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MESI

Middle East Security Institute

Counter-Terrorism

Policy Implication Paper for the

State of Israel Ministry of Public Security

INTR 12-230 Terrorism Pat Blannin

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Table of Contents

Aims ............................................................................................................................................ 2

Scope .......................................................................................................................................... 2

Key Terms .................................................................................................................................... 2

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3

Background/Current Policy .......................................................................................................... 6

Recommendations

Targeted Attacks and Military Suppression Campaigns...................................................... 8

Target Hardening ........................................................................................................... 11

International Sanction Regimes and UN Resolutions ....................................................... 12

Political/Social Reform ................................................................................................... 14

Diplomatic/ Constructive Engagement ............................................................................ 14

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 17

References ................................................................................................................................. 18

About MESI ............................................................................................................................... 21

Maps ......................................................................................................................................... 21

I acknowledge that all work in this essay, unless otherwise stated, is my own. I further acknowledge that

failure to properly cite the work of other authors is plagiarism and that plagiarism constitutes cheating and

attract serious penalties.

(Signed) ................................................... (Date) ..................................

Essays submitted without this statement will not be marked until a signed statement is received.

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Aims:

The following Policy Implication Paper has been drafted by the Middle East Security

Institute (MESI) for the State of Israel’s Minister of Public Security, the Hon. Yitzhak

Aharonovitch to assist in the formulation of a revamped, comprehensive counter-terrorism

strategy aimed at eliminating the threat potential of Lebanese Militant Organisation,

Hizbollah.

Scope:

The following Policy Implication Paper focuses on Hizbollah and the counter-terror

measures provided are specifically formulated to issues associated with the organisation

and the State of Israel. The recommendations outlined in this document fall within the

following categories; Use of force, Repressive, Conciliatory and Legalistic options.

Key Terms:

Counter-terrorism, Hizbollah, Israel, Security, Strategy, Terrorism

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INTRODUCTION

Hizbollah is a Lebanese based Shiite political-militia organisation which came to

prominence in 1982. To define Hizbollah as a terrorist organisation is to simplify the group’s

complex hierarchical structure and an analysis based on that assumption would seriously

limit the effectiveness of such an examination. Hizbollah’s organisational structure consists

of a legitimate political core that has participated in Lebanese parliamentary elections since

1992 and a militant wing otherwise known as the External Security Branch that is

responsible for terrorist acts committed inside Lebanon and throughout the world.1 For

almost three decades Hizbollah has held a monopoly on Lebanese political violence

perpetuated historical sectarian divisions to devastating effect and while Hizbollah exhibits

elements of new terrorism, the organisation are pioneers rather than followers of a new

paradigm.2 Hizbollah’s aggressive reputation extends beyond Lebanese borders, best

summed up by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who prophesised that

“Hezbollah may be the A team of terrorists, while al Qaeda is actually the B team”.3

Israel has been a primary target of Hizbollah for both ethno nationalist and religious

reasons and because Israel has the capacity to affect the future direction of the region and

1 Mokhtari, F. (2005). Countering Terrorism: Hezbollah’s Appeal. CSRC discussion paper 05/45, September at

www.eurojournals.com/ejss_15_1_06.pdf ; Byman, D. (2003). Should Hezbollah Be Next? Foreign Policy, November/December at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2003/11middleeast_byman.aspx . p.p.54-66 2 Martin, G. (2010). Tools of the Trade: Tactics and Targets of Terrorists. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges,

Perspectives and Issues.(3rd

e.d.). Sage Publications: California. Martin describes New Terrorism as having vaguely articulated political objectives, indiscriminate attacks, attempts to achieve maximum psychological and social disruption and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction p.343. 3 Byman, D. op. cit. During President Bush’ Axis of Evil years, Hizbollah was high on the agenda. The US

government emphasised the fact that prior to 9/11, Hizbollah had killed more American’s than any other terrorist group. Will Kristol and Richard Perle, two of the most visible ‘experts’ in the US media insisted that any ‘war on terror’ must include Hizbollah. p.55

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thus constitute a direct threat to the influential power that is sought by Hizbollah in

Lebanon.4 Hizbollah has consistently engaged Israel in asymmetric warfare by employing

tactics such as body borne and vehicle borne IED’s5, assassinations, kidnappings and short to

long range rocket attacks6, as well as more traditional ground force escalations.7

