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BASIC PROBLEM3 OF "AF-STRACT QUIDDITY"

By

Toshihiko Izutsu

Professor a t M cGill University

Ins titu te o f Islamic Studies

I

T h e concept of “ q u id d ity ” (máhíyah) plays an exceedingly im p o rtan t

rőle in Islam ic philosophy, nő t only in metaphysics b ú t alsó in logic. Fór the

Eisagógé (Ar. Isághuji), w hich constitutes the First Book of classical A ristote-

lian logic as it has been accepted by th e Muslims, is in its essentials no th ing

o ther th an an e labora te theory of “ q u id d ity ”. In the course o f history, the

concept o f ^q u id d ity ” has raised in Islam ic thought a n u m b er of interesting

problems. T h e so -ca lled iUibárát of “ qu idd ity” is surely of the most im p o r

ta n t o f those problems.

T h e w ord i ‘tibárát fsg. iHibár) rneans ^ (various possible) ways o f look-

ing a t ” a th ing . T h e expression (<ictibárat of qu idd ity” , therefore, refers to

various possible ways in which “ qu idd ity” can be viewed a t the level of

conceptua l analysis. I t m ust be noted th a t the expression in no wise suggests

the existence o f various kinds of “ qu id d ity ” . All th a t it ndicates iS th a t every

“ q u id d ity ” can be rationally ap p roached from a n u m b er of different angles,

or can be conceived in a n u m b er o f different dimensions, and th a t a t each

of the dimensions “ q u id d ity ” discloses different ra tional characteristics.

T h ree iHibár&t have been consecrated by philosophic trad ition as being

the most fu n d am en ta l am o n g all the im aginable approaches:

(1) la bi-shart o r “ n o n - conditioned” .

(2) bi-shart Iá or ^negatively conditioned” .

(3) bi-shart shay’ or “ positively conditioned” .

O f these th ree the m ost controversial have always been the first an d

the second. T h e present p ap er will deal with somé o f the most basic problems

th a t have arisen a ro u n d the second, bi-shart Iá.

T he very concept o f “ quidd ity q u á negatively cond itioned” (máhiyah

bi-shart Iá) goes back directly to the metaphysics of Ib n Síná (Avicenna).

Bút it becam e a reál moot problem in Islamic philosophy w ith the descrip-

tion N a s i r a l - D in a l - T ű s íg a v e o f this concept in his celebrated Tajrid al-

‘Aqá’id. I n view of this fact, we shall do well to s ta rt by rep roducing the

short b ú t highly controversial passage o f this la tte r work, in which T űsi

enum erates w hat he considers the characteristic features of “ qu idd ity q u á

negatively conditioned” .1

ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 4

II

(1) Wa - qad tűkhadh al - máhiyah,

(2 ) mahdhufan ‘an-há má *adá-há ,

(3) bi-hayth

(4) lau indámmá ilay - há shay\

(5) la-kána z á ’id.

(6) w a -lá takűn maqűlah ‘ alá,

dhálika al-majmű(.

(7 ) Wa - hiya al - máhiyah bi - shart Iá,

(8) w a -lá tájad illa f i al-adhhán

“ Q u id d ity ” m ay be viewed,

all elements o ther than itself being

rem oved therefrom ,

in such a way that,

if any elem ent were adjoined to it

(i.e. th e “ qu idd ity” ),

it (i.e. tha t elem ent) would b ú t be

something external (and su p erad d -

ed),

and it w ould nő t be pred ica ted of

th a t com bined whole.

“ Q u id d i ty '’ in such a state is “ n e

gatively conditioned ,,5

an d it does nőt exist except in the

mind-

5 T. IZLJTSU

Fór a correct unders tand ing of w h a t is s tated here about the categry

of “ q u á negatively conditioned ' it m ust be rem em bered th a t most of the lead-

ing M uslim philosophers recognize, over a n d a b o v e th e three Vtibárát, ano ther

iHibár or a stage which metaphysically precedes all of them , nam ely, a stage

a t w hich “ q u id d ity ” is viewed in its conceptual pu rity p rio r to its being

de te rm ined or conditioned by any th ing w hatsoever. This is the iHibár o f

“ qu idd ity q u á itselfv (máhíyah min hayth hiya).2

A t the stage of “ q u á itself” , “ qu idd ity“ is viewed in a state of totál

indeterm ination . N o de te rm ina tion , either positive or negative, is a t tached

to it. I t is nő t de term ined e v e n b y th e purely negative de term ina tion o f n o t-

b e in g - de term ined - by - anything. “ Q u id d ity ” is here being considered in

itself a n d by itself. T h e re is absolutely no reference to w hatever is nőt itself.

I t is in the capacity o f the hu m án m ind, however, to detach itself

f rom the state o f pure in tuition , recede a step, an d consider the in tu ited

thing, w hatever it m ay be, from a distance, observing it in an objective

way. “ Q u id d ity q u á itself”, w hen observed in such a m anner , discloses itself

to the m ind as som ething transcending, o r cut off from, all o ther things. No

longer is the “ qu id d ity ” then being in tu ited in its absolute purity ; fór “ o th e r”

things have already in tru d ed in tő the field of consciousness, except th a t the

“ q u id d ity ” is p ú t intő a negative relation w ith these “ o th e r” things. T h a t is

to say, the “ o th e r” things of which the m in d is conscious and which, so to

speak, su rro u n d the “ qu id d ity ” , a re in ten tionally expelled f iom the field of

consciousness an d kept back from the “ qu idd ity” . All this is a conscious

process, a t least theoretically if nő t practically. A nd the absolute pu rity or

transcendence o f the “ q u id d i ty ’’ becomes re - established on the g round p re -

p a red by this ra tiona l process. T h e “ qu id d ity ” is now in the state of “ n e g a

tively cond it ioned” .

