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Wireless Sensor Systems:Security Implications for the
Industrial Environment
Dr. Peter L. FuhrChief Scientist
RAE Systems, Sunnyvale, CA
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RAE Systems Inc. Pervasive Sensing Company based in
Silicon Valley founded in 1991
Capabilities
Radiation detection
Gamma and neutron
Chemical/vapor detection
Toxic gas, VOC, combustible gas,oxygen, CWA, temperature,humidity, C02
Redeployable sensor networks Mobile and fixed wireless monitors
Cargo Container Sensor Systems
Dr. Peter Fuhr, Presenter: 480+ publications&presentations in wireless sensor
networking arena. Old-timer in this areaetc etc.
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ContributorsA number of individuals have provided content for these slides. Theyinclude:
Wayne Manges, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Robert Poor, EmberPat Gonia, HoneywellHesh Kagan, Foxboro/InvensysKang Lee, NISTTom Kevan, Advanstar
Ramesh Shankar, Electric Power Research InstituteLarry Hill, Larry Hill ConsultingRob Conant, DustRick Kriss, XsilogyGideon Varga, Dept of EnergyJack Eisenhauser, EnergeticsMichael Brambley, Pacific Northwest National LabsDavid Wagner, UC-Berkeley
Undoubtedly, there are other contributors too (apologies if
your name is not listed).
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Wireless Sensor Networkingits not cellular telephony
its not just WiFi...(and it just may be the next big thing)
Each dot represents one cell phone tower.
Wireless devices circa 1930
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Sensor Market: $11B in 2001
Installation (wiring) costs: >$100B
Freedonia Group report on Sensors, April 2002
Fragmented market platformopportunity
Installation cost limitspenetration reducinginstallation costincreases market size
Slide courtesy of Rob Conant, Dust
Highly Fragmented
Sensor Market
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Industrial Market SizingSensor Networking Products
North American Market for Wireless products used in
Applications where transmission distances are 1 mile or
less:
2002 Total: $107 million
2006 Forecast: $713 million
2010 Estimates: $ 2.1 billion
Largest Application areas: 2002: Tank Level Monitoring, Asset Tracking, Preventative
Maintenance
2006: Tank Level Monitoring, Preventative Maintenance,
Environmental Monitoring
Conclusions:
Rapid Growth in Industrial markets Tank Level Monitoring will remain a significant opportunity
Key User Needs: Lower Costs over Wired (or Manual) Solutions
Education of Potential Customers on the Technology
Demonstration of Operational Reliability & Application Domain
Knowledge
Slide courtesy of Rick Kriss, Xsilogy
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The True cost per monitored node to the
End User
3-YrTOC $$
$
Radio RF Range (dB)
Lower
Higher
InstallationCosts
Higher
Lower
DENSEBluetooth,
802.15.4, WiFi etc
SPARSE1xRTT, FLEX
SAT, etc
Meters Miles
$$$$$$
Design For Here
Slide courtesy of Rick Kriss, Xsilogy
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What to do with the data?
Great! But how do you get the output signal from the sensor to the location where theinformation will be interpreted (used)?
Sensor Modifier OutputTransducer
PowerSupply
Parameterof Interest
Measurement SystemOutput Signal
ChemicalElectricalMechanicalThermalRadiationOpticalMagnetic
ChemicalElectricalMechanicalThermalRadiationOpticalMagnetic
Traditionally the output of the sensor was hardwired to some form ofinterpretive device (e.g., PLC) perhaps relying on a 4-20mA signal
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Outline:
1. Security? Who needs it?2. How is security achieved in a wired channel?3. The Situation for Wireless (its RF in an industrial setting.Spectrum, modulation, encryption, spatial)
4. Security within various Wireless Delivery Schemes(cellular, WiFi, 802.15.4, Bluetooth, others)
5. An Integrated Solution6. The Big Review
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Oh, who needs security in a
wireless channel anyway!
(pretty ridiculous statement isnt it!
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Lets ask some experts:WINA meeting, Coral Gables, Sept. 2003
www.wireless4industrial.org
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Whats a WINA?
In the spring of 2003, the Wireless Industrial NetworkingAlliance (WINA) was formed to promote the adoption ofwireless networking technologies and practices that will help
increase industrial productivity and efficiency.
WINA will be holding a 1.5 day meeting at ISA-HQ in RTP, NC on Feb 11/12
right after the ISA Wireless Security Expo and conference. Check out
www.wireless4industrial.org for WINA meeting details AND
www.isa.org/wireless for the ISA Wireless Security conf details!
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Back to the Question:
Who needs security in a wirelesschannel anyway!
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Strategy Workshop Participants
Suppliers (13)
System integrators (6)
Industrial end users (10)
Chemicals
Petroleum
Automotive
Industry analysts/venture capitalists (3)
Others (associations, government, media, researchers)
Energy/Utilities
Forest Products
Electronics
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End-User View of Industrial WirelessLikes
Mobility
Compactness
Flexibility
Low cost
Capability to monitor rotating
equipment
Short range (security)
Ease of installation
High reliability
Impetus to enhanceelectronics support
Dislikes
Change to status quo
Complexity
High cost for coverage in largeplants
Security issues
Portability issues (power) Unproven reliability
Too risky for process control
Lack of experience introubleshooting (staff)
Restricted infrastructure flexibilityonce implemented
Lack of analysis tools
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Technology Group: Key Issues
Security
Jamming, hacking, and eavesdropping Power
Value (clear to customer)
Interoperability
Co-existence with other facility networks, sensors,collectors, technology
True engineered solution (sensors, collectors, etc.)
Assured performance & reliability/MTBA*
Software infrastructure, data, & systems management
Robustness (at least as good as wired)
RF characterization (radios, receivers, environments)
*mean time between attention
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Technology Group: Criticality Varies
by Application (5 = most critical)
Attributes Monitor Control Alarm Shutdown
Biz
WLAN
Latency 2-3 3-5 5 5 1
Device Reliability 2-3 3-5 5 5 1
Raw Thru-put
(node / aggr.)