International Israeli citizens and symbols have also been targeted.8 Hizbollah is compelled

by the knowledge that “Israel can beat all Arab Armies however it can do nothing against a

youth with a knife or an explosive charge on his body”.9

Hizbollah’s southern Lebanese support base is reasonably consistent and they possess

various funding options that include voluntary contributions from charities and religious

entities through to state sponsorship from Iran and Syria.10 Both these revenue creation

streams have been the focus of past counter-terrorism policy with measured success. Iran

4 International Crisis Group. (2010). Drums of War: Israel and the “Axis of Resistance”. Middle East Report

No.97. “Israel cannot survive in this region, and cannot live in it in peace, or at least not war, unless people in Israel an d its surroundings believe that Israel has the political and the military leadership, military capabilities....to deter those of its neighbours who wish to harm her, and to prevent them – if necessary through the use of force- from achieving their goals”. p.1. Hizbollah realises that Israel will not accept the organisations growing influence in Lebanon and utilize any method at their disposal to counter them. 5 Medea Group, Innovative Security and Development. (2007). Suicide Bomber Tactics. Strategic Security and

Analysis: Islamic Terrorist Field Training & Tactics at http://mediagrp.com .Hizbollah pioneered the suicide bomb in the early 80’s several highly effective attacks on MNF targets led to the tactic being adopted by T/O’s such as LTTE, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Kurdistan Workers Party and al Qaeda. p.p.1-10 6 Summary of Katyusha Attacks (Communicated by IDF Spokesman) Jerusalem, 21 April 1996 at

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-%20Obstacle%20to%20Peace/Terrorism%20from%20Lebanon-%20Hizbullah/SUMMARY%20OF%20KATYUSHA%20ATTACKS%20-%2021-Apr-96 . 500 rockets launch in 8 days causing property damage valued at: 20 million NIS (about $7 million) Indirect damage to business, tourism: 40 million NIS (about $13 million); ICG Middle East Report, No.97. op. cit. Former spokesman for UNIFIL, Timor Goksel said that in the 2006 conflict “Hizbollah launched 4 000 rockets, the report goes on to say that Hizbollah has improved the accuracy and range of its Scud missile arsenal. p.p3-5 7 Ibid. The report claims that Hizbollah has established a second line of defence along the Bekaa Valley in

anticipation of an Israeli ground attack. The report quotes a Hizbollah official as saying” in a future war, Israel would be compelled to conduct a major land offensive deep within Lebanese territory”. p.4 8Hizbollah conducted attacks against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aries (1992) and a Jewish community

centre (1994) killing over 100 people and injuring more than 400. A Hizbollah bomb tore through a restaurant in Tarrejon, Spain in 1984. The restaurant was located near a US Air Force Base and the attack killed 18 US servicemen. 9 Pape. R. A. (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review. p.12

10 See Norton, A. R. (2007). Origins and Prehistory of Hezbollah. (p.p.11-22); Bhalla, R. (2010). Syria, Hezbollah

and Iran: An Alliance in Flux. STRATFOR. 14TH

October at http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/burton_and_stewart_on_security?fn=2417307156 ; International Crisis Group. Hizbollah: Rebel Without a Cause? Middle East Briefing Paper, 30

th July 2003. p.p3-6

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remains a vocal supporter of the organisation however the Syrian connection cannot be

neglected. Hizbollah’s parliamentary veto power makes Lebanese state intervention difficult

although the resurgence of several sectarian opposition groups may provide future

opportunities for state suppression of Hizbollah.11 The Lebanese Shi’a plurality view

Hizbollah as incorruptible and consistently represent the Shi’a conscience.12

Hizbollah has reduced its visible presence in the region since the 2006 conflict with

Israel and has concerned itself with internal power politics however the organisation is

coming under increasing pressure from sectarian rivals within the Lebanese government and

may seek to re-establish themselves by attacking the nation of Israel as a universally

recognised target.13 Hezbollah controls an extensive media infrastructure, which includes

satellite television channels and radio stations. Their media network spreads incitement and

hate propaganda against Israel (and occasionally against the Jewish people) and the West,

to target audiences around the world.14

The international community’s primary goal is to disarm Hizbollah and direct its focus

on legitimate political activism.15 This would eliminate Hizbollah’s threat potential in terms

11

Dicter, A. and Byman, D. (2006).. Israel’s Lessons in fighting Terrorism and their Implications for the United States. The Saban Centre at the Brookings Institution. Dicter and Byman insist that finding ways to induce governments to stop tolerating terrorist activity is the key to global counter-terrorism strategy. p.4 12