T h e “ q u id d ity ” in this new state o f pu r ity is a “ q u id d ity ” as an

ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 6

abstrac t concept. S tructura lly it is said to be “negatively conditioned” because

here its conceptual pu rity is m ain ta ined by d in t o f a negative determ ination ,

nam ely, th a t of nőt - being - accom panied - by - any th ing - else.3 In the tradition-

al theory o f universalia in Islamic logic, “ q u idd ity" in such a State is know n

as “ ra tional universal” (kulit (aqli). I t m ay conveniently be exemplified by

the pure concept o f ‘an im al’ viewed as a self - subsistent ra tional entity pre-

cluding all o ther concepts th a t m ay possibly be associated with it. In the text

given above, Tusi refers to this aspect of the p rob lem by the clause(2): “ all

elements o ther th a n itself being rem oved therefrom ” . T h e sentence (6) States

th a t a “ qu idd ity” considered in this way is a “ qu idd ity q u á negatively c o n

ditioned” .

T he text mentions three m ore points as characteristic o f “ qu idd ity quá

negatively conditioned” .

F i r s t : -----as indicated by (3) - ( 4 ) “ qu idd ity” in such a state cannot

form an integrál whole w ith any o ther concepts. This is b ú t a d irect conse-

quence of ( l ) - ( 2 ) . Since the concept o f ‘an im al’, fór exam ple, is in this

dimension supposed to subsist independently of all o ther elements which, as

we have ju s t seen, are being consciously kept back from it, it is n a tu ra l tha t

the concept should absolutely refuse to be com bined with any o ther c o n c e p t-----

th a t of ‘ra tiona l’, fór e x am p le intő a conceptual unity . ‘A n im á l’ a n d

‘rational' here are two independen t concepts. Evén if we forcefully p ú t them

together, w hat is obtained will be no th ing m ore than a n external com bina -

tion of two self-contained elements refusing, ju s t like oil and w ater, to be

m ixed with each other. T h e com bination ‘an im a l’ - ‘ra t io n a l’ in this concep

tual dimension wáll aptly be com pared w ith a m án an d a stone p ú t side by

side in the external world. T hey can never be in tegra ted intő a whole. This

negative feature distinctively marks off the “ q u á negatively conditioned”

from the “ quá non - conditioned” , fór if ‘ra t iona l’ is ad jo ined to ‘a n im a l’ in

7 T. IZUTSU

the la t te r dimension, the two concepts get smoothly com bined intő a th ird

concept, i.e. th a t of ‘ra tiona l a n im a l’ which in fact is no th ing bú t the c o n

cept o f ‘m á n ’.

S e c o n d :-----as ind ica ted by ( 6 ) a “ q u id d i ty ” in the state of “ quá

negatively cond itioned” can never be predicated o f any th ing o ther th an its

own self (“ A nim al is an im a l” ), nő t even of itself as com bined with something

else. As we have observed in the foregoing, ‘an im al’ a n d ‘ra t io n a l’, fór

instance, a re in this dim ension preclusive o f each o ther, so th a t the c o m b i-

n a t io n of these two concepts rem ains an external com bination of two inde-

p e n d e n t elements: ‘a n im a l+ ra t io n a l’. T h e ‘a n im a l+ ra t io n a l’ is of course quite

a different concept from ‘a n im a l’, because it is ‘animal-i- X ’, representing

som ething m ore th a n m ere anim ality . ‘A n im ál’ ( “ q u á negatively conditioned”)

c an n o t possibly be p red ica ted of ‘an im al + X ’ because the former precisely

represents m ere anim ality . A nd by this negative feature, too, the “ q u á negatively

c o n d it io n ed ” proves radically different from the “ quá non - conditioned” , fór in

the la t te r dim ension ‘an im a l’ has a full r igh t to be pred ica ted o f the c o m

b ined whole (“ ‘A n im al+ ra tio n a l’ i s a n an im a l”, tha t is, “ M á n is an an im a l” ).

W e m ay add th a t in the text quo ted above, Tusi does nőt discuss the

re la ted p rob lem , w hether there is som ething th a t can be p redicated o f

“ qu idd ity q u á negatively conditioned . Briefly stated, the answer is yes.

Fór, a l though p r im a ry intelligibles canno t be pred icated of it, secondary

intelligibles c a n 4 . (“ A nim al is a genus” , “ M án is a species”, etc.).

T h i r d : -----as ind icated by the last sentence of the text, (8) “ q u id

d ity q u á negatively conditioned” does nő t exist except in the m ind. T h e re is no

disagreem ent am o n g M uslim philosophers th a t “ q u id d ity ” deprived of all its

accidents , i.e. a pure ly abs trac t concept, canno t exist in the external world.

T h e reál p rob lem is ra ther, w hether “ qu idd ity” in such a state does or can

exist in the m ind . A m ong the leading thinkers o f the la te r periods of Islam,

ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 8

like Ju r ján i , Taftázáni, Q űshji, etc., we íind this pi'oblem being very seri-

ously discussed. Those who take the position th a t “ q u id d ity ” in its absolute

pu rity canno t exist even in the m ind a rgue th a t “ to exist írS the m in d ” is

itself an accident so tha t a “ qu idd ity existing in the m in d ” is by this very

qualification deprived of the conceptual purity which is a t issue in th e pre-

sent context. T h a t is to say, the “ q u á negatively conditioned” cannot exist

in the m ind w ithout bem g transform ed intő som ething else

Against this argum ent, those who adm it the m en tá i ex;stence ( ' “ q u á

negatively conditioned” point out th a t the negative thesis is based on a eon-

fusion between two different “ intentions” 5. W e must, they argue, clearly

distmguish between a State of affairs being viewed in its prim ary , de facto

m ode (nafs al-amr) o f being, i.e. as na tu ra lly given, before the light of anal-

ysis is shed upon it, and the State o f affairs being viewed analytically w hen

the secondary, reflexive in tention of consciousness is focused upon its s tructure.

