence can be as great as those experienced during the initial period of war
(Muggah2009). InElSalvador,GuatemalaandNicaragua, forexample,homiciderates
arenowhigherthantheywereduringtheconflictperiod(Waiselfisz2008).InIndonesia
too, such ‘postconflict’ forms of violence are also present. In Aceh, for example, the
Helsinkipeaceagreementofficiallybroughttoanendathree‐decadeconflictbetween
theIndonesiangovernmentandGAM,arebelgroup.Yetwhilethepeaceprocesshasby
andlargegonewell,therehavebeenrisinglevelsoflocalizedroutineviolencesincethe
signingofthepeaceagreement(Figure4).
51SeeMuggah(2009)foradiscussion.
29
Figure4:ViolentconflictsinAceh:January2005‐January200952
Source:Barron(2009)
In Indonesiaandelsewhere, relatively little isknownabout the formsofviolence that
emergeafterpeacesettlements.Thishasnegatedfromanunderstandingofthefactors
that lead to violence re‐escalation. Most of the cross‐country quantitative analyses,
which aim to give causal explanations resumption of war, have implicitly treated
violenceasabinaryvariable:thelackofthereemergenceoffull‐scalecivilwarisseenas
asuccess.Patternsofpostconflictviolenceare inherently importantforunderstanding
the potential for war or large‐scale violence to restart. Yet, they have not been
adequatelyincorporatedintotheoriesforwhywarresumesinsomeplacesanddoesnot
in others; Tilly’s (1995) argument that understanding the ‘causes’ of war and its
reoccurrenceare less important thandevelopingdeeperunderstandingsof thenature
ofpostwarviolencehas,toalargeextent,notbeentakenupbyresearchers.
Further,therehasbeenrelativelylittlestudyofhowandwhyviolenceformsmorphin
postconflict settings, andhow thisnegatively impactsonhuman security and stability
(evenwithout re‐escalation towar or large‐scale violence). Variations in the levels or
forms of postconflict violence that have not escalated to full‐scale civil war are not
considered. In Indonesia, thetreatmentsof thehighconflictareaswhereviolencehas
seemingly subsided (theMalukus, Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and now Aceh) have
focused on initial actions taken to end the conflicts such as the Helsinki agreement
(Aceh)andtheMalinoaccords(PosoandMaluku).No‐onetoourknowledgehassought
tosystematicallycomparelevelsandformsofnewviolenceand/ortensionssincethese
conflicts peaked. Little data (quantitative or qualitative) has been collected to permit
52NotethattheHelsinkiMoUwassignedinAugust2005.
30
suchcomparisons.This lackofpostconflictdatamakes ithard toanalyzehowconflict
subsides,takesnewforms,and(potentially)re‐escalates.
6.1AimsandQuestions
Thefourthpartofthestudywilllookatissuesrelatingtothede‐escalationofconflictin
areas that have been affected by large outbreaks of intercommunal violence in
Indonesia.Thisinvolvesmappingoutlevelsofviolenceand/ortensionsforanumberof
years after the larger conflict has ended and carrying out more in‐depth work to
understandhowthesedifferentpatternsemerged.Theresultswillhaveimplicationsfor
understandingpreemptive and responsive conflict resolution strategies in postconflict
settings, allowing for the generation of policy recommendations applicable in both
conflictandpostconflictsettings.
Thefollowingquestionswillbeaddressed:
1. What patterns of conflict emerge after large‐scale episodes of violence end, and
howdothesechangeovertime?
2. Whatexplainsvariationintheincidenceandformsofpostconflictviolence?53
3. Howdopastpatternsofviolenceshapethepotentialforconflictre‐escalationdown
theline?
4. What is the relationship between patterns of postconflict routine violence and
patternsofde‐escalation?
5. Has the de‐escalation of conflict in Indonesia acquired the properties of a
permanent decline (a sustainable peace), or there is a real possibility of the
reemergenceofviolenceinsomeareas?
6. What policies and strategies can consolidate peace in both the short‐run (the
immediate period after agreements are signed or when conflict significantly de‐
escalates)andinthelonger‐runpostconflictperiod?
7. To what extent are patterns of de‐escalation similar in areas affected by
intercommunalandseparatistviolence?
6.2ResearchMethods
Quantitative and qualitative evidence will be used to answer these questions. The
formerwillbeusedtoidentifypatterns.Thiscanthenbeusedtoselectcasesformore
in‐depthfieldwork.
53Thiswillincludeconsiderationofthedifferentaidinterventions,whichmayhavecontributedtoconflict
de‐escalation(orwhichmayhavehelpedleadtonewviolence).This isparticularly importantwithinthe
WorldBankgiventheemphasisondocumentinglessonslearnedondifferenttoolsforpostconflictareas
(e.g.KostnerandJohnsonforthcoming).OtherworkunderthePCFgrantinvolvesevaluationstotestthe
efficacyofreintegrationprogramsinPosoandAceh,conflictresolutiontraining,psycho‐socialprograms
for traumatized conflict victims, and public information peace‐building programs. Insights from these
studieswillhelpinformouranalysis.
31
The quantitative datasetwill be used tomap violence by incidence, impact and form
acrossthoseprovincesthatexperiencedhighlevelsofcommunalviolentconflictinthe
post‐Suhartoperiod:Maluku,NorthMaluku,WestKalimantan,CentralKalimantan,and
CentralSulawesi.54Thekeyperiodsofconcernaretheyearsofhighlevelviolenceand
subsequent years. Importantly, both routine violence and large‐scale violencewill be
included(althoughtheywillbedisaggregated).55
Such mappings will help us select areas for comparative study. However, in‐depth
fieldwork will be needed to understand causal factors that explain variation. For the
escalation component of the study, many studies already exist, meaning that less
fieldwork is necessary. In contrast, very little work on de‐escalation has been done
whichfocusesonrecentyearsandthepresentday.Thus,itislikelythatteamswillneed
tospendasubstantialamountoftimeinthefield.