Simon, S. and Stevenson, J. (2010). The Hezbollah Problem. Democracy: A Journal of Ideas. (Issue 17) at http://democractjournal.org/article.php?IC=6752 . The “corrupt and dysfunctional Lebanese government have provided ineffectual welfare for decades, an efficient incorruptible Hezbollah has furnished schools, medical assistance and food for Lebanese people” and “Hezbollah enhanced its appeal....by its incorruptibility and through charity and community involvement”. 13

See Ibid; Middle East Report, No97.op. cit; International Crisis Group. (2010). Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current. Middle East Report No.96, 26

th May. (p.p.1-35); International Crisis

Group. (2007) Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis. Middle East Report. No.69. 10th

October. (p.p.1-21). 14 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, August 23, 2010. Hizbollah Communications at

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e125.htm

15 Simon, S. and Stevenson, J. op. cit. Simon and Stevenson note the British governments efforts since late

2009 to enter into constructive negotiations with Hizbollah’s political body in an attempt to ultimately disarm the group and ”transform Lebanon from a perpetually war-torn society and geopolitical pawn into a durable 21

st century state”

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of Israel’s national security however Israel needs to implement counter-terrorism strategies

that will ensure its security in the interim.

Background/Current Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The State of Israel exists in a highly unstable region and certainly cannot rely on the

geographic advantage of its closest ally, the United States. Terrorism is a direct affects all

aspects of Israel Strategic Threat outlines in Israel’s Concept of Public Security.16 The Israeli

government’s attempts to counter Hizbollah’s terrorist activity to date comprise a broad

range of traditional anti/counter-terrorism options including target hardening, military

suppression campaigns, targeted killings and arrests, participating in international

institutions and regimes and legalistic responses however the threat persists and the

overall effectiveness of Israel’s response is questionable. Evidence of past counter-terrorism

activity will be briefly examined to isolate areas of success and concern and to clearly

establish a reference point from which to begin the proposed recommendations.

Israel does not have the option of creating a physical barrier to deter Hizbollah in a

similar manner to the wall that separates the West Bank and had previously erected along

its border with Jordan.17 Border posts and checkpoints along the Lebanese/Israeli border

16

Falk, R. (2010). Israel’s Concept of Public Security-Looking to the Future. State of Israel ministry of Public Security at http://www.mops.gov.il/BPEng/Abot+MOPS/The Vision/OrganizationalStructure.htm . MOPS states that Strategic Threats “threaten the most important matters and institutions: The sovereignty of the state itself, the state’s ability to enforce the law and public order, serious damage to property, serious harm to life and limb, serious damage to the national economy. 17

Martin. op. cit. The 650 km West Bank separation barrier and the Jordanian Border Fence that preceded it are extremely effective counter-terrorism measures which feature “mounds of razor wire, electronic sensors, patrol roads and high electronic fences p.486

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have however proved and effective psychological deterrent to Hizbollah militia18, and can

also deflect the attention of the militants away from the Israeli population.19

IDF Military suppression campaigns have had limited success20, and have created a

tremendous scare on the Israeli national identity perhaps most visible after the ‘Operation

Changing Direction’ in July 2006 in southern Lebanon. Israel’s attempts to indirectly coerce a

change in behaviour of the Lebanese government had early success with Operation

Accountability (1993) and Grapes of Wrath (1996) but those brief but highly effective

victories were erased by the abject failure in 2006.21

Special Operations activities have delivered significant results against a range of

Hizbollah members and high ranking officials in particular. Former Secretary General Sayyad

Abbas Musawi was assassinated by an Israeli helicopter gunship in 1992 and his successor

18

Dicter and Byman. op. cit. “The anxiety that checkpoints create in the minds of terrorists....who have reported aborting attacks by what they thought was increased scrutiny....and provide the security forces ....to use intelligence without compromising (burning) a source” p.7 19 For evidence to support this statement see; Hizbullah Attacks IDF Post (Communicated by IDF spokesman)

Jerusalem, 18 April, 1996. Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism information centre at http://www.terrorism-

info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/meir_amit_en.htm ; Address by Prime Minister Shimon

Peres to the Knesset on the IDF Operations in Lebanon .April 22, 1996 at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-

%20Obstacle%20to%20Peace/Terrorism%20from%20Lebanon-

%20Hizbullah/HIZBULLAH%20ATTACKS%20IDF%20POST%20-%2018-Apr-96

20 Dicter and Byman. op. cit; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Summary of Katyusha Attacks, Statement by IDF