Certainíy, they go on to argue, a “ quiddity existing in the m in d ” is

nőt a “ qu idd ity” pure and simple w ithout any qualification. Bút in the first

o f the two dimensions tha t have ju s t been explained, “ existing in the m in d ”

is still a m a tte r o f the p rim ary m ode o f being, an d as such the h g h t of

consciousness is nőt shed upon it. As long as the m ind does nőt take cogni-

zance of it, “ existing in the m in d ” does nő t constitute a n accident o f the

“ qu idd ity” . A nd such is exactly the dimensjon in which th e “ q u á negatively

conditioned” is actualized. T h e being - in - the - m ind viewed as an accident

o* the “ qu idd ity” belongs to a different dimension, an d is therefore to be

completely ignored a t this stage of p r im ary intention. T h e being - in - the - m in d

disdoses itself as an accident of the “ qu idd ity” only a t the stage o f s eco n

dary in tention , w hen the consciousness hav ing in itself the pu re “ qu id d ity ”

a lready actualized, directs now its a tten tion to the very fact th a t it is beinj>

conscious o f the “ qu idd ity” in such a state.

9 T. IZUTSU

A similar, b ú t slightly different solution of the p ro b ltm has alsó been

proposed by somé o f the philosophers, th e gist of w hich is as follows.® T h e

functioning o f the m in d is by n a tú ré such th a t it can represent anything,

even its ow n non - existence. I t is, therefore, quite a simple m atte r fór the

m in d to represent “ qu idd ity” in the state of an absolute purity , deprived o f

all its accidents, be they external or m entái. So even i f “ quiddity q u á n eg a

tively conditioned” be qualified, a lready a t the p rim ary stage, by b e i n g - in -

t h e - m in d , the m ind is able to consider it as something nő t qualified by this

m en tá i accident.

T hose who take this position usually explain the s ituation by having

recourse to cases th a t a re m ore easily unders tandab le , like the concepts of

“ non - existent” a n d “ unknow n” . A “ non - existent” thing is existent in the

m in d as long as it is conceived as something, be it in a purely negative way.

Bu this k ind of existence does nő t p revent it from being the concept of

“ n o n - existent” . Similarly som ething “ u nknow n” is known as such the m om ent

the m in d takes cognizance of it. I t remains nevertheless the concept o f

“ un k n o w n ” in itself. J u s t in the same way, “ qu iddity q u á negatively condi -

tioned” is qualified by b e in g - in - th e - m in d insofar as the m ind is conscious

o f i t ; b ú t in itself it is “ q u id d ity ” s tand ing aloof from all qualifications, and

as such is opposed to “ qu idd ity q u á positively conditioned” .

So far the a b o v e -q u o te d text of Tusi would nőt seem to lead intő any

serious difficulties. Its a rg u m en t appears flawless. Such, however, is in

reality n ő t the case. F ó r m an y of the f ir s t- ra te thinkers claim to notice a

g la n n g contrad ic tion betw een the clauses (2) an d (4). H ence the thesis o f

“ two different m eanings” of the expression “ q u á negatively conditioned” (bi-

shart Iá). W a shall be concerned w ith this problem in the following section.

ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 10

III

Before exam ining the na tú ré of the “ con trad ic tion” or “ confusion” which

Tűsí is said to ha ve m ade in pu tt ing the clauses (2) a n d (4) together in his

description o f “ quiddity q u á negatively conditioned’’, let us first give a brief

explanation o f the two different m eanm gs which these thinkers a t ta c h to the

expression bi-shart Iá.

(1) T h e first m eaning o f “ q u á negatively cond itioned” concerns essen-

tially an d exclusively the conceptual re lation between a “ qu id d ity ’’ an d its

accidents. H ere “ quiddity q u á negatively conditioned” m eans “ q u id d ity ” in

th e state of a totál seclusion from everything alien and external to itself-----

“ qu id d ity ” as viewed in its absolute conceptual pu r ity a p a r t from all “ o th e r”

elements, whether the la tter be its inseparable accidents (like being - an - o d d -

num ber in relation to the “ qu idd ity” of the n u m b er 3) or separable accidents

(like b e in g -w h ite in relation to the “ qu idd ity” of ‘m á n ’). I t will be quite

clear that this is precisely the m eaning in which we have in the foregoing

pages used an d understood the expression “ quidd ity q u á negatively c o n d i

tioned” . I t will be clear alsó tha t a “ q u id d ity ” understood in this way can n o t

exist in the external world, because it cannot b ú t be an abstract concept.

(2) T h e second m eaning of bi-shart Iá concerns a re lation th a t obtains

between the “ constituent parts” (a jzá \ sg. ju t?) of “ qu idd ity” . H ere we start

from a concrete situation in which we find a “ q u id d ity ” (e.g. ‘m á n ’) being

existent in the m ind as a conceptual composite (murakkab) constitu ted by

ano ther “ qu idd ity” ( ‘an im a l’) and a differentia (‘ra t io n a l5). W h a t we are

initially given is, on this supposition, a composite whole (‘m á n ’). O u r reason

exercises its discriminating ability upon this composite w hole an d analyzesit

in tő its com ponents: ‘an im al5 and ‘ra t io n a l5. T h en the reason considers the

concept of ‘an im al5 thus taken out of its original composition as an independent

11 T. IZUTSU

en ti ty s tand ing opposed to the o ther e lem ent: cr a t io n a l \ T h e concept of

‘an im a l’ viewed in this way exemplifies the second m e a n in g o f “qu idd ity q u á

negatively cond itioned” . T h e “ q u á negatively conditioned” is to be taken here

as a “ constituent p a r t” (juz?) o r “ m a t te r” (maddah) of a “ q u id d ity ” (‘anim al'1)

as the “ m a t ie r ” o f ‘m á n ’ in the present exam ple). ‘A n im ál’ here is “ negatively

cond itioned” in the sense tha t its conceptual independence is conditioned by

its difference or separation from ‘ra tio n a l’.

