PPP Conference 2003
PPP Practices & Research in China中国的 PPP实践与研究
Prof. Dr. ShouQing WANG (王守清 )Dept of Constr Mgmt, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
北京清华大学土木水利学院建设管理系
Westleigh Conference Centre, Preston, UKMarch 18-20, 2003
Outline
• My brief bio and affiliation
• Economic growth and infrastructure development
in China
• PPP practices in China and challenges faced
• PPP research in China
• My recent research on “Equitable Risk Allocation
for PPP Projects in China”
My Brief Bio and Affiliation
• Brief Bio– Prof, Dept of Constr Mgmt, School of Civil Eng’g, Tsinghua University– Research mainly on PPP since 1996 and published 40+ English
journal papers on PPP and 100+ Chinese journal papers on PPP– Lectured off-campus 1000+ times on PPP in China– Chairman, National Network of 161 Universities offering M.Eng.(PM)
• Affiliation– Tsinghua University: Top 1 in China (cradle of engineers & national
leaders – Presidents Hu J.T. & Xi J.P., Premier Zhu R.J. etc)– School of Civil Eng’g: 1 of the 4 oldest majors in Tsinghua– Dept of Constr Mgmt: Top 1 in China (research funds, publications,
students quality, int’l programs/activities, etc)• Tsinghua Summer School for Int’l Constr (since 2007)• Innovation Competition on Constr Eng’g & Mgmt (since 2007)• GloNIC (Global Network for Int’l Constr) (since 2009)• FT English M.Eng. Program on Int’l Constr & Proj Mgmt (since 2012)
Tsinghua Summer School for International Construction
Tsinghua Summer School for International Construction
Tsinghua Summer School for International Construction
Construction Engineering and Management
Innovation Competition
Construction Engineering and Management Innovation Competition
Global Network for International Construction
Yu Kuan Chair Professors Group
Roger Flanagan (UK) George Ofori (S’pore)
Geoffrey Q.P. Shen (HK) Markarand Hastak (US) Chimay Anumba (US)
M.Eng. in Int’l Constr & Proj Mgmt
China: the Biggest Construction Site
• Land area: 9,600,000 km2 • Population: 1,370,536,875 (6th census in 2010)• Administration: 23 provinces, 5 autonomous
regions, 4 municipalities, 14 special cities (under central & local), and 646 cities (under provincial government)
• Social system: socialist ideology, socialist politics and socialist economy
• Economy: public (state/collective) + private (local/foreign); planned socialist market
• Economy growth: ≈10% in last 3 decades
Private Investments in Infrastructure in China1990-2011 (2 booms around 1997 & 2007)
Source: World Bank and PPIAF Project Database (http://ppi.worldbank.org), adjusted by CPI
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Year
New
Pro
ject
s
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
US
$ B
illio
ns
New Projects Investment
3rd boom?
Development of PPP in China
• PPP projects have been developing and applying fast since late 1980s in China
• Milestone projects: – Shajiao B Power Plant (6/1984) – BOT– Laibin B Power Plant (9/1997) – BOT– Chengdu #6 Water Plant (8/1999) – BOT– National Stadium & Sub-Railways Line 4 etc for 2008
Olympic Games (2003~2008) – PPP
• Since 2000, BT dominated – will no sustainable– Officials’ short term objective – public finance relies heavy
on land-selling (resulted/ing from/in sharp escalation of housing price), and then local financing platform
– Private’s low confidence in local government’s credit
Challenges of PPP in China• No national PPP law/guidelines nor national PPP unit – vary
by region and/or sector and even government official– No sound cost auditing, tariff regulation, & definition of scope of
responsibility & remit of relevant regulatory agencies– No “one-stop” approval system – the approvals are time-consuming and
complicated, e.g. related to SC, SDRC, MoC, MoF, MoCom, SAIC, SAFE, SBLR, SAT, MHRSS at central and/or local levels
• No real PPP – dominate players are state-owned/holding contractors/bank (fake “Private”) – efficiency gains?– Hard to achieve limited recourse due to monopoly banking system
• Strong government vs weak “private” & community – good or bad?
– No community involvement in decision-making & no info transparent– To have asset for economics/Q of life or to have efficiency?
