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Midwest Political Science Association 66th Annual ConferenceApril 3-6, 2008
Chicago, IL
The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy Implementation:
The Case of Illegal Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan
Saltanat Liebert, Ph.D. Assistant Professor
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government & Public AffairsVirginia Commonwealth University
Scherer Hall, Office 313PO Box 842028
923 W. Franklin Street
Richmond, VA 23284-2019Phone: (804) 828-1874
E-mail: [email protected]
DRAFT
Comments and critique are welcome:
please refer them to the author at [email protected]
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The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy Implementation:
The Case of Illegal Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan
Abstract:
Politicians, scholars and citizens alike pronounce the U.S. immigration policy to be
“broken” as the number of illegal immigrants has reached 11 million. Why is the immigration
policy in crisis? This article argues that informal institutions involved in migration processes,
such as migrant trafficking networks, can explain much of the crisis. It examines the influence of
informal institutions on the effectiveness of immigration policy based on a case study of labor
migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States. This project embraces a case study research
method relying on multiple data sources, including in-depth semi-structured interviews with
labor migrants, migration intermediaries, migration officials and American consular personnel,
and analysis of migration laws of the United States and Kyrgyzstan. This research finds that
while informal institutions undermine the implementation of immigration policies, they also have
a positive effect substituting for ineffective formal institutions such as childcare and elderly care.
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The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy Implementation:
The Case of Illegal Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan
Immigration is an acute and sensitive topic on the U.S. political, social and economic
agenda. It has been a subject of heated debates, rendering the country drastically divided on this
matter. Proponents of immigration equate it to the civil rights issue (Bernstein 2006), while
opponents cite the alleged burden of illegal immigration on public education, Medicare,
Medicaid and public welfare of the United States. Due to globalization and the end of the Cold
War people are on the move as never before. Millions of individuals from poor countries migrate
to richer ones in an effort to provide for themselves and their families both through legal
channels, and in their absence, illegal ones.
In general, the United States has strict immigration policies; it has been enforcing existing
measures and introducing new ones, including a construction of a fence along Mexico-U.S.
border, to curb illegal migration into the country. However, the number of irregular labor
migrants from various countries has not decreased and seems to be only increasing. Politicians,
scholars and citizens alike pronounce the immigration policy to be “broken” as the number of
illegal immigrants has reached 11 million (Papademetriou 2005). Why is the immigration policy
(and its implementation) in crisis? This article argues that informal institutions involved in
migration processes, such as migrant trafficking networks, can explain much of the crisis.
U S. Immigration Policy
At present, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 and its numerous
amendments passed since then regulate legal labor migration into the United States.
Opportunities for migration for highly skilled professionals and unskilled workers vary
significantly. Well-educated foreign nationals, who speak fluent English and have skills readily
transferable into the U.S. labor market, can legally migrate to the United States for labor via non-
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immigrant temporary employment visas. Legal avenues for migration of unskilled laborers or of
workers, whose skills are not readily transferable to the American labor market, are much more
limited. There are presently only two categories of visas available to unskilled workers. The first
visa category, H-2A Agricultural Worker visa, allows foreign agricultural workers to come to the
United States for temporary or seasonal work. There is no annual cap for agricultural seasonal
workers, who are mostly used by American employers for “perishable-crop” jobs such as
harvesting vegetables and picking fruit. To bring in foreign workers to the United States under
this visa, the employers must petition the Department of Labor. Even though almost all H-2A
certifications are approved by the Department of Labor, the process is so cumbersome and the
necessary certifications are often issued late, after the peak harvest season, that many employers
choose not to go through the process (Waller Meyers 2006). In addition, the H-2A worker
program is highly regulated and requires that the employers provide free transportation, housing
and meals, and pay the migrant workers wages prescribed by the authorities. It is likely that some
unscrupulous employers prefer to hire undocumented workers with no authorization for
employment in the United States, who are thus more vulnerable to exploitation.
The second visa category available to labor migrants sponsored by American employers
is H-2B, Skilled or Unskilled Worker visa. It allows skilled and unskilled foreign workers to
work in the United States to meet temporary or seasonal non-agricultural needs of employers.
Both the job and the worker have to be of temporary nature and workers have to return to their
home country after 6 months in the United States. The employers have to show that qualified
U.S. workers are not available for these jobs and have to file a petition with the Department of
Labor. The annual cap for non-agricultural skilled or unskilled workers is 66,000. This number
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falls significantly short of the estimated 400,000-500,000 unskilled workers that the U.S.
employers need (Smith 2006).
There is practically no way for unskilled workers to migrate to the U.S. for labor through
legal channels unless sponsored by American employers. Many employers find the official
process extremely cumbersome and prefer to hire illegal migrants who are already in the United
States. The process of legally importing temporary unskilled workers is complicated and
involves the following U.S. formal institutions: the Department of Labor, which processes and
approves labor certification of jobs; the State Department, which issues visas; and the
Department of Homeland Security, which adjudicates petitions and determines admissibility of
workers into the United States (Waller Meyers 2006).
Knowing that there is a substantial demand for unskilled laborers in the U.S. and lacking
legal channels for migration, millions of unskilled migrants arrive in the United States, either by
crossing the U.S. border illegally or by overstaying their visas. Immigration policies designed to
control the U.S. borders and to prevent tourists and other temporary guests from staying in the
United States illegally are clearly being undermined, oftentimes by informal institutions.
The Case of Migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States
The case of migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States demonstrates the pervasive
role that informal institutions play in enabling and perpetuating irregular migration. This case
study specifically illustrates how informal institutions respond to immigration policies they (and
their “clients”) deem to be undesirable.