2 / 5 2.5 /2.5 1 / 4 1 / 1 1/5
Scalability
(Max.# nodes)
5 4 4 1 2-3
Data Reliability 1 5 5 5 2
Security 1-5 5 5 5 5
Low Cost 5 2 1-3 1 2-3
Gateway Technology 5 1 3-4 1 1
Engineered Solution 1 5 4 5 3
Applications
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Industrial CyberSecurity
The Case of Vitek Boden
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On October 31, 2001 Vitek Boden was convicted of:
26 counts of willfully using a restricted computer tocause damage
1 count of causing serious environment harm
The facts of the case:
Vitek worked for the contractor involved in the
installation of Maroochy Shire sewage treatmentplant.
Vitek left the contractor in December 1999 andapproached the shire for employment. He wasrefused.
Between Jan 2000 and Apr 2000 the sewagesystem experienced 47 unexplainable faults,causing millions of liters of sewage to be spilled.
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How did he do it?
On April 23, 2000 Vitek was arrested withstolen radio equipment, controller
programming software on a laptop and a fullyoperational controller.
Vitek is now in jail
Disgruntled
Contractor
PLC PLC
Sewage Plant
Rogue Radio
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A Favorite 2.4 GHz Antenna
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WarDriving 802.11 HotSpots in
Silicon Valley
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WarDriving 802.11 HotSpots in
San Francisco
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The Question:Who needs security in a wireless channel
anyway!
The Answer:
We do. SoHow do you provide theappropriate level of security within theacceptable price and inconvenience margin-> Risk Management!
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Inside vs. Outside?
Where do attacks come from?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Foreign Gov. Foreign
Corp.
Hackers U.S.
Competitors
Disgruntled
Employees
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
*Source: 2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey Computer
Security Institute - www.gocsi.com/losses.
%
ofResponden
ts
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An Outside Example.
When? April 2001
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In the Spring of 2001, the US got its first a
taste of a new form of warfare.Launched from overseas and targeted atUS critical infrastructure.
Hacker War I
H k U i
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Chinese Hacker Group working to advance
and in some cases impose its political agendaDuring the spring of 2001, Honker Unionworked with other groups such as the ChineseRed Guest Network Security Technology
Alliance
Honker Union
Hackers were encouraged to "...make use oftheir skills for China..." Wired.com
Denial of Service Attacks
Website Defacement
E-mailing viruses to US Government Employees
KillUSA package
Attack Methods:
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Cyberwar Cyber attacks and web defacements
increased dramatically after the start of thewar against Iraq.
More than 1,000 sites were hacked in thefirst 48 hours of the conflict, with many ofthe attacks containing anti-war slogans.
Security consultants state that the waragainst Iraq made March the worst month fordigital attacks since records began in 1995.
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The Question:Who needs security in a wireless channel
anyway?
The Answer:
Everyone.
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Outline:
1. Security? Who needs it?2. How is security achieved in a wired channel?3. The Situation for Wireless (its RF in an industrial setting.Spectrum, modulation, encryption, spatial)
4. Security within various Wireless Delivery Schemes(cellular, WiFi, 802.15.4, Bluetooth, others)
5. An Integrated Solution6. The Big Review
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Wired Data Security - Encryption
The traditional method involved encrypting the data prior totransmission over a potentially insecure channel. The level ofprotection rests on the encryption algorithm. (There are a fewother factorssuch as the physical media.)
Slide courtesy of Wayne Manges, ORNL
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Outline:
1. Security? Who needs it?2. How is security achieved in a wired channel?3. The Situation for Wireless
4. Security within various Wireless Delivery Schemes(cellular, WiFi, 802.15.4, Bluetooth, others)5. An Integrated Solution6. The Big Review
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Wireless Buildings
Key to success: reduced installation costs
From many perspectives, THIS is what a wireless sensor network can provide.
Slide courtesy of Pat Gonia, Honeywell
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E(t) = A(t) cos[ t + (t)]Modulation
Amplitude Modulation (AM)
info is in A(t)
Frequency Modulation (FM)
info is in Phase Modulation (PM)
info is in (t)
P h a s e =0o
P h a s e =1 8 0o
P h a s e =2 7 0o
P h a s e =3 6 0o
( o r b a c k t o0o)
Different vendors use
different schemes - and they
are not interoperable.
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The FCC Frequency Assignment
Different vendors may use
different frequencies within
the various ISM bands
(green in the diagram).
The ISM bands most commonly used are at 433, 915 and 2400 MHz.
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Multiple Sensors Sharing the Medium:
Multiplexing. FDMA, TDMA and CDMA
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Binary Signaling Formats
Used to Improve Digital Signal
Reception and Decision
NRZ: Non-Return to Zero
RZ: Return to Zero
Unipolar: Only one side of 0V
Bipolar: Both sides of 0V Manchester: Bi-Phase (0 in
left 1/2 time slot, 1 in right)
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Narrowband or Spread Spectrum?Narrowband uses a fixed carrier frequency, F0.
The receiver then locks onto the carrier frequency, F0.
Easy to implement (inexpensive).Prone to jamming or interference (two transmitters at the samecarrier frequency, F0.
Least secure modulation scheme.
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N b d S d S t ( t ) ?
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Narrowband or Spread Spectrum (cont.) ?
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum uses a fixed carrier frequency, F0 but
interleaves the data with a precise mathematical 0/1 data sequence.(This increases the length of the transmitted information vectormaking it longer). The information is replicated many timesthroughout the bandwidth, so if one lobe of the information isjammed, the remainder gets through. Highly robust technique.
The receiver then locks onto the carrier frequency, F0 receives the signal and then must undo the interleaving.
