ForthcomingintheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy

TheCommonGood:ABuck-passingAccountEricBeerbohmandRyanDavis

The“commongood”isappealedtobyphilosophers,politicalscientists,andpoliticiansalike.

Althoughtheirpurposesarediverse,mostinvocationsofthecommongoodshareaunified

orientationtowardit.Thecommongoodistakentobeanidealworthyofourpoliticalpursuit.The

commongoodrepresentsawayofrisingaboveprivateorparochialinterests,settingasidepolitical

posturingorgamesmanship,andworkingtowardgoalswhosevaluenonecoulddeny.1Givenits

uniformlypositivevalence,itshouldnotbesurprisingthatthecommongoodisoftenpairedwith

theotherguidingconceptofpoliticalsociety:justice.Wearefrequentlytoldthattheappropriate

aimofadeliberativedemocracyistoward“justiceandthecommongood,”implicatingboththatthe

commongoodissomethingbeyondjusticeitself,butalsothatbothconceptsplayasimilar

function—asappropriateguidestopoliticalactivity.2

Whatwillinterestushereisnothowjusticeandthecommongoodaretreatedsimilarly,but

inacontrastbetweenthem.Whilejustice—perhapswithoutmuchcontroversy—isthemost

examinedconceptinpoliticalphilosophy,therehasbeenrelativelylittlesystematicstudyofits

complement.Ifweagreethatjusticeifthe“firstvirtue”ofpoliticalsociety,itmaywellwarrant

greaterscrutiny.Yetthecomparisonbetweenjusticeandthecommongoodsetsinreliefthedeep

disparityinattention.Ifthecommongood,aswellasjustice,shouldguideourpoliticalreasoning

andaction,thenthisconceptlikewisemeritstheoreticalattention.

Ouraimistoprovidetheoutlinesofatheoryofthecommongood.Wewillproposea

partiallyrevisionaryaccount.Onourview,tosayaproposalisinthecommongoodistosaythat

1See,recently,DominiqueLeydet,“PartisanLegislaturesandDemocraticDeliberation,”Journalof

PoliticalPhilosophy22:3(2014);EricMcGhee,SethMasket,BorisShor,StevenRogers,andNolanMcCarty,“APrimaryCauseofPartisanship?NominationSystemsandLegislatorIdeology,”AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience58:2(2013):337-351

2See,forexample,EricMacGilvary,“DemocraticDoubts:PragmatismandtheEpistemicDefenseofDemocracy,”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy22:1(2014):105-123.HereMacGilvaryisfollowingJoshCohen,“AnEpistemicConceptionofDemocracy,”Ethics97(1986):26-38.

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therearereasonstoacttogethertobringitabout.WetakethisaccounttoofferwhatCarnapcalled

anexplicativeconcept.3Ourviewpreservesafairamountofthemeaningofthewordineveryday

use.Atthesametime,werefinetheconcepttomeetasetofthreerelevanttheoreticaldesiderata,to

bedescribedinsection1.Section2willpresentourpositiveaccount.Sections3and4willinturn

illustratehowouraccountmeetsthedesiderata,andrespondtoobjections.

1. DesiderataforaTheoryoftheCommonGood

Weshouldnotethatourprimaryaimwillbetowardtheory-building,andsowillbeexploratory

ratherthancritical.Forexample,wewillnotarguethatalternativewaysofspecifyingtheconcept

ofthecommongoodwillfailtomeetourdesiderata.Ouraimisnottoprecludeotherwaysof

theorizingthecommongood,buttosuggesttheneedfortheoryinthefirstplace.Conceptual

choicesshouldnotbemadeunconsciously,andouraimistomakeexplicitsomepossibleoptions.

Aswithanyconceptualchoices,therearecostsandbenefitstoourfavoredview.Withthisas

background,wewillsuggestthatatheoryofthecommongoodshouldmeetthreecriteria.Itshould

bedistributivelyneutral,non-partisan,andextensionallyadequate.

First,theconceptofthecommongoodshouldnotprivilegetheinterestsorvaluesofsome

membersofasocietyoverothers.Anygood-centeredapproachbringsacertainhazardtopolitical

deliberation.Itallowscitizenstomakeargumentsthatpaperoverinterpersonaltrade-offs.Inso

doing,itcreatesthepossibilitythattheconceptitselfcouldbiasthedistributionofgoodsor

resources.Suchaconsequence,webelieve,shouldcountasatheoreticalcost.Instead,aconceptof

thecommongoodshouldbedistributivelyneutralamongtheinterestsofrelevantparties.

Itmayhelptohaveaconcreteexampleofhowconceptofthecommongoodcanbeinvoked

inawaythatrunsafoulofdistributiveneutrality.RobertMosesensuredthatsomeofNewYork’s

3RudolfCarnap,MeaningandNecessity:AStudyinSemanticsandModalLogic.(Chicago,IL:The

UniversityofChicagoPress,1947)

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overpassesweresolowthatbusescouldnoteasilytravelfromthepoorestboroughs.4Herethe

distributiveburdenplacedontheleastwelloffwasmorallyunacceptableonarangeofegalitarian

views.Mosesdefendedhisblueprintinabstractions.Hewasparticularlyfondofcitingthecommon

orpublicgoodashisally.Ofcourse,hisactionswerenotactuallysanctionedbyagood-oriented

approachtopoliticalmorality.Butitraisesthedistributiveworryabouthowtheconceptofthe

commongoodcanbeused.Ifpublicofficialsthinkofthemselvesasmakingdecisionsthataregood-

for-us,theymaybetemptedtoglossoverdisparitiesconcealedbehindthisnormativebanner.

AlthoughthecaseofRobertMosesisanextremeinstanceofdeployingthe“commongood”

asaguisefordistributivebias,realizingdistributiveneutralitycanbedifficulty.Asanother

example,consider“objectivelist”theoriesofthecommongood.Accordingtotheseaccounts,the

commongoodisgivenbyalistofgoodstakentobepositivelyvaluabletoeverymemberofa

politicalcommunity.Evenseeminglyuncontroversialitemsonsuchlistscanbedistributively

consequential.Manyobjectivelistsofthe“commongood”willcitenationalsecurity,forinstance.5

Whilenationalsecuritymaybeintheinterestofeverycitizen,allocatingresourcesinawaythat

marginallyreducesthesusceptibilityofthepoliticalstatetoattackmaymeanlittletocitizens

whosebodilysecurityisvulnerabletoviolencebyothermembersoftheirhousehold,community,

oreven,possibly,localgovernmentauthorities.Anotherfrequentitemonlistsofthecommongood

isequalityineducation.6Whilecertainlyaworthyideal,allocatingresourcestoachieveequalityin

educationmaymattermosttothosewhoalreadyreceiveaneducationthatprovidesbasiccivic

capacities.Forthosenotyetinthisgroup,equalityineducationmaynotbeameaningfulideal.7In

4RobertCaro,ThePowerBroker:RobertMosesandtheFallofNewYork(NewYork:VintageBooks,

1975).5Forexample,BrianM.Barry,PoliticalArgument(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1965),p.

195.6ThiselementhasaRawlsianpedigree.SeealsoSamuelFreeman,“DeliberativeDemocracy:A

SympatheticComment,”Philosophy&PublicAffairs29:4(2000):371-418,p.412.7Forthispoint,seeElizabethAnderson,“FairEqualityinEducation:ADemocraticEquality

Perspective,”Ethics117(2007):595-622.Animportantpaperinthehistoryofsociologyonclassandeducation,whichvividlyportraysthevariedwaysinwhichstatusinfluencesmanyaspectsofeducation,isJeanAnyon,“SocialClassandSchoolKnowledge,”CurriculumInquiry1:1(1981):3-42.

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eachofthesecases,aseeminglyuncontroversialitemonanobjectivelistofthecommongoodmay

quietlyimportcertainbackgroundassumptionsaboutwhichdistributiveissuesaremostpressing.

