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CHAPTER THREE
THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE GUANGXI CLIQUE
After his defeat in the struggle for the central power of the GMD, Li Zongren with
the Guangxi Clique were forced to return to the province in April 1929. Jiang Jieshi could
not, however, tolerate the idea of Li and the Clique holding a province in opposition to him.
Jiang employed a policy of replacing one Clique with another (yi-Gui zhi-Gui), sending
the main force of the 7th Army of NRA, which had defected from the Clique in Hubei and
was currently under the command of Generals Yu Zuobai and Li Mingrui, back to their
home province in order to use Guangxi natives to fight each other. Meanwhile, Jiang used
silver bullets to try to bribe Li Zongrens subordinates who had remained in the province
during the Northern Expedition and encouraged them to defect from the Clique.1
Under
Jiangs pressure, Li and other Guangxi leaders were finally forced into exile and left their
home province for Hong Kong and Vietnam two months later. However, Jiang
underestimated his rivals. In fact, they still had potential influence in Guangxi. Seizing the
opportunity in the complicated situation of the anti-Jiang wars initiated by the
Reorganization Faction under Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo, particularly that of the
1For details of the defection of Guangxi native generals headed by both Yu Zuobai and Li
Mingrui from the Clique in 1929, see Zhang Renmin, Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe -
Yu Zuobai, CQ, No. 112 (01/03/1962), and the same author, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi,
xianhua Guangxi neimu, ibid, No. 308 (16/05/1970); Lai Gang, Jiang Jieshi liyong Yu-Li
dao-Gui wowen, GDWSZLXJ, No. 10, pp. 123-9; Lin Tinghua, Jiang-Wang mimou dao-
Gui de qianyin houguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 8, pp. 43-9; Zhang Wenhong, Li Mingrui dao-
Gui tou-Jiang he dao-Jiang shibai jingguo, GXWSZL, No. 13, pp. 142-54; Zhongguo
qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe,
1934; and Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 1979,
Chapter 6.
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anti-Jiang mutiny launched by General Zhang Fakui in September 1929,2
Li, Huang and
Bai returned to Guangxi in the fall of the year. They joined forces with the 4th Army of the
NRA, the famous Ironside under the command of Zhang, which entered Guangxi at the
end of 1929, and restored the Cliques force. Through the anti-Jiang wars in 1929-1931,Lis group revived,
3becoming a powerful rival to Jiang in the struggles for both power and
policies in the 1930s, the latter mainly over the issue of how to deal with resistance against
Japanese aggression. How could the Clique have revived and developed political ideals
and formidable military strength within the GMD in the 1930s before the Sino-Japanese
War? There are indications that, aside from the reasons that Li successfully carried out
mass mobilization in Guangxi and strove for regional cooperation with other provinces, a
possible answer is that he also relied on political and military support from his group.Unfortunately, previous studies of contemporary Guangxi history did not deal with this
issue. For this reason, before we deal with the political ideas and policies of Li and the
Clique in response to imperialist aggression, it is necessary to analyze and account for its
internal structure, and the impact of this on the political development of the Guangxi group
in the 1930s.
The Graduates of Baoding Military Academy (BMA) Group
The officers of the Clique were mainly military school graduates, as mentioned
earlier, but the nucleus actually came from the Baoding Military Academy (BMA). The
phenomenon of the BMA group in domination over the Clique can be attributed to the
historical background of its formation.
2For details of the civil wars in 1929-30 - also called Hudang jiuguo zhanzheng (the
War of the Party Protection and National Salvation) - and the anti-Jiang war in Guangxiduring 1929-1931, see Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, pp. 75-95;
Disijun jishi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.),Disijun jishi, Guangzhou: Huaiyuan wenhua shiye
fuwushe, 1949; and Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Chapter 6.
3For details of the survival and revival of Li Zongren and his Clique in Guangxi and
Zhang Fakuis anti-Jiang mutiny organized by the Reorganization Faction, see Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, chapter 6; and memoirs of Li Zongren, Li Pinxian, Wei Yongcheng,
Cheng Siyuan, Huang Shaohong, Huang Xuchu, Bai Chongxi, Zhang Renmin, Xu Qiming,
Yu Shixi, and Chen Xiong in the Bibliography of this thesis. Also see Archives of the
War History Compiled Committee, the Nationalist Government, The Second Historical
Archives of China, Nanjing.
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The Clique was initially composed of two major parts: Lis own troops from Yulin,
and the Guangxi Model Battalion (GMB) where most Guangxi native BMA graduates
started their military careers. For example, when the GMB was established in 1917, its
main officers were BMA graduates, such as Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Xia Wei, XuQiming, Chen Xiong and so on; while Li built his own force in Yulin, BMA graduates,
such as Yin Chenggang, Yu Zuobai and others, who acted as senior commanders of Lis
troops at that time, also played an important role.4
When it was reorganized in 1926, most
middle and high ranking officers of the 7th Army of the NRA were BMA graduates.5
In
fact, this phenomenon also occurred in other armies of the NRA, such as the 1st, 4th, and
8th armies at that time.6
Even the revival of Li's force in Guangxi after 1929 was
dependent on this group, because elements of the group actually controlled the remnanttroops of the Clique when Li was forced into exile in Hong Kong and Vietnam.
7Before the
War of Resistance, HMA (Huangpu Military Academy) graduates had already become the
leading officers at all levels of Jiangs zhongyang jun (the Central Army). On the
contrary, the BMA Group in the Clique still occupied the most important positions in the
provincial government, the army, and the militia organizations as well.8
Another reason for the BMA Groups domination in the Clique was that there were
no Guangxi native graduates from the Japanese Military School before the Expedition,except Ma Xiaojun, founder of the GMB. However, Ma left the GMB for the Guangzhou
government one year after the war between Guangdong and Guangxi broke out in 1921.9
As a result, Huang Shaohong and Bai Chongxi replaced Ma as leaders of the GMB, which
had been expanded to a regiment during the war, and then joined Li in 1922. We know
4See Appendix 1.1.
5See Appendix 1.2.
6For a discussion of the role played by the BMA graduates in the 1910s and 1920s, see
Lin Dezheng, Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjiu (1912-1924), M. A. thesis, National
Political University, Taipei, 1980.
7See Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ, No. 308-9
(1-16/05/1970).
8See Appendix 1.3 and 1.4.
9See Ma Xiaojun, Guangxi gemingjun fayuan zhilue, GXWX, No. 63 (1994), pp. 8-10.
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that, at the end of the late Qing Dynasty and in the early Republic, there were four
categories of the military school in ascending order: 1) the elementary military school; 2)
the army preparatory school; 3) the middle military school; and 4) the BMA. That is to say,
among them the BMA was on the top level with its current modern military educationsystem.
10In general, BMA graduates had longer and more systemized military training
(about six to seven years from the beginning until the highest level) than those from other
levels. Thus, not surprisingly, these BMA graduates from Guangxi provided the source of
officers for the new Guangxi armies after Lu Rongting was defeated by the Guangdong
armies in 1921, and became the main commanders of the Guangxi armies.11
Among them
were Huang and Bai. After the occupation of Wuzhou in 1923, Huang and Bai became
provincial militarists. They attracted numerous Guangxi BMA graduates to their troops tostrengthen the force. Their attitude towards BMA graduates also won the support of some
of these from other provinces who came to join them.12
For example, Wang Yinyu, a
BMA graduate of the 1st term (qi) and a native of Guangdong, became Chief of Staff of the
7th Army during the Northern Expedition; Hu Zongduo, a BMA graduate of the 4th term
and a native of Hubei province, with his fellow provincial, formed a sub-faction in the
Clique, which we will discuss later; and Zhang Dingfan, a native of Jiangxi province and a
BMA graduate of the 3rd term, was Mayor of Shanghai in 1927-28 and one of Bais trustedsubordinates. Through the efforts of both Huang and Bai, the BMA group dominated the
most important positions amongst middle and senior commanders in the new Guangxi
army under the command of Li. No doubt, this large number of BMA graduates helped to
ensure the Cliques control over the province.
10
For details of curriculums in the Baoding Military Academy, see Lin Dezheng,Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjiu (1912-1924).
11The old Guangxi armies under Lu Rongting belittled these younger well-trained
officers and limited their promotions in the army. This was the main reason for them
coming under the command of Li Zongren soon after the defeat of Lu Rongting by the
Guangdong army. See Yin Chenggang, Li Zongren qijia jingguo, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7;
and Li Pinxian,Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei: Zhongwai tushu chuban gongsi, 1975, pp. 25-
30.
12Lu Weiqian, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Guixi zhong de qiluo, WSZLXJ, No. 52
(1964), p. 64.