• For academic, hard to get data to conduct quantitative research
Key Differences in PPP from Western
e.g. Australia:• Public-Private Partnership• National PPP guidelines
• National PPP unit• Investment decision +
Procurement option– No more unsolicited
• Drivers: VfM with PSC evaluation
• Mainly social projects– School, health, court, water,
correction, road …
China:• Public-Public Partnership• No national but 20+ local
(province/city) guidelines• No national nor local unit• Investment decision but no
procurement option– Solicited + unsolicited
• Drivers: capital constrain w/o PSC evaluation
• Mainly economic projects– Road, power, water, waste,
urban-rural co-devp’t …
Key Differences in PPP from Western (con’t)
e.g. Australia:• Scale >$A50 million• Leading player: bank• Debt: bank & pension
fund• Concession period: no
regulated• Seldom upfront payment
by private• Bid cost: relative high
– Whole-life cost: low• Process: relative long• Demand risk by private
China:• Scale no regulated• Leading player: contractor• Debt: bank (no pension fund
before 2010)• Concession period: usually
regulated, eg road 30→25yrs• Frequent upfront payment
by private• Bid cost: relative low
– Whole-life cost: may high?• Process: short• Demand risk by public
1994 Local administrative measures on the concession of municipal public utilities in Huherhaote and Hainan1995 Circular Concerning the Issues of Absorbing Foreign Investment through BOT1995 Circular Concerning the Issues of the Approval and Administration of Experimental Foreign-invested Concession
Projects2000 Temporary Provisions of the Ministry of Construction on Utilizing Foreign Capital in Municipality Public Utilities2001 Several Opinions of the State Development and Reform Commission concerning the Promotion and Guidance of
Private Investment2001 Local administrative measures on the concession of municipal public utilities in Jilin and Dalian2002 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on the Relevant Issues concerning the Appropriate Handling of the
Existing Projects Guaranteeing the Fixed Return from Investments by Foreign Parties2002 Opinions of the Ministry of Construction on Accelerating the Marketization of Urban Utilities 2003 Local administrative measures on the concession of municipal public utilities in Beijing, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Hebei,
Chengdu, etc2004 Administrative Measures on the Concession of Municipal Public Utilities2004 Decision of the State Council on Reforming the Investment System2004 Sample Document for the Franchised Operation of Urban Water Supply, Gas Supply and Waste Disposal2004 Local administrative measures on the concession of municipal public utilities in Ji’nan, Guizhou, Shanxi, Xuzhou, etc2005 Several Opinions of the State Council on Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding the Development of Individual and
Private Economy and Other Non-Public Sectors of the Economy2005 Local administrative measures on the concession of municipal public utilities in Tianjin, Dongguan, Gansu, Qingdao,
Xinjiang, etc.2006 Sample Document for the Franchised Operation of Urban Heat Supply and Waste-water Disposal2006 Local administrative measures on the concession of municipal public utilities in Hu’nan, Shanxi, Hefei, Wuhan,
Shenzhen, Beijing, etc.2007 Local administrative measures on the concession of municipal public utilities in Shanghai (draft)2008 Research Reports of PPP Legislation in Infrastructure Development2010 Several Opinions of the State Council on Encouraging and Guiding the Healthy Development of Private Investment2012 Evaluation Guidelines for Concession Projects (under drafting), PPP Law (under feasibility studying)
China Central Government Documents on PPP
Case Study: The National Stadium
The Project’s Brief
• The 1st PPP Sport Project in China– The Project Company is responsible for the financing, building,
operation & maintenance of the Stadium for a concession period of 30 years after which transfers it to the BMG.
• Total Investment/Cost: 3.13 billion RMB≈0.44 b.US$– BMG (the Public) authorizes the BSAMC as a shareholder in the
Project Company undertaking 58% of the total investment
– CITIC Consortium (the Private) undertakes the remaining 42%
• Plot Area: 20.29 hectares (ha.)• Parking Capacity: >1000 cars
Pro
ject
Str
uctu
re
Government’s Supports & Incentives• BMG provides land at very low cost (1040 RMB/m2 for gross land
development - c.f. 10,000 RMB/m2 for other land nearby)• BMG contributes 1.8154 billion RMB, 58% of total investment
(3.13 billion RMB) but gets no dividend• BMG provides necessary infrastructure• During the Test Competitions/Events and the Olympic Games,
BOCOG to pay the amount = (actual operation fee – daily operation fee)
• BMG to pay all expense of the special equipment used for the opening and closing ceremonies
• During the concession period, BMG will not permit to develop new competitive stadium or to expand any existing competitive stadium in northern area of Beijing
• BMG issues new relevant Policies and Regulations …
Disputes Among the Project Company’s Shareholders
• Construction is divided into three parts to the CITIC, BUCGC and Golden State as per their % equities, resulting that the Project Company has no good control on construction.