I t is im p o rta n t to rem ark fór a r igh t understand ing of w hat we are

going to say ab o u t the “ confusion” Tusi m ay have m ad e between the two

m eanings o f bi-shart Iá, tha t a “ qu idd ity” understood in the second sense

is considered by all those who m ake this distinction to exist in the external

world. I t m ust be ad d m itted , they say, th a t primarily a “ qu idd ity” in such a

s tate exists only in the m ind , fór it is originally a p roduct of a ra tional

analysis by w hich the m ind establishes it as an independen t entity in sepa

ra t io n from its com pan ion from which it is in reality nőt separated. However,

insofar as it exists in its original form in the external world in com bination

w ith its differentia a n d o ther accidents, it does exist secondarily a n d per

accidens, in the ex ternal world.

W ith this p re lim inary explanation in m ind, let us now tu rn to the

a rg u m en t o f those who see a “ confusion” in w hat Tűsi says abou t the struc-

tu re o f “ qu idd ity q u á negatively conditioned” .

T h e m a in po in t o f their criticism is as follows. T ű s i’s description of

“ qu id d ity q u á negatively conditioned” lacks consistency in th a t it can be

taken nefiher in the first sense th ro u g h o u t n o r in the second sense. T h e

criticism is based on the observation o f the two following facts.

(a) T h e expression: “ all elements o ther th an itself being rem oved

th e re fro m ” clearly shows th a t w h a t Tűsí has in m in d is “ q u á negatively

co n d it io n ed ” in the first sense. Bút the clause which follows it, nam ely : “ if


any elem ent were adjoined to i t” stands flagrantly in conflict with this

understanding . Fór “ q u á negatively conditioned” in the first sense is sup -

posed to be absolutely de tached from all “ o th e r” elements, so tha t if any

elem ent were to be adjoined to i t ---------even by m ere su p p o sit io n --- the

“ q u id d ity ” would cease to b e i n the p u r ity of “ q u á negatively conditioned

in the first sense.

(b) Nor, however, is it possible fór us to take T ű s í’s description con -

sistently in the second sense, because the sentence i 8) explicitly states th a t

the “ qu idd ity" in question “ does nő t exist except in the m in d ” . W e have

already seen above tha t “ quá negatively cond itioned” does exist in the exter

nal world, albeit secondarily.

According to Ju r ján í , the clause (2) fits only the first sense, while the

clause (4) is proper only to the second sense. Thus he sees in T ű s í’s descrip

tion an obvious an d undeniable confusion betw een the two meanings.

I t is interesting to rem ark in this respect th a t because o f this “ c o n fu

sion' no less an au thority th an Taftázán i goes to the extreme of denying the

authenticity of the T a jr id a l- ‘Aqá'id itself. C om paring the ab o v e-c ited passage

w ith w hat Tűsi says in his Com m entary on the A vicennian Ishárát, T a ftázán i

reaches the astonishing conclusion that this work is p robab ly nő t a reál work

o f this g reat Master. Says he: “ (T h e confusion be ween the two meanings)

testifies tha t this is nőt one of his reál works” . “ In this (confusion) we have

a n indubitab le evidence in support of the negative opin ion th a t has been

expressed about the Tajrid a l - ‘Aqá'id, nam ely th a t it is nő t an au then tic

work of Tűsi, despite the fact tha t the book is too good and precious to be

ascribed to anyone else” .8

O f all those who see a “ confusion” in T ű s i’s description, Q űshji ( ‘A lá5

a l - D in A h m ad a l-Q ű sh ji , d. 1474) deserves special mention. H e was

am ong the first thinkers to recognize the distinction between the two technical

13 T. IZUTSU

m eanings w ith which we are concerned in this section, a n d to em phasize the

im portance o f m a in ta in ing this distinction rigorously an d in the most sys-

tem atic way, nőt restricting the distinction to “ quá negatively conditioned”

alone b ú t ex tending it to “ q u á positively conditioned” a n d “ q u á n o n -c o n d i

t io n e d ” as well. A n d on the basis o f this w idened vicw, Q űshji criticised

I asi’s exposition, a l though he did nő t go to the extent o f denying the au then-

ticity o f the Tajrid al-'AqüHd. In view o f the historical im portance o f his

theory, we shall give here an outline of the m ain ideas which he expresses

on the par t icu la r p rob lem a t issue in his famous Gom m entary9 on this very

work o f Tűsi.

I t is im p o r ta n t to note tha t, since, as we have ju s t seen, Q űshji does

n ő t restrict the d istinction betw een the “ two m eanings" to bi-shart Iá, b ú t

extends it systematically to Iá bi-shart a n d bi-shart shay\ the problem is no

longer how one should u n ders tand the expression “ q u á negatively c o n d i

tio n ed ”. Q űsh ji r a th e r proposes to establish now two different systems of

i ‘tibárát of “ q u id d ity ” , two systems o f technical terininology which are parallel

to each o ther in th a t both consist o f three terms exactly the same, b ú t which

are different from one anofher in iha t they are based each on a different

m terp re ta tion of the terms.

T h e basic “ m ean ing” in terms o f w hich one o f the two systems is

constitu ted is the same as w hat we have already elucidated a t the outset of

the present section as the first m eaning o f “ q u á negatively conditioned” . T h e

iHibárát o f “ q u id d ity ” , u n d e r this in terp re ta tion , tu rn out to be a systematic

p resenta tion of the three m ajo r ways in which reason can consider “ q u id d i ty ”

m term s of the degrees a n d modes of determ ination .

T h e second system of the iHibárát of “ q u id d ity ” is a classification o f

th e m u tu a l relations th a t a re conceivable between the inner (or essential)

constituents o f “ qu idd ity" , which are capab le o f being p red ica ted o f the latter.


Thus, to repeat, we have two systems o f iHibárát o f “ qu id d ity ” , each

consisting o f the same terms:

(1) Iá bi-shart “ q u á n o n -c o n d i t io n e d ” ,

(2) bi-shart Iá “ q u á negatively cond itioned”,

(3) bi-shart shay “ q u á positively conditioned” .

Each of these three terms carries a different m ean ing accord ing to

w hether it is understood in reference to the one or the o ther system. Let us,

fór the sake of convenience, designate the two systems as S y s tem -A an d

System -B respectively. Since abou t S ys tem -A w h a t we already know is

sufficient fór our present purposes, we shall p ú t System -B in the foreground

and consider in particu la r bi-shart Iá an d bi-shart shay3 w hich are o f special

relevance to the p rob lem we are concerned with.