Legal temporary migration and permanent immigration from the former Soviet republics,
including Kyrgyzstan, to the U.S. for permanent residency is not a new phenomenon. However,
there is a new trend of temporary (and mostly illegal) labor migration from the Commonwealth
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of Independent States (CIS)1 to the United States that has emerged in the last decade. There are
typically two categories of labor migrants from the CIS: highly educated individuals with fluent
English whose skills are in demand in the American labor market (such as scientists, high-tech
professionals, academics, accomplished athletes), and who can thus officially obtain U.S. work
visas; and unskilled (or with skills not in demand in the U.S.) labor migrants who are either
smuggled into the country or work illegally having arrived on tourist or other types of visas.
Such illegal labor migrants are primarily employed in unskilled low-wage jobs such as domestic
service workers, caregivers to children and the elderly, as well as in construction and in
sweatshops.
This research focuses on the latter group of migrants because due to lack or non-
transferability of their skills and education into the American labor market, there are practically
no legal channels for migration available for these groups of prospective migrants. Consequently,
they are more likely to use informal channels for migration.
The United States was chosen as the focus of this case study because immigration policy
is presently one of the most important and divisive issues in the country. Perhaps the most
obvious arena indicative of the status of immigration is politics: immigration has played a key
role in 2006 congressional elections and has been prominent in 2008 presidential debates. The
example of Kyrgyzstan-U.S. labor migration is important because it is a microcosm of the large
phenomenon of migration from developing to advanced countries. Kyrgyzstan was chosen for
this case study as an example of a post-Soviet transitional country that sends a large share of its
population abroad for labor. Kyrgyzstan has few exportable natural resources, which has created
1 Commonwealth of Independent States was created in December 1991 shortly before the official disintegration of the Soviet Union. It now includes all former Soviet republics with the exception of the three Baltic states.
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a situation where the country’s largest export is its labor force. It is estimated that over one third
of Kyrgyzstan’s labor force is currently working abroad.2
Implementation and Institutionalism Literature
Immigration, a phenomenon that involves formal and informal institutions in migrant-
sending and receiving countries, represents an interesting case that readily lends itself to the
study of implementation. Among numerous factors influencing the effectiveness of immigration
and other public policies, the existence and efficacy of informal institutions might have a
significant explanatory power. The outcomes of formal policies can be undermined, or in
contrast, be complemented by informal institutions. This study seeks to shed light on the
behavior of informal institutions in response to immigration control policies they perceive to be
undesirable.
Policy implementation literature largely focuses on the following factors as determinants
of policy success: 1) realizable policy expectations; 2) effective policy tools; 3) implementation
(i.e. policy implementation assigned to an agency that is well-staffed, has resources, and has a
champion, is likely to succeed); and 4) public support for the policy (Ingram and Mann 1980).
In addition, it has been argued that economic and social conditions, clear communication of
policy standards, incentives for compliance with new policy, and biases of implementation
officials are also likely to affect policy success (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980).
2 There was also a practical consideration in choosing Kyrgyzstan for the case study. Migrant workers, some of whom might be undocumented and/or out of status in the receiving countries, are traditionally a difficult populationto access. Having been born and raised in Kyrgyzstan, I hoped (as it turned out, rightly so) that Kyrgyzstanimigrants, some of whom might be in the United States illegally, would be more likely to agree for an interview andshare their stories with a compatriot. In addition, securing interviews with migration policy makers and officials in apost-Soviet setting is a very challenging task. In a system that heavily relies on personal connections, bureaucrats“cold-called” by researchers would rarely agree to a meeting unless the latter are affiliated with potential donororganizations. As a Kyrgyz researcher, it was more feasible to secure interviews in a country where I had somepersonal contacts.
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What is underanalyzed in the literature is a consideration of informal institutions that
influence the effectiveness of public policies. The present study addresses this research gap by
examining the effect of informal institutions on the immigration policy based on a case study of
labor migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States. I start out by a review of literature on
implementation and institutionalism. In the following section, I outline the theoretical framework
guiding this research and my methodology in conducting the case study. I then analyze the main
types of institutional interaction uncovered in this research and examine how informal
institutions influence formal institutional outcomes. Finally, I conclude by discussing policy
implications of this study.
Until 1970s public policy scholars had largely ignored policy implementation as a subject
of a systematic study focusing instead on the process of policy adoption and on administrative
and judicial behavior. However, 1970s and 1980s have witnessed a proliferation in the number of
studies on the implementation of specific policies (Hargrove 1975; Pressman and Wildavsky
1973; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980).
Much of the implementation literature focuses on what could be classified as internal and
external forces that determine whether policies succeed or fail. Internal organizational factors
usually include: 1) characteristics of the implementing agencies such as competent policy
appliers who have “time, financial resources, expertise, positive incentives, and negative
sanctions in administering the policies” (Ingram and Mann 1980, 8; see also Van Meter and Van
Horn 1975; Hogwood and Gunn 1984); 2) clear communication within and among implementing
agencies (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Hogwood and Gunn 1984); 3) clear and consistent
policy objectives that are clearly understood and agreed upon (Hogwood and Gunn 1984;
Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980); and 4) the roles of implementing officials are specified
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(Hogwood and Gunn 1984). In addition, Sabatier and Mazmanian argue that “probable policy
predispositions of implementation officials” (i.e. their biases) are likely to affect policy success
(1980, 540; see also Maynard-Moody, Musheno, and Palumbo 1990; Van Meter and Van Horn
1975; Lipsky 1980).