More difficult to implement (more expensive).
Most complicated scheme (of these presented).
Most secure modulation scheme.
DIRECT SEQUENCE SPREAD SPECTRUM
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Data
PN Clock
Data
Data
Clock
Carrier
1
Local PN ClockLocal
Carrier
1
1
Frequency
PowerSpectralDensity
fc Frequency
PowerSpectralDensity
fc Frequency
PowerSpectralDensity
fc
DIRECT-SEQUENCE SPREAD-SPECTRUMSIGNALS
Narrow spectrum atoutput of modulatorbefore spreading
Spectrum has wider bandwidthand lower power density afterspreading with PN sequence
(PN Rate >> Data Rate)
Original narrowband, highpower density spectrum isrestored if local PN sequence issame as and lined up withreceived PN sequence
RFISpread
RFI
Phase
Demod
Narrow
BP Filter
Wide
BP Filter
PN Sequence
Generator
PN Sequence
Generator
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Narrowband or Spread Spectrum (cont.) ?
Which is best?
Each has its pluses and minusesand each scheme has its share of die-hardadvocates and/or naysayers!
From a security standpoint, DSSS is best.
Different vendors use these
(and other) schemes at
different frequencies within
the various ISM bands.
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Reality
DSSS FHSS
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No Matter WhatIts Just an
Electromagnetic Field
A(t): amplitude of the wave
: radian frequency of the wave
(t): phase of the wave
E(t) = A(t) cos[ t + (t)]
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There are SO many technical questions: such as
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Network Topologies?
Bus Network
Tree Network
Star Network
Ring Network
Ad Hoc Network
There are SO many technical questions: such as
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The Real World Presents theWireless Channel with Multipath and
Attenuationand
M lti thReal World:
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Multipath
The Cause
The Effect
Real World:
Real World:
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Atmospheric Attenuation at 2.4 GHzReal World:
Rayleigh Fading @ 2.4GHz
Real World:
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Signal Attenuation at 2.4 GHzReal World:
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Wireless networks use a variety of techniques to enhance security,
such as spreading and interleaving. These techniques can make thesignal virtually undetectable without prior knowledge about the
network. This can improve the security of the network by orders
of magnitude.
Wireless Data Security: Encryption, Spreading, Interleaving
Slide courtesy of Wayne Manges, ORNL
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The Wireless Market
SHORT
LONG
LOW < DATA RATE > HIGH
PAN
LAN
TEXT GRAPHICS INTERNET HI-FIAUDIO
STREAMINGVIDEO
DIGITALVIDEO
MULTI-CHANNELVIDEO
Bluetooth1
Bluetooth 2
ZigBee
802.11b
802.11a/HL2 & 802.11g
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Bluetooth vs. the Rest (contd)
802.112.4 GHz, DSSS11 chips/bit11Mbps+20 dBm
50m128 devicesCSMA/CAOptional WEPOptional
HomeRF2.4GHz, FHSS50 hops/s1 Mbps+20 dBm
50m128 devicesCSMA/CAOptionalOptional
Bluetooth2.4 GHz, FHSS1000+hops/s1Mbps0, +20dBm
1-10m, 50m8 devices,PiconetEncryption
Yes
ParameterTechnology
Data RatePower
RangeTopology
SecurityVoice Channel
ZigBee(proposed)2.4 GHz,DSSS15 chips/bit40 kbits/s
0dBm100m100s devices,CSMA/CANot yetNo
Bluetooth aka IEEE 802.15.1
ZigBee aka IEEE 802.15.4
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Side by Side
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802.11?
The Worldwide View of the 802.11 Spectral
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The Worldwide pSpace
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Radiated Field from a single AP(Kansas City)
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20dB Attenuation Profile for Univ of Kansas
Eng Bldg., Mesh and AP deployments
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WEP
The industrys solution: WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)
Share a single cryptographic key among all devices
Encrypt all packets sent over the air, using the shared key Use a checksum to prevent injection of spoofed packets
(encrypted traffic)
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Early History of WEP
802.11 WEP standard released1997
Simon, Aboba, Moore: some weaknessesMar 2000
Walker: Unsafe at any key sizeOct 2000
Borisov, Goldberg, Wagner:
7 serious attacks on WEP
Jan 30, 2001
NY Times, WSJ break the storyFeb 5, 2001
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Subsequent Events
Jan 2001
Borisov, Goldberg, Wagner
Arbaugh: Your 802.11 networkhas no clothes
Mar 2001
Arbaugh, Mishra: still more attacks
Feb 2002
Arbaugh: more attacks May 2001
Newsham: dictionary attacks on WEP keysJun 2001
Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir: efficient attack on way WEP uses RC4Aug 2001
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WEP Attack Tools
Downloadable procedures from the Internet
To crack the Key:
AirSnort
http://airsnort.sourceforge.net
WEPCrack
http://sourceforge.net/projects/wepcrack/
To brute force enter into WLAN,
THC-RUT
http://www.thehackerschoice.com/releases.php
( )
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Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
Flaws in WEP known since January 2001 - flaws include weak encryption,
(keys no longer than 40 bits), static encryption keys, lack of key distributionmethod.
IEEE developing 802.11i standard for enhanced wireless security - Addressesweak data encryption and user authentication within existing 802.11 standard.
802.11i standard will not be ratified until late 2003, possibly early 2004 -outstanding issues.
WPA standard joint effort between Wi-Fi Alliance and IEEE - WPA a subset ofIEEE 802.11i standard (Draft 3.0).
WPA provides stronger data encryption (weak in WEP) and userauthentication (largely missing in WEP).
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WPA Data Encryption WPA uses Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) - stronger data encryption, addresses known
vulnerabilities in WEP.
TKIP chosen as primary encryption cipher suite - Easily deployed and
supported in legacy 802.11b hardware compared to other available cipher suites.