6.3CaseSelection
Caseswillbeselectedtoallowforanumberofdifferentcomparisonstobemade:
• Variationsinlevelsandtemporalpatternsofde‐escalation
• Variationsintheextenttowhichnewformsofviolencearelinkedtooldconflict‐era
forms
• Variationsinthetypesofpostconflictviolencethatemerge
Comparingdifferentde‐escalationpatterns
First,withinthesampleoffivepostconflictprovinces,wewilllookforvariationinlevels
ofde‐escalation. Suchvariationmightbe inaggregate levels (e.g. toa certain levelof
violence) or in patterns of de‐escalation (e.g. in the speed at which violence has de‐
escalated).Figures5aand5billustrate.InFigure5a,districtAhasseenade‐escalation
of violence as has district B. However, the scale of such de‐escalation differs, being
greaterindistrictB.InFigure5b,incontrast,bothdistrictAanddistrictBendupwitha
similarlevelofviolence.However,thespeedofde‐escalationdiffersbetweenthetwo,
asdoestheextenttowhichitislinear,beingfasterandmorelinearindistrictB.
54 Aceh will be excluded from the initial analysis because of the different nature of conflict there.
Likewise,ourfocuswillnotbeonotherareasthatexperiencedonlyshort‐runviolence,suchasJakarta.55 Inpractice,distinguishingbetweenlarge‐scale(“big”)violenceandroutineorsmallscaleviolencewill
notbesimple.Inmanypostconflictcontexts,newformsofviolencethatemergeareoftenlinked(directly
orindirectly)totheinitialconflict.However,ourdatasetcontainsanumberofvariablesthatshouldallow
ustoseparateroutineandlarge‐scaleviolence,includingconflicttypes,actorsinvolved,andtheconflict
cleavage.
32
Figure5aDifferentscaleofde‐escalationintwodistrictsFigure5bDifferentspeedofde‐escalationintwodistricts
Comparingsuchcases—throughin‐depthfieldworkand,totheextentpossible,areview
of the case literature—can help in the development of causal theories for why de‐
escalationpatternsdiffer.
Comparinglevelsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings
We are also interested in the relationship between routine violence and forms of
violencethatwereprevalentintheconflictperiod.Evenwhereaggregatelevelsofde‐
escalationare similar acrossareas, varying formsof violencemayemerge indifferent
places.Someof thesemayhavedirect links to the formsofviolenceprevalentduring
theconflictperiod,whileothersmaybenew.
The fourhypothetical scenarios laidout in Figures6a‐d illustrate. Ineach, the shaded
space represents the trajectory of the original, large‐scale, violence, and the red line
represents routine,small‐scale,violence.All four figuresshowsteadilydeclining large‐
scale violence, but four different trajectories in the evolution of routine violence. In
Figure6a,routineviolencecontinues,unaffectedbythedeclineinlarge‐scaleviolence.
InFigure6b,bothlarge‐scaleandroutineviolencedecline,atasimilarrate.InFigure6c,
thetworatesofdeclinearedifferent,withroutineviolencetakinglongertodecline.In
Figure6d, large‐scaleviolencedeclinesover time,but routineviolence increases in its
stead.
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Figure6:Differentlevelsofroutinepostconflictviolence
Figure6a Figure6b
Figure6c Figure6d
Comparingformsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings
Variationintheformsofpostconflictviolencepresentwillalsobeconsidered.Figures7a
and 7b break down further the different forms of postconflict violence observable in
two areas. In each, levels of violence remain similar but violence has taken different
forms. Figure 7a shows a rise in vigilantism, while Figure 7b shows a rise in land
conflicts.
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34
Figure7a:Riseinvigilantisminpost‐conflictperiodFigure7b:Riseinlandconflictsinpost‐conflictperiod
Withincasestudyanalysis
Much canalsobe learnedby looking at variationswithin cases in levels and formsof
violence. The quantitative dataset will allow us to look for sharp rises and falls in
violence over the postconflict period. In the qualitative cases, time will be spent
identifyingreasonswhysuchrapidchangesoccurred.
Our within case analysis will focus on comparing periods of conflict escalation with
thosewhereconflicthasre‐escalated(afterinitialdropsinviolence).Figure8showsthe
pattern of violence over time in a hypothetical district. Comparative analysis of two
periods(markedwitharrows)withinthesameconflictcanhelpindeterminingwhether
arecentperiodofviolencere‐escalation isaprecursortoa futureperiodofextended
violence or whether the characteristics are different, with re‐escalation a temporary
blip.Withincaseanalysiswillalsobeconductedforperiodsofconflictde‐escalation.
Figure8:Within‐caseanalysisofde‐escalation
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Total Violence Large-scale violenceLand conflicts Vigilantism
35
Finally, within case analysis will compare conditions after conflict de‐escalation with
thosebeforetheoriginalperiodofviolence.Arethefactorswhich(wehypothesize)led
to the initial violence missing or do they remain. (These will be identified in the
component of the project on escalation). If these underlying factors remain, we can
positthatviolencemayre‐emergeagaininthefuture?
6.4FieldworkandAnalysis
Variation along these dimensions will be used to select a number of cases (to be
decided) forcomparativeanalysis.The levelatwhichcasecomparisonswill takeplace
(province,districtorsub‐district)willbedecidedafterweobtaininformationindicating
thelevelatwhichvariationismostmarked(whichwillcomefromthedatabase).Ideally,
wewillmatchcasesatmultiplelevels(provincial,district,sub‐district)tohelpteaseout
thefactorsateachlevelthatcontributedtodifferentialtrajectories.
Qualitative fieldworkwill then be needed. Aswith thework on routine violence and
escalation,structuredcomparisonswillbeemployed.Aftercasesareselected,in‐depth
fieldworkwillthencarriedouttotrytoteaseoutthesourcesofthedifferentformsof
variation.Whenthere,theywillfocusonanumberofissueswhichmayinclude:56
• Whatareinformants’(villagers,leaders,conflictactors,government,etc.)viewson
whyviolencehasdeclined(ornot)?