External conditions affecting the successful implementation of public policies comprise:
1) public support for policy; 2) policy and the implementing agency has a champion (usually a
highly regarded policy maker) who is able to resolve impediments to implementation as they
arise (Bardach 1977); 3) environmental conditions are “conducive to compliance, including
communications media, education facilities, and business conditions” (Ingram and Mann 1980,
8); 4) policy recipients are favorably disposed toward the proposed policy; 5) social and
economic conditions (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975); 6) incentives for compliance with policy
decisions (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975); 7) effective cooperation between implementing
agencies and departments (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973); 8) proposed policy is based on an
accurate theory of cause and effect (Hogwood and Gunn 1984); and 9) “tractability” or
solvability of issues that policy seeks to address (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980; Van Meter and
Van Horn 1975; Ingram and Mann 1980).
In addition to the internal and external factors mentioned above, during the last decades
of the 20th century scholars have turned their attention to the impact of institutions on policy
formulation and implementation (Hill and Hupe 2002). While few implementation scholars have
studied the role of institutions in implementation, much can be learned from political science and
sociology with implications pertinent for implementation studies. Institutions are important
because they can “make” or “break” public policy. The study of institutions, institutionalism, has
been present in American political science as early as 1887. In his famous essay Woodrow
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Wilson (1887) focused on the role of institutions in the United States and in Europe. Many
political scientists have since studied how formal institutional arrangements, such as
constitutional design and electoral systems, influence political and social outcomes (Cain,
Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Lijphart 1994;
McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995). However, other researchers began to draw attention to
limitations of studying only the formal institutional design - many political outcomes cannot be
fully explained by it. They argued that more research had to be done on informal institutions that
guide political behavior stating, “if social and political actors respond to a mix of ‘formal and
informal’ constraints, then good institutional analysis requires that scholars examine both sets of
rules” (Helmke and Levitsky 2003, 4).
The study of informal institutions is not a new research avenue. Comparative political
scientists have examined patterns of political behavior that diverge from formal rules (Hyden
1983; Jowitt 1983; Price 1975; Riggs 1964). Nevertheless, the leading institutionalism scholars
point out that “informal institutions have not been rigorously conceptualized or theorized in
comparative politics, and as a result, they remain at the margins of contemporary literature on
political institutions” (Helmke and Levitsky 2003, 4). A notable exception is the institutionalism
work pioneered by sociologists such as Philip Selznick, who in his classic study TVA and the
Grass Roots (1949) argues that local citizens “co-opted” into the administration of agricultural
programs in 1930s through voluntary associations were involved in policy formation and
implementation (at least theoretically). In a different approach, Chester Barnard (1938) has
drawn attention to the role of informal social systems within formal organizations [emphasis
added]. In a similar vein, Dahl has pointed out that it was a mistake to assume that “individuals
… would accept logical organization and would not… rebel against it or silently supersede it
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with an informal organization better suited to their personality needs” (Dahl 1947, 5). Both
Barnard and Dahl focused on informal institutions within a formal system. The missing link in
the literature is the examination of external informal institutions and their impact on policy
implementation. This study picks up where Dahl and Barnard left off and examines how external
informal institutions, not the social systems created within formal organizations, affect policy
outcomes.
The disintegration of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union have
presented scholars with an opportunity to study the countries that were previously closed to the
rest of the world and that had institutional arrangements significantly divergent from the western
school of institutional thought. Political institutions in the post-communist states, largely
inherited from the Soviet system, present an interesting challenge to scholars and theorists of
institutional studies. Douglass North, for example, doubted that the “present version of any
existing theories could adequately encompass these extraordinarily complex processes and
explain the very different rates and patterns of transformations across the post-communist world”
(North 1997, 1-2). The rigidity of formal rules in the Soviet Union and a chronic shortage of
basic consumer goods necessitated creation of informal networks by elites. Such informal
networks were designed to lessen the burden of bureaucracy and provide access to consumer
goods. For example, the system of informal connections – blat – has been regularly used by the
Soviet elites for various purposes ranging from advancing one’s career to securing an overseas
trip subsidized by the Soviet government. Similarly, clans – informal identity networks based on
kinship – played a profound role in politics and institutions of Kyrgyzstan, and Central Asia as a
whole, even during the Soviet era. Informal institutions are so prevalent in the former Soviet
states and other developing countries that Collins calls to “look beneath and within formal
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institutions and systematically integrate informal organizations and informal politics into our
study of political order” (2004, 261).
Interaction between formal and informal institutions
A puzzle for many scholars and practitioners is trying to understand why similar
institutions in various settings produce different outcomes. Douglass North (1990) summarizes
this matter in the following statement:
Many Latin American countries adopted the U.S. Constitution (with somemodifications) in the nineteenth century, and many of the property rights laws of successfulWestern countries have been adopted by Third World countries. The results, however, are notsimilar to those in either the Untied States or other successful Western countries. Although therules are the same, the enforcement mechanism, the way enforcement occurs, the norms of behaviour, and the subjective models of the actors are not (1990, 101).
In search of answers, several authors looked at the interaction between formal and
informal institutions in various economic, political and social spheres. Interaction between
formal and informal institutions is a recent and understudied area of research. As Pejovich states,
“… the relationship between formal and informal rules … is by no means a new question.