• Unit price contract for construction signed due to the structural characteristics and not available detail design by then, the general contractor (BUCGC) considers more its own profit, progress and safety than the overall, leading to construction cost overrun.– e.g. BUCGC asking for “technical measure fee”
Disputes between the Project Company and the BMG
• Original no. of parking lots is 2000 but BMG later asks the Project Company (PC) to cut 1000 because BMG to construct a large parking area for the whole Olympic Park.
• BMG asks the PC to cut commercial area.• BMG cancels the retractable roof.
All above changes reduce the PC’s sources of revenue.• BMG sets tight deadlines (financial closing, construction
commencing & completion on Dec 15, Dec 24, 2003 and Dec 31, 2006 respectively) but changes design >>> actual financial closing delayed for 2 months and actual completion to delay 6 months.
Allowing not enough time for economic construction.
Disputes between the Project Company and the Designer
• BMG hasn’t got copyright of the Stadium’s design and therefore asked the Project Company to follow the designer.– This leads to the Project Company’s weak status when
negotiating with the Designer resulting the Stadium not good enough for commercial use.
• As the Stadium is for 2008 Olympic Games & also due to China’s system, BMG has played a more important role in deciding the blue print.– This constrains the Project Company in maximizing the
commercial and efficient use of the Stadium.
Impacts of Cancelling the Retractable Roof
• Pros:– Reduce the material (mainly steel) used– Reduce difficulty in the steel structure construction– Reduce safety risk in construction– Reduce the operation cost
• Cons:– Incur the Designer’s claim (40 million RMB, about 1/3 of
total design fee)– Delay construction schedule (0.5 year) and cause cost
overrun (technical measure fee to accelerate progress)– Affect the operation
• Reduce the revenue of holding large performance etc events• Reduce the Stadium’s brand value
Lessons Learnt: Key Risks
• Legal Risk: Lack of relevant laws on and enforceability of contractual claim to protect investors
• Political Risk: Government’s strong influence• Construction Risk: change in design/scope and complex
structure causes schedule delay and cost overrun (the latter also due to in-proper design or construction contract, escalating price of raw materials and underestimated cost of work).
• Market Risk: Small market for the Stadium and non-guaranteed revenue
• Operation Risk: Lack of experience in operating large sport facility technically and commercially
Lessons Learnt
• Project scope to be well defined (& better to D&B)• Project Company shareholder agreement and
design/construction contracts to be well formulated• All parties to have life cycle & common project objectives• Proper risk management is critical, especially:
– Align interests with the Public, e.g. share profits or bring other benefits to the Public and community.
– Rely on published policies/regulations/laws and written contracts rather than oral promises.
– Clear/strong contractual arrangements and enforcement– Maintain good relationship with the public sector– Sometimes re-negotiation with government is more efficient
than mediation/arbitration/lawsuit.
Lessons Learnt from other Projects
• Government’s supports & commitments are important
• But Government’s over or direct involvement in PPP projects would reduce efficiency
• Government better to oversight only:– Price and fees (tariff)
– Quality of service
– Adequacy of service
Key Political Risks in China’s PPP Projects
• Change of local government and her key officials• Change of government’s attitude on PPP• Government’s fiscal situation & capability to purchase
guaranteed output (especially of power/water/gas)• Government’s poor knowledge & high expectation• Government under pressures from society/public• Relationship (guanxi) between private & public sectors• Creditworthiness of local government & partners• Immature legal system (change of law)• Enforceability of law
PPP Research in China
• More & more in recent years eg funded by NSFC• No much difference from international top 7 research
interests in recent years (Ke, Wang & Chan, 2009)
– Equitable risk allocation
– Comparison between PPP and traditional procurement(Feasibility studies, Public auditing & accountability…)
– Value for Money, Public Sector Comparator
– Output specifications for PPP projects
– Improving relational contract for PPP projects
– Decision making for public sector
– Knowledge management
PPP Related Research – 4 dimensions
Decision-Maker
The Private
The Society
Decision Process
ProcureBuild
O&M
Decision Issue
The Public
……
Transfer
• Risk management related• Financing related eg equity structure, D/B ratio• Reasonable return/charge related• Project governance with unincomplete contracts• Early termination related• Transfer & post-transfer related• Legal & institutional framework related• ……
Other Stakeholders Some are common for all Sectors while others Sector-specific
Initiate
The relationship between them
• Research Contents– Related to Economics, Finance, Law & Engineering, e.g.