Spokesman, 21st April 1996 at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-%20Obstacle%20to%20Peace/Terrorism%20from%20Lebanon-%20Hizbullah/SUMMARY%20OF%20KATYUSHA%20ATTACKS%20-%2021-Apr-96. Operation Accountability (1993) and Grapes of Wrath (1996) are campaigns that succeeded in driving Hizbollah out of southern Lebanon and severely damaged social infrastructure denting the resolve of Hizbollah’s Shiite support base. 21

Ibid p.3; Pape, R. A. op. cit. “the Shameful defeat that Israel suffered in southern Lebanon and which caused its army to flee it in terror....achieved a great victory for the Islamic Resistance and the Lebanese people” p.13; ICG. (2006). Israel/ Hizbollah/Lebanon: Avoiding Renewed Conflict. Middle East Report No. 59. ‘Operation Changing Direction’ was the Israeli name for the 2006 conflict , Hizbollah labelled their campaign ‘Operation Dependable Promise’ in relation to the Hizbollah’s promise to gain the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israeli gaols p.1; "Operation Accountability" at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon-accountability.htm

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Sheik Hassan Nasrallah has been targeted unsuccessfully to date.22 The last recognised

targeted killing took place in Damascus, Syria (February 2008) when Hizbollah Commander

Imad Mughniyeh was killed by a Vehicle Boerne IED.23

Recommendations

The elimination of Hizbollah’s terrorist threat will have immediate and long-term

national security benefits for the proud nation of Israel. Effective containment of Hizbollah

will have broader implications as Hamas and Islamic Jihad gain tactical knowledge and

ideological strength from Hizbollah successes against the Israeli enemy.24

The following Counter-terrorism options for the Israeli Ministry of Public Security

combine to create a comprehensive approach to the terrorist threat posed by Hizbollah.

Targeted Attacks and Military Suppression Campaigns

Must be conducted accurately and expediently.

Intelligence Gathering/Targeted Arrests: Hizbollah’s complex, secretive and

closed organizational structure provides limited opportunity for intelligence

22

Kaplan, E. (2010). Profile: Hassan Nasrallah. Council on Foreign Relations at http://www.crf.org/publications/11132/profile.html . On the 14th July, 2006 Nasrallah’s home and office were targeted by Israeli jets. The buildings were destroyed however Nasrallah was uninjured. Nasrallah has also survived attempted poisoning by Israeli Intel operatives. 23 Martin, G. (2010). op. cit. Similar to the Mahmoud al-Mabhoud (see footnote 26), Israel neither confirmed

or denied its involvement in the assassination p.474; For detailed analysis see Jordan, J. (2009). When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation. Security Studies, 18. (p.p.719–755) at http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/618088_929899867_917380001.pdf “In a study of targeted killings in Israel Stephen David, in spite of concern over potential backlash, argued that

decapitation is effective and should be retained”. 24

Pape, R. A. op. cit. Khalid Mish’al, a senior Hamas official claimed “The Zionist enemy....only understands the language of Jihad, Resistance and Martyrdom, that was the language that led to the blatant defeat in South Lebanon....we will always have the Lebanese experiment before our eyes. It is a great model of which we are proud” p.13

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gathering and infiltration is almost impossible. Although the Israeli government

has one of the most capable intelligence networks in the world25, and has

successfully used infiltration tactics in the past, most notably Ramzi Nahara and

Mahmad Biro26, the potential for the Israeli Intelligence Community to drive

Hizbollah further underground is high and a lower profile does not equate to

reduced activity. 27

Targeted Killings: The intelligence limitations outlined above are magnified 10

fold when applied to targeted killings. The shambolic events in Dubai on the

19th January 201028, (whether involved or not) publicized Israeli Secret Service

operations and increased scrutiny by the international community will require

a tightening of procedures. Targeted killings have proven to be an effective

counter-terror weapon against Hizbollah and MESI recommends that they’re

optioned accordingly.