However, what is new is the systematic treatment of the relationship between formal and
informal institutions” (Pejovich 1999, 169). Several scholars have recently attempted to
categorize the types of interaction between formal and informal institutions. Lauth broke the
ground in this undertaking by identifying three ways in which formal and informal institutions
interact: complementary, substitutive, and conflicting (Lauth 2000, 25). Helmke and Levitsky
(2003) expanded on this typology and added the fourth, accommodating, interaction type
between formal and informal institutions. Grzymala-Busse (2004) refers to three types of
interactions – substitution, reinforcement , and undermining – in her review of formal-informal
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interaction in post-communist state transformation in East Central Europe. Finally, Pejovich
(1999) proposed a thesis of interaction between formal and informal institutions.
Migration presents a particularly interesting case for the analysis of interaction between
formal and informal institutions. The most illustrative example of such interaction is that of
restrictive immigration laws and law enforcement versus migrant smuggling networks. The latter
continuously undermine the former, which prompts even more restrictive policies. Rey
Koslowski argues that "as more restrictive policies increase the obstacles to crossing borders,
migrants increasingly turn to smugglers rather than pay the growing costs of unaided attempts
that prove unsuccessful" (Koslowski 1999, 207-08). In a similar vein, Massey (1990) rightly
maintains that it would be difficult for governments to control migration flows because informal
migrant networks (including smugglers) are outside of governmental control.
However, this newly emerging body of research on the interaction between formal and
informal institutions focuses on such interaction in the context of one country. In contrast, this
article examines the institutional interaction in two countries and investigates transnational3
interaction between formal and informal institutions. Migration is a phenomenon that involves
actors and institutions in more than one country. Thus, in order to fully understand the impact of
institutional interaction on immigration policy, it is important to analyze the interaction between
formal and informal institutions that takes place across international borders.
3 Much of literature uses the terms “transnational”, “international” and “multinational” referring to the sametype of migration (sometimes interchangeably). Such confusion has (hopefully) been clarified by Portes whospecified that “transnational” refers to activities “initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors, be theyorganized groups or networks of individuals across borders” (Portes, 2001). He also states that “international”pertains to activities and programs of national-states, while “multinational” refers to large-scale institutions such ascorporations or religions whose activities take place in multiple countries.
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Definitions
The definition of “institutions” has been the subject of contention among scholars and
there are numerous suggested definitions (see, for example, O’Donnell 1994; Carey 2000).
However, Douglass North’s framework dominates the literature in the field. He defines
institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, … the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction” (1990, 3). North differentiates between “formal
constraints – such as rules that human beings devise – and … informal constraints – such as
conventions and codes of behavior” (1990, 4).
Formal institutions are defined as: “rules that are openly codified, in the sense that they
are established and communicated through channels that are widely accepted as official”
(Helmke and Levitsky 2003, 5). In the context of migration formal institutions include
immigration and border control laws and procedures; law enforcement, immigration and consular
authorities; as well as laws regulating employment of aliens. The definition proposed by Helmke
and Levitsky does not seem to clearly include political institutions, such as organizations, or
economic institutions. I will, therefore, modify their definition and define formal institutions as
“rules, procedures and organizations that are created, communicated, and enforced through
channels that are widely accepted as official.”
Helmke and Levitsky define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned
channels” (2003, 6). A good example of informal institutions is migrant networks and migrant
smugglers. I will adopt Helmke-Levitsky definition of informal institutions as it is well suited for
the purposes of this study. Given the economic nature of migration phenomena, this paper will
explore the relationship between political and economic institutions involved in labor migration.
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Theoretical Framework and Research Questions
This article examines a set of questions in the context of international labor migration: 1)
how do informal and formal institutions involved in labor migration interact with each other? 2)
how do informal institutions affect formal policy outcomes? These questions are prompted by
the newly emerging theory of interaction between formal and informal institutions articulated by
Helmke and Levitsky (2003). In their framework for studying informal institutions, they
differentiate between effective and ineffective formal institutions, defining effectiveness as the
“extent to which rules and procedures that exist on paper are enforced or complied with in
practice” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006, 13). For operationalization purposes, I consider
institutions ineffective when actors repeatedly violate formal rules and the probability of
enforcement is low.
Another dimension of the Helmke-Levitsky framework is the compatibility of actors’
goals - “what they seek to accomplish through a particular informal institution and their
expectation about the likely outcomes generated by formal institutions”. In some cases the
actors’ goals are compatible with expected formal institutional outcomes, while in others they are
in conflict with those outcomes. Bringing all the above mentioned arguments together, Helmke
and Levitsky propose a four-fold typology of interaction between formal and informal
institutions: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive.
Table 1. A Typology of Interaction between Formal and Informal Institutions
Effective Formal Institutions Ineffective Formal Institutions
Compatible Goals Complementary Substitutive
Conflicting Goals Accommodating Competing
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Source: Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. “Informal Institutions and ComparativePolitics: A Research Agenda.” Working Paper # 307, September 2003.
The complementary type denotes that type of interaction where informal institutions co-
exist with effective formal institutions enhancing the performance or efficiency of the latter. In
situations where the actors’ goals are at odds with expected formal institutional outcomes, the
type of interaction is accommodating. This type is described as “a ‘second best’ strategy for
actors who dislike outcomes generated by the formal rules but are unable to change or openly
break those rules” (Helmke and Levitsky 2003). Competing type refers to interaction involving
informal institutions and weak or ineffective formal institutions. In this type of interaction actors
choose to use informal institutions even if such action is in violation of formal rules. And finally,
substitutive type of interaction refers to the scenario in which informal institutions substitute the
role of ineffective formal institutions.