Sector-specific application, model selection, capital structure, risk management, legal issues, the Public/Private behavior, the Public supports, contract structure & key clauses, evaluation of the Private, performance evaluation, concession, adjustment mechanism, etc
• Research Types– Qualitative (eg risk identification & mitigate, CSFs, government’s functions)
toward Quantitative (eg government’s creditworthy, evaluation of guarantee, determination of concession period and adjustment, tariff structure and adjustment mechanism)
• Research Process & Methods– Problem identification (literature, practice)→Data collection (literature,
case, interview, survey)→Problem analysis (statistic, experiment, case, modeling, simulation, theories eg agency by agreement, public goods, external benefit, game, real option, fuzzy, system eng’g, AHP, governance, contract, SNA)→Justification (workshop, interview, comparison, application)
PPP Research in China
Active PPP Researchers in mainland China
• By International Journal Papers (Ke et al 2009, etc):– Myself (PostDr of Robert TIONG at NTU) & my former
PhD student Yongjian KE, Tsinghua (now in NUS)– Sudong YE, Beijing Jiaotong University– Bing LI, Xiamen University (Akin’s former PhD students)– Jianfeng YUAN, SouthEast University– Jingbo SONG, Dalian University of Technology
• By No. of NSFC Funded Projects (see next):– Individual: Jingbo SONG (2007, 2010, 2012), myself (2004,
2007), Zhe ZHANG (2009, 2012), another 22 researchers (1 each)
– Institution: Tianjin U & DUT (4 each), Tsinghua (3), SEU, XJTU & CQU (2 each), another 12 universities (1 each)
PPP related Research Funded by NSFC
█ No. of Projects Funded ● Sum of Fund in 104 RMB
A Research Co-funded by NSFC (Mainland China) and RGC (HKSAR, China)
Equitable Risk Allocation for PPP Projects in China
Principal Investors:
Prof. Dr. WANG S.Q.Dept of Constr Mgmt, Tsinghua University
Prof. Dr. Albert CHANDept of Constr & Real Estate, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
中国 PPP项目风险合理分担机制Reasonable Risk
Allocation Mechanism for PPP
Project
Research Design
Interview
Actual Allocation
Difference in all
sectors?
Difference in one sector?
No
Difference in one
project?
No
Fair Risk Sharing
Contract Clauses Suggestion
Risk Adjustment Mechanism
Delphi Survey
Preferred Allocation
Yes
Risk
sharin
g p
reference
for this
sector
Yes
modify
Factors
affecting
risk sh
aring
Yes
Risk criticality
Risk List Risk cause/ result analysis
Risk management status
Literature review
Interview
Past research
Risk allocation practice
Risks in past cases
Risks w/o clear allocation
Differences in risk allocation
Filing
Research Outcome Research Process
Fair Risk Allocation Mechanism in China
Risk Identification
• Critical risks in China's PPP projects• Risks with unclear or different allocations
Preliminary Risk List
Literature Review
Interview
Previous Studies
Existing Allocations
Critical Risk in Past Projects
Risks with unclear allocation
Risks with different allocations
1st Round Delphi
Final Risk List
Risk List
Risk Group
Expropriation and nationalization Country
Government's reliability Country
Government's intervention Country
Poor political decision-making Country
Land acquisition Country
Corruption Country
Approval and permit Country
Change in law Country
Immature juristic system Country
Public/Political opposition Country
Force majeure Country
Environmental protection Country
Ground/weather conditions Country
Risk List (con’t 1)
Risk Group
Tax regulation changes Country
Exclusive right Market
Inflation Market
Foreign exchange and convertibility Market
Market demand change Market
Third party reliability Market
Interest rate Market
Financial risk Market
Supporting utilities risk Project
Uncompetitive tender Project
Tariff change Project
Payment risk Project
Risk List (con’t 2)Risk Group
Insufficient financial audit Project
Subjective evaluation Project
Improper contracts Project
Construction/operation changes Project
Residual assets risk Project
Organization and coordination risk Project
Consortium inability Project
Private investor change Project
Delay in supply Project
Construction completion Project
Operation cost overrun Project
Technology risk Project
Delphi Survey
• To analyze the risks and identify preferred allocations
• Dec. 2008 - Jan. 2009, First Round of Delphi– 203 invitations sent, 47 replies received, 23.2% response rate
• Jan. 2009 - Feb. 2009, Second Round of Delphi– 46 replies received, 97.9% successive response rate
Delphi Survey Outcome
• Ranking of risk probability and consequence
• Preferred risk allocation(based on experts’ perspectives)
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Probability
Con
sequ
ence
Country Risks Market Risks Project Risks
Moderate
Top 10
Interview
• To identify actual risk management and risk allocation• March – May 2009, face-to-face interview
– Experts having extensive working experience in PPP projects
– Evaluate actual risk management according to PPP experience
– Identify actual risk allocation in the successful PPP projects
Interview Outcome
• Current status of risk management– Absence of risk management culture
– Lack of historic data to support risk mgmt
– Late start of risk management
– Managers lack knowledge in RM
– Poor considerations of RM in contracts
– Rely only on qualitative analyses
• Actual risk allocation– Experts from 38 different cases
– Water, power, transport, etc.