• Howhave conflict actors reorganized themselves? Are their formernetworks still
strong?Towhatextentaretheiridentifies,andtheirpositionsincommunities,still
definedbytheroletheyplayedintheconflict?
• Whatrolehavegovernmentpoliciesandactionsplayed?Howdidlocalandnational
governmentrespondtotheconflict,eitherdirectlyorinprovidingbelligerentswith
positionsofpowerorresources?
• Whatrolehaveaidandpeacebuildingeffortsplayed?Howhavetheycontributedto
limiting/triggeringrenewedviolence?
• What preexisting social networks exist? What cross‐cutting relationships and
institutionsexistedbeforetheperiodof large‐scaleviolentconflict,howwerethey
affectedbytheviolence,andhowhavetheybeenreconstituted(ornot)?
56 Other focus areas will be identified once the quantitative data is in. This will allow us to develop
hypothesesthatcanbetestedduringthefieldwork.Relevantliteraturesthatmayalsohelpinhypothesis
formulationincludethatonsocialmovements(e.g.Tarrow1994),sourcesofrevolution(Wolf1969;Scott
1976; Skopkal 1994); the security dilemma (Posen 1993); the organization of violence and rebel
movements(Kalyvas2006;Weinstein2007);institutionalorganization(e.g.North1990;Fukuyama2004);
andbroaderworkon thepoliticaleconomyofdemocratic transitions (e.g.HaggardandKaufman1995;
Bates2001).
36
6.5TestingtheTheoryonDifferentTypesofCases
Theanalysisabovewillhelpgeneratetheoryonwhyviolencede‐escalates indifferent
waysandwhatconditionsmakeforsustainablepeaceinpostconflictareas.Oursampled
provinceswereall sitesof large‐scale intercommunal violence.Towhatextentdo the
same factors and dynamics that lead to de‐escalation and sustainable peace in these
areas leadtosimilaroutcomes inareasthathaveexperiencedother typesofextreme
violence?
Thisquestionhasparticulartheoreticalrelevance.Inmuchoftheliteratureitisassumed
thatresumptionofintercommunalviolencehasverydifferentcausestothosethatlead
torenewedviolenceagainstthestate.57Thissoundsplausible,butisittrue?Weplan
toapplysomeofthehypothesesgeneratedfromtheanalysisabovetothecaseofAceh,
whereconflictbetweenasecessionistmovementandtheIndonesianstate ledtoover
15,000 deaths. The method and analytical steps will be similar to those above. The
quantitativedatasetwill identifypatternsofpostconflictviolencebyareawithinAceh.
We will then look for variation in current violence levels, and in patterns of de‐
escalation.Fieldworkcanhelptestwhetherthesamefactorsledtode‐escalationhere
asinthesitesofintercommunalviolence.
57Onthedifferencebetweenethnicwarsandotherviolentconflicts,seeHorowitz(1985),Fearon(2004),
andDoyleandSambani(2006).
37
7.TestingourHypotheses:LinkstoOtherQuantitativeData
Aswehavesaidabove,wealsoremainopentotheideathattheViCISstudydatacanbe
used for econometric testing of hypotheses about what causes violent conflict in
countriesandwhataccountsforvariationsinviolentconflictlevels.Anewliteratureon
themicro‐dynamicsandfoundationsofcivilwarandlocalconflicthasemergedinrecent
years. These studies look at the impacts of local social, economic and institutional
factorsinshapingviolencepropensity.58Oneweaknessofmanyexistingstudiesisthat
thedependentvariable(incidenceorimpactsofviolentconflict) ispoorlymeasuredor
collected at only onepoint in time. This is an artifact of theuseof household or key
informantsurveys.
Thenewspaperconflictdatasetwillprovideaseriesofdependentvariables(presenceof
violentconflict, levelsofviolentconflict,presenceofparticular formsofviolence,etc)
that can be used for econometric analysis. The dataset will have limited data on
independentvariables.However, thesecanbe integrated fromotherexistingdatasets
suchasSUSENAS,PODESandtheGovernanceandDecentralizationSurvey.
As such, we expect that a final stage of the projectwill be tomerge the newspaper
conflictdatasetwithotherssurveydatasets.Thiswillallowforformaltestingofsomeof
thehypothesesdevelopedfromthecasestudywork.
At thispointwecannotdeterminewhathypotheseswewould like to test,andhence
whatvariableswewouldwanttomergeintothedataset.However,areasofhypotheses
are likely to relate to three areas: (a) social/demographic causes of violence; (b)
economic causes of violence; and (c) institutions and violence. Independent variables
mayincludethefollowing:
Social/demographicfactors
• Percentageofunmarriedmen
• Youthbulge:highorincreasingproportionofyouth(especiallyyoungmen)
• Ethnicheterogeneity–ELF,withtemporalaspect(changesinELF)
• In‐migration
• Seasonandtemperature
Economicfactors
• Economicshocks:nationalandlocal
• Changesinwages
• Unemployment,changesinemploymentlevels(especiallyforyoungmen)
• Changesininflation
• Changesincommodityprices
58SeeKalyvas(2007)forasummaryandcritique.
38
Institutionalfactors
• Perceptionsofgovernance
• Proximitytoreligiousinstitutions
• Representativeness of government institutions (for example percentage of civil
servantsbyethnicity)
• Districtsplitting(pemekaran)
• Changesingovernmentafterlocalelections
• Remotenessfromurbancenters
39
8.AudienceandOutputs
8.1Audiences
The project aims to speak to a number of distinct audiences. First, ViCISwill provide
dataandinsightsofusetopolicymakersinIndonesia.ThesewillfeedintoBappenas’s
(the National Planning Agency) strategy for developing of conflict‐affected
disadvantagedareas.Thestudywillbefinanced,inpart,fromfundsfromajointWorld
Bank‐BappenasgrantfromthePost‐ConflictFund(PCF),whichaimstobuildknowledge
of conflict in Indonesia, and to build the capacity of the state and non‐government
organizations to respond to it in effectiveways. Counterparts from Bappenaswill be
involvedinpeerreviewingmaterialsthroughoutthestudytohelpensurethatthestudy
contributes information useful to the government’sMedium TermDevelopment Plan
2010‐2014.Bappenaswill be responsible fordisseminating results and ideas from the
studytootherGovernmentministries.