Clandestine operations have delivered results for the people of Israel however

improvements can and should be made. Internal audits must be carried out to

identify and eliminate current weaknesses. MESI recommends that covert ops

25

Office of the Prime Minister National Security Council. Dr. Uzi Arad - Head of the NSC and National Security Consultant at http://www.nsc.gov.il/NSCWeb/TemplatesEnglish/CounterTerrorismEN.aspx . The MOSSAD, Shin Bet, General Staff Elite ('Sayeret Matkal') and the Counter-terrorism Bureau are just some of the groups that combine to create Israel’s Intelligence Community. 26

Kulick, A. (2009). Hizbollah Espionage Against Israel. INSS Strategic Assessment, vol.12, no.3 at http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1259664045.pdf . Amir Kulick claims that Nahara and Biro, who at the time were major Lebanese drug dealers, were recruited to serve as Israeli agents however the type of intelligence supplied in unknown. Nahara and his brother Kamil later turned on the Israeli secret service and set up recruitment and intelligence operations among Israeli Arabs on behalf of Hizbollah. The Nahara brothers spy rings provided critical Israeli Intel for Hizbollah for over 4 years. p128 27

Shiyoukhi, N. (2010). Top-level informer affair embarrasses Hamas. Associated Press/MSNBC at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/cleanprint/CleanPrintProxy.aspx?1289552292337. Mosab Yousef, the son of Hamas founding member Sheik Hassan Yousef admitted to relaying intelligence to Shin Bet for over a decade. The assassination of Hamas Commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in January 2010, for which two Palestinians were arrested, has added to the Yousef incident in severely damaging Hamas’ perceived impenetrability. 28

Ibid. Mahmoud al-Mabhoud’s assassination, the fundamental errors of the operation, the trail left behind and the suggestions that Israel was involved combined to damage the credibility of the Israeli Secret Service.

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should continue to form the backbone of the Israeli government’s counter-

terrorism strategy.

Israel must realize that the IDF cannot eradicate Hizbollah by engaging in a

contemporary ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’.29 Hizbollah has far greater military

capability than the PLO, and the international community would not tolerate

belligerent actions from the Israeli government. 30 The Dahiya Doctrine should

not be the ‘end game’ for the Israeli government and continued reference to

the doctrine by IDF officials only exacerbates the situation by empowering

Hizbollah and Iran and raising Syrian anxiety, moreover it heightens

expectations of the Israeli population.31

MESI recommends that the suppression of Hizbollah be undertaken in advance

of a strategic strike on Iran. Iran would retaliate immediately through

Hizbollah; therefore it is imperative that Iran’s ‘second strike capacity’ is

neutralized.32

29

Martin, G. (2010). Responding to Terror: The Options. op. cit p. Operation Peace for Galilee was launched in 1982 in response to PLO rocket attacks and involved IDF and a combination of Palestinian and Syrian forces. The four week war was the beginning of an 18 year occupation of Lebanese territory by Israeli Forces that ended in July 2000. p.468 30

International Crisis Group. (2010). Drums of War: Israel and the “Axis of Resistance”. Middle East Report No.97. The 2008 Winograd Commission gave a damning response to its findings regarding the 2006 war with Hizbollah. The Commission found that a “semi-military organisation of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technological advantages”. p.1 31

Ibid. The Dohiya Doctrine was named after a southern Lebanese town that was used by Hizbollah to launch rocket attacks into Israel during the opening salvo in 2006. Israel responded by totally destroying the town and this is the premise on which the Dahiya Doctrine was founded. Major General Eizencourt of the Northern Israeli Command said that “What happened to Dahiya will happen to each village from which Israel is fired on. We will apply disproportionate force and inflict huge damage and destruction”. p.2 32

Ibid. Tehran would almost certainly use their intimate relationship with Hizbollah to react to an Israeli pre-emptive attack. This assumption is based on the widely agreed notion that Hizbollah “plays to Iran’s tune” and that “Iran would react only if and when its own situation became far more precarious”, however Hizbollah needs to offset the wishes of Iran against the needs of the Lebanese Shi’a, who would certainly view any action by Hizbollah/Iran that resulted in an IDF attack as an act of aggression outside of the muqawama. p.10

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Target Hardening

Specific measures can be employed to reduce the impact of Human and Vehicle

Borne IED’s and air attacks from Hizbollah rockets. This function of terrorist activity is

Hizbollah’s most effective weapon because of the psychological damage inflicted on the

people of Israel.

Increased visibility by State Security officers and IDF soldiers at border control

posts and checkpoints will increase the likelihood of detection in the short-

term and reduce their occurrence in the long-term. MESI is not suggesting that

such a threat can be eliminated however as has been noted previously in this

document, target hardening will direct the focus away from the general

population thereby reducing potential casualties.