Oursecondproposeddesideratumforaconceptofthecommongoodisthatitshouldbe

non-partisan.Theconceptofthecommongoodshouldbespecifiedinawaythatallowsforthefull

rangeofsubstantivedebateaboutwhatshouldcountaspartofthecommongood.Wehavea

strongmethodologicalreasontofosteragreementaboutcoreconcepts,sincethatallowsforthe

possibilityofgreaterclarityindisagreementsamongconceptions.Toseetheforceofthisreason,

wecanagainlooktoconceptofdistributivejustice.Membersofasociety–andtheirresident

philosophers–canagreethattheyareinterestedincomingupwiththerightdistributionof

benefitsandburdensinacooperativesocialarrangement.Theconceptofjustice,inthissense,

helpssettheircollectiveproblem.Theywilldisagreeaboutwhichparticulartheoryoffersa

plausibleanswertothispredicament.Buttheyhaveaplatformonwhichtodisagree,make

concessions,andevensearchforoverlappingprinciples.

Partisanaccountsofthecommongoodwillfailtoprovidethisservice.Instead,theywill

tendtofavorsomefirst-orderviewaboutmoralityorpoliticsattheexpenseofothers.Itis

temptingtotalkaboutthecommongoodinawaythatcastsadistinctivetelicvalence.Thecommon

goodcaneasilybethoughtofasavaluethatisbothspecifiableintermsofanendstatetobe

realizedorpromoted,and“common”—inthephilosophicallyloadedsenseof“agentneutral.”But

tomakethissuppositionwouldbetoruleoutmanycontendingtheoriesaboutpoliticallife.An

especiallyprominentincludesseveralformsofdeonticegalitarianism.Relationalegalitarianism,

wewanttosuggest,isplainlyincompatiblewithagood-centeredview.Itholdsthatwhatismorally

centralisrelatingtoothersonjustifiableterms.Inequalitiesofgoods–powerorwealth–can

reflectformsofmistreatment.Itconstruesequalityasasocialandpolitical–notfundamentally

distributive–value.Onthisview,thevalueofequalityliesnotinabstractpatternsoritsimpacton

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ourwell-being.Itrests,instead,inthewebofrelationshipsthatweholdasdirectlyvaluable.A

good-orientedapproachwillmisplacethesignificanceofequality.

Third,andmostobviously,anaccountofthecommongoodshouldbeextensionally

adequate.Itshouldbeabletomakesenseofcontemporaryusesamongtheorists,aswellas

practitionersofpolitics.Extensionaladequacydoesnotruleoutthepossibilityofconceptual

revision.8Sometimes,existingpracticemaybepartisanandordistributivelybiased,andso

theoreticalrevisionmayofferthepossibilitiesforprovidingamoreusefulconcept.However,the

conceptshouldcontinuetoanswertoactualpractice.Ausefulconceptmustbeonethatis

intelligiblefromthepointofviewofthosewho,infact,invokeit.

2. ABuck-PassingAccount

Wearelookingforawayofformulatingthecommongoodinawaythatisdistributivelyneutral,

non-partisanamongcompetingconceptions,andextensionallyadequateinlightofuse.How

shouldweproceed?Letusinspecttherolethatthisnotionplaysinourfirst-personalplural

reasoning.Supposewearedeliberatingwhethertoinvestmoreinourspaceprogramor

performingarts.Argumentsthatoneoftheseprogramsis“better-for-us”wouldcomeacrossas

unusual.Itwouldseemtobeprovidingareasonofthewrongkind.Toseetheforceofthis,consider

theexperienceofindividualdecision-making.Inourpersonalchoices,itisstrikinghowrarelywe

aredirectlyguidedbytheaimofourowngood.TheindividualwhohasjustclimbedMount

Himalayawillnotbegladtorecastheraccomplishmentintermsofherwell-beingorinterest.To

her,acceptingthattheclimbwasgoodforher–onwhatevermetricyou’dlike–neednotmakethe

experiencemorevaluable.Itisinthissensethatwhatis“goodforus”is,inScanlon’slanguage,

“evaluativelytransparent.”9So,ifweoptforthepolicyofbolsteringthespaceprogram,wedosofor

reasonsthatweseeaschoiceworthyintheirownright.Wearenotmakingagood-for-usappeal–

8Cf.Godfrey-Smith,“MetaphysicsandthePhilosophicalImagination,”PhilosophicalStudies160:1

(2012):97-113.9Scanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress),93.

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whateveraggregativeprocedurewearelikelytouse.Thisisn’ttosaythattheprogram’simpacton

thegoodofparticularindividualsisnull,orthatisgoesunregistered.Butwerecognizethatour

collectiveaimisvaluedprimarilyfornon-welfaristreasons.

HerewefollowT.M.Scanlon’sinfluentialbuck-passingaccountofthegood.Scanlonwrites:

[B]einggood,orvaluable,isnotapropertythatitselfprovidesareasontorespondtoa

thingincertainways.Rather,tobegoodorvaluableistohaveotherpropertiesthat

constitutesuchreasons.Sincetheclaimthatsomepropertyconstitutesareasonisa

normativeclaim,thisaccountalsotakesgoodnessandvaluetobenon-naturalproperties,

namelythepurelyformal,higher-orderpropertiesofhavingsomelower-orderproperties

thatprovidereasonsoftherelevantkind.10

InScanlon’soriginalversion,predicates“good”or“valuable”refer(passthebuck)toother

properties,whichprovidereasonsforadoptingvariousattitudes.11ModifyingScanlon’sidea,we

propose,

TheBuck-PassingAccountoftheCommonGood:Beinginthecommongoodconsists

inthefactthattherearereasonstoacttogethertobringitabout.

OurproposalmodifiesScanlon’sinseveralways.First,theparagraphfromScanloncitedabove

famouslycontainsatleasttwotheses:onenegativeandtheotherpositive.Thenegativethesis

claimsthatsomething’sbeinggooddoesnot,itself,providereasons.Thepositivethesisclaimsthat

something’sbeinggoodindicatesthattherearealwaysotherreasonstorespondtoitinsome

appreciativeway.12Ashasbeenpointedoutinthemeta-ethicalliterature,thesethesesare

independent.Wewillbeinterestedonlyinadaptingthepositivethesis.Thetruthofthepositive

10Scanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther,97.11Asarefereehelpfullypressesustoclarify,ourproposalforthecommongoodwillnotrequire

adoptinganyspecificviewoftheroleof‘thegood’incollectivedeliberation.12Butnotnecessarilythatthereareonlyotherreasonstorespondinanappreciativeway.Our

thankstoarefereeforpressingustoclarifythis.Ifthepositivethesisimpliedtherewereonlyotherreasons,thenitwouldentailthenegativethesis.

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thesisdoesnotentailthenegativethesis.13Moreover,withasufficientlycapaciousviewofreasons,

itispossibletothinkthatthegoodmightprovidereasonsevenifitmerelyreferstoother,reason-

providingproperties.InSchroeder’scase,Nate’sfriendtellsNatethatthereisareasontogointo

thelivingroom,butdoesnottellhimwhatthereasonis(unbeknownsttoNate,asurpriseparty

awaitshimthere).WhenNategoesintothelivingroom,heactsontheconsiderationthat“thereis

areasonforhimtogointothelivingroom.”Byhypothesis,though,healsoactsforareason.Butif

thisfactcan,itself,countasareason,thenitseemsthatthenegativebuck-passingthesisisfalse.

Analogouscasesareeveneasiertofindatthecollectivelevel.Inaworldofcomplex

decision-making,policymakersareoftenforcedtorely—tosomeextent,anyway—onexperts.14

Supposeanadvisortellsarepresentativethatthereisreasontovoteforaneconomicstimulus

package.Itmaywellbethattherepresentativehasneithertheexpertisetounderstandwhatthe

reasonisnorthetimetocometounderstandthereason.Nevertheless,itmayberationalforthe

representativetovoteforthepackage.Therepresentativestillvotesforareason—namely,“that

thereisareasontovoteforthestimuluspackage.”However,thenegativethesiswouldrequirethat

therepresentativeactfornoreasonatall,since,byhypothesis,shehasnoother,first-orderreasons

forvotingforthepackage.Thus,thereisananalogousdisconfirmingcaseforthenegativethesis.