This study will test the Helmke-Levitsky typology. The goal of this research is to
improve the newly emerging theory of interaction between formal and informal institutions and
demonstrate how informal institutions impact the effectiveness of immigration policy in the
United States.
Methodology
This project embraces a case study research method relying on multiple data sources,
including in-depth semi-structured interviews with 30 labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan in New
York metropolitan area, migration intermediaries, Kyrgyz migration officials and American
consular personnel, and analysis of migration laws and regulations of the United States and
Kyrgyzstan. This research is based on a single case study of low-wage labor migration from
Kyrgyzstan to the United States. The unit of analysis is the labor migrants and formal and
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informal institutions they interact with. The project involves multiple units of observation –
formal and informal institutions involved in such migration and the labor migrants themselves.
Review of the U.S. and Kyrgyz migration laws and regulations. The initial phase of data
collection involved archival research. To understand the role of formal institutions involved in
migration processes, I reviewed migration-related laws and procedures of Kyrgyzstan and the
United States. This was important because such laws and regulations are a codification of formal
rules.
Interviews with labor migrants. The main part of the field research involved interviewing
migrants from Kyrgyzstan working in the New York metropolitan area (including New Jersey
counties adjacent to New York City), and Philadelphia. The purpose of migrant interviews was
to map out all institutions involved in irregular labor migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United
States and identify their roles in order to be able to analyze how formal and informal institutions
interact. I chose the New York metropolitan area as a field research site because it has a large
immigrant population of former Soviet citizens4, which naturally attracts labor migrants from
Kyrgyzstan due to linguistic and cultural links. In addition, New York City traditionally absorbs
large numbers of illegal migrant workers.
The interviews were conducted between November 2005 and February 2006. I conducted
30 in-depth semi-structured interviews with labor migrants via snowball sampling method
through referrals. Selection of persons to interview was purposive - I only interviewed migrants
who have legally or illegally arrived to the U.S. after 1991 and who are or were employed in
unskilled low-wage positions. I limited the inquiry to migrants who arrived in the U.S. after the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Prior to 1989-91 migration out of the Soviet Union was
4 It is estimated that over 1.6 million ethnic Russians live in New York Metropolitan area. Exact statistics onthe number of immigrants from the former Soviet republics are not available but are likely to be well over 2 million.
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very restricted, and with very few exceptions, emigration of Soviet citizens was not allowed (see,
for example, Shevtsova 1992).
I had prepared a list of questions to guide the interviews, and I documented the responses in
a systematic manner as if it was a survey. Interviews with migrants from Kyrgyzstan were
conducted in Russian or Kyrgyz languages depending on the migrants’ preference.5 Due to the
possibility that some of the respondents might have been in an irregular immigration status at the
time of the interviews, all interviews were anonymous.
Interviews with migration officials. To complement the review of migration laws and
understand the migration policies that are not apparent from official rules and regulations, I
interviewed policy makers and migration officials in Kyrgyzstan. Interviews took place in
September 2005 and in May 2006. These interviews were important to understand the informal
rules relevant to migration and migration policies that are not apparent from official rules and
regulations.
The US migration policies are more transparent and could be drawn from readily available
laws and immigration procedures. Nevertheless, to complement the review of U.S. migration
policies, I interviewed an employee of the American Consulate in Kyrgyzstan to identify on the
ground policies and procedures of the United States towards labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan.6
Migration facilitators/intermediaries. I was able to secure an interview with a migrant
who used to facilitate migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States. She provided invaluable
5 Despite almost all migrants being ethnically Kyrgyz, some were more comfortable conversing in Russian,while others were more at ease speaking Kyrgyz. Such preference for Russian language among some urban ethnicKyrgyz is attributable to the russification policies of the Soviet government, especially in larger cities. Russian wasthe lingua franca during the Soviet era required for higher education and professional advancement (see JonesLuong 2004; Roy 2000 for a discussion of Soviet language policies).
6 Due to the sensitive nature of the information shared by this individual, his name is not disclosed in the textand is referred to as “Informant”.
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information as to how some Kyrgyz migrants obtain US visas and other details about the
transnational cooperation of informal institutions involved in migration. As I started interviewing
migrants, I repeatedly heard that many of them use the services of employment agencies in
finding work in the United States. A closer examination of an employment agency of this sort
would add a lot of value to the research project. Therefore, I decided to visit a couple of such
agencies to investigate how they work. These field visits resulted in a valuable insight into the
workings of an important informal institution involved in migration.
Analysis and Findings
Given the challenge of understanding and theorizing about institutions in transitional
societies, the question that arises then is, What happens when institutions in developing and
developed countries interact with each other? How does such interaction influence the
effectiveness of public policies?
There is a variety of informal and formal institutions taking part in the process of labor
migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States. This study has identified more than 40 formal
and informal institutions. In the interest of conciseness, the discussion below will focus on select
few institutional interactions. An analysis of the interaction between informal and formal
institutions participating in the process of labor migration through the prism of the Helmke-
Levitsky typology (table 1) reveals that the following types of interaction are present in this case
study: competing, substitutive and complementary. It is noteworthy that informal institutions
involved in migration influence not only the immigration-related formal institutions in the United
States, but also child care, elderly care, housing regulations and other formal systems as
discussed in the following section.
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Competing Interaction. Migration intermediaries play a critical role in the process of labor
migration by enabling migrants from Kyrgyzstan to obtain tourist and other types of visas.