Technical upgrades to monitoring and surveillance equipment for human and

vehicular traffic and rocket/missile detection systems when combined with a

reliable intelligence gathering capability will create the most comprehensive

target hardening strategy.

Hizbollah’s intelligence gathering techniques; the way information is obtained and the

type of intelligence gathered, indicate the organisations strategic goals are more complex

than traditional terrorist target identification. Besides individual infrastructure and human

target nomination, detailed geographic, military, political and Israeli civil society information

have been obtained.33 Hizbollah employ their intelligence agents as recruiters and have

33

Kulick, A. op. cit. Kulick believes that by analysing Hizbollah’s intelligence gathering technique’s several key points emerge; Tactical Intel: IDF movements, for terrorist attacks along the border, Operational Intel: Critical Israeli infrastructure to improve Hizbollah’s ability to cause significant damage in all-out war with Israel, this is also an indication that Hizbollah has acquired higher accuracy missiles than the Katyusha rocket. Strategic Intel: To better understand the Israeli psyche in an attempt to determine what type of terrorist act would inflict the most damage. Kulick insist that “Hizbollah’s intelligence work is not random, rather systematic and well established”. p.130

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coerced the services of several Israeli citizens ranging from Israeli Arab students to Knesset

members and IDF officers.34

MESI recommends that the Ministry of Public Security in cooperation with the

IDF, the National Security Council, the Counter-Terrorism Bureau and the

Israeli intelligence community prioritise the hardening of vital infrastructure

and eliminate information proliferation by narrowing the information stream.

International Sanction Regimes and UN Resolutions

The Israeli government’s relationship with the UN, while never extraordinary, has

been severely strained over recent months35, and Israel must not create further tension

with the international community. Bilateral sanctions deliver limited results36, however UN

resolutions (1559, 1680 and 1701) and the sanctions contained within them will have a far

greater impact on Hizbollah’s operational capability although “some independent analysts

34

Ibid. Kulick provides the example of Nassim Nasser who was recruited because a family member was employed in an official role with the Security Service and used this access to gather Intel on GOC Northern Commander Gabi Ashkenazi and Galil Division Commander Meir Kalifi. Omar al-Heib an IDF lieutenant Colonel of Bedouin descent led a Hizbollah espionage network between 2001-03 and supplied controllers with Intel on IDF movements, methods and equipment in the northern security zone. Azmi Bashara a sitting Knesset member provided Hizbollah with Israeli policy assessments and even advised Hizbollah how to improve their political-psychological war against Israel. p.120-125 35

See 2009 UNHCR Goldstone Report at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC_Report.pdf . The UNHCR accused Israel of using White Phosphorous munitions in the Gaza Strip and have been highly criticized for deploying cluster-bombs in southern Lebanon and most recently concerning the Turkish IHH flotilla incident on the 31

st May, 2010, see Hall, A. 3

rd, June at http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/06/03/2917766.htm

36 ICG Middle East Briefing Paper, 30

th July 2003. op. cit The Syrian Accountability Act subjects Syria to

sanctions if it is found to be dealing with Hizbollah or southern Lebanon. It was introduced in 2002 under the title “Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act” p.3; Van Engeland, A. (2008). Hezbollah: from a Terrorist Group to a Political Party-Social Work as a Key to Politics. Amid calls from congress that they supported terrorism, Lebanon refused to seize Hizbollah’s assets after 9/11 despite significant US pressure to commit to the US designed sanction scheme. p.30

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suggest that efforts to curb terrorist finances have reached a point of diminishing returns, as

terrorist groups are often self-supporting, and that the amount of terrorist funds

governments seize is insignificant”.37

UN sanction regimes have delivered tangible results, disrupting Hizbollah

operations. Israel must proceed with caution when engaging with the UN,

making concessions where necessary to create the impression of a constructive

working partner.38

Continue to cooperate with UNIFIL II and the LAF under the conditions

introduced in UN resolution 1701.39

The Disarmament of Hizbollah is central to the UN stated outcome however

the process will take time and MESI recommends that the Israeli government

analyse the situation in its entirety and by adopting the proposals outlined

within this document, Hizbollah will disarm out of necessity.

