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PROTECTIVE
COUNTERMEASURES
VIPPSC 10-13
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TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE
Although the goals of surveillance remainconstant, the means by which surveillance isconducted differ depending on who is interested
in you or your protectee. The terrorist organization is interested in daily
routine.
Establishing an individuals schedule can provide
terrorists with valuable information, such as thetime the target leaves for work, what route istaken and the kind of vehicle driven.
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The Terrorist always needs to be one
step ahead of security If the agent has an armored vehicle the terrorist should
have an armor-defeating weapon, such as a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) or a light, anti-tank weapon(LAW).
The terrorist surveillance group looks for predictablepatterns which determine a logical place to stage an attack.
The terrorist understands choke points.
The protective detail is presented with greater challengesnear the protecteesresidence and work place since thepotential attacker knows that the target must be at eitherone of these two locations at some point during the day.
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To confuse surveillance team, change:
Routes;
Times of departure and arrival
Vehicles (stealth or dummy convoy);
Number of vehicles in convoy; and
Configuration of convoy.
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All protective detail must vary as much inaccurateinformation as possible, while continuing toprovide comprehensive surveillance/counter-surveillance.
All surveillance/counter-surveillance should be
immediately reported to the detail leader todetermine its threat level.
Terrorists usually employ newer members to
conduct initial surveillance as part of their testmission.
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These individuals often are not trained in
surveillance tactics and, as a result, are easilydetected.
Also, if one of these new operatives arecaptured by police they will have little, if any,
information about the inner cells of the
terrorist structure.
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PRO-ACTIVE VS REACTIVE SECURITY
MEASURES
Certainly marksmanship proficiency andspecialized driving skills are necessary, however, ifan attack gets to where one needs to use these
skills, when a series of opportunities were missedin predicting and thus preventing the attack fromoccurring it means you already failed to protectyour protectee.
Pro-active measures uncover an attack plan whilein its preparation stage.
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These measures include detecting
surveillance, piecing together intelligence
reports and identifying pre-incident indicators.
Pre-incident occurences may be unrelated but
sometimes, when examined together, they
provide clues that terrorist activity is in the
works.
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Types of Pre-incident indicators
An increase in criminal activity, i.e., car thefts,passport fraud, stolen weapons.
Uniforms from public utility companies, militaryfacilities and police departments are reportedmissing.
There is new construction along the protecteesprimary route.
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What indicators would differentiate between
suspected and actual surveillance?
Correlated movement
Inappropriate or crude disguises.
Communications equipment
Physical gestures which coordinate with the
protecteesmovement.
Note taking.
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If surveillance is verified, do not apprehend thesurveillant.
Rather, keep in mind that initial surveillance isconducted by newer terrorist members. If theymake mistakes, the detail/intelligence units canprobably identify and neutralize them.
Employ counter-surveillance methods to uncoverinformation or a safe house which may lead tothe core of the organization.
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One method is an inconspicuous tail or sweepcar/motorcycle.
The terrorists surveillance vehicle will trail the
convoy, taking an inappropriate interest in thedetail.
The sweep car will be effective in this manner
because the terrorists attention will be focused onthe detail in front of him and they will not beaware of whats behind them.
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TYPES OF SURVEILLANCE
Fixed surveillance
The surveillant remains in the same position over time toobserve the activities of a particular subject or location.
Examples:
(1) phone booths,
(2) bus stops,
(3) garages,
(4) parked vehicles,
(5) rented apartments,
(6) vendors, only limited to the terrorist imagination.
They attempt to blend in with the dress, mannerisms, andtime schedules of the local populace.
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Moving/Mobile Surveillance
The subject is followed on foot or by vehicle. The terrorist may use any number of surveillants
and various types of vehicles in doing this.
Technical Surveillance
Equipment used to record conversations in rooms,
automobiles, or from telephones.
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Combination Surveillance
Any combination of fixed, moving, or technicalsurveillance.
Progressive Surveillance Time intensive, involving surveilling a subject
along a route, in successive segments, over an
extended period of time.
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COMMON TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE
MISTAKES
Vehicles parked in prohibited zones.
Vehicles parked in the same spot for an extendedtime, with possible surveillants sitting in the frontseat.
Vehicles that stop or start as the protectee ordetail moves, especially motorcycles.
Vehicles that pass the target and park.
Vehicle that goes through an intersection slowly,rounds a corner slowly or pokes its nose arounda corner and then withdraws.
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Vehicles moving on parallel streets at roughly
the same speed as the protectee.