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As for HMA graduates, they joined the Clique too late to occupy important
positions in both the Guangxi government and the army. When the HMA was set up in
1924, the BMA group was already entrenched in the principal positions in the Clique.
Even when some HMA graduates joined the Clique after 1925, their ranks and positionswere so minor that they could not play important roles before the Sino-Japanese War.
More importantly, after the reunification of Guangxi, the Clique set up its own military
school in Nanning as a branch of the HMA, with BMA graduates as instructors or teachers.
With this background, the graduates of this branch regarded themselves as coming from
the Guangxi Military School rather than from the HMA.13
The Guangxi army under the Clique had shown high combat effectiveness in wars
of the reunification of Guangxi and the Northern Expedition. Even in the War ofResistance, the Guangxi troops, according to a Western observer, are the best of the
provincial forces. These troops were organized and trained by Generals Li Tsung-jen and
Pai Chung-hsi, two of the best soldiers in China. The men receive excellent care, their
morale is high, and they have given a good account of themselves in battle.14
Therefore,
they have won high praise for their gallantry.15
As John S. Service, an American
diplomat, pointed out early in 1945, the Guangxi army had proved in earlier days that they
were good fighters - against the Northern warlords, against Chiang and against theCommunists. So they were given the honour of an important place in the front lines - but
north of the Yangtze and far from their home province. they fought well - and lost heavily -
at Taierchuang and Hsuchow.16
The reason for its excellent performance is that, it to a
great extent, depended on the domination of the BMA group in the Guangxi troops. With
excellent military knowledge and fighting skills as well as experience of the BMA group
13Liang Xueqian, Guijun ganbu de yaolan - Nanning junxiao, GXWX, No. 57 (1992),pp. 13-8; and Liu Qianyi, Guilin Lijiacun junxiao huiyi, GXWX, No. 11 (1981), pp. 48-
50.
14Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency,
New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 31.
15Li Po-Sheng, How Kwangsi Trains Its Troops, Peoples Tribune, Vol. XXV, No. 3
(May 1938), p. 141.
16Joseph W. Esherick (ed.), Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of
John Service, New York: Random House, 1974, p. 43.
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and other commanders who originated from other military schools, the Guangxi army
defeated the enemy in one battle after another. This army was in addition well-trained and
it always was conscious of its reputation as it carried forward the militant tradition of the
Guangxi people, the source from which its soldiers were recruited. There is no doubt thatthe defeat of the Clique after the Expedition was the result of divisions in the BMA group
caused by Jiang, as mentioned in Chapter Two. However, the fighting skills of this group
and the militant tradition of the Guangxi people were once more to become a vital factor in
the revival of Lis force in Guangxi from 1929 to 1931 and in building its reputation as a
courageous army in the Sino-Japanese War.
The most important element in the political cohesion between the BMA group and
the Clique was the shared aim of regional self-government (difang zizhi), which drove themto acknowledge Li Zongren as their leader. First, they came mainly from rural families and
had the same educational background. Secondly, they were pushed into oblivion because
they failed to obtain the chance to be promoted to higher positions in the central
government and the army, though they had on their record significant military
achievements in the Expedition. Even those natives of Guangxi who served other
provinces or armies were not trusted by Jiang and other factions. As a result, those men,
such as Li Pinxian, Ye Qi, and Liao Lei, former senior commanders of Tang Shengzhistroops, were forced to return to their native province - Guangxi. In this situation, the
ambitions of Li and the Clique to transform and reconstruct the province in the earlier stage
of the Cliques rise were to be realized by these officers. Moreover, after the Expedition,
the GMD proclaimed that China had begun the political tutelage (xunzheng) period. How
could the policy be carried out? Different factions and groups had different ideas. For
example, in 1928 Feng Yuxiang proposed to settle problems of the livelihood of the people
as the first agenda of the Nationalist Government, but he failed to have the proposal passedin both the party and the government.
17The fact that Li and the Clique were excluded from
Nanjing led them to the belief that Jiang aimed at building his own dictatorship over the
country, and would not implement democratic practice in politics. Here democracy was an
ideal which they believed demanded national power-sharing by all factions of the GMD
and the people including, of course, the Clique itself. More importantly, Guangxi had
17For details see Cao Hongxin, Feng zai Nanjing, Shanghai: Zhengzhi yanjiushe, 1932.
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experienced two years of the chaos of war because Jiang had commanded the Nanjing and
non-Nanjing troops to attack the province in order to eliminate the Clique from 1929 to
1931. Li and the Clique attributed this to Jiangs attempt to establish his dictatorship and
they were forced to arouse political regionalism to defend their homeland.
18
Theyadvocated regional self-government in order to consolidate their base and to emphasize
how their ideal differed from that of Jiang's policy which aimed to consolidate his rule first.
Furthermore, they insisted on regional self-government, which they considered an effective
weapon against the influence of the Communists on the rural society of Guangxi, even the
whole country.19
This mixture of political regionalism and regional self-government
provided a favourable foundation on which to build the BMA group's support for Li to
carry out the policies of the Clique in Guangxi.That is not to say, however, that the BMA graduates were an absolutely
consolidated group and always made a great contribution to the Clique expanding its
influence in Chinese politics at all times. Actually, the defeat of the Clique in central China
by Jiang after the Expedition in 1929 was to a great extent caused by divisions within the
BMA group itself.
The first one who split from the Clique was Yu Zuobai. A native of Beiliu county
and a BMA graduate of the 3rd term, Yu had been one of the senior commanders of theClique since its rise in Yulin under the aegis of Li Zongren. With his brilliant military
achievements during the reunification of Guangxi, Yu became one of the secondary leaders
of the Clique. However, he was not satisfied with his position. He attempted to replace Li,
Huang and Bai as leader of this group. For this purpose he joined both Jiang Jieshi and
Wang Jingwei. In March 1929 Yu used the enmity between both Guangxi and Hubei
natives in the Clique and bought over the main force of the 7th Army, which was under the
direct command of General Li Mingrui, his former subordinate as well as his cousin - thisfamily relationship is important in understanding how this could happen. Yus action
directly led the Cliques forces quickly to collapse in Hubei. However, he was unable to
control the Guangxi troops effectively because of his obstinate and unruly reputation and
18For details of propaganda of Li Zongren and the other Guangxi leaders for defending
the province and opposing Jiangs dictatorship over the country, seeHudang jiuguo ji, n.p.,
1931.
19SeeDSZK, Nanning, No. 3 (1931), p. 13.
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soured relations with other Guangxi native BMA graduates. The troops in the province,
who were mostly under the control of the elements of the BMA group, came back to Li
Zongren when he and other Guangxi leaders returned to the province in the fall of 1929.20
As a result, Yu followed in the previous footsteps of Li, Huang and Bai, and left Guangxifor Hong Kong where he remained in exile until 1957, during which his former colleagues
refused to allow him to return to his home province. He died in Guangzhou in 1958 after
his return to the mainland.21
Following Yu was Lu Huanyan, a native of Rong county as well as a BMA graduate
of the 3rd term. Lu joined the Clique in 1923 when Huang Shaohong was expanding his
strength in Wuzhou. Lus defection from the Clique occurred in early 1930, when Guangxi
was under Jiangs siege from the three provinces of Guangdong, Hunan and Yunnan and Liwas struggling to revive his shaky force. As a Divisional Commander in the Guangxi
armies at that time, Lu had low prestige in the Clique. Most elements of the BMA group
who were at present under his command soon abandoned him and went back to their
former leaders - Li, Huang, and Bai when they returned to the province. His split did not
cause serious trouble for the Clique but strengthened the impression that the defection
could not destroy this group which was of strong cohesion and regional identity. Lu was
assassinated by his bodyguard several months later.
22
Another man who disengaged from the Guangxi group was Huang Shaohong, the
number two leader of the Clique. The departure of Huang was a mystery, but his departure
from the province for Nanjing occurred after discussion with both Li and Bai. In other
words, he separated from the Clique peacefully, which I will discuss later. Apart from Yu,
Lu and Huang, the most important blow to the cohesion of the Clique was that of a sub-
faction in this group - the so-called Hubei Faction (Hubei pai, orHubei bang) under the
20For details of the BMA group of the Clique, and their welcome of the return of their
former leaders Li, Huang and Bai to continue leading them and their abandonment of Yu
and Li Mingrui, see Huang Xuchu, Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe
yishu, CQ, No. 119, p. 12. Also see Zhang Renmin,Huiyi Lu, Hong Kong, 1987, pp. 95-
100.
21For details of Yu Zuobais defection from the Guangxi Clique and his last years, see
Zhang Renmin, Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe - Yu Zuobai, CQ, No. 112 (1/3/1962).
22See Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ, Nos. 308-
9 (1, 16/05/1970).