Becausethenegativebuck-passingthesismighttherebyencounterproblems,wewillnowsetit

aside.(Equally,nothingwesaywillrequirethatthenegativethesisbefalse.)

Second,ourbuck-passingaccountofthecommongoodisfocusedonreasonsforaction,

ratherthanreasonsforsomeotherattitudeorsetofattitudes.Onemightworrythatthisfeature

willraiseapartisanshipobjectionagainstourownaccount,privilegingdeontologicalratherthan

consequentialistfirst-orderpoliticalviews.However,consequentialistsalsohavetheoriesofright

action,andthereisnoobstacletothinkingthatrightactionsarejustthosethatpromotedesirable

13Cf.MarkSchroeder,“TheBuck-passers’NegativeThesis,”PhilosophicalExplorations12:3(2011).14Cf.Pettit,“DepoliticizingDemocracy,”RatioJuris17:1(2004):52-65.

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statesofaffairs.Ourproposalisevencompatiblewithversionsofconsequentialismaccordingto

whichallvaluesareagent-neutral.15Morecentrally,thereasonsthatwehavetoactwilldependon

thereasonswehaveforintending,whichwillinturndependonourreasonsfordesiring.16Soit

willmatterlittle,fromthestandpointoffirst-ordernormativetheory,whetherwedescribeour

accountintermsofdesires,intentions,oractions.

Onourproposal,itismostnaturaltofocusonreasonsforacting,sinceactingissomething

thatwecandotogether.Ouraccounttherebyconnectsactiontothe“common”aspectofthe

commongood.Weneednottakeanyparticularstandonhowactingtogetherworks:whether,for

example,itinvolvesnon-reductivecollectiveagents,someagentsactingonintentionsformedby

otheragents,orthelike.17Weconsideritavirtueofouraccountthatitisaction-theoretically

lightweight.Further,weneednotarticulatenowexactlyhowrobustoursharedagencymustbe.In

somecasesofactingtogether,ourindividualactionsmaybetightlycoordinated.(Think,for

example,ofreliefworkersactingaspartofasingle,unifiedplanofaction).Onotheroccasions,our

involvementinactingwithfellowcitizensmaybelimitedtodeliberationorvotingthataimstolink

upwiththeactionsofotherstomodifypolicydownstream.18Instillothercases,itmayinvolve

incorporation,iftherelevantreasonsfavorformingacollectivebodyorinstitutionwherenone

15Suchconsequentialistsmaysimplyexpandthesetofreasonsthatapplytoall-of-ustogether,since

allvalueswould,inprinciple,warrantpromotionbyanyagent,nomattertheirposition.Ontheotherhand,somecollectionsofagentswilllikelybecontingentlybebetterplacetopromotesomevaluesthanothers,whichmayrestrictwhatisinthecommongoodforparticulargroups.Ingeneral,theonlyconsequentialiststhatmightbeconcernedwithourviewwouldbethosewhofavoreliminatingdeontictermsaltogether.Eveninthatcase,however,suchtheoristsmightretaintheconceptof“reasonsforaction,”evenwhiledischargingconceptslike“rightness”and“wrongness.”

16Fordiscussion,seeJohnSkorupski’s“bridgeprinciple,”inhisTheDomainofReasons(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010):p.265.AsimilarpointisforwardedbyHowardNye,DavidPlunkett,andJohn,Ku,“Non-ConsequentialismDemystified,”Philosopher’sImprint15:4(2015).

17SeeMargaretGilbert,JointCommitment:HowWeMaketheSocialWorld(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013);MichaelBratman,SharedAgency:APlanningTheoryofActingTogether(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2014);DavidVelleman,“HowtoShareanIntention?”inSelftoSelf(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006);AbrahamRoth,“SharedAgencyandContralateralCommitments,”ThePhilosophicalReview113:3(2004).

18Foranaccountofhowourwillscanbecomeinvolvedincommonendeavors,butinawaythatalsodoesnotrequiresuigeneriscollectiveagents,seeXXX.

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existedpreviously.19Anotherrelatedpoint:takingthecommongoodtodirectustoreasonstoact

togetherdoesnotdenythatindividualssometimeshavereasontoactaloneforthecommongood.

Itmerelyentailsthatindividualsdohavereasontoactwithothersforthecommongood.Sothe

proposalcanbeneutralon,forinstance,debatesbetweenRawlsandG.A.Cohen.20Thatis,agents

mightpursuethecommongoodtogetherthroughinstitutions(likethosecomprisingRawls’s‘basic

structure’)orthroughtheactionsofindividualpersons.

Thebuck-passingaccountthusconnectsthecommongoodwithactingtogether.This

featuresupportstheideathatthatthereasonstoactforthecommongoodwillalsobereasonsfor

us,together.Inotherwords,thereasonstoadoptcertainactionsorattitudesmaybeunderstoodas

agent-relative.Becausebuck-passingaccountsofthegooddonotsuggeststatesofaffairsasthe

fundamentalbearersofvalueindependentofthenormativedeliberationofagents,theyfitmore

easilywiththephenomenonofagent-relativity.21Buck-passingaccountscanmakesenseofthe

ideaofindexedvaluesthatprovidereasonstoparticularagents.Mykeepingmypromisemaybe

goodmebutnotgoodyou.Myavoidingterriblesuffering,ontheotherhand,maybegoodmeand

goodyou.Ingeneral:

∀x(xhasreasontodowhatisgoodx)

WhenIactalone,Ioughttoactonconsiderationsofwhatisgoodrelativetome.22Whenweact

together,wemightthenexpectthatweshouldactonwhatisgoodrelativetous.Weshouldacton

reasons“attributabletous,collectively,astheirjointsubject”—or“reasons-for-us.”23Theseideas

19Onincorporationtoachievesharedgoods,seePhilipPettit,“ResponsibilityIncorporated,”Ethics

117(2007):171-201.20SeeG.A.Cohen,“WheretheActionIs:OntheSiteofDistributiveJustice,”Philosophy&PublicAffairs

26(1997):3-30.21Cf.Wallace’sdescriptionofteleologicalaccountsas“inhospitable”tothephenomenonofagent-

relativity.SeeR.JayWallace,“Reasons,ValuesandAgent-Relativity,”Dialectica64:4(2010):503-528,p.519.22AhelpfulexpositionofagentrelativevalueisgivenbyMichaelSmith,“NeutralandRelativeValue

afterMoore,”Ethics113(2003):576-598.23AndreaWestlund,“DecidingTogether,”Philosopher’sImprint9:10(2009),p.2.

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mightmakeittemptingtothinkthatforsomegroupofagents,thecommongoodisgivenbysome

functionoftheagent-relativegoodsoftheagentscomprisingthegroup.Suchas:

∀x∀y(xandyhavereasontodotogetherwhatisbothgoodxandgoody)

Inwhichcase,thecommongood(xandy)wouldbegivenasafunctionofgoodxandgoody.Thatis,the

commongood(xandy)couldbereducedtotheagent-relativegoodsofXandY.Theremightbesome

challengeinspecifyinghowthisreductionwouldwork,sinceinsomecaseswhatisgoodxmightalso

bebady.Suchcases(andperhapsothers)wouldhavetoberuledout.Butinprinciple,wemight

thinkthattheagentrelativegoodofagroupcanbe“factored”intotheagentrelativegoodsofits

members.