Results will be fed into the drafting of the law on conflict management, which is
scheduledtogotoparliament in2009or2010.Withsupport fromBappenas,outputs
from this studywill be streamlinedwith the timeline of the drafting of legislation to
informlawmakersaboutconflictdynamicsineveryprovinceandenablethemtodevise
effectiveconflictmanagementstrategies.
Resultswillalsobedisseminatedwidelytolocalgovernmentstostrengthentheirrolein
conflict management and prevention. These are increasingly important to promote
conflict sensitivity in participatory planning process within the policy context of
Bappenas’ support of the Musrenbang process. It is envisioned that funds for pilot
projectresponsesbasedonfindingswillbefoundfromothertrustfunds,otherdonors,
andgovernmentbudget.59
Second, ViCIS will provide key information for development practitioners from aid
agencies and national and international NGOs. The study will help these groups
prioritizeareastoworkin,typesofprogramstofinanceandimplement,andwillgivea
broadsenseoftheextenttowhich“conflictprogramming”shouldremainapriorityas
Indonesiamaturesasademocracy.Findingswillfeedintotheongoingimplementation
of large‐scale Bank‐financed projects such as PNPM/KDP and SPADA that operate in
many conflict‐affected areas in Indonesia. Materials may be of use in building the
capacity of facilitators and other project staff to understand, analyze and manage
conflictintheirareas.
59Somedonors,especiallyUSAID,haveexpressedinterest,ashasBappenas.
40
Third, the projectwill provide fresh insights to Indonesian and Indonesianist scholars
and to the broader global community working, and writing, on conflict issues. The
analyticapproachesshouldhelptocontributetoanswerstosomeofthekeyquestion
on conflict in Indonesia today (as discussed earlier). ViCIS will provide key data and
frameworksthatwillhaveapplicabilitytounderstandingconflict,andhowtodealwith
it, inothercountries. Inaddition,ourconflictdatamaybeusedbyothers toperform
their own analyses. Materials will be published through international fora, and
workshops will be held in Washington and elsewhere to disseminate findings. The
project aims to help in the process of incorporating Indonesian materials into
internationaldebatesandworkonviolentconflict.
Finally, the study also aims to build the capacity of local research organizations to
conduct empirical policy‐focused research. Large portions of the fieldwork will be
implemented by partners. Local research instituteswill assist in the quantitative data
collection,whilemuchofthequalitativedatacollectionwillbecontractedtoIndonesian
social scientists (political scientists, historians, anthropologists), selected from local
universitiesinsiteschosenforcasestudieswhereverpossible.Thiswillalsohelpensure
capacity‐buildingactivitiestargetorganizationsoutsideofJava.
8.2Outputs
Given the diverse audiences for the project, outputs will take a number of different
forms.
Policybriefingnotes
Regular briefing notes will be produced summarizing data and analysis. Key target
audience is the government. Briefing noteswill also beproduced for an international
audience and will be disseminated through the World Bank’s Crime, Conflict and
ViolenceteaminWashington.
Workingpapers,journalarticlesandbook
Workingpaperswillbeproducedforeachofthefourresearchtopics.Therewillbean
emphasisongettingdataandearlyanalysisoutquicklytohelpmaximizeusefulnessfor
government and practitioners in Indonesia. At a later point, more conceptual and
theoretical papers will be produced aimed at a wider audience. A book will bring
togetherthefindingsfromthestudy.
Conflictdataset
TheprojectwillproduceacomprehensivedatasetonviolenceinIndonesia.Thiswillbe
on‐line and freely available for conflict researchers, government, NGOs, etc. It is
planned that the dataset will bemaintained in partnership with Bappenas to ensure
dataiskeptup‐to‐datewhentheprojectends.
41
Workshopsandcapacitybuilding
Theprojectaimsnotonlytoproducegooddataandtheory,buttobuildthecapacityof
local groups in Indonesia. Regularworkshopswill be held to disseminate and discuss
data.Overtime,itishopedthatfundswillbeavailablefortargetedcapacitybuildingof
localgovernmentandcivilsocietygroupstointerpretthedataandfindings,andtoplan
responses.
42
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AnnexA:ConceptsandDefinitionsConflict “Astruggleovervaluesandclaimstosecurestatus,power,andresources,a
struggleinwhichthemainaimsofopponentsaretoneutralize,injure,or
eliminaterivals”(Coser1956).
ViolentConflict Includesallformsofconflictbetweenindividualsandgroupsthatinvolveany
formofphysicalactionthathasconcreteconsequencessuchasdeaths,injuries
anddestructionofproperty,orwhichhasaviolentform.
Non‐Violent
Conflict
Includesallincidentsthatinvolve:(1)theformationandmobilizationofagroup
and(2)wherethegrouptravelstoalocationanddeliversademandforactionor
response.
ViolentCrime Includesallviolentcriminalincidentsthathavenotbeencodedasconflict.These
includethoseillegalactivitiesthatinvolveanyformofphysicalactionthathas
concreteimpactssuchasdeaths,injuriesanddestructionofpropertyorthat
haveaviolentform.Crimediffersfromconflictinthatthereisnoissueover
whichthepartiesareindispute.
Escalation Thefollowingwillbeconsideredinthestudyofescalation:
Changefromnon‐violentconflicttoviolentconflict.
Increaseinscale,i.e.numberofparticipants,impacts,numberofincidents.
Escalationwithinincidentsaswellasacrossincidents.