TKIP based on RC4 stream cipher algorithm, surrounds WEP cipher engine with 4 newalgorithms,
1. Extended 48-bit Initialization Vector (IV) and IV sequencing rules (compared to the shorter 24-bit WEP RC4 key).
2. New per-packet key mixing function.
3. Derivation and distribution method - a.k.a. re-keying.
4. A message integrity check (MIC) - a.k.a. Michael, ensures messages havent been tampered with during transmission.
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WPA Data Encryption, contd the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol.
DA Destination Address TKIP Temporal Key Integrity ProtocolICV Integrity Check Value TSC TKIP Sequence CounterMPDU Message Protocol Data Unit TTAK result of phase 1 key mixing of Temporal KeyMSDU MAC Service Data Unit and Transmitter AddressRSN Robust Security Network WEP Wired Equivalent PrivacySA Source Address WEP IV Wired Equivalent Privacy Initialization VectorTA Transmitter Address
MIC Key
TSC
SA + DA +Plaintext MSDU
Data
CiphertextMPDU(s)
WEPEncapsulation
MIC
TTAK Key
Plaintex tMSDU +
MIC Fragment(s)
Phase 2
key mixing
PlaintextMPDU(s)
WEP seed(s)(represented asWEP IV + RC4
key)
Phase 1key mixing
TA
Temporal Key
WPA D t E ti td
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WPA Data Encryption, contd
TKIP implements countermeasures - reduces rate which attacker can makemessage forgery attempts down to two packets every 60 seconds.
After 60 second timeout new PMK or Groupwise Key generated, depending onwhich attacked ensures attacker cannot obtain information from attacked key.
Countermeasures bound probability of successful forgery and amount ofinformation attacker can learn about a key.
TKIP is made available as firmware or software upgrade to existing legacyhardware.
TKIP eliminates having to replace existing hardware or having to purchase
new hardware.
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Bluetooth?
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BlueTooth- Some Specifications
Uses unlicensed 2.402 - 2.480 GHz frequency range
Frequency hopping spread spectrum 79 hopsseparated by 1 MHz
Maximum frequency hopping rate: 1600 hops/sec
Nominal range: 10 cm to 10 meters
Nominal antenna power: 0 dBm
One complete Bluetooth data packet can betransmitted within each 625 msec hop slot.
Potential Bluetooth Markets
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Potential Bluetooth Markets
Bluetooth Market Forecast
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Nov03: 100M Bluetooth compliant devices worldwide
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Bluetooth Security
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Bluetooth Security
Supports Unidirectional or Mutual Encryption based
on a Secret Link key Shared Between Two Devices Security Defined In 3 modes:
Mode1- No Security
Mode 2 - Service Level Security: Not Established
Before Channel is Established at L2CAP Mode 3 - Link Level Security: Device Initiates
Security Before LMP Link is Setup
Devices and Services can be Set for Different Levels of Security
Two Trust Levels are Set for Devices Trusted Device: Fixed Relationship and Unrestricted
Access to All Services
Untrusted: No Permanent relationship and RestrictedServices
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Bluetooth Security
Devices and Services can be Set for Different Levelsof Security
Two Trust Levels are Set for Devices
Trusted Device: Fixed Relationship andUnrestricted Access to All Services
Untrusted: No Permanent relationship andRestricted Services
Bluetooth Security
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Bluetooth Security 3 Levels of Service Access
Require Authorization and Authenication Require Authentication Only
Default Security for Legacy Applications
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But is this Wireless Link Secure?
Newsflash: Jan 2001: Norwegian hackers
crack a Bluetooth transmission
Newsflash: Jan 2001: Norwegian hackers
crack a Bluetooth transmission
Analysis of a BlueTooth Transmission
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y
High overhead?
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IEEE 802.15.4 standard
Includes layers up to and including Link Layer Control
LLC is standardized in 802.1
Supports multiple network topologies including Star, Cluster Tree and
Mesh
IEEE 802.15.4 MAC
IEEE 802.15.4 LLC IEEE 802.2LLC, Type I
IEEE 802.15.4
2400 MHz PHY
IEEE 802.15.4
868/915 MHz PHY
Data Link Controller (DLC)
Networking App Layer (NWK)
ZigBee Application Framework
Features of the MAC:Association/dissociation, ACK,frame delivery, channel accessmechanism, frame validation,guaranteed time slot management,beacon management, channel scan
Low complexity: 26 primitivesversus 131 primitives for802.15.1 (Bluetooth)
PHY overview
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PHY overview Speed
20, 40 or 250 kbps
Channels 1 channel in the 868MHz band
10 channels in the 915MHz band
16 channels in the 2.4GHz band
Modulation
BPSK (868MHz/20kbs) BPSK (915MHz/40kbps)
O-QPSK (2.4GHz/250kbps)
Coexistence w/
802.11b DSSS
802.15.1 FHSS
802.15.3 DSSS
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MAC overview
Security support Power consumption
consideration
Dynamic channel selection
Network topology
Star topology
p2p topology
cluster-tree networktopology
Device classification
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Device classification Full Function Device (FFD)
Any topology
Can talk to RFDs or other FFDs Operate in three modes
PAN coordinator
Coordinator
Device.
Reduced Function Device (RFD) Limited to star topology
Can only talk to an FFD(coordinator)
Cannot become a coordinator
Unnecessary to send largeamounts of data
Extremely simple
Can be implemented usingminimal resources and memorycapacity
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Transmission management Acknowledgement
No ACK
ACK
RetransmissionDuplicate detection
Indirect transmission
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Security
Unsecured mode
ACL mode
Access control
Secured modeAccess control
Data encryption
Frame integrity
Sequential freshness
S l bl S it
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Scalable Security
Assume the attacker can deploy own nodes (can create aring at some distance from controller)[Wisenet 2003]
Enemy nodes mimick the mesh nodes; they ACK thehealth inquiry as if everything was OK but they donot forward to the rest of the net
The rest of the network is virtually cut off frominspection by controller
Need secure key and a random seed that changes at each
round
Wh t Ab t
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What About:
1451.5?1xRTT?