Yetthereareavarietyofcaseswherewehavereasons-for-usthatmaynotbereduciblein

thisway.AsWestlundpointsout,ifamarriedcoupleisplanningavacation,itmaybeimportantto

eachpersonthattheotherhasreasonsfromtheirownpointofviewforacceptingtheproposed

destination,eveniftheotheriswillingto“leaveitup”totheirpartner.24Insuchacase,tosaythata

destinationisgoodrelativetomeandgoodrelativetoyou(since,byhypothesis,myhavingahappy

vacationisgoodyou),itdoesn’tfollowthatwehavereasons-for-ustogothere.Ontheotherhand,I

maysometimesbepersuadedthatevenifsomeplanisbadme,therestillmightbereasons-for-usto

doit.Thatis,althoughIhaveanexanteagent-relativereasonagainstsomeplan,Imightfindin

deliberationwithyouthatyouragent-relativereasonsfavoringtheplanarereasonsIcan,ina

sense,sharebydecidingtoadoptyourendsasmyown.25AsWestlundputsit,“co-deliberators

24Ibid.,p.7.KasparLippert-Rassmussenpointsoutthatagent-relativityintuitivelyinvolves

assigning“differentaimstodifferentagents.”[SeeLippert-Rassmussen,Deontology,Responsibility,andEquality(Copehhagen:MuseumTusculanumPress,2005),p.16].Ifagentrelativityingeneralinvokestheperspectivesofseparateagents,thenthecommongoodintuitivelyassigningasingleperspectivetoagentsactingtogether.

25Compare,KylaEbels-Duggan,“AgainstBeneficence:ANormativeAccountofLove,”Ethics119:1(2008):142-170;ChristineKorsgaard,“TheReasonsWeCanShare,”inCreatingtheKingdomofEnds(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).ComparealsowithJohnFinnis,“PublicGood:TheSpecificallyCommonGoodinAquinas,”inR.P.George[ed.]NaturalLawandMoralInquiry(Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress,1998).

11

behavereasonablywhentheyaredialogicallysensitivetotheinterdependenceoftheirindividual

reasonsforacceptingRasareason-for-them.”26

Resolvingsuchmattersextendsbeyondourpresentscope,butwesuggestthree

implications.First,thedifficultyoffactoringthecommongoodintoitsconstituentgoodsis

probativefortheviewthatthecommongoodmustbereachedthroughsomedeliberativeprocess

(wewillreturntothislater).Second,itmaybeanopenquestionwhethersomegroupofagentshas

acommongoodatall—this,itself,maybeanappropriatesubjectforpoliticaltheorizing.Third,the

irreducibilityofthecommongoodcountsinfavorofitstheoreticalusefulness.Itoffersareasonto

thinkthatweshouldnoteliminatetheconceptaltogetherinfavorofsimpler,lesscontested

notions.27Instead,wemightseethecommongoodasirreduciblyagent-relativetoagroup,asin:

∀x∀y(Ifxandyhaveacommongood,thenxandyhavereasontodotogetherwhatisinthe

commongood(xandy))

Thisproposalclearlydoesnotrequirethatforanysetofagents,theremustbeacommongood.

Whetherthereisacommongoodinthefirstplace—foragroupsomehowdelimited—maybea

controversialmatter.Thereisalsonosuggestionthatthecommoncouldcanbefactoredintothe

goodsofspecificmembers—althoughitalsodoesnotdenythispossibility.Forgroupsthatdohave

acommongood,theproposalanalyzesthatgoodintermsofreasonsthatmembersofthegroup

havetoacttogethertobringitabout.

3. VirtuesoftheBuck-PassingAccount

Withtheproposalnowmoreclearlyinview,wecanconsiderhowourbuck-passingaccount

managesthedistributiveandpartisanshipobjections.Thebuck-passingaccountneednotreduce

26Westlund,p.10.27Non-eliminativestrategiesareofcoursealsosupportedbythecontinuedusefulnessofthe

distinctionbetweenself-interestandamoregeneralcivicinterest.Thissortofdistinctionisdeployed,forexample,inKasparLippert-Rasmussen,“VoteBuyingandElectionPromises:ShouldDemocratsCareAbouttheDifference?”TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy19:2(2011):125-144,especiallyn.13.

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thecommongoodtothegoodspickedoutbythewelfarefunctionofanyperson,setofpersons,or

group.Wemayhavereasonstoacttogethertopromoteorhonorimpersonalvalues.Wemayalso

havereasonstoacttogethertopromoteorhonorgoodsconnectedtopersonsnotincludedamong

thoseacting.Inprinciple,suchactionsarejustasmuchpartofour“commongood”asthemountain

climber’squestisapartofherindividualgood.Recallthatinthemountainclimber’scase,wedo

notjudgethatshehassomeexanteinterestsatisfiedinbeingatthetopofamountain.28Rather,

sheadoptstheaimofclimbingthemountainforreasonsthatmakethisaworthyproject,anditis

thengoodforherwelfaretoachieveheraim.Inthecaseofourcommongood,wemayacttogether

forreasonsthat(morallyorotherwise)warrantouraction,andachievingourcommonaim

becomesgoodforuscollectively.29Thus,ouraccountcanremainneutralwithrespectto

distributivequestions.

Thebuck-passingaccountofthecommongoodisalsonon-partisan.Becauseittakesno

axiologicalstand,itallowsfordebatesbetweencompetingpoliticaltheoriestobedecidedontheir

substantivemerits,ratherthanconceptualfiat.Liberalegalitarian,communitarian,naturallaw,and

republicantheoriescanallbegivenintermsofreasonstoacttogether.Libertarians—sometimes

28Wallaceisalsogoodonthispoint,in“TheRightnessofActsandtheGoodnessofLives,”inSmith,

Pettit,SchefflerandWallace(eds.)ReasonandValue(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004).29Itmaybeintuitivelyoddtoregardallactionwhichwehavereasontodotogetheraspartofthe

commongood.Forexample,supposethatasodacompanywouldgiveeveryAmericancitizenalargesumofmoneyifeachpersonpurchasedonecanofthesoda.Thecompany’sgenerouspublicitystuntwouldseemtogiveallAmericanssufficientreasontocoordinatetheiractionstogetherinresponsetothesamesetofconsiderations.Butitseemsoddtothinkthatinbuyingthesoda,Iamactingforthecommongood.(WethankAdamKernforcallingthispointtoourattentionwiththiscase.)Theissueisthatthiscaseofthecommongoodappearslikeasetofmanyindividualprivategoods,ratherthanonepublicgood.Hereitmayhelptodistinguishthecommongoodfromtherelatednotionofthepublicgood.Thecontrastbetweenpublicandprivategoodsisoftenconnectedtotheideaofexcludabilityornon-excludability.Becausethesodacasefocusesattentiononeachindividualreceivingacorrespondinglyindividuatedgoodratherthansharingasinglegood,ithasthefeelavaluethatisin-principleexcludable.Soitseemsnottobewithinthepublicgood.Foramoredetaileddiscussionoftheconceptofthepublicgoodanditshistory,seeJaneMansbridge,“OntheContestedNatureofthePublicGood,”inWalterW.PowellandElisabethS.Clemens(eds.)PrivateActionandthePublicGood(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1998).Mansbridgealsonotesthehistoricalevolutionoftheconceptofthecommongood.Foranothersignificanttreatmentofthepublicgood,seeRobertE.Goodin,"InstitutionalizingthePublicInterest:TheDefenseofDeadlockandBeyond,"TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview90,no.2(1996).