Escalationintolargehighprofileconflicts.
Escalationonamuchsmallerscale:fromademonstrationtoafewsmallriots
withnodeaths.
De‐escalation Thefollowingwillbeconsideredinthestudyofescalation:
Changefromviolenttonon‐violentform.
Decreaseinscale,i.e.numberofparticipants,impacts,numberofincidents.
Mutualresolutionofunderlyingissuesbetweenparties.
Routine
Violence
Frequentlyoccurringformsofviolence,whichhavelowper‐incidentimpacts
(maximumfivedeaths)andwhicharenotpartofalargeorwidespreadconflict.
Suchincidentsinvolvelocalactorsstrugglingoverlocalissues,ratherthanlarge‐
scalemobilizationbyidentitycharacteristics(suchasethnicity,religion,or
region).
47
AnnexB:ProvincesandEstimatedDistributionofMediaSourcesProvince NoofDistricts ProvincialPapers Sub‐ProvincialPapers
Aceh 23 2 2
Papua 20 2 2
WestPapua 9 2 2
CentralSulawesi 10 2 2
Maluku 8 2 2
NorthMaluku 8 2 1
Jakarta 6 ‐ 3
CentralJava 35 2 4
Lampung 10 2 3
EastNusaTenggara 19 2 3
EastJava 38 2 4
NorthSumatra 26 2 4
WestKalimantan 13 2 3
WestNusaTenggara 9 2 3
NorthSulawesi 13 2 2
Yogyakarta 5 2 2
CentralKalimantan 14 2 2
WestJava 26 2 4
SouthSulawesi 23 2 2
Riau 11 2 3
Bengkulu 9 2 2
Banten 6 2 2
Total 341 42 57
48
AnnexC:CodingTemplate
49
AnnexD:ExplanationofCodes
SECTION1
Coderinitials Enteryourinitialsinthisfield.
IncidentID AssigneachincidentbundleauniqueincidentIDfromthelistofIDsprovidedbythe
ProjectManager.
FortwoormoreeventstobeconsideredasingleIncidentandhavethesameIncident
IDtheymustbedrivenbythesameissue,involvethesameactorsandoccuronthe
samedate.
Sourceinfo Entertheinitialsofnewspapers(fromtheprovidedlist)anddateofeveryarticle
attachedtoincidentbundle.
SECTION2
Actors • Enterminimumoneactorpersideandmaximumtwoactorsperside.
• Ifmore than 2 actors involved on a side, or if three sides are involved in one
incident,writethisinthe‘CodingIssues’Section.
• If there isaclearpelakuandaclearkorban,enter thepelaku inSide1andthe
korbaninSide2.
• Each set of actors, or ‘sides’, should be coded for General, Type, Total and
Women.
General • At‘General’,enterthecodeforthebestdescriptionoftheformofparticipantto
theincident:
1. Individual
2. Group
3. Institution
Type • At‘Type’,enterthecodeforthebestdescriptionofwhotheactorsareaffiliated
with,oractingonbehalfof:
1. Individual,groupofindividualswithnoclearaffiliation
2. Group(warga,massa)withnoclearaffiliation
3. Militias(ethnic,religious,martialarts)
4. IDPs
5. Government – elected or bureaucracy (civil servant or government body, e.g.
courts,DepartmentofHeath)
6. Foreignaidorganization/NGO(includingemployees)
7. IndonesianNGO(includingemployees)
8. Privatecompany,contractor,shop
9. Politicalparty
10. Ormas–secularsocietalgroupsuchasyouthorganization,PP
11. Religious leader or group (Church, Islamic group, santri group,NU, JI). Includes
preman‐likegroupswhichclaimtobereligiousgroupssuchasFPI.
12. TNI(Indonesianarmedforces)
13. Brimob(Policespecialforces)
14. Police
15. Separatistgroup(GAMbeforeMoU,RMS,OPM)
16. Tradeunion/workersgroup(formalorinformal)
17. Electoralinstitution(iePanwas,KPUD,KPU)
18. Students
88AUNCLEAR
99AOTHER(Explain)
50
Total • Enter the total number of actors involved for every actor. Follow the following
guidelines:
o IFrangesarementioned,estimatenumbersusingthefollowingrules:
Beberapa‐2
Belasan‐11
Puluhan‐20
Ratusan‐100
Ribuan‐1000
Range(e.g2‐4)‐lowernumber.
o IF multiple sources report different totals, use the LOWEST estimate
(UNLESSthelowestiszero).
o IF revised numbers are published by newer sources, use the revised
numbers.
? • IFyouhaveestimatedatotalfromarange,ORifthedifferencebetweentotals
reportedbymultiplesourcesismorethan5,tickthe?boxnexttothatTotal.
Women? • Tickthisboxifwomenwereprominentinthissetofactors.
Cleavage? • Tickthisboxifyoufeeltheremaybeacleavageassociatedwiththisconflict.(See
definitionofcleavages).
Ifyoutickthisbox,thenentercodesforGenericandLocalCleavages.
Genericcleavage • Thereisspaceformaximum2genericcleavages.Ifyoudetectmorethan2,write
thisintheCodingIssuessection.
• Enterthecodeforthegenericcleavageyouthinkispresentbetweenthetwosides
ofactors:
1. Ethnic
2. Inter‐Religious (Choose between several options,MuslimChristian,Muslim
Hindu,HinduChristianandOther).
3. Intra‐Religious
4. Migrant‐Local
5. Separatist
99AOTHER(Explain)
Localcleavage • Eachregionmaydevelopasetoflocallyrelevantcleavagecodes.Thesemightbe
furtherspecificationofthegenericcodes(i.e.whichethnicitiesareinconflict,or
whichgeographicregions),ortheymaybedifferentcleavagestothoseinthe
genericlist(inwhichcase‘other’wouldbeselectedasthegenericcleavage).
Localcleavagecodeswillvaryfromregiontoregion.Listoflocalcleavagesfrom
yourprovinceareattachedattheendofyourcodingkey.