Migration intermediaries, usually operating as a turisticheskoe agentstvo (travel agency) in
Kyrgyzstan, have established partnerships with intermediary firms in the United States. The
U.S.-based intermediaries supply letters of invitation from U.S. citizens and companies to
prospective migrants in Kyrgyzstan for fees ranging from $150 to $2,000. In almost all cases
such invitations are fraudulent: even if they are signed by individuals and companies that exist,
these actors do not know the prospective migrants and have no intention of hosting them in the
United States.
7
There appear to be hundreds of entities in the New York metropolitan area
supplying invitations to prospective migrants. As a former migration intermediary reports, “Here
[in Brooklyn, New York] you can get those invitations on every corner, even in law firms. If you
pay them, they’ll arrange for an invitation.”8
Upon receipt of the invitations, visa applicants are coached by the intermediaries in
Kyrgyzstan to memorize an invented story to be recited to the U.S. consul: how they know the
individual or a firm that is inviting them, the purpose of their visit, etc. A former travel agent
who supplied letters of invitation to potential migrants in Kyrgyzstan estimated that thirty
percent of her clients received visas to the United States. Once her clients received visas, the
Kyrgyz intermediary would call her American counterpart who would then meet those clients at
the airport upon their arrival in the United States.9 As this example demonstrates, migration
intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan and the United States engage in transnational interaction.
Collectively, these intermediaries undermine the U.S. policies intended to prevent illegal
7 The invitations have to come from real individuals and firms because the U.S. Consulate could potentiallytelephone these parties before issuing a visa to an applicant.8 Anonymous migrant worker, interview by author, Brooklyn, NY., 4 December, 2005.9 Anonymous migrant worker, interview by author, Brooklyn, NY., 4 December, 2005.
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immigration. Their cooperation ranges from simple operations, such as supplying invitations
from U.S. citizens and firms to Kyrgyz migrants, to more complex ventures that involve bringing
large groups of Kyrgyz migrants to the United States on H-2B visas issued for non-agricultural
unskilled workers. On several occasions an American intermediary firm has submitted the
necessary paperwork to the U.S. Department of Labor and the Department of Homeland Security
to bring unskilled workers from Kyrgyzstan. These formal institutions have approved the firms’
petitions for migrant workers, at which point their Kyrgyz counterpart recruited would-be
workers in Kyrgyzstan. At least one group of thirty migrant workers brought to the United States
through this channel has “mysteriously disappeared” upon arrival at an airport in the United
States. The two partner firms drew the attention of the U.S. Consulate in Kyrgyzstan when the
entire group of migrant workers did not return from the United States upon expiration of their
visas. Subsequently, when these two intermediaries submitted visa applications on behalf of
another group of 30 potential migrant workers, the U.S. Consulate in Kyrgyzstan denied visas to
the entire group (Anonymous 2006).
By facilitating the migration of individuals to the United States under false pretenses,
migration intermediaries engage in a competing type of interaction vis-à-vis formal immigration
policies. The goals of these two institutions in question are clearly divergent: the intermediaries
seek to facilitate the migration of individuals who enlisted their services, while the U.S.
Consulate tries to prevent migration of persons who present an immigration risk and are likely to
overstay their visas. Since formal rules pertaining to the issuance of visas to enter the United
States are often violated by migrants and migration intermediaries who submit visa applications
with false information, the U.S. Consulate, which enforces formal visa procedures, can be
described as an ineffective formal institution.
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Corrupt government officials at several ministries of Kyrgyzstan were also found to
facilitate the migration of Kyrgyz nationals to the United States. They “sell” spots in official
delegations going to the United States for exchange visits or for athletic tournaments. Visa
applicants who are part of an official government delegation are more likely to receive a U.S.
visa because their applications are submitted to the U.S. Consulate by Kyrgyz government
agencies and seem legitimate. Once in the United States, such “delegates” go “AWOL”.
Migrants interviewed in this study reported having paid anywhere from $4,000 to $7,000 to be
“included” in such delegations. Such corrupt government officials seek to achieve goals that are
drastically divergent from the formal U.S. immigration policies implemented by the Department
of State through its consulates overseas.
An interesting informal institution actively used by migrants in the United States is a
network of informal hostels. When migrants arrive in the United States, they typically do not
have a lot of financial resources and cannot afford to stay at a hotel. There are numerous
informal hostels, which are typically run by other immigrants, where migrants (or anybody else)
can get a place to sleep for $10-15 a night. These hostels range from neat bedrooms (rented out
by families living in the same apartment) to overcrowded rooms or basements that accommodate
10-15 individuals sleeping on mattresses on the floor.10 It is noteworthy that migrants stay at
such informal hostels not only upon arrival in the United States but also throughout their stay.
For example, female live-in domestic workers and caregivers usually have one unpaid day off
per week. They are expected to leave their employers’ residences on their days off. However,
they often do not have anywhere else to go and resort to spending a night at one of the informal
hostels. Many of the informal hostels violate the local Housing Maintenance Codes, restrictions
10 Similar types of accommodation options exist in other migrant destination communities such as Houston, TX(Hegstrom 2006).
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pertaining to occupancy limits in residential dwellings, and are unlikely to report their income
from running such informal hostels to the Internal Revenue Service. In interacting with formal
rules such as Housing Maintenance Codes, the informal hostels disregard the latter. By evading
taxation of their rental income, these informal institutions undermine the rule of law in the
United States.
Substitutive Interaction. Informal hostels used by migrants also serve another function. As
formal hotels are beyond reach for almost all newly arrived migrants, who sometimes bring less
than $200 with them, informal hostels fill in the gap and address the need for affordable
temporary housing. In doing so, informal hostels substitute for formal institutions that are
ineffective in some way. In the context of the Helmke-Levitsky typology (table 1), a formal
institution would be classified as ineffective if it is substituted for by informal institutions.