13

waryoftheverynotionofjointaction—mightworrythattheirviewswillnotbeexpressible

throughthebuck-passingaccount.Forthatmatter,libertariansmightcontendthattheveryideaof

thecommongoodisapartisanone,smugglingincollectivistvalues.30However,evenstrict

libertariansallowthattherearesometimesreasonstoacttogetherthroughpolitics.31

Nordoesthebuck-passingaccountsmuggleinanimplicitconsequentialism.Wemayhave

reasonstoacttogetherthatfollowfromtherelationshipswecurrentlyshare,ormightrealize

throughsharedaction.Thesereasonsmightnotbegroundedfundamentallyinourwelfare

(althoughmay,asnoted,derivativelyconnecttowelfare),andtheymayalsonotbeabout

promotinganystateofaffairs.Thispointbearsemphasizing,asitmightseemthatthedifference

hereismerelyverbal.32Forexample,acriticmightarguethattheconsequentialistversionofthe

commongoodcouldalsocapturerelationalreasons(e.g.weoughttopromotethestateofaffairsin

whichwestandwithothercitizensinrelationshipsofequality).Importantly,thiskindofre-

descriptiondoesnotnecessarilycapturethesamesetofreasons.Tosaythatthemountainclimber

hasareasontoclimbthemountainisnotequivalenttosayingthatshehasareasontobringabout

thestateofaffairsinwhichshehasclimbedthemountain.Anambitiousbutself-effacingmountain

climbermighthavereasontowanttoclimbEverest(agreatachievement!),butnothavereasonto

wanttobringaboutthestateofaffairsinwhichshehadclimbedEverest(toomuchattention!).As

30Forthisversionofapartisanobjectionagainstthecommongood,seeGeoffreyBrennanandLoren

Lomasky,“AgainstRevivingRepublicanism,”Politics,Philosophy&Economics5:2(2006),especiallysectionII.31Forexample,ifthereisuniversalconsenttosomedecisionprocedureotherthanuniversalconsent

forsomedomainofcollectivedecisions,thenonemightregardthatdecisionprocedureasonewehavereasontogethertofollow.Cf.JamesBuchanan,TheCalculusofConsent:LogicalFoundationsofConstitutionalDemocracy(AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress,1965).AhelpfulintroductionisprovidedinJohnThrasherandGeraldGaus,“OnTheCalculusofConsent”inJecobLevy[ed.]TheOxfordHandbookofClassicsinContemporaryPoliticalTheory(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming).

32Nozick,forexample,allowedthatdifferencemightbeverbal,butremainedsuspiciousofconsequentialistre-descriptions.SeeAnarchyStateandUtopia(NewYork:BasicBooks,1974):29.

14

Nye,Plunkett,andKupointout,thefunctionalroleofact-directedreasonscanbequitedifferent

fromstate-directedreasons.33

Sotooforreasonsinthecommongood.Wemayhavereasontoacttobringaboutsocial

equality,notjusttobringitaboutthatweachievedsocialequality.Toseethedifference,imagine

socialequalitybeingachievedbythesamegroupofpeople,butinonecasethroughexclusively

privateactions,andinanothercasethroughtheuseofasharedstateapparatus.34Ourpresent

pointisnotthattheactionmattersbeyondthefactofrealizingthestateinwhichtheactionis

performed,butmerelythatitmaymatter,andoursoconceptualtoolsshouldnotoccludethis

possibility.Thatshouldbelefttothebusinessofsubstantivepoliticalargument.Itmaymatterthat

wehavereasontoapologizeforhistoricalinjustice,notjustthatwebringaboutthestateofaffairs

inwhichweapologized.Itmaymatterthatweprovidehumanitarianaid,notjustthatwebring

aboutastateofaffairswhereaidisprovidedbyus.

Thislastpointleadstoafinal,centralvirtueofouraccount--namely,thatitcanhelpus

understandhowtheconceptofthecommongoodisusedbypoliticaltheorists,andhowitis

connectedtootherconceptswithinpoliticaltheory.First,wewillconsidertheconcept'suse.While

wedonotwantaconceptofthecommongoodthatcallsanyclaimsmadebyactualtheoristsinor

outofbounds(asiftheycouldbedisabusedoftheirmisguidedviewofthecommongoodmerelyby

attendingmorecloselytotheconcept),wedowantaconceptthatwillexplainfeaturescommonto

alluses.35Asthefirstsectionindicated,thecommonthemetoallusesofthecommongoodisthatit

isnormative.36Thereligiousgroup,thepoliticalliberal,andthepoliticalideologuehavevery

33ThisisthecentralpointinHowardNye,DavidPlunkett,andJohnKu,“Non-Consequentialism

Demystified,”Philosopher’sImprint15:4(2015).ItisalsoanticipatedbyVelleman’sdiscussionof“actingforthesakeof”in“LoveasaMoralEmotion”inSelftoSelf(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006).

34SeeXXX.35Wemightcallthesethecommongood’sconceptualplatitudes.SeeMichaelSmith,TheMoral

Problem(Malden,MA:Blackwell,1994).36OurproposalispresagedbyHenryRichardson’sdiscussionofthe“publicgood.”LikeRichardson,

wearemotivatedbydecouplingtheconceptofthecommongoodfromawelfaristaccountofvalue.Second,ourproposalmakesthecommongoodakindofnormativesuccessterm,similartoRichardson,whodefines“aconceptionofthepublicgood,”as“aviewabouthowpublicactionshouldberegulated”(emphasesin

15

differentviewofthecommongood,buttheyallagreethatweshouldactforitorinitsbehalf.

Moreover,theverysparsenessofdescriptiongivenbysometheoristscitedabovesuggeststhatthey

takeforgrantedthatthecommongoodisnormativeforus.Like“justice,”thecommongoodisa

kindofnormativesuccessterm.Ourbuck-passingproposalcanexplainwhythecommongoodhas

thisfeature.Thisissimplybecausethecommongoodisunderstoodintermsofreasons,and

reasonsarewhatexpressnormativity.37Ifweunderstandthecommongoodasconceptually

connectedtoreasons,wecanmakesenseoftheonefeaturethatclearlyunitesthewayinwhichthe

termisused.

Ouraccountcanalsohelpilluminatehowthecommongoodisconnectedtootherconcepts

withinpoliticaltheory.Inparticular,considertheideaofdeliberation.Assection2described,

politicaltheoristsregularlyinsistthatpoliticaldeliberationshouldbesomehowaimedator

directedtowardthecommongood.38Howeveraswedescribedabove,tyingtheconceptofthe

commongoodtoocloselytoaimsofdeliberationcanrisktyingtheconceptofthecommongoodtoo

closelytothetheorist’sothersubstantivepoliticalcommitments.Thatis,itraisestheworrythat

thecommongoodwillbecomephilosophicallypartisan.Avirtueofthebuck-passingaccountofthe

commongoodisthatitcanexplainthecloseconnectionbetweenthecommongoodand

deliberationwithoutintroducinganypartisanpoliticalvalues.Thisisbecauseitcanexplainhow

thecommongoodisconceptuallyconnectedtoadeliberativeunderstandingofevaluativefacts.

original).SeeRicharson,DemocraticAutonomy:PublicReasoningabouttheEndsofPolicy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),p.40.

37Schroederpointsoutthisasavirtueofthebuck-passingpositivethesis.Butitisremainsanovelpointthatusesof“commongood”inthepoliticalliteraturesouniformlypresupposethatthecommongoodisnormativeinsomeway.

38GutmannandThompsonusethe“aimedat”languageconnectingthetwoconcepts.SeetheirWhyDeliberativeDemocracy?(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004),p.28.JoshCohensaysthatdeliberationshouldbe“focused”onthecommongood.SeeCohen,“DeliberationandDemocraticLegitimacy,”ibid.

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Herewefollowanexplanationofthebuck-passingaccountofgoodnessdevelopedbyR.Jay

Wallace.39WallaceobservesthatonScanlon’soriginalview,thereason-givingpropertiestowhich

thebuckispassedare,themselves,evaluativeproperties.Forexample,theclaimthatsome

experienceisgoodmightbegivenbyotherproperties--forexample,thatitwouldbepleasant.Such

propertiesarenotnaturalproperties--’pleasantness’expressesanevaluativeappraisal.

Respondingtothisproblem,Wallaceelaboratestwodifferentwaysofinterpretingthebuck-passing

account.Accordingtowhathecallsthe“deliberationindependentinterpretation,”evaluative

propertiesaremetaphysicallypriortoandepistemicallyaccessiblewithoutdeliberation.The

“deliberativeinterpretation”reversesthedirectionoffit.Onthedeliberativeinterpretation,“the

onlywaytoestablishwhetheracandidatepropertyisagenuinesubstantivevalue...isthrough

deliberativereflectionaboutthenormativesignificanceofthepropertyforagents.”40The

deliberativeinterpretationmaintainsthepriorityofthenormativetotheappreciativeway.The

responsetosuchfactsintheformofdeliberativeattentionplaysacrucialconceptualrole.Buck-

passingtiesthegoodtoanagent’sdeliberativeresponse.