Intervention • If some parties came to the scene of the conflict and attempted to stop the
eventsinthisincident,thisinterventionmustbenoted.
• Thereisspaceforenteringupto3interventions.Ifyoudetectmorethan3,write
thisintheCodingIssuessection.
Foreachintervention,youmustidentify,theintervener,theresultofthe
intervention,theconflictform(1or2)inwhichtheinterventionhappenedandifthe
intervenerswerealsotheactors.
Intervener • Foreveryinterventionenterthecodefortheintervenersfromthefollowinglist:
1. Individual,groupofindividualswithnoclearaffiliation
2. Group(warga,massa)withnoclearaffiliation
3. Militias(ethnic,religious,martialarts)
4. IDPs
51
5. Government ‐ official, formal or informal (includes Village Heads, Camat,
memberofparliament)
6. Government – bureaucracy (civil servant or government body, e.g. courts,
DepartmentofHeath)
7. Foreignaidorganization/NGO(includingemployees)
8. IndonesianNGO(includingemployees)
9. Privatecompany,contractor,shop
10. Politicalparty
11. Individualpoliticalfigure
12. Supportersofpoliticalcandidate(s)orindividualpoliticalleader.
13. Ormas–secularsocietalgroupsuchasyouthorganization,PP
14. Religious leader or group (Church, Islamic group, santri group, NU, JI).
Includespreman‐likegroupswhichclaimtobereligiousgroupssuchasFPI.
15. TNI(Indonesianarmedforces)
16. Brimob(Policespecialforces)
17. Police
18. Separatistgroup(GAMbeforeMoU,RMS,OPM)
19. Tradeunion/workersgroup
20. Electoralinstitution(iePanwas,KPUD,KPU)
21. Students
77ANONE
88AUNCLEAR
99AOTHER(Explain)
Result • Foreveryintervention,enterthecodefortheresultoftheattemptedintervention:
1. Werecontactedbutdidnotcome
2. Werecontactedbutcamelate
3. Cametothescenebutdidnotintervene
4. Cametothescene,triedtointervenebutwereunsuccessful
5. Came,intervenedsuccessfullytostoptheviolence,madenoarrests
6. Came,intervenedsuccessfullyandarrestedpartiestotheconflict
7. Cameandtookintocustodythevictimofviolence
8. Cameandaggravatedtheviolence
88AUNCLEAR
99AOTHER(Explain)
Conflictform1
or2?
• If twoconflict formswerepresent in this incident,enter thenumberofconflict
forminwhichthisinterventiontookplace.(1or2?)
Intervener
affiliatedwith
anactor?
• Tickthisbox iftheaffiliationofthe intervener isthesameasoneoftheactors.
(e.g., if theconflict isbetweenFPIandAhmediyyaandthereligious leaderwho
triestointerveneisalsoamemberoftheAhmediyyabutwasnotpresentatthe
scenebefore).
Violentimpacts • Beforewritinganynumbersintheimpactsboxes,readallsourcesthatreportthis
incident and all follow‐up articles (attached) to ensure there isn’t any more
specificinformation.
• InViolentImpacts,youshouldwriteinformationaboutbothhumanandbuilding
impacts.
Totals(Deaths,
Injuries,
Kidnappings,
SexualAssaults
andBuilding
Impacts)
• For every type of impact, enter the total number following the following
guidelines:
o IfitisclearthattherewereNOimpacts,write77A(NONE)inthosefields.
o IFno impactsarementioned inanyof thesourcesbutyouthink there
mayhavebeensomewrite88A(UNCLEAR)inthosefields.
52
o IF impacts are mentioned in ranges estimate numbers using the
followingrules:
Beberapa‐2
Belasan‐11
Puluhan‐20
Ratusan‐100
Ribuan‐1000
Range(e.g.,2‐4)‐lowernumber.
o IF multiple sources report different totals, use the LOWEST estimate
(UNLESSthelowestiszero).
o IFrevisednumbersarepublishedbynewersources,usethemostrecent
numbers.
? • IFyouhaveestimatedatotal fromarange,OR if thedifferencebetweentotals
reportedbymultiplesourcesismorethan5,tickthe(?)boxnexttotheTotalof
thatimpact.
FemaleVictims • If it is not clear how many victims were male or female write 88A in
correspondingfields.
• Ifyouknowforafactthattherewerenomale/femalevictims,write77Ainthose
fields.
• Ifyouknowthebreakdownofthemale‐femaleimpacts,enterthemhere.
• Ifyouestimatedthebreakdownfromarangeorifthedifferenceinbreakdowns
reportedbymultiplesourceswasmorethan5, tickthe?boxnexttothemale‐
femalebreakdown.
Breakdown
(damaged‐
destroyed
buildings)
• If it is not clear howmany buildingswere damaged or destroyedwrite 88A in
correspondingfields.
• Ifyouknowforafactthattherewerenodamagedbuildings(onlydestroyed)or
that there were no destroyed buildings (only damaged) , write 77A in those
fields.
• If you know the breakdown of the damaged‐destroyed buildings, enter them
here.
• Ifyouestimatedthebreakdownfromarangeorifthedifferenceinbreakdowns
reportedbymultiplesourceswasmorethan5, tickthe?boxnexttothemale‐
femalebreakdown.
BuildingType • Tickallthebuildingstypesthathavebeendamagedordestroyedinthisincident.
OtherImpacts • Usethisspacetodescribeanyotherviolentimpactsthatyoucouldnotrecordin
theotherfields(e.gburningofcarsetc)
Weapons • Thereisspaceforuptotwoweapons.Ifyoufoundthatmorethantwoweapons
wereused,writethisintheCodingIssuessection.
• Enterthecodeofweaponsusedfromthefollowinglist:
1. Club/rock
2. Knife/Spear/othersharp,cuttingweapon
3. SmallFirearm.
4. LargeFirearm.
5. Firearm(butsizenotclear)
6. Molotov/grenade/bomb
7. Homemadeweapon.
8. Fire
77ANONE
88AUNCLEAR
99AOTHER(Explain)
53
SECTION3
Conflict
incident?