Reasonable Risk Allocation
Mechanism
Preferred vs. Actual Risk Allocations
Actual Allocation(Interview)
Preferred Allocation(Delphi survey)
In all sectors?
YesSuggested Allocation (common)
Difference
Only in one sector?
No
YesSuggested Allocation (specific sector)
Only in one Project?
No
YesInfluencing Factorsof risk allocation
Reasonable Risk Allocation
Risk Allocation Framework
Suggested Contract Design
Suggested Risk Allocation (Common)
Risk Suggested Allocation
Expropriation and nationalization Public
Government's reliability Public
Government's intervention Public
Poor political decision-making Public
Land acquisition Public
Corruption Public
Approval and permit Public
Supporting utilities risk Public
Uncompetitive tender Public
Exclusive right Public
Change in law Public
Immature juristic system Public
Suggested Risk Allocation (Common) Con’t
Risk Suggested Allocation
Public/Political opposition Shared
Tariff change Shared
Force majeure Shared
Payment risk Shared
Environmental protection Shared
Insufficient financial audit Shared
Subjective evaluation Shared
Improper contracts Shared
Inflation Shared
Foreign exchange and convertibility Shared
Ground/weather conditions Shared
Market demand change Shared
Tax regulation changes Shared
Suggested Risk Allocation (Common) Con’t 2
Risk Suggested Allocation
Third party reliability Shared
Interest rate Shared
Construction/operation changes Private
Residual assets risk Private
Organization and coordination risk Private
Consortium inability Private
Private investor change Private
Delay in supply Private
Construction completion Private
Financial risk Private
Operation cost overrun Private
Technology risk Private
Risks by the Public
• Expropriation and nationalization, Government's reliability, Government's intervention, Poor political decision-making, Land acquisition, Corruption, Approval and permit, Supporting utilities risk, Uncompetitive tender, Exclusive right, Change in law, Immature juristic system
• Risk Commonness– Most are country risks– Related to government or officers’ behavior
Key Points on RM for the Public
• PPP is NOT to transfer all risks to private
• Enough supervision– Specifications on project input (incentives, guarantee, etc.)
– Specifications on project output (service, price, quality, environment protection, etc.)
Key Points on RM for the Public – con’t
• Effective competition in bidding
• Incentives for private sector involvement
• Punishment against opportunists
Risks by the Private
• Construction/operation changes, Residual assets risk, Organization and coordination risk, Consortium inability, Private investor change, Delay in supply, Construction completion, Financial risk, Operation cost overrun, Technology risk
• Risk Commonness– Most are project risks
Key Points on RM for the Private
• Transfer risks to more professional partners
• Choose appropriate partners
• Evaluate objectively the Public support
• Guarantee certain monopoly in a certain area
Key Points on RM for the Private – con’t
• Evaluate objectively the market demand
• Prepare a precise financing scheme
• Pay attention to risks behind highly leveraged financing
Risks Shared
• Public/Political opposition, Tariff change, Force majeure, Payment risk, Environmental protection, Insufficient financial audit, Subjective evaluation, Improper contracts, Inflation, Foreign exchange and convertibility, Ground/weather conditions, Market demand change, Tax regulation changes, Third party reliability, Interest rate
• Risk Commonness– Single party (the Public or Private) not able to deal with alone
– Risks may caused by both the Public and the Private
Reasonable Risk Allocation
Mechanism
Preferred vs. Actual Risk Allocations
Actual Allocation(Interview)
Preferred Allocation(Delphi survey)
In all sectors?