SAT?CDPD?
Others?
No time this morning!
Outline:
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Outline:
1. Security? Who needs it?2. How is security achieved in a wired channel?3. The Situation for Wireless (its RF in an industrial setting.Spectrum, modulation, encryption, spatial)
4. Security within various Wireless Delivery Schemes(cellular, WiFi, 802.15.4, Bluetooth, others)5. An Integrated Solution
6. The Big Review
I t t d I d t i l N t k ?
There are SO many technical questions: such as
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Integrated Industrial Networks?
If the sensor network is to integrate into an industrial setting, then you
should be cognizant of the Industrial Networking arena.
Industrial Device Network Topology
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Typically, three layers of networking make up enterprisewide networks. Ethernet
acts as the company's intranet backbone, and it's linked to controllers orindustrial PCs, which supply strategic data to the enterprise.An industrialnetwork, or fieldbus, links sensors and smart devices.A gateway (not uncommonin a large system with lots of devices) links devices that have only RS-232 or RS-485 ports to the fieldbus system.
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Cl ifi i f I d i l
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Classification of Industrial
Networks
Three logical groupings of instrumentation networks used in an
industrial setting.
There are over 100 different proprietary networks in thefield.
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Inside Security Incident
Employee attacks PLC in another plant area
over PLC highway.
Password changed to obscenity, blockinglegitimate maintenance and forcing process
shutdown.
* Source: BCIT Industrial Security Incident Database (ISID)
Disgruntled
Employee
PLC PLC PLCPLC
Steam Plant Paper Plant
Plant Highway
Network Positioning
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-
Functio
nality
+
Ethernet TCP/IP
- Cost +
+
Co
mplexity
-
- Data +
DeviceNet
Other CAN
SDS
Fieldbus H1
Profibus-PA
Modbus
HART
Profibus-DP
Interbus-SRemote I/O
Profibus-FMS
Data Highway+Modbus Plus
ASi, Seriplex,
Hardwiring, RS485 etc.
ControlNet
Foundation Fieldbus H2
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Too Focused on Internet Issues?
Myth #1: Our SCADA/PLC/DCS is safe if
we dont connect to the Internet.
Myth #2: Our Internet firewall will protectour control systems.
Myth #3: Our IT department understands
process control issues and security.
Is Industrial Comm Security Too
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Focused on Internet Issues?
Field Devices
Control
Network
SCAD
AProgramming Stations
PLCPLC
Remote
Engineering
Production
Planning
Manufacturing Logistics
Enterprise
Resource Planning
Process
Historian
Enterprise Network
Internet
Firewall
Ethernet
Production Networks
)))))
Handheld
Operator
Terminal
Modem
OEM
802.11
WLAN
Source (used by permission): Interface Technologies, Windsor,CT, 2002
WarDialing
Attack
Outline:
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Outline:
1. Security? Who needs it?2. How is security achieved in a wired channel?3. The Situation for Wireless (its RF in an industrial setting.Spectrum, modulation, encryption, spatial)
4. Security within various Wireless Delivery Schemes(cellular, WiFi, 802.15.4, Bluetooth, others)5. An Integrated Solution6. The Big Review
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Coding vs. Quality of Service
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g y
Is Coding
Really
Necessary?
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
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Comparing Wireless
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Comparing Wireless
Tech. Range RF Power Battery
life
Numbers
In Area
DSSS Medium Low longest High
FHSS Long High Short Medium
UWB Medium Lowest short High
Narrow
band
Longest highest short Lowest
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Statistics on Types of Attacks
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0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Theft of Propriety Info
Sabotage
TelecomEvesdropping
SystemPenetration
Insider Abuse of Net Access
Finacial Fraud
Virus
Unauthorized Insider Access
TelecomFraud
Active Wiretap
Laptop Theft
Denial of Service
1997
1998
1999
2000
20012002
*Source: 2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey ComputerSecurity Institute - www.gocsi.com/losses.
% of Respondents
Optimization of Security vs Cost
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Optimization of Security vs. Cost Risk reduction is balanced against the cost of
security counter measures to mitigate the risk.
Security Level
Cost ($)
Cost of Security
Countermeasures
Cost of Security
Breaches
Optimal Level of Security
at Minimum Cost
Risk in Safety vs. Risk in Security
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y y
Safety Definition: Risk is a measure of humaninjury, environmental damage, or economic lossin terms of both the incident likelihood and themagnitude of the loss or injury.
Security Definition: Risk is an expression of thelikelihood that a defined threat will exploit aspecific vulnerability of a particular attractivetarget or combination of targets to cause a given
set of consequences.
*Source: CSPP Guidelines For Analyzing And Managing The SecurityVulnerabilities Of Fixed Chemical Sites
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Firewall Architectures
The external router blocks attempts to use theunderlying IP layer to break security (e.g. IPspoofing, source routing, packet fragments, etc) and
forces all traffic to the proxy. The proxy firewall handles potential security holes in
the higher layer protocols.
The internal router blocks all traffic except to the
proxy server. InternalRouter
Internet
External
Router
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Theres lot of Wireless
From cellphones to PDAs to WiFi to
Satellite-based
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Wireless LAN Standards
Existing/Developing
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Existing/Developing
IEEE 802.11 Standards 802.11- 802.11a 802.11b 802.11e 802.11f 802.11g 802.11h 802.11i
802.1x 802.15 802.16
Frequency Hopping/DSSS
54Mbps / HyperLAN
(1999) 11Mbps
Quality of Service
Point 2 Point Roaming
(2003) 54Mbps
European Inspired Changes
(Q2,2004) New Encryption Protocols
(Q2,2004) Port Based Network AccessPersonal Area Network (WPAN)
Wireless Metropolitan Area Network (WMAN)
Wireless Backbone for Inflight Entertainment
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PicoCellBTS
PicoCellBTS
NoiseFloorLifter
6 MCUGSM SERVER
On-Board Network Integration
SDU
and we havent even touched on RFID!