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leadership of Hu Zongduo. The rise and fall of this faction in the Clique provided the
Guangxi leaders with an experience which eventually strengthened internal unity and the
regional identity of the group.
The Hubei Faction
As the term suggests, it was composed of natives of Hubei province. This faction
once played an important role in the rapidly expanding influence of the Guangxi Clique
during the Northern Expedition. Hu Zongduo, leader of the faction, joined the Clique
around 1923 when Huang Shaohong occupied Wuzhou and was appointed Chief Adviser
(zong canyi) for Huangs troops. Hu was rapidly promoted to secondary leadership of the
Clique, as a Brigadier of the 7th Army on the eve of the Expedition. During theExpedition, Hu, who was promoted later to Commander of the 19th Army, had been one of
Lis two senior subordinate commanders (the other was Xia Wei) commanding the
Guangxi troops advancing from the south to the Yangzi River Valley. Surprisingly, as a
native from a province outside Guangxi, his rise in the Clique was quicker than those of
Guangxi native BMA graduates. A reason was that Hu was favoured by both Huang and
Bai because they were all graduates of the BMA and were at that time advocating the
greater unity of BMA graduates within and outside the province. Hu served the oldGuangxi army under Lu Rongting for years before the formation of the Clique under Li.
His career in the Guangxi armies gave him a higher prestige than his fellow provincials,
particularly those who were Hubei native BMA graduates. By using Hus prestige, Huang
and Bai were able to attract numerous other Hubei native BMA graduates into the Clique,
strengthening its force.23
Hus achievements in the reunification of Guangxi were
considerable and the leaders of the Clique intended to let him play more important roles
when the Expedition was launched. Because one of the destinations of the Expedition wasthe middle Yangzi River valley, in Hubei, Hus home province, he was more familiar with
this region, its personnel and geography, than anyone of the Clique.24
23Lu Weiqian, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei de qingkuang, HBWSZL, No. 18
(1987), p. 2.
24Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi yu liangguang tongyi ji dageming beifa,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, p. 95.
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As BMA graduates of the 4th term were nearly all natives of Hubei, Hu brought
many of his classmates and fellow provincials into the Clique as middle and lower ranking
officers, among these Tao Jun and Li Yixuan, who served in the reunification of Guangxi.
As his rank was higher than any of his fellow provincials, Hu promoted and appointed themin his own unit in order to enhance his own position.
25In this way, he was naturally
accepted as leader of the Hubei natives in the Clique.
A good opportunity for Hu to form his own faction within the Clique came in
March 1927 when Li Zongren was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Route Army
of the NRA marching to the east of China. The Wuhan Nationalist regime moved one
division and one brigade from the 15th Army, a Hubei body of troops which defected from
Wu Peifus armies and claimed loyalty to the NRA recently, to join Lis action. To usethese troops more conveniently, Li put them under Hus command as the latter was a native
of Hubei. Seizing the opportunity, Hu put his friends among the Hubei natives, particularly
BMA graduates, into commands in these formations and a division of the 7th Army, which
was under his direct command. Both units later formed the 19th Army with Hu as
Commander, a subsidiary unit of the Clique.26
This was the starting point of direct control
of his own forces. At the end of 1927 Hu led the 19th Army, following with other Lis
troops, i.e. the 7th Army, back to Hubei after the victory of the punitive expedition againstTang Shengzhi, a militarist who was a mainstay of the Wuhan regime and opposed
Nanjing. Early in 1928, Li disarmed the old Hubei zapai jun (armies of inferior brands),
which was reorganized as a new army, i.e. the 18th Army, a subsidiary force of the Clique.
By taking advantage of Lis advocacy of the policy Hubei for the Hubei people, Hu,
under the support of Bai Chongxi, persuaded Li to appoint Tao Jun, his classmate at the
BMA and an acting Divisional Commander of the 7th Army, as Commander of the 18th
Army. Thus, by creating both the 19th and 18th armies with Hubei natives, or to be moreexact, Hubei native BMA graduates in commands from low to high ranks, Hu actually
made himself leader of the Hubei Faction (Hubei pai) within the BMA group of the Clique
25Li Chunchu, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Hubei de tongzhi yu bengkui, WHWSZL, No.
11 (1983), p. 17.
26Yan Jing, Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji qingxiang jingguo,HBWSZL, No. 18, p.
44-7.
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in 1927-1929. Not surprisingly, Hubei native BMA graduates were the nucleus of the
Faction.27
There were two aspects of this development. First, the Hubei Faction expanded
considerably the influence of the Clique into Hubei, secondly, it also planted the seeds of asplit within the Clique - an internal enmity between both Guangxi and Hubei natives, which
was cleverly exploited by Jiang to defeat Li in 1929. As Hu was eager to build up his own
influence by putting all his fellow provincials into influential positions at each level of
government and party organizations as well as controlling the army in Hubei, he and his
followers rapidly became masters of the province.28
In so doing, they hurt the interests and
power of other factions in the province. On the other hand, as one of the secondary leaders
of the Clique, and, in the view of the outsiders, any of Hus actions was regarded as part ofthe Cliques. Hus actions made the Clique an objective to be attacked by other groups and
factions. These actions also hurt internal interests of the Clique, for Hu and his followers
discriminated against the other Guangxi troops in Hubei which they once served,
particularly in personnel, distribution of financial resources and promotions in the army.29
Although there is no evidence that Hu had already taken a firm decision to immediately fly
his own colours and to form his own independent influence,30
disunity did arise within the
Clique. Hu and his followers had come back to their home province with many distinctionsin war. They had earned the right to take a hand in any domestic issue of the province that
they desired, but began to exclude outsiders, including Guangxi natives who were their
27See Lu Weiqian, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei de qingkuang, HBWSZL, No.
18, p. 18; and Appendix 2.
28For details of the Hubei Factions policies in handling provincial affairs, seeHBWSZL,
No. 18, pp. 1-43; and WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 2-38.
29See Yan Jing, Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji qingxiang jingguo,HBWSZL, No. 18,
pp. 4-7; Lan Tengjiao, Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui zhanzheng, HBWSZL,
No. 18, pp. 29-43; Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ,
Nos. 308-9; and Tu Yuntan, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi
neibu maodun, WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 28-38; Peng Boxun, Zhang Zhiben shi zenyang
dangshang Hubei sheng zhuxi de,HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 52-4.
30According to Tu Yuntan, one of Hus trusted followers, soon after the defeat of the
Clique in Hubei, Hu told Tu that he had a mind to fly his own colours in the future, but not
at the present. See Tu Yuntan, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi
neibu maodun, WHWSZL, No. 11, p. 36.
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colleagues in the Clique, from the political and military operation of the province. The
practice began to assume a strong regionalist colour. The officers and soldiers of the 7th
Army not only distrusted Hu but bitterly resented the actions of the Hubei natives in
dropping their benefactor as soon as their help was no longer required. Many commanderswere jealous of the strength of Hu and his followers, their swift expansion of influence, and
of the unfair speedy promotions through the army ranks. A wave of discontent and enmity
spread between them. This resentment was deepened by the scramble for possession of
opium taxes.31
The income from opium taxes was an important financial resource of the
army at the time, particularly where it lacked normal financial support from the Central
government at Nanjing, for example in the 7th Army.32
The defeat of Lis troops in Hubei was, to a great extent, due to the resentment ofGuangxi officers, headed by Li Mingrui, a Divisional Commander who became
Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Red Army in Guangxi later, against Hu Zongduo
and the Hubei Faction. At least all members of the Clique thought so.33
In their memoirs,
even some of Hus followers emphasized that the defeat of the Clique had resulted from
damage caused by the Hubei Faction which severely hurt Guangxi natives interests.34
Hu,
himself also recognized and acknowledged, several years later, after the defeat of Lis
troops in Hubei, that his actions in the province, to some extent, had been disastrous to the
31See Lan Tengjiao, Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui zhanzheng, HBWSZL,
No. 18, pp. 29-43.
32During the Expedition, financial support of the 7th Army, except that from the Central
government for a short time in the first half of 1928, came mainly from the Guangxi
government, totalling 17,000,000 Yuan (Chinese dollars). See Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang
Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ, Nos. 307-9 and Guanyu Guangxi de jingbu,
CYGL, Vol. 2, No. 6 (20/03/1937), p. 3; Lu Weiqian, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubeide qingkuang, HBWSZL, No. 18, p. 10; Yan Jing, Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji
qingxiang jingguo,HBWSZL, No. 18, p. 46; Li Chunchu, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Hubei
de tongzhi yu bengkui, WHWSZL, No. 11, p. 11.