• TickthisboxiftheincidentisConflict(violentORnon‐violent)
Conflicttypes • ForeveryincidentclassifiedasconflictyouwillenterminimumoneConflictType
andmaximumtwo.
• If you thinkmore than two conflict types are present,write this in the Coding
Issuessection.
• To assign a Conflict Type, enter the number of the Type and the letter of the
correspondingConflictsub‐type(e.g.aResourceIssueovercommonLandwillbe
codedas‘1A’,ResourceissueoverprivateNaturalResourceswillbecoded‘1D’
• Ifasubtypeisnotlistedinourcodes,choosethe‘OTHER’sub‐typeandexplainit
inthespaceprovided.(Writecode199A,299A…etc)
• IftheConflictTypedoesnotfitinanyofourtypes,enter99A.
• IftheConflictTypeisentirelyunclear,Enter88A.
1.Resourceissues:ownership,access,anduse
A) Land(common):ownedcommunallyordesignatedpublicusebythestateor
ownedbyindividuals/families,privatecompaniesorthestate.
B) Naturalresources.
C) Man‐maderesources.
D) Markets,routes,customers,etc.
E) Accesstojobs,markets,routesandservices.
F) CommodityPrices
G) Pollution,environmentaldamage,noise
99A)Other(explain)
2.Administrativeissues
A) Tenderrelatedissues.
B) Corruptionormisuseofgovernmentfundsnotrelatedwithtenderissues.
C) Public services (quality of a public service, e.g. a education, healthcare
utilities, this includes services provided by government and private
institutions)
D) Other program implementation issues for government funds, including
funding priorities and complaints about implementation or unaddressed
needs,includingsubsidies.
E) Corruption or misuse of funds for non‐government aid and development
programs
F) Non‐government aid or development projects that are not related to
corruptionoffunds.
G) Labor‐related(industrialaction,complaintsoverpay,conditions)
H) Splittingofregions(pemekaranwilayah)orgeographicborder
I) Arrestorotherlawenforcementissueorlegalprocedure.
99A)Other(explain)
3.Politicalissuesandcontestsoverposition,influenceandpower
A) Government position a national level (e.g. National elections, calls for
resignationofnationalMPs,PresidentorVicePresident)
B) Government position at provincial level (e.g. Provincial elections, calls for
resignationofelectedofficials)
C) Governmentpositionatdistrictlevel(Pilkadaandlegislativeelectionsetc)
D) Government position at sub‐district level (e.g. dispute over Camat
appointment)
E) Governmentpositionatvillagelevel(e.g.Pilkades,BPDelections)
F) Position/influence/powerwithinapoliticalparty
G) Position/influence/power of appointed government workers outside A‐E
54
above,includingcivil‐serviceandbureaucraticappointments
H) Struggleforindependence/separationfromNKRI,orspecialautonomywhich
govern the province’s relationship with the central government (eg
Aceh/Papua).
I) Internationalissue.
99A)Other(explain)
4.Identityissues
A) Ethnic issues (eg disputes over cultural attributes of migrants, name of
district,monumentetc)
B) Religious issues (ie attacks on Church for holding service or on gambling
parlour,JIattacksieBalibomb)
C) Intra‐religious(egattacksonAhmadiyah,enforcementofshariah)
D) Migration‐related
E) Migration and Ethnicity‐related (use if the issue involves BOTH Migration
ANDEthnicity)
F) Geographic(ieinter‐villagefight)
G) Genderrelated
99A)Other(explain)
5.MoralIssues
A) Humiliation/lossofface/offense
B) Accident
C) Debt
D) Theft
E) Damagetoproperty
F) Sexualindiscretion
G) Murder/Assault
H) Gambling/Alcohol/Narcotics
I) Witchcraft
99A)Other(explain)
Conflictforms • Forevery incident classifiedas conflict, enterminimumoneandmaximumtwo
conflictforms.
• Ifyouthinkmorethantwoconflictformswerepresentinthisincidentthanwrite
thisintheCodingIssuessection.
• Enterthecodefortheconflictformspresentfromthefollowinglist:
Non‐violent
1. Demonstration
2. FormalDelegation(delegasi)
3. Formal complaint or protest (formally aired through media, or by submitting
complainttorelevantauthority)
4. Dispute(squabblebetweenparties)
5. (non‐violent)Threat
6. Blockade
7. Strike(stopwork)
8. Courtcase(grouptakesachallengetocourt)
Violent
9. Riot:Groupattackinganddamagingproperty
10. Riot:Group(over10,massa)attackingpeople
11. Groupclash(over10oruseofIndonesianterms–kelompok,massa)
12. Fight(smallgroupsorindividuals–beberapaorang)
13. SmallerGroupAttack(manyagainstoneortwoieVigilantism,beatingofpolitical
55
opponents)
14. Terror‐style attacks, where an individual or small group attacks people or
buildings (i.e.attackswhichare intendedtocausefear,suchasabombthrown
intoacrowd,ortheAcehgrenadeattacks)
15. Vandalism,arson
16. Assault/sexualassault(one‐sided)
17. Sweeping/Forcibleentry
18. Kidnapping
88AUNCLEAR
99AOTHER(Explain)
Violence? • TickthisboxifyourecordedviolentimpactsforthisconflictincidentAND/ORyou
choseatleastoneviolentConflictForm
Organizationin
riots?
• In case of Riots (Conflict Form 9 or 10) tick this box if there was any sign of
organization, such as coordination, funding, leadingby any individuals and / or
organizations.