Let us first take up bi-shart shay’ “ quá positively conditioned”, or m ore

literally “ q u á conditioned by som ething” . I t is to be rem arked im m ediately

th a t in System -B the w ord shay’ does nőt m ean “ an y th in g ” ; th a t the r e fe r

ence is ra th e r to a certain definite thing. A n accident like ‘laugh ing ’ (dáhik)

or Ccapable of writing’ (kátib), fór instance, function in S y s tem -A as shay*,

i.e. a conditioning factor of the “ q u id d ity ” (of ‘an im al’, fór instance). Fór

in fact in System -A anyth ing can function as a conditioning factor o f “ q u id

dity” . T h e ‘an im a l’ as conditioned by being - c a p a b le -o f -w r i t in g is ‘m á n ’,

an d it provides an example o f “ quiddity q u á positively conditioned” . In Sys

tem -B , on the contrary, only those concepts w hich are found in the in terior

of a “ qu iddity” an d which essentially constitute it from inside are allowecl

to function as the conditioning factors of the “ qu idd ity” . O therwise expressed,

it is only the diíferentia th a t can be considered the shay’ of the “ qu idd ity” .

‘A nim ál’, fór example, is in itself an indeterm inate “ qu idd ity” . I t does

nőt acquire detcrm ination an d ac tuah ty unless a diíferentia (e.g. ‘ra t io n a l’)

15 T. IZUTSU

be added to it. W h en ‘an im al’ is conceived as being in a s tate in which one

o f its differentiae has a lready actualized it, the “ q u id d ity ” o f ‘a n im a l’ is

said to be in the s tate of “ q u á positively conditioned.” in terms of S ystem -

B. T h u s a “ qu idd ity q u á positively cond itioned” in terms of System -B is a

predicable , “ species”.

B i-shart Iá o r “ q u á negatively conditioned" is alsó given two different

in te rp re ta t ions in terms o f the two systems. In S y s tem -A , bi-shart Iá reT rs

to the s tate in w hich “ qu idd ity” is kept deliberately detached from all e le

m ents o ther th an itself, while in System -B ‘‘qu idd ity q u á negatively c o n d i

tioned" is “ q u id d i ty ” viewed as a constituent elem ent of a composite concep-

tual whole in which it is com bined with ano ther constituent element. H ere

we have a “ q u id d ity ” (let us call it X) seen as jo ined to ano ther element

(let us call it Y) so th a t as the result of this com bination a th ird conceptual

en tity (let us call it Z) is actualized. X and Y are the constituent elements

o f Z ; th a t is to say, each of X and Y is a “ p a r t” f ju z ’) o f Z. Thus, to

restate the m a t te r in m ore concrete terms, ‘an im a l’ (X) is com bined with

‘ra t io n a l5 (Y) to form a th ird concept: ‘m á n ’ (Z). ‘M á n ’ in this context is

viewed as a conceptual composite m ade of ‘an im a l’ an d ‘ra t io n a l’. ‘A nim ál’

is a “ p a r t ” of ‘m á n ’. A n d under such an in terpre ta tion , ‘an im al’ m aintains

its own conceptual independence so tha t w hatever is jo ined to it is regarded

as som ething external to it. I t is in this sense th a t the “ qu iddity ’ of ‘an im al’

is said to be in the state o f “ q u á negatively conditioned in System -B . Since

it is only a “ p a r t ”, or a constituent element, of ‘m á n ’, it canno t be p r e d i

cated o f ‘m á n ’. In o ther words, we canno t say in this par t icu la r dim ension:

“ M á n is an an im al ', fór ‘an im a l’ here does n ő t include in itself the other

constituent of ‘m á n ’, nam ely ‘ra tio n a l’. ‘A n im ál’ in this situation is said to

be the “ m a tte r" (máddah) of ‘m á n ’.

I t m ust be noticed th a t in System -B , “ qu idd ity" , w hether it be “ q u á


positively conditoned” or “ quá negatively conditioned”, is viewed as being

jo ined with something else. Evén in the state o f “ q u á negatively conditioned” ,

it is nő t the case tha t “ qu idd ity” stands com pletely detached from all e le

ments o ther th an itself, as it does in System -A . T h e only difference betw een

“ quá positively conditioned” and “ q u á negatively cond itioned” in System -B

lies in the following fact. In the former, the added elem ent (Y) is viewed as

having completely pene tra ted intő the inner tex ture o f the “ q u id d ity ” (X)

in such a way th a t X is actualized as Z pu re an d simple, leaving outw ardly

no trace of X and Y. Thus, to use again our fam iliar exam ple, w h a t we

actually have here is the pure concept of ‘m á n ’, while its constituent e l e

ments, ‘an im al’ an d ‘ra tiona l’, having been, as it were, dissolved in tő ‘m á n ’,

lie totally h idden u nder this composite whole. In the state of “ q u á negatively

conditioned”, on the contrary, the ad ded elem ent is viewed as rem ain ing

external to the “ qu idd ity” so th a t the two constituents, although they a c t u

ally are united intő a single composite, m ain ta in each its ow n conceptual

independence. In the very s tructure o f ‘m á n ’, fór exam ple, ‘a n im a l’ is intui-

ted in itself as an independently subsisting entity.

I t is on the basis of such an in terpre ta tion of the two systems th a t

Qushji claims to find a confusion between the tw o m eanings of “ q u á n e g a

tively conditioned” as described by Tűsi.

I h e expression (2) “ all elements o ther th a n itself being rem oved

thereform ”, he argues, means mujarradah, i.e. completely stripped o f all addi-

tional factors, and therefore it applies only to System -A . Fór, as we have

ju s t seen, in System -B, the “ q u id d ity ” is nő t in tu ited in its absolute i n d e

pendence; it is viewed in com bination with another element, except th a t the

two factors are regarded as m u tually exclusive of each other.