33See the memoirs of middle and high ranking officers of the Guangxi Clique, such as
Zhang Renmin, Zhang Wenhong, Yin Chenggang, even of the senior leaders of the Clique -
Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Huang Xuchu, and Bai Chongxi in the Bibliography of this
thesis.
34For details see memoirs and collections of Yan Jing, Lan Tengjiao, Tu Yuntan, Lu
Weiqian, Lu Zhibing, Liu Minggao, and Huang Sufu in the Bibliography of this thesis.
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Clique, in which he once rapidly rose as a provincial militarist.35
This resentment seems to
explain why Li Mingrui joined Jiang Jieshi when the Jiang-Gui War broke out in March
1929. For its negative impact on the Clique, this Hubei Faction was not again revived after
Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were driven back to their home province by Jiang in that samemonth.
In general, the BMA group was not an organized faction in Guangxi. They were
gathered together for the military purposes of reunifying Guangxi and making a career of
serving in the war of national unification; also, they enthusiastically shared Lis idea of
regional self-government and other policies. They provided the main source of senior
officers for Li and the Clique and formed the secondary and lower-level leadership of thisgroup. Although some of its members left to follow Jiang, the elements of this group still
were the military mainstay of this body because they had already realized that their careers
were firmly linked with the fate of the Clique and nowhere else. The criticism and attacks
from other factions as well as outside temptation had not broken down the group, but
strengthened their regional identity. Furthermore, although the action of some elements of
the group such as the Hubei Faction caused the defeat of the Clique in central China, it
provided the Guangxi group with a lesson to prevent further internal division. To that end,the Guangxi leaders strengthened the unity of the group and the formation of its political
aim, which were closely related to the structure of the Cliques leadership and the discipline
of a secret political organization.
Leadership
Revival of the Clique after 1929 also depended on its leadership. Unlike other
factions of the GMD which all had only one leader, the Clique had a governing body of
three people. In other words, it was like a triumvirate, a unique characteristic of the Clique.
This might explain to some extent why the Clique retained the capacity for survival after
35Tu Yuntan, Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi neibu maodun,
WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 36-7; and Lan Tengjiao, Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui
zhanzheng,HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 42-3.
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each defeat by Jiang, and why it was always regarded as a powerful political and military
rival by the latter.
In this triumvirate, also known as the Li (Zongren) - Huang (Shaohong) - Bai
(Chongxi) leadership, Li was always acknowledged to be the number one leader of theClique. This arrangement of the leadership can be traced back to the Cliques initial
formation, as described in Chapter Two. As Huang and Bai were leaders of the Guangxi
Model Battalion (GMB), one of the two main component parts of the Clique, they of course
became its number two and number three leaders. Huang seized an opportunity to leave
Yulin for Wuzhou to expand his own strength independently in 1923, but he had
maintained a good relationship with Yulin and obtained support from Li.36
As the
expansion of his own strength at that time was made possible by support from Li, Huang, inappearance at least, regarded the former as his superior. When the troops of both Li and
Huang, respectively from Yulin and Wuzhou, joined forces to form the Guangxi
Pacification and Bandit Suppression Joint Army (dinggui taozei lianjun) in Nanning in
1924 in order to reunify Guangxi, logically, Li became Commander-in-Chief, and Huang
Deputy Commander-in-Chief. By this arrangement, Huang voluntarily placed himself as
the second leader of the new rising Guangxi group.37
Apart from the fact that he was founder of the Clique in Yulin, the main reason forLi to proclaim himself as the number one leader was his good personal moral character,
according to memoirs and recollections of most senior members of the Clique who trusted
him throughout his career, as well as some outside observers, both Chinese and foreign.38
A British intelligence report in 1934 stated that Li:
Gives an impression of great mental and physical vigour, and of being possessed of
moral and physical courage to an unusual degree. Wide views on the exterior and
36Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1979, p. 99; and Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 16.
37Huang Shaohong, Wushi Huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 84-5.
38Yin Chenggang, Li Zongren qijia jingguo, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 104-45; also see
Yuan Qingping, Li Zongren, in Yuan Qingping (ed.),Dangdai dangguo mingren zhuan,
Nanjing: Junshi xinwenshe, 1936.
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interior problems of China. Very ambitious and visualizes himself as capable of
replacing Chiang Kai-shek at the helm of state. A fighter.39
Huang Shaohongs memoirs several decades later also confirmed the importance of Lis
character in the recognition of his right to the top leadership of the Clique.40
In addition,
the Clique had already realized that the Taiping Rebellions failure in the 1860s had
originated in its internal split. As the Clique considered itself to be the successor of the
Taiping, it always emphasized the importance of avoiding internal dissension of the
Taiping, the mistake that led to its final failure. It became an axiom to make secure the
leadership of Li and other persons in this Guangxi group.41
With the support from all his
followers and through political propaganda, Lis leadership in the Clique was further
strengthened and undisputed.
As for Bai Chongxi, he had two favourable advantages which made him an ideal
candidate for the position of the number three leader in the Clique. First, he shared the
leadership of the GMB with Huang Shaohong. Secondly, he was a fellow townsman of Li
Zongren; both were natives of Lingui county. Culturally, they all belonged to the Guilin
guanhua dialect system (i.e. Guilin dialect, a dialect of xinan guanhua or Southwest
Mandarin, which includes Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou provinces and north Guangxi), one
of the two main dialect systems in Guangxi (the other being the baihua, i.e. Cantonese).
More importantly, they shared and pursued the same ideals in both the province and the
nation. This made their relations closer than with any others.42
When the troops from
Yulin and Wuzhou were combined in one force, Bais previous position in the GMB and
his close relationship with Li ensured that he would play a very important role in promoting
consolidation of this new and rising military group. For this reason, Bai was, after the
39Great Britain, Foreign Office 371 (General Correspondence) /18153 /1783, Report onKwangsi Province, by Captain A. T. Wilson-Brand, Intelligence Section, General Staff,
June 1, 1934, p. 147 (quoted in Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang
China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, p. 7).
40Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 109.
41See Guangxi yu zhongguo geming, compiled and published by General Political
Training Department of Headquarters of the 4th Group Army of the NRA, Nanning, 1935.
Also see Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36.
42Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 100.
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formation of the Clique, usually authorized to command its troops. This position advanced
him naturally into the triumvirate.
This triumvirate contributed to the expansion of the Cliques influence outside
Guangxi and its capacity to revive its forces in the province during and after the Expedition,even during a series of civil wars between the GMD factions. During the Expedition, Li
and Bai were in the battlefield commanding the Guangxi troops in all battles against
Beiyang militarists in the northern sector. At the same time Huang firmly controlled
Guangxi. Relying on this base of the Clique, Huang was able to provide Guangxi troops
with manpower and armament expenditure when they fought in both central and south
China. This was necessary because the Nationalist Government virtually did not provide
any financial assistance to the 7th Army at the beginning stages of the Expedition.
43
Theactions of Huang during these struggles for power of both the Nationalist government and
the GMD always coincided with those of Li and Bai in political and military matters. For
example, in the autumn of 1927 Huang supported the Nanjing Special Committee and the
Western Expedition against Tang Shengzhi, in which both Li and Bai played very
important roles.44
Even after Li and Bai were defeated in both Hubei and Hebei provinces
respectively and driven back to Guangxi, Huang still gave great support to both of his
colleagues. The three powerful men of Guangxi used the forces that Huang had kept in theprovince to struggle for the fortunes of the Clique. In other words, this triumvirate
provided them with a foundation on which to base any struggle for expansion or revival of
the forces of the Clique.
Behind their cooperation was their common desire to expand the Cliques influence
outside the province and to reconstruct Guangxi. They regarded Guangxi as an area for
experiment and testing of their policies in mass mobilization and regional self-government,
43Except that he appropriated for the 7th Army a sum of money totalling 200,000 Yuan
for its reinforcement to Tang Shengzhi which was the prelude to the Expedition in May
1926 (See Mao Sicheng, Minguo shiwu nian zhiqian de Jiang Jieshi xiansheng, reprinted
Hong Kong, 1962, Vol. 15, p. 76), Jiang and the Guangzhou Nationalist Government did
not give any financial support to the 7th Army before early in 1927. See Huang Shaohong,
Wushi huiyi, p. 127; and Zhang Renmin, Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi
neimu, CQ, No. 307.
44For details of Huangs activities in response to that of Li and Bai during the NSC
period, see Guangzhou Pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou:
Pingshe, 1929; and Huang Shaohong, 1928 nian Yue-Gui zhanzheng, WSZLXJ, No. 3.