However, one would hardly describe formal hotels as being ineffective. Rather, they are
unavailable for many migrants due to their high cost. This new classification of formal
institutions warrants a modification of the Helmke-Levitsky typology, which I suggest below. It
is important to note that the Helmke-Levitsky typology was designed to classify political formal
and informal institutions. In addition to political institutions this study analyzes economic
informal and formal institutions. Therefore, the dimension of price and availability/accessibility
becomes an integral part of the institutional analysis. I suggest a modified typology of informal-
formal institutional interaction that encompasses political and economic institutions (table 2).
Based on the modified typology, I argue that informal hostels housing migrants substitute for
formal hotels that are unaffordable, and thus unavailable, for most migrant workers.
“Unavailable” in this modified typology encompasses formal institutions that are beyond reach
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for some actors due to the cost, accessibility, and availability (i.e. hotels are sometimes fully
booked).
Table 2. Modified Typology of Interaction between Formal and Informal Institutions
Effective FormalInstitutions
Ineffective or Unavailable
Formal Institutions
Compatible Goals Complementary Substitutive
Conflicting Goals Accommodating Competing
As many studies report, there is a substantial shortage of good quality, affordable childcare
in the United States (Blau and Robins 1988; Kisker and Ross 1997; Blau 1993; Johansen,
Leibowitz, and Waite 1996; Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001). The demand for formal
childcare that provides learning opportunities for children far outstrips the supply. The shortage
of childcare options is an often-cited impediment to women’s participation in the formal labor
force and to a manageable balance between work and family (Gordon and Chase-Lansdale
2001). Formal childcare is often either unaffordable or unavailable, and many parents are not
satisfied with its quality. Hondagneu-Sotelo argues that many middle-class families are deeply
prejudiced against formal childcare centers, “perceiving them as offering cold, institutionalized,
and second-class child care” (2001, 4). Children attending formal childcare centers also tend to
get sick more often, forcing parents to miss work. As a result, many parents turn to informal
childcare11
, much of which is provided by female migrant workers. Twenty percent of female
interviewees in this study were live-in caregivers for children. Their responsibilities also
included numerous other household chores such as cleaning the house, cooking, doing laundry,
11 Formal childcare includes childcare centers or family childcare homes that are regulated by state authorities.Informal childcare is performed in unregulated home settings (Kisker and Ross 1997).
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and ironing. An additional 26.7 percent of women were child caregivers at some point, but later
moved on to jobs that involved only housekeeping duties. Overall, almost half of the women
interviewed were childcare workers at the time of the interviews or at some point during their
employment in the United States. I argue that affordable female migrant labor providing
childcare allows more American women to participate in the formal labor force, and thus
enhances the effectiveness of the formal economy. This relationship represents an example of a
substitutive interaction between informal and formal institutions where migrant labor substitutes
for the unaffordable, unavailable or low-quality formal childcare.
Similarly, the responsibility of caring for the elderly is being increasingly transferred from
the immediate family members to hired workers who are often migrants (Pratt 1999). The
capacity of public assistance programs for the elderly is limited: federally-funded healthcare
covers only acute health conditions requiring skilled medical assistance (Bass and Noelker
1987). Many elderly individuals do not want to live in nursing homes or cannot afford to live in
expensive retirement facilities. They might not require medical assistance on a daily basis, which
makes them unqualified for federally subsidized programs, but they do need help with personal
care. In such cases the only in-home care options for the elderly are limited to daily assistance
from family members (if it is available) and/or to privately purchased care. Traditionally, the
families provided the bulk of care for elderly individuals with disabilities (Bass and Noelker
1987). Purchased care is becoming a more attractive option for primary caregivers given the
significant physical and emotional care-related stress, and the availability of inexpensive migrant
labor. It is estimated that half of the disabled elderly using in-home services rely exclusively on
privately purchased care (Bass and Noelker 1987). A quarter of the female migrants interviewed
in this study reported working as live-in caregivers to the elderly. Migrant workers willing to
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work as live-in caregivers to the elderly relieve the burden from the immediate family
members/children. Since the responsibility of caring for the elderly is disproportionately borne
by women (Ettner 1996; Bass and Noelker 1987), migrant labor in this sphere allows more
women to fully participate in the labor force. This arrangement of caring for the elderly
represents a substitutive interaction where migrant labor substitutes for the ineffective formal
elderly care system.
Complementary Interaction. Unlicensed employment agencies in Kyrgyzstan routinely
facilitate labor migration out of the country. According to the Kyrgyz legislation, employment
agencies placing Kyrgyz workers in overseas jobs are required to obtain a license from the State
Committee for Migration and Employment (Kyrgyz Republic 2006). Yet, a recent study reports
that almost 80 percent of such agencies operate illegally without a license (The European
Commission and International Organization for Migration 2005). Unlicensed employment
agencies are not sanctioned and/or prosecuted in Kyrgyzstan despite their violation of the Law
on External Labor Migration (Kyrgyz Republic 2006) and the Provision on the Activities of
Employment Agencies Facilitating Employment of Kyrgyz Citizens Abroad (Kyrgyz Republic
2006). It is likely that unlicensed employment agencies are largely ignored because the Kyrgyz
state implicitly encourages out-migration. I argue that since the state cannot provide legal
channels for international migration, it allows employment agencies to do so through illegal
channels. The State Committee for Migration and Employment is particularly interested in
encouraging out-migration as its mandate includes employment issues as well. The more
migrants leave the country, the lower the unemployment rate will seem on paper. Both
institutions have a converging goal – facilitating labor migration out of Kyrgyzstan. Unlicensed
employment agencies seek to achieve this goal to profit from the passage fees paid by migrants.