Hizbollah continues to use Al-Manar TV to “preach the adoption of terrorism,

reject the State of Israel's right to exist and spread the Iranian version of radical

Islam”40. The Israeli government should re-introduce the issue to the United

States and the European Union to place restrictions on satellite supply

companies Nilesat (Egypt), Arabsat (Pan Arab), IndoSat (Indonesia) and RSCC

37 Perl, R. F. (2007). International Terrorism: Threat, Policy and Response. CRS Report for Congress at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33600.pdf . p.8

38 Issues such as the Goldstone Report and the IHH flotilla incident require a measured response from the

Israeli government however justified their actions are thought to have been. There remains animosity over Resolution 425 and the destruction of a UN Compound in Qana (1996) that killed 125 Lebanese and UN members. 39

United Nations Security Council, Department of Public Information. News and Media division. Document SC/8808 Resolution 1701. Retrieved from http://www.Un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm . Resolution calls for a buffer zone to be created in southern Lebanon to be patrolled by UNIFIL troops and LAF soldiers and calls on the Lebanese government to extend control of its borders. The resolution also calls for the fulfilment of resolution 1559 and 1680 which called for the disarmament of all non-state militant groups. 40

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre. op. cit.

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(Russian) under international broadcasting legal conventions.41

Political/ Social Reform

The reduction in Hizbollah’s deployment of terrorist acts parallels the organisations

participation in the Lebanese political process. Academics who subscribe to Rational Choice

Theory argue that the offer of positive incentives can effectively reduce or eliminate the

threat of terrorism by increasing the cost to the terrorist of carrying out terrorist actions.42

Fundamental political reform is required in Lebanon and although Israel cannot

directly intervene in the reform process it can facilitate progress through a reduction in pre-

emptive actions targeting Hizbollah. Non-action by Hizbollah is far easier for the Israeli

government to control.

Diplomatic/Constructive Engagement

Dicter and Byman insist that “effective local partners are vital for counter-terrorism to

succeed”43, however Israel does not have a fully committed local partner to compliment

their counter-terror strategy. The nation of Israel finds itself in a complicated geographic

41 Ibid. The US, EU and South American countries have waged a struggle against broadcasting its programs. So

far there has been only partial success. Some of its broadcasts have been limited, but not completely prevented in countries outside the Middle East. “The Jewish community in Australia protested Al-Manar TV's incitement hate propaganda broadcasts, which reached the country via IndoSat. However, the Australian government took no steps to curtail reception of Al-Manar TV broadcasts”. p.3 42

Frey, B. S. and Luechinger, S. (2008). Three Strategies to Deal with Terrorism. ETH Zurich. University of Zurich at http://pams.com.au/ecosoc/staticontent/images/Bruno_Fey_on_terrorism.pdf . Frey and Luechinger argue that de-incentivizing the terrorist is more effective than traditional counter-terror deterrence. Political incentives, decentralization of the terrorist, effectively removing the focus and reaction away from the terrorist therefore reducing the benefit of engaging in terrorism. Their paper is based on Rational Choice Theory. 43

Dicter and Byman op. cit. The Saban Centre’s paper creates recommendations for the US government’s counter-terrorism strategy by examining Israel’s success and failures in their struggle against Hamas and Hizballah. p.1

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situation as it is extremely difficult to encourage neighbour states to support it in a

comprehensive attack on Hizballah as regional states risk public retribution by openly

supporting Israel, obviously there is no regional public diplomacy option for Israel.44 While it

is recommended that the Israeli government re-engages with potential regional partners the

outcomes of those talks should in no way shape counter-terrorism options, merely enhance

the strategy’ effectiveness. Policy needs to focus on the elimination of Hizbollah’s external

influences primarily arms and financial assistance but also in terms of inciting Hizbollah

members into action.45

The current geopolitical environment in the Middle East presents Israel with a unique

opportunity to exploit regional realignments. MESI understands it will require strategic

finessing inside the Knesset however MESI strongly urges the Israeli government to prioritise

the measures of this particular recommendation.46

Israel should accelerate diplomatic re-engagement with Syria47, Egypt and

Turkey as well as actively encouraging the United States’ current level of

engagement with the Lebanese government. Since the inauguration of

44

Ibid. Israel realised that the Palestinian Authority was reluctant to commit to the Hamas suppression campaigns initiated by Israel even though they would directly benefit from the program’s success. p.3 45

Mroue, B. and Keath, L. (2010). Ahmadinejad taunts Israel from border with Lebanon. The Christian Science Monitor, 14

th October. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content

/view/print/332284 . Events like the recent visit by the Iranian President have the potential to reignite Hizbollah’s support base at a time when the organization is attempting to focus on internal issues such as the imminent release of the UN Report into the 2005 assassination of Lebanese P.M. Hariri. 46