• Enterthecodeofactorresponsiblefororganizingtheriotfromthefollowinglist:
1. Individual,groupofindividualswithnoclearaffiliation
2. Group(warga,massa)withnoclearaffiliation
3. Militias(ethnic,religious,martialarts)
4. IDPs
5. Government ‐ official, formal or informal (includes Village Heads, camat,
memberofparliament)
6. Government – bureaucracy (civil servant or government body, e.g. courts,
DepartmentofHeath)
7. Foreignaidorganization/NGO(includingemployees)
8. IndonesianNGO(includingemployees)
9. Privatecompany,contractor,shop
10. Politicalparty
11. Individualpoliticalfigure
12. Supportersofpoliticalcandidate(s)orindividualpoliticalleader.
13. Ormas–secularsocietalgroupsuchasyouthorganization,PP
14. Religious leader or group (Church, Islamic group, santri group, NU, JI).
Includespreman‐likegroupswhichclaimtobereligiousgroupssuchasFPI.
15. TNI(Indonesianarmedforces)
16. Brimob(Policespecialforces)
17. Police
18. Separatistgroup(GAMbeforeMoU,RMS,OPM)
19. Tradeunion/workersgroup
20. Electoralinstitution(iePanwas,KPUD,KPU)
21. Students
88AUNCLEAR
99AOTHER
• Specify which form of organization occurred in the notes section. In field
provided,indicatethetypeofactorinvolvedinorganizingtheincident.
Election
conflicts?
• Ticktheboxprovidediftheconflictconcernedanelection.Tospecifythelevelof
election,choosetheappropriateConflictType3.
Relatedto
crime?
• Tickthisboxiftheconflictincidentyouarecodingisrelatedtoacrime
committedpreviously.
Individualissue? • Tickthisboxiftheincidentwasapurelyindividualdisputeandnotconcerninga
groupissue.Tickthisboxif“thedisputeconcernsthe‘status,powerand
56
resources’ofacentralindividualactororsmallnumberofindividualsandnot
thoseofthewidercommunity”.
Changefrom
individualto
groupissue?
• Tickthisboxiftheissuechangedfromindividualtoagroupissuewithinthesame
incident.
Relatedtoother
conflict?
• Tickthisboxiftheconflictisrelatedtoanotherconflictinthesameprovince.
ConflictID • TOBECOMPLETEDBYTHECODINGTEAMLEADERafterthetemplatehasbeen
coded.
SECTION4
Purecrime? • TickthisboxiftheincidentisaPureCrime(makesureyouhaven’tenteredany
informationinSection3)
Crimeform • For every incident classified as pure crime, enterminimum one andmaximum
twocrimeforms.
• If you think more than two crime forms are present, write this in the Coding
Issuessection.
• Enterthecodeforthecrimeformfromthefollowinglist:
1. Murder/Manslaughter
2. Assault
3. Rape,SexualAssault
4. Robbery
5. Deprivationofliberty(iekidnapping)
6. Domesticviolence
88AUNCLEAR
99AOTHER
SECTION5
Incident
summary
Write a brief summary, 2‐3 sentences, so that the reviewer can understand what
happened without needing to look at the article. Try not to repeat too much
informationwhichisalreadycodedonthetemplatebutdothefollowing:
• Identifyspecificactors
• Distinguishbetweensides
• Explainsequenceofevents
• Otherimportantdetails
Codingissues • Noteanyproblemsyouhadchoosingappropriatecodes,orcodingissueswhich
arose,sothattheycanbereviewed.
IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers
No. Title Authors(s) Date
1 TheDynamicsofDistrictGovernance:Forums,BudgetProcessesand
Transparency
LuthfiAshari May04
DynamikaPemerintahanKabupaten:Forum,PerencanaanAnggaran
danTransparenci
2 ViolenceandConflictResolutioninNon‐ConflictRegions:TheCaseof
Lampung,Indonesia
PatrickBarron
DavidMadden
Aug04
3 MobilizingforViolence:TheEscalationandLimitationofIdentity
Conflicts
YuhkiTajima Aug04
4 MoreThanJustOwnership:TenLandandNaturalResourceConflict
CaseStudiesfromEastJavaandFlores
SamuelClark(ed.) Dec04
BukanSekedarPersoalanKepemilikan:SepuluhStudiKasusKonflik
TanahdanSunberDayaAlamdariJawaTimurdanFlores
5 Crisis,SocialTies,andHouseholdWelfare:TestingSocialCapital
TheorywithEvidenceFromIndonesia
AnnaWetterberg Apr05
6 VillageCorruptioninIndonesia:FightingCorruptioninIndonesia's
KecamatanDevelopmentProgram
AndreaWoodhouse Apr05
7 CountingConflicts:UsingNewspaperReportstoUnderstandViolence
inIndonesia
PatrickBarron
JoanneSharpe
May05
8 Aceh:ReconstructioninaConflictEnvironment AdamBurke
Afnan
Oct05
9 MediaMapping:UnderstandingCommunicationsEnvironmentsin
Aceh
JoanneSharpe
ImogenWall
Apr07
10 ConflictandCommunityDevelopmentinIndonesia:Assessingthe
ImpactoftheKecamatanDevelopmentProgram
PatrickBarron
RachaelDiprose
MichaelWoolcock
Jul06
11 PeacefulPilkada,DubiousDemocracy:UnderstandingAceh’sPost‐
ConflictElections
SamuelClark
BlairPalmer
Aug08
12 Community‐BasedReintegrationinAceh:AssessingtheImpactsof
BRA‐KDP
PatrickBarron
MacartanHumphreys
LauraPaler
JeremyWeinstein
Dec09
13 DeliveringAssistancetoConflict‐AffectedCommunities:TheBRA‐KDP
PrograminAceh
AdrianMorel
MakikoWatanabe
RobWrobel
Dec09
14 DDRandLocalizedViolentConflict:EvaluatingCombatant
ReintegrationProgramsinPoso,Indonesia
DaveMcRae Dec09
15 UnderstandingViolentConflictinIndonesia:AMixedMethods
Approach
PatrickBarron
SanaJaffrey
BlairPalmer
AshutoshVarshney
Dec09
Papersareavailableon‐lineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org
57