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Theres lot of Wireless
And it all needs to feel more Secure!
For a real review of networking
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For a real review of networking
security Take Eric Byrnes ISA course IC32C
Will History Repeat?
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Will History Repeat?
analog cellphones: AMPS1980
1990
2000
analog cloning, scannersfraud pervasive & costly
digital: TDMA, GSM
TDMA eavesdropping [Bar]
more TDMA flaws [WSK]
GSM cloneable [BGW]GSM eavesdropping
[BSW,BGW]
Future: 3rd gen.: 3GPP,
Cellular networks
802.11, WEP
2001
2002
WEP broken [BGW]WEP badly broken [FMS]
WPA
2000
1999
Future: 802.11i
2003
attacks pervasive
wireless networks
Proprietary systems
2002
1451, 802.15.4, Tiny
Future: ???
2003
sensor networks
wireless security: not just 802.11
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SoIf Nothing else, at leastS f
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PLEASE do this for your WiFi
System!
WLAN Security Countermeasures Conduct site survey
Identify areas of signal strength and weakness
Do a walkaround with NetStumbler
Document and shut down rogue access points
Document and shut down unauthorized wireless NICs
AND TURN ON SOME LEVEL OF THE PROVIDEDPROTECTION!
Oh
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And dont forget that as you layer in all ofthese wacky encryption schemes and
CDMA and DSSS andand that it takes
some joules to actually implement this. Soif your wireless network has primepower
(a.k.a. AC) youre ok. But if youre going
off a battery then its a tradeoff of security
versus Power Consumption YouChoose that one!
...and in the end...
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...or...
Two potential forms of wireless sensor networks.
And they should both be secure!
HoneyBee with RFID
BumbleBee with RF xcvr
Outline:
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1. Security? Who needs it?
2. How is security achieved in a wired channel?3. The Situation for Wireless (its RF in an industrial setting.Spectrum, modulation, encryption, spatial)
4. Security within various Wireless Delivery Schemes
(cellular, WiFi, 802.15.4, Bluetooth, others)5. An Integrated Solution6. The Big Review7. Glossary and References
Glossary10BASE-T: IEEE 802.3 standard for a twisted-pair Ethernet network. 10 Mbps transmission rate over baseband using unshielded, twisted-
pair cable
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pair cable.
802.11: The IEEE 802.11 standard defines both frequency hopping and direct sequence spread spectrum solutions for use in the 2.4-2.5 MHz
ISM (Industrial, Scientific, Medical) band.
802.11a: The Global System for Mobile Communications standard for worldwide wireless communications on wide area networks (WANs).
802.11b: The portion of the 802.11 specification that defines the 11 Mbps data rate.
A
Access Point: Provides a bridge between Ethernet wired LANs and the wireless network. Access points are the connectivity point between
Ethernet wired networks and devices (laptops, hand-held computers, point-of-sale terminals) equipped with a wireless LAN adapter card.
Analog phone: Comes from the word "analogous," which means similar to. In telephone transmission, the signal being transmitted from the
phonevoice, video or imageis analogous to the original signal.
Antenna-Directional: Transmits and receives radio waves off the front of the antenna. The power behind and to the sides of the antenna is
reduced. The coverage area is oval with the antenna at one of the narrow ends. Typical directional antenna beam width angles are from 90
(somewhat directional) to as little as 20(very directional). A directional antenna directs power to concentrate the coverage pattern in a
particular direction. The antenna direction is specified by the angle of the coverage pattern called the beam width.
Antenna-Omni-directional: Transmits and receives radio waves in all directions. The coverage area is circular with the antenna at the center.Omni-directional antennas are also referred to as whip or low-profile antennas.
Association: The process of determining the viability of the wireless connection and establishing a wireless network's root and designated
access points. A mobile unit associates with its wireless network as soon as it is powered on or moves into range.
ATM: Asynchronous Transfer Mode. A type of high-speed wide area network.
GlossaryB
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Backbone: A network that interconnects other networks, employing high-speed transmission paths and often spanning a large geographic
area.
Bandwidth: The range of frequencies, expressed in hertz (Hz), that can pass over a given transmission channel. The bandwidth determines the
rate at which information can be transmitted through the circuit.
Bandwidth Management: Functionality that allocates and manages RF traffic by preventing unwanted frames from being processed by the
access point.
BC/MC: Broadcast frames; Multicast frames
Beacon: A uniframe system packet broadcast by the AP to keep the network synchronized. A beacon Includes the Net_ID (ESSID), the AP
address, the Broadcast destination addresses, a time stamp, a DTIM (Delivery Traffic Indicator Maps) and the TIM (Traffic IndicatorMessage).
BFA Antenna Connector: Miniature coaxial antenna connector manufactured by MuRata Manufacturing Corporation.
Bluetooth: See Wireless Personal Area Networks.
Bridge: A device that connects two LANs of the same or dissimilar types. It operates at the Data Link Layer, as opposed to routers. Thebridge provides fast connection of two collocated LAN segments that appear as one logical network through the bridge.
Buffer: A segment of computer memory used to hold data while it is being processed.
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GlossaryH.323: An umbrella standard from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) that addresses call control, multimedia management, and bandwidth management
for point-to-point and multi-point conferences, as well as interfaces between LANs and other networks. The most popular standard currently in use.
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Handheld PC (HPC): The term adopted by Microsoft and its supporters to describe handheld computers employing Microsoft's Windows CE operating system.
Interactive Voice Response: System used to access a database access application using a telephone. The voice processing acts as a front-end to appropriate databases that
reside on general purpose computers. For instance, DTMF (touch tone) input of a Personal Identification Number can be required for access or more unusual and
expensive techniques such as voice recognition and voice print matching.