Giventhatthebuck-passingaccountofthegoodrequiresadispositionofagentstorespond

deliberativelytoasetofconsiderations,itshouldbeunsurprisingthatthe“commongood”also

requiresthecollectivedeliberativeattentionofsomelargergroupofagents.Abuck-passing

accountofthecommongoodcanexplainwhythisconnectionholdssogenerally.Tosaythat

somethinginthecommongoodistogivemetaphysicalandepistemologicalprioritytothe

deliberativeattentionofagroupofpersonsonasetofconsiderations,andtheirdispositionto

respondtothoseconsiderationsinanappreciativeway.Withouttakingsidesabouthowidealized

deliberationshouldproceedorwhichvaluesitshouldfavor,wecanvindicatetheconceptual

39Wallace,“Reasons,Values,andAgent-Relativity,”ibid.40Wallace,513.

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intuitionbehinddeliberativistaccountsofthecommongood.Thisintuition,stretchingbackto

Rousseau,seesthecommongoodasbothamatterofwill,andasidentifyingacommoninterest.41

Wewillnowsettoonesidethebuck-passingaccount’sconceptualvirtues.Totestthis

account,letusconsideritsexplanatoryvalueinimaginedandactualcases.Startwithacasewhere

ourapproachcanexplainsomethingthatislikelytopuzzlethesimplestgood-for-usaccounts.Brian

Barryputshisfingeronaparadigmuseoftheconceptofthecommongood.Henoticesthatwedo

nottendtomakeuseofthisideawhenacandidatepolicycancrediblybesaidtobegood-for-all.

“’Thecommongood’istypicallyusedinaverydifferentway,”hewrites,“namelyinthecontextof

anappealtoindividualpeopletodosomethingorotherwhichiscontrarytotheirnetinterests.”42

Soacentralcaseuseforthecommongoodispreciselywhenwearetryingtoconvinceapersonor

groupofpersonstosupportadecisionthatwilldisadvantagethempersonally.Insuchasetting,we

mightimagineaddressingthemsecond-personally,offeringreasonstoacttogether,ratherthan

takingupthethird-personalpostureofabenefactor.

InthecaseofKelov.CityofNewLondon,theSupremeCourtallowedthecityofNewLondon

totransferlandfromaprivateownertoaprivateredevelopmentproject.TheNewYorkTimes

celebratedtherulingas“awelcomevindicationofacity’sabilitytoactinthepublicinterest.”43

Onceweunderstandthepublicinterestasreflectingaimsthatprovideuswithreasonsfor

collectiveaction,wewillnotbesearchingforthemostinfinitesimalofwaysthatapolicycanbe

seenasgoodforeachmemberofacommunity.Ourclaimthateminentdomainreflectsoraffronts

thecommongoodcannowsetthetermsforadebatethatisnotprimedtowardsaggregating

individualgoods.Tosaythatasocialdecisionisinthecommongoodisnottosaythatitismerely

41Ourthankstoarefereeforthispoint.Ofcourse,addingthedeliberativecomponentdoesmakethe

accountmoremeta-ethicallypartisan.Ifonefavoredalesscommittedview,thisadditionisamodularcomponentoftheview.However,forthoseindependentlyattractedtoanidealofthecommongoodthatistiedtodeliberation,thebuck-passingaccountcanhelptoexplaintheconnectionbetweenthetwo.

42Barry,203.43“TheLimitsofPropertyRights,”TheNewYorkTimes,June24,2005.

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appealing.Itis,onourview,awayofregisteringthattherearesharedreasonsforactingtogether

towardsaparticularend.Thisleavesopenwhetherthosereasonsaremorallydecisive–thatwill

dependonthesubstantivemoraltheoryathand.Weshouldn’texpectaconcepttosettlethiscase,

onlytoensureafairdebateamongalternativeconceptions.44

Onourtheory,thebuckthatgetspassedhereistheideaofthegood.Whileprevious

formulationsrelieduponparticularaccountsofthegood,thisapproachavoidsthisphilosophically

fraughtexerciseinaxiology.Itthuscreatesroomfordisagreementsamongamorediversesetof

moralconceptions.So,forexample,thecontractualistapproachthatwesketchedearliercan

developthisconceptintoaconceptionthattreatshumanrelationshipsasreason-giving.Norneed

oneacceptthatthereisaprotantoreasontopromotethegoodtoacceptthisreadingofthe

concept.Thosewhodenythisgood-promotingviewwouldseethe“good-for-us”variationsofthe

conceptasidentifyingaimsthataredecidedlysupererogatory.Onouraccount,thisproblemdoes

notcarryover.Thecontractualisthasasmuchevaluativeroomastheconsequentialisttodraw

uponitsdistinctivemoralvocabulary.

4. ObjectionsandResponses

Inthissectionwewillconsiderwhatwetaketobetwoofthemostpressingobjectionstoabuck-

passingaccountofthecommongood.Thefirstobjectionarguesthatourconceptofthecommon

goodimplicitlyprecludestheoriesthatwouldlimitstateactiontothepursuitofjustice.Because

plausible,well-defendedtheoriestakeexactlythisform,ourconceptofthecommongoodrulesout

44Weemphasizethatourproposalisnotintendedasaputativeconceptualanalysis.Insteaditis

somethingclosertowhatPeterGodfrey-Smithreferstoasconceptual“reform”—orspecifyingconceptswithaneyetotheoreticalvirtuesandtheoryuse,ratherthantofitwithcurrentuseinagivensocialoracademicpractice.(SeeGodfrey-Smith,MetaphysicsandthePhilosophicalImagination,”PhilosophicalStudies160(2012):97-113.)ThuswecanagreewithMansbridgethat“inpracticalpoliticallife”itis“oftennotnecessarytobeanalyticallyclearerthantheordinarylanguage”aboutthepublicgoodorthecommongood.Still,asMansbridgealsoobserves,“wemaywanttochooseonlyonefromasetofcompetingmeanings”whenengaginginphilosophy(ibid.,p.12).Weagree,andonlywanttoaddthatforsuchpurposes,somemeaningsmaybemoreusefulandexportabletoadiversityofphilosophicalcontextsthanothers.Inshort,howtospecifytheconceptmaybesomethingwortharguingabout.

19

toomuchlogicalspace.Thesecondobjectionmaintainsthatouraccounttreatsintuitivelytoo

manypublicpoliticalactionsaspursuingthecommongood.Thefirstaccusestheaccount

presentedhereofakindofpartisanship,whiletheseconddisputestheaccount’sextensional

adequacy.Forthesakeofhavinglabels,wewillrefertotheseasthepartisanobjectionandthe

over-inclusionobjection.Therestofthissectionwilldiscussthemindetail.

4.1 Partisanship

Consideratheoryoflegitimatestateactionaccordingtowhichtheonlythingthestatecan

permissiblydoisbringabouttheconditionsofjustice.Forexample,somepoliticallyliberal

theoriesofjusticeholdthatallstatecoercioncanonlybelegitimatedbypublicjustification.45By

hypothesis,onlyrequirementsofjusticecouldfulfillthisjustificatoryrole.Thus,thestateisonly

permittedtosatisfytherequirementsofjustice,butisnotpermittedtopursueothervalues.

Thislineofargumentposesaproblemforouraccount.Itseemstositintensionwithour

suppositionthatthecommongoodprovidesreasonstoactpoliticallythataresomehow“beyond

justice.”Theproblemmaybeformulatedasadilemma.Ononehorn,ouraccountallowsthe

politicallyliberaltheoryaboveasaviablecandidatetheoryofjustice.However,ifthistheoryis

correct,thenthevalueofjusticeisnecessaryandsufficienttoguideallpoliticalactivity.Butifthat

istrue,thenthecommongoodplaysnoadditionalinformativeroleaboutwhichpoliticalactions

shouldbetaken.Itiseithersilent,oritidlyaffirmstheantecedentpronouncementsofjustice.Ona

secondhorn,ouraccountcoulddenythattheorieslikethatofthepoliticalliberalabovearecorrect.