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The government of Kyrgyzstan encourages temporary labor out-migration because the latter
results in a significant inflow of hard currency into the economy, strengthens the local financial
system, substitutes for an ineffective social welfare system (through remittances sent to
migrants’ families), and artificially reduces the unemployment rate. This is an example of a
complementary interaction between unlicensed employment agencies and the state, the former
providing an outcome that the Kyrgyz government itself cannot achieve.
Interestingly, I found no incidences of an accommodating relationship between
institutions, in which the informal institution alters formal institutional outcomes without directly
violating formal rules. A possible explanation for the lack of accommodating relationships is that
when it comes to a restrictive immigration regime, actors engaging informal institutions often
seek outcomes (i.e. irregular migration) that are markedly divergent from formal institutional
goals (i.e. restricted immigration). By choosing to follow informal rules, actors inevitably violate
formal rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2006).
Conclusion
This study stands in stark contrast to the existing implementation literature in that it
examined the role that informal institutions play in the effectiveness of public policies. The
critical finding is that informal institutions in the United States have established transnational
partnerships with their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan and cooperate fairly effectively to find
avenues for migration of Kyrgyz nationals. Collectively, these informal institutions routinely
undermine the effectiveness of immigration policies. Informal institutions also influence other
formal institutions such as childcare, elderly care, and housing regulations.
A test of the Helmke-Levitsky typology undertaken in this study demonstrates that the
typology is a good starting point for the analysis of institutional interaction not only in the
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context of one country but also in a transnational setting. With some modification, namely the
categorization of formal institutions as “ineffective and/or unavailable” as opposed to
exclusively “ineffective”, the typology holds true for examining not only political but economic
formal and informal institutions as well.
This research project discovered a significant number of informal institutions undermining
formal institutions and rules designed to control illegal immigration. It therefore comes as no
surprise that the current immigration situation in the United States is considered to be “broken”,
and the government is unable to manage illegal immigration to the extent that some individuals
have taken matters into their hands, as demonstrated by grass-roots initiatives such as the
“Minuteman project”.12
The widespread perception in the literature on informal institutions is that informality is a
feature of an under-developed Third World state (Borocz 2000; Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987;
Sztompka 1993). Some scholars argue that informal institutions are prevalent in developing
countries, where formal institutions are more likely to be ineffective as compared to developed
countries (Borocz 2000; Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987; Jones Luong 2004; Collins 2004; Peng
2004; Sztompka 1993). This research project, however, finds that in the context of labor
migration, informal institutions are almost as prevalent in the United States as they are in
Kyrgyzstan. The findings of this study suggest that the emergence and resilience of informal
institutions in developed countries such as the United States is due to local supply and demand.
The demand for inexpensive migrant labor in the United States is so great that migration
intermediaries find ways to bring in migrant workers. Domestic services are increasingly
performed by paid workers in the United States as more American women are entering the
12 The Minuteman Project is a movement that started in 2005 in several border states of the United States. Civilianactivists patrol the borders to intercept and report migrants attempting to illegally cross the Mexico-U.S. border.
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formal labor force. In essence, as Hondagneu-Sotelo puts it, “the work of cleaning houses and
caring for children gradually left the hands of wives and mothers and entered the global
marketplace” (2001, xii). Few American women want to work in domestic service industry as
wages are low, work is often back-breaking, no benefits are offered and the job itself is perceived
as demeaning. As a result, domestic work in the United States has become “the domain of
disenfranchised immigrant women of color” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, xii). Similarly, labor-
intensive low-wage jobs in agriculture, construction, and restaurant industries are largely filled
by migrant workers insofar as native-born or legal immigrant workers are reluctant to do this
type of work despite its abundance.
Much of the literature in the field of institutionalism argues that informal institutions
undermine formal institutional outcomes. Such arguments are largely confirmed by findings of
this research project. Yet, this study shows that not all informal institutions are subversive of
formal rules. In some cases, informal institutions enhance the effectiveness of formal rules or
substitute for ineffective formal institutions, thereby addressing a legitimate need. Most notably,
migrant labor makes up for the ineffective formal childcare and elderly care system in the United
States and allows more American women to participate in the labor force.
Further research focusing on the role of informal institutions in immigration from major
migrant-sending countries would contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of
informal-formal institutional interaction. It would be especially interesting to compare how
informal institutions emerge and operate in states sharing a border with the United States, such as
Mexico, and in far-off countries such as China.
The policy implications of this study are significant. Informal institutions play an active
and important role in the implementation of immigration and other policies and, thus should be
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taken into account in the early stages of policy design. Over 60 years ago Dahl argued that the
study of public administration is “a study of human beings as they have behaved, and as they
may be expected or predicted to behave, under certain special circumstances” (Dahl 1947, 4). As
this study has demonstrated, in response to policies designed to control illegal immigration actors
create informal institutions. In line with Dahl’s timeless argument, given the restrictiveness of
the present immigration regime (Dahl’s “special circumstance”), these informal institutions
should be expected to behave in ways that undermine formal immigration policies. Thus, it is
imperative that informal institutions are considered an important variable in the design and
evaluation of immigration and other policies. The emergence of informal institutions in response
to societal demands accentuates the need for dynamic formal institutions that are responsive and
flexible to ensure that their effectiveness is not undermined by informal institutions.
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