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and for the achievement of their goal to modernize Guangxi.45
The achievements of
Guangxi during the Expedition demonstrated the correctness of the Cliques aspirations in
provincial reconstruction and mass education.46
After being excluded from Nanjing, they
were anxious to regain control of Guangxi, to prepare for revenge, and to resume theimplementation of their own policies in the province. However, at a critical point, when
they were striving to revive their force in Guangxi, Huang Shaohong suddenly left his
colleagues and the Clique for Nanjing at the end of 1930, where he joined the Political
Studies Faction ( zhengxue xi), an influential and potentially powerful group in the
Nationalists and a powerful support of Jiang. Huang soon became Minister of Interior of
the Nanjing Government and later Chairman of Zhejiang, Jiangs home province; he also
continued to enjoy his high position in the government. Thus, the triumvirate seemed tohave disintegrated. The Clique was in crisis.
The real reason for the departure of Huang is still unknown. Perhaps Huang felt
himself responsible for the military reverses of the Clique within and outside Guangxi as
the forces under his command made serious mistakes in several decisive campaigns against
Jiang. For these reverses, his reputation among members of Guangxi fell to a point he
could no longer tolerate.47
Perhaps he had realized that his chances for a future career in a
strong military atmosphere were irreparably ruined. Also, in a typically Chinese way, theexistence of a tougher political and military group in opposition to Jiang, in which he once
was a leader, was a weapon that Huang could use to bargain with the former to obtain a
high position in the central government under the leadership of Jiang.48
It has even been
suggested that his departure was a tactic of the Clique to ease Jiangs siege of Guangxi.49
It
45SeeDSZK, No. 3, pp. 12-13.
46For details of Guangxi's achievements under Huang Shaohong, see serial articles of
Zhu (Chu) Hongyuan and Huang Zongyan in the Bibliography of this thesis.
47Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, pp. 25-47;
Chen Liangzuo, Xin Guixi cong qingchao ru-Xiang dao huishi quzhu dianjun chujing,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 45-50; Zhang Dihai, Zhang-Guijun fan-Jiang zhong de Beiliu ji
Hengyang zhanyi, GDWSZLXJ, No. 19, pp. 157-62; Huang Mengnian, Xin Guixi
qingchao ru-Xiang ceying Feng-Yan fan-Jiang zhanzheng, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 35-44;
Disijun jishi; and Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 197-212.
48Huang Shaohong, Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he Guixi de guanxi, WSZLXJ, No. 7, p. 75.
49Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 214.
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also was, according to Huang himself, due to the fact that he gave up the anti-Jiang attitude
held by Li and Bai, who would continue opposing Jiang.50
Whatever the reason, Huangs
departure did not irreparably harm the Clique. In short, he left peacefully on his own,
without taking any force of the Clique with him. It is safe to say that he left not because ofpressure from his colleagues but for a multiplicity of reasons, perhaps even some which
were purely personal.
Although Huang did not take any forces with him at the time of his departure, the
action effected the armys morale; in particular, those officers of the Clique in military and
civic administration of the province, who had remained at Guangxi with Huang while Li
and Bai were expanding the Cliques influence outside the province, were shocked. To
strengthen and reconstruct the leadership, Li successfully developed a secret organization toestablish and monitor the common political goal of the Clique, which was to consolidate
the Guangxi group internally. Also, early in 1931, after Bai moved up to take the previous
position of Huang Shaohong, Li promoted Huang Xuchu into the triumvirate, as number
three leader of the Clique. The new Li-Bai-Huang (Xuchu) leadership replaced that of Li-
Huang (Shaohong)-Bai. The formation of the new leadership retained the power balance of
the Clique and sought to carry on as usual.
A classmate of Li at the GMITS and a graduate of Military Staff College (MSC) inBeijing, Huang Xuchu was once Ma Xiaojuns aide in the Guangxi Model Battalion and
later Lis Chief of Staff in Yulin. During the formation of the Guangxi Clique, he had
already seemed to be the most important aide to Li in Yulin.51
As assistant to Huang
Shaohong during the Expedition, the position of Huang Xuchu in the province was only
slightly less important than that of the former. An important reason was that both men
were fellow townsmen of Rong county, an area within the baihua dialect system of the
province. In this circumstance, the officers from the baihua system held a nearly completesway on all fronts of the province at this time. At the crucial moment that Huang Shaohong
left Guangxi, Huang Xuchu demonstrated his continuing loyalty to Li and Bai even though
50Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 212-3, and the same author, Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he
Guixi de guanxi, WSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 75-6.
51Huang Xuchu, Ba-Gui yiwang lu, CQ, Nos. 168-70. Also see Te-kong Tong and Li
Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 92-3.
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he still maintained a good relationship with the former.52
This was very important because
his remaining in the Clique helped to reassure and retain the loyalty of the officers from the
baihua system. More importantly, as a practitioner of policies and a good civic
administrator rather than a policy-maker, he had a strong capability for handling provincialadministration. By promoting Huang Xuchu, Li and Bai were able to restore the
confidence of the province in the Cliques revival, after it had been shaken by Huang
Shaohongs departure, and to strengthen control over the province in both the military and
civil administrations. On the other hand, the promotion of Huang Xuchu enabled the
Clique to retain the status of the triumvirate. The three men worked well together after that
and the Clique finally took control of the province again, because, as Joseph Stilwell
pointed out, the friendship that exists between these men, and their common antipathytowards Nanking augurs well for the success of their plans.
53Guangxi enjoyed a
reputation as the model province under their leadership for its achievements in
reconstruction and mass mobilization.
Once the new triumvirate was re-formed in 1931, it was never again broken.
Certainly the senior leaders of the Clique themselves did not want to alter the current
structure of leadership, because they needed each other. During the period of 1931-1936,
except when he shared the work with Bai in determining policies for Guangxi, Li paid greatattention to cooperation with other factions of the GMD, particularly those of Guangxis
neighbourhood, such as Guangdong, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan. Bai concentrated on
provincial mobilization with the dual purpose of defending Guangxi and preparing for
resistance against Japan, a process in which the masses' political consciousness in the
regional and national identity was aroused to join the mainstream consciousness of
nationalism. At the same time, Huang devoted himself to the reconstruction of Guangxi.
Perhaps, as has been suggested, they did not attempt to overthrow Li or others, because theyfeared senior subordinates of the Clique who might follow. In so doing, they would be the
victims of a domino effect.54
On the other hand, some senior officers, such as Yu
Zuobai, Li Mingrui and Lu Huanyan, defected from the Clique and attempted to replace Li,
52Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, p. 118.
53U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
54Su Mingde, Bai Jiangong wannian yishi, GXWX, No. 60 (1993), p. 53.
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Huang and Bai and to make themselves leaders of this group, but they all failed to shake the
triumvirate for they were utterly isolated by their colleagues of the Clique and distrusted by
this Guangxi groups rivals - Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei, or even executed by the CCP
though they joined this party, such as Li Mingrui.
55
The fate of these defectors of coursewas a warning to other senior officers of the Clique.
This Li-Bai-Huang leadership coincided with the needs of the Clique of the 1930s
in domestic reconstruction and mobilization of the province and in external relations with
other factions, including the Jiang group. As Leng Guan (Hu Lin), editor ofDagong Bao
(Ta Kung Pao, or Ta Kung Daily) in Tianjin, pointed out in 1935, Li had won the position
of top leader and was able to control the whole Clique because of his superior moral
characteristics and his charismatic ability; Bai had distinguished himself in military strategyand tactics; and Huang was the best possible civil administrator to implement the Cliques
policies which were made by both of the former. In other words, to draw a parallel with
ranks in the army, Li was Commander-in-Chief, Bai Frontline Commander-in-Chief and
Chief of Staff, and Huang served as Commander of the rear base.56
In a sense, this
triumvirate was seen as a whole, particularly within the Clique. Li and Bai were, in the
view of those observing from the outside, even treated as one person, named Li-Bai. Li
also recognized this without reservation in his memoirs.
57
The adjustment to the leadership
55Li Mingrui later joined the CCP and became Commander of the 7th Army of the Red
Army. But he was executed by the CCP in October 1931 after the remnants of the 7th Red
Army from Guangxi under his command joined forces with the Central Red Army under
the leadership of Zhu De and Mao Zedong in Jiangxi. See Gong Chu, Wo yu hongjun,
Hong Kong: Nanfang chubanshe, 1954; Zhonggong Guangxi quwei dangshi ziliao zhengji
weiyuanhui (ed.),Zuo-You jiang geming gengjudi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, pp. 492-7;
Lu Qunhe and Li Yingfen, Li Mingrui, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992; and articles and
memoirs of Wu Xi, Huang Songjian, Lu Xiuxuan, Lin Qing in the Bibliography of this
thesis. Also see Zhang Renmin, Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe - Yu Zuobai, CQ, No.112 (1 March 1962), and Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu, CQ, Nos. 308-
9 (1-16 May 1970); Diana Lary, Communism and Ethnic Revolt: Notes on the Chuang
Peasant Movement in Kwangsi, 1921-31, China Quarterly, No. 49 (1972); and Graham
Hutchings, The Troubled Life and After-life of a Guangxi Communist: Some Notes on Li
Mingrui and the Communists in Guangxi Province Before 1949, China Quarterly, No.