Butinthatcase,itseemsthatwehaveviolatedthepartisanshiprequirementfromsection1.

Simplybyspecifyingtheconcept,wewouldhaveruledoutalogicalavailableconceptionthat

actuallyisdefendedfrommultipledifferenttheoreticalperspectives.

45ArefereehelpfullygivesJonathanQuongasanexample.SeeQuong,LiberalismwithoutPerfection

(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2011),especiallychs.2-3.AnotherexamplemightbeGeraldGaus,TheOrderofPublicReason:ATheoryofFreedomandMoralityinaDiverseandBoundedWorld(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010).

20

Wewilltakethefirsthornofthedilemma.Suchanaccountcanbeallowedwithout

renderingthecommongoodeithersilentoridle.Toseewhy,itwillhelptoframe,moreprecisely,

thebasicpoliticallyliberalinsight:46

(P1)Allcoercivestateactionsmustbejustifiedbysufficientpublicreasons.

(P2)Onlyjusticecanprovidesufficientpublicreasons.

(C1)So,coercivestateactioncanonlybepermissiblydirectedatsatisfyingjustice.

(P3)Ifjusticeistheonlylegitimateendofcoercivestateaction,thenothervaluesareeither

idleorsilent.

(C2)So,thecommongoodiseitheridleorsilent.

Statedthisway,itisclearerthatpremise(P3)isvulnerable.Premises(P1)and(P2)simplygivethe

substantiveclaimsofthetheory,soitwouldbeobjectionablypartisan(forpresentpurposes)to

denyeither.Butthepoliticallyliberaltheoryisnotdisputedbydenying(P3).Andinfact,we

believethatthispremiseisincorrect.P3isonlytrueiftheonlyactionsthatcanbecollectively

takenthroughstateinstitutionsarecoerciveactions.However,thisseemslikelytobefalse.

Considerthefollowingcases:

(a) Expression.Aliberal,democraticstatetoleratesthepresenceofreligiousoreducational

institutionsthatdiscriminateonthebasisofrace.However,membersofthepolitical

communitywanttoofficiallyrepudiatetheideathatracistdiscriminationisacceptable.As

such,theydecidethroughdeliberative,democraticinstitutionstorevokethetaxexempt

statusofinstitutionsthatdiscriminate.

(b) Expertise.MembersoftheFederalReserveboarddeliberateaboutwhethertoraiseinterest

ratesbya¼point.Suppose—exhypothesi—thatnoonehasaclaimofjusticeeitherthat

46Ofcourse,politicalliberalismisabroadtent,andmanyofitsmemberswouldnotacceptthatthe

statecanonlylegitimatelypursuejustice.Wearenotconsideringthetruthofthisclaimasathesisaboutthenatureoflegitimatestateaction.

21

ratesberaised,orthatratesnotberaised.Still,membersoftheFederalReserveboard

oughttomaketheirdecisionbasedonreasons,ratherthanarbitrarily.47

(c) Refusal.Stateinstitutionsgenerallyenforcecontracts.However,thestatemaydecidethat

ithasmoralreasontodeclinetoenforcecertaincontracts.Membersofthepolitical

communitydecide,forvariousreasons,thatcertaincontractsshouldbelegally

unconscionable.48

Weproposethatineachofthesecases,thecommongoodcanfacilitatedeliberationabouthow

thestateshouldact.Thisremainstrueevenifoneacceptsthepoliticallyliberalstrictureagainst

coercionfornon-justicebasedreasons.Thisisbecausethestatecandothingsotherthanact

coercively.49Ifthistheorywerecorrect,thecommongoodcouldcontinuetoplayameaningfulrole

inwhatmoralmessagesthestateshouldnon-coercivelyexpress,orinhowtosetpoliciesthataffect

membersofthestatebutdonotaltertheextenttowhichthestateengagesincoercion.TheFederal

Reserveexampleillustratesonesuchcase.ImagineiftheFederalReservesimplyselectedan

interestratethatwasbestforFortune500executives.Eventhoughtheirdecisionmightnotaffect

theamountofcoercioninthepoliticalcommunity,itwouldstillseemtobefaulty.TheFedshould

decideinawaythatwassupportedbyreasonsofthecommongood.Finally,thestatecouldusethe

commongoodtoguideitindecidingwheretowithholdcoerciveactivity,evenifthatactivitymight

benotbeunjust(asinRefusal).

Finally,consideraweakerversionof(P3),accordingtowhich:Ifjusticeistheonly

legitimateendofcoercivestateaction,thenothervaluesareeitheridleorsilentwithrespectto

coercivestateactions.Thispremiseallowsthatthecommongoodcouldstillberelevantincasesof

47ThiscaseisadaptedfromPetit,“DepoliticizingDemocracy,”ibid.48ThiscaseisinspiredbySeannaShiffrin,“Paternalism,UnconscionabilityDoctrine,and

Accommodation,”Philosophy&PublicAffairs29:3(2000):205-250.49ThecaseofExpressionismodelledonsimilarexamplesgivenbyCoreyBrettschnieder,who

defendssuchexamplesasnon-coercive.SeeBrettschnieder,WhentheStateSpeaks,WhatShouldItSay?HowDemocraciesCanProtectExpressionandPromoteEquality(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2012).

22

stateactionthatarenon-coercive,butdeniesitcouldberelevanttoanycoerciveaction.Webelieve

thateventhisweakerpremiseisfalse.Sometimes,justicemightprovidesufficientpublicreasonin

supportofsomedisjunctionofcoerciveactions,butremainsilentaboutwhichdisjunctis

preferable.Forexample,supposethatjusticerequiresthateachchildbeprovidedwithasufficient

opportunitytoenterthepoliticalelite.50Forthesakeofspecificity,supposethisrequiresthata

publichighschoolofferanactivitythatmodelsdeliberation—say—ModelUN,Debate,orEthics

Bowl.Whilereasonsofjusticemightprovidetheweightyconsiderationssupportingcoercive

actionsnecessaryrealizetherelevantstandardofpubliceducation,thesereasonsmightleaveopen

whichoptionisbest.However,wemightstillthinkthatthechoiceshouldbemadedeliberatively—

onthebasisofreasons.Onourview,theseshouldbereasonstoacttogether,orreasonsofthe

commongood.

4.2 Over-inclusion

Thesecondobjectionwewillconsiderholdsthatourconceptistoocapacious—counting

considerationsaspartofthecommongoodthatintuitivelyissuefromsomequiteseparate

normativeconcern.Recall,forexample,thequestionfromsection2overwhethertofundaspace

programortheperformingarts.Accordingtothepresentobjection,itmightseemintuitivelyodd

toregardbothoftheseascandidateinstancesofthecommongood.Whiletheperformingarts

mightbethoughtofasacommongood(though,astheprevioussectiondescribed,notrequiredby

justice),onemightthinkthatthereasonstosupportaspaceprogramhaveasourcethatisquite

differentfromthecommongoodofanygroup.Afterall,spaceexplorationmightnotresultin

improvinganyparticularperson’swelfare.Ifitisnotsupportedbyanyperson’sparticulargood,

thenhowcoulditbepartofthecommongood?Instead,onemightthinkthatthereasonsto

50Cf.Anderson,ibid.

23

supportthespaceprogrammightbethoughtsomehowmoretranscendent.51Perhaps,forinstance,

theintrinsicvalueoftruthordiscoverymightprovidereasonsforthespaceprogram.

Inshort,theover-inclusionobjectionholds:

(1) Therearereasonsthatwehavetogethertopoliticallypursueaspaceprogram(for

example).

(2) Ifthebuck-passingaccountofthecommongoodiscorrect,thenactingtogetherto

politicallypursueaspaceprogramispartofthecommongood.

(3) However,aspaceprogramisnotpartofthecommongood.

So,thebuck-passingaccountmustbewrong.Ourresponsetothisobjectionwillbetwofold.First,

wewilltrytoshowhowactionsthatdon’tappeartoadvanceanyone’swell-beingcouldstillbepart

ofthecommongood.Second,wewillsuggestthatifouraccountdoesincludesomerevisiontothe

folkconceptofthecommongood,theassociatedtheoreticalcostisworthpaying.

