Transcript
Page 1: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Segment Identification Inspections

What did OPS Learn?

Page 2: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Presentation Topics

• Review Segment Identification Inspection Approach

• Summarize Inspection Results

° Segment Identification

° IM Program and Baseline Assessment Plan Development

• Communicate OPS Conclusions

Page 3: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

IM Inspection Approach Overview

• Initial Segment Identification and Completeness Check

• Comprehensive Baseline Assessment Plan and IM Framework Review

• On-going Program Implementation Inspections

Page 4: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Segment Identification and Completeness Check: Objectives

• Confirm Segments Affecting HCAs have been Identified (Required by 12/31/01)

• Assure Baseline Assessment Plans and IM Frameworks have Essential Elements

• Identify Potential Noteworthy Practices

• Support Prioritization of Comprehensive Inspections

Page 5: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Segment Identification Inspection Approach

• Inspect all Large Operators in 3 months

• Inspection Duration - Approximately 1-2 Days

• Multiple, Multi-Region Teams

• OPS Inspectors Only

° Texas RRC Inspectors Observed Several Texas Operator Inspections

• Periodic Process Checks to Assure Consistency

Page 6: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Major Components of Segment Identification Inspection

• Review Operator Approach and Technical Justification for Identifying Segments

• Review Small Sample of Analyses to Determine Segment Boundaries

• Compare Location of Operator Segments to HCAs from NPMS

• Perform Completeness Check on Baseline Assessment Plan and IM Framework

Page 7: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Accomplishments

• 40 Hazardous Liquid Operators

• Operating ~ 159,000 miles of pipe

• Summary Reports Prepared and (after approval) Provided to Operator to Document Inspector Feedback

• Created and Implemented a Web-based Information System for Inspection Records

Page 8: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Segment Identification Results

• Percentage of Operator Mileage Identified that “Could Affect” HCAs = 39%

• Median = 44%

• Maximum = 100%

• Minimum = 0%

Page 9: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

“Could Affect” Mileage

3 3

65

9

6

34

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0-10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 100%

Total "Could Affect" Mileage as a Percentage of Total

Num

ber

of O

pera

tors

Page 10: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Segment Identification:Effect of Operator Size

"Could Affect" Mileage by Operator Total Mileage

40%51% 46% 40% 35%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

< 500 500-1000 1000 - 5000 5000-10,000 > 10,000

Total Operator Mileage

Perc

ent "

Coul

d Af

fect

"

Page 11: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Common Segment Identification Problems

• Inadequately Justified “Buffer Zones”° Topography not Considered° Stream/Waterway Transport to

HCAs not Considered• No Consideration of HVL Vapor

Properties• No Consideration of HVL Impacts

on USAs• No Segment Identification for

Subsidiaries or Joint venture Pipelines

Page 12: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Common Segment Identification Problems

• No Segment Identification for Idle Lines

• No Identification of Segments affecting USAs in States without USA Maps on NPMS (as of 12/31/01)° 50% of Operators faced this problem

° Issue is likely to be corrected as most all state maps are now complete.

Page 13: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Segment Identification Enforcement

• OPS Demonstrated Commitment to Enforcement of the Integrity Management Rule

Operators 40

Operators with no compliance action

8

Operators receiving NOAs

31

Operators receiving NOPVs and CP

9

Operators receiving WL

1

Page 14: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Integrity Management Program Observations

• Most operators Understand Rule Programmatic Requirements

• Formalization of Program Needs Work

° Implementing procedures and guidance

° Assigned responsibilities

° Documentation requirements

• Many operators Plan more Technically Robust Segment Identification Determinations

Page 15: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Baseline Assessment Plan Observations

• Integrity Assessment Plans Progressing Well

• Operators Strongly Prefer In-line Inspection over Pressure Testing

• Operators Pigging Far More Miles than Affects HCAs.

° Many are applying HCA repair criteria system-wide (though not with rule’s time constraints)

Page 16: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Baseline Assessment Plan Observations

• Weaknesses Observed in Some Operator Plans:

° Basis for Segment Priorities not Readily Evident

° Assessment Method Selection Criteria not documented

Page 17: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

What’s Next

• Preparing for Comprehensive IM Inspections

° Protocols and Guidance

° Training for Federal and State Inspectors

• Industry Workshop – July 23 & 24

• Inspections Begin - August 2002

Page 18: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Segment Identification Inspection Conclusions

• Operators have a Significantly Improved Understanding of Where HCAs are and Where Their Pipelines can Impact These Areas

• Significant Portion of Liquid Pipelines can Impact HCAs (39%), and Even More Mileage will be Assessed as a Result of this Rule

• Most Operators Understand the Importance of Developing an Integrity Management Program, but Fully Mature Programs will Take Time to Develop

Page 19: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Segment Identification Inspection Conclusions

• OPS Successfully Determined Operator Compliance with Segment Identification Requirement° Inspections began immediately after

12/31/01 deadline and were completed in 3 months

• OPS Successfully Implemented a Programmatic Approach to Inspect for Operator Compliance (versus a yes/no checklist)° Measures to achieve consistency were

effective• Operator Interactions were Generally

Cooperative with Open Communication ° OPS provided operators with significant

and well-received feedback on areas for improvement

Page 20: Segment Identification Inspections What did OPS Learn?

Office of Office of Pipeline Pipeline SafetySafety

Segment Identification Inspection Conclusions

• Vigorous Enforcement is Being Pursued

° While most operators appear headed toward sound program development, there are some areas that need to be improved.

° NOAs are being used to communicate areas where improvement is needed. These do not necessarily represent a deterioration in the operator’s IM program as a whole.

° Operators not taking IM requirements seriously face NOPV/Compliance Orders and Civil Penalties


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