104 (December 1985), pp. 700-708.
56Leng Guan, Yue-Gui xieying, in Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning,
1935, p. 7. Also see Lu Yi, Guangxi san jutou yinxiang ji, Nanning minguo ribao, 23
February 1936.
57Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 100.
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plus the common political goal designed by the secret organization, along with changes in
the political situation, made the Clique more secure than all others, and lasted until the fall
of the GMD on the mainland in 1949.
The Secret Political Organization
Of course, the stabilization of the Li-Bai-Huang leadership after 1931 was also
benefited by the work of an efficient secret political organization within the Guangxi
Clique.
As stated above, military school graduates were able to achieve spectacular
successes for the Clique militarily. But the Clique had clearly been out-manoeuvredpolitically by Jiang. The reverses of Guangxi troops in Hubei and departure of Huang
Shaohong indicated the necessity for strengthening political unity within the Clique. A
possible measure to meet the necessity was that after 1930 the Clique set up a secret
organization as a politically cohesive force by setting a political goal which they would all
strive for. This was a common political consciousness which emerged in the senior ranks
of the Clique, first, after their failure in the struggle with Jiang to achieve power sharing
and for freedom in carrying out different domestic and external policies, and second, afterthe shock of the departure of several senior members from this Guangxi group. The Clique
believed that the departure of these members was the result of failing to provide them with
a clear and firm political goal. Of course, the fact of a secret organization in a faction
working to tie their internal relations to the leaders and to unite policies and define goal was
also a common phenomenon in the GMD.58
It worked to deflect the different political
demands and discordant policies within the Nationalists, and also, to some extent
reconciled the different consciousness of the factions within the GMD to achieve politicalunity of the party and nation. The GMD under Jiangs control had successfully subverted
the forces of the Clique in subduing Guangxi, but the Clique leaders learned fast and
formed their own organization in their revival.
58For example, Jiang Jieshi had a secret organization - the Blue Shirts. See Lloyd E.
Eastman, Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule 1927-1937, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 31-84. For details of Jiang Jieshi's secret
organization in the GMD, see Chai Fu (ed.), C. C. neimu, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1988.
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The secret organization of the Clique, named Zhongguo Guomindang hudang
jiuguo qingnian juntuan (the Party Protection and National Salvation Young Army Corp
of the Chinese Nationalist Party),59
was formed in September 1930. Because of its internal
division, to which Jiang partly contributed, this was a critical time for Li Zongren and theGuangxi Clique. At the same time, Jiang also ordered the neighbouring provincial troops
of Guangxi to invade the Cliques base in an attempt to destroy its strength completely in
the province. These all brought crisis to the Clique. These events also provided two urgent
reasons for Li to set up the secret organization. First, to survive in the province and to
prevent further internal wavering, Li had realized the necessity for building up a political
organization to transform the Clique from a single military group into one with a dual
nature, both military and political. A firm political standpoint and a united political groupwould bring strength to Li in his continuing struggle with Jiang, to back up a tough army
which he had always had. Another reason for a secret political body was that Li wanted to
maintain the Zhang Fakui group (i.e. the Ironside) in Guangxi for continuing anti-Jiang
activity, because the latter and the Clique had fought together against Jiang after it followed
the Reorganization Faction in opposing Nanjing and entered Guangxi to join forces with
the Guangxi group at the end of 1929.60
Thus, the aim of the Young Army Corp was to
oppose Jiang and eventually to overthrow his dictatorship in the cause of national salvation.This central aim was based on the assumption that China was coming under Jiangs
dictatorship, and the perceived need for democratic politics throughout the country, by
59For details of this organization, see Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi
zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 136-50. But, according to the memoirs of Yu Shixi, a
member of the secret body and a senior commander of the 7th Army at that time, the name
of this secret body was Zhongguo Guomindang geming qingnian juntuan (The
Revolutionary Young Army Corp of the Chinese Nationalist Party). See Yu Shixi, Xin
Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi - Zhongguo Guomindang geming qingnian juntuan,GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 47-58. It should be noted here, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japan
War in 1937 when Li and Bai left Guangxi leading the Guangxi troops to the battlefront in
east and central China, they dismissed this secret body and destroyed all confidential
documents relating to the body obeying the orders of Li and Bai in order to demonstrate
their sincere intention of cooperation with Jiang and upholding internal unity of the GMD
(see Feng Huang, Gengzheng, GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, p. 202). For this reason, this secret
body in the Clique was not known by the public. Of course, details on this body rely only
on the memoirs of the relevant persons who were once its members as its original
documents are all not available at this time.
60Cheng Siyuan,Zhenghai mixin, p. 70.
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which it meant power sharing of the nation and regional self-government, according to the
political program of this body.61
To achieve these ends, it claimed Sun Yatsens the Three
Principles of the People as its guiding ideology even though this was never more concrete
than a mere outline of ideas. This is understandable because all of the factions within theGMD claimed to be faithful followers of the Three Principles of the People in the
Nationalist era. Li and his colleagues were no exception. Of course, this body had to be a
secret one because Li and other Guangxi leaders still waved the GMD flag and attempted to
avoid both attack from the Nationalists and adverse public opinion. Through a secret
organization, they also expected to promote and strengthen the prestige of the triumvirate.62
For this reason, the body was well-organized in its organizational structure, with Li, Bai,
and Zhang Fakui as the top leaders. They then established branches in both the Guangxiarmies and the Ironside under the command of Zhang which joined forces with the
Clique and fought in Guangxi against Jiang, with middle and high ranking officers (i.e.
military school graduates) as members.63
Through a two year struggle, Li revived his forces in Guangxi, to which this secret
body made a considerable contribution. There was additional assistance also from the
Guangdong Faction, which had once supported Jiang Jieshi in his attempts to eliminate the
Clique. This faction abandoned its hostilities and resumed the cooperation between the twoparties after the Hu Hanmin Incident which occurred in March 1931.
64With two years
experience, Li had already realized important results from his secret organization because it
played an extremely important role in helping the Clique to overcome its crisis. During that
time, it had consolidated internal unity, formed the ideal of the anti-Jiang and regional self-
government that the Clique would pursue, and strengthened the union with the Ironside.
61See Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 139-
41, and the same author,Zhenghai mixin, pp. 42-3; and Yi Shixi, Xin Guixi yu gaizupai demimi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 48-51.
62Song Houren, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and Yu
Shixi, Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 47-58.
63Yu Shixi, Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 49-50.
64For details of the Hu Hanmin Incident, see Lau-cheung Yee, Hu Han-min: A
Scholar-Revolutionary in Contemporary China, unpublished PhD dissertation, University
of California, Santa Barbara, 1986. Also see Hu Hanmin, Hu Hanmin zizhuan,JDSZL,
No. 2, 1981, and No. 2, 1983.
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Furthermore, a semi-independent organization from Nanjing was set up in Guangzhou,
with Guangdong and Guangxi provinces as its mainstay, after the Hu Hanmin Incident.
With this new political situation appearing in the GMD, and with Guangxi freed from the
military pressure of encirclement by the neighbouring provincial troops, particularly that ofGuangdong, the whole situation was clearly changed. The Ironside then left Guangxi in
early 1932 for Nanjing because Wang Jingwei, its spiritual leader, joined Jiang and formed
a cooperative government between the two groups under their leadership. The Young
Army Corp, which was formed with the Ironside, was to be reorganized as part of the
latter. Meanwhile, after the September 18 Incident in 1931, along with the further
Japanese invasion of China, resistance to imperialism, or to be more exact, resistance
against Japan, which was the mission of the Nationalist Revolution, became an urgentpolitical demand throughout the country. To strengthen control of the province and to
synchronize the activities of the Clique with the needs of this new political development in
internal and external situations, Li now reorganized this secret body and renamed it
sanmin zhuyi geming tongzhihui (the Revolutionary Association of Comrades of the
Three Principles of the People) early in 1932 instead of the Young Army Corp in order to
make it really become a nucleus body of the Clique to strengthen its internal unity in the
province.