Internet: World's largest network, often referred to as the Information Superhighway. The Internet is a virtual network based on packet switching technology. The
participants on the Internet and its topology change on a daily basis.
Internet Commerce: Electronic business transactions that occur over the Internet. Samples of Internet commerce applications include electronic banking, airline
reservation systems, and Internet malls.
Internet Phone: Device used to transmit voice over the Internet, bypassing the traditional PSTN and saving money in the process. An Internet phone can be a small phone
(such as the NetVision Phone) or a multimedia PC with a microphone, speaker, and modem.
Interoperability: The ability of equipment or software to operate properly in a mixed environment of hardware and software, from different vendors. Enabled by the
IEEE 802.11 open standard.
IP (Internet Protocol): The Internet standard protocol that defines the Internet datagram as the unit of information passed across the Internet. Provides the basis of the
Internet connection-less- best-effort packet delivery service. The Internet protocol suite is often referred to as TCP/IP because IP is one of the two fundamental protocols.
International Roaming: Ability to use one adapter worldwide.
Intranet: A private network that uses Internet software and Internet standards. In essence, an intranet is a private Internet reserved for use by people who have been given
the authority and passwords necessary to use that network.
ISDN: Integrated Services Digital Network. Emerging network technology offered by local phone companies that is designed for digital communications, computer
telephony, and voice processing systems.
ISM Band: ISM bands--instrumental (902-928MHz), science (2.4-2.4835GHz), and medical (5.725-5.850GHz)--are the radio frequency bands allocated by the FCC for
unlicensed continuous operations for up to 1W. The most recent band approved by the FCC for WLANs was the medical band in January 1997.
ITU: International Telecommunications Union. Standards body that defined H.323 and other international standards.
Jitter: Noise on a communications line which is based on phase hits, causing potential phase distortions and bit errors..
GlossaryKerberos: A widely deployed security protocol that was developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to authenticate users and clients in a wired
network environment and to securely distribute encryption keys.
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Key Telephone System: A system in which the telephone has multiple buttons permitting the user to directly select central office phone lines and intercom lines. Key
phone systems are most often found in relatively small business environments, typically around 50 telephones.
Layer: A protocol that interacts with other protocols as part of an overall transmission system.
LPD (Line Printer Daemon): A TCP-based protocol typically used between a Unix server and a printer driver. Data is received from the network connection and sent out
over the serial port.
MAC (Media Access Control): Part of the Data Link Layer, as defined by the IEEE, this sublayer contains protocols for gaining orderly access to cable or wireless
media.
MD5 Encryption: An authentication methodology when MU is in foreign subnet.
MIB (Management Information Base): An SNMP structure that describes the specific device being monitored by the remote-monitoring program.
Microcell: A bounded physical space in which a number of wireless devices can communicate. Because it is possible to have overlapping cells as well as isolated cells,
the boundaries of the cell are established by some rule or convention.
Modem: Equipment that converts digital signals to analog signals and vice versa. Modems are used to send digital data signals over the analog PSTN.
MMCX Antenna Connector: Miniature coaxial antenna connector in use by several major wireless vendors.
Mobile IP: The ability of the mobile unit to communicate with the other host using only its home IP address, after changing its point of attachment to the Internet andintranet.
Mobile Unit (MU): May be a Symbol Spectrum24 terminal, PC Card and PCI adapter, bar-code scanner, third-party device, and other
Mobile Unit Mode: In this mode, the WLAN adapter connects to an access point (AP) or another WLAN installed system, allowing the device to roam freely between AP
cells in the network. Mobile units appear as network nodes to other devices.
Modulation: Any of several techniques for combining user information with a transmitter's carrier signal.
Multipath: The signal variation caused when radio signals take multiple paths from transmitter to receiver.
Multipath Fading: A type of fading caused by signals taking different paths from the transmitter to the receiver and, consequently, interfering with each other.
GlossaryNode: A network junction such as a switch or a routing center.Packet Switching: Refers to sending data in packets through a network to some remote location. In a packet switched network, no circuit is left open on a dedicated basis.
Packet switching is a data switching technique only.
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PBX Phone System: Private Branch eXchange. Small version of the phone company's larger central switching office. An alternative to a PBX is to subscribe to a local
telephone company's Centrex service.
PCMCIA (Personal Computer Memory Card International Association) PC Card: A credit card-size device used in laptop computers and available as removable network
adapters.
PCS (Personal Communications Service): A new, lower powered, higher-frequency competitive technology to cellular. Whereas cellular typically operates in the 800-
900 MHz range, PCS operates in the 1.5 to 1.8 GHz range. The idea with PCS is that the phone are cheaper, have less range, and are digital. The cells are smaller and
closer together, and airtime is cheaper.
Peer-to-peer Network: A network design in which each computer shares and uses devices on an equal basis.
Ping: A troubleshooting TCP/IP application that sends out a test message to a network device to measure the response time.
PLD (Data Link Protocol): A raw packet protocol based on the Ethernet frame format. All frames are sent to the wireless network verbatim--should be used with care asimproperly formatted data can go through with undesirable consequences.
Plug and Play: A feature that allows a computer to recognize the PCI adapter and configure the hardware interrupt, memory, and device recognition addresses; requires
less user interaction and minimizes hardware conflicts.
Pocket PC: The term adopted by Microsoft and its supporters to describe handheld computers employing Microsoft's Pocket PC operating system.
Point-of-Sale Device: A special type of equipment that is used to collect and store retail sales data. This device may be connected to a bar code reader and it may query a
central computer for the current price of that item.
POTS (Plain Old Telephone Service): The basic service supplying standard single line telephones, telephone lines, and access to the public switched telephone network.
Power Management: Algorithms that allow the adapter to sleep between checking for network activity, thus conserving power.