Vehicles apparently hiding behind traffic,
pulling out as if to pass, then dropping back.
Vehicles passing in a traffic circle until thedetail has taken an exit.
Vehicles stopping nearby when the protectee
or detail stops.
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Persons dismounting vehicles when the
protectee or detail stops. Persons turning away when observed by the
protective detail or SD team.
Persons hesitating or looking around whenentering a building that the protectee has just
entered.
Persons leaving or entering a store, restaurant,etc, immediately before or after the protectee.
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Persons who begin to move as the protecteeor detail does, or stop as they do.
Persons standing on the street or in lobbies,
reading newspapers or magazines. Broken down vehicles.
Sloppy suveillant shift changes near the
residence. One vehicle arriving, anotherdeparting. Possible communication betweendrivers.
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Any vehicle with an altered or obliterated
license plate in or near a choke point.
Work crews in or near chokepoints. Check
vehicles, equipment, and clothing, especially
the footwear. Inquire with appropriate agency
to verify the legitimacy of the work order.
Persons inappropriately dressed for the area
or season.
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ROUTE SURVEY
A route survey is simply an area street mapindicating where the detail and protectee willbe travelling.
It is the responsibility of the protective detail(both the protective drivers and advance
detail) to plot out the routes that will be takenor could be used to get from point A to pointB.
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The ideal route will have minimal choke points
and many strong points.
Remember, it is likely the attack will occur in
or around the area where surveillance is
taking place.
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SURVEILLANCE DETECTION ROUTE
(SDR or pag-pag)
One method of detecting or confirming
surveillance is through the use of a
surveillance detection route (SDR). The SDR
forces correlation between the surveillanceand the targeted individual.
The SDR uses a logical detour in which the
target doubles back on their route.
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This natural reverse should allow the target
to observe anyone following them into and
out of the SDR.
It would be very likely that anyone would
make the same combination of turns.
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OBSERVATION
Observation is the complete awareness by an
individual of his surroundings achieved
through maximum employment of the senses.
Expert observation enables on to recognize
and recall any object or situation accurately
and completely.
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When Observing vehicles, the following
sequence should be followed:
First its plate number, general type, size, condition
and color
any distinguishing characteristics
Its make, model and year.
Identifying information on name plates and bodyparts. i.e. commemorative plate.
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When observing People, notice their:
Sex
Race(i.e.): Caucasian, American Indian. Black,
Mongolian, or Malayan. Other terms, such asmestizo or Hispanic, may be more descriptive of
the local populace and should be learned.
Color of Skin. Height
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Unaware of the surroundings
An attack on an individual in condition white will probably be successful.
General awareness of surroundings.
You perceive events and changing in condition yellow 24 hours a day.
Heightened state of awareness.
A person can only stay in this condition for about 3 to 4 hours.
State of Action - FIGHT or FLIGHT
DURING this state a person will exhibit the symptoms of physical reaction tohigh stress.
A person in this state is so overwhelmed by the situation they are shocked intoan inability to react.
An attack on a person in this state will probably be successful.
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Unaware of the surroundings
An attack on an individual in condition white will probably be successful.
General awareness of surroundings.
You perceive events and changing in condition yellow 24 hours a day.
Heightened state of awareness.
A person can only stay in this condition for about 3 to 4 hours.
State of Action - FIGHT or FLIGHT
DURING this state a person will exhibit the symptoms of physical reaction tohigh stress.
A person in this state is so overwhelmed by the situation they are shocked intoan inability to react.
An attack on a person in this state will probably be successful.
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TYPES OF ATTACK
Looking at the route, could the terrorists
succeed in kidnapping the protectee or
staging a bomb attack?
Is there an escape route, cover or
concealment for the terrorists?
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Weapons at close range - sub-machine gun,
small caliber weapons. EXAMPLE: assassination attempt on President
Reagan.
Stand-off attack - RAG rocket, hand grenade.
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Kidnapping / Selective violence.
Hostage must remain unharmed to be used as abargaining chip for the terrorists.
EXAMPLE: Hans Martin Schleyer kidnapping,Cologne, Germany 2977 by R.A.F.
Explosives / Random violence.
EXAMPLE: Secretary of State Schultz, bombing. La
Paz, Bolivia 1986.
Escape.
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SUMMARY
The protective detail is responsible for
familiarizing itself with all possible routes.
Strong points and escape routes should be
identified on a street map and visually verified.
Establish what is normal in an area to be able to
identify suspicious activity.
Know what type of attack could be used againstyour Protectee in the area you will be working.