65
The political program of the Revolutionary Association of Comrades after its
reorganization was as follows: 1) It affirmed sanmin zhuyi as the leading ideology of the
Chinese revolution and would fight with others to reach this goal. 2) It stated that the
nature of the Chinese revolution at the present was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal
Nationalist Revolution, while the central mission of the revolution was to struggle for
national liberation. The national struggle for independence was the prerequisite for
carrying out measures for developing people's rights and enriching people's livelihood. 3) Itstated Jiang Jieshi as the primary enemy of the Chinese revolution, while all patriotic
parties and groups were in alliance with this organization. 4) It would unite all forces
65See Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 144-
5. The name of this body, according to Wei Yongcheng, was Kangri geming tongzhihui
(The Revolutionary Comrade Association of Resistance against Japan). See Wei
Yongcheng, Tan wangshi,ZJWX, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 116.
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which could be united (to achieve its goal) and avoid making enemies as much as possible
while pointing others towards the real enemy.66
This political program indicated the political attitude of the Clique in the first half
of the 1930s. The main theme of the program was its anti-Jiang sentiment and anti-Japanese attitude. It is true that the anti-Jiang bias was based on the resentment of the
Clique against Jiang himself. However, the anti-Jiang policy of the Clique had a dual
purpose: revenge for Jiangs attempts to eliminate other factions with which he had
differences; and opposition to Jiangs dictatorship throughout the country resulting from his
policy of rangwai bixian annei (domestic pacification before an external war). After
1931, although the Clique had escaped the fate of total destruction by Jiang, it was still
excluded from the central power structure. In other words, the gap between Li and Jianghad not been eliminated but actually enlarged, because the latter still wanted to wipe out all
his rivals, among whom the Clique was the principal one, before starting a war of national
resistance against Japanese aggression. Li and his group remained opposed to Jiang,
waiting for a chance to restore their previous force, and to consolidate their base - Guangxi.
They also wanted to reestablish their reputation because Li and the Clique had been
regarded by Jiang and his followers as the representative of feudal regionalism since
1929.
67
Such resentment against Jiang also had a wider social basis within the GMD.Sharp internal factional struggles had divided that body after the launching of the Northern
Expedition and this provided fertile soil for the Clique to continue holding up its anti-Jiang
banner, as it could derive a lot of allies and sympathy as a result. This is because all of
those factions of the GMD, which were either defeated or were being threatened by Jiang,
were seeking to restore their own forces and to overthrow his rule.68
66Chen Siyuan,Zhenghai mixin, p. 71.
67See Taofa Guixi junfa wengao, 1929,Nationalist Government Archives, The Second
Historical Archives of China, Nanjing. Also see Pan Gongzhan, Shinian lai de Zhongguo
tongyi yundong, in Zhongguo jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan qian shinian zhi Zhongguo,
first printed in 1937; reprinted Hong Kong, 1965, pp. 1-20.
68For example, Hu Hanmin had contacts on all sides, with influential and potential
figures in the Nationalists such as Cheng Qian, Zhang Xueliang, Song Zheyuan, Feng
Yuxiang, Han Fuju and militarists in the Southwest in order to form a wide united front
designed to overthrow Jiang Jieshi and carry out their policy towards the Japanese invasion.
See Yang Tianshi, Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou yu Hu-Jiang hejie, KRZZYJ,
First Issue (September 1991), pp. 101-40.
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There also was a political basis. The two political organizations of the Southwest
existed as a semi-independent organization from Nanjing, the Clique being one of the two
mainstays in these organizations. Both the organizations and the Clique aimed to share
power in the Nanjing government and the party. Their aim was, according to Hu Hanmin, aGMD veteran and spiritual leader of the organizations, to reach the minquan tongzhi (the
rule by civic rights) instead of Jiangs junquan tongzhi (the rule by military force).69
To
some extent, this minquan tongzhi was the idea of regional self-government held by the
Clique. It emphasized power sharing by all factions and groups, of course, mainly
including the Clique and others, as against Jiangs dictatorship. Both social and political
bases were linked by the above political program of the secret body under the Clique.
The Revolutionary Association of Comrades was further renamed ZhongguoGuomindang geming tongzhihui (The Revolutionary Association of Comrades of the
Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1934.70
The further reorganization of this body was
correlated with the current situation. To draw more people into the Clique and strengthen
it, a firm political group with discipline and the capacity for the pursuit of political aims
was necessary. Moreover, Hu Hanmin was secretly reorganizing a political party, i.e. the
new Guomindang, in an attempt to replace that of Nanjing. Hu attempted to use both
Guangdong and Guangxi provinces as the base of this new Guomindang. However, ChenJitang, ruler of Guangdong, refused to cooperate with Hu in his plan. Hu then turned to
Guangxi. He sent Huang Jilu, one of his trusted followers and a GMD veteran, into the
province in 1934, with many details of his organizations plans for a new Guomindang. Li
had not fully adopted this plan, but used the idea in reorganizing his secret political body
and renamed it with the above title.71
This perhaps was the first step taken by Li and Bai in
their attempt to form their own political party instead of supporting the GMD under Jiangs
control. According to Song Houreng, a member of the secret body, during that period, Liand the Clique still nursed the humiliation of their earlier defeat and planned for another
69Ibid, p. 133.
70Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 146-9;
Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and He
Zuobai, Zhongguo Guomindang geming tongzhihui neimu, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 35-
46.
71Cheng Siyuan, Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, p. 147.
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day. But this was only part of their motivation. They firmly believed it was necessary to
form a new political party to replace Jiang for both political and military reasons in order to
lead the nation to resist Japan and save the country, because they were convinced that
Jiangs policy of rangwai bixian annei would not lead to national salvation but woulddestroy China. At least their aim was to restore the GMD, a good reason which denied any
suggestion of self-aggrandizement.72
If so, they naturally claimed themselves to be national
leaders.
During this period, Li and Bai had always held that Jiang betrayed the Revolution,
and had used the GMD as a tool for advancing his own interests, breaking all of Sun
Yatsen's promises to the peasants and common people. Jiang and his followers had done
their best to represent the Clique as the chief criminal element, destroying the reunificationof the nation, and forming an obstacle to prosecution of the external war at this time in
order to make easier Japan's absorption of China.73
In order to rebut this claim and to
preserve its existence and expansion, the secret body of the Clique linked its purposes
firmly with those of Chinese nationalism. The leaders of the Clique used the resentment
against Jiang which existed among the Guangxi people as they suffered in straitened
circumstances in 1929-1931. They attributed the chaos of 1929-1931 to the invasion of
Guangxi by the neighbouring provincial troops in order to impose Jiang's dictatorship. Liand the Clique gained willing support when they encouraged the Guangxi people to fight
together with them against the invasion. At the same time, the existence and expansion of
the Clique were largely enhanced by the national political situation, in which the most
important event was the September 18 Incident in 1931 engineered by the Japanese in an
offensive designed to conquer the whole of China. In response to this event, Jiang merely
continued to concentrate his troops for the purpose of eliminating domestic adversaries,
both the CCP and rivals within the GMD, including the Guangxi Clique, instead ofimmediately resisting the latest burst of Japanese aggression. Seizing this opportunity, the
political program of the secret body put forward anti-Japanism, national independence,
72Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 138-31.
73See, for example, Taofa Guixi junfa wengao, 1929, Archives of the Editorial
Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government, The Second Historical Archives
of China, Nanjing; Anonymous, Dui Liangguang yidong zhi renshi, n.p., 1936; and
Anonymous,Liangguang panluan neimu, n.p., 1936.
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together with the anti-Jiang movement. In China, it was customary to emphasize shichu
youming (dispatch troops with just cause) when a campaign or a movement was initiated.
So anti-Jiang and anti-Japan slogan became the foundation for the existence and
expansion of the Clique within and outside Guangxi. The secret body served thosepurposes well. In other words, Li and the Clique used propaganda against Jiang's weak
policy towards the Japanese invasion of China to serve their own ends. However, there
could be no question of the genuineness of the anti-Japanese spirit of both the leaders and
the people of Guangxi. As Hallett Abend pointed out in the 1930s, Guangxi was sincere in
their anti-Japanism and in their belief that if Jiang continued to be in power, China would
be given away to Japan, bit by bit, while Jiang husbanded his military and cash reserves
to sustain his own domestic position against domestic adversaries. Guangxi sincerelywanted to reorganize the central government, and then to arouse the national patriotism of
all the Chinese people in order to make an effort to regain North China and Manchuria,
which were occupied and threatened by the Japanese army.74
Why did the secret body claim itself to belong to the GMD and operate publicly
under the GMD banner? First, the Clique opposed Jiang and his group, but not the GMD
itself. Secondly, the current ideology of the GMD provided the most useful tool for the
secret body. All people within the GMD had claimed themselves to be the followers ofSuns sanmin zhuyi, regardless of whether or not ordinary people could be said to be clear
about the implications of those principles. Li and his followers were of course no
exception. Once the secret body of the Clique affirmed sanmin zhuyi as the guiding
ideology, it could clear the doubt from the minds of its members on the one hand, and could
easily obtain the political belief of its members on the other, as well as inviting people
opposed to Jiang to join. Furthermore, with the banner of the GMD, it had a justifiable
excuse to defend itself from any attack under a flag well known to the Chinese people andthe rest of the country, and could also easily avoid public criticisms.