Bhalla, R. op. cit.; Brookings. 19th March 2009. On a New Footing: US-Syria Relations. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/0319_syria_saab.aspx?p=1 ;ICG. (2010). Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’ Future Current. Middle East Report No.96. p.5. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/lebanon/096-lebanons-politics-the-sunni-community-and-hariris-future-current.aspx . It is a perfect opportunity for Israel to engage with Syria who have made efforts to establish relations with Hariri’s government which in turn is supported by the US and Saudi Arabia. This would leave Hizbollah venerable with a hesitant Iran as its primary backer while Syria continues to increase its assistance to Hizbollah’s Lebanese secular rivals in an attempt to hedge its bets. 47

International Crisis Group. Lebanon at a Tripwire. Middle East Briefing No.20, 21st

December 2006. The Briefing Report claims that the US had been pressuring Israel over proposed unconditional resumption of negotiations between Israel and Syria. See also Saab, B. Y. On a New Footing:U.S.-Syria Relations, 19

th March,

2009.Brookings Institution at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/0319_syria_saab.aspx?p=1

16

President Obama, the United States has “provided more than $700 million in

security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security

Forces (ISF) to increase the capacity of those forces to combat terrorism and

secure Lebanon’s borders against weapons smuggling to Hezbollah and other

armed groups”. 48

The Israeli government should initiate a withdrawal from the Golan Heights49,

and the Shebaa Farms.50 The withdrawal procedure can be negotiated with the

Syrian government as part of the re-engagement process outlined above.

This minor although symbolic concession will re-invigorate bilateral affairs with

Syria and removes a primary source of resistance for Hizbollah, reducing their

justification for aggressive acts towards the nation of Israel. Strategically, the

government of Israel converts the territorial dispute into a Lebanese

(Hizbollah)/ Syrian issue that may lead to increased tension and therefore

Syria’s influence in southern Lebanon. MESI cautions the Ministry of Public

Security and the Israeli government to take into consideration the role of the

Syrian Social Nationalist Party. The party was active in the resistance against

the Israeli occupation of Lebanon from 1982-2000 and is now part of the

48

Addis, C. L. (2010). U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon. CRS Report for Congress. (p.p.1-17) at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R40485.pdf. The report laments that “Hezbollah’s electoral success in the 2009 national elections and its seats in Lebanon’s cabinet complicate U.S. and other international efforts to engage with Beirut on security issues and a number of key reform questions....U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that U.S. assistance to the LAF is not intended to enable the force to militarily confront Hezbollah”. p.14 49

ICG, Briefing No.20. “An agreement entailing the return of the Golan, security arrangements and normal relations between Syria and Israel would represent a strategic shift of enormous consequence for the region as a whole”. p.2 50

See Eschel, D. (2000). The Israel-Lebanon Border Enigma. IRBU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Winter 2000-2001 at http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publication/download/?id=179 ; In Focus: Shebaa Farms. BBC News Online, 25

th May, 2000 at http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/763504.stm ; Kaufman, A. (2004).

Understanding the Shebaa Farms Dispute: Roots of the Anomaly and Prospects for Resolution. Palestine-Israeli Journal, vol 11 no.1 at http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=9

17

Resistance and Development Bloc, alongside Hezbollah and could undermine

negotiations to consolidate its position of influence in Lebanese politics.

MESI recommends that Syria’s move towards normalisation with the United

States and Lebanon presents a favourable situation that the Israeli government

must encourage by any means possible.

Conclusion

Hizbollah is in a state of flux and MESI urges the Ministry of Public Security to

lobby the Knesset to adopt this comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. MESI

recognises that the recommendations contained in this Policy Implication Paper

contravene the fundamental Ministry of Public Security doctrine, however it is

apparent that the current Israeli government’s counter-terrorism strategy is

ineffective and costly in both human and financial terms as well as severely

damaging the regions perception of the nation of Israel. Israel’s security will

ultimately be delivered through a combination of internal vigilance and external

acceptance and MESI remain confident that the recommendations provided in

this Policy Implication Paper will achieve that goal.

18

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Who is MESI?

MESI IS a Non-Government Organization established to provide

governments and regional institutions with Counter-terrorism

strategies. MESI is able to draw from an extensive network of

international specialists in terrorism related areas to formulate

comprehensive, state specific policy responses to the global threat

of terrorism.

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