First,wethinkitisimportanttodistinguishbetweentwowaysinwhichthespaceproject

mightbepursuedthroughapoliticalinstitution.Ontheonehand,consideracaseinwhichasmall

cadreofpoliticallyinsulatedelitesiscuriousaboutscientificinquiryintofarcornersofthe

universe.Toslaketheircuriosity,theyadoptandpoliticallyauthorizeaplantofundaspace

program.Inthesecondcase,apoliticalcommunityhasapublicdebate—say,inanelectionyear—

aboutwhethertoprioritizefundingaspaceprogramforthesakeofthevaluesofdiscoveryand

knowledge.Opinionelitesaswellasgrass-rootsorganizationsareinvolved.Intheelection,the

sidefavoringthespaceprogramwins,andtheytakemeasurestopoliticallyauthorizeit.

Whilethesespaceprogramsmightequallyrealizethevaluesoftruthorknowledge,we

suggestthatthelatterprogramhasbettercredentialsforrealizingthecommongood.Thisis

becauseonlyinthelattercaseisthereevidenceofreasonsthatmembersofthepolitically

communityshare,onwhichtoacttogether.Toseethispoint,recallthesimpletwo-personaction

51Wearegratefultoarefereeforhelpingustothinkmoreclearlyaboutthisobjection.

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theorycasefromsection2.Amarriedcouplecoulddecidetogoonvacationeitherbyhavingone

partyunilaterallypickthedestination,orthroughaprocessofdeliberation.Butbecauseeach

party’sreasonsdependinpartontheother’sreasons,thereasonstheyhaveforjointactioncan

onlyemergethrough“dialogicalsensitivity”toeachother.Ifthatisright,thenwemightthinkthat

thepublicdeliberativeprocessesinthesecondversionofthespaceprogramcaseallowaccessto

reasonsformembersofthecommunitytoacttogether,andforthatreasonisintuitivelyaninstance

ofacommongood.

Toputthepointadifferentway,wedonotthinkthatthereisanythinginthenatureofthe

folkuseof“commongood”thatprecludesthespaceprogram.Onavarietyoftheories,the

realizationofgoalsorplanscancountasatleastapartofanindividual’swell-being.52Evenon

purelysubjectivetheoriesofwell-being,whatapersondesiresorvaluespartlydetermines

welfare.53Onlyonamentalstatetheoryofwell-beingwouldsuchpossibilitiesbedenied.Buthere,

itseemsthatthedifferencebetweengroupsandindividualsmakessuchtheorieslessplausiblein

thecaseofthecommongood.Whileitismetaphysicallyinnocuoustothinkthatgroupsofpersons

shareintentions,reasons,orgoals,itismorecontroversialtoattributementalstatestogroups.So

itseemsthattheoriesofanindividual’sgoodthatwoulddisallowgoal-basedprojects(analogousto

thespaceprogram)wouldbelessplausibleatthelevelofthecommongood,anyway.

Moreover,typicaluseofthecommongoodseemslessassociatedwithgoodsthatare

connecteddirectlytowell-being,asmuchastogoodsthatarepoliticallyselectedintherightway.

Politicalscientistsjuxtaposethe“commongood”withmere“partisaninterests,”orwiththe

“particularinterests”ofasubgroupofone’sconstituents.54Tosuggestthatimpersonalorother-

52Foraverynicerecentdiscussion,seeSimonKeller,“WelfareasSuccess,”Nous43:4(2009):656-

683.53AccordingtoDaleDorsey,thisisbecausesubjectivistsmustnecessarilyincludeidealizing

elements.Well-beingcannotsimplybereadofftheactualmentalstatesofanagent.SeeDorsey,“IdealizationandtheHeartofSubjectivism,”Nous(2015):1-22.

54McGhee,et.al.,ibid.,p.337;Leydet,ibid.,pp.235-236.

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regardingvaluescouldbepartofthecommongooddoesnoviolencetotheseuses.Evenwhen

theoristsarguethatthecommongoodmustbeshapedbythe“subjectiveinterests”ofthemembers

ofasociety,theytendtohaveinmindonlythatindividualshavethe“lastword”onwhatcountsas

“goodandbadfortheircommunity.”55

Finally,consideranevenmoreextremeexample.Apoliticalcommunitydecidesthatthey

havemostreasontogethertoprovideaidtoagroupofdistantneedypersons,notwithstandingthat

membersofthisgroupwillnotbeabletoreciprocate.Couldsuchself-sacrificingbehaviorreallybe

partofthecommongood?Ouraccountwouldsuggestso.Itisnotobvioustousthatthisisatodds

withuse,giventhatthecommongoodisfrequentlyinvokedonlyinanegativesense—notpartisan,

orparochial,orselfish,etc.Butsuppose,notimplausibly,thatitisrevisionist.Itmaystillbe

importanttomaintainthisconceptualspace.Consider,forexample,PeterSinger’sargumentthatit

isinourcommongoodtoprovideaidtoothers,becausedoingsomakesourlivesmeaningful.

Weretheworldorganizedinawaythatdidnotallowforsuchactions,ourliveswouldnotbe

meaningful.56ClearlySinger’sviewisaproposalaboutthecommongood,andhisviewholdsthat

thecommongoodiscentrallyrealizedbypreciselythekindofactionbeingconsidered.Singerhas

longbeenopenabouthisdesireforrevisioninourmoralconceptualscheme.Wedonottakesides

hereabouthisproposal,butwedothinkitshouldnotruledoutasaconceptualmatter.Itwouldbe

partisantoclaimthathisproposal,contrarytohisclaims,couldn’tbethecommongood.Atsome

point,thelessonmaysimplybethattradeoffsamongourdesideratacannotbealtogetheravoided.

Conclusion

55ChristianBlumandChristinaIsabelZuber,“LiquidDemocracy:Potentials,Problems,and

Perspectives,”TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy24:2(2016):162-182.Seealso,ChristopherKarpowitzandJaneMansbridge,“DisagreementandConsensus:TheImportanceofDynamicUpdatinginPublicDeliberation,”pp.237-253inJ.GastilandP.Levine(eds.)TheDeliberativeDemocracyHandbook(SanFrancisco:Jossey-Bass,2005).

56Singer,PracticalEthics,3rded.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2011)ch.12,especiallyp.294.

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Politicalphilosophershaveinsistedthatthecommongoodisa“self-evident”concept.57This

papersuggeststhatthathopeisunrealistic.Wedoneedanevaluativeterm–orperhapsaplurality

ofterms–thataddresstheterritorythatisunderdeterminedbyatheoryofdistributivejustice.

We’vesuggestedthatabuck-passingaccountofthecommongoodoffersahelpfulwayoffillingthis

role.Itcandosowithouttacitlyencouragingpoliticalpractitionerstoelidedistributive

implicationsoftheirchoices.Atthesametime,itcanavoidunnecessaryphilosophicalcontention.

Givenhoweasyitisto“slipintoutilitarianismbysheerinattention,”58nonconsequentialistsshould

beespeciallywaryaboutembracingconceptsthatcarrywiththemconsequentialistassumptions–

orevenvalences–thatrelyuponatheoryofvalue.FollowingScanlon’sindividualapproach,we

offeredabuck-passingreadingofthecommongoodthatwasdesignedtoavoidthemastervalue

assumption.The“commongood”isanotdummyconcept.Ithasthepotentialtoplayanimportant

roleinourcollectivedecision-making,solongasitbasiccontoursandcontentareworkedout.

57Inthesamesentence.AmitaiEtzionireferstoitastherightthingtodo,byitself,foritselfand

“goodsthatserveallofusandtheinstitutionsweshareandcherish.”AmitaiEtzioni,TheCommonGood(NewYork:Wiley-Blackwell,2004),1.

58RichardKraut,WhatIsGoodandWhy:TheEthicsofWell-Being(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2007),17.