All policies and activities of the Clique had always centred on a theme - linking its
own existence and expansion to the tide of the time - by insisting on resistance against
Japan during the 1930s. The secret body of the Clique embodied the theme of carrying out
mass mobilization and reconstruction in the province. This was well-organized with
74Hallett Abend,My Years in China, 1926-1941, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943, p.
223.
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rigorous discipline and clear anti-Jiang and anti-Japanese political goals, and played a very
important role in the reconstruction and mobilization of Guangxi. The internal unity of
Guangxi during the June 1 Movement in 1936, when Jiang encircled the province from
three provinces with superior forces, showed the success of the secret body in politicalorganization and discipline. Because none of the Cliques members defected from the
Guangxi group, except several pilots who were natives of Guangdong and who left
Guangxi for their native province, Jiang failed to buy over Guangxi members as he
successfully did in Guangdong. Lis secret body continued its work until the outbreak of
the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 when Jiang officially called for national resistance. To
show the determination of political unity within the GMD and to offer resistance to the
Japanese in full force, Li and the Clique officially disbanded the RevolutionaryAssociation of Comrades and destroyed all relevant documents in September 1937.
75
After that, Bai left Guangxi for Nanjing to become Jiangs Deputy Chief of Staff, and Li
went to the Fifth War Zone as Commander-in-Chief and led several hundred thousand
Guangxi soldiers to resist Japan in central and east China.
Brains Trust
75According to Huang Qihan, Bais confidential secretary in the late 1930s, after the
outbreak of nationwide resistance against Japan occurred in August 1937, the Clique and
Jiang reached an agreement to dismiss all secret political organizations. The Clique did so.
But Jiang had, in fact, not kept his word. Both Li and Bai privately swore to Jiangs
betrayal. For the organization of the so-called Guangxi jianshe yanjiuhui (Guangxi
Reconstruction Studies Association) which was openly established by Li in Guilin in
October 1937, someone might claim that it was the reproduction or continuation of the Zhongguo Guomindang geming tongzhihui (see Chen Shaoxian, Guangxi jianshe
yanjiuhui de chengli he jieshu, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 73-846). In fact, the association
was not a secret political organization but was a liaison unit of the Clique with the aim of
maintaining and enlarging its contact with all forces the Clique could influence. Of course,
this association also had a dual mission to provide the Clique with the political organization
and officers once Jiang could not continue to resist Japan. But such a proposal never had a
chance to be put into practice. For details of the association, see recollections of Li Wei,
Chen Shaoxian, Li Renren, Wan Zhongwen and Cheng Siyuan in the Bibliography. In the
Autumn of 1947, Bai, then Minister of Defence in Nanjing, once proposed restoring the
previous secret political body. The exact result of this proposal is unknown. See Huang
Qihan, Guixi jiqi fandong de zhengzhi zuzhi, WSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 128-129.
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The formation and development of a secret political body in the Clique depended
on its Brains Trust, a group of political advisers. This group was composed of two parts:
figures from other provinces and factions who had opposed Jiang, and the Guangxi students
returned from Russia. The willingness of the former to join Guangxi showed that theCliques anti-Jiang policy had a certain support and sympathy. These people included Pan
Yizhi, Qiu Changwei, Zhu Foding, Liu Shiheng, the former elements of the Reorganization
Faction and the Third Party under Deng Yanda as well as elements who gave up the
Communist memberships, and so on, a mixture of politicians and political scholars.
However, the important contribution came from the latter, who made great contributions to
the consolidation of the Revolutionary Association of Comrades and provided a
theoretical basis for its political program. These returned students from Russia became animportant force in the Clique during the 1930s.
Wang Gongdu was head of the returned students. A native of Yongfu county (in
the guanhua dialect system), Wang was sent by Li to Russia in 1926 to study at Sun Yatsen
University, Moscow, an institution set up for the benefit of both Chinese Nationalists and
Communists.76
According to Wei Yongcheng, a senior officer of the Clique and Wangs
classmate in Russia, this background provided Wang with an opportunity to learn the
Russian leader Stalins methods of organization in the party. Wang had realized theenormous possibilities of political organization, particularly a secret one, and viewed this as
a prerequisite to defeat domestic adversaries in internal struggles in the party. The fact that
Stalin successfully defeated Trotsky, another leader of Russian Communists, was one good
example. This perception of Russian political organization had strongly influenced Wangs
subsequent actions in Guangxi.77
He came back to China in 1928 to serve as secretary to Li
in Wuhan.
Lis defeat in the following year provided Wang with an opportunity to play animportant role in the revival and consolidation of the Cliques internal unity. Owing to
military defeat, Li had already been conscious that it was not sufficient to rely solely on the
power of a single military group. What his rival Jiang possessed was not only a central
government but also a national party with a political ideal, even if the ideal was only given
76Wei Yongcheng, Tan wangshi,ZJWX, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 97.
77Ibid, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 116.
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in lip service and without real substance. Wang became Lis political adviser in this critical
circumstance. He suggested Li to form a secret political organization within the Clique in
accordance with that of Russia as a preparation for forming a political party. This would
make the Clique a main force in the Chinese Revolution. The Young Army Corp, andthen the Revolutionary Association of Comrades, were established in accordance with
what Wang suggested.78
Since 1931, Wang had been Chief of the propaganda and
organization field of the Clique. Meanwhile, Wang drew numerous returned students from
Russia into the Clique. They held all important positions of propaganda work in Guangxi,
and became an influential Brains Trust.
This group set all propaganda machines in motion serving the needs of the Clique,
particularly that of the secret organization. They loudly advocated the political program ofthe Revolutionary Association of Comrades, the theoretical foundation of the Clique
which will be discussed in the next chapter. Once the appropriate political policy (i.e. that
of anti-Jiang and anti-Japan, for the Clique) was determined, officers were a decisive factor
for a political organization. When the secret body was formed, Wang and his colleagues
devoted their major efforts to training political and military officers. On the one hand, they
imbued the officers with the ideas that the Clique was the leading force of the Chinese
Revolution and Li and Bai were its real leaders.
79
On the other hand, they set up manysmall-size secret clubs or societies in the army and schools as well as the provincial
government, which became peripheral organizations of the secret political body.80
Through
their efforts, the low and middle ranking officers of the Clique fostered belief in their group
and leaders. Although Wang was executed by Li and Bai in September 1937,81
his ideals
78See Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36;
and Wei Yongcheng, Tan wangshi,ZJWX, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 115-6.
79Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-8; He
Zuobai, Wang Gongdu de mimi zuzhi huodong, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 137-49;, and
the same author, Zhongguo Guomindang Guangxi dangzheng yanjiusuo, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 15, pp. 40-4.
80Song Houreng, Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and Ni
Zhongtao, Wang Gongdu zai junxiao de mimi zuzhi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 13, pp. 178-82;
and He Zuobai, Wang Gongdu de mimi zuzhi huodong, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 137-49.
81The execution of Wang in September 1937 remains a mystery to this day. There are
several theories about Wangs death. One is that Wang was the victim of an internalstruggle of the Clique. As Wang had influence on the lower and middle ranking officers of
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still influenced the activities of these people. For example, during the Sino-Japanese War,
Jiangs trusted followers failed to draw these low and middle ranking officers of the Clique
over to Jiangs side, even though they tried in many ways.82
The success of the Brains Trust in propaganda work was correlated with theirperception of the nature of Chinese society. Their perception was based on their similar
political backgrounds. Members of the Brains Trust, including those students returned
from Russia and other politicians and scholars who had joined the CCP before such as Zhu
Foding,83
were mostly influenced by Marxism-Leninism. They realized that the nature of
Chinese society was semi-feudal and semi-colonial, and as stated above, influenced by
borrowing from the theory of imperialism. Against the CCPs theory that the working class
was the leading force of the Chinese revolution, they emphasized that the productivemasses were the basis and main force of the Chinese revolution linked with reconstruction
and mobilization.84
Their perception contributed to the formation of a firm political goal
by the Clique on the one hand, and coincided with the needs of awakening the masses to
the political consciousness of the current situation that China faced on the other. With their
perception of the nature of Chinese society, the Clique created a theory of the Pearl River
the Clique, those veterans and senior officers of Guangxi were jealous of the promotion of
his power so quickly. They concocted a false charge against him. As a result, Li and Bai
had to put Wang to death in accordance with the excuse that he attempted to overthrow the
rule of the Clique in Guangxi
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