This would im m ediate ly imply th a t the clause (4): “ if any elem ent

were adjoined to i t” cannot apply except to System -B . T h e particu le lau ‘i f ’

17 T. IZUTSU

indicates th a t the m en tá i act o f ad jo in ing an o th e r e lem ent to the “ q u id d ity ”

is a m ere supposition. Bút even a supposed ad jo in ing o f ano th e r e lem ent

transposes the “ qu id d ity ” from S ystem -A to System -B .

Q űshji concedes th a t it is nő t impossible to unders tand the expression:

“ All elements o ther th a n itself being rem oved th e re fro m ” as a reference to

th e s truc tu re o f “ q u á negatively conditioned” in S y s tem -B } nam ely to u n d e r

s tand it in the sense of th e “ qu idd ity" nőt in terna lly m ixed with any o ther

e lem ent even if in ac tuality it m ay be found in com bination with o ther e le

ments. In th a t case, the clause (4) would be no th ing m ore th a n an additional

explication of w h a t is expressed by (2). In support of this in terpreta tion one

could ad d u ce the words o f Ib n Siná him self which a re found in the M éta -

physics c~ his .STiz/ű’ an d which read : “ ‘Quiddity* m ay be taken q u á c o n d i

tioned by no th in g (i.e. “ q u á negatively cond itioned” ). T h a t is the case when

its concep t is represented strictly in such a way th a t it should be represented

alone, th a t w hatever is jo in e d to i t should be considered something external

to it, an d th a t the original concept should nőt be pred icab le o f the c o m p o

site concep t (thus p roduced as the result o f this com bina tion )” .

Bút then , Q űshji continues to argue, the description of Tűsi thus

in te rp re ted would come intő conflict with the sentence (8): “ an d it does nőt

exist except in the m in d ” . Fór “ q u á negatively conditioned” in system -B

can very well exist in the external world as well as in the m ind , whereas

w hatever is com pletely s tr ipped o f all add itional factors can n o t in the n a tú ré

o r the case exist in the ex ternal world.

IV

T o w a rd the end of the 1 5 th cen tury there arose an in teresting philo-

sophical despu te betw een Ja lá l al - D in al - D aw w áni ( 1 4 2 7 - 15 0 1 ) a n d

G h iyá th a l - D in a l -D a sh ta k i (d. 1 5 4 2 ) . D aw w án i an d D ashtakí were two


outstand ing philosophers of the age, who were sharp ly opposed to each o ther

on a n um ber o f m ajor problems. T h e “ two m eanings” of “ q u á negatively

conditioned” happens to be one o f those problems on which they desagreed

in a rad ical m anner*0.

D ashtaki denies the very existence o f tw o different systems of technical

terminology. Each one o f the three m ajor i ‘tibárát: Iá bi-shart, bi-shart Iá and

bi-shart shay', m ain ta ins one an d the sam e basic technical m ean ing w hether

it be applied to the relations between “ qu idd ity” a n d its accidents (S ys tem -

A) or to the relations holding between the constituent elements of “ qu idd ity”

(System -B).

D ashtaki adm its th a t w hat Tusi refers to by the expression: “ all o ther

elements other than itself being removed therefrom ” is certainly “ qu id d ity ”

viewed by itself, in isolation from all external elements. Bút this does nőt

m ean th a t Tűsi is considering here “ qu idd ity” , as it were, in a completely

void space, p u tt in g it in a state of totál conceptual isolation in which it

appears w ithout any accom panying acc id en t fór, D ash tak i says, observ-

ing “ quidd ity” in such a state serves absolutely no purpose in the present

context. W h a t is in queston is ra th e r “ qu idd ity” observed in such a state

th a t it will rem ain conceptually independent, refusing to be umfied w ith

any accident th a t may come to be a ttached to it, i.e. “ qu idd ity” th a t will

continue to keep its self-identity even when in actuality it is accom panied

by o ther elements. ̂ This an d no th ing else, D ash tak i says, is w hat is m ean t

by the “ abstrac tion” ( tajrid, i.e. rendering abstract or naked, m ’jjarradah) of

“ qu idd ity” from all accom panying factors ( lawáhiq, sg. láhiq).

I t goes w ithout saying, Dashtaki adds, th a t “ q u id d ity ” seen in such a

state does nőt exist in the external world. Fór in the external v 'orld “ q u id

d ity” is completely unified with w hatever accompanies it, be the accom pa -

nying factor essential or accidental. A n “accom panying factor” is a predicate ,

19 T. IZUTSU

an d every p red icate is na tu ra lly unified a n d identified with the subject in

the external world.

A ccording to D ashtaki, no o ther in te rp re ta tion accords w ith the words

o f I o n Siná, (w hich we quoted earlier tow ard the end o f the last section).

D aw w áni, however, takes exception to this view. H e says: D ash tak i’s

thesis is no th ing other th a n a dow nrigh t denial o f the external existence oí

■'matter” . F ór “ q u id d ity ” which is actually accom panied by an o th e r faclor

b ú t w hich rem ains v ithou t being unified with it, can n o t b ú t be “ m a tte r” ;

an d D ashtaki declares th a t “ qu idd ity” in such a state does nőt exist except in

the m ind. Bút saying so, D aw w áni continues to a rgue , comes intő direct

conflict w ith w h a t Ib n Siná taugh t, who clearly recognized the existence o f

“ m a t te r ” . Besides it comes intő conflict w ith reality as well.

T h e upshot o f this a rg u m en t is tha t we have to adm it th a t there

a re two systems of technical terminology in terms of w hich the phrase “ q u á

negatively coxditioned” m ust be undestood in two different meanings.