YesSuggested Allocation (common)
Difference
Only in one sector?
No
YesSuggested Allocation (specific sector)
Only in one Project?
No
YesInfluencing Factorsof risk allocation
Reasonable Risk Allocation
Risk Allocation Framework
Suggested Contract Design
Reasonable Risk Allocation for Power Projects
• Change in law
• Power sector reform is a hot issue in China
• in Oct 2009, the Government’s announcement to regulate power tariff
• Change in law is out of local governments’ control
• Borne by the Public, if contract with Provincial government
• Shared, if contract with Municipal government
Reasonable Risk Allocation for Power Projects
• Exclusive Right
• Not to build any type of power projects which are against the national long-term policy of encouraging new energy
• Great competitive pressure caused by policy support to new energy
• Share the risk of exclusive right by signing a Take-or-Pay power purchase agreement (PPA)
Reasonable Risk Allocation for Power Projects
• Organization and coordination risk
• Fuel supplier, power purchaser, dispatching station and some other partners are government agencies or state-owned companies
• Government’s involvement or interruption
• Shared, but to define the timing and process of the government’s involvement or interruption
Reasonable Risk Allocation for Transport Projects
• Exclusive Right• Borne by the Public for urban rail and bridge projects
• Less competitive pressure (few alternative transport)
• Shared for toll road projects• Great competitive pressure
• Evaluate the expected traffic volume objectively
Reasonable Risk Allocation for Water Projects
• Change in law• Water sector reform is also a hot issue in China
• Policies on marketization, tariff adjustment, water quality standard, etc.
• Borne mainly by the Public, if contract with Provincial government
• Shared, if contract with Municipal government
Reasonable Risk Allocation
Mechanism
Preferred vs. Actual Risk Allocations
Actual Allocation(Interview)
Preferred Allocation(Delphi survey)
In all sectors?
YesSuggested Allocation (common)
Difference
Only in one sector?
No
YesSuggested Allocation (specific sector)
Only in one Project?
No
YesInfluencing Factorsof risk allocation
Reasonable Risk Allocation
Risk Allocation Framework
Suggested Contract Design
Influencing Factors of Risk Allocation
• Risk allocation in contracts
• Right and obligation
• Risk control capability
• Comparative advantage
• Government incentives
• Tariff design and compensation
• Responsibility principle
• Risk premium
• Government incentives
Risk Allocation Framework
Reasonable Risk Allocation
(1) Risk control capability?
(2) Comparative advantage?
(3) Government incentives?
Risk Allocation in Concession Agreement
(5) Risk premium
(6) Government
incentives
(4) Responsibility
principle
Right and obligation
Tariff design and compensation
Yes
Yes
No
No
No Yes
Adjust Allocation
Thank you for you attention!
All of you are welcome to Tsinghua!
Please drop me a line in advance [email protected]
Key References• Wang S Q, Ke Y J & Xie J (2012), PPP Implementation in China,
in Winch G M et al (ed.) Taking Stock of PPP & PFI Around the World, ACCA, 29-36.
• Ke Y J, Wang S Q & Chan A P C, Cheung E (2009), Research Trend of PPP in Construction Journals. J. of Constr Eng’g & Mgmt, ASCE, 135(10): 939-1113.
• Liu Y W, Zhao G F & Wang S Q (2009), The National Stadium BOT Project for Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, in Alfen H W, Kalidindi S N, Ogunlana S et al (ed.), PPP in Infrastructure Development – Case Studies from Asia and Europe, Publisher of Bauhaus-Universitat Weimar, 130-153.
• Ke Y J, Wang S Q & Chan A P C (2010), Risk Allocation in PPP Infrastructure Projects: Comparative Study. J. of Infrastructure Systems, ASCE, 16(4): 343-351.
• Ke Y J, Wang S Q, Chan A P C & Lam P T I (2010), Preferred Risk Allocation in China's PPP Projects. Int’l J. of Proj Mgmt, 28(5): 482-492.