PSP (Power Save Polling): stations power off their radios for long periods. When a mobile unit in PSP mode associates with an access point, it notifies the AP of its
activity status. The AP responds by buffering packets received for the MU.
PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network): Refers to the worldwide voice telephone network accessible to all those with telephones and access privileges. In the U.S.,
the PSTN is provided by AT&T.
GlossaryQoS (Quality of Service): Measure of the telephone service quality provided to a subscriber. QoS refers to things like: Is the call easy to hear? Is it clear? Is it loud
enough?
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RBOC (Regional Bell Operating Company): One of the seven Bell operating companies set up after the divestiture of AT&T, each of which own two or more Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs).
Roaming: Movement of a wireless node between two microcells. Roaming usually occurs in infrastructure networks built around multiple access points.
Repeater: A device used to extend cabling distances by regenerating signals.
Router: The main device in any modern network that routes data blocks from source to destination using routing tables and determining the best path dynamically. It
functions as an addressable entity on the LAN and is the basic building block of the Internet.
SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol): The network management protocol of choice for TCP/IP based intranets. Defines the method for obtaining information
about network operating characteristics, change parameters for routers and gateways.
Scanning: A periodic process where the mobile unit sends out probe messages on all frequencies defined by the country code. The statistics enable a mobile unit to re-
associate by synchronizing its frequency to the AP. The MU continues communicating with that access point until it needs to switch cells or roam.
Site Survey: Physical environment survey to determine the placement of access points and antennas, as well as the number of devices necessary to provide optimal
coverage, in a new or expanding installation.
Spread Spectrum: A transmission technique developed by the U.S. military in World War II to provide secure voice communications, spread spectrum is the most
commonly used WLAN technology today. It provides security by "spreading" the signal over a range of frequencies. The signal is manipulated in the transmitter so that
the bandwidth becomes wider than the actual information bandwidth. De-spreading the signal is impossible for those not aware of the spreading parameters; to them, the
signal sounds like background noise. Interference from narrowband signals is also minimized to background noise when it is de-spread by the receiver. Two types of
spread spectrum exist: direct sequence and frequency hopping.
Stream Mode: A communications protocol supported only by the Telnet and TCP protocols. Stream mode transfers serial characters as they are received by encapsulating
them in a packet and sending them to the host.
Glossary
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T1: A type of dedicated digital leased-line available from a public telephone provider with a capacity of 1.544 Mbps. A T1 line can normally handle 24 voice
conversations, each one digitized at 64 Kbps. With more advanced digital voice encoding techniques, it can handle more voice channels. T1 is the standard for digital
transmission in the U.S. Canada, Hong Kong, and Japan.
TCP/IP: Networking protocol that provides communication across interconnected networks, between computers with diverse hardware architectures, and variousoperating systems. TCP/IP is used in the industry to refer to the family of common Internet protocols.
TCP (Transport Communication Protocol): Controls the transfer of data from one client to one host, providing the mechanism for connection maintenance, flow control,
retries, and time-outs.
Telnet (Terminal Emulation Protocol): A protocol that uses the TCP/IP networking protocol as a reliable transport mechanism. Considered extremely stable.
Terminal: An endpoint, which provides for real-time, two-way communications with another terminal, gateway, or mobile unit.
Token Ring: A ring type of local area network (LAN) in which a supervisory frame, or token, must be received by an attached terminal or workstation before that
terminal or workstation can start transmitting. Token ring is the technique used by IBM and others.
UDP (User Datagram Protocol): UDP/IP is a connection-less protocol that describes how messages reach application programs running in the destination machine;
provides low overhead and fast response and is well suited for high-bandwidth applications.
Video Conferencing: Video and audio communication between two or more people via a video CODEC (coder/decoder) at either end and linked by digital circuits.
Voice Mail System: Device or system that records, stores, and retrieves voice messages. The two types of voice mail devices are those which are "stand alone" and those
which offer some integration with the user's phone system.
Wi-Fi: A logo granted as the "seal of interoperability" by the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA). Only select wireless networking products possess thischaracteristic of IEEE802.11b.
Wireless AP Support: Access Point functions as a bridge to connect two Ethernet LANs.
Glossary
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Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN): A wireless LAN is a data communications system providing wireless peer-to-peer (PC-to-PC, PC-to-hub, or printer-to-hub) and
point-to-point (LAN-to-LAN) connectivity within a building or campus. In place of TP or coaxial wires or optical fiber as used in a conventional LAN, WLANs transmit
and receive data over electromagnetic waves. WLANs perform traditional network communications functions such as file transfer, peripheral sharing, e-mail, and
database access as well as augmenting wired LANs. WLANs must include NICs (adapters) and access points (in-building bridges), and for campus communications
building-to-building (LAN-LAN) bridges.
Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN): Personal area networks are based on a global specification called Bluetooth which uses radio frequency to transmit voice and
data. Over a short range, this cable-replacement technology wirelessly and transparently synchronizes data across devices and creates access to networks and the Internet.
Bluetooth is ideal for mobile professionals who need to link notebook computers, mobile phones, PDAs, PIMs, and other hand-held devices to do business at home, onthe road, and in the office.
Wireless Wide Area Network (WWAN): Wide area networks utilize digital mobile phone systems to access data and information from any location in the range of a cell
tower connected to a data-enabled network. Using the mobile phone as a modem, a mobile computing device such as a notebook computer, PDA, or a device with a
stand-alone radio card, can receive and send information from a network, your corporate intranet, or the Internet.
A Few References
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e J.,"Fieldbuses for Process Control: Engineering, Operation, Maintenance". ISA Press 2002, ISBN 1-55617-760-U., "Physical Level Interfaces and Protocols". IEEE, ISBN 0-8186-8824-6.U., "The V-series recommendations". McGraw-Hill, ISBN 0-07-005592-0.
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