Against this criticism D ashtaki argues in the following way. H e begins

by agreeing tha t “ qu idd ity q u á negatively conditioned" as he himself under-

stands it is a constituent “ p a r t” i.e. “ m a t t e r " of a “ qu id d ity ” which,

accom panied by accidents, actually exists. B ut} he says; a “ constituent p a r t”

is nő t necessarily a constituent p a r t in the ex ternal world. Fór it can very

well be a “ p a r t ” w hich is ob ta inab le only th rough ra tiona l analysis. R a ther ,

it is in the present context a ra tional “ p a r t” , because w hat are regarded as

“ accidents” (or “ accom panying factors” ) in the present context are all “ pre-

dicates” , an d “predicates” are nő t constituent “ parts” o f “ qu idd ity” in the

ex ternal world. So the denial o f the external existence o f “ m a t te r ” in this

sense goes ne ither against the teaching o f Ibn Siná nor against the objective

s truc tu re of r e a l i ty .^

T his answer, however, does nő t a t all satisfy Daw w áni. Besides, D aw w áni


radically differs from D ashtaki in the u n ders tand ing o f “ q u á negatively con

ditioned” . A nd his in te rp re ta tion o f T ű s i’s text is accordingly very different

from D ash tak i’s.

In his view, the “ abstraction of q u id d i ty ” , i.e. looking a i ^ q u id d ity ”

in the state o f isolation from o ther elements, is a relatíve m atte r . T h a t is to

say, “ qu idd ity” in such a state changes its n a tú ré a n d s truc ture in accordance

with the “ o ther elements” w hich are excluded from it. D aw w án í points ou t

two casses as directly relevant to our problem.

(a ) T h e first is the case in w hich “ q u id d ity ” is viewed as being in

totál isolation from all o ther elements w ithout exception. “ Q u id d ity ” in such

a state, being a sheer conceptual abstraction, canno t na tu ra lly exist in the

external world. Fór in o rder to exist externally, “ qu id d ity ” m ust necessarily

be determ ined in one way or another. Bút being - de te rm ined is itself an

alien factor added from outside to “ q u id d ity ” in this dimension.

(b ) T h e second is the case in which “ qu id d ity ” is considered as being

preclusive of somé definite elem ent or elements, nő t o f all. Fór exam ple, the

‘body’ viewed in isolation from the ‘sóul’, the ‘body’ from whose inner s truc

ture the ‘sóul’ is considered to be excluded, is in the s tate o f “ q u á n e g a

tively conditioned” only with regard to the ‘sóul’. W ith regard to the rest of

the elements th a t could accom pany the ‘body’, it rem ains indeterm inate ,

th a t is, “ q u á n o n -co n d it io n ed ” . In such a case, it is qu ite possible fór the

‘body* to becom e actualized in the external world in v ir tue of somé of these

elements o ther th an the ‘sóul’.

D aw w áni is convinced th a t the distinction betw een these tw o c a se sc a n

account fór the seem ingcon trad ic tion w hich is observable betw een Tűsi and

Ib n Siná concerning the external existcnce of “ q u á negatively conditioned” .

T h a t whose external exstence is denied by Tűsi is “ q u á negatively conditioned”

in the sense ( d ) , while Ibn Siná affirms its existence because he understands

21 T. IZUTSU

“ q u á negatively conditioned” in th e sense (b ) . ‘A n im á l’ does exist in the

external world when it is considered in the state o f “ q u á negatively c o n d i

t io n ed ” with reg ard to ‘ra tiona l’ alone, a lthough it canno t have external

existence w hen it is considered in isolation from all elements o ther than

itself. T hus , D aw w án i concludes, there is no reál contradiction betw een the

two Masters.

V

Láhiji h im self13 has a n original solution o f his ow n to offer fór the

p roblem concerning the notorious “ confusion” which m any a leading thinker

have seen in T ű s i’s descn'ption of “ q u á negatively conditioned” .

H e starts w ith “ quiddity q u á itself” (min hayth hiya hiya). “ Q u idd ity

q u á itself” is absolutely noth ing other than itself. T h a t is to say, all the

elem ents th a t could possibly accom pany it, w hether negative or positive, are

all p recluded from “ q u id d ity ” a t this stage. T hus we find T űsí’s words: “ all

elements o ther th a n itself being rem oved there fo rm ” literally actualized in

“ qu idd ity q u á itself” . I t is im p o rta n t to rem ark , however, tha t a t this highest

stage o f abstraclion , the expression “ all elements o ther th a n itself being

rem oved thereform ” refers only to the de facto s tructure o f “ qu idd ity q u á

itself” before the m in d starts to work upon it. O therwise expressed, there is

as yet no represen ta tion or notion o f the “exclusim o f other e lem ents” from

“ q u id d ity ”. T h e very act o f conceiving its - b e in g -d e ta c h e d - f ro m -a l l -o th e r -

elements belongs to the secondary level o f ra tional elaboration. A t th e p r im ary

level o f conception w hich is p r io r to all ra tional e laboration , “ qu idd ity” is

s im ply in tu iied in itself, there being on our p a r t no awareness even of its

being isolated from o ther elements.

N ow according to Láhiji, the expression “ all elem ents o ther th an

itself be ing rem oved therefrom ” m ust be understood exactly in this sense. I t


is in tended to be a descerption o f the state in w hich we find “ qu idd ity quá

itself” before our m ind proceeds to analyze its structure.

Thus, in the view o f Láhíji, the first sentence in the a b o v e -c i ted

passage from Tűsi’s Tajrid m ust be given an ar ticu la tion entirely different

from the usual one. T h e usual a r t ic u la t io n in accordance w ith w hich we

translated the passage earlie r 1̂ — connects the words “ all elements o ther

th an .. .” with the verb qad tűkhadh (“ m ay be view ed” ), so th a t the sentence

reads: Wa qad tűkhadh/al- máhiyah/mahdhűfan ían-há mű ‘adá-há. T h e a r t ic u la

tion which Láhiji proposes takes the words “ all elements o ther th a n . . .” as a n

adjectival phrase qualifying al-máhiyah, so th a t th e read ing will be: Wa qad

tukhadh/al-máhiyah mahdhufan ian-há má ‘adá-há/bi hayth lau indámmá..., which

will m ean : “ Q u idd ity in the state in which all elements o ther th a n itself are

rem oved therefrom (i.e. in the state o f “ q u á itself”) m ay be viewed in such

a way that if any elem ent...” . U n d e r this in terpre ta tion , T űsi is here referring

to the above - m entioned process of ra tional e labo ia tion in virtue o f which

“ qu iddity quá itself” comes to be viewed in such a s tate th a t w hatever is

associated with it must be regarded as an alien elem ent ad ded to it from

outside. T h e s tructure of “ qu idd ity” which is disclosed to the m in d through

such a ra tional process is no other than “ q u á negatively cond itioned” .

All this would seem to indicate th a t Láhíji does nő t recognize the

validity o f the conception peculair to S ystem -A in the understanding of

bi-shart Iá or “ q u á negatively conditioned” . F ó r bi-shart Iá as understood in

terms of S ys tem -A would, n his view, simply be “ quiddity q u á itself” . His

t re a tm e n t of the m atte r sliows a t the sam e tim e how he understands System-

B in relation to “ q u á negatively conditioned”. T h e la tter, according to his

understand ing , refers to the state in which the negative situation o f “ o ther

elements” vis - á - vis “ qu idd ity” has come intő a clear focus o f our conscious

ness after having been completely h idden an d invisible a t the stage of “ q u á

itself” .

23 T. IZUTSU

Láhiji points out th a t the source o f confusion fór the critics o f Tusi

hes in the fact th a t Tűsi uses the w ord mahdhufan íkbeing rem oved” in a way

w hich is really confusing. Bút in t ru th the “ rem oving” here does nő t m ean the

ra tiona l process oí rem oving all o ther elements from “ q u id d ity ” . I t means

exactly the same situation which Ibn Siná pointed to by the use o f a fa r less

confusing phrase : b i-dh áti-h á “ in itself” , i.e. “ qu idd ity q u á itself” .

Thus, Láhiji concludes, there is no contradiction between Tűsí and

Ib n Siná. N or is there any confusion ín the conception of Tűsi himself between

the so -ca l led two m eanings o f “ quá negatively conditioned” .

VI

W e have exam ined in the foregoing somé o f the representative views

on the n a tú ré a n d s tructure of “ quiddity q u á negatively conditioned” . In

spite o f a n exceeding im portance th a t has been a ttached to i t or, we

m igh t say, precisely because o f i t the problem does nő t seem to have

reached any final solution. H ow ever this m ay be, the distinction betw een the

two m eanings o f “ q u á negatively conditioned”, together with the m ore

generál d istinction between the two systems o f the i‘tibárát o f “ qu idd ity”,

have exercised an indelible influence on the developm ent o f Islamic ph ilo -

sophy in all its branches including the sem antic theory o f jurisprudence. Bút

to go fu rther in tő details a b o u t these m atters will take us too far beyond the

scope o f th e p resent paper.

Footnotes

1) Tajrid a U ‘tiqád (or Tajridal-‘Aqá’id) in Kashf al-Mur&d by al-H illi, Q um , undated, p. 60.

2) Aceording to the m ajority of the later philosophers, this stage is nő t to be established

as that of "qu idd ity quá itself ” , bút rather as a special klnd of "q u id d ity quá

non-conditioned” technically known as máhiyah Iá b ishart maqsamí. T he la tter is

"q u á non-conditioned” which stands side by side with, and opposed to, "q u á

negatively eondltioned” and " q u á positively conditioned” . Since. however, this

is nőt a point having a direct bearing upnn the problem we are concerned w ith

in this paper, I shall treat the i'tibár now a t issue as "q u id d ity quá qu idd ity” .

3) See Taftázáni: Shark al-Maqdsid', Istanbul, 1305 A .H ., p . 98.

4) Háshim al-H usayni, fór example, categorically States: "q u id d ity ” in this dimension

cannot be predieatcd of anything else, nor can anything else be predicated of it

(Tawdíh al-Murád, T ehran, 1381 A .H ,, p. 131). Bút this is evidcntly a mistake

(See al-K ázim i a l-K hurásan i’s rem ark on this point in his Taqrírát Muhammad

Husayn al-N á’int, vol. 1, T ehran, 1368 A .H ., p. 359. Alsó a l-K h ű ’i: Ajwad al-

Taqrirát f i al-Usúl, vol. 1, Qum , undated, p. 522.

5) See Ju rján i: Sharh al-M awáqif I I I , Cairo, 1907, pp. 26-28.

6) £A bd al-R azzáq al-L áh iji: Shawáriq al-llh&m, vol. 1, T ehran , 1860, p. 150.

7) Ibid., p. I 48.

8) Op. cit. pp . 101-102.

9) Sharh Tajrid al-Túsi, L ith ., T ehran , 1247 A .H ., pp. 84-85.

10) Dawwáni wrote an encyclopaedic survey of Islamic philosophy entitied Unmúdhaj al-

‘Ulúm ("A General Survey of All Sciences” ) against which D ashtaki wrote a book

of refutation called Hadd ‘alá Unmúdhaj a l-U lúm al-JTláliyah ("R cfu tation of Ja láh

al-D in’s General Survey of All Sciences” ). T he following exposition is based on

Láhíji (op. cit.) p . 149.

11) Thus understood, however, bishart Iá will simply be " m a tte r” (máddah) as wre have

defincd above. And this is w hat Dawwáni is going to point out.

25 T. IZUTSU

12) This argum ent is certainly weak because it is based on a confusion between " m atte r”

and “ genus” . In Avicennian metaphysics " m a tte r” is an external constituent, the

corresponding rational constituent being "g en u s” .

13) ‘A bd a l-R azzáq a l-L áh iji (d. 1640), disciple and son-in -law of M óllá Sadrá, the

au thor of the above-m entioned Shawáriq al—Ilhám which he wrote in the form of

a com m entary upon T űsi’s Tajrtd al—I ‘tiqád (or Tajrtdal - ‘Aqá’id) bút whieh is far

m ore than a com m entary. T he book itself remains to be studied.

14) A t